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10. Khoroshilov O. Ukrajins’ka politychna natsija: stsenariji konstytuvannia / Khoroshilov

О. // Politychnyj menedzhment. – 2004. – № 5 (8). – p. 23-30. – p. 24.

11. Makeev S. “Tri strany I tri politicheskiye natsiji ” [Elektronnyj resurs]. – Rejim dostupu: http://tomenko.kiev.ua/cgi/redir.cgi?url=prozpol46.html.

12. Varnaliy Z. Strategiya podolannia dysproportij u rezvytku regioniv / Varnaliy Z.,

Pavliuk A., Shevchenko O. // Ukrajina: strategichni pryoritety. Analitychni otsinky. – К.: NISD, 2003. – 312 p. – p. 162.

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V. Khmel’ko // Sotsiologija: teorija, metoda, marketyng. – 2003. –№ 1. – p. 5-23. – p. 18-19. 14. Ivanov І.Yu. Formuvannia ikrajins’koji politychnoji natsiji v suchasnykh umovakh:

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Kryvyts’ka О. // Politychnyj menedzhment. – 2005. – № 3 (12). – p. 42-62.

Yuliya Biletska,

Ph.D. in Political Science, Assistant Professor,

Department of Internatinal Relations,

Karabuk University,

Turkey, Karabuk

“POLITICS OF MEMORY” IN THE PROCESS OF SHAPING

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF CRIMEAN TATARS, RUSSIANS

AND UKRAINIANS IN CRIMEA

Introduction

Being a part of Ukraine, Crimea has its ethnic peculiarities determined by

the domination of ethnic Russians (58,5%), the presence of Russian-

speaking Ukrainians (24,4%), and the Crimean Tatar community (12,1%)

that was deported in 1944 and repatriated in the late 1980's and early

1990’s.

Each of the mentioned ethnic groups claims Crimea as their own

homeland. These claims are accompanied by the implementation of politics

of memory that includes cultivating of historical myths and their

incorporation into the political landscape of Crimea.

The aim of the paper is to define how politics of memory relates to the

ethnic identity and territorial claims of each ethnic group in Crimea. In

other words, paper seeks to define historical myths that underline ethnic

identity and territorial claims of Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in

Crimea and the ways these myths have been incorporated in the political

landscape of Crimea.

46

Historical Memory and Historical Myths of Russians, Ukrainians and

Crimean Tatars in Crimea

The theoretical framework of the research paper adopts a constructivist

approach to ethnicity (F. Barth, A. D. Smith, B. Anderson, V. Tishkov).For

constructivists, ethnicity has roots not “in the heart” or “in the blood”, but

rather “in the mind” of individuals, which are members of ethnic groups –

“imagined communities”. In fact, ethnicity is understood as a socially

constructed phenomenon. According to Smith’s approach to ethnicity,

historical myths and memories play a crucial role in shaping ethnic

boundaries [1, p.7]. Historical myths and ideas about “golden age” are

commonplace within all nation-states [2, p.105]. Max Weber also stressed

on “memories of colonization and migration” in his definition of ethnic

group [3, p.389]. Taras Kuzio points out that “issue of myths and history

writing is largely understood as part of nation-building aspects of nation-

states” [4, p.29]. Referring to Eriksen, Kuzio argues that history for the

anthropologists is not a product of the past but a response to requirements of

the present [4, p.31]. The past is constructed according to the conditions and

desires of those who produced historical books in present. Therefore history

can never be truly objective [5, p.246].

Historical myths of the Crimean Tatars

The main point of the Crimean Tatar historical memory is based on the

idea that ethnogenesis of Crimean Tatars took place within the territory of

Crimean peninsula; therefore they are the “indigenous people” of Crimea. It

is the main argument when they claim the Crimean territory as their

homeland. Crimean political scientist A. Malgin [6] as well as the English

researcher G. Sasse [7, p.74] emphasize that the efforts of Crimean Tatars to

prove indigenous origins of their culture in Crimea are kind of response to

stereotype prevailing among Crimean Slavs about Crimean Tatars as

descendants of stranger nomads that was poorly connected with their land.

Crimean Tatar researcher R. Kurtiyev argues that the Crimean Tatars

appeared as a result of the combination of autochthonous agricultural tribes

in Crimea and nomadic Turkic tribes. As a result of this synthesis

numerically predominant first component was gradually Islamized and

adopted Turkish culture. At the same time these non-Turkic agricultural

tribes preserved their ethnic and anthropological characteristics [8].

The time of Crimean Khanate was seen as the so-called “golden age” in

the Crimean Tatar politics of memory, as they have managed to develop

unique society and culture. The fact of creating an independent state (albeit

for a short period) has importance for Crimean Tatar identity, as the

evidence of early formation of the Crimean Tatar nation. According to

Crimean Tatar historian R. Kurtiyev, the formation of ethnic core of the

47

Crimean Tatar nation had been completed till the first half of the 16th

century [8].

Russian conquest and annexation of Crimea is evaluated as the time of

ethnic strains and tragedies for the Crimean Tatars [8] and dramatic event in

the Crimean Tatar history [9]. In the historical memory of the Crimean

Tatars, Russia is shown as conqueror of Crimea. From the viewpoint of

Crimean Tatar historians, Manifesto of Catherine II destroyed the

independence of the Crimean Khanate and the Crimean Tatar people were

deprived of its statehood [10]. Kuzmin indicates that in the historical

memory of the Crimean Tatar people, the conquest of the Crimea by the

Russian Empire is evaluated as unlawful occupation, and region under the

rule of Russia - as a colony [11, p.419].

Soviet times are seen as the most difficult period in the Crimean Tatar

history. Crimean Tatar’s deportation committed by Soviet government is

considered as a crime against whole Crimean Tatar nation that caused

casualties and discrimination in cultural, educational, economic and

political spheres. Contemporary Crimean Tatar politics of memory aims, on

the one hand, to disprove the myths of the Soviet historiography about

Crimean Tatars as ‘traitors’ of Motherland during Great Patriotic War

(1941-44) and, on the another hand, to develop the myth of negative

consequences of deportation.

A bulk of researches is devoted to debunking the myth of Crimean Tatars

as betrayers, but most of them are based on several arguments: 1) forced

nature of collaboration [12; 13], 2) facts of collaboration among other

nations including Russians and Ukrainians, [14, p.293; 15, p.8] 3) evidence

of Crimean Tatars, who faithfully served in the Red Army [16, p.161; 12].

Almost all authors conclude that collaboration with the Nazi “was not the

real reason for Stalin’s order” [13], but “simply a pretext for cleansing the

Soviet Union’s borderland of non-Slavic, predominantly Islamic,

population” [14, p.294].

Together with such rehabilitation of history, the myth of the Crimean

Tatars as victims of Soviet regime, based on memories and memoirs about

the process of deportation and early years in exile is evolving. Analyzing

Crimean Tatar newspaper discourse, Ukrainian researchers O. Bogomolov

and I. Semyvolos noted that the loss of the homeland and the rights to own

land in the result of deportation in 1944, a long period of exile without

social rights and ability to return to Crimea, memories about the attempts to

return home and following re-exile - all these discourse constitute a

powerful image of a crime against the whole nation [17, p.14]. Crimean

researcher O. Veleshko, analyzing the impact of victimization factors on

political behavior of the Crimean Tatar repatriates, concludes that their

48

expectations from government and other ethnic groups are formed under the

influence of the “victim complex” [18, p.10-11].

Deportation and exile had played an important role in shaping Crimean

Tatar national identity. Awareness of deportation of the whole nation as

common trouble had led to awareness of unity of nation. According to

Turkish researchers Ayşegül and Ismail Aydıngün, discriminatory policy of

the Soviet state is the most important factor in strengthening of the ethnic

identity [19, p.119]. As Crimean Tatars “always perceived themselves as

guests in Central Asia” [19, p.122], common idea of returning to homeland

became a central element of shaping national identity.

Starting with the year 1989 and especially after the collapse of the Soviet

Union, Crimean Tatars have begun to return to Crimea. This process of

repatriation has a special symbolic meaning such as the restoration of

justice for whole repressed nation.

Having analyzed the historical myths of the Crimean Tatars, one can

conclude that the central element of the Crimean Tatars ethnic identity is

based on three concepts: “concept of land” (idea of the Homeland),

“concept of crime” (referring to the deportation and forced migrations), and

“concept of victim” (repatriation and land claims). Thus, it was the Soviet

regime that promoted shaping Crimean Tatar national identity with strong

sense of Crimea as their only homeland.

Historical myths of the Russians and the Ukrainians

In historical memory cultivated by Russophile as well as Ukrainophile

historiographies (about peculiarities of the historiographies see T. Kuzio

[4]) it is emphasized the early appearance of the Slavs in Crimea. Russian

historians Andreev indicates that the Slavs first settled on the Crimean

peninsula after mid of 10th

century when the Crimea was conquered by

Prince Svyatoslav of Kiev and became a part of the Tmutarakan principality

[20, p.37]. Analyzing the textbooks used in Ukrainian schools (since they

are the primary source of historical myths), we found that the Slavs

appeared in Crimea in 6-7th

centuries [21, p.23].

The period of Kievan Rus is a kind of "golden age" (in the sense of A.

Smith) for both nations Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea. Their "myths of

origin" are connected to the Kievan Rus, what Smith calls "the

appropriation of history" [22, p.64].

Due to the official historiography in Ukraine includes all the periods and

events that have taken place in its present boundaries, Kievan Rus within

this approach is understood to be a “proto-Ukrainian state”, to which Russia

doesn’t connect [4, p.38]. All territorial possessions and achievements of

Kievan Rus are considered as indigenous land of Ukraine. Therefore, the

Christianity and the place where it was adopted by Prince Vladimir are also

49

considered as an important spiritual element in the identity of Ukrainian

nation. The school textbooks describe the acceptance of Christianity as a

key event in the formation of the Ukrainian nation. It is stressed that

Christianity overcame pagan polytheism, contributed to the political and

cultural unification of East Slavic tribes that led to the formation of

Ukrainian ethnos [21, p.66].

Times of Kievan Rus also have powerful meaning for Russians in their

identification process with Crimea and especially with current Sevastopol.

The Soviet as well as the Russophile schools deny any pre-fourteenth-

century history of Ukraine and either, and see Ukrainians as a Russian tribe

or as a wayward people whose only desire was to reunite with Russia [4,

p.32, 38]. All ideas about possessions and achievements of Kievan Rus

correspondingly take place in the Russian history. Vladimir’s conversion to

Christianity has crucial meaning for Russian Orthodox Church (it was The

Church of Moscow Patriarchy that has been reconstructed in Chersonesus)

as one of the first evidence of appearance of Orthodoxy on Russian lands.

Later, this event was a significant point of the idea that Moscow is “The

Third Rome”.

Annexation of Crimea by Russian Empire is considered in historical

memory of Russians as a reestablishing of the rights of the Russian people

to its own land. Politics of Memory of Russians in Crimea aims to cultivate

the myth of the positive influence of Russian annexation on Crimea.

Crimean Tatar Khanate is seen as quasi-state with parasitic economy, it was

not capable of independent existence and after leaving the Ottoman Empire

it was naturally included in the composition of more successful state [11,

p.419]. Russia is shown as a rescuer of Crimean Tatars that were nomadic

and uncivilized population. By inclusion of Crimea to Russia, the last one

brought civilization and promoted the development and prosperity of

Crimea [20]. The influence of Russian culture on the region is estimated as

an introduction of the civilization that promoted movement from the dark

Middle Ages to the progress of modern times [11, p.419]. These myths

promoted appearance of negative stereotypes about Crimean Tatars such as

they are illiterate and retrograde people. Especially this message was

cultivated in the Soviet history and it had serious effects on the ethnic

identification of Soviet generation of Russians and Ukrainians.

The special attention in the politics of memory of ethnic Russians in

Crimea as well as in Ukrainian official policy is paid to event occurred in

1954, when Crimean oblast was given by Khrushchev from the jurisdiction

of Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. The fact of legal transfer of Crimea

to the Ukrainian SSR is the main argument of Ukrainian politics of memory

to claim Crimea as region that legally belongs to Ukraine. The politics of

50

memory of Russians in Crimea is based on the denying the legality of this

event [23].

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of an independent

Ukrainian state in 1991 actualized among the inhabitants of the Crimea the

issue of ethnic identification. The source for identification as "Soviet

citizen" was destroyed, and a new identity associated with the Ukrainian

nation was not appropriate for the Russian-speaking region. Under such

conditions the idea of Crimean regionalism has emerged. Currently

“regionalism” is one of the most popular tendencies in the Crimean

scientific as well as public discourse. It has been developed by such

Crimean political scientists as Andrey Malgin, Andrey Nikiforov, Oleg

Gabrielyan. Nikiforov defines “Crimean regional community” as proto

ethnic community that has developed in the Crimea under certain historical

conditions and in the result of long cultural and historical process [24, p.13].

In the framework of regionalism the Crimean Russians identify

themselves as the local community which has its own specific

characteristics that distinguished them from both, the state where they live

and the historical homeland - Russia. A striking example of this regional

identity is popular expression: “there is no land for us beyond the Perekop”

[Perekop is the place in the north of Crimea where the peninsula is

connected to the continent] [6]. Russians in Crimea perceive their political

demands (autonomy, the status of the Russian language), not as a struggle

for rights of national minority surrounded by titular nation (Ukrainian), but

rather as efforts to preserve multicultural environment, historically shaped

in the region.

Political Landscape in Crimea

Examined in the previous section historical memory always has the

material embodiment in the particular territory. Referring to the certain

historical myths, political elite try to fill the landscape with the features of

their presence. To describe this phenomena researchers use definition

“political landscape”. A. Smith defines it as a territorization of memory. He

notes that to become a national, common memories have to be connected to

specific places and territory [25, p.453-454].

Currently the “political landscape” of Crimea is composed of symbols

related to imperial, Soviet and independent periods and also symbols of the

Crimean Tatars, who are trying to consolidate their national history. Also

important factor is a religion, which has a strong influence on ethnic

identity and political ideology of each community in Crimea.

In memorial space, Russian ethnic community is presented by

monuments that epitomize imperial period of the Crimean history. The

examples are monuments of Catharine II, Dolgorukov obelisk, monuments

51

to famous Russian writers and poets (there are at least 12 monuments to

Alexander Pushkin in Crimea [26]), different monuments, buildings and

symbols that can be considered as embodiment of “myth of Sevastopol”

(see G. Sasse [27, p.70]). The Empire symbols in the political landscape of

Crimea are intended to cultivate myths of “Russian” past of Crimea.

Crimean Tatar historical memory in the political landscape of Crimea is

mainly represented by the memorials that are reflection of the “crime” and

the “victim” concepts. The examples are memorials dedicated to the tragic

event of deportation (memorial complex "Renaissance" in Crimean

Industrial-Pedagogical University, memorials of deportation in the square

near the train station and in the park Salgirka in Simferopol and memorials

in other cities of Crimea) and monument of the Ukrainian dissident Pyotr

Grigorenko who contributed to the publicity of the Crimean Tatar problem

in the exile. This monument is also an example of cultivation of myth about

Crimean Tatars as “only true Ukrainians in Crimea”, that is by-turn a

manifestation of Crimean Tatar elite’s loyalty to pro-Ukrainian political

forces. Other symbols of Crimean Tatar historical memory are monuments

to enlightener Ismail Gasprinsky (Gaspralı), Bakhchisaray State Historical

and Cultural complex, Republican Crimean Tatar Art Museum that reflect

the Crimean Tatar past of Crimea and can be considered as part of

explained above concept of “land” and indigenous roots of the Crimean

Tatars in Crimea.

A relatively new trend in Crimean Tatar politics of memory is symbols

that deny created by Soviet Union myth about the Crimean Tatars, as Nazi

collaborators and traitors of Fatherland (monuments and squares named

after pilot Amet-Khan Sultan, monument of Commissioner of Crimean

partisans Mustafa Selimov in Sokoline village and the memorial plates with

the names of 400 Crimean Tatars soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army,

who were called to the front in 1941 from Yalta and the surrounding

villages and killed during Great Patriotic War). The founders of this

memorial stress that it is a harbinger of a very important process in

rehabilitation of good name of the Crimean Tatar people [28].

The case of the ethnic Ukrainians has its peculiarities in Crimea. Most of

the Ukrainians in Crimea lost their culture and language in the process of

Russification under the Soviet Union. 52,7% of the Ukrainians in Crimea

considers themselves as a representative of the Russian cultural tradition,

while 26,6% associates themselves with the Soviet culture, and only 9,7% -

with Ukrainian one [29, p.3]. Thus, analyzing the Ukrainian politics of

memory it is more correct to focus on official policy of the Ukrainian

authority in this area. Generally, we can conclude that the Ukrainian

historical memory is purely presented in the memorial space of Crimea.

52

However, one of the examples is Taras Shevchenko monuments. There is a

monument to Hetman Sagaidachny in Sevastopol. The title of the music

theater in Simferopol includes adjective "Ukrainian" that has a symbolic

meaning.

The peculiarity of Crimean identity situation is also determined by high

level of Soviet identity among Crimean population (17,4% of the ethnic

Russians, 26,6% the ethnic Ukrainians identify themselves with the Soviet

culture)[29, p.3]. Strong position of the Soviet politics of memory is clearly

reflected in political landscape of Crimea. Soviet symbols are mostly

presented by the monumental complexes dedicated to the Great Patriotic

War (eternal flame, Tombs of the Unknown Soldier, tanks) and monuments

to Lenin. The political force that cultivates Soviet historical memory is the

Communist Party of Crimea. Another component of the politics of memory

of communists dedicated to the denials of historical myths of the Ukrainians

that concern, for example soldiers of nationalist movement OUN-UPA or

Famine 1932-33. In 2007 Communist Party of Ukraine established three-

meter steles of memory of victims of the OUN-UPA in Simferopol.

The contrast of “historical memories” of different ethnic groups in the

Crimea inevitably leads to tension in the political landscape of Crimea.

Attempts to incorporate certain historical myth into the political landscape

provoke sharp discussions that sometimes develop into so-called “war of

monuments”. It has several forms: from the Mass Media controversy and

protest meetings to the desecration or the destruction of “unwanted”

monuments. The main confrontation in the political landscape coincides

with the general political opposition in Crimea. Implementation of pro-

Russian politics of memory is negatively perceived by Crimean Tatar and

pro-Ukrainian organizations. Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian politics of

memory is similarly opposed by both communist and pro-Russian political

actors. All three political sides (Crimean Tatar, Russian and Ukrainian

organizations) struggle against the communist legacy in political landscape

of Crimea.

Another way of incorporation of historical memory into the political

landscape is toponyms. B. Andersen stresses that maps play a key role in

creating the phenomenon of “imagined communities” [30, 173-175].

Currently the majority of Crimean toponyms are preserved from the Soviet

times. From time to time the question about the necessity to change the

names of towns, streets, squares, etc. is raised in the Crimean society. The

Crimean Tatars demand the restoration of toponyms that existed in Crimea

in pre-Russian and pre-Soviet periods. Pro-Russian organizations in Crimea

demand to replace the current toponyms with those existed at the time of the

Russian Empire. The central government in Kiev required the translation of

53

current toponyms into Ukrainian. In fact, issue of toponyms implicates the

question "historical memory of which ethnic group should be incorporated

into political landscape of Crimea?"

Being significant factor for ethnic identification, religion is actively

involved in the politics of memory. Smith in his book ‘National Identity’

stresses on the correlation between “religious identity” and “ethnic

identity”. He points out that in some communities “religion criteria of

differentiation” can be the base for ethnic identity of these groups [31, p.7].

The religious diversity in Crimea is presented by two dominant

communities: Orthodox and Muslims. Most of the Crimean Tatars are

Muslims; and most of the Russians and Ukrainians are Orthodox. In such

situation, the Crimean Tatars constitute a minority in the both senses –

ethnic and religious. Therefore religion serves to be an additional

component of ethnic identity, which could also increase the level of social

distance between ethnic (and/or religious) groups in Crimea in the

framework of dichotomy “we-they”.

There were several cases of confrontation with religious component in

Crimean society for the last decade, such as events around the metal cross in

Morskoe (so-called Krestopoval), building of church in Golubinka,

restoration of madrasah near Dormition cloister (Uspenskiy monastr), the

demands to eliminate the city market from the territory of ancient Muslims

cemetery “Azizler” in Bakhchisarai, protest against the sale of the territory

of another Muslims cemetery to commercial organizations in Yevpatoriya,

protest against building the highway through ancient Muslim cemetery in

Gaspra, setting up the Andrey Pervozvanuy monument in Feodosia, the

allocation of land for construction Mosque (Juma Jami) in Simferopol. All

this conflict situation can be divided into two groups: 1) Crimean Tatar

activists protest against the initiatives of including Orthodox symbols

(memorial crosses, church, monument of Orthodox Holly persons) in the

political landscape of Crimea; 2) the Crimean Tatar organizations demand

to restore Muslim symbols (cemeteries, madrasah, mosques) that were

abandoned after the deportation. In fact, it reinforces the myth of Muslim

history of peninsula. These conflict situations appeared due to clash of

politics of memory implemented by political actors that focus on two main

ethno-religious community: on the one hand Orthodox Russians and

Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and on the other hand Crimean Tatar

Muslims. Marking of political landscape of Crimea by certain religious

symbols helps to shows the connection of correspondent ethnic (and

religious) community with the territory of Crimea, and to justify their

territorial claims. It means that historical myths about ethnogenesis (in the

case of Crimean Tatars) or earlier appearance in the region (in case

54

Russians or Ukrainians) are accomplished by the myth of the historical

roots of Islam and Orthodoxy in Crimea.

Conclusion

Symbolism plays an important role in the process of ethnic identification.

The symbolic space of the ethnic group is based on the “politics of

memory”. Historical memory is some kind of autostereotype of cultural

tradition that plays one of the essential roles in shaping ethnic or national

identity. Politics of memory includes the cultivation of historical myths and

their incorporation into the political landscape.

Historical myths of the dominant ethnic groups in Crimea are influenced

by several historiographies that can be considered as mutually exclusive.

There is a kind of “battle for the past” in Crimea when history estimated by

certain way becomes a valuable symbolic resource that has mobilizing

potential and can be considered as an ideological tool.

Referring to the correspondent historiography and the historical myths,

each of the dominant groups in Crimea claims their rights on the territory of

peninsula. Their politics of memory aims to establish a connection of each

community with the peninsula. Crimean Tatars cultivate the myth of

ethnogenesis on the territory of Crimea, while Russian and Ukrainian - the

myth of their antiquity appearance on the peninsula.

Political landscape in Crimea can be characterized by transitional period.

Preserving a lot of Soviet symbols, it includes the embodiments of Russian,

Crimean Tatar and official Ukrainian historical myths. There is some kind

of the struggle for historical memory between the Slavic and the Crimean

Tatar communities, Russians and the Ukrainians, Russian and Communists.

Religion is serves to be an additional component of ethnic identity, which

could also increase the level of social distance between the ethnic (and/or

religious) groups in Crimea. The special importance has been put on the

issue of return, rehabilitation and reconstruction of religious buildings and

memorial structures; establishment of religious symbols and monuments of

famous historical figures; changing names of settlements and reappraisal of

historical events. However, if one ethnic group considers such changes as

the restoration of historical justice and the realization of the religious rights,

the other group usually considers this act as aggression and humiliation of

their national or religious feelings.

Development of the peaceful interethnic relations in Crimea requires the

understanding that there is no objective history, and the historical truth is

always a relative construct within the boundaries of certain ethnic group.

Because, used at schools historiography is a basis for understanding ethnic

relations among younger generation, describing the history with focus on

55

conflict has to be changed to a more “peaceful” way. It can help to reduce

the negative stereotypes about other ethnic group.

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Yevheniy Chorny,

Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Associate Professor,

Dean of the Faculty of Psychology,

Taurida National V.I. Vernadsky University,

Ukraine, Simferopol

SPECIFICS AND DYNAMICS OF THE RATIO OF SOCIAL

IDENTITIES AMONG CRIMEAN ADOLESCENTS

The purpose of research

In 2006, and then in 2012 within the framework of a comprehensive study

of an ethnic worldview, we have been studying the priority of social identity

types, the valence of identities and expression of personal identity among

Crimean adolescents. In both cases, there was 230 adolescents of 15-16

years (students of 10-th and 11-th grade at the schools of Belogorsk region

in Crimea). Some parts of the adolescents were studying at

ethnohomogeneous schools – those are Crimean tatars from the areas of

compact settlement of the members of this ethnic group. The other part is

adolescents from the ethnoheterogeneous schools with mixed ethnic groups

of students (generally, those are Slavs and Crimean tatars.).

We supposed that:

1) The differences in the ethnic structure of contingent at the

institution might influence on the ratio of social identities of the students.