Post on 27-Mar-2023
International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 3, Number 2, February 2015 (Serial Number 17)
David
David Publishing Company
www.davidpublisher.com
PublishingDavid
International Relations and Diplomacy. 3(2015). 89. Copyright ©2015 by David Publishing Company
Publication Information: International Relations and Diplomacy is published monthly in print (ISSN 2328-2134) by David Publishing Company
located at 240 Nagle Avenue #15C, New York, NY 10034, USA.
Aims and Scope: International Relations and Diplomacy, a professional scholarly peer reviewed academic journal, commits itself to promoting the
academic communication about recent developments on Relations and Diplomacy, covers all sorts of research on international
relations, international security studies, politics, international political economy, regional studies, local government, public law and
policy, military study, foreign affairs and other relevant areas and tries to provide a platform for experts and scholars worldwide to
exchange their latest findings.
Editorial Office: 240 Nagle Avenue #15C, New York, NY 10034
Tel: 1-323-984-7526, 323-410-1082; Fax: 1-323-984-7374.
E-mail: diplomacy@davidpublishing.com; order@davidpublishing.com; shelly@davidpublishing.com
Abstracted/Indexed in:
★Index Copernicus, Poland;
★Summon Serials Solutions, USA;
★Polish Scholarly Bibliography (PBN);
★Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory, USA;
★Universe Digital Library S/B, Malaysia;
★Electronic Journals Library (EZB), Germany;
★NewJour, Georgetown University Library, USA;
★Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), Norway;
★ProQuest Social Science Collection, Public Affairs
Information Service (PAIS), USA;
★WorldCat;
★J-Gate;
★Google Scholar;
★Academic Keys;
★CiteFactor, USA;
★Scholar Steer, USA;
★Scientific Indexing Services;
★Turkish Education Index, Turkey;
★Sherpa/Romeo, University of Nottingham;
★China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI).
Subscription Information: Print $520 (per year) For past issues, please contact: shelly@davidpublishing.com, order@davidpublishing.com
Copyright ©2015 by David Publishing Company and individual contributors. All rights reserved. David Publishing
Company holds the exclusive copyright of all the contents of this journal. In accordance with the international convention,
no part of this journal may be reproduced or transmitted by any media or publishing organs (including various websites)
without the written permission of the copyright holder. Otherwise, any conduct would be considered as the violation of the
copyright. The contents of this journal are available for any citation, however, all the citations should be clearly indicated
with the title of this journal, serial number and the name of the author.
David Publishing Company
240 Nagle Avenue #15C, New York, NY 10034
Tel: 1-323-984-7526, 323-410-1082 Fax: 1-323-984-7374.
E-mail: order@davidpublishing.com
David Publishing Company
www.davidpublisher.com
DAVID PUBLISHING
D
International Relations and Diplomacy. 3(2015). 89. Copyright ©2015 by David Publishing Company
Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:
★Abdel-Hady (Qatar University, Qatar);
★Abosede Omowumi Bababtunde (National Open
University of Nigeria, Nigeria);
★Adriana Lukaszewicz (University of Warsaw, Poland);
★Alessandro Vagnini (Sapienza University of Rome,
Rome);
★Ali Bilgiç (Bilkent University, Turkey);
★Amedeo Arena (University of Naples, Italy);
★András Mérei (University of Pécs, Hungary);
★Anna Rosario D. Malindog (Ateneo De Manila University,
Philippines);
★Aruna Kumar Malik (Gujarat National Law University,
India);
★Basia Spalek (Kingston University, UK);
★Beata Przybylska-Maszner (Adam Mickiewicz University,
Poland);
★Brian Leonard Hocking (University of London, UK);
★Caner Bakir (Koç University, Turkey);
★Chandra Lal Pandey (University of Waikato, New
Zealand);
★Constanze Bauer (Western Institute of Technology of
Taranaki, New Zealand);
★Christian Henrich-Franke (Universität Siegen, Germany);
★Christos Kourtelis (King’s College London, UK);
★David J. Plazek (Johnson State College, USA);
★Dimitris Tsarouhas (Bilkent University, Turkey);
★Fatima Sadiqi (International Institute for Languages and
Cultures, Morocco);
★Ghadah AlMurshidi (Michigan State University, USA);
★Giuseppe Caforio (Torino University, Italy);
★Guseletov Boris (Just World Institute, Russia);
★Hanako Koyama (The University of Morioka, Japan);
★Kyeonghi Baek (State University of New York, USA);
★John Opute (London South Bank University, UK);
★Leila Simona Talani (King’s College London, UK);
★Léonie Maes (United Nations University, Japan);
★Marius-Costel ESI (Stefan Cel Mare University of
Suceava, Romania);
★Marek Rewizorski (Koszalin University of Technology,
Poland);
★Martha Mutisi (African Centre for the Constructive
Resolution of Disputes, South Africa);
★Menderes Koyuncu (Univercity of Yuzuncu Yil-Van,
Turkey);
★Myroslava Antonovych (University of Kyiv-Mohyla
Academy, Ukraine);
★Nazreen Shaik-Peremanov (University of Cambridge,
UK);
★Nermin Allam (University of Alberta, Edmonton,
Canada);
★Nadejda Komendantova (International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis, Austria);
★Nari Shelekpayev (Université de Montréal, Canada);
★Ngozi C. Kamalu (Fayetteville State University, USA);
★Niklas Eklund (Umeå University, Sweden);
★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
★Peter Simon Sapaty (National Academy of Sciences of
Ukraine, Ukraine);
★Raymond Lau (The University of Queensland, Australia);
★Raphael Cohen Almagor (The University of Hull, UK);
★Romi Jain (Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, India);
★Satoru Nagao (Gakushuin University, Japan);
★Shkumbin Misini (University of Prishtina, Yugoslavia);
★Sotiris Serbos (Democritus University of Thrace,
Greece);
★Stéphanie A. H. Bélanger (Royal Military College of
Canada, Canada);
★Timothy J. White (Xavier University, Ireland);
★Tumanyan David (Yerevan State University, Armenia);
★Zahid Latif (University of Peshawar, Pakistan);
★Zinaida Shevchuk (Masaryk University, Czech Republic);
★Valentina Vardabasso (Pantheon-Sorbonne University,
France);
★Xhaho Armela (Vitrina University, Albania);
★WANG Yi-wei (Renmin University of China, China).
The Editors wish to express their warm thanks to the people who have generously contributed to the
process of the peer review of articles submitted to International Relations and Diplomacy.
International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 3, Number 2, February 2015 (Serial Number 17)
Contents
Military Strategies and Religious War
The Diffusion of Military Strategies 89
Mehmet Ondur
Religious War: Al-Qaradawi During the Wars in Gaza 99
Shaul Bartal
Political Regime and International Relations
Female Traditional Rulers in Eastern Nigeria: Eze-Ogo Alu Ibiam as a Case Study 116
F. A. OLASUPO
Malaysia’s Contemporary Political and Economic Relations with Iran 123
Asmady Idris, Remali Yusoff
Judicialization and the Restavèk Phenomenon
Judicialization of Catalonian Language and Identity Politics 134
Walter F. Carnota
Understanding the Restavèk Phenomenon in Haiti Through Storytelling and Film 141
Marcela Moyano
International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 89-98
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.001
The Diffusion of Military Strategies
Mehmet Ondur
Wayne State University Detroit, Detroit, USA
Turkish Military Academy, Ankara, Turkey
This study shows the diffusion processes of innovations on military strategies. Since the notion of diffusion
describes the systemic spread and systemic equilibrium in more powerful terms and demonstrates dynamism, I
examined the military doctrinal diffusion patterns in terms of organizational, societal, and rational approach
perspectives. These approaches are the pillars of the theoretical edifice in which I argue that it is easier to see the
systemic diffusion of military strategies than the military innovations on weapons because of two factors: The
characteristics of doctrinal innovations and the behaviors of innovators (gatekeepers) are different. I use the
heuristic approach and examine many historical cases by focusing on military doctrines and the relationships
between alliances. I use the Blitzkrieg doctrine and the member relationships between the members of NATO as
case studies.
Keywords: diffusion, innovation, military strategies
Introduction
The notion of power varies across different areas. We can think of different variants of power such as
economic power, cultural power, diplomatic power, military power, and the like. Although they are related with
each other, military power is the most important aspect of power determinants in the international system. As a
result, the issue of military innovation becomes significant for the international security environment.
Although with the changes in the international system, such as globalization and the information
revolution, the understanding of the military power has been exposed to the function of many factors. However,
still the importance of soldiers, in other words, the traditional military power understanding has its importance
in addition to other factors. Mearsheimer (2001) argued that military power is the most important power variant
and military troops hold the focal point in the military power. He argued that it is the troops that occupy the
regions and keep the area under control.
Military power is correlated with the troops, the doctrinal, organizational (settings and arrangements) and
cultural aspects (discipline and obedience), however, it is also related with the complexity of the military
weapons systems, which provide efficiency to the military power structures. Today the battle theatre is different
and it continues to change as it has ever been. The reason why this change happens is related with both the
changes in the tangible and intangible goals of states. Tangible goals are the tactical level goals, in other words,
they are the military targets, such as different military assets of the enemy. However, intangible goals are
strategic level goals, such as gaining political or economic advantages against hostile or rival state. This also
Mehmet Ondur, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, Wayne State University Detroit; Turkish Military Academy.
DAVID PUBLISHING
D
THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES
90
plays an important role on military innovations.
The military power innovation can be examined from different approaches, which are structural realist,
organizational, and societal perspectives. Among these dimensions, the structural realist perspective addresses
the diffusion phenomena when it comes to the military innovations better than others. It is also important to
note that each of these approaches explains the factors of the theory of the diffusion of military innovations on
military strategies differently, and their framework depends on the different levels of analysis.
Literature Review
Military innovations provide a relative advantage to the sides that can innovate or effectively adopt an
innovation. This being said, military innovations hold key significance because states want to gain relative
advantage especially within the military balances for systemic equilibriums. And, it is those countries that can
adopt innovations significantly earlier than other adopters.
Today each new target can require a different weapon and each new defense means to protect these targets
requires new counter-attack means. This is also called as action-reaction spiral of the diffusion of power by way
of the military innovations. Moreover, examining the international security environment in terms of how states
fall and rise contributed significantly to the understanding of the role of the state as it is still the main actor of
the international system (Gilpin, 1981; Kugler & Lemke, 1996; Organski & Kugler, 1980; Waltz, 1979).
Diffusion of military power had been discussed by many authors. According to Modelski’s (1987) long
cycle world leadership theory, there are four periodical cycles, which are global war, world power,
deligitimization, and deconcentration. Each of these phases lasts roughly 25 years1, and each cycle process
determine the new world power which emerges after these series of cycles.
The salient aspect of the power diffusion according to Modelski happens at the last phase, because the
aggregated military power at the world power diffuses, and this brings out a new global war. This cyclic
relationship happens deterministically, and therefore, diffusion of power has dynamic characteristics according
to him. Modelski’s (1987) remarks on international justice can be thought as putting him within liberalist camp;
however, his arguments on the diffusion of power in the deconcentration phase is similar to that of the realism
perspective.
According to Hoffman (1974), foreign policy should be different than before, because over years many
dimensions have been added to the sole notion of power. Therefore, he defines power in broader terms, because
in the new world order foreign policies should include economic and social aspects. This shows the diffusion
and diversification of power, and this understanding of diffused power is economic power. The transformation
of the notion of power has brought new hierarchies, and each hierarchy demonstrates a different dimension of
power.
In this way, according to Hoffman (1974), we see the interaction of multiple systems. The new
interdependent international system has two traditional models. First model is state of war, which means
continuation of arms races, conflicts, hostilities, and the like. The second model is troubled peace, which means
that the restrictions upon uses of force such as economic interdependence because of the diffusion and
diversification of power and nuclear interconnection. These arguments on the new world order put Hoffman’s
argument within the new institutionalist paradigm in which it is believed that there is a systemic anarchy.
1 This is similar to the Kondratieff Long Price Waves theory.
THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES
91
This diffusion of power according to other liberalists, such as Josph Nye (2002), regarded non-state actors
to be important actors and to play new roles in the international system. Kegley and Raymond (1994) also
considered the power concentration as it is moving toward power diffusion in a multipolar world order. Thus,
all these insightful arguments indicate that there is a diffusion of power and military power is the most
important aspect of power. Therefore it becomes important to consider the diffusion of military power.
The issue of military innovation is not only significant in the area of weapons per se, but also the
noteworthy changes in the other areas, such as planning a military doctrine or organizing the military forces,
can also be regarded as military innovations. For example, a doctrine on the fight against terrorism might be a
military innovation or guerilla warfare might be another military innovation. The new or different doctrines are
especially seen in the different configuration types of alliances. NATO doctrine is much more different than the
USSR doctrine, and they are all military planning innovations.
When it comes to the states rather than firms, it is more difficult for gatekeepers to avoid the diffusion
because states have tremendous means to achieve their goals for breaking the firewall of the gatekeepers. It is
owing to the very reason that states seek security because international system is anarchic, and they follow each
other very closely especially their relative military capabilities and this gets harsher if they experienced conflict
between them. Waltz argues that “competition produces a tendency toward the sameness of the competitors…
so the weapons of major contenders, and even their strategies, begin to look much the same all over the world”
(Waltz, 1979).
However, the time for the systemic diffusion depends both on the “characteristics of the innovation” and
“the influence of the innovation gatekeepers”. While sometimes states can be willing to share an innovation,
sometimes they abstain from sharing technology with any other states. As an example of the first, this
especially happens within the alliances as seen between the United States and Britain after the Second World
War on the naval warfare technology.
As an example for the latter case, we can give weapons, such as nuclear weapons as an example for this
situation, because rather than giving the technology to the friend countries, they prefer to cover others under
their security umbrella. This is seen especially during the Cold War alliance configurations. This willingness is
seen more on doctrinal aspects than weapons diffusion as will be seen from the cases held from the Blitzkrieg
doctrine.
The factors of the diffusion of military innovations, i.e., organizational, economic, and dispute contiguity
have different levels of analysis ranging from the state level to the systemic level and demonstrate different
variation within them. The interaction of these factors specifies the necessary condition of diffusion of military
innovations.
Methodology
Given the three approaches on innovativeness and the theory of the three pillars of the theory, I try to
answer how does the military innovations diffuse? In order to analyze and answer the research question, I use
an historical heuristic approach. The unit of analysis of the study is innovations within the military sectors. The
dependent variable is the diffusion of military innovations and I boil it down to the innovation of military
weapons and military strategies. In particular, I examine military doctrines. Independent variables are
opportunity to acquire, military conflict contiguity, organizational rigidity, and characteristics of the military
innovation per se. I use the method of qualitative heuristic approach which examines the cases in the context of
THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES
92
history and interaction between units of analyses—states.
Military Innovations and Theory
Considering military innovations, three distinct approaches can shed light on the possible spread of
military innovations. These distinct perspectives are structural realist, organizational, and societal approaches.
Since each perspective demonstrates different aspects of military innovations, they will be called as the
dimension of the military innovations theory in this study.
From the societal point of view, militaries that are within harmonious societies are more innovative and
better to be more adoptive of the innovation. Civilian-military coordination and good relations between them
are also important part of this aspect. As it can be assumed that civilian influence can contribute mostly to the
weapons because it requires the technological knowledge and which is highly conducive to engineering and
scientific issues. However, planning part of military innovations mostly happen because of the officers within
the organization, but this is very rare and as can be seen in the history, the military fighting doctrines do not
change as frequent as military weapons change.
As civilian influence to military innovations most of the time demonstrates itself in the new weapons,
which depend heavily on technological innovation, and the military organization side generally demonstrates
itself on military planning and doctrines, it becomes crucial to distinguish military innovations from
technological innovations. Some military innovation can include the application high technology, however, all
military innovations do not require the use of high technology. Some states cannot afford to build military
weapons but they can innovate by using the available resources efficiently. Therefore, poor states by obtaining
high military effectiveness can prevail over those who use or have superior technology. This also explains why
poor states can win the wars sometimes.
Moreover, this perspective can also be elucidated by looking at the cohesiveness of the different peoples
within a country, and if there is minority or ethnicity discrimination, it can be assumed that it is less likely to
see military organizations in which all different peoples are same, equal and in harmony. This also makes
military organizations as well-functioning organizational structure and demonstrates some aspects of
organizational pillar point of view.
Divided societies are more likely to avoid progress because instead of focusing on research, they try to
eliminate the other party within the community from gaining influence, which, in the end, turns the game into a
lose-to-lose. This eventually causes conflicts mainly stemming from the different gains from the rents within
the societies. This indicates that civil societies, which have higher level of social capital, trust, and horizontal
relationships rather than hierarchical relationships can help to bring about better functioning governments, and
this will bring out positive effects on the military innovations.
As seen above, organizational and societal perspectives shed light on the factors needed for military
innovations, however, structural realist perspective can explain better which actors (countries) might innovate
and which will not. Since system structure is the key element and influences all of the policies of states,
neorealism can demonstrate the possible innovation trends by considering the international system, rather than
state characteristics and individual characteristics of rulers. According to neorealism, the biggest reason why
states tend to military innovation is because of their external threat perception and because of the relative
change within the balance of power and according to structural realism power parity means peace and power
preponderance means war (Grieco, 1988; Layne, 1993; Walt, 1985; Waltz, 1959). These are all very important
THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES
93
contributions to show the pattern of the diffusion of military innovations.
From this point of view, if state A has more external threat or security concerns than state B, which does
not have as many external threats as state A, then state A tends more toward military innovation. When we look
at Germany before the First World War, we see many military innovations, and the biggest reason for this was
their perception of threat, especially after the First World War. The level of external threat was so high in their
perceptions; they made both many military weapons innovations and military planning innovations. For
instance, Blitzkrieg was a striking development for both tactical and strategic level planning of armies. NATO
has been the most powerful alliance organization in the history depending mostly on the fact that the perceived
level of threat to the West was higher than ever been in the history.
Blitzkrieg is a military innovation which is a genuine new concept and combined arms warfare. As a
recent example, Israel improved blitzkrieg substantially from its traditional fighting doctrine. Israel is an
important example for military innovations because it exposed a very high level of external threat from the time
of its foundation. The Israeli example is also very important because although militaries tend not to change
within the military organization itself and unless there is a civilian contribution to the mainstream, Israeli
military had the motivation to military innovations both from outside of the organization and within the
organization.
Another point to note is that military innovations do not promise victory. There might be factors that
cannot be controlled in the battle field, such as weather conditions, the structure of the terrain, and the like, can
influence negatively the expected outcome from the military innovations. Those exogenous factors also most of
the time play important roles in the outcomes of wars.
Although external threats to a state provide incentives for innovations in many areas, states, at first, tend to
prioritize military innovations or the successful adoption of military innovations. The neorealist paradigm
posits that international system is anarchical and that this creates a very competitive environment. Since there is
no upper authority of rule-making, states put the survival and security concerns as their most important
determinants of their foreign policy behaviors. Since all states tend to behave in this way under the self-help
environment, they want to build power balances against each other, and alliances are the important agencies for
these goals. Alliance configuration is determined according to the balance of power between states, and the
most important determinant of power according to structural realism is military power. Therefore military
innovations play a significant for in changing power balances.
Case Studies: The Doctrine of Blitzkrieg and Alliance Configurations (NATO)
Blitzkrieg is a military doctrinal innovation, and innovations similar to Blitzkrieg require a certain level of
technology. For example, tanks, anti-tank weapons, sophisticated fire support units including dive-bombers and
artillery are all integral parts of this strategy. These are also related with economic power in addition to
organizational arrangements for successful diffusion of military doctrines.
Blitzkrieg describes a method of warfare in which the mobilization and maneuvers are very important
because this strategy intends to encircle the enemy through swift maneuvers. Rather than seeing troops in a row,
Blitzkrieg warfare uses spearheaded moving troops in order to penetrate the defending forces in a row of
trenches. The importance of speed is seen with the penetration of the first front of the enemy line because the
enemy will be unable to use its secondary mobile units against the penetrating units. Therefore, mobilized
troops, tanks, panzers, effective and close fire support of artillery, and air forces are vital for the success. After
THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES
94
penetrating and reaching the back of the primary, main, and subsidiary fronts of defense forces, with swift
maneuvers, the enemy gets encircled and trapped inside the circle by the cutting of its communication and
support, such as the channels of logistics which provide maintenance of the enemy’s fighting.
However, the influence that Blitzkrieg wielded during the Second World War attracted interest from all
over the world. Blitzkrieg began to be adopted with the latest technological changes and new defense tactics,
such as mobile defense and avoiding concentration of power stationary in a specific area, over years. This was
easier for states to adopt because when it comes to the doctrinal aspects, it is difficult to keep the know-how
under the monopoly of its innovators. This has been in this way in the international system, traditionally;
therefore, the emergence of each new doctrine has been effective over many years and became a paradigm.
One of the biggest difficulty of the diffusion of the military innovations on strategy and planning aspects is
doctrinal innovations are difficult to see, and discerning the influence of the creativity becomes similarly
problematic. However, it was explicit, on the outcome of the war. For example, when German troops invaded
Poland in 1939, the collapse of the Polish troops was mainly viewed in such a manner as to suggest that the
defeat was not attributable to the superiority of the doctrine, but instead due to the ineptitude of the Polish
troops. Thus, France did not need to make changes to its defense plans and continued the First World War
trench warfare defense doctrine. However, it became obvious after the fall of France that Germans applied a
superior doctrine in its victories. But the result was different for Germans on Russian soil.
Even during the inter-war period, great powers began to adopt Blitzkrieg and started the diffusion process.
States began to give importance to mobility and to use military decision weapons, such as tanks, and heavily
use of air force fire support. However, it did not spread before Germany conquered most of the Europe, and
allied powers could not imitate Germany before suffering enormous causalities and losses. For example, the
Blitzkrieg diffused to Japan and the United States before they fought with each other during the Second World
War. However, toward the end of the war, nearly all countries, having the technological means to build
required military weapons for this doctrine, adopted the Blitzkrieg.
With the United States’ military innovation of nuclear weapons, the blitzkrieg doctrine began to be
replaced with other doctrines over years, however, it remained important to shape the subsequent doctrines.
However, updated doctrines have been adopted easily, again. For instance, the United States’ nuclear weapon
monopoly did not last long because the Soviet Union acquired the technology after only four years. Nuclear
weapons were intended to serve for strategic purposes of retaliation instead of using conventional weapons.
However, when the Soviet Union became nuclear weapons capable, then the blitzkrieg doctrine changed into
mutually assured destruction (MAD) and limited war doctrines.
One of the salient influences of nuclear weapons on the doctrinal military innovations is that nuclear
weapons diffused before an appropriate doctrine for their use by the United States had been forged. After the
emergence of other nuclear weapons countries in the international system, states began to adopt mutually
assured destruction and limited war strategies similar to the US and Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the MAD and
limited war doctrines still required mobile troops similar to the way as it was introduced by the Blitzkrieg
doctrine beforehand; therefore, we see the vicious cycle of action-reaction pattern, again.
However, in the limited war doctrines, the use of large number of troops became outmoded between
nuclear weapons states because of the massive retaliation possibility with nuclear weapons. The only one war
between nuclear weapons states show that crises and wars between nuclear weapons states have not escalated to
all-out wars, as seen in the Kargil War in 1999. Nevertheless, the number of proxy wars between the great
THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES
95
powers have increased, and the density of militarized international disputes over years have continued to
increase up-to-date.
We can assume that the primary aspects of Blitzkrieg were shaped by the continued efforts during
industrialism, especially with the combined help of the steam, rifle and telegraph to defeat the Austrian Empire
by the Prussians in 1866. This is followed by the introduction and effective use of machine guns and artillery
supports and applied during the trench warfare of the First World War. Then the stability of trenches turned
into mobile trenches with the effective introduction of armored vehicles in the battlefield. This mobility reached
its peak at the Second World War period. Battles became more decisive over the years of industrialization.
Blitzkrieg is a significant example of military innovation because it caused a huge impact on international
politics and it provided a noteworthy relative advantage to its innovators before it began to diffuse. However, it
also provided many strategic advantages to those who adopted this doctrinal innovation early periods of its
innovation. Those who could not adopt or left in the laggard position could not gain as much advantage relative
to earlier adopters.
One of the main reasons why Blitzkrieg spread so fast is particularly because of the existence of highly
competitive environment of the Second World War created in the international system. As a result of this,
major countries became much more alert to any changes among the relative capabilities of states. Although
bilateral or multilateral information channels were closed between them, there was a considerable flow of
information on the changes within the relative capabilities especially between the fighting states.
When the threat is eminent or inevitable and its early shocks are felt, states, as if, tend to open their
receptors to gain more information and deduce their following course of action to the more goal oriented way.
During the time of both the First World War and the Second World War, states spent enormous time and
energy to provide relative advantages especially in terms of military aspects and the acquisition of information
about the new use of weapons and doctrines. That is why the German Wars (WWI and WWII) increased the
diffusion military innovations and especially the Blitzkrieg during the Second World War.
Germany could not avoid spreading its military innovation—Blitzkrieg—as a gatekeeper because it could
not hide it from others over time. Moreover, after the successes of this strategy were witnessed by the other
warring states, it became important for them to adopt this doctrine for their security and also for their survival
in the anarchical international order. The environment of competitiveness made other states act in a similar way
in the adoption of new advantages.
Not only did Japan adopt this doctrine successfully, but other states, such as the United States, Britain, and
the USSR also adopted it. Although organizational changes are related with the societal aspects, when the need
for security requires the changes, these happen very quickly, as seen with examples derived from between 1941
and 1945. Since doctrinal changes are also related with the organization and societal aspects, the incubation
period should be higher when compared with the use of a new weapon or system of communication or change
in the logistic systems. Therefore, it was more difficult for the adopters to get used to the mobile
combined-arms warfare rather than the weapons innovation, such as nuclear weapons.
Considering the Blitzkrieg, we can assume that there is a payoff for making institutional arrangements due
to many reasons but mainly because of the available time and instinct of survival. Long-term institutional
changes are less costly and are adopted more efficiently than the abrupt and sudden ones. For example, because
of their geographic locations, states can apply different fighting doctrines. We can think the Finnish-Russian
War (also known as Winter War because of the harsh weather conditions during fighting) in 1939 and 1940 in
THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES
96
terms of this situation.
This war was started with the Soviet’s unsuccessful invasion of Finland, the Winter War, which lasted
more than one year and caused the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations. The interesting
aspect of this war was the power differentials between the armies of the two states. Russia had almost ten times
more troops than Finland and had more than 100 times number of tanks and armored vehicles than Finland.
Soviet generals admired the Blitzkrieg but it was not a good idea to use a highly mobile army and change the
formation and organization of the army according to it. Moreover, there were not pavements but many
obstacles of rivers, lakes, ice, and the like. Therefore, advantages provided by the geography would provide
tremendous benefits to any side. It was the Finnish army that obtained this advantage of cold weather, snow,
long hours of night-time, and forest.
It is also important to note that, however, the main characteristics of the Blitzkrieg strategy was to bring
out mobilized troops of various units together. Nevertheless, each country adopted the doctrine according to
their conditions. As seen in the Winter War, the side that who could adapt according to their conditions better
suffered less causality.
For example, at the beginning of the German Wars, the Unites States did not have much mechanized
troops, Britain and France had very low numbers of motorized units, and Soviet Union was not that much
different than the others. However, at the end of the war, all had their main combatant units motorized. The
biggest change was seen in the United States because other states had to adopt Blitzkrieg when engaging in a
war, and therefore, their observations could not provide them adequate time required. Therefore, they had
difficulty in using the doctrine effectively at the beginning of their adoption.
When it comes to the United States, the situation was different because it could observe the battle theatre
and adopt the doctrine more thoroughly than the others. However, United States could not have the opportunity
to test its own doctrine and determine its deficiencies as effectively as other states who engaged actively for the
duration of the War.
It was especially difficult for the Soviet army to reorganize its doctrine because they had a huge
experience of fights not only in the Eastern side of the Second World War, but also against the Turkic
minorities on the Central Asia steps, the Ottomans in the Balkans, and other minorities in the Caucasus regions.
Moreover, historically, Russia engaged many wars with others such as, the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian
Empire, and with Asian states. This has posed some organizational rigidity on its military structure over years.
However, for the United States, the situation was completely different because it did not have much war
experience; therefore, it has less organizational power to resist the doctrinal changes. In addition to this, it could
easily build its own doctrine by modifying the Blitzkrieg more appropriately in a relatively shorter period of
time. When the factors of more accurately observing the war theatre and less resistance to institutional change,
and high degree of external threat came together, this brought about the best modification of the Blitzkrieg. But
being away from the war theater and being unable to measure the possible outcomes of the doctrinal changes,
nevertheless, the United States adopted the Blitzkrieg most effectively and efficiently than the others.
For example, units under General George S. Patton’s command in the northern Africa swept the Axis
Power from the region successfully. He was later regarded as turned the general who turned the Blitzkrieg
against its own originators (Mayer, 2009) and compared with the victories on the battlefield with German Field
Marshall Erwin Rommel always. Patton’s Third Army introduced a new style of fighting doctrine based mainly
on the Blitzkrieg. His doctrine mainly depended on the heavily use of armored vehicles together with
THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES
97
continuously pushing forward and moving so fast but abstaining from entranced infantry warfare.
It might be misleading if we were to rely solely on security concerns as being more successful for
innovations or adoption of military innovations for the diffusion of military innovations because of the role of
the gatekeepers also determine the future course of the diffusion. If there is little chance that gatekeeper has the
power to impede the diffusion process, then the motion of the diffusion becomes slowed. However, alliances
can serve to ease the diffusion process.
Since the security is priority, states can sometimes share their innovation and voluntarily if it helps their
security. This is related with the security concerns because of the anarchical structure of the international
system. For example, Britain shared the know-how required to build powerful naval forces. It is also striking to
see that there had been no great power wars between the power transitions processes from Britain to the United
States and Britain share its military innovations with the United States. Therefore, however possible to see
gatekeepers voluntary share innovations, it is very rare in history.
The internal potentials of the United States can be assumed as a combination of many factors, such as
education, economic development, urbanization, and industrialization, etc. All these factors are mutually
reinforcing and helping the maintenance of global power position. The systemic influence, when combined
with the internal potential of the United States, causes the international system to feel America’s influence in a
more pronounced manner.
Therefore, it is also important to mention the Unites Stated in the diffusion of military planning and
strategy. The experiences of the United States’ troops in the Second World War together with the Patton’s
enhanced Blitzkrieg strategy also influenced the current military doctrine of the Western Armies. Today,
NATO doctrine is the main fighting doctrine for the member states, and each member state has had to arrange
its military organizations according to the rules of the alliance. The same was true for the Warsaw Pact
countries.
The accurate information on the security concerns and military solutions are extremely important because
it creates the pool of experiences of the member states and enable to select best course of action in the future
confrontations. Therefore, what we see today is the remnants of the Blitzkrieg, but with constant development
efforts of trials errors over years. This is especially important for the world’s superpower, the United States, in
order to maintain its international superiority from the feedback.
In sum, it is important to consider the payoff because the experience might also be important. Since states
most of the time have developed more efficient adoption of innovations by first observing and detect their
problems with less participation at first and develop their adoption accordingly. As seen in the United States
and Russia example. Russians could not use Blitzkrieg efficiently because of their traditional military doctrine,
but they learned a lot from the shameful Winter War. Then the question becomes why the United States could
easily learn from the Second World War theater and applied the Patton’s more innovative Blitzkrieg
successfully lies under the reason that American military did not engage with wars with other states historically
and this gave the United States and low level of organizational block for the new doctrinal arrangements.
Conclusion
Since the pillars of the theoretical edifice argued in this study reinforce and complement each other, each
dimension has different, dynamically changing relations with each dimension (structural realist, organizational,
and societal). Given this relationship between the theoretical pillars and the theoretical dimensions, the different
THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES
98
levels of analysis show the dynamic and, although interconnected, self-help environment of the international
system for the diffusion mechanisms of military innovations. If they are put in an order of importance, system
level (conflict contiguity) influence plays larger role than the others, and it is followed by the hybrid level
(economic factor) and eventually followed by the state level (organizational factor).
Within its own dynamism, the international system is a system of rivalry and one of the most important
aspect for relative advantage of one arty over the others is to halt one way or another process of diffusion. If it
is not possible, then try to find new innovations in order to maintain the current advantageous position.
Otherwise, states are doomed to fail and to lose their advantage relative to the other competing actors.
This brings us to the conclusion that states are still the key players in the relatively complex international
system. As the theory argued in this paper shows, the only way to impede the diffusion of nuclear weapons is
through the role of the gatekeepers, otherwise, diffusion is inevitable. Since the influence of gatekeepers on
military strategies is not effective, it is easier to see the diffusion of doctrinal innovations than that of the spread
of military weapon innovations.
References
Gilpin, R. (1981). War and change in world politics. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Grieco, J. M. (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. International
Organization, 42(3), 485-507.
Hoffman, S. (1974). US primacy or a world community? The Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy: Opportunities and contradictions
from old catalog [Sound recording]. Santa Barbara, Calif: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.
Kegley, C. W., & Raymond, G. A. (1994). A multipolar peace?: Great-power politics in the twenty-first century. New York: St.
Martin’s.
Kugler, J., & Lemke, D. (1996). Parity and war: Evaluations and extensions of the war ledger. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
Layne, C. (1993). The unipolar illusion: Why new great powers will rise. International Security, 17(4), 5-51.
Mayer, B. (2009). Who dares wins : The Green Beret way to conquer fear and succeed. New York: Pocket Books.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: Norton.
Modelski, G. (1987). Long cycles in world politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Nye, J. S. (2002). The paradox of American power: Why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone. Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Organski, A. F. K., & Kugler, J. (1980). The war ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Walt, S. M. (1985). Alliance formation and the balance of world power. International Security, 9(4), 3-43.
Waltz, K. N. (1959). Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis. New York: Columbia University Press.
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics (1st ed.). Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill.
International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 99-115
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.002
Religious War: Al-Qaradawi During the Wars in Gaza
Shaul Bartal
Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
Since Israel‟s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, it has already conducted over three wars and a few
other operations against Hamas. The last Gaza War lasted 50 days (July 7-August 26, 2014). This article shows
how this conflict is in actuality a war between Islamic nationalism (represented by Hamas) and Jewish nationalism
(represented by Israel). In this constant state of conflict, Hamas is supported by the famous Sheikh Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, a Muslim Brotherhood scholar and the head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars and other
well-known Islamic institutions. An analysis of Qaradawi‟s views on the wars in Gaza explains why jihad in
Palestine will continue and why there is no possible compromise solution. According to Qaradawi, the war against
Israel is the most important type of jihad in the Arab world today (and not in Syria and Iraq). This is the first and
foremost of all Muslim problems and must be supported by all Muslims. The Gaza Strip is only one battlefield in
this war.
Keywords: Gaza War, Hamas, Israel, Qaradawi, Palestine, Egypt, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades
Religious War: Al-Qaradawi During the Wars in Gaza
In June 2006, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) began military operations with the purpose of harming
Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The first Gaza Strip operation began as a response to the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit
on 25 June 2006 and was called “Summer Rain”. It was discontinued due to the break out of the second
Lebanese War one week later. On 31 October 2006, operation “Autumn Clouds” began. In this operation, the
IDF entered the Gaza Strip in the area of Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahia which are located in the northern end of
Strip. On 26 November 2006, after the deaths of over 400 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, the operation drew to
a close (Ali, 2009, pp. 85-89). These two military actions took place at a time when the Fatah organization,
under the leadership of Muhammad Dahlan, was still the ruling factor in the Gaza Strip under the Palestinian
Authority. At this time, Dahlan was still fighting his opposition and dealing with rising criticism by the Hamas
organization on his performance. The June 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas and the establishment of
Hamas control over the Strip by the removal of all Fatah operatives, led to a period of repeated rounds of war
between Israel and the Hamas organization and its supporters in the Strip, a policy which has been described as
“lawn mowing” (Inbar, September 1, 2014).
In the period of time since the Hamas revolution in June 2007 until today, there have been four Israeli
military operations aimed at weakening the Hamas regime and reducing the amount of rockets launched at
Israel from the Gaza Strip as much as possible. Although operations “Warm Winter” (27 Feb. 2008-4 Mar.
2008) and “Cast Lead” (27 Dec. 2008-1 Jan. 2009), cost over 1,600 deaths, it led only to a relative period of
Shaul Bartal, Ph.D., Middle Eastern Studies Department, Bar Ilan University.
DAVID PUBLISHING
D
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
100
quiet. Israel‟s success in these operations was limited (Ali, 2009, pp. 87-95). Hamas was able to rehabilitate
itself, renew its rocket strength and even successfully increase the firing range of the air strikes on Israeli
targets. A large part of the Hamas organization‟s success in retaining its abilities stems from the financial and
military aid that it received from Qatar. This financial aid enabled Hamas to not only rehabilitate the Strip
physically but to purchase weapons as well. The financial, political and public support given to Hamas from
around the world also included monies from the charity committees. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi‟s support
which stemmed from his position as the Director of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) and
head of the trustees of the International Jerusalem Institute insured that a major part of the monies collected as
part of tithing in the Islamic law (zakat) went to the Hamas organization (The General National Security
Service, Shabak, September 2009; Drori, 2014, pp. 3-4).
After the “Cast Lead” operation in 2009, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi actively raised significant funds for
the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip after the Israeli attacks. He did this in the framework of his position as the
Director of IUMS by diverting donations from the international charity organizations that he had established,
E‟itilaf Al-Khair (The Charity Coalition), to Hamas. In addition, Qaradawi, operating from Qatar (his place of
residence), convinced the local ruler (Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani) to support the Hamas organization
economically and politically (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, January 29, 2009). This article will survey
Qaradawi‟s contributions to Hamas during the last two Israeli operations.
Qaradawi’s Support for Hamas During “Operation Pillar of Defense”
On 14 November 2012, the IDF began Operation “Pillar of Defense”. The operation‟s purpose was to limit
the amount of rockets fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip. This operation began with the assassination of
Ahmed al-Jabari, the Deputy Commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (the military arm of Hamas),
who was the actual commander in the field. Under Hamas rule, over 169 Gaza residents died and over 800 were
injured during the operation. In addition, there was mass destruction of foundations and public buildings. The
operation led not only to an Israeli military achievement but to a Hamas political achievement as well (Bartal,
November 18, 2012). This operation took place during the period of the blossoming of the Arab spring where
the Islamic parties won elections in Tunis, Morocco, Egypt and Yemen. It appeared as if the Muslim
Brotherhood would, in another minute, win control over the whole Arab world thereby making it possible for
their vision of an Islamic Empire to become a reality. For the first time, Hamas was granted political
recognition for the legitimacy of its rule from the states of the Arab League. Ismail Haniyeh, the prime minister
of the Hamas government, began to receive Arab foreign ministers and the heads of the Arab governments who
expressed support and unequivocal recognition for Hamas in Gaza to the dissatisfaction of the President of the
Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas (Abu „Amer, January 2013, pp. 32-33). Credit for these
achievements should also be given to Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi who, already on the second day of Operation
Pillar of Defense, came to the aid of the Hamas organization. In his visit to Egypt he was able to find fertile
ground for stirring up anti-Israel feelings in the state where the president, Mohamed Mursi, was a member of
the Muslim Brotherhood.
Sheikh al-Qaradaw also serves as a member of the al-Azhar Committee of Muslim scholars, the most
influential law institution in the Islamic world. Qaradawi‟s words from within the al-Azhar organization were
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
101
widely broadcast throughout the Arab states. Qaradawi called for Islamic Arab unity against the mutual enemy
of the Islamic nation and the strengthening of the spirit of the children of Palestine in Gaza. Qaradawi‟s words
were broadcast on Friday, 16 November 2012, on the same historic day that the Egyptian Prime Minister
Hesham Mohamed Qandil visited the Gaza Strip. Qaradawi said: “They [the Muslim States] have to prove to
the whole world that they are one [Islamic] nation which can clash with all of the [aggression] of a nation from
among its people [like in Palestine]” (Maktab al-Filastini lil-l'alam, November 16, 2012). Qaradawi also added
a condemnation of “those same religious leaders of the Islamic nation who do not arise against Israel and its
evil, boastful deeds” (Maktab al-Filastini lil-l‟alam, November 16, 2012).
The revolutions in the Arab world, where the Islamic movements connected to the Muslim Brotherhood,
came into power in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Yemen. This led to an Islamic Arab world much more willing
to aid the Palestinians in their struggle. In his sermon, which was broadcast throughout the Arab world from
al-Azhar, Qaradawi called for a joint mass march of all Arabs for the freedom of Gaza and for aid to the
children of Palestine. In his call to the Arab states and especially to the rule of the Brotherhood in Egypt,
Qaradawi demanded the cancellation of the peace agreement, the breaking off of relations with Tel Aviv and
the return of the Arab ambassadors to their own countries. Qaradawi‟s call did not fall on empty ears. A
number of Arab states expressed support for the Hamas government and this included a procession of Arab
foreign ministers to Gaza. Thus, Hamas‟ political gain became an actual one—de facto recognition for its
government (Bartal, November 18, 2012). For example, Egypt recalled its ambassador from Israel as a result of
the Israeli operation, but it did not cut off its diplomatic relations with Israel and even took a significant role in
stopping the fighting between the two sides. This shows that despite the evident influence of Qaradawi on the
supporters of the Moslem Brotherhood throughout the world with an emphasis on Egypt, his political influence
on the regime was limited. In the meantime, the regime of the Muslim Brotherhood prefers its political interests
over its political recommendations. Likewise, despite widespread support, as much as it was, not a single Arab
state went out of its way to help Hamas in its war against Israel. Hamas senior personnel expressed their
disappointment with the reactions of the Arab world which were not effective enough in putting enough
pressure on Israel as had been expected (Kam, 2012, pp. 22-23).
What is Qaradawi‟s contribution to Hamas‟ political achievements for that same period? The contribution
is enormous. He aided in the realization of the first visit to the Gaza Strip by an Arab leader since the Hamas
Revolution in June 2007—the visit of the Emir of Qatar Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani on 23 October 2012.
During this visit, the Emir of Qatar purposely skipped over a similar visit to the Palestinian Authority in
Ramallah thereby, through his actions and his monetary support, showing his belief in the legitimacy of the
regime and in the Hamas ideology. His shunning of the Palestinian Authority led to criticism by the
government of Salam Fayad and the president of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas. Heniyah also
announced the establishment of a new city near Khan Yunis which would carry the name Hamad in honor of
the historic visit which symbolized an historical turnabout in the diplomatic recognition of the Hamas regime.
Nothing was left for Mahmoud Abbas other than to express his objections to the visit and to hope that it would
not affect the efforts which in the end succeeded—the signing of an appeasement agreement between the two
movements (Issacharoff, October 24, 2012; Haaretz, October 23, 2012).
In an article published on the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades‟ site, Qaradawi is quoted as saying that it
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
102
was his influence on Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani which was responsible for the historical visit of the
Emir of Qatar to the Gaza Strip during Operation Protective Edge and for the actions of the rest of the
governmental factors in Duha where he has lived since the 1960s (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, January 23,
2013). Qaradawi explains that his close ties with the president of Qatar began right after the Gaza War which
resulted in the deaths of 1,415 martyrs and left 5,450 people injured. As head of a delegation of religious sages,
Qaradawi met with the Emir of Qatar and asked him to intercede on the behalf of the Hamas government in
Gaza to help fight the Israeli aggression. According to al-Qaradawi, it was him who succeeded in awakening
the enthusiasm of the Emir of Qatar to the distress of Gaza and to the Palestinian matter and that the Emir
committed himself in front of him to do as much as he could in regard to the Gaza problem (Izz ad-Din
al-Qassam Brigades, January 29, 2009). In the beginning, the Emir of Qatar did, in fact, try to aid in the
realization of an internal appeasement with the sponsoring of the Duha Agreement between the two
sides—Fatah and Hamas, signed in Qatar on 6 Feb. 2012 (Issacharoff & Khuri, February 6, 2012). But, when
this agreement failed to lead to the awaited for appeasement, the Emir took independent political action which
was in opposition to the stand of the Palestinian Authority and the official stand of the Arab League at that time.
The Emir came to the Gaza Strip on an official state visit—the first time of an Arab leader to the Strip since the
Hamas gained control in 2007.
Operation Protective Edge
On July 8, the “Operation Protective Edge” broke out in the Gaza Strip. This operation was carried out in a
number of stages that included air strikes, limited ground entry and the assassination of the leaders of the Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The most high profile assassinations were against the leaders and founders of the
Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades: Muhammad Ibrahim Salah Abu Shamala (Abu Khalil), a member of the upper
military council, Raed Subhi Ahmad al-Attar (Abu Eyman), the commander of the Rafah district, the
“mastermind behind the abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit” (Albany Tribune News, March 14, 2014)
and a member of the upper military council and Mohammed Hamdan Barhoum, (Abu Osama) (Izz ad-Din
al-Qassam Brigades, August 21, 2014). Also included the attempted assassination of Muhammad Deif (chief
commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades). During the assassination attempt the following were
killed: Deif‟s wife, Widad, his son, Ali, and his daughter Sara were killed (Levi, Kais, & Somfalvi, 2014).
From the first day of the operation, Qaradawi supported Hamas and encouraged it and the rest of the
Palestinian factions to continue with their opposition and their jihad against Israel. IUMS, in an opinion written
by Qaradawi which was already published on the second day of the war, on July 9th, called on all the
governments and the Islamic and the Human Rights organizations to stop the Zionistic violence. At the same
time, Qaradawi called for the “Palestinian nation to continue in its struggle through a third intifada” and for the
“Palestinian nation to continue to steadfastly hold on to the land of Palestine against the exploiting Zionist
occupier” (Qaradawi, July 9, 2014a).
Qaradawi‟s messages, as expressed in the last Gaza war, are a continuation of the consistent content in his
speeches and sermons in regard to the duty of jihad in Palestine. A number of these messages were repeated in
different contexts even during the Cast Lead Operation (27 December 27 2008-18 January 2009) and the Pillar
of Defense Operation (14-21 November 2012). The fifty-day battle in this round of fighting enabled Qaradawi
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
103
to decisively express his views supporting Hamas and to emphasize many other additional motifs.
The Most Important Jihad is in Gaza
For those fighting on the land of al-sham [a nickname for the land of Greater Syria which includes Jordan,
Lebanon and Israel] and to all those who turn to Gaza [and who carry out] the jihad in Gaza, this is the most
important jihad on the land of al-sham. This is my ruling for this hour, everything that is related to [the struggle]
on the land of Gaza. Gaza is calling you!! Where are the jihad fighters and the free men? Hey, the children of
Umar-al-Faruq [a nickname for Amar Ibn al-Khatib, the second Caliph during whose reign Jerusalem and the
land of Israel were captured]! (Qaradawi, July 23, 2014).
The struggle in the Gaza Strip is part of the ongoing struggle between the Zionistic Jews and the Islamic
nation. This crucial struggle demands to be resolved in a way which is in favor of the children of the nation
who are protecting themselves from an anti-Muslim attacking force which the Egyptian regime of Abdel Fattah
Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi put together. In light of this, the drafting of every son of the nation is the
requirement of the hour. In a declaration made by at the beginning of the fighting, Qaradawi warned of
fabricated religious rulings and emphasized that his religious stand is constant and is expressed in his books, his
writings and his sermons which deal with the issue of Palestine and which require fighting in
Palestine—against people and property (Qaradawi, August 9, 2014).
From among his books, Qaradawi indicates three significant ones which emphasize his ideas on the
importance of jihad in Palestine. He believes that jihad is a defensive jihad and therefore it is within the realm
of personal responsibility (fard al-'ayn). These are: (1) A lesson in the second nakbeh [1967]—Why we were
defeated and how we can win). This book was published immediately after the Six-Day War (Qaradawi, 1993);
(2) Jerusalem, the problem of every Muslim (Qaradawi, 2001a); (3) The encyclopedia of the laws of jihad
(Qaradawi, 2009).
Fighting for jihad in Gaza takes religious precedence over fighting for jihad in other sectors where there is
a struggle between Muslim and Muslim such as in Syria and Iraq. Fighting in Gaza against the Jews proceeds
any fighting against Christian infidels such as the United States fighting in Afghanistan. Jihad is graded
according to the level of the importance of the area to Islam. This ideology also stems from Qaradawi‟s
anti-Semitic approach which describes the struggle against the Jews as a cosmic struggle between good and evil
that began at the dawn of Islam (Qaradawi, 2001b, pp. 61-69).
The understanding that jihad is on a graded scale with jihad in Palestine at the top of the list of priorities is
expressed by the words of the members of the Islamic movement in Israel such as Sheikh Ra‟ed Salah
Mahagana and Sheikh Kamal Khatib. The Islamic Movement in the Northern sector is headed by Raed Salah
and is part of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and is a sister organization to Hamas in Palestine (Bartal,
2012, pp. 84-95). But, keep in mind that these Islamic leaders, like their counterpart Hamas activist Dr. Ismail
Heniyah, are members of the IUMS headed by al-Qaradawi.
Palestine, according to Sheikh Kamal Khatib, is a central problem of the nation and will stay like that. The
crisis in Iraq in which the Islamic State of al-Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) organization is involved, and the crisis in
Syria, Lebanon and Egypt are not the central problems of the Islamic nation. The importance of jihad in
Palestine stems from the position of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa in Islam. Khatib emphasized that the qibla (the
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
104
direction of the Islamic prayer) towards al-Aqsa is the Muslims‟ important qibla. It was the first qibla in Islam
and it will return to that status. It is the role of the religious sages to support the Palestinian struggle which will
indicate the renewed importance of Jerusalem in Islam (Qaradawi, August 21, 2014).
The reason for Khatib‟s strong stand as he expressed it at the General Assembly of the IUMS which took
place in Istanbul is:
Due to the religious ruling of the Jewish sages who permit the settlers to break into the al-Aqsa mosque and to plan its
destruction while rebuilding the fake Holy Temple (al-Hikal al-Mazoum). How can it be that the Jews would make such a
religious ruling and the Islamic sages will be quiet? (Qaradawi, August 21, 2014)
This stand by Khatib is not new and represents the ideas of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. In a
proclamation published by the Harakat al Kifah al Islami [Islamic Struggle Movement] before the first intifada
in July 1983, which was, already, at that time, identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, it said:
Hey, masses of the Muslim nation, what are the Jews, the descendants of the apes and pigs, doing to us?… What is
this pure blood of our sons that flows every day between us without being avenged?… What is this violence that is being
carried out against us by our armed enemies which satisfies its lust for blood?… The Jews‟ program is one since they came
to your Holy Land, settlement, harassment, acts of slaughter, wholesale migration, the hostile hearts spit from their hatred
to Islam and as a preparation for their decisive attacks on our holy places in order to erase the al-Aqsa Mosque and rebuild
their false Holy Temple… There is nothing before us except to rise up and there is nothing in front of us except for jihad,
there is nothing before us except for war against the enemies of Allah. We must fight them with every possible means and
all of the places, without pity. (Shabi & Shaked, 1994, pp. 62-63)
The content of this proclamation is repeated time and time again, up until today, by the people of Hamas
and the Islamic Jihad and you can find these expressions in Qaradawi‟s works as well.
On 10 July 2014, during Ramadan, after Muhammed Abu Khdeir was murdered and his murderers
revealed, and after Operation Protective Edge and after the first reports and sights of the destruction in Gaza,
Qaradawi publicized his call to come and protect Jerusalem, “Palestine and Jerusalem are the #1
Islamic problems in importance” (Qaradawi, July 10, 2014). The struggle in Jerusalem today is an additional
struggle,
The division [of the Temple Mount] and the expulsion, oppression and Judaization of the city in order to turn it into a
Jewish capital. This is while destroying the Arab and Islamic character and the expulsion of its Jerusalemite residents. The
[Zionist] occupation is in a race against time and therefore it is trying to set facts on the ground. (Qaradawi, July 10, 2014)
According to Qaradawi, Israel is using the internal instability in many areas of the Muslim nation in order
to carry out the dangerous plan. The dangerous plan referred to by Qaradawi is the destruction of the al-Aqsa
Mosque and the building of a temple on its ruins.
The enemies‟ [the Jews‟] plans, which are using the events in Syria and Egypt, are gradually advancing… They are
building beneath al-Aqsa and they are creating a blockade on top of al Aqsa. Thus, they are preventing the entry of Muslim
worshippers. The threat against al-Aqsa is one that has been going on a long time and is permanent. That is why I am
declaring that the problem of Palestine and the problem of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa is a Muslim problem of the first degree.
(Qaradawi, July 10, 2014)
It is not just the problem of the Palestinians alone but of all the Muslims. Thus, despite the fact that
Muslims in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq also face internal difficulties, the most important place for jihad is
still in Palestine due to the holiness of Jerusalem and the constant threat on it by the Jews. Qaradawi, as head of
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
105
the trustees of Muasasat al-Quds al-Dawliya (International Jerusalem Institution) calls for the religious leaders
to be aware of their job and their responsibility to support the struggle over Jerusalem and to endow Islamic
awareness on the city. In addition, Qaradawi called out to all Muslims, wherever they are, to support Jerusalem
and the struggle of the sons of Palestine for it. The struggle of Hamas in Gaza is a part of the religious struggle
between the Muslim believing community and the infidel community (Qaradawi, July 10, 2014).
In light of this, it is not surprising that at the conference of the IUMS, which took place in August 2014
immediately after the Gaza Operation, Salah Aruri raised his voice. Aruri is a member of Hamas‟ political
bureau and a founder of the Hamas‟ military arm in the West Bank. Aruri, originally from the village of Arura
near Ramallah) today lives in Turkey and is the man who approved the action of the kidnapping of the three
boys. This kidnapping led to the war in Gaza. At the general conference he made no mention of the kidnapping
at all. It was reported that Aruri:
Updated those present on what was generally happening in Palestine and what was specifically happening in Gaza. He
detailed what happened during the racist and barbaric [Zionist] wars, the strangling blockade [on Gaza]. He described the
exploiting settlements and the Judaization of the respected Jerusalem—a Judaization which is expressed by a change in the
building and the division of al-Aqsa according to the timetable [a time for Jews and a time for Muslims] and also in the
division of the al-Aqsa plaza between the sides [Jewish space and Islamic space. (Qaradawi, August 24, 2014)
The Forth IUMS Conference was organized in Istanbul, the capital of Turkey between 20-22 Aug 2014.
Those attending the conference included Rashid al-Ghannushi, the leader of the Islamic party, Al-Nahda
(Rebirth) which won the elections in his country. The combination of Kamal Khatib, Salah Aruri and Qaradawi
once again shows the ties among the Islamic movement in Israel, Hamas and Sheikh al-Qaradawi.
In addition to the holiness of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa in Islamic tradition which justifies the fact that jihad
in Palestine is the most important today, al-Qaradawi argues that the war in Gaza, is, in practical terms, a war of
existence, a war without a choice:
Israel is the one that started the war in Gaza which the opposition will of course use and will behave heroically… for
the Palestinians] the war is a matter of existence… the opposition is linked and God will enable it to win. (Qaradawi, July
21, 2014)
The way to Jerusalem passes through the victory of the opposition in Gaza as expressed by the Hamas
leaders after the Protective Edge operation was concluded (Madina al-Quds, September 5, 2014a; Madina
al-Quds, September 5, 2014b).
Jihad in Palestine is a Religious Obligation That Falls on Every Muslim
The kidnapping of the three Israeli boys and Israel‟s military operations against the Hamas in the month of
June led to the opening of another round of Palestinian-Israeli blood-letting. These events led to a barrage of
rockets toward Israel from the Hamas side. As a result of this, Operation Protective Edge broke out. Mass
demonstrations by Palestinians took place in Hebron area, Qalandiya, Nablus, Jerusalem and in the refugee
camps while searches took place for the three young men. It made a deep impression on Qaradawi that they
were called a third intifada. Already in the first days of the military operation against Hamas in Gaza, the IUMS
publically called out to all of the Islamic and Arabic countries and to all of the nation‟s children to break out
and support the struggle of the Palestinian nation (Qaradawi, July 9, 2014a). In another public declaration,
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
106
Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi, Qaradawi‟s deputy, called for an Islamic and Arabic intifada for Palestine and
Jerusalem (Qaradawi, July 7, 2014a; Qaradawi, July 9, 2014a).
On 2 July 2014, the shocking murder of Muhammed Abu Khdeir of the Shu‟afat neighborhood in
Jerusalem took place. An energetic police investigation resulted in the arrest of a number of Jewish suspects for
the deed. According to the confessions of the suspects, the murder was carried out as revenge for the three boys,
Ayal Yifrach, Gilad Shaar and Naftali Frenkel who had been killed earlier by Hamas members. The media
exposure of the murderers and their motives, on July 6th, led to an IUMS public declaration which called for
violent opposition to the Zionists and Israel. The fatwa (religion order) of Qaradawi was publicized on 7 July
2014, the day that the war broke out according to the Hamas organization.1 In this fatwa, al-Qaradawi
criticized the inappropriate silence of the Arab and Islamic world and all of the rest of the nations of the world
and the international community:
Jewish extremist criminals murdered a Palestinian boy and burned him in occupied Palestine… In light of this the
Palestinian nation has the full right to protect its occupied land in any way possible without any limitations of any kind…
(Qaradawi, July 7, 2014a)
That is how a single event, condemned by all Israeli government factors, was turned into a justification for
Hamas‟ terrorist activities and the IUMS position. As a result of the exposure of Muhammed Abu Khdeir‟s
murderers on the first day of the new Gaza War a detailed clear call was issued:
We, IUMS call on the Islamic and Arabic nations, their people and governments to wake up and support the
Palestinian nation. One needs to solve the Palestinian problem and strengthen the Palestinian nation which is fighting for
its just rights and for the protection of its holy places which have fallen prey to a wicked conqueror. They must carry the
responsibility as God, may He be praised commanded: “O you who have believed, if you support Allah, He will support
you and plant firmly your feet”. (Surat Muhammad (47), v. 7)
In a different interview which was publicized after the war, on September 2nd, Sheikh al-Qaradawi
indicated that, “Islamic law demands that we as Muslims together protect Gaza” (As-Sharq channel, September
2, 2014).
In a fatwa publicized by the IUMS on July 27th, Sheikh al-Qaradawi, the head of the organization,
together with Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi, the general secretary of the organization, announced that: The support
for Gaza is a religious requirement (wajeb shar’ai) on all Muslims. Muslims must take all steps that they have
at hand in order to remove the aggression from the people of Gaza (Qaradawi, July 7, 2014b).
This is the most significant steadfast position and the Muslims are required to support it. How will this
support be expressed? In a public declaration, Qaradawi detailed all of the steps that need to be taken by the
Muslims worldwide. Qaradawi is aware of the general character of the campaign and that jihad is not only in
the soul but also with money, in the pen, in demonstrations and awareness.
(1) Inside of Palestine: It is up to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem to demonstrate and
protest against the Israeli activities in Gaza. They must make the Palestinian cities burn until the world intifada
will awaken—especially the intifada in the Arab countries, in other words, a continuation of the revolutions
against the Arab leaders.
(2) To reveal unity of the entire public by standing steadfast alongside the people of Gaza.
1 According to Israel, the first day of the war was July 8, 2014.
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
107
(3) A call to all of the free nations of the world to act for the true and just rights of the Palestinian nation in
Gaza which includes the removal of the blockade, the opening of the crossing points, the enabling of every son
of Palestine to pray at the al-Aqsa Mosque, the return of the sons of Palestine to their land and an end to the
Zionist occupation.
(4) A demand to the whole Arab and Islamic nation to support the struggle of the people of Gaza and to
act inside of their countries and inside of the international community in order to put pressure on the occupation
to stop the aggression in Gaza.
This public declaration concludes with the verse: “And Allah is not unaware of what you do” (al-Baqarah
(2), v. 74). The explicit call by Qaradawi and the IUMS, whose home base is in Europe, to Muslims to take all
steps including encouraging “spontaneous” demonstrations against the aggression in Gaza, led to dozens of
stormy mass demonstrations around Europe—in Berlin, Paris, London, Belgium with most of them made up of
Muslims living in Europe. These demonstrations were aimed against the Israeli fighting in Gaza. “Israel is a
Terrorist State” cried the masses. In addition, they also called for the boycotting of Israeli products since
economic support for Israel is also support for the Israeli War Machine.
Hamas is not a Terrorist Organization
One of the songs heard over and over again on the al-Aqsa Radio and Radio al-Quds which are identified
with the Hamas organization and which are active in the Gaza Strip, was a song that dealt with jihad and its
significance. The chorus of the song emphasized that jihad is not terror. Due to the Egyptian definition of the
Islamic Brotherhood as a terror organization, Qaradawi comes out strongly against the description of Hamas as
a terrorist organization, especially by the Egyptian regime. Hamas is an organization that protects the
Palestinian people and represents the Islamic nation. The political approach of the Egyptians, Israel, the
European states and the United States which present Hamas as a terrorist organization causes a disaster and
disrupts the attempt of awareness of the Islamic opposition. “Muslims have a right to continue with their
opposition until the freedom of their land” (Qaradawi, July 21, 2014). The argument that Hamas is a terrorist
organization is in the realm of “continuous brainwashing but the opposition will continue to stand steadfast and
Allah will grant it victory” (Qaradawi, July 21, 2014). In his book, Fiqh al-Jihad, Qaradawi described Israel as
the real terrorist state (Qaradawi, 2009, pp. 1078-1080). Hamas irhab (terror) is legitimate according the Sari‟a.
Israel counterterrorism acts are not legitimate (Qaradawi, 2009, pp. 1082-1085).
This is also the reason that the spokespersons for Hamas over the years explain time after time that the
activity of the kidnapping soldiers or settlers is not terror, Thus, for example, Ibd al-Aziz Rantisi, the head of
Hamas from Gaza who was assassinated in April 2004 about a month after Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was
assassinated in similar circumstances, explained after the first abduction of policeman senior sergeant, Nissim
Toledano in December 1992:
This activity is not a terrorist activity. The Hamas movement is characterized by activities against Israeli soldiers. If
there is something that can be called terror it is the actions of the armed Israeli army against our nation‟s unprotected
citizens…activities against soldiers is not terrorism in any sense of the word. (Shabi & Shaked, 1994, p. 17)
In a spine-tingling manner, similar words were said by Khaled Mash‟al, chief of Hamas Political Bureau,
when he referred to the responsibility of his organization in the abduction of the three boys, who were
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
108
kidnapped at the Gush Etzion junction by a Hamas cell from Hebron under the command of Hossam
Qawasmeh. Qawasmeh received the money for this action from the Hamas government in Gaza (Lake,
August 5, 2014). On the Shubaka Palestine Ll-Hawar site, which is identified with Hamas, and on additional
sites, it is emphasized (according to Mash‟al) that:
The soldiers and the settlers in the West Bank are aggressors who are living in a way that is against [international] law
on stolen land. Therefore, the Palestinian nation has the right to resist [which includes hurting them]…Netanyahu‟s
comparison of the Hamas [organization] to “extremist groups” [like ISIS] is a lie and is aimed at influencing the general
opinion of the community. We are an independence movement and not a violent organization. (Ynet, August 23, 2014;
Shubaka Filastin lil-hawar, August 23, 2014)
In an interview on al-Jazeerea on July 15th, al-Qaradawi explained that the reason for the rejection of the
Egyptian initiative by the Hamas organization stems from the fact that the Egyptians defined the Hamas and the
Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organizations. How can Egypt define the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist
organization, remove a president elected in democratic elections, Muhmmad Mursi, arrest over 40,000 Muslim
Brotherhood activists and torture them? Egypt cooperates with Israel on the blockade on Gaza and then
presents itself as a mediator. Al-Qaradawi asks: “How can one have faith in the regime of [Abdel Fattah]
al-Sisi?” (Al-Jazeera, July 21, 2014).
Islamic Solidarity
That is the motif that is repeated in all of Qaradawi‟s declarations and in all of his campaigns against Israel.
Qaradawi used his stand as the head of the IUMS and ruled that it is necessary to support the people in Gaza.
The behavior of the Arab nations was described by him as “a scandalous embarrassment” (Qaradawi, July 21,
2014). It is “up to the Muslims to extricate themselves in order to support the men of Gaza in any way that they
can, in spirit, with money and in prayer” (Qaradawi, August 9, 2014).
Haram [It is a sin] to the Muslim nations which sit [all over the world] in the East and the West. They are watching
Gaza which is under attack by [Israel] Land Sea and Air Force and they will abandon her to her fate [without help].
(Qaradawi August 9, 2014)
Every Muslim must aid as much as he can, even adding an additional plea for the people of Gaza is
acceptable. During the Ramadan holiday and after ten days of war, al-Qaradawi indicated that:
At the beginning of the tenth night [of the war] we turned to God, the believers, that he would grant victory to our
brothers in Gaza and that he would destroy their enemies and ours and the extorting Jew. (Qaradawi, July 19, 2014)
The struggle by the men of Gaza influences the respect of the entire Islamic nation. From this it follows
that the success of the opposition in Gaza positively influences the members of the entire Islamic nation and not
just the men of Gaza.
The courageous steadfastness of the members of the Gaza family raised up the heads of the [Islamic] nation. They are
fighting with great strength against the Zionists and others. I am with them and strengthen the hands of the children of
Gaza and the [West] Bank!!! (Qaradawi, July 26, 2014)
The fighting force against the children of Palestine is made up not only of Zionists but also of those who
support Zionists. Qaradawi does not describe who the others are, but all those who support Israel from
among the Christian nations are immediately turned into the enemies of Islam and everything that stems from
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
109
that.
Because of this, it is clear that one cannot abandon the children of the Palestinian nation to their fate.
Islam imposes an obligation on the Arab and Islamic states to support the opposition in Gaza with food, medicine and
arms. Islam requires the unity of the nation in all of the many countries of the Islamic Motherland, despite the distances
between them. It is not possible that we will abandon the opposition alone [in the campaign]. (Qaradawi, July 22, 2014)
According to al-Qarawadi, the idea of an Islamic nation is not an amorphous concept lacking meaning.
When part of the nation is hurt, it is the responsibility of the other part of the nation to protect it. The battle for
Palestine, the struggle between Israel and Hamas, is seen as a cosmic struggle, one between the Jewish-Zionist
nation which is supported by those who oppose Islam and the Muslim world. The battle has no borders because
in the end we are talking about a struggle of life and death between Judaism and Islam. Thus, Qaradawi adopts
Sayyid Qutb‟s view of the world as it was described in his book, Our war against the Jews (Qutb, 1993,
pp. 20-38).2
From a practical point of view, Qaradawi presents fundamental criticism against the Arab nations which,
in his opinion did not do enough in order to support the opposition and abandoned it in its struggle against
Israel. According to him, it is the duty of the Arab and Muslim states to support the opposition just as the Jews
support the State of Israel (Qaradawi, July 21, 2014).
Qaradawi‟s deputy, the general secretary of IUMS, Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi, was more blunt. On July
20th, after what was called the “Shuja‟iyya slaughter”, the Sheikh criticized the:
Arab and Islamic silence on these acts of slaughter which hurt the rights of our Palestinian brothers in Gaza…the
denouncement of their happiness at the misfortune of the Palestinians and the continuation of their coordination with Israel
to the detriment of the Palestinians. (Qaradawi, July 20, 2014)
He asked: What type of Islamic unity is this? Who is supposed to lead the Islamic nation in its continuing
struggle against the forces opposing Islam?
According to al-Qaradawi, he would like this to be Egypt but, to his sorrow, at this time there is an evil
regime which he believes will quickly disappear (Qaradawi, July 22, 2014). In light of this, Qatar and Turkey
are the leading countries in the Muslim world today. The harsh criticism by Qaradawi about Egypt under the
leadership of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi touches many parameters of Egypt‟s conduct. Thus, for example, consider his
attitude toward the Rafah crossing as an Egyptian-Arab-Islamic crossing. Qaradawi asks:
By what right does Abdel Fattah al-Sisi allow himself to take away the natural rights of all of the rest of the members
of the united Islamic nation to pass through this crossing. “Are we not one nation and one Islamic entity”? (Al-Jazeera,
July 21, 2014)
The Islamic nation is 1.7 billion Muslims. There is not one country or any Muslim who lives alone. It
cannot be that Muslims will be killed at the same time that other Muslims are saying we are alone; we are not
connected to them. Egypt is not alone, neither is Tunisia, etc. (Al-Jazeera, July 21, 2014).
While it is true that Egypt does indeed receives a lot of fundamental criticism for standing on the sidelines
and cooperating with Israel, the rest of the Arab states are not absolved from criticism either. This criticism is
expressed in the caricatures and the many articles on the various Hamas sites.
2 Sayyid Qutb (died 1966) was one of the leading philosophers of the Muslim Brotherhood who is originally from Egypt.
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
110
Personal Example
In light of all this, al-Qaradawi tries to serve as a personal example in his honest attempt to solve the
Palestinian problem:
All my life I am proclaiming the obligation of jihad in Palestine against Israel the occupier and extortioner. From the
year 1948 until today, I have not stopped doing this and if at this time I was able, I would hurry to Palestine to fight. I have
called and I have not stopped shouting out for jihad in Palestine. The problem of Palestine is first and foremost our
problem and it will not be forgotten [by us]. (Qaradawi, August 9, 2014)
According to Qaradawi, the last war in Gaza in the summer of 2014 is not a specific war that was aimed at
protecting the people of Gaza from the cruel Israeli attacks. We are not talking about a war between an Islamic
organization and a sovereign nation that is fighting against the attacks upon its citizens. We are talking about a
crucial battle, a stage in the war for the freeing of Palestine, a war that began from the moment that the State of
Israel was created in the year 1948 and which has continued until today. It is a war that will only end when the
jihad organizations succeed in destroying the Israeli army and freeing Palestine. Qaradawi remembers with
yearning the year 1948, when the military companies of the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the fighting in
the land of Israel (Khaled as-Sa'ad, 2003, p. 180). Qaradawi himself was of course one of those youngsters who
practiced for the war in Palestine, but, due to his bad luck, he did not fight in Palestine (Qaradawi, 2002,
p. 264).
What is the purpose of the 'ulamā (religious sages) in the present round of the Jewish-Islamic
struggle in Gaza? According to Qaradawi, the job of the religious sage is an active one of leading the nation.
This view brings al-Qaradawi very close to the world outlook of Ruhollah Khomeini which is based on the
religious principles of the religious sages who are leading the nation on a straight path (Khomeini, 1969).
The job of the men of the cloth is not only to explain the Qu‟ran and the Hadith but it is “their responsibility to
rise up and stand alongside the Palestinian Opposition” to aid in the resistance, to lead the masses and to
aid all of the believers in every part of the Islamic Motherland (Qaradawi, July 22, 2014; Qaradawi, July 26,
2014).
Qaradawi and the rest of the religious sages who were members with him in IUMS attacked the religious
leaders who opposed them. This applies to the religious sages who came out against the Hamas organization
because it rejected the Egyptian initiative which was announced by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi after only one
week of war on July 15th. As a result of this, Qaradawi related with disdain toward the 'ulamā who criticized
the Hamas organization:
Those from among the 'ulamā of Egypt who attack Gaza, the majority of whom are from among the supporters of
Husni Mubarak and the rest of the corrupt organizations. (Qaradawi, July 21, 2014)
The Islamic religion, according to Qaradawi‟s view of the world, requires a united stand among all of the
'ulamā for their support of the people of Gaza. The ‘ulamā who dare to express a different view are condemned
for their views. According to Dr. Ahmad al-Risuni, the religious sages who support the steps that Egypt has
taken are demonstrating their corruption (Qaradawi, July 9, 2014a). Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi came out with a
moving call to the Muslim governments to support Hamas and he warned the religious sages and the rulers that
“God will punish those who engage in treason and will give him what he deserves” (Qaradawi, July 20, 2014)
Any criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood or of the Hamas organization is seen as treason against the Islamic
nation and as a type of heresy in the eyes of Qaradawi and the rest of the ‘ulamā in IUMS.
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
111
Qaradawi emphasizes that he has nothing against the Egyptian people and that his criticism of Egypt is
one that stems from his role as a religious leader. He is a part of IUMS which has many members from among
the ‘ulamā of Egypt. It is his responsibility to criticize the Egyptian regime. “I am a part of the nation… fellah
[peasant] Ibn Fellah and the whole Egyptian nation love me…” (Al-Jazeera, July 21, 2014). According to
Qaradawi, a religious leader, especially one in our time, bears a responsibility. A religious leader needs to say
his words without fear according to the shriy’a.
In a conference which took place after the conclusion of the Protective Edge operation, a whole session
was held dedicated to the role of the religious Muslim sages and their responsibility in the present time. Seven
sessions were dedicated to the role of the religious sages. Thus, for example, the first session dealt with the role
of the religious leaders in building a base on the way of wasatiyyah (the Islamic middle path about which
al-Qaradawi preached) and its renewal. The seventh session dealt with the role of the religious sages in the
problems of the nation in light of international law. In addition, there was a special session dedicated to
Palestine and Jerusalem. The purpose of the religious sages is not just to guide the believers in the matters of
the shriy’a but also to lead, support and aid them in problem solving, especially in regard to the most difficult
and complicated problem of them all—the problem of Palestine (Qaradawi, August 24, 2014).
In light of this, it is not surprising that in the summation meeting of the conference the conclusions of
IUMS in regard to the problems of Palestine were in the spirit of Hamas and included a call to aid the
Palestinian nation as much as possible.
What took place in Gaza throughout the month of Ramadan and in these days was the crude aggression of the enemy
Zionist occupier, an enemy which undertook deeds of a massacre and war crimes against innocent citizens by destroying
their homes, refugee shelters, government buildings, educational institutions, mosques and others. (Qaradawi, August 24,
2014)
The bodies of the United Nation and the Security Council did nothing to aid the refugees and even
supported the occupier.
In light of this, IUMS made five practical decisions:
(1) Jerusalem retains its respected religious and historical place. It is the center of the Islamic nation and
represents its pride. All of the plans to Judaize the occupation will not change in light of this truth;
(2) There is no replacement for the role of Jerusalem in the Islamic nation and therefore we cannot allow
any concessions on it—not even on a little finger of the holy city;
(3) IUMS announces its loyalty to and responsibility for the protection of the nations‟ holy places. The
Palestinian nation takes part in the burden willingly, without being coerced. One cannot grant a present to
whoever does not work to achieve this;
(4) The union announces its opinion to all parts of the nation headed by the religious sages who stand at
the head of the nation and who will act to prevent the occupation and the division of the al-Aqsa Mosque or
control of it. Likewise, they will act to stop the series of daily attacks and outbreaks against al-Aqsa;
(5) Opposition to the occupation is a legal right that has been bought as part of God‟s plan and
international charters. That is why the union announces that one should keep the ammunition of the opposition
in all of Palestine and especially in Gaza. The union also announces and calls with all of its might that it is
strictly prohibited to leave the ammunition of opposition which is one of the items that believers are
commanded to do.
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
112
And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of
Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows (Surat al-„Anfāl (8), v.
60).
These are the proclamations of the IUMS organization on the issue of Palestine. In a public statement
summary, hope is expressed that the freeing of al-Aqsa is coming close and the day will come when the
children of Palestine will come to pray in the blessed mosque when they are “free and winners”. They bring the
full support of the participating negotiating delegations on the part of the Palestinians and represent the unity of
the Palestinian nation against the occupier and wish them success in achieving the victory (Qaradawi, August
24, 2014).
Conclusions
In the Arab/Muslim world, there are no other problems that have received so much attention in books and
articles as the Palestinian problem has—not the Syrian regime which is slaughtering its own people, not ISIS
which is a threat to the Shiites in Iraq, nor Lebanon which represents the world outlook of the Muslim
Sunni-Salafi radicals. If there is one thing that can unite the entire Islamic world, radicals and moderates, it is
against a common hated enemy—Israel and the Jewish people. According to the speeches of Sheik Yussuf
al-Qaradawi who is seen as a central Islamic philosopher with relatively moderate views when it comes to the
many Islamic issues, his views in regard to Israel are seen as very similar to those of the other Islamic Jihad
organizations.
Qaradawi‟s outlook is consistent and loyal to his words which were already publicized in his books in
1968 as a reaction to the Arab defeat in the Six Day War (Qaradawi, 1993, pp. 41-42). The war against the
Zionist Jews is a religious war. It is a war between a mighty Islamic nation which has over 1.7 billion and the
Jewish nation which has about 14 million Jews. There are no separate Arab nationalities. There is just one
nation—the Islamic nation. In the Pillar of Defense Operation in 2012, this Arab Islamic unity was expressed
through visible political expression conducted by the victory of Muhmmad Mursi. In contrast, in the Protective
Edge Operation, under the leadership of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the songs changed. During the 50 days of
Operation Protective Edge, the Arab League did not meet even once to discuss the problem of Palestine. The
feeling among Hamas was that unlike the political blossoming that took place in 2012, in 2014 they were alone.
This feeling was also expressed in al-Qaradawi‟s speeches.
Egypt received special criticism from Qaradawi. To his consternation, the Egypt of Salāh ad-Dīn al-Ayubi
(who died 1193) remained uninvolved and on the sidelines during this war. They instituted closures of the
Rafah crossing and they arrested over 40,000 Muslim Brotherhood activists. Instead of leading the nation and
providing aid and support to Hamas and the Palestinians, it did just the opposite, it pressured the opposition and
helped the Israeli occupation. According to Qaradawi, there is no Egyptian nationalism; there is only Islamic
nationalism (al-Jazeera, July 21, 2014). The Egyptian behavior is especially grating when compared with the
conduct of Muhmmad Mursi in the previous round of fighting in 2012 when the head of his government,
Hesham Qandil was sent to the Gaza Strip during the days of the Israeli operation.
In dozens of speeches, Qaradawi makes it clear that jihad against Israel is the most important type of jihad
in the Arab world today. This is the first and foremost of all Muslim problems and all must support it. This is
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
113
Qaradawi‟s permanent opinion and reflects the views of Hamas as expressed in speeches by Khaled Mash‟al,
Ismail Heniyeh, Kamal Khatib and Ra‟ed Salah, all of them IUMS members. The Islami nation must lead this
jihad until the defeat of the Zionist entity.
Why is the jihad in Palestine the most important? How is it different than the jihad in Iran, Afghanistan,
Somalia and Syria? One can simply say that we are talking about protecting the holy items of Islam in
Jerusalem. The historical argument that the Jews are going to destroy al-Aqsa and build a temple on its ruins is
the central reason for this. But, an analysis of the declarations and the writings of al-Qaradawi show that we are
talking about an existential war between Islam and Judaism. We are not talking about a war between groups of
Muslims who are divided between themselves in regard to the meaning of faith. We are talking about an
existential war which will conclude with only one winning side and that will be Islam. From here flows the
importance of Palestine and the struggle with Israel. Therefore, one can say that the next round between Israel
and Hamas will come soon. It is the obligation of every Muslim to do what he can in order to defend the
Islamic lands and most of all Palestine. Hamas is not a terrorist organization, according to this definition, but
the Islamic spearhead to destroy the Jewish state.
References
Abu „Amer, A. (2013, January). Istiyaa sahayuoni min nataej al-harb al-akhira ala Gaza: Hamas intisart. Filastin al-Muslima,
Sheet 1, 32-33.
Albany Tribune News. (2014, March 14). Hamas military wing denies report linking leaders to Egypt attack. Retrieved December
15, 2014, from http://www.albanytribune.com/14032013-hamas-military-wing-denies-report-linking-leaders-to-egypt-attack/
Ali, Y. (Ed.) (2009). Al-Majajer al-Ishraeliya bi-haq al-sha'ab al-Filestini. Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies &
Consultation.
Al-Jazeera. (2014, July 21). As- Shari'a wa-al-hayat, siyasa fi din m'a al-sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Retrieved August 26, 2014,
from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pa9vLhNJcF8
As-Sharq channel (2014, September 2). Retrieved from http://elsharq.tv/
Bartal, S. (2012). The jihad way in Palestine. Jerusalem, Carmel.
Bartal, S. (2012, November 18). Hamas and the Islamic winter. Maariv. Retrieved from
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/11/israels-south-under-fire-hamas-v.html
Drori, M. (2014, December 14). File no. T"f 34838-01-14. State of Israel against Gazawi. Sentence of Khalil Ghazawi in the
Jerusalem central court.
Haaretz. (2012, October 23). In official visit to Gaza, Qatari emir endorses Hamas, slams Israeli settlements. Retrieved December
19, 2013, from
http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/in-official-visit-to-gaza-qatari-emir-endorses-hamas-slams-israeli-settlements-1.4
71861
Inbar, E. (2014, September 1). Hamas was defeated, until the next time. Middle East Forum. Retrieved September 10, 2014, from
http://www.meforum.org/4789/hamas-was-defeated-until-the-next-time
Issacharoff, A. (2012, October 24). Qatari ruler‟s visit to Gaza signals turning point for Hamas. Haaretz. Retrieved December 19,
2013, from
http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/east-side-story/qatari-ruler-s-visit-to-gaza-signals-turning-point-for-hamas.premium-1.471898#
Issacharoff, A., & Jack, K. (2012, February 6). Abbas to lead Palestinian unity cabinet following Hamas-Fatah deal. Haaretz.
Retrieved December 19, 2013, from
http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/abbas-to-lead-palestinian-unity-cabinet-following-hamas-fatah-deal-1.411354
Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. (2009, January 23). Al-Qaradawi: qadiyat Filastin hiye a'adal qadiye fi al-'alam. Retrieved
December 19, 2013 from http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=30352
Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. (2009, January 29). Al-Qaradawi: atmani al-shahada fi Gaza walu 'ala kursi mutharaq. Retrieved
December 19, 2013, from http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=7683
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
114
Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. (2014, August 21). Al-Qassam mourns three of its leaders in Gaza. Retrieved September 21, 2014
from http://qassamps.blogspot.co.il/2014/08/al-qassam-mourn-three-of-its-leaders-in.html
Kam, E. (2012). After the operation: Balance between the two sides. In S. Brom (ed.), After the pillar of defense operation (Gaza
Strip: Nov. 2012) (pp. 14-20). Tel Aviv University, Research and National Security Institute.
Khaled al-Sa‟ad. (2003). Khtab al-Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Vol. 5, Cairo: Maktaba Wahba.
Khomeini, R. (1969). Wilayat Faqih. Beirut: Muassasat tanzim wa-nshar atar Imam Khomeini.
Lake, E. (2014, August 5). Israeli claim: Hamas funded the kidnapper who started the Gaza War. The Daily Beast. Retrieved from
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/05/israeli-claim-hamas-funded-the-kidnapper-who-started-the-gaza-war.html
Levi, E., Kais, R., & Somfalvi, A. (2014, August 20). Only Deif will decide if the residents of the communities surrounding Gaza
will return to their homes, his wife and his son were buried in the Gaza Strip. Ynet. Retrieved from
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4560976,00.html
Madina al-Quds. (2014a, September 5). Mudir 'Aam Muasasat al-Quds al-Dawliya Yasin Hamud: Intisar Gaza Ymhad al-Tariq
ila al-Quds. Retrieved December 16, 2014, from http://alquds-online.org/index.php?s=news&id=461
Madina al-Quds. (2014b, September 5). Khalil al-Haya 'Adu al-Maktab al-Siyasi li-Haraka Hamas: Intisar Gaza Saymn'a
al-Ihtilal min Fardh Siyadetu ala al-Quds. Retrieved December 16, 2014, from
http://alquds-online.org/index.php?s=news&id=460
Maktab al-Filastini lil-l'alam. (2012, November 16). Al-Qaradawi Yadeu al-Arab aw-al-Muslimin ltajim'aa Safufuom li-Nasra
Gaza. Retrieved from http://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?ItemId=124598
Qaradawi, Y. (1993). Dars al-nakbah al-thaniyah: li-madha inhazamna--wa-kayfa nantasir. Cairo: Maktaba Wahba.
Qaradawi, Y. (2001a). Al-Quds qadiyat kol Muslim. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risalah.
Qaradawi, Y. (2001b). A'ada al-hal al-Islami. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risalah.
Qaradawi, Y. (2002). Al-Qarya wa-al-kuttab: malameh sira wa-masira. Vol. 1, Cairo: Dar al-Sharuq.
Qaradawi, Y. (2009). Fiqh al-Jihad. Cairo: Maktaba Wahba.
Qaradawi. (2014a, July 7). Al-Qaradaghi Yetlab bi-Intifada Islamiya wa-Arabiya min ajal filastin. Retrieved August 26, 2014,
from http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7364-2014-07-07-14-27-54
Qaradawi. (2014b, July 7). Itihad Ulama al-Muslimin yestankr al-Samet al-'Alami tujaa Katel al-Fta al-Filastini Muhammed Abu
Khdeir. Retrieved August 26, 2014, from http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7366-2014-07-07-14-30-22
Qaradawi. (2014a, July 9). Wa-Aqdashaa wa-iaghaztaa. Retrieved August 26, 2014, from
http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7373-2014-07-09-07-30-56
Qaradawi. (2014b, July 9). Al-Risuni: Surat Sheikh al-Azhar wa-Baba al-Knisah Yejaneb al-Sisi Ta'aks. Retrieved August 26,
2014, from,http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7374-2014-07-09-07-38-59
Qaradawi. (2014, July 10). Al-Qaradawi: Al-masas bial-Aqsa sa-Yafjar Haba Jamahirya la yetwaqa'a Ahad, Retrieved August 26,
2014, from http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7324-2014-06-10-15-36-13
Qaradawi. (2014, July 19). Al-Qaradawi: Ada'au kul al-Muslamin an yeahbu li-nasra ahalna fi Gaza. Retrieved August 26, 2014,
from http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7390-2014-07-19-12-14-15
Qaradawi. (2014, July 20). Al-Qaradaghi li-hukam al-Muslimin: Allah mahsabkum wa-al-tarikh yil'an min yekhun. Retrieved
August 26, 2014, from http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7392-2014-07-20-23-08-58
Qaradawi. (2014, July 21). Al-Qaradawi: Wasaf Hamas bial-Irhab Masiba wa-Tghayb lil-Wa'ai. Retrieved August 26, 2014, from
http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7394-2014-07-21-23-35-05
Qaradawi (2014, July 22). Al-Qaradawi: La yejuj an tarek al-mukawma wahadha. Retrieved August 26, 2014, from
http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7397-2014-07-22-07-35-53
Qaradawi. (2014, July 23). Facebook page. Retrieved August 13, 2014, from
https://www.facebook.com/pages/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8
1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A/351459878354757
Qaradawi. (2014, July 26). Al-Qaradawi: Mawqaf ahal Filastin raf'at ras al-Umma Kulha. Retrieved August 26, 2014, from
http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7406-2014-07-26-14-39-04
Qaradawi. (2014, August 9). Al-Qaradawi yenfi saha tasrihat tsbat lahu hawal al-Jihad fi Filastin. Retrieved August 26, 2014,
from http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7417-2014-08-09-21-24-15
Qaradawi. (2014, August 21). Al-Khatib: Filastin hiye al-qadiya al-markaziya lal-'umma wa-satabqi kadhlak. Retrieved August
26, 2014, from http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7449-2014-08-21-13-34-36
Qaradawi. (2014, August 24). Al-Bayan (Mohammad) Khatami li-Jam'aiya al-'Amumiya al-Rab'a lil-Itahad al-'Alami Li-Ulama
RELIGIOUS WAR: AL-QARADAWI DURING THE WARS IN GAZA
115
al-Muslimin. Retrieved August 26, 2014, from http://www.qaradawi.net/new/takareer/7455-2014-08-24-20-46-26
Qutb, S. (1993). Ma’rakatuna ma’ al-Yahūd. Cairo: Dar Al-Sharuq.
Shabi, A., & Shaked, R. (1994). Hamas from believing in God to the way of terror. Jerusalem: Keter.
Shubaka Filastin lil-hawar. (2014, August 23). Interview with the leader Khaled Mash’al on the Yahoo web side. Retrieved
August 26, 2014, from
https://www.facebook.com/paldf/photos/pb.114312025247339.-2207520000.1409179086./866117693400098/?type=3&theat
er
The General National Security Service-Shabak. (2009, September). The charity coalition, the charting and analysis of the
terrorism money system. Retrieved October 20, 2014, from
http://www.shabak.gov.il/publications/study/Pages/coalition_he.aspx?webid=a3db3c16-25d8-423d-98df-eb1b9253ab9
Ynet. (2014, August 23). Mash’al: Hamas murdered the boys is a legitimate activity. Retrieved August 26, 2014, from
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4562324,00.html
International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 116-122
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.003
Female Traditional Rulers in Eastern Nigeria: Eze-Ogo Alu
Ibiam as a Case Study
F. A. OLASUPO
Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria
Over a period of three years, research activities were embarked upon to verify the claim that female traditional
rulers also exist in significant degree in the Eastern part of the country, particularly among the Igbo speaking people.
The essence of the research was to find out whether there are some correlations between the findings here and those
of other parts of Nigeria—Western and Northern part of the country in particular. The paper intends to find out how
symmetrical and asymmetrical the finds female traditional rulers are with those of their counterparts in the Western
and Northern part of the country.
Keywords: traditional ruler, female king, regent and gender
Introduction
Notable historians over the years have proven the existence of female traditional rulers in the Eastern part
of Nigeria not only in the pre-colonial period but more recently in colonial and post-colonial periods while
Bolanle Awe stated there was once an “Omu, which means Queen, at both Osomari where she was born and at
Onitsha, where she achieved fame”. The Omu in question was Okwei (Awe, 1992, p. 104). Moreover, Nwando
Achebe proved there was once a female traditional ruler known as Ahebi Ugbabe, who “became the only
woman in all of colonial Nigeria to be chosen to sit as a member of the Native Court as warrant chief” (Achebe,
2011, p. 105).
Recently, there have been more recent proofs of female traditional rulers in this region and the Igbo
speaking areas of the Delta state. While Olasupo proves the existence of a sovereign female ruler in Unwana,
Regent Alu Ibiam but now known as Ezeogo II of Unwana; Emordi and Osiki also proved the existence of
female kings (traditional rulers) known as Omu in the Delta area of Asaba: Ogwashi Uku, Ubulu-Uku,
lulehaIbuso and others (Oseghale & Osiki, 2010, p. 539; Agborh, 2007, p. 9).
In faraway Calabar is also Queen Duke, “which was given to her by the European traders who saw in her
such qualities as royalty, elegance, grandeur, towering physique as well as the air of magnificence and celebrity,
which surrounded her personality” (Akoda, 1999, p. 85).
As in Yorubaland, there are also three categories of female traditional rulers in Igboland: substantive
female traditional ruler having sovereignty over both male and female in the community; female regency; and a
gender balance in which there existed male and female kings as in Onitsha, OgwashiUku, Ubulu-Uku, luleha,
Ibuso and others. But amongst the Baatonu people of northern Nigeria, one of these three
categories—Regency—does not exist. The question is, to what extent are these female chieftaincy: female
F. A. OLASUPO, Ph.D., Department of Local Government Studies, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University.
DAVID PUBLISHING
D
FEMALE TRADITIONAL RULERS IN EASTERN NIGERIA
117
traditional sovereigns, regency and female kings, symmetrical and asymmetrical across the broader Nigerian
spectrum? In my previous work on female traditional rulers, I have considered those of Western and Northern
Nigeria. Now, it is the turn of Eastern Nigeria and its relativity with other regions.
Sovereign Female Monarch
The origin of the sovereign female monarch in Igboland in particular Eastern Nigeria in general is not yet
certain but Achebe made a discovery that indicated that there was at least one in Igboland before the advent of
colonialism in Nigeria. It was Monarch Ahebi Ugbabe, who the colonial authority incorporated into the system
of warrant chiefs and the only woman known to have been a member of warrant chiefs in Eastern Nigeria. A
different but similar case of colonial authority recognizing a woman as a monarch is the case of Queen Duke of
Calabar who never made it to the point of being made a warrant chief. Thus, apart from these two, there are no
known facts of women becoming sovereigns in this area (Eastern Nigeria) until September 29, 2012 when
Regent AluIbiam was crowned as Ezeogo (Opara, 2012, p. 1).
Figure 1. Women sovereigns in Eastern Nigeria until September 29, 2012.
The journey to the coronation was rough in three important and interesting ways. One, until now, no
women had ever become the ruler of Unwana. The father of Princess AluIbiam who became one did so at the
twilight of his life and after years of meritorious service as the Governor of Eastern Nigeria (The Nation
newspaper of December 30, 2007, p. 54). He was EzeOgo I of Unwana. Secondly, just as her father was the
first EzeOgo of Unwana, Princess AluIbiam became the first princess to become female Regent, not only in
Unwana but the whole of Eastern Nigeria. Thirdly, her coronation as EzeOgo II of Unwana was a bit turbulent.
Starting from when she became Regent, as presage to full and substantive female king, some disgruntled
elements within the Unwana community were not comfortable with her resulting in her regency being subjected
to electoral review. But each time this came up she had always won the support of the traditional council,
“including standing for an election during which titled men, youths and women endorsed her re-election” as
Regent (Online, AluIbiam in her father’s shoes).
However, her coronation was to be the highest point in the theatrics of her challengers especially from Mr.
Ikechukwu Njoku, whose opposition platform—Unwana Reformation Committee—described her coronation as
“an aberration of the traditional norms of the community”. According to them “it should be disregarded in its
entirety as the matter was already in court and the youths and elders of the community had on June 15, 2012,
crowned Mr. Ikechukwu Njokuas the rightful traditional ruler of the community” (Opara, 2012, p. 1).
Regardless of the antics of few miscreants who felt that woman should not be a leader over them, Regent
AluIbiam was “crowned as the Uwana-Afikpo’s traditional ruler by a popular majority of the community”. She
bears the title Ezo-Ogo II of Unwana.
FEMALE TRADITIONAL RULERS IN EASTERN NIGERIA
118
Figure 2. Queen Okpanam receiving homage from the coordinator Olasupo.
Note. In the pictures above, from left, are Omu (Queen) of Okpanam, Dr. Marthia Dunkwu; Omu of Onitsha, Mrs
Onochia, former Regent of Unwanna, Princess AluIbiam, And the only Female Warrant Chief in the colonial days,
Queen Ahebi Ugbage ; Omu of Oguwashi-Uku, Her Royal Highness, Mrs. Clara RafuaKinke; and at the bottom is the
researcher, Olasupo, paying homage to the recently crowned Eze-Ogo II of Unwana, EzeAluIbiam, in Afigbo area of
Eboyin State.
Figure 3. The Executives of Council of Ekiti State Regents receiving homage from the coordinator RGFIN, F.A
Olasupo.
Note. Standing from left are Retired Regent Falade Moradeke Aladesanmi (President), Jinadu Temilola (PRO),
Owoeye Juliana, Awolusi Esther (Vice President), Eunice Falade, Adebomi Adenike (Secretary), Ademuyi
Madojutola, and Adeyemo Kehindo (Treasurer).
The female regency institution is a new phenomenon in Igboland. It is a traditional crisis management
institution that came on board immediately after the death of an Oba (King) in specific Yoruba speaking areas
FEMALE TRADITIONAL RULERS IN EASTERN NIGERIA
119
of Ekiti, Ondo and Osun States. The stipulated minimum period of stay as regent in Yorubaland is three months
with six months seen as the maximum period. How this became adopted to be in the eastern part of the country,
for the first time, as was the case of Princess AluIbiam, is an interesting topic to investigate. Eze Ogo II
narrated this herself. According to her:
I came back on holiday to visit my father, to see how he was doing. But then his health started failing, and I decided
to stay with him for a while. And it turned out to be the very last period of his life. So, when he passed on, I decided to go
back to Canada to carry on with my life there. But I was invited to take the Regency, caretaker traditional rulership. I was
informed that it was going to be for a very short period, like a maximum of six month. But here I have been, running along
for the past ten years. (Orisakwe, 2005, p. 29)
What is unstated but most likely to be the reason for the rationalization of the adoption of the female
Regency institution in Igbo land for the first time, is AluIbiam’s maternal background Miss Eudora Olayinka
Sasegbon, delete later Lady Olayinka Onikepo Ibiam, was a Yoruba woman from the western part of Nigeria
(Orisakwe, 2005, pp. 28-29). Female regency is known in the Yoruba parts of Ekiti, Ondo and Osun states.
There could be some other areas where this institution of female regency exists but the states mentioned earlier
are the bastion of the regency institution in Yorubaland. The theory behind this tradition is that,
Traditional Yoruba culture provides that the throne should not be totally vacant, particularly during interregnum… As
a rule, Regents are largely selected among women in the ruling houses. If a male child is made the Regent, he may refuse
to leave the throne at the appropriated time. This is why Regents are mostly chosen from women in the ruling houses.
(Olomola, Ajuwon, & Omotoso, 2003, pp. xx-xxi)
Over their neglect by the government as well as their male counterparts, Council of Ekiti State Regents
(CESR) recently paid a protest visit to the coordinator, Research Group on Female Traditional Rulers in
Nigeria (RGFIN) located in Department of Local Government Studies, Faculty of Administration of Obafemi
Awolowo University. “Their mission, according to the President of the Council, Ex-Regent Falade, Moradeke
Aladesanmi, is to call the attention of (RGFIN) to the puerile and insensate attitudes of some of their
communities, Obas, Local Government and State government to their plight” (Olasupo, 2014b, p. 58). Figure 3
is the images of the Executives of Council of Ekiti State Regents.
If the Igbos copied this idea of female Regency from the Yorubas, there is something important that the
Yorubas must also have copied from the Igbos—transition from Regency to sovereign monarch. After 16 years
at Alu Ibiam Regency, the elders in Unwana that having passed all the necessary traditional tests including high
performance, Regent AluIbiam was due to be elevated to substantive monarch and was accordingly elevated to
this position on September 29, 2012. In the Yoruba areas of the Ekiti, Osun and Ondo states, woman regents in
some places spend 10, 20, 30, 40 and even 60 years without being confirmed as substantive monarchs
(Adegbola, 2014, p. 50; Olasupo, 2014b, p. 58; p. 33; Okwuofu, 2014, p. 30). Her Royal Highness, Eze-Ogo II
has set a record for Yorubas to emulate.
Omu
The origin of Omu (Igbo gender balance in traditional governance) has a somewhat background. For Awe,
the first Omu of Viz., appeared to be around 1872 to 1943. Oseghale and Osiki however state that the origin of
Omuship, for Ubulu-Uku people of Delta State, could be traced back to 1349-1400. Regardless of the
conflicting date, what is certain is that there still is a female traditional institution in Igbo land called Omu
(Queen). Yet, another account from Onitsha says that “the stool of Omu (Queen) of Onicha has been vacant for
FEMALE TRADITIONAL RULERS IN EASTERN NIGERIA
120
more than hundred years now. Our last queen was Omu Nwagboka. She was from Ogbendida village and was
married into the Egwuatu family of Ogbeotu. The Omu was never the wife of the King in Onicha but was
appointed by the King”1. The Omu tradition flowed from Onitsha to Anioma, the Igbo speaking area of the
Delta State, or the other way round, is a different issue altogether.
Like their Yoruba and Baatonu counterparts, women of advanced age in the past, were made Omu (female
kings) (Agborh, 2007, p. 13). Again, like the Baatonu people, Omus normally are daughters of reigning Obis
who had been married out or were of marriageable age and the persons so appointed as Omus remain in office
until they died and new ones were appointed (Oseghale & Osiki, 2010, p. 541). They, according to Oseghale
and Osiki, were “women arm of male political institutions and their selections were oracular determined like
their male counterparts”.
Like their male counterparts, Obis, they had their own palaces and other insignia of office such as sword,
drums and fan like those of male Obis (Oseghale & Osiki, 2010, p. 543). Regarding their operations, they had
their own cabinet (the OtuOmu) and their offices entailed both physical and spiritual responsibilities (Agborh,
2007, p. 13). Part of the duties of the Omus are presiding over matters, dispute settlement among women and
the offering of “living” advices to their monarchs, especially on religious and administrative matters. In short,
as Oseghale and Osiki put it, Omus are mini-kings in their small palaces in the sense that they are attended to
by retinues of advisers (that included few men who the Omus had conferred with traditional titles) and
domestic assistants (Oseghale & Osiki, 2010, p. 542; Agborh, 2007, p. 13). Omus represented women folks in
the council of state and were considered more powerful than Obis male chiefs (Oseghale & Osiki, 2010, p. 542).
In other words, Omus are female kings next to Obis in royalty in their various communities. This is very, very
similar to Baatonu peoples’ female traditional institutions. Among the Baatonu people of Baruten Local
government in Kwara State, Female Emirs are next to the Male Emirs in the administrative structures of their
communities (Olasupo, 2014a)
Statistics of male Obis and female Obis in Igbo land and Igbo speaking areas of Delta States are: Onitsha:
Obi of Onitsha (Alfred Achebe) and Omu (female Obi) of Onitsha (Onocha); Okpanam: HRM. Obi V.A.
Nwaokobia IV and the Omu (female Obi) Dr. Marthia Dunkwu; Ogwashi-Uku: Obi Prof. Chukwuka Okonjo
and Omu (female Obi) Clara RafuaKinke; Ibusa: Obi Prof. Chelunor Nwoboshi and Omu (female Obi) of Ibusa
(whose name is not yet known). There are many more that are yet to be explored.
Today however, the institution itself and the roles performed by these women monarchs in gender balance
are gradually fading out particularly in those communities where, according to Agborh, “Omus are not literate
enough and are still holed up by the ancient traditions. But for the Omus that are highly educated like Dr.
Martha Dunkwu, the Omu of Okpanam and her Royal Highness, Mrs. Clara Rafua Kinke, the Omu of Ogwashi,
they have “injected positive ideas into the OtuOmu and focused it to bring positive changes to lives of women
in their communities” (Agborh, 2007, p. 13).
Conclusion
It has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that three types of female traditional rulers institutions exist in
Nigeria: Sovereign Substantive female traditional rulers, Female Regency in only Igbo and Yoruba land, and of
course the most spectacular one, gender balance in traditional ruler ship (Male king-Female king). Note that the
1 Retrieved from http://www.onitshaadounion.com/files/ABOUTUS/AdoUnionHistory0.html
FEMALE TRADITIONAL RULERS IN EASTERN NIGERIA
121
issue of gender is African Origin and not 1971 Beijing declaration.
Like in other parts of Nigeria, a substantive female traditional ruler, Eze-Ogo, Alu Ibiam, has been found
in Eboyin State to join her counterparts in the West and the North. Just as there is only one substantive
sovereign female traditional ruler in the East so is there only one so far found in the West. Oba Mary Alari
Igbayilola, though dead now, is found in Maya, a town very close to Ogbomosho in Oyo State. Surprisingly but
interestingly, two sovereign substantive female traditional rulers are found in the North; Kumbada in Niger
State and Ganye in Adamawa State. Both were duly turbaned by Emirs of Mina and Ganye respectively.
Interestingly, apart from public opinion, institutional pressures have begun to ratchet-up on the question of
female traditional rulers in Nigeria. Arguably, the statue of traditional rulers in today’s modern Nigerian
government is said to be that of civil servant and must therefore obey civil service rule. A test of this was the
case between the late Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero and one of his kingmakers, Alhaji Aminu Babba Dan
Agundi as the DarkinMaituta (one of the four kingmakers of Kano) purportedly sacked by Ado Bayero way
back in 2003 and, had to be reversed by Justice Mohammed Salamato (Magbo, 2011, p. 63).
To fault sacked decision of Ado Bayero and his traditional council, Justice Salamato relied not on the
emirate traditional process but that of the statute of traditional rulers in the state. Justice Mohammed Salamato
resolved the case in favor of the fact that (1) traditional rulers are public servants; (2) the emirate council itself
is a creation of statue adding that it derives its own life from the Local Government Laws of Kano State; (3)
that kingmakers are invested with high public responsibilities in their domains; and (4) that the deposed
kingmaker’s office did not exist at the pleasure of the Emir of Kano, but regulated by the rules of the public
service of the state (Magbo, 2011, p. 63).
Another booster to this was the recent Supreme Court judgment that “nullified age long tradition in some
parts of Igbo land which excluded women from such inheritance”. By this Supreme Court ruling, “wives and
daughters can share in the inheritance of their spouses or fathers” (Onu & Odogwu, 2014, p. 37). Expectedly,
this generated heated arguments among traditional rulers, community leaders and opinion molders in the
Eastern part of Nigeria. For the Chairman of Anambra North Traditional Council, Igwe Rowland Odegbo, the
judgment “is in line with international practice”. Igwe Odegbo who “is traditional ruler of Nteje in Oyi Local
Government area, wondered why men should be enjoying everything about women but once their husband is
dead they became pariahs”. “My opinion is that our female children and women are part of our community and
part of us. It is inhuman to deny them inheritance. Why can’t they inherit their fathers’ properties” (Onu &
Odogwu, 2014, p. 37).
For retrogressive and ultra-patriarchal traditional ruler of Njikoka Local Government Area, Chijioke
Nwankwo, and his callous counterpart, Igwe Elias Nneli, from Umueje, in Ayamelum Council Area, “the
judgment was a way of rubbishing the Igbo culture and tradition; arguing that customary courts were supposed
to deal with such cases”. In any case the “Oracle”, Supreme Court, has spoken and it is unappeasable.
These two judgments have serious and positive implication on the vex question of Princess becoming
female traditional rulers; Regents transmuting to substantive female traditional rulers; and gender-balance in
traditional rulership (male king and female king) as upheld by some cultures in Nigeria.
Thus, these discoveries are parts of intensive two decades of research on traditional rulers across Nigeria.
Authorities at all levels of government in Nigeria should take note of these and accord recognition to
FEMALE TRADITIONAL RULERS IN EASTERN NIGERIA
122
institutions of female traditional rulers in Nigeria.
References
Achebe, N. (2011). The female king of colonial Nigeria: Ahebi Ugbade. USA: Indiana University Press.
Adegbola, T. (2014, May 14). Female traditional rulers need to be recognized. Nigerian Tribune.
Agborh, A. (2007, July 9). Queen mother in N/ Delta society. Nigerian Tribune.
Akoda, W. E. (1999). The political and religious roles of Efiki Women in pre-colonial Calabar. Calabar Journal of Religious
Studies, 1(1), 84-95.
Awe, B. (1992). Women and politics in historical perspective in women and politics in Nigeria. Ikeja: Malt house Press Limited.
Magbo, D. (2011, July 17). Royal rumble: The unmaking of an Emir. Sunday Sun.
Olasupo, F. A. (2014a). A case for female traditional rulers. The Guardian Newspaper, June 29 and July 6.
Olasupo, F. A. (2014b). Revolution in emirate system in Nigeria. International Relations and Diplomacy, 2(3), 212-226.
Olomola, I., Ajuwon, B., & Omotoso, D. (Eds.). (2003). Prominent traditional rulers of Yorubaland. Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo
University & Celebrity Publication Limited, Ibadan.
Onu, N., & Odogwu, E. O. (2014, April 29). Female inheritance: More communities react to supreme court verdict. The Nation
Newspaper.
Okwuofu, O. (2014, May 14). Royal rumble: Women traditional rulers complain of neglect, suppression. The Nation Newspaper.
Opara, G. (2012). Controversy trails Ibiam coronation as Unwana Monarch. Blueprint.
Orisakwe, S. (2005, August 13). Akanu Ibiam’s house should be a national monument. The Guardian Newspaper.
Oseghale, B. E., & Osiki, O. M. (2010). Women chieftaincy institutions: A comparative study of the Oluaship title in Luleha Clan,
Edo State and the Omushiptitle in Ubulu-Uku, Delta State, 1400-2000. In T. Babawale, A. Alao & B. Adesoji (Eds.), The
chieftaincy institution in Nigeria (p. 539). Lagos: Center for Black African Arts and Culture.
The Nation. (2007, December 30). AkanuIbiam resurrects at Okotie’s church. The Nation Newspaper.
International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 123-133
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.004
Malaysia‟s Contemporary Political and Economic
Relations with Iran
Asmady Idris, Remali Yusoff
Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia
Traditionally, Malaysia‟s relations with the Middle Eastern World boil down to narrow-limited interaction with
only a handful of countries, mainly Egypt, Saudi Arabia (before known as Hejaz), and Turkey. The underlying
reasons behind are largely owing to the established ancient relations and religious fulfillments like performing
pilgrimage as well as pursuing religious studies in highly respected institutions. Malaysia‟s relation with the Islamic
Republic of Iran, however, has shown steady progress of development since the end of 1960s and onwards.
Although Iran has become an Islamic Republic after the eruption of the Revolution in 1979, the relations remain
intact in spite of the potential expansion of Iran‟s religious ideology, Shi’ah, among Malaysian Muslim
communities. On top of that, with Iran now facing economic sanctions due to its nuclear programs, both countries
continue to bolster their relations, especially in political and economic interactions. Contemporarily, both Malaysia
and Iran are closely working together to further enhance the level of their relations. The leaders of both countries
have quiet regularly exchanged visits and have also actively ventured into promising business opportunities. Iran
ranked as the Malaysia‟s third West Asian trading partners along with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi
Arabia, provides a lot of opportunities for Malaysia to seize onto. In other words, Malaysia‟s contemporary
relations with Iran will evolve beyond the dogma of the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
Keywords: politics, business, economics, co-operations, bilateral relations
Introduction
Malaysia has steady relations with most of the Middle Eastern nations including the Islamic Republic of
Iran. Although in the early years of post-World War II, particularly during 1957-1962, Malaysia‟s relations
with these nations were only confined to two states, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. During this
period, Malaysia had only two foreign offices, namely a Malayan Consulate in Jeddah (later Malaysian
Embassy established in Riyadh in 1964) (Idris, 2006) and the Malayan Embassy in Cairo, Egypt which were set
up in 1958 and 1960 respectively. This was due to the nature of the early interactions which was mainly
concentrated in the form of religious activities such as performing pilgrimage in the Holy City of Mecca and
pursuing religious studies at Al-Azhar University in Egypt1 (Boyce, 1968; Dalton, 1967; Dato‟ Abdullah, 1984;
Idris, 2006).
Nevertheless, from mid-1960s and onwards, Malaysia has begun to enhance its diplomatic relations with
other Middle Eastern nations. Among those countries are Turkey (1964), Oman (1973), Kuwait (1974), UAE
Asmady Idris, Ph.D., Faculty of Humanities, Heritage and Arts, Universiti Malaysia Sabah.
Remali Yusoff, Ph.D., Faculty of Business, Economy and Accountancy, Universiti Malaysia Sabah. 1 National Archive of Malaysia (1083/1963).
DAVID PUBLISHING
D
MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN
124
(1983), Jordan (1994), Yemen (1999), Bahrain (2003), Qatar (2004), and Lebanon (2005).2 Meanwhile,
Malaysia‟s diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran began with the establishment of its embassy
in Tehran in 1970, and followed by the setting up of an Iranian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in 1980 (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2014).
Despite facing various issues and challenges, Malaysia‟s relation with Iran up until today has been
diplomatically stable. The relations are never broken off in spite of the eruption of the Iranian Revolution in
1979 which turned Iran into an Islamic Republic. Since becoming an Islamic state, however, Iran has been
facing tougher challenges in maintaining its diplomatic relations, especially with the western world as well as
with Muslims counterparts. Prior to the revolution, Iran was governed by the Pahlavi dynasties and formed
close allies with the United States vis-à-vis containing the former Soviet influence in the Middle East.
Nevertheless, Iran‟s close relations with the US have turned sour due to the downfall of the Pahlavi regime
when it was overtaken by Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Ruler of the Islamic Republic.
Concerned with the abrupt political changes that took place in Iran, Malaysia continues to look after its
relations with this new government. Although realizing the potential spread of Shi‟ah ideology among Muslim
communities, the Malaysian government has not taken any bold actions that could jeopardize the established
relations. Therefore, this is the main task of this study to re-look and re-investigate the approaches that have
been taken by the Malaysian government in accommodating the new Iranian political changes. The study
believes that Malaysia‟s continuous steady relations with Iran until the present have been confined mainly in
the form of diplomatic-political and economic relations without ignoring the curtailment of the potential spread
of Shi‟ah ideology among local Muslim communities.
Before discussing this further, the study will divide the scope of discussion into four: Firstly, a brief
outlook on the existing models of foreign policies that is shaping a state‟s foreign policy, especially from
developing countries viewpoints; Secondly, on Malaysia‟s diplomatic-political relations with Iran since the
post-Revolution until today; Thirdly, on contemporary economic interactions; And fourthly on Malaysia‟s
diplomatic accommodation in dealing with Shi‟ah ideology.
State’s Foreign Policy Approaches
There are various models applied in understanding a state‟s foreign policy. The models range from
leadership theory, bureaucratic-decision makers, and comparative foreign policy to the overwhelming systemic
structure in the international political system. Each model has its own advantages over another but one thing is
for sure, in a more complex world of today, one researcher cannot single-handedly depend on one model alone.
He or she must take into consideration all variables that could influence the formation of a state‟s foreign policy.
In other words, there is a possibility that a researcher will combine more than one model to understand the
direction of a states‟ foreign policy determinants.
Nevertheless, in the case of developing countries, two models are considered domineering in determining
their foreign policy directions: leadership and systemic structure. This is probably due to the emergence of a
number of visionary leaders like Mahatma Ghandi of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam,
Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, Mahathir of Malaysia and others which caused some to argue that most of the
2 The stated years are in conjunction with the establishment of a Malaysian Embassy in those Middle Eastern countries. An early
diplomatic relation may have been formed earlier. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014. Retrieved June 26, 2014, from
http://www.kln.gov.my/
MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN
125
foreign policy formation is heavily orchestrated by these leaders. Moreover, these states are also unfavorably
claimed that they are toothless in designing their own foreign policies vis-à-vis systemic pressure either during
the bipolar era or with the presence of a unilateral hegemonic power like the United States which
overwhelmingly control the international political system (Saravanamuttu, 1983; Korany; 1984; Nathan, 1995;
Neack, Hey, & Haney, 1995; Neack, 2003; Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; Nonneman, 2005; Idris, 2006).
Happily, this study does not intend to lengthen this debate but more focus will be given to analyze those
underlying variables that could play significant role in determining Malaysia‟s relations with Iran. Most of the
studies done on Malaysia‟s relations with Middle Eastern states, especially since the post-World War II, to cite
only a few like Fadzillah (1988), von der Mehden (1993), Redzuan (1994), Nair (1997), Idris (2006), Harun
(2009), Joseph (2013), the religious element is one of the most consistent variables that could play a significant
role to strengthen the level of relations. In discussing the variables that may influence Malaysia‟s relations with
Iran, religious elements could be less vital compared to others. This is due to Shi‟ism, commonly associated
with Iran as its strong hold ideology. However it is found less compatible with the Muslims in Malaysia for
they have been practizing the Sunni ideology or „Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jamaah since the 15th Century during the
the Malacca Sultanate era or even earlier.
Besides that, since Iran has become an Islamic Republic after the 1979 Revolution, the systemic structure
variable is also insignificant in understanding Malaysia‟s relations with Iran. Prior to the 1990s, the
international political system had been dominated by two superpowers, namely the US and the former Soviet
Union. Most of the states‟ political movements, especially developing countries, were rather limited and they
were entangled in these two superpowers‟ rivalries either to be in the US-camp or the Soviet-camp.
Nonetheless, Iran had freed herself from this political entrapment. It was neither joining the US nor the Soviet
but chose her own political destination through the revolution by becoming an Islamic state during the tense of
the Cold War era. Iran‟s political stance which jeopardized its close allies with the Western-liberal bloc, the US
in particular, has not hampered the character of her relations with Malaysia. The government of Malaysia
instead remained firm to keep the relations growing with the new regime, the Ayatollah Khomeini‟s
government. Furthermore, the current economic sanctions imposed mainly by the US and EU against Iranian
nuclear program (based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 which demanded Iran to halt
its uranium enrichment program on July 31, 2006) also did not give much implication upon their relations.
Thus based on this argument, the study believes that, with an exception of the religious element and systemic
structure, other variables like diplomatic-political and economic interactions could be considered as the most
pivotal variables that have safeguarded Malaysia‟s relations with Iran until the present moment.
Diplomatic-Political Relations
It is a huge task to trace back the exact date of the earliest interactions between Malaysia and Iran,
particularly in the pre-modern period or prior to the emergence of state-system3 in the international political
system. Nevertheless, since the present Shiite ideology in Iran was generally associated with the Alids family
(ahlul bait), therefore the earliest note that can be recalled was most probably on the arrival of these families in
the Southeast Asian region in the seventh century where they took refuge in Champa (could be considered
3 State-system here is referred to the outcome of the post-Westphalia treaty in 1648 which ends the Thirty Years War in Europe
and gives birth to the establishment of modern state system based on sovereignty replacing the old religious defined territories
mostly controlled by the Holy Roman Empire (particularly within the context of imperial-papal cooperation since 800 AD).
MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN
126
nearby Malaysia) after their expulsion during the Umayyad periods. For Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas
(2011, pp. 13-15)4, however, he does not consider these Alids family as the Shi‟ites who adhered to the legal
and theological doctrines of the School (madhab) that developed much later and established a separate state of
their own since the early 16th century during the Safavid era. But they were simply the children of „Ali Bin Abi
Talib by his wife Fatimah r.a, the daughter of the Holy Prophet p.b.u.h, and Ali‟s children by his other wives
whom he married after the death of Fatimah.
On another note the study can relate to Malaysia‟s earliest interactions with Iran based on Tome Pires‟
report about the arrival of various traders in Malacca during the 15th century that to include not only Arabs but
also Parsees, Turks, Armenians and others (Cortesao, 1944; Tibbets, 1979). The word “Parsees” (or Persian is
the majority ethnic in Iran) is indicative enough to notify as some of the earliest Iranian traders that had ever set
foot in Malacca or other areas in Malay Peninsula. Even Musa (2013) wrote that there were about three
thousands Khorasones or Persians during the fall of Malacca in 1511. Nonetheless, the stories of Arabs were
more popular than other foreign merchants including the Parsees due to their roles as the ones, alongside the
Gujerat, southern Indian and Chinese traders, who were generally believed to have introduced Islam into the
Malay Peninsula (Fatimi, 1963; Majul, 1964). Despite this, the Parsees traders who probably brought along the
ideology of Shiah (but this is not to conclude that all Persians are Shiite followers), to some extent, had left
some influential marks among a group of people in Malaysia nowadays.
From a diplomatic-government point of view, after both Malaysia and Iran become modern states, among
the initial official interactions between the two (from Malaysian point of view) might begin in 1968 when 13
Iranian businessmen led by Mr. Ali Akbar Mahnoudji, Iranian Chief Trade Council, met Malaysian Trade
Minister, Dr. Lim Swee Aun in Kuala Lumpur. As a result of the meeting, the first Malaysian Prime Minister,
the late Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj, and Dr. Manoutchehr Marsbar, Iranian ambassador to Malaysia,
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on trade agreements on January 15, 1968. In fact, this meeting
was in conjunction with the visit of His Highness the King Shahanshah and the Queen Shabanou to Malaysia to
seek audience with the King of Malaysia5. A year later on October 2, 1969, another Iranian delegation led by
Dr. Assehi Khonsari, Director of the Teachers and Parents Education Association of Iran, who accompanied
Tun Faridah Diba, the mother of Queen Shahbanou of Iran, came to meet the Queen of Malaysia. Dr. Asehi
also had a visit with the Ministry of Education, Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur6.
Furthermore upon The Shah of Iran‟s invitation, the King of Malaysia and the Queen made a returned visit
to Iran to attend this country‟s 2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire on October 10, 19717. A series of
official visits then continued up until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. These included such visits by Iran‟s
Prince Gholam Reza Pahlavi and his Princess Marigeh Pahlavi to Malaysia on August 26, 19738. However,
when the revolution erupted in Iran in 1979, the then Prime Minister, the late Tun Hussein Onn, was in no
hurry to make any official statement regarding the Iranian case. This was duly believed to safeguard
harmonious relations that had previously been established between the two countries. At the early stage, Tun 4 In contrast with the view of the Malaysian Shiite Council, it regarded this as the point of the earliest arrival of the Shiite
ideology in the Malay Archipelago, especially in the Malay Peninsula. Majlis Syiah Malaysia, MEMORANDUM Majlis Syiah
Malaysia Kepada Yang DiPertuan Agong Malaysia. Retrieved May 5, 2014, from
http://www.al-ahkam.net/home/content/memorandum-majlis-syiah-malaysia-kepada-yang-dipertuan-agong-malaysia 5 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0036501; 2001/0036503. 6 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0037893. 7 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0040573. 8 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0042225.
MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN
127
Hussein seemed to have no “suitable answer” for such a revolution, although there were some actions taken by
the Malaysian non-governmental organization, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), which through its
President—Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, visited Ayatollah Khomeini after the event occurred. It was only 18
months later, via a Malaysian Foreign Minister, Tengku Ahmed Rithauddeen, that it was announced that
relations between Malaysia and the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue, and that the revolution was
considered to be Iran‟s internal matter (Ali, 1984; Nair, 1997). In other words, the Iranian Revolution has not
hampered Malaysia‟s relations with Iran.
Heading towards the 1980s and 1990s, the relations had been growing positively. A few official
encounters through diplomatic office continuously took place in Kuala Lumpur; these included a meeting
between Mr. Majid Hedayatzadeh Razri (Iranian ambassador to Malaysia) and Dr. Mahathir, the fourth
Malaysian Prime Minister, on January 11, 19839, Mr. Mohamed Reza Motshed‟s (Iranian ambassador to
Malaysia) visit with the former Malaysian Information Minister, Dato‟ Mohamad Rahmat on January 18,
198810
, and Omer Suleiman al-Hashmi‟s (Iranian ambassador to Malaysia) visit to seek an audience with the
King of Selangor on July 22, 199211
.
Nonetheless, the most historical moment was the visit by the former President of Iran, Mohammad
Khatami (1997-2005) to Malaysia on July 21-24, 2002. During this meeting, another MoU of economic
cooperation was signed in the areas of tourism, trade agreement and the agreement on the promotion and the
protection of investments12
. The Khatami‟s visit to Malaysia indicates that the bilateral relations had grown in
maturity, and both governments were full of enthusiasm to venture into various economic activities. The most
current notable diplomatic activities are the former Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi‟s
two-day visit to Tehran on 21-22 December 2008 to sign three agreements on cooperation in technology,
anti-drug campaign and car manufacturing, and also Tun Dr. Mahathir‟s presence in Hassan Rohani‟s
inauguration ceremony as the new President of Iran on August 4, 2013 last year. During this visit, Tun Dr.
Mahathir congratulated the new Iranian President on his election to the position and expressed optimism that
Tehran- Kuala Lumpur ties would improve in line with the interests of both nations and governments (Press TV,
2013).
Although in recent times a number of issues have constantly beleaguered Kuala Lumpur-Tehran
interactions, especially as a result of the Malaysian government‟s harsh stance on Syiah but the relations remain
unharmed. Even the call from certain parties to cut off Malaysia‟s relations with Iran which have been blamed
for spreading banned Syiah teachings, Malaysian current Foreign Minister, Datuk Anifah Aman has firmly
rejected the call by arguing that the Syiah issue was a domestic matter and to be dealt with internally by the
concerned authorities. At the same time he also explained clearly the importance of Iran for Malaysia by saying:
“Iran is an important partner to Malaysia and it is Malaysia‟s foreign policy to be friendly with all countries,
based on mutual respect, to foster goodwill and cooperation in all areas of interest for mutual benefit….The call
does not in any way reflect the views of the Government of Malaysia,” he said here yesterday” (The Star, 2013).
On the issue of Iranian nuclear program, Malaysia has clearly stated its position that all signatories to the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including Iran, should have the right to develop nuclear power as long
9 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0048095. 10 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0050841. 11 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0054184. 12 National Archive of Malaysia, 2006/0003714.
MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN
128
as it is to be used as peaceful energy, and not to build nuclear weapons which could destabilize world‟s stability
(Farrar-Wellman & Frasco, 2010).
Table 1
Trade between Malaysia and Iran, 1990-2013
Year Total trade Export Import Balance of trade
1990 246,001,358.0 150,058,481.0 95,942,877.0 54,115,604.0
1991 165,790,413.0 119,838,323.0 45,952,090.0 73,886,233.0
1992 176,751,922.0 109,959,517.0 66,792,405.0 43,167,112.0
1993 303,206,779.0 151,298,704.0 151,908,075.0 -609,371.0
1994 269,707,843.0 159,942,891.0 109,764,952.0 50,177,939.0
1995 405,455,951.0 289,181,124.0 116,274,827.0 172,906,297.0
1996 357,337,605.0 234,712,509.0 122,625,096.0 112,087,413.0
1997 387,019,473.0 295,990,450.0 91,029,023.0 204,961,427.0
1998 529,977,173.0 318,990,695.0 210,986,478.0 108,004,217.0
1999 514,082,081.0 336,581,621.0 177,500,460.0 159,081,161.0
2000 881,802,203.0 493,303,254.0 388,498,949.0 104,804,305.0
2001 1,233,404,793.0 678,086,676.0 555,318,117.0 122,768,559.0
2002 1,349,193,703.0 870,521,087.0 478,672,616.0 391,848,471.0
2003 1,613,656,008.0 1,246,060,768.0 367,595,240.0 878,465,528.0
2004 2,291,380,789.0 1,314,166,589.0 977,214,200.0 336,952,389.0
2005 2,672,420,781.0 1,357,895,516.0 1,314,525,265.0 43,370,251.0
2006 3,749,515,836.0 1,616,154,987.0 2,133,360,849.0 -517,205,862.0
2007 3,594,869,442.0 2,122,187,076.0 1,472,682,366.0 649,504,710.0
2008 4,995,771,012.0 2,447,102,215.0 2,548,668,797.0 -101,566,582.0
2009 3,538,431,262.0 2,400,761,124.0 1,137,670,138.0 1,263,090,986.0
2010 4,009,656,924.0 2,730,508,055.0 1,279,148,869.0 1,451,359,186.0
2011 4,982,570,913.0 3,214,059,302.0 1,768,511,611.0 1,445,547,691.0
2012 4,582,311,640.0 3,523,025,611.0 1,059,286,029.0 2,463,739,582.0
2013 3,268,421,320.0 3,139,650,626.0 128,770,694.0 3,010,879,932.0
Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 2014.
Based on the above account, it is quite convincing that Malaysia always gives emphasis to its diplomatic
relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, Malaysia has been consistent with its foreign policy since
the era of the second Prime Minister, Tun Razak who introduced a “Non-Alignment” policy, a big swing from
the Tunku Abdul Rahman‟s old pro-Western policy to befriend all countries irrespective of differences in
ideology or systems of government. This policy also had been nurtured by the longest Malaysian Premier, Tun
Dr. Mahathir who threw strong support behind the idea of “prosper thy neighbor” as he had put into: “… we
realized that the best way to help ourselves was to help others. By doing so you don‟t simply generate gratitude
and goodwill, you also create partners and friends” (Mohamad, 2011, pp. 618-626).
Contemporary Economic Interactions
As had been mentioned before, along with diplomatic-political variable, the economic element also plays a
significant role in strengthening of Malaysia‟s relation with Iran. For Malaysia, Iran is its third largest trading
partner in the Middle Eastern region after the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Based on the trade percentage in 2010
(Mohd Perai, 2010), among five Malaysia‟s close trading partners in the region, the UAE acquired 38.4%,
MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN
129
followed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (20.3%), Iran (20%), Oman (6.7%), and Kuwait (5.4%). Furthermore,
it was reported that the total value of Malaysia‟s trade with Iran in 2012 was RM4.58 billion with exports
valued at RM3.52 billion and imports at RM1.06 billion. Up to 2013, however, Malaysia‟s trade with Iran had
slightly decreased with the total trade of RM3.26 billion. This has been largely argued due to US unilateral
economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic over its nuclear programme (New Straits Times, 2013).
Malaysian exports to Iran include palm oil, crude rubber, chemical and chemical products, wood products,
rubber products and machinery, appliances and parts. Meanwhile, about 83% of Malaysia‟s imports from Iran
consist of crude petroleum and petroleum products (MATRADE, 2013; G15 Organization, 2008). For further
information on Malaysia‟s trade with Iran, especially from 1990 until 2013 (see Table 1).
Analyzing the economic performance shown above, it could be said that Malaysia‟s economic relations
with Iran, especially in trading activities, is full of potential to be further developed. The study believes that
apart from a number of trade agreements that had been signed such as the 1968, 1989 and 2002 Trade
Agreements, several joint-ventures in economic cooperation, as the result of the MOUs, were also undertaken.
These included a $6 billion deal to develop areas of Iran‟s massive offshore gas fields in 2007, a joint
automotive industry between Iran Khodro and Proton in 2008, a joint company between the National Iranian
Oil Engineering and Construction Company and Malaysian SKSD to construct the Kedah Refinery in Malaysia
in 2009, and the formation of the Iran-Malaysia Businessmen Council in Kuala Lumpur in 2009 which to some,
points to further enhancing Malaysia‟s economic relations with Iran (MATRADE, 2013; Farrar-Wellman &
Frasco, 2010; Ilias, 2010).
Moreover, through Malaysia‟s active participation in Iranian Trade Fairs, it indirectly helped diversifying
the nature of economic dimensions, and not merely depending on petroleum-based products (particularly in
Malaysia‟s imports from Iran). It also promotes other Malaysian products that could attract more Iranian
companies to execute a joint-venture project. Among the success of the Malaysian participation in Iranian
Trade Fairs were the Ninth Tehran International Industry Fair in 2009 which succeeded in securing export
orders worth RM13.39 million (Muin, 2009), and the latest was in the 13th Tehran International Industry
Exhibition held from 6-9 October 2013 where nine Malaysian companies, through the Malaysia External Trade
Development Corporation (MATRADE), participated in the fair and they also fruitfully succeeded in
generating business worth RM664.65 million. The participating Malaysian companies marketed various
products such as health supplements, LED Lights and fittings, personal care products, adhesive sealants and
coating products, security systems, busbar systems, electric and telecom poles, garment accessories, etc.
(MATRADE, 2013). In addition, Malaysian palm oil has recently made the headlines where through the
Malaysian Plantation Industries and Commodities Minister, Datuk Amar Douglas Uggah Embas, the Islamic
Republic had imported 671,384 tonnes of Malaysian palm oil during January-November 2013, which reflects
the importance of Iran as a major export destination for Malaysian palm oil in the Middle East (Malaysian Palm
Oil Council, 2014). In other words, the encouraging performance of the Malaysian companies in Iranian Trade
Fairs as well as the current penetration of Malaysian palm oil into Iranian society have further consolidated the
degree of economic cooperation between these two countries for the coming years ahead.
Malaysia’s “Diplomatic Accommodation” with Shi’ah Ideology
Undeniably, the issue of Syi‟ah could become the thorn in the flesh in relation to Malaysia‟s harmonious
relations with Iran. Without a careful approach, and being moderate in Malaysian foreign policy in particular,
MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN
130
the bright climate of the relations might be changed into cloudy. Thus, in dealing with this issue, the
government of Malaysia seems to apply a double-edged sword that is, being stricter at home, and at the same
time looking appeasing and wise in justifying its domestic policy in the eyes of the Iranian counterparts.
For the domestic policy, Malaysia through its National Fatwa of the Malaysian Religious Council has
issued, at least, two resolutions in curbing the spread of Syiah ideology among the local Muslim community.
The first was in 1984 where it only allowed two Syi‟ah sects; Zaidiyah and Ja‟fariyah, to be practiced in
Malaysia. The second was in 1996, but it runs until today, where the 1984 Fatwa was annulled. All Muslim
communities were not allowed to practice any Syiah sects, and they were obliged to practice Islam in
accordance with the teachings of Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jamaah. It was generally understood that after the Iranian
Revolution erupted, the Islamic Republic had drafted a new constitution which declares the official religion is
Islam of the Ja‟fari sect, but other Islamic sects, including Zeydi, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafe‟I and Hanbali, are valid
and will be respected. Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians will be recognized as official religious minorities
(Lunn, 1991). Since then, the call for the ban for Syiah was made when it was allegedly claimed that Iran were
“exporting” its Islamic ideology, the Ja‟fari sect or the Ithna ‘ashariyya (also called as the 12 Imams) to other
Muslim countries including Malaysia. In the opinion of the National Fatwa, the Ithna „ashariyya Shia‟s
teachings were against the Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jamaah. Prior to this, Malaysia had been friendly to the other two
sects of Syiah, namely Syiah Taiyibi Bohra (Dawood Bohra) and Syiah Ismailiyah Agha Khan which limited
their movement among their own families and friends only (Ustaz Bongsu @Aziz Jaafar, personal
communication, July 14, 2014; The Malaysian Insider, 13 Disember 2013)13
.
Moreover, when the issue of Syiah was suddenly brought up in the Parliament in 2011, Datuk Seri Jamil
Khir, Minister in the Prime Minister Department, had stated that Malaysian government permits Shi‟ism to be
practiced in Malaysia with a condition it cannot be propagated to others. This statement, however, to some was
confusing. But again, looking through the 1996 Fatwa it is clear that Syiah is no longer welcomed in Malaysia.
This is largely due to the fact that Muslims in Malaysia have been traditionally accustomed to the teachings of
Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah under the Shafie School, and the government does not want any confusion that could
threaten national unity and domestic stability.
At the international level, the Malaysian stance is certainly incompatible with the openness principle of the
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC‟s position on Syiah was based on the Amman Message in
2004 (Tun Abdullah Badawi, the former Malaysian Prime Minister was among the signatories) where in July
2005 CE, H. M. King Abdullah II convened an international Islamic conference of 200 of the world‟s leading
Islamic scholars including Shaykh Al-Azhar; Ayatollah Sistani and Sheikh Qaradawi (Musa, 2013; Zulkifli,
2014). The outcome of this conference clearly declared that:
They specifically recognized the validity of all 8 Mathhabs (legal schools) of Sunni, Shi'a and Ibadhi Islam; of
traditional Islamic Theology (Ash’arism); of Islamic Mysticism (Sufism), and of true Salafi thought, and came to a precise
definition of who is a Muslim. (The Official Website of the Amman Message, 2007)
This declaration has been used by some parties (Musa, 2013; Zulkifli, 2014) to heavily criticize the way
Malaysia‟s handling the issue of Syiah. They demand the Malaysian government to adhered to the principle of
global human rights. For Malaysia, however, since it is a sovereign country, it has a free hand to manage this
13 E-Fatwa, Portal Rasmi Fatwa Malaysia. (2014). National archive. The Malaysian Insider. Retrieved December 13, 2013, from http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-kebangsaan/syiah-di-malaysia
MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN
131
issue with its own ways without any interference from outside.
In justifying this banned policy against Syiah for the Iranian government, the Najib administration, as had
been mentioned before, has kept firmly reiterating that this issue is merely a domestic matter and it will be dealt
with by the relevant authorities. Although this creates some uneasines among Iranian officials in Malaysia
(Torki, personal communication/interview with April 3, 2014) but to conclude that this policy may affect
Malaysia‟s relations with Iran, especially on the existence of more than 80,000 Iranian plus with 15,000 Iranian
students here, in the future remains to be seen (New Straits Times, 2013).
Conclusion
Malaysia‟s relationship with Iran is one of the most important interactions that may represent the former‟s
connection with the rest of the Middle Eastern nations. These relations have been traditionally developed either
in the form of commercial trading activities or the conveying message of Islam since the 15th century or earlier.
Till the present, this liaison has been growing and both countries are venturing into various activities as the
result of the signings of a number of trade agreements…
Against the bedrock of the foreign policy of most developing countries which are mainly influenced by
leadership or systemic influence, this study to some extent is able to show that diplomatic-political and
socio-economic variables are the pivotal elements that keep Malaysia‟s relations with Iran close until today.
Apart from that, this study also demonstrates that although religion has been long considered as the main key
variable to strengthen Malaysia‟s affiliations with the Middle Eastern world, but in the case of Iran, religious
elements play a less significant role in cementing the bilateral relations. Even, this element could become the
thorn in the flesh that could jeopardize Malaysia‟s relations with Iran in the future. Nevertheless, so far both
countries are happily understanding on the different approaches that had been taken, especially in dealing with
the issue of Syiah at a domestic level. On the issue of Iran‟s nuclear power, Malaysia has shown its strong
support as long as there is no violation against Non-Proliferation Treaty principles. What both countries need is
a continuous dialogue in order to minimize all differences so that a better relationship can be built upon in the
years to come.
References
Ali, A. (1984). Islamic revivalism in harmony and conflict: The experience in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. Asian Survey March, xxiv
(3), 296-313.
Boyce, P. (1968). Malaysia and Singapore in international diplomacy: Documents and commentaries. Sydney: Sydney University
Press.
Braveboy-Wagner, A. J. (2003). The foreign policies of the global south: An introduction. In J. A. Braveboy-Wagner (Ed.), The
foreign policies of the global south: Rethinking conceptual frameworks (pp. 1-9). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Cortesao, A. (1944). The Suma oriental of Tome Pires: An account of the east, from the red sea to Japan, written in Malacca and
India in 1512-1515, vol. II, series II (Trans.). London: The Hakluyt Society.
Dalton, J. B. (1967). The development of Malayan external policy, 1957-1963. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Oxford: University of
Oxford.
Dato‟ Abdullah, A. (1984). Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s foreign policy, 1963-1970. Unpublished Thesis (Degree of M.
Litt). Cambridge: University of Cambridge.
Fadzillah, M. J. (1988). The reawakening of Islamic consciousness in Malaysia: 1970-1987. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis.
Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh.
Farrar-Wellman, A., & Frasco, R. (2010, June 29). Malaysia-Iran foreign relations. Iran Tracker. Retrieved July 10, 2014, from
http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/malaysia-iran-foreign-relations
MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN
132
Fatimi, S. Q. (1963). Islam comes to Malaysia. Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd. Iran‟s Economic
Conditions: US Policy Issues
Harun, R. (2009). In pursuit of national interest: Change and continuity in Malaysia‟s foreign policy towards the Middle East.
International Journal of West Asian Studies, 1, 23-38.
Idris, A. (2006). Key determining factors influencing small states‟ relationship: A case study of Malaysia‟s relations with Saudi
Arabia. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK.
Ilias, S. (2010, April 22). Iran‟s economic conditions: US policy issues analyst in international trade and finance. Congressional
Research Service. Retrieved July 15, 2014, from http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34525.pdf
Joseph, L. A. (2013). Hubungan Malaysia-Mesir, 1957-1970. Unpublished Master Thesis. Kota Kinabalu: Universiti Malaysia
Sabah.
Korany, B. (1984). Foreign policy in the third world: An introduction. International Political Science Review, 5(1),7-20.
Lunn, J. (1991). History. The Middle East and North Africa 1992. London: Europa Publications Limited.
Majul, C. A. (1964). Theories of the introduction and expansion of Islam in Malaysia. Silliman journal, 11(4), 335-398.
Malaysia Seeks Broader Economic Cooperation With Iran. (2008). G15 Organization. Retrieved July 12, 2014, from
http://www.g15.org/bulletindecember08.pdf Malaysian Palm Oil Council. (2014). Iran-Malaysia should strengthen palm oil trade by exploring Middle East markets.
Retrieved July 14, 2014, from
http://www.mpoc.org.my/Iran-Malaysia_Should_Strengthen_Palm_Oil_Trade_By_Exploring_Middle_East_Markets.aspx
MATRADE. (2013, October 18). Growing demand for Malaysian products and services. Retrieved July 11, 2014, from
http://www.matrade.gov.my/en/about-matrade/media/press-releases/press-releases-2013/3059-growing-demand-for-malaysi
an-products-and-services-18-october-2013
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014). Retrieved June 26, 2014, from http://www.kln.gov.my/
Ministry of International Trade and Industry. (2014). Trade between Malaysia and Iran, 1990-2013. Kuala Lumpur.
Mohamad, M. (2011). A doctor in the house. Selangor: MPH Group Publishing Sdn. Bhd.
Mohd Perai, Z. (2010, July-August). Building a bridge across the Middle East, Trademart: Tapping the lucrative global halal
market. Kuala Lumpur: Matrade Publication.
Muin, A. M. (2009, October 12). Matrade sees Iran as good prospect for Malaysian exports. Bernama. Retrieved July 15, 2014,
from http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news_lite.php?id=446270
Musa, M. F. (2013). Malaysian Shi‟ites lonely struggle. World Public Forum, Dialogue of Civilizations. Retrieved July 14, 2014,
from http://wpfdc.org/images/docs/Mohd_Faizal_Musa_The_Malaysian_Shiites_Lonely_Struggle_web.pdf
Nair, S. (1997). Islam in Malaysian foreign policy. London: Routledge.
Nathan, K. S. (1995). Vision 2020 and Malaysian foreign policy: Strategic Evolution and the Mahathir impact. Southeast Asian
Affairs. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 220-237.
Neack, L. (2003). The new foreign policy: US and comparative foreign policy in the 21st Century. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc..
Neack, L., Hey, J. A. K. & Haney, P. J. (Eds.). (1995). Foreign policy analysis: Continuity and change in its second generation.
New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Nonneman, G. (Eds.). (2005). Analyzing Middle East foreign policies. London: Routledge.
PM‟s Moderation Concept Boosts Malaysia-Iran Ties. (2013, June 22). New Straits Times. Retrieved July 10, 2014, from
http://www.nst.com.my/nation/general/pm-s-moderation-concept-boosts-malaysia-iran-ties-1.305198
Press TV. (2013). Iran’s Rohani meets Mahathir Mohamad in Tehran. Retrieved July 9, 2014, from
http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/08/05/317320/irans-rohani-meets-mahathir-mohamad/
Redzuan, M. O. (1994). The Middle Eastern influence on the development of religious and political thought in Malay society,
1880-1940. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh.
Saravanamuttu, J. (1983). The dilemma of independence: Two decades of Malaysia’s foreign policy, 1957-1977. Penang: Penerbit
Universiti Sains Malaysia.
Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas. (2011). Historical fact and fiction. Johore: Universiti Teknologi Malaysia.
The Malaysian insider. (2013, December 13). Semua Ajaran Syiah Di Malaysia Menyeleweng Daripada Syarak, Kata Jakim.
Retrieved April 7, 2014, from
http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/semua-ajaran-syiah-di-malaysia-adalah-menyeleweng-daripada-hukum-
syarak-kat
MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN
133
The Official Website of the Amman Message. (2007). The Amman message summary. Retrieved July 14, 2014, from
http://www.ammanmessage.com/
The Star. (2013, September 12). Anifah: Call to cut Iran ties unjustified. Retrieved July 9, 2014, from
http://www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2013/09/12/Anifah-Call-to-cut-Iran-ties-unjustified/
Tibbetts, G. R. (1979). A study of the Arabic texts containing material on South-East Asia. Leiden & London: The Royal Asiatic
Society.
von der Mehden, F. R. (1993). Two world of Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Gainesville:
University Press of Florida.
Zulkifli, S. (2014, March 3). As anti-Shia campaign hits the pocket, minister seeks PAS’s help to restore Iran ties. Retrieved July
13, 2014, from
http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/as-anti-shia-campaign-hits-the-pocket-minister-seeks-pas-help-to-rest
ore-ir
International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 134-140
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.005
Judicialization of Catalonian Language and Identity Politics
Walter F. Carnota
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Since the adoption of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, the relationship between the Spanish State and the Catalonian
autonomous region has been considerably strained. Originally, many remembered the dictatorship of Francisco
Franco (1936-1975), when centralization was heavily imposed on all parts of the country, irrespectively of ethnicity,
language or traditions. As the constitutional bargain (Title VIII of the 1978 Constitution) worked for smaller
regions (Madrid) or poorer regions (Extremadura), it did not pan out for an economic powerhouse as Catalonia. For
over 30 years, Catalonian regional political parties (notably Convergencia e Unio) have held the balance of power
within the Spanish parliamentary system. Autonomous regions were allowed to write their own “statutes”, a sort of
sub-national constitution subject to national approval. Anti-Spanish sentiment is running high in Catalonia, and a
straw poll was conducted in 2014, as voters were asked if they wanted to remain part of the Spanish kingdom.
Many Catalonians would sever all ties with Madrid while attempting to remain in the European Union, a move
preemptively vetoed by the European Commission. Inevitably, more judicialization is expected, whether on a
federal scenario (intergovernmental relations: who does what) or if secession ultimately happens and economic
compensation becomes necessary. The ruling Popular Party is adamant to any concessions; left-wing parties are
more open to nationalistic demands. But the strictly political negotiations between the Popular party and the
Socialists (who favor federalism) are stalled and nationalism is being overplayed by regional forces. As political
solutions seem to falter momentarily, Courts will experience more demands based on identity grounds.
Keywords: Spain, Catalonia, independence, constitutional design, European integration
Introduction
The Spanish national Constitution celebrated its 35th anniversary in late 2013. During its three and a half
decades, the Constitution provided Spain with the necessary stability to transition peacefully from the Franco
era dictatorship to become a full-fledged member in 1986 of the then European Economic Community (now the
EU). Although partisan bickering is pretty common between the two major political forces, the Popular Party
(PP) and the Socialists (PSOE), parliamentary monarchy under former King Juan Carlos enabled the country to
achieve minimum consensus on democratic governance, dismantling the previous centralized state (García
Morales & Arbós Marín, 2010, p. 44) and upholding the rule of law, even in the midst of the severe 2010
economic crisis (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013).
Political decentralization sketched by the Constitution remained an unfinished business, a thorny issue to
be redefined later on by political means. The first decades of the new cycle were signaled by Basque terrorism
spearheaded by ETA, despite the overall success of the constitutional design of parliamentary monarchy.
Lately, ETA has renounced its violent means and the ECtHR in October 2013 enabled prominent terrorists to
Walter F. Carnota, Ph.D., Law School, Universidad de Buenos Aires.
DAVID PUBLISHING
D
JUDICIALIZATION OF CATALONIAN LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY POLITICS
135
be sent home from jail, tossing away the so-called “Parot doctrine” concocted by the Spanish courts. ETA is
currently in a cumbersome process of giving up its weaponry and accepting the democratic political process.
Now that Basque separatism has ebbed considerably, Catalonia-Spain’s most vibrant economy-threatens
with independence. First, it scheduled a referendum for November 9, 2014, based on two questions: (1) Is
Catalonia a state? (2) Should it be independent? Catalonian leading political coalition CiU (Convergencia e
Unió) and other regional parties such as ERC aggressively promoted a “yes” answer to both questions on the
ballot, based on the premise that Catalonia was entitled to “decide to decide” (a local version of the right to
self-determination) and paving in this fashion the way for outright independence from Spain (the so-called
“soberanismo”, meaning the position which defends the “sovereign rights of Catalan people”). The Catalonian
Executive headed by Artur Mas conducted a highly visible international campaign (mainly within the EU and
even the U.S.), so as to elicit eventual support from the international community.
The Spanish central government in Madrid, in turn, coordinated policy with the British government of
Prime Minister David Cameron in order to link Catalonia with other parallel situations such as that of Scotland
(which held a referendum on September 16, 2014, when independence from the UK lost). In sum, the
pro-independence forces dislike Catalonia’s current status (“encaje”) within Spain; they would gleefully retain
EU membership, despite qualms from Brussels as to how to achieve this goal. Catalonia is part now of the EU
because it is a portion of Spain: how an independent Catalonia could retain this status in the future remains an
open question.
Spanish majority parties have different stances towards Catalonia. The current PP government flatly
denies any right to regional self-determination without explicit approval from the national Parliament (Cortes).
The opposing PSOE is prone to the adoption of a federal model, replacing the instability of autonomous
communities for good.
Regionalism has been a key component of Spanish party politics, as PNV in the Basque country and CiU
in Catalonia eloquently illustrate. As Hamann (1999) observed,
Compounded representation is a crucial concept in understanding the development of patterns of political
representation in Spain. The existence of regional administrative and political units, including regional parliaments and
executives, provides a strong incentive for regional parties to form and compete in regional elections, as well as in national
and European elections, by emphasizing the distinct interests of the voters in that particular region. (p. 112)
Why did this particular conflict begin to flare up again? Catalonia strongly supported the democratic
transition from Franco and its final outcome the 1978 Constitution, which was only resisted by Basque
nationalists (Peces-Barba Martínez, 1988, p. 252). The “territorial model” adopted by Title VIII of the
Constitution was a unitary decentralized hybrid called “Estado de las autonomías” or “state of autonomies”
(Aja, 2014, p. 16)
Authority is vested mainly on the central government; however, a significant number of tasks may be
performed by CUs (constituent units) autonomously. Yet, the judicial decision of June, 2010, invalidating some
parts of Catalonia s new sub-national constitution (EAC) fueled the flames of the current conflict. Catalan
people saw the ruling as a response to “a political climate that it is widespread in Spain in which one of the
objectives is to put an end to the development of regional autonomy” (Cardús, 2011, p. 26).
The Spanish Constitutional Court twice became involved in the Catalonian question during 2014. First, it
ruled that the Nov. 9 referendum as such was unconstitutional since it was not called under the aegis of the
JUDICIALIZATION OF CATALONIAN LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY POLITICS
136
national Constitution. Subsequently, it also suspended on Nov. 4, 2014 a diluted version of the referendum (a
so-called “participation process” election). Anyway, people voted on November 9 as scheduled in the straw
poll format, where as expected pro-independence forces won.
Historical and Sociological Context
Catalonian grievances date back from 1714, when the Spanish Succession War ended and Bourbonic rule
suppressed Catalonian freedoms (“Decreto de Nueva Planta”). From that moment on, Spain and Catalonia
faced diverse development and social paths. Catalonia remained an integral part of Spain, but disputes lingered
on. Centralism was rampant in the 19th century and first seven decades of the 1900s.
Internal migrations fostered the widespread use of the Spanish language in the 1800s. Catalan was mainly
confined to rural areas and became a secondary language of sorts. Linguistic imperialism took hold: major
newspapers in the capital city of Barcelona (such as “La Vanguardia”, for example) were published in Spanish,
instead of Catalan.
John E. Joseph (2006) further observed that:
Catalonia was the center of the left-wing movement that briefly established an anarco-syndicalist government in the
region in 1936, and it continued to be the center of resistance to the Franco government over the following decades. For
Madrid, the suppression of the Catalan language thus had a clear political-symbolic motivation. For Catalans, in turn, the
laws forbidding the use of the Catalan language made it the symbol for all their political and cultural aspirations. Retaining
their language, using it despite the laws forbidding it, was a political and cultural imperative. Catalan attained its symbolic
force from its suppression by the “other” power. (p. 40)
Catalonia’s relationship with the centralist Franco government (1936-1975) was confrontational. Boix
(2011) added that:
Our current problem… started in the 1950s, when large-scale Spanish immigration doubled Catalonia s population. It
was a time when all the practical mechanisms for promoting functional assimilation were outlawed by the Franco
government. From the start, the regime was brutal in its repression of the Catalan language…In the 50s and 60s, the
situation was made even worse by radio and television, which were exclusively in Spanish and were absolutely Spanish in
content and ideology. (p. 22)
Catalonia endorsed the new constitutional framework of 1978, which was put in place after Franco had
died in 1975. But the most recent focal point of discussion involved a highly controversial judicial decision
(STC 31/10). The Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010 struck down as unconstitutional certain key provisions
of the Estatut d´Catalunya (Catalonia’s de facto sub-national constitution1). This step was seen by many in
Catalonia as another evidence of the supremacist stance of the Spanish state over historic regions and rights.
Constitutional Framework
The autonomous state is a rather vague idea. It was purportedly devised as a work in progress, an initially
open-ended model prone to subsequent fine-tuning and flexible scenarios (Díaz Ricci, 2009, p. 87; Villaverde
Menéndez, 2012, p. 76). Some authors even labeled it as a “never-ending federal state” (Valdés, 2001, p. 163),
to emphasize that it involves a process rather than a finished product. To compound the problem, Article 2 of
the Spanish Constitution contains two joint principles which could eventually collide: indivisible unity of the
1 Ironically, each autonomous community has its Statute, but it is actually enacted by the national Cortes in Madrid as an organic
law, a hard proposition for a federal state to swallow.
JUDICIALIZATION OF CATALONIAN LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY POLITICS
137
State and autonomy rights of regions and “nationalities”2.
A constitutional issue develops when individual and social rights are recognized both at the national and
sub-national levels, and courts at both levels of government face similar problems. In federal states, this is
called “jurisdictional redundancy” (Cover, 1981, p. 639).
Famous scholar Daniel Elazar (1987) pondered that,
[R]edundancy was considered to be one of the unattractive aspects of federalism, something to be tolerated because of
federalism’s political virtues but minimized whenever possible. This view became especially prevalent after the rise of the
modern science of public administration, which is built on hierarchical principles and the notion that the larger the
institution or organization, the more efficient it will be. (p. 30)
Spain’s Estatutos de Autonomía , like American state constitutions (Gardner, 2007), often duplicate rights
recognized at the center (Aparicio, 2008). And the Spanish Constitutional Court had a relevant role in defining
the terms of autonomy since its very inception (some even spoke about a “judicial autonomous state”,
Fernández Ferreres, 2005, p. 17), as the Catalonian Supreme Court also had on a lesser degree (see below).
However, the Constitutional Court issued two very important judgments, the first concerning the Valencia
Statute3 and the second one, most importantly, about the Catalonian Statute (EAC)
4.
A Most Important Judicial Decision (STC 31/10)
Judgment 31/2010 proved to be pivotal in the conflict between Spain and Catalonia. Ninety-nine
legislators from the-then disgruntled opposition conservative party PP (now in government)5 challenged the
2006 reforms to the EAC as unconstitutional6. The Constitutional Court partially agreed, holding that fourteen
clauses were inconsistent with the Spanish Constitution. Simultaneously, in a long and complex ruling
spanning more than 800 print pages (López Aguilar, 2011, p. 224), it also validated many other clauses.
The whole reform process of autonomy statutes was halted. Colino and Olmeda (2012) contended that:
Due to a protracted process of reform and to the final intervention of the Constitutional Court with a landmark ruling
on the Statute of Catalonia, this round of reforms has raised many questions about the real reform capacity of the system,
on its capacity to achieve integration, accommodation, and adaptation to changing social circumstances and therefore
legitimacy and stability without formal constitutional reform. (p. 192)
Firstly, the Court held that the EAC Preamble, replete with references to Catalan nationhood, had no legal
effect whatsoever. It also struck down article 6, section 1, which mandated for preferential use of Catalan in
public administration, public mass media and education. “Preferential” was deviant from a bilingual policy of
equal footing between the Spanish and Catalan languages. Other stricken provisions involved Catalonian
powers vis-à-vis the central government in Madrid, which the Constitutional Court is entitled to referee
(Biglino, 2007, p. 154).
Are the national and linguistic aspects intertwined? Undoubtedly, yes. Major (2013) stressed that:
2 The first principle is relevant as far as constitutional amendments are concerned, since they require a nation-wide will to reform
the Constitution (Sánchez Agesta, 1980, p. 344). 3 STC 247/2007. 4 STC 31/2010. 5 The PP had been excluded from the reform deal which was struck between the three-party sub-national Catalonian government
and the PSOE-led Administration in Madrid. 6 These amendments were the first to be made to the 1979 Catalonian Statute. Its text mushroomed from 57 articles to 223 articles,
becoming in effect a fully-fledged sub-national Constitution (Castella Andreu, 2010, p. 6).
JUDICIALIZATION OF CATALONIAN LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY POLITICS
138
Catalans are no different from any other society in the world in that their culture has a particular language as its
proper vehicle. And, no differently from every other society in the world, they see in their language a central element of
their national character. (p. 86)
EAC Preamble references to nationhood (“Catalonia is a nation”, “national reality of Catalonia”) are
deliciously vague and not prone to a straightforward constitutional interpretation. It is not easy to tell, for
example, whether they fall inside or out of the Article 2 perimeter. Several times the Catalonian Legislature
(“Parlament”) had issued unilateral nationhood declarations (1989, “Catalonia is a differentiated national reality
which does not resign its right to self-determination”; 1998, It confirms the right of the Catalan people to freely
choose its future), but the nationalist references were now entrenched in the EAC).
Judicially, the Catalonian Executive argued in briefs that the Constitutional Court had given no legal
effects to preambles in prior decisions7, so nationhood as it stood was a mere political statement with no
binding legal character. The Court, however, disagreed: it held that Preambles had no dispositive effects as
legal norms regularly do, but that they still represent useful yardsticks for constitutional interpretation
(Solózabal Echavarría, 2011, p. 216), according to its own criteria espoused in STC 36/81. Consequently,
Preambles were not entirely “off-limits” to some kind of judicial scrutiny.
The Constitutional Court was bent on defusing EAC’s own imprint as a whole sub-national Constitution.
Many Constitutions worldwide have preambles and they serve as helpful tools to sharpen constitutional
identity.8 The Court wanted to send a clear message to Barcelona, in the sense that nationhood was ambiguous
and that it did not entertain the idea that a distinct citizenship (i.e., a political concept) could be derived from a
cultural or social reality. Technically, it did not strike down the Preamble as unconstitutional, but it gave it no
effect as far as nationhood was concerned. Undoubtedly, it was a big blow to Catalan identity politics. Salvador
Cardús sums it up (2013):
Awareness of the complete failure of the [reform] project, which began in 2006, was widespread by 2010. The
Catalonian people leapfrogged the political class by demanding a new sovereigntist political framework. The final
denouement arrived with the demonstration in September 11, 2012, the day that Catalonia celebrates its National Day.
(p. 98)
Former Catalonian President Jordi Pujol-himself a recent subject of criminal investigation due to money
transfers to Andorra- has termed the ruling as “harmful” and “morally damaging” (2011, p. 59).
Language Politics in Court
One of the most delicate areas of identity politics is language. Language permeates everyday life and
almost every identity politics equation (Canada, Belgium) has had linguistic implications as a substantial part of
it.
STC 31/10 also meddled in language politics. Its criticism of Catalonian identity politics did not stop at
nationhood or national reality. One of the most visible consequences of national affirmation is language, and it
has a reverse effect on national politics: A common language (English in Canada) is heightened and the
minority/majority language (French in Québec) seems to suffer. The same happens with Spanish and Catalan,
even though Spanish is also the first language in Catalonia (a rough 36%-51% ratio currently exists).
7 STC 36/81 at paras. 2 and 7. 8 With the exception of the Netherlands, Austria, Uruguay and Chile Constitutions, among other countries, which do not include
Preambles.
JUDICIALIZATION OF CATALONIAN LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY POLITICS
139
The 2006 EAC had provided for a language policy bent on a preferential treatment of Catalan so as to
bolster national identity. It was not a new stand: previous sub-national legislation on language use had a
manifest pro-Catalan bias.
Recently, Catalonia’s top Court has ruled in favor of a 25% use of Spanish in five schools as “lengua
vehicular” (lingua franca). Many object to a fixed percentage determined by courts.
Catalonia has pursued a policy of linguistic immersion, where Catalan is prevalent and Spanish remains a
secondary option, having to make room for other languages such as English. Controversies abound, since
business and commerce with the rest of the country is obviously conducted in Spanish and internationally in
English. Increasing globalization has compounded the linguistic issue:
In our globalizing world, the distinction associated with geography, including statehood and language differences, are
fading as English becomes ubiquitous and even nation states that have not restructured officially are dealing with
non-national normative claims, entailing legal changes of a non-national nature (Grosswald Curran, 2006, p. 700)
STC 31/10 objects to Article 6.1 of EAC which gives preference to Catalan. The Court states that
preference is not just an empirical observation such as “linguistic normalcy”. If Spanish and Catalan are on an
equal footing “official language” status, it would seem contradictory to upgrade one of them to a preferential
rank. In that case, the “equilibrium” among the two official languages would be affected.
Future Trends
It seems, after the 9-N voting, that the Spanish government and its top Court would not be able to catalog
Catalonia’s claims as “illegal” forever9. At some point, negotiations between Madrid and Barcelona should start
in earnest, paving for a “third way” or a nuanced version of regionalism. The Socialist Party continues to vouch
for a federal option; the new party Podemos is eager to pursue a “Scottish solution”, meaning more dialogue
and consensual solutions. Gridlock is for the moment gaining the upper hand.
Catalans are keen to continue as EU members, despite some formal objections from the European
Commission. Some contend that were Catalonia leave the Spanish state altogether, it would have to reapply for
admission to be fully approved by the 28 Member States. Probably, this issue will end up at the ECJ sitting in
Luxembourg, which would imply a new round of judicialization.
References
Aja, E. (2014). Estado Autonómico y Reforma Federal. Alianza, Madrid.
Aparicio, M. (Ed.). (2008). Derechos y Princípios Rectores en los Estatutos de Autonomia. Atelier: Barcelona.
Biglino, C. P. (2007). Federalismo de integración y de devolución: el debate sobre la competencia. Madrid, Centro de Estudios
Políticos y Constitucionales.
Boix, C. (2011). Interview. In T. Strubell (Ed.), What catalans want (“Could Catalonia become Europe s next State”). Ashfield,
Mass, Catalonia Press.
Cardús, S. (2011). Interview. In T. Strubell (Ed.), What catalans want („Could Catalonia become Europe´s next State‟). Ashfield,
Mass, Catalonia Press.
Cardús, S. (2013). What happened to us Catalans? In L. Castro (Ed.), What‟s up with Catalonia (The causes which impel them to
the separation). Ashfield, Mass, Catalonia Press.
Castella Andreú, J. M. (2010). La sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional 31/2010, sobre el Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña y
su significado para el futuro autonómico. Fundación Ciudadanía y Valores.
Colino, C., & Olmeda, J. A. (2012). The limits of flexibility for constitutional change and the uses of sub-national constitutional
9 Elections are scheduled now for Sept. 27, 2015.
JUDICIALIZATION OF CATALONIAN LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY POLITICS
140
space: The case of Spain. In B. Arthur, & K. Felix (Eds.), Changing federal constitutions (Lessons from international
comparisons) (pp. 190-209). Opladen, Barbara Budrich Publishers.
Cover, R. M. (1981). The uses of jurisdictional redundancy: Interest, ideology and innovation. William and Mary Law Review,
22(4), 639-682
Díaz Ricci, R. M. (2009). Relaciones Gubernamentales de Cooperación. Buenos Aires, Ediar.
Elazar, D. J. (1987). Exploring federalism. Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press.
Fernández Ferreres, G. (2005). La contribución del Tribunal Constitucional al Estado Autonómico. Madrid, Iustel.
García Morales, M. J., & Marín Arbos, X. (2010). Intergovernmental relations in Spain. In R. Chattopadhyay, & K. Nerenberg
(Eds.), Dialogues on intergovernmental relations in federal systems (pp. 44-47). Ottawa, Forum of Federations.
Gardner, J. A. (2007). In search of sub-national Constitutionalism. Paper presented at Seventh Congress of the International
Association of Constitutional Law, Athens, Greece, June 11-15.
Grosswald Curran, V. (2006). Comparative law and language. In M. Reinmann, & R. Zimmermann (Eds.), The Oxford handbook
of comparative law (pp. 675-707). Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Hamann, K. (1999). Federalist Institutions, Voting Behavior, and Party Systems in Spain? PUBLIUS, 29(1), Winter.
Joseph, J. E. (2006). Language and politics, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.
López Aguilar, J. F. (2011). La sentencia más larga (Repercusiones de la STC 31/2010; política y jurisprudencia’). In 27 TEORIA
Y REALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL, UNED and Ramón Areces.
Major, J. C. (2013). On the prickly matter of language. In C. Liz (Ed.), What s up with Catalonia? (The causes which impel them
to the separation) (pp. 85-88).Ashfield, Mass, Catalonia Press.
Peces-Barba Martínez, G. (1988). La Elaboración de la Constitución de 1978. Madrid, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
Pujol, J. (2011). Interview. In T. Strubell (Ed.), What Catalans want (Could Catalonia become Europe s next State) (pp. 54-59).
Ashfield, Mass., Catalonia Press.
Rodríguez Zapatero, J. L. (2013). El Dilema (600 días de vértigo). Barcelona, Planeta.
Sánchez Agesta, L.(1980). Sistema Político de la Constitución Española de 1978. Madrid, Editora Nacional.
Solózabal Echavarría, J. L. (2011). La sentencia sobre el Estatuto de Cataluña: Una visión de conjunto. In 151 REVISTA DE
ESTUDIOS POLITICOS, January/ March, Madrid.
Valdés, B. R. (2001). El Estado federal interminable. In G. de Cortazar (Ed.), El Estado de las autonomías en el siglo XXI: cierre
o apertura indefinida. Papeles para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales, no.66.
Villaverde Menéndez, I. (2012). La igualdad en la diversidad (Forma de Estado y derechos fundamentales). Madrid, Centro de
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 141-150
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.006
Understanding The Restavèk Phenomenon in Haiti Through
Storytelling and Film
Marcela Moyano
St. Thomas University, Miami Gardens, Florida, USA
Known as the Pearl of the Antilles, Haiti was the first black republic to win its independence from the French in an
uprising by slaves. Two hundred years after the revolt, Haiti’s children, the most vulnerable population of the
nation, endure modern day slavery. Extreme social, economic, and political instability have led the country to adopt
and accept this practice. This qualitative study reveals audiences’ narratives of their experiences as guardians of
Restavèks and their reflections after watching the documentary film Blooming Hope (2010). The documentary
features Tata Dumasie, an artisan woman who narrates her life story growing up as a Restavèk. This ethnographic
research concludes that documentary films serve as tools for popular education. Furthermore, narrative discourse
can reconstruct identities of former Restavèks and positively transform guardians’ perceptions of the Restavèk
phenomenon.
Keywords: Restavèk, narrative discourse, Haiti
Understanding the Restavèk Phenomenon in Haiti Through Storytelling
This research paper originates after several screenings of the documentary Blooming Hope (2010) in rural
Haiti and in South Florida. Audience members approached the film’s director to engage in deeper conversation
about the Restavèk phenomenon. As a result, the researcher designed a qualitative study through in-depth
personal interviews with six audience members who share their most intimate untold narratives of their
experiences as Restavèks’ guardians. This study is the result of a storytelling process that aids participants to
reconcile their negative attitudes towards their domestic child servants. Finally, this paper demonstrates the
power of documentary films to scrutinize social issues commonly accepted and how such representation of
hidden social issues can result in social transformation.
Historical Context of Haiti and Slavery
In an attempt to understand the root cause and context of child-indentured servitude in Haiti, the
researcher studies historical texts of the French colonization and the slaves’ revolt to gain the nation’s
independence. These texts demonstrate the conflict between the powerful class, predominantly French and
Caucasian decent, and the disadvantaged class, predominantly slaves of African descent. Furthermore, the
author presents social and economic indicators of the Haitian society.
Haiti constitutes one third of the Island of Hispaniola. The French colonization was remarkable in Saint
Marcela Moyano, Assistant Professor, Institute for Communication, Entertainment & Media School of Leadership Studies, St.
Thomas University.
DAVID PUBLISHING
D
UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI
142
Domingue due to the large numbers of people who were brought from Africa as slaves to work the land and to
serve the dominant colonial class. Saint Domingue became the largest producer of sugar cane and coffee as the
result of the exploitation of the land and extreme human labor (Moyano & Rosero, 2010).
The independence of Haiti was the result of a revolt of slaves who did not tolerate any longer the abuse
and subjugation of the French colonizer. Bell’s All Souls Rising novel illustrates the story of the independence
of Haiti. One passage of the novel depicts the main character raising this question: “For all creatures, there is
only fertility within their kind… if a white man and a black woman come together, what will you call their
offspring? Is it something else or is it human” (Bell, 1995). The problem of racism and discrimination in Haiti
is perfectly illustrated in this questioning of human nature based on skin color.
Furthermore, historical records tell the magnificent story of the liberation of the slaves from the French
(Dubois & Garriqus, 2006). In August of 1791, numerous slaves gathered in a Choiseul plantation known as
Caiman and carried out a religious ceremony in preparation for the revolt against the French colonists. A black
woman slit the throat of a black pig that was sacrificed; the slaves present at the ceremony drank the pig’s
blood. They all had bristles of the pig that they believed had magical properties and would make them invisible
during the revolt. This ritual is known as a voodoo cult that some understand as a night when the African slaves
made a pact with the devil. Some blame the cult for the misfortune of the country that has faced extreme
political turmoil, continuous generations of dictatorships, natural disasters, and human rights violations.
A few nights after the cult was executed, slaves revolted against the French masters of plantations and
their families. One young slave confessed the intention of all slaves to “fight the death against the whites”
(Dubois & Garriqus, 2006, p. 91). A group of slaves who had a torch in one hand and a dagger in the other, and
led by a man known as “Boukman”, violently massacred all the whites that could not escape through the sugar
cane fields. The revolt illustrates the burning of plantations. “Twenty Thousand slaves who were once peaceful
and submissive were now cannibals” (Dubois & Garriqus, 2006, p. 93). The independence concludes on
January 1st of 1804 when Saint Domingue is declared as a free and independent nation.
The history of liberation clearly represents the struggle of the oppressed over the oppressor. Fischer (2004)
argued that the truth of the Haitian revolution lies on the displacement of the ruling class of Haiti and former
slaves taking power. The disavowal of revolutionary antislavery became an ingredient in Creole nationalism
and, eventually, in hegemonic conceptions of modernity (Fischer, 2004, p. 273). A robust comprehension of the
liberation of Haiti is vital to reach a deeper understanding of the class struggle that Haiti faces today, which can
be merely reduced to a matter of skin color.
The history of Haiti is exemplary of courage and freedom. Haiti is the first country in the world that
became an independent nation with a rebellion led by slaves to free themselves from the French colonists.
However, the independence was then followed by a demand from the French for reparations of $28 million for
having lost their colony commonly known as the Pearl of the Antilles. This sank Haiti into an endless debt
(Bracken, 2006). Many Haitians refer to their lives as living in Iamise, a Creole term that refers to Economic
Despair. Today, Haiti is the country with the lowest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of the Western
Hemisphere (United Nations Statistics Division, 2015).
According to the United Nations Statistics Division (2015), 35% of the Haitian population is comprised by
children under 14 years old. Life expectancy is only 61 years old. Haiti has the highest infant mortality rates in
the western hemisphere and there is a 2.1% of the population living with the prevalent HIV virus. 52% of the
population is illiterate. Twenty five percent of children between 5 and 14 years old work (UNICEF, 2015).
UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI
143
According to UNICEF (2015), approximately 2,000 children are victims of human trafficking taken to
Dominican Republic often with their parental/custodian support. Today, approximately 300,000 children are
victims of domestic slavery known as Restaveks (End Slavery Now, 2015).
The Haitian population is divided between two social systems (1) comprised of light skinned, French
speaking, Catholic, urban residents who hold powerful roles in the workforce and (2) comprised of people of
darker skin, Haitian Creole speaking, voodoo practicing, illiterate, rural residents who are severely
impoverished (Wagner, 2008). Consequently, the duality between oppressed and oppressor and the dichotomy
of power relationship is a clear example of the treatment given to children who are victims of the structural
violence in Haiti and the Restavèk phenomenon as one simple example of such class violence (Wagner, 2008).
The restavèk phenomenon can be best described as the result of a prevalent colonization of the ruling class over
the most disempowered group of any nation: its children.
The Haitian Restavèk Phenomenon
This section of the paper attempts to define the Restavèk Phenomenon and provides facts of the current
Haitian Restavèk population. The term Restavèk stems from French rester avec translated as “stay with”
(Balsari et al., 2010; Bracken, 2006; Wagner, 2008) and is a historical practice in Haiti to send children away to
live with wealthy families who can provide them food and shelter. The social connotation of the restavèk is one
who is “motherless or unwanted”. Restavèk is a term, which is often used as an insult and characterizes an
individual with lack of personality or self empowerment (Campbell, Miers, & Miller, 2011).
Article I (d) of the UN Supplementary Convention of the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956) defined Child Servitude as:
Any institution of practice whereby a child or young person under 18 years is delivered by either or both his/her
natural parents or guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or
young person or of his labor. (p. 3)
Therefore, according to this definition of Child Servitude, the restavèk phenomenon falls under this
category of modern slavery.
For the purpose of this study, the person who owns the restavèk children is labeled as guardian. The
restavèk phenomenon is based on the assumption that the children do not receive monetary compensation for
their labor; therefore, caregivers cannot be denominated as employers. Furthermore, the nature of
institutionalization of children rests on the belief that guardians compensate children’s work through supplying
their basic needs as food and shelter.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of this paper is based on poplar education and storytelling. The researcher
designs the methodology based on these two approaches.
Popular Education
Popular education is a vehicle of social transformation, which engages learners with usually unheard
narratives and personal stories (Freire, 1970). Some of the premises of popular education are: (1) Learner and
educator engage in a process of reciprocity benefiting from the educational experience; (2) open-ended
UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI
144
questions to entice answers to learners’ own problems; (3) a commitment to political change fostering more
egalitarian societies. A key component of popular education is practice, which revolves around the idea of act
upon the knowledge acquired toward a more just and equal society (Crowther, Galloway, & Martin, 2005).
When popular education is applied to this study, the researcher identifies the learners as the documentary’s
audience and subsequently the interviewees. Participants of this research engage in the learning process when
they watch the documentary for the first time and listen to the story of the restavèk woman depicted in the film.
The process of popular education takes place when participants answer the questionnaire as an attempt to
organize their experiences and better understand the restavèk phenomenon in Haiti.
Storytelling
Storytelling is the practice of sharing narratives with self, others, or with researchers (Vannini, 2012,
p. 935). Narratives are stories about personal and/or collective memories that result in storytellers reliving
previous experiences with the aim to better make meaning of them. Thus storytelling can be viewed as means
for ordering potentially disconnected experiences into mutually interrelated, meaningful episodes of a larger
plot, be that a biography or a common history (Vannini, 2012, p. 936).
Furthermore, Vannini (2012) emphasized the importance of discursive frames that shape narratives based
on the storyteller’s cultural background, morals, and common popular knowledge. Researchers must understand
narratives considering the storyteller’s encoding and interpretation of his/her memories based on cultural
conventions (Vannini, 2012). The value of storytelling lays on the fact that people negotiate their identity
through the re-count of their narrative and thus construct their reality based on how they verbalize and organize
their lived events (Vannini, 2012).
Furthermore, when studying storytelling, films are texts that can be analyzed and meaning can be
negotiated through personal stories of depicted subjects (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2004). Therefore, Blooming
Hope (2010) is a documentary film that depicts a woman who was a victim of the restavèk phenomenon in
Haiti and who shares her narrative in the film. In addition, each of the participants tell their personal stories
while engaging in a process to better understand their past experiences with restavèk children and often as an
attempt to narrate an apologetic discourse for themselves.
Methodology
This ethnographic study consisted of in-depth personal interviews. Participants (1) answered a
pre-questionnaire related to personal experiences with restavèks; (2) then, participants watched the
documentary film Blooming Hope (2010); and (3) they responded to a post-questionnaire related to their
perceptions of restavèks after having watched the documentary and having listened the story of Tata Dumasie,
the restavèk woman featured in the film.
Participants
The researcher used purposeful sampling to select participants for this study. Each of the six participants
approached the researcher after having watched Blooming Hope (2010) at public screenings, and expressed
their desire to further discuss the restavèk phenomenon in Haiti. All of the participants had restavèks living
with them in their homes and are recognized as guardians in this study. The researcher assigned different names
to each of the participants for this paper. They all signed consent forms.
UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI
145
Instrument
This study consists of a pre-questionnaire, a screening of Blooming Hope (2010), and a post-questionnaire.
The pre-questionnaire inquires about the participants’ experiences with restavèk children in Haiti. As
participants tell their stories, they reconstruct their realities and awareness of the restavèk phenomenon.
Blooming Hope (2010) is a documentary film that portrays three long-term sustainable projects in the
Northwest region of Haiti. One of the projects is a women’s artisan cooperative that features Tata Dumasie, a
woman who grew up as a restavèk in Port-de-Prince and is a member of the artisan cooperative. She tells her
personal story as a restavèk and demonstrates how her artwork represents a sustainable economic solution for
her family of five children.
When Tata Dumasie was six years old, her mother sent her to Port-de-Prince to live with a family as a
domestic servant. The family, or guardians, took Dumasie and promised her mother that they would offer her
food, shelter, and education in exchange of her work. Dumasie worked for this family for six years. She had to
do all the house chores and walk the children of the family to school every day. When she tells her story in the
documentary film, she cries while recalling memories of her physical pain and hard work. Her back and feet
hurt so much of ironing clothes and cleaning all the time. The most traumatic fact of her experience as a
restavèk child is that her guardians never sent her to school. She assures that if she had been sent to school, she
would have been able to offer a better future for her kids. On the contrary, she states “sometimes my children
are hungry, and I do not have any food to give them” (Moyano & Rosero, 2010).
Finally, the post-questionnaire attempts to bring to the surface the experience of participants after
watching Blooming Hope (2010) and hearing the personal story of Tata Dumasie growing up as a restavèk
child.
Results
The researcher used content analysis to organize the raw data collected through the study. This section
consists of participants’ experiences with restavèks followed by their reactions after watching Blooming Hope
(2010). The major themes identified in this content analysis through the pre-questionnaire are restavèks’ origins,
duties, and abuse. Abuse branches into emotional, physical, and sexual abuse. Themes identified through the
post-questionnaire after having watched Blooming Hope (2010) are discomfort, regret, and awareness.
Participants’ Experiences with Restavèks
The researcher organized the personal experiences of participants with restavèks in to three themes based
on their responses, such as restavèks’ origin, duties and abuse.
Restavèks’ Origin
All of the participants resided in Port-de-Prince when they had restavèks living with them in their homes.
When asked about the process of recruiting restavèks as servant domestic workers, they said that most of them
came from the countryside. Some of the participants’ families found the children homeless in the streets and
took them as restavèks. In other cases, mothers offered their children to be taken as restavèks.
Rachel: Growing up I remember having many restavèks living with us. Some of them lasted a really long time, like
about eight to nine years, and some of them just months or weeks. The first restavèk that I ever knew was given to my
mom because her parents were deceased. She was from Cap-Haitian. She grew up with us, went to school, and even got
UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI
146
pregnant with a baby boy while living in my house. The other ones also came from the countryside because their families
were not able to care for them. My mom found two of the restavèks of my house right outside our block in Port-au-Prince.
Alcid: I was probably eight years old. This woman came and she had a young little girl. She may have been 11 years
old. I did not know what was going on. My mom gave her food. Before I knew it, the mother left and she stayed with us.
She had a bag of belongings with her.
Some of the restavèks are children who do not have parents or caregivers. In other cases, their parents
cannot sustain them and prefer to send them away to be domestic servants as a solution for subsistence.
Duties
Most of the restavèks are assigned hard working routines. Some of them are responsible for accomplishing
particular house chores such as cooking, laundry, or cleaning. Alcid remembers that “they wake up before
everyone else around 4:30 a.m. or 5:00 a.m. They make coffee, make beds, do the laundry, iron clothes, cook,
and constantly clean”. Other Restavèks are assigned to assist and accompany their guardian’s children.
Paulmarie says “She [her restavèk] removed my uniform, bathed me, was behind me everywhere. She was just
like my mother”.
Abuse
The researcher classified abuse into three themes such as emotional, physical, and sexual abuse.
Emotional Abuse. Most of the restavèks are victims of emotional abuse. Participants explained that there
is always a clear power difference between restavèks and guardians’ family members. Even though some
guardians attempt to treat restavèks with as much dignity as possible, there is always the clear line that
identifies them as servants and inferior to anyone else in the family. Therefore, guardians constantly remind
them that they are restavèks, evidently implying the derogatory meaning of the term. Alcid recalls situations of
emotional abuse against the restavèks, “My sister always reminded them that she had education that they could
not get because of their restavèk status”. In the story of Dumasie, the fact that her guardians did not send her to
school was the most traumatic episode of her life. “I also experienced my dad yelling at them at times and not
treating them fairly when they did not get the job properly done—Rachel”.
Physical Abuse. Restavèks are expected to perform difficult house chores that usually young children are
not capable of accomplishing. As a result, guardians abuse their Restavèks physically when they do not perform
house chores as expected. Paulmarie recalls that her aunt mistreated one of the restavèk children, “They are
expected to perform difficult house chores that usually young children are not capable of accomplishing. She
did not send her to school. She used to beat her every time she did not do anything right. She was a little girl
and she could not do things right [as an adult]”. All of the participants agree that the reasons that lead guardians
to abuse restavèk children rest on their inability to perform house chores. “My mom used to spank her every
time she did something wrong or did not do her chores—Alcid”. Physical abuse escalates to episodes like what
Rachel recalls, “My sister once threw hot water at her because she had not done her chores” .
Sexual Abuse. Sexual abuse is different from emotional or physical because it is not based on the
restavèks’ inability to perform domestic duties. Sexual abuse against restavèks is a major issue in the Haitian
community. Some of the participants claim that male guardians “use” female restavèks to satisfy their sexual
needs. All of the participants knew about an episode of sexual abuse against their restavèks.
UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI
147
Paulmarie: Usually males in the family rape the restavèk girls. I heard about a case in my neighborhood. They
[restavèks] do not talk about it. These children are so scared that they do not tell the adults that they are molested.
Alcid afflicted with anguish recalled occasions when he sexually abused the female restavèks living in his
house.
Alcid: I remember me touching the girls. I was 13 years old. I was the result of my society. Superiority allows me to
dehumanize them and mom justified the behavior by saying that it was a male necessity or desire.
Two participants reported that sexual abuse against restavèk girls was socially accepted. “…I remembered
her telling my auntie about what my cousin did and they never believed her and when she got pregnant, they
said she went looking for it—Rachel”. Restavèks do not have custodians who can protect them, which
facilitates male adults to sexually abuse them. They know that if the female children denounce the abuse, no
one will even care to defend them.
Participants’ Reactions after Watching Blooming Hope
The researcher classified responses of participants after watching Blooming Hope (2010) into three themes
such as discomfort, regret and awareness.
Discomfort
The Restavèk phenomenon in Haiti is an accepted practice rarely publicly discussed. “I knew about it [the
reality of the Restavèks], but every time you hear a story is like something new. It makes you really
uncomfortable—Paulmarie”. Restavèks are not expected to be active communicators, but are rather constrained
to listen and obey their guardians’ orders. Therefore, they do not have the right to voice their concerns. “It was
difficult to see. Yes, I had seen the restavèks speaking on international media. They never talk about these
stuff—Crystal”.
Regret
All of the participants regret having physically or psychologically mistreated the Restavèk children. “I
regret all the times that I may have ever disrespected one of them or made them feel less than me—Rachel.”
Before watching Blooming Hope (2010), participants had never consciously evaluated the restavèk
phenomenon. After seeing Dumasie telling her story as a restavèk in the documentary, participants remembered
their experiences with restavèks and feel guilty about their abuse against them. “In her voice I hear the cry of
these girls asking for justice and I feel responsible for it… It is as if she was talking to me and telling me why
you did this to me—Alcid”.
Awareness
Most of the participants had never seen a woman telling her story as a restavèk from her perspective.
“After watching Blooming Hope (2010), I understand their [restavèks] story and their struggle—Rachel”.
Dumasie represents all the children in Haiti who face domestic slavery. When audiences see Dumasie telling
her afflicting story, they are able to recognize her as a human being rather than a property or object that serves.
“She put a face to the suffering of all these kids. They do not have voices… they are not given the
space—Alcid”.
Alcid said that Blooming Hope (2010) deeply impacted him because he was able to reflect about the
UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI
148
restavèk phenomenon in Haiti. Also, he confessed that he had never spoken to anyone about his experiences
with the restavèk children and his great regret. “It helps me to confess this past that very few know, because I
can make sense of what I did, and really reflect on how wrong I was—Alcid”.
Participants recognized the impact of Blooming Hope (2010) as an instrument to spark dialogue and to
uncover the unheard violence against children. “The story of Dumasie brings to light the unheard personal story
of Haitian restavèks—Crystal”.
Arthur: The story of Dumasie is the movie to me because it gives a voice to all the Restavèks who are
speechless in our Haitian society. This demonstrates the power struggle that we face in our modern society in
Haiti.
Furthermore, most participants also realized the permanent psychological distress of Dumasie and most
restavèks as a result of their experiences as domestic servants. “Even though she [Dumasie] made a way out of
it, she lived something that destroyed her real person and she will not get counseling—Paulmarie”. Alcid
reflected that he has become a successful professional because he was allowed to have dreams and accomplish
them; while the numerous restavèks that served him throughout his life were never allowed to dream and were
just struggling to satisfy their basic needs. He concludes, “I am who I am today thanks to all the work that
restavèks did for me along the years. Now, I wonder how their lives unfolded”.
Discussion
This research demonstrates that documentaries can be used as tools for popular education to facilitate
members of featured communities to engage in reflection of social issues portrayed. All of the participants of
this study felt the urge to discuss the restavèk phenomenon with the researcher after watching Blooming Hope
(2010). They were willing to share their most intimate personal stories to better understand the restavèk
phenomenon and to find a solution for this entrenched social problem. This study is the result of a request of
Haitian audiences who watched Blooming Hope (2010) and were eager to engage in conversation about the
restavèk phenomenon in Haiti.
Narratives told by individuals who are restavèks or were restavèks in their childhood are significant for the
re-construction of the social fabric of Haiti as they serve as vehicles to connect the dichotomy of social
differentiation between the poor and the rich (Vannini, 2012). One of the most important outcomes of this study
is that participants came to the realization that restavèks suffer an abysmal social subjugation that neglects their
freedom to develop personally and professionally.
Most of the participants identified episodes of mistreatment of the restavèks that someone else had
performed. Some of them mentioned family members or neighbors treating the restavèks poorly. However,
only one participant recognized that he had mistreated the restavèks while growing up and confessed that he
had sexually abused the female restavèks living in his house. This may be the result of the collective shame
experienced in the Haitian community for such atrocious crimes against children, but yet an accepted practice.
Restavèk girls are often called la pou sa, a Creole term meaning “available for that” which defines girls as
sexual objects at the disposition of the men or boys of the household. Clair (1993) and Townsley and Geist
(2000) stated that this type of sexual harassment is the result of the hegemonic discourse of an oppressive
system against the restavèk children.
UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI
149
Another outcome of this study is that participants came to become aware of the severity of the restavèk
phenomenon in Haiti through a process of discomfort, regret and awareness.
This study reveals that this sexual abuse breeds two kinds of victims: (1) female restavèks who are
sexually molested and (2) men who are socially pressured to sexually abuse the girls. Therefore, violence
resulting from the restavèk phenomenon produces a volatile social composition of individuals who constantly
regret their obscure past. Popular education serves as a tool to confess victims’ past and liberates them from
such traumatic aggression.
Further research must be dedicated to child modern day slavery. In addition, film producers and directors
should use storytelling to portray narratives of victims of child modern day slavery, who are often socially
neglected. Such documentary films can result in social movements that ignite social consciousness and change.
Conclusion
Historically adopted practices are challenged when the human story is brought to the surface. Even though
Haiti became a free republic as a result of the revolution of the slaves over their ruling class, two hundred years
later, Haiti still endures practices of oppression commonly known in colonial times. And, the restavèk
phenomenon can be best described as the result of a prevalent colonization of the ruling class over the most
disempowered group of any nation: its children. This ethnographic research concludes that documentary films
serve as tools for popular education. Furthermore, narrative discourse can transform guardians’ perceptions of
the restavèk phenomenon.
References
Article I(d) quoted in Basic Documents of Human Rights (Ed.). (1992). Brownlie, I. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Balsari, S., Lemery, J., Williams, T. P., & Nelson, B. D. (2010). Protecting the children of Haiti. The New England Journal of
Medicine, 362(9), 25. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1001820
Bell, M. S. (1995). All souls rising. New York: Pantheon Books.
Bracken, A. (2006). Haiti’s children pay the price of poverty. NACLA Report on the Americas, 39(5), 22-25. Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com/docview/202681721?accountid=14129
Campbell, G., Miers, S., & Miller, J. C. (Eds.). (2011). Child slaves in the modern world. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
Clair, R. P. (1993). The use of framing devices to sequester organizational narratives: Hegemony and harassment. Communication
Monographs, 50, 113-137.
Crowther, J., Galloway, V., & Martin, I. (Eds.). (2005). Popular education: Engaging the academy: International perspectives.
Leicester, UK: National Institute of Adult Continuing Education England and Wales (NIACE).
Dubois, L., & Garriqus, J. D. (2006). Slave revolution in the Caribbean, 1789-1804: A brief history with documents. New York:
Bedford Press.
End Slavery Now. (2015). Restaveks: Haitian slave children. Retrieved January 9, 2015, from
http://endslaverynow.org/learn/photos/restaveks-haitian-slave-children
Fischer, S. (2004). Modernity disavowed: Haiti and the cultures of slavery in the age of revolution. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press.
Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group.
Huczynski, A., & Buchanan, D. (2004). Theory from fiction: A narrative process perspective on the pedagogical use of feature
film. Journal of Management Education, 28(6), 707-726. Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com/docview/195715326?accountid=14129
Moyano, M., & Rosero, F. J. (2010). Blooming hope: Harvesting smiles in port-de-Paix, Haiti [DVD]. Bloominghope.org
Townsley, N. C., & Geist, P. (2000). The discursive enactment of hegemony: Sexual harassment and academic organizing.
Western Journal of Communication, 64(2), 190-217. Retrieved from
UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI
150
http://search.proquest.com/docview/202695390?accountid=14129
Vannini, A. (2012). Stories and storytelling. Encyclopedia of Communication Theory (Ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2009.
935-37. SAGE Reference Online. Web. 2 Jul.
Wagner, L. R. (2008). When the one who bears the scars is the one who strikes the blow: History, human rights, and Haiti’s
restaveks. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Pro-Quest Dissertations and Theses, 64. Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com/docview/288169168?accountid=14129
UNICEF. (2015). Haiti at glance. Retrieved January 9, 2015 from http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/haiti_statistics.html
United Nations Statistics Division. (2015). Haiti. Retrieved January 9, 2015, from
https://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Haiti; http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/haiti_61518.html