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Yuliya Biletska,
Ph.D. in Political Science, Assistant Professor,
Department of Internatinal Relations,
Karabuk University,
Turkey, Karabuk
“POLITICS OF MEMORY” IN THE PROCESS OF SHAPING
ETHNIC IDENTITY OF CRIMEAN TATARS, RUSSIANS
AND UKRAINIANS IN CRIMEA
Introduction
Being a part of Ukraine, Crimea has its ethnic peculiarities determined by
the domination of ethnic Russians (58,5%), the presence of Russian-
speaking Ukrainians (24,4%), and the Crimean Tatar community (12,1%)
that was deported in 1944 and repatriated in the late 1980's and early
1990’s.
Each of the mentioned ethnic groups claims Crimea as their own
homeland. These claims are accompanied by the implementation of politics
of memory that includes cultivating of historical myths and their
incorporation into the political landscape of Crimea.
The aim of the paper is to define how politics of memory relates to the
ethnic identity and territorial claims of each ethnic group in Crimea. In
other words, paper seeks to define historical myths that underline ethnic
identity and territorial claims of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in
Crimea and the ways these myths have been incorporated in the political
landscape of Crimea.
46
Historical Memory and Historical Myths of Russians, Ukrainians and
Crimean Tatars in Crimea
The theoretical framework of the research paper adopts a constructivist
approach to ethnicity (F. Barth, A. D. Smith, B. Anderson, V. Tishkov).For
constructivists, ethnicity has roots not “in the heart” or “in the blood”, but
rather “in the mind” of individuals, which are members of ethnic groups –
“imagined communities”. In fact, ethnicity is understood as a socially
constructed phenomenon. According to Smith’s approach to ethnicity,
historical myths and memories play a crucial role in shaping ethnic
boundaries [1, p.7]. Historical myths and ideas about “golden age” are
commonplace within all nation-states [2, p.105]. Max Weber also stressed
on “memories of colonization and migration” in his definition of ethnic
group [3, p.389]. Taras Kuzio points out that “issue of myths and history
writing is largely understood as part of nation-building aspects of nation-
states” [4, p.29]. Referring to Eriksen, Kuzio argues that history for the
anthropologists is not a product of the past but a response to requirements of
the present [4, p.31]. The past is constructed according to the conditions and
desires of those who produced historical books in present. Therefore history
can never be truly objective [5, p.246].
Historical myths of the Crimean Tatars
The main point of the Crimean Tatar historical memory is based on the
idea that ethnogenesis of Crimean Tatars took place within the territory of
Crimean peninsula; therefore they are the “indigenous people” of Crimea. It
is the main argument when they claim the Crimean territory as their
homeland. Crimean political scientist A. Malgin [6] as well as the English
researcher G. Sasse [7, p.74] emphasize that the efforts of Crimean Tatars to
prove indigenous origins of their culture in Crimea are kind of response to
stereotype prevailing among Crimean Slavs about Crimean Tatars as
descendants of stranger nomads that was poorly connected with their land.
Crimean Tatar researcher R. Kurtiyev argues that the Crimean Tatars
appeared as a result of the combination of autochthonous agricultural tribes
in Crimea and nomadic Turkic tribes. As a result of this synthesis
numerically predominant first component was gradually Islamized and
adopted Turkish culture. At the same time these non-Turkic agricultural
tribes preserved their ethnic and anthropological characteristics [8].
The time of Crimean Khanate was seen as the so-called “golden age” in
the Crimean Tatar politics of memory, as they have managed to develop
unique society and culture. The fact of creating an independent state (albeit
for a short period) has importance for Crimean Tatar identity, as the
evidence of early formation of the Crimean Tatar nation. According to
Crimean Tatar historian R. Kurtiyev, the formation of ethnic core of the
47
Crimean Tatar nation had been completed till the first half of the 16th
century [8].
Russian conquest and annexation of Crimea is evaluated as the time of
ethnic strains and tragedies for the Crimean Tatars [8] and dramatic event in
the Crimean Tatar history [9]. In the historical memory of the Crimean
Tatars, Russia is shown as conqueror of Crimea. From the viewpoint of
Crimean Tatar historians, Manifesto of Catherine II destroyed the
independence of the Crimean Khanate and the Crimean Tatar people were
deprived of its statehood [10]. Kuzmin indicates that in the historical
memory of the Crimean Tatar people, the conquest of the Crimea by the
Russian Empire is evaluated as unlawful occupation, and region under the
rule of Russia - as a colony [11, p.419].
Soviet times are seen as the most difficult period in the Crimean Tatar
history. Crimean Tatar’s deportation committed by Soviet government is
considered as a crime against whole Crimean Tatar nation that caused
casualties and discrimination in cultural, educational, economic and
political spheres. Contemporary Crimean Tatar politics of memory aims, on
the one hand, to disprove the myths of the Soviet historiography about
Crimean Tatars as ‘traitors’ of Motherland during Great Patriotic War
(1941-44) and, on the another hand, to develop the myth of negative
consequences of deportation.
A bulk of researches is devoted to debunking the myth of Crimean Tatars
as betrayers, but most of them are based on several arguments: 1) forced
nature of collaboration [12; 13], 2) facts of collaboration among other
nations including Russians and Ukrainians, [14, p.293; 15, p.8] 3) evidence
of Crimean Tatars, who faithfully served in the Red Army [16, p.161; 12].
Almost all authors conclude that collaboration with the Nazi “was not the
real reason for Stalin’s order” [13], but “simply a pretext for cleansing the
Soviet Union’s borderland of non-Slavic, predominantly Islamic,
population” [14, p.294].
Together with such rehabilitation of history, the myth of the Crimean
Tatars as victims of Soviet regime, based on memories and memoirs about
the process of deportation and early years in exile is evolving. Analyzing
Crimean Tatar newspaper discourse, Ukrainian researchers O. Bogomolov
and I. Semyvolos noted that the loss of the homeland and the rights to own
land in the result of deportation in 1944, a long period of exile without
social rights and ability to return to Crimea, memories about the attempts to
return home and following re-exile - all these discourse constitute a
powerful image of a crime against the whole nation [17, p.14]. Crimean
researcher O. Veleshko, analyzing the impact of victimization factors on
political behavior of the Crimean Tatar repatriates, concludes that their
48
expectations from government and other ethnic groups are formed under the
influence of the “victim complex” [18, p.10-11].
Deportation and exile had played an important role in shaping Crimean
Tatar national identity. Awareness of deportation of the whole nation as
common trouble had led to awareness of unity of nation. According to
Turkish researchers Ayşegül and Ismail Aydıngün, discriminatory policy of
the Soviet state is the most important factor in strengthening of the ethnic
identity [19, p.119]. As Crimean Tatars “always perceived themselves as
guests in Central Asia” [19, p.122], common idea of returning to homeland
became a central element of shaping national identity.
Starting with the year 1989 and especially after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Crimean Tatars have begun to return to Crimea. This process of
repatriation has a special symbolic meaning such as the restoration of
justice for whole repressed nation.
Having analyzed the historical myths of the Crimean Tatars, one can
conclude that the central element of the Crimean Tatars ethnic identity is
based on three concepts: “concept of land” (idea of the Homeland),
“concept of crime” (referring to the deportation and forced migrations), and
“concept of victim” (repatriation and land claims). Thus, it was the Soviet
regime that promoted shaping Crimean Tatar national identity with strong
sense of Crimea as their only homeland.
Historical myths of the Russians and the Ukrainians
In historical memory cultivated by Russophile as well as Ukrainophile
historiographies (about peculiarities of the historiographies see T. Kuzio
[4]) it is emphasized the early appearance of the Slavs in Crimea. Russian
historians Andreev indicates that the Slavs first settled on the Crimean
peninsula after mid of 10th
century when the Crimea was conquered by
Prince Svyatoslav of Kiev and became a part of the Tmutarakan principality
[20, p.37]. Analyzing the textbooks used in Ukrainian schools (since they
are the primary source of historical myths), we found that the Slavs
appeared in Crimea in 6-7th
centuries [21, p.23].
The period of Kievan Rus is a kind of "golden age" (in the sense of A.
Smith) for both nations Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea. Their "myths of
origin" are connected to the Kievan Rus, what Smith calls "the
appropriation of history" [22, p.64].
Due to the official historiography in Ukraine includes all the periods and
events that have taken place in its present boundaries, Kievan Rus within
this approach is understood to be a “proto-Ukrainian state”, to which Russia
doesn’t connect [4, p.38]. All territorial possessions and achievements of
Kievan Rus are considered as indigenous land of Ukraine. Therefore, the
Christianity and the place where it was adopted by Prince Vladimir are also
49
considered as an important spiritual element in the identity of Ukrainian
nation. The school textbooks describe the acceptance of Christianity as a
key event in the formation of the Ukrainian nation. It is stressed that
Christianity overcame pagan polytheism, contributed to the political and
cultural unification of East Slavic tribes that led to the formation of
Ukrainian ethnos [21, p.66].
Times of Kievan Rus also have powerful meaning for Russians in their
identification process with Crimea and especially with current Sevastopol.
The Soviet as well as the Russophile schools deny any pre-fourteenth-
century history of Ukraine and either, and see Ukrainians as a Russian tribe
or as a wayward people whose only desire was to reunite with Russia [4,
p.32, 38]. All ideas about possessions and achievements of Kievan Rus
correspondingly take place in the Russian history. Vladimir’s conversion to
Christianity has crucial meaning for Russian Orthodox Church (it was The
Church of Moscow Patriarchy that has been reconstructed in Chersonesus)
as one of the first evidence of appearance of Orthodoxy on Russian lands.
Later, this event was a significant point of the idea that Moscow is “The
Third Rome”.
Annexation of Crimea by Russian Empire is considered in historical
memory of Russians as a reestablishing of the rights of the Russian people
to its own land. Politics of Memory of Russians in Crimea aims to cultivate
the myth of the positive influence of Russian annexation on Crimea.
Crimean Tatar Khanate is seen as quasi-state with parasitic economy, it was
not capable of independent existence and after leaving the Ottoman Empire
it was naturally included in the composition of more successful state [11,
p.419]. Russia is shown as a rescuer of Crimean Tatars that were nomadic
and uncivilized population. By inclusion of Crimea to Russia, the last one
brought civilization and promoted the development and prosperity of
Crimea [20]. The influence of Russian culture on the region is estimated as
an introduction of the civilization that promoted movement from the dark
Middle Ages to the progress of modern times [11, p.419]. These myths
promoted appearance of negative stereotypes about Crimean Tatars such as
they are illiterate and retrograde people. Especially this message was
cultivated in the Soviet history and it had serious effects on the ethnic
identification of Soviet generation of Russians and Ukrainians.
The special attention in the politics of memory of ethnic Russians in
Crimea as well as in Ukrainian official policy is paid to event occurred in
1954, when Crimean oblast was given by Khrushchev from the jurisdiction
of Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. The fact of legal transfer of Crimea
to the Ukrainian SSR is the main argument of Ukrainian politics of memory
to claim Crimea as region that legally belongs to Ukraine. The politics of
50
memory of Russians in Crimea is based on the denying the legality of this
event [23].
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of an independent
Ukrainian state in 1991 actualized among the inhabitants of the Crimea the
issue of ethnic identification. The source for identification as "Soviet
citizen" was destroyed, and a new identity associated with the Ukrainian
nation was not appropriate for the Russian-speaking region. Under such
conditions the idea of Crimean regionalism has emerged. Currently
“regionalism” is one of the most popular tendencies in the Crimean
scientific as well as public discourse. It has been developed by such
Crimean political scientists as Andrey Malgin, Andrey Nikiforov, Oleg
Gabrielyan. Nikiforov defines “Crimean regional community” as proto
ethnic community that has developed in the Crimea under certain historical
conditions and in the result of long cultural and historical process [24, p.13].
In the framework of regionalism the Crimean Russians identify
themselves as the local community which has its own specific
characteristics that distinguished them from both, the state where they live
and the historical homeland - Russia. A striking example of this regional
identity is popular expression: “there is no land for us beyond the Perekop”
[Perekop is the place in the north of Crimea where the peninsula is
connected to the continent] [6]. Russians in Crimea perceive their political
demands (autonomy, the status of the Russian language), not as a struggle
for rights of national minority surrounded by titular nation (Ukrainian), but
rather as efforts to preserve multicultural environment, historically shaped
in the region.
Political Landscape in Crimea
Examined in the previous section historical memory always has the
material embodiment in the particular territory. Referring to the certain
historical myths, political elite try to fill the landscape with the features of
their presence. To describe this phenomena researchers use definition
“political landscape”. A. Smith defines it as a territorization of memory. He
notes that to become a national, common memories have to be connected to
specific places and territory [25, p.453-454].
Currently the “political landscape” of Crimea is composed of symbols
related to imperial, Soviet and independent periods and also symbols of the
Crimean Tatars, who are trying to consolidate their national history. Also
important factor is a religion, which has a strong influence on ethnic
identity and political ideology of each community in Crimea.
In memorial space, Russian ethnic community is presented by
monuments that epitomize imperial period of the Crimean history. The
examples are monuments of Catharine II, Dolgorukov obelisk, monuments
51
to famous Russian writers and poets (there are at least 12 monuments to
Alexander Pushkin in Crimea [26]), different monuments, buildings and
symbols that can be considered as embodiment of “myth of Sevastopol”
(see G. Sasse [27, p.70]). The Empire symbols in the political landscape of
Crimea are intended to cultivate myths of “Russian” past of Crimea.
Crimean Tatar historical memory in the political landscape of Crimea is
mainly represented by the memorials that are reflection of the “crime” and
the “victim” concepts. The examples are memorials dedicated to the tragic
event of deportation (memorial complex "Renaissance" in Crimean
Industrial-Pedagogical University, memorials of deportation in the square
near the train station and in the park Salgirka in Simferopol and memorials
in other cities of Crimea) and monument of the Ukrainian dissident Pyotr
Grigorenko who contributed to the publicity of the Crimean Tatar problem
in the exile. This monument is also an example of cultivation of myth about
Crimean Tatars as “only true Ukrainians in Crimea”, that is by-turn a
manifestation of Crimean Tatar elite’s loyalty to pro-Ukrainian political
forces. Other symbols of Crimean Tatar historical memory are monuments
to enlightener Ismail Gasprinsky (Gaspralı), Bakhchisaray State Historical
and Cultural complex, Republican Crimean Tatar Art Museum that reflect
the Crimean Tatar past of Crimea and can be considered as part of
explained above concept of “land” and indigenous roots of the Crimean
Tatars in Crimea.
A relatively new trend in Crimean Tatar politics of memory is symbols
that deny created by Soviet Union myth about the Crimean Tatars, as Nazi
collaborators and traitors of Fatherland (monuments and squares named
after pilot Amet-Khan Sultan, monument of Commissioner of Crimean
partisans Mustafa Selimov in Sokoline village and the memorial plates with
the names of 400 Crimean Tatars soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army,
who were called to the front in 1941 from Yalta and the surrounding
villages and killed during Great Patriotic War). The founders of this
memorial stress that it is a harbinger of a very important process in
rehabilitation of good name of the Crimean Tatar people [28].
The case of the ethnic Ukrainians has its peculiarities in Crimea. Most of
the Ukrainians in Crimea lost their culture and language in the process of
Russification under the Soviet Union. 52,7% of the Ukrainians in Crimea
considers themselves as a representative of the Russian cultural tradition,
while 26,6% associates themselves with the Soviet culture, and only 9,7% -
with Ukrainian one [29, p.3]. Thus, analyzing the Ukrainian politics of
memory it is more correct to focus on official policy of the Ukrainian
authority in this area. Generally, we can conclude that the Ukrainian
historical memory is purely presented in the memorial space of Crimea.
52
However, one of the examples is Taras Shevchenko monuments. There is a
monument to Hetman Sagaidachny in Sevastopol. The title of the music
theater in Simferopol includes adjective "Ukrainian" that has a symbolic
meaning.
The peculiarity of Crimean identity situation is also determined by high
level of Soviet identity among Crimean population (17,4% of the ethnic
Russians, 26,6% the ethnic Ukrainians identify themselves with the Soviet
culture)[29, p.3]. Strong position of the Soviet politics of memory is clearly
reflected in political landscape of Crimea. Soviet symbols are mostly
presented by the monumental complexes dedicated to the Great Patriotic
War (eternal flame, Tombs of the Unknown Soldier, tanks) and monuments
to Lenin. The political force that cultivates Soviet historical memory is the
Communist Party of Crimea. Another component of the politics of memory
of communists dedicated to the denials of historical myths of the Ukrainians
that concern, for example soldiers of nationalist movement OUN-UPA or
Famine 1932-33. In 2007 Communist Party of Ukraine established three-
meter steles of memory of victims of the OUN-UPA in Simferopol.
The contrast of “historical memories” of different ethnic groups in the
Crimea inevitably leads to tension in the political landscape of Crimea.
Attempts to incorporate certain historical myth into the political landscape
provoke sharp discussions that sometimes develop into so-called “war of
monuments”. It has several forms: from the Mass Media controversy and
protest meetings to the desecration or the destruction of “unwanted”
monuments. The main confrontation in the political landscape coincides
with the general political opposition in Crimea. Implementation of pro-
Russian politics of memory is negatively perceived by Crimean Tatar and
pro-Ukrainian organizations. Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian politics of
memory is similarly opposed by both communist and pro-Russian political
actors. All three political sides (Crimean Tatar, Russian and Ukrainian
organizations) struggle against the communist legacy in political landscape
of Crimea.
Another way of incorporation of historical memory into the political
landscape is toponyms. B. Andersen stresses that maps play a key role in
creating the phenomenon of “imagined communities” [30, 173-175].
Currently the majority of Crimean toponyms are preserved from the Soviet
times. From time to time the question about the necessity to change the
names of towns, streets, squares, etc. is raised in the Crimean society. The
Crimean Tatars demand the restoration of toponyms that existed in Crimea
in pre-Russian and pre-Soviet periods. Pro-Russian organizations in Crimea
demand to replace the current toponyms with those existed at the time of the
Russian Empire. The central government in Kiev required the translation of
53
current toponyms into Ukrainian. In fact, issue of toponyms implicates the
question "historical memory of which ethnic group should be incorporated
into political landscape of Crimea?"
Being significant factor for ethnic identification, religion is actively
involved in the politics of memory. Smith in his book ‘National Identity’
stresses on the correlation between “religious identity” and “ethnic
identity”. He points out that in some communities “religion criteria of
differentiation” can be the base for ethnic identity of these groups [31, p.7].
The religious diversity in Crimea is presented by two dominant
communities: Orthodox and Muslims. Most of the Crimean Tatars are
Muslims; and most of the Russians and Ukrainians are Orthodox. In such
situation, the Crimean Tatars constitute a minority in the both senses –
ethnic and religious. Therefore religion serves to be an additional
component of ethnic identity, which could also increase the level of social
distance between ethnic (and/or religious) groups in Crimea in the
framework of dichotomy “we-they”.
There were several cases of confrontation with religious component in
Crimean society for the last decade, such as events around the metal cross in
Morskoe (so-called Krestopoval), building of church in Golubinka,
restoration of madrasah near Dormition cloister (Uspenskiy monastr), the
demands to eliminate the city market from the territory of ancient Muslims
cemetery “Azizler” in Bakhchisarai, protest against the sale of the territory
of another Muslims cemetery to commercial organizations in Yevpatoriya,
protest against building the highway through ancient Muslim cemetery in
Gaspra, setting up the Andrey Pervozvanuy monument in Feodosia, the
allocation of land for construction Mosque (Juma Jami) in Simferopol. All
this conflict situation can be divided into two groups: 1) Crimean Tatar
activists protest against the initiatives of including Orthodox symbols
(memorial crosses, church, monument of Orthodox Holly persons) in the
political landscape of Crimea; 2) the Crimean Tatar organizations demand
to restore Muslim symbols (cemeteries, madrasah, mosques) that were
abandoned after the deportation. In fact, it reinforces the myth of Muslim
history of peninsula. These conflict situations appeared due to clash of
politics of memory implemented by political actors that focus on two main
ethno-religious community: on the one hand Orthodox Russians and
Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and on the other hand Crimean Tatar
Muslims. Marking of political landscape of Crimea by certain religious
symbols helps to shows the connection of correspondent ethnic (and
religious) community with the territory of Crimea, and to justify their
territorial claims. It means that historical myths about ethnogenesis (in the
case of Crimean Tatars) or earlier appearance in the region (in case
54
Russians or Ukrainians) are accomplished by the myth of the historical
roots of Islam and Orthodoxy in Crimea.
Conclusion
Symbolism plays an important role in the process of ethnic identification.
The symbolic space of the ethnic group is based on the “politics of
memory”. Historical memory is some kind of autostereotype of cultural
tradition that plays one of the essential roles in shaping ethnic or national
identity. Politics of memory includes the cultivation of historical myths and
their incorporation into the political landscape.
Historical myths of the dominant ethnic groups in Crimea are influenced
by several historiographies that can be considered as mutually exclusive.
There is a kind of “battle for the past” in Crimea when history estimated by
certain way becomes a valuable symbolic resource that has mobilizing
potential and can be considered as an ideological tool.
Referring to the correspondent historiography and the historical myths,
each of the dominant groups in Crimea claims their rights on the territory of
peninsula. Their politics of memory aims to establish a connection of each
community with the peninsula. Crimean Tatars cultivate the myth of
ethnogenesis on the territory of Crimea, while Russian and Ukrainian - the
myth of their antiquity appearance on the peninsula.
Political landscape in Crimea can be characterized by transitional period.
Preserving a lot of Soviet symbols, it includes the embodiments of Russian,
Crimean Tatar and official Ukrainian historical myths. There is some kind
of the struggle for historical memory between the Slavic and the Crimean
Tatar communities, Russians and the Ukrainians, Russian and Communists.
Religion is serves to be an additional component of ethnic identity, which
could also increase the level of social distance between the ethnic (and/or
religious) groups in Crimea. The special importance has been put on the
issue of return, rehabilitation and reconstruction of religious buildings and
memorial structures; establishment of religious symbols and monuments of
famous historical figures; changing names of settlements and reappraisal of
historical events. However, if one ethnic group considers such changes as
the restoration of historical justice and the realization of the religious rights,
the other group usually considers this act as aggression and humiliation of
their national or religious feelings.
Development of the peaceful interethnic relations in Crimea requires the
understanding that there is no objective history, and the historical truth is
always a relative construct within the boundaries of certain ethnic group.
Because, used at schools historiography is a basis for understanding ethnic
relations among younger generation, describing the history with focus on
55
conflict has to be changed to a more “peaceful” way. It can help to reduce
the negative stereotypes about other ethnic group.
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Yevheniy Chorny,
Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Associate Professor,
Dean of the Faculty of Psychology,
Taurida National V.I. Vernadsky University,
Ukraine, Simferopol
SPECIFICS AND DYNAMICS OF THE RATIO OF SOCIAL
IDENTITIES AMONG CRIMEAN ADOLESCENTS
The purpose of research
In 2006, and then in 2012 within the framework of a comprehensive study
of an ethnic worldview, we have been studying the priority of social identity
types, the valence of identities and expression of personal identity among
Crimean adolescents. In both cases, there was 230 adolescents of 15-16
years (students of 10-th and 11-th grade at the schools of Belogorsk region
in Crimea). Some parts of the adolescents were studying at
ethnohomogeneous schools – those are Crimean tatars from the areas of
compact settlement of the members of this ethnic group. The other part is
adolescents from the ethnoheterogeneous schools with mixed ethnic groups
of students (generally, those are Slavs and Crimean tatars.).
We supposed that:
1) The differences in the ethnic structure of contingent at the
institution might influence on the ratio of social identities of the students.