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★Nermin Allam (University of Alberta, Edmonton,

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★Nadejda Komendantova (International Institute for

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★Ngozi C. Kamalu (Fayetteville State University, USA);

★Niklas Eklund (Umeå University, Sweden);

★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);

★Peter Simon Sapaty (National Academy of Sciences of

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process of the peer review of articles submitted to International Relations and Diplomacy.

International Relations

and Diplomacy

Volume 3, Number 2, February 2015 (Serial Number 17)

Contents

Military Strategies and Religious War

The Diffusion of Military Strategies 89

Mehmet Ondur

Religious War: Al-Qaradawi During the Wars in Gaza 99

Shaul Bartal

Political Regime and International Relations

Female Traditional Rulers in Eastern Nigeria: Eze-Ogo Alu Ibiam as a Case Study 116

F. A. OLASUPO

Malaysia’s Contemporary Political and Economic Relations with Iran 123

Asmady Idris, Remali Yusoff

Judicialization and the Restavèk Phenomenon

Judicialization of Catalonian Language and Identity Politics 134

Walter F. Carnota

Understanding the Restavèk Phenomenon in Haiti Through Storytelling and Film 141

Marcela Moyano

International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 89-98

doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.001

The Diffusion of Military Strategies

Mehmet Ondur

Wayne State University Detroit, Detroit, USA

Turkish Military Academy, Ankara, Turkey

This study shows the diffusion processes of innovations on military strategies. Since the notion of diffusion

describes the systemic spread and systemic equilibrium in more powerful terms and demonstrates dynamism, I

examined the military doctrinal diffusion patterns in terms of organizational, societal, and rational approach

perspectives. These approaches are the pillars of the theoretical edifice in which I argue that it is easier to see the

systemic diffusion of military strategies than the military innovations on weapons because of two factors: The

characteristics of doctrinal innovations and the behaviors of innovators (gatekeepers) are different. I use the

heuristic approach and examine many historical cases by focusing on military doctrines and the relationships

between alliances. I use the Blitzkrieg doctrine and the member relationships between the members of NATO as

case studies.

Keywords: diffusion, innovation, military strategies

Introduction

The notion of power varies across different areas. We can think of different variants of power such as

economic power, cultural power, diplomatic power, military power, and the like. Although they are related with

each other, military power is the most important aspect of power determinants in the international system. As a

result, the issue of military innovation becomes significant for the international security environment.

Although with the changes in the international system, such as globalization and the information

revolution, the understanding of the military power has been exposed to the function of many factors. However,

still the importance of soldiers, in other words, the traditional military power understanding has its importance

in addition to other factors. Mearsheimer (2001) argued that military power is the most important power variant

and military troops hold the focal point in the military power. He argued that it is the troops that occupy the

regions and keep the area under control.

Military power is correlated with the troops, the doctrinal, organizational (settings and arrangements) and

cultural aspects (discipline and obedience), however, it is also related with the complexity of the military

weapons systems, which provide efficiency to the military power structures. Today the battle theatre is different

and it continues to change as it has ever been. The reason why this change happens is related with both the

changes in the tangible and intangible goals of states. Tangible goals are the tactical level goals, in other words,

they are the military targets, such as different military assets of the enemy. However, intangible goals are

strategic level goals, such as gaining political or economic advantages against hostile or rival state. This also

Mehmet Ondur, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, Wayne State University Detroit; Turkish Military Academy.

DAVID PUBLISHING

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THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES

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plays an important role on military innovations.

The military power innovation can be examined from different approaches, which are structural realist,

organizational, and societal perspectives. Among these dimensions, the structural realist perspective addresses

the diffusion phenomena when it comes to the military innovations better than others. It is also important to

note that each of these approaches explains the factors of the theory of the diffusion of military innovations on

military strategies differently, and their framework depends on the different levels of analysis.

Literature Review

Military innovations provide a relative advantage to the sides that can innovate or effectively adopt an

innovation. This being said, military innovations hold key significance because states want to gain relative

advantage especially within the military balances for systemic equilibriums. And, it is those countries that can

adopt innovations significantly earlier than other adopters.

Today each new target can require a different weapon and each new defense means to protect these targets

requires new counter-attack means. This is also called as action-reaction spiral of the diffusion of power by way

of the military innovations. Moreover, examining the international security environment in terms of how states

fall and rise contributed significantly to the understanding of the role of the state as it is still the main actor of

the international system (Gilpin, 1981; Kugler & Lemke, 1996; Organski & Kugler, 1980; Waltz, 1979).

Diffusion of military power had been discussed by many authors. According to Modelski’s (1987) long

cycle world leadership theory, there are four periodical cycles, which are global war, world power,

deligitimization, and deconcentration. Each of these phases lasts roughly 25 years1, and each cycle process

determine the new world power which emerges after these series of cycles.

The salient aspect of the power diffusion according to Modelski happens at the last phase, because the

aggregated military power at the world power diffuses, and this brings out a new global war. This cyclic

relationship happens deterministically, and therefore, diffusion of power has dynamic characteristics according

to him. Modelski’s (1987) remarks on international justice can be thought as putting him within liberalist camp;

however, his arguments on the diffusion of power in the deconcentration phase is similar to that of the realism

perspective.

According to Hoffman (1974), foreign policy should be different than before, because over years many

dimensions have been added to the sole notion of power. Therefore, he defines power in broader terms, because

in the new world order foreign policies should include economic and social aspects. This shows the diffusion

and diversification of power, and this understanding of diffused power is economic power. The transformation

of the notion of power has brought new hierarchies, and each hierarchy demonstrates a different dimension of

power.

In this way, according to Hoffman (1974), we see the interaction of multiple systems. The new

interdependent international system has two traditional models. First model is state of war, which means

continuation of arms races, conflicts, hostilities, and the like. The second model is troubled peace, which means

that the restrictions upon uses of force such as economic interdependence because of the diffusion and

diversification of power and nuclear interconnection. These arguments on the new world order put Hoffman’s

argument within the new institutionalist paradigm in which it is believed that there is a systemic anarchy.

1 This is similar to the Kondratieff Long Price Waves theory.

THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES

91

This diffusion of power according to other liberalists, such as Josph Nye (2002), regarded non-state actors

to be important actors and to play new roles in the international system. Kegley and Raymond (1994) also

considered the power concentration as it is moving toward power diffusion in a multipolar world order. Thus,

all these insightful arguments indicate that there is a diffusion of power and military power is the most

important aspect of power. Therefore it becomes important to consider the diffusion of military power.

The issue of military innovation is not only significant in the area of weapons per se, but also the

noteworthy changes in the other areas, such as planning a military doctrine or organizing the military forces,

can also be regarded as military innovations. For example, a doctrine on the fight against terrorism might be a

military innovation or guerilla warfare might be another military innovation. The new or different doctrines are

especially seen in the different configuration types of alliances. NATO doctrine is much more different than the

USSR doctrine, and they are all military planning innovations.

When it comes to the states rather than firms, it is more difficult for gatekeepers to avoid the diffusion

because states have tremendous means to achieve their goals for breaking the firewall of the gatekeepers. It is

owing to the very reason that states seek security because international system is anarchic, and they follow each

other very closely especially their relative military capabilities and this gets harsher if they experienced conflict

between them. Waltz argues that “competition produces a tendency toward the sameness of the competitors…

so the weapons of major contenders, and even their strategies, begin to look much the same all over the world”

(Waltz, 1979).

However, the time for the systemic diffusion depends both on the “characteristics of the innovation” and

“the influence of the innovation gatekeepers”. While sometimes states can be willing to share an innovation,

sometimes they abstain from sharing technology with any other states. As an example of the first, this

especially happens within the alliances as seen between the United States and Britain after the Second World

War on the naval warfare technology.

As an example for the latter case, we can give weapons, such as nuclear weapons as an example for this

situation, because rather than giving the technology to the friend countries, they prefer to cover others under

their security umbrella. This is seen especially during the Cold War alliance configurations. This willingness is

seen more on doctrinal aspects than weapons diffusion as will be seen from the cases held from the Blitzkrieg

doctrine.

The factors of the diffusion of military innovations, i.e., organizational, economic, and dispute contiguity

have different levels of analysis ranging from the state level to the systemic level and demonstrate different

variation within them. The interaction of these factors specifies the necessary condition of diffusion of military

innovations.

Methodology

Given the three approaches on innovativeness and the theory of the three pillars of the theory, I try to

answer how does the military innovations diffuse? In order to analyze and answer the research question, I use

an historical heuristic approach. The unit of analysis of the study is innovations within the military sectors. The

dependent variable is the diffusion of military innovations and I boil it down to the innovation of military

weapons and military strategies. In particular, I examine military doctrines. Independent variables are

opportunity to acquire, military conflict contiguity, organizational rigidity, and characteristics of the military

innovation per se. I use the method of qualitative heuristic approach which examines the cases in the context of

THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES

92

history and interaction between units of analyses—states.

Military Innovations and Theory

Considering military innovations, three distinct approaches can shed light on the possible spread of

military innovations. These distinct perspectives are structural realist, organizational, and societal approaches.

Since each perspective demonstrates different aspects of military innovations, they will be called as the

dimension of the military innovations theory in this study.

From the societal point of view, militaries that are within harmonious societies are more innovative and

better to be more adoptive of the innovation. Civilian-military coordination and good relations between them

are also important part of this aspect. As it can be assumed that civilian influence can contribute mostly to the

weapons because it requires the technological knowledge and which is highly conducive to engineering and

scientific issues. However, planning part of military innovations mostly happen because of the officers within

the organization, but this is very rare and as can be seen in the history, the military fighting doctrines do not

change as frequent as military weapons change.

As civilian influence to military innovations most of the time demonstrates itself in the new weapons,

which depend heavily on technological innovation, and the military organization side generally demonstrates

itself on military planning and doctrines, it becomes crucial to distinguish military innovations from

technological innovations. Some military innovation can include the application high technology, however, all

military innovations do not require the use of high technology. Some states cannot afford to build military

weapons but they can innovate by using the available resources efficiently. Therefore, poor states by obtaining

high military effectiveness can prevail over those who use or have superior technology. This also explains why

poor states can win the wars sometimes.

Moreover, this perspective can also be elucidated by looking at the cohesiveness of the different peoples

within a country, and if there is minority or ethnicity discrimination, it can be assumed that it is less likely to

see military organizations in which all different peoples are same, equal and in harmony. This also makes

military organizations as well-functioning organizational structure and demonstrates some aspects of

organizational pillar point of view.

Divided societies are more likely to avoid progress because instead of focusing on research, they try to

eliminate the other party within the community from gaining influence, which, in the end, turns the game into a

lose-to-lose. This eventually causes conflicts mainly stemming from the different gains from the rents within

the societies. This indicates that civil societies, which have higher level of social capital, trust, and horizontal

relationships rather than hierarchical relationships can help to bring about better functioning governments, and

this will bring out positive effects on the military innovations.

As seen above, organizational and societal perspectives shed light on the factors needed for military

innovations, however, structural realist perspective can explain better which actors (countries) might innovate

and which will not. Since system structure is the key element and influences all of the policies of states,

neorealism can demonstrate the possible innovation trends by considering the international system, rather than

state characteristics and individual characteristics of rulers. According to neorealism, the biggest reason why

states tend to military innovation is because of their external threat perception and because of the relative

change within the balance of power and according to structural realism power parity means peace and power

preponderance means war (Grieco, 1988; Layne, 1993; Walt, 1985; Waltz, 1959). These are all very important

THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES

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contributions to show the pattern of the diffusion of military innovations.

From this point of view, if state A has more external threat or security concerns than state B, which does

not have as many external threats as state A, then state A tends more toward military innovation. When we look

at Germany before the First World War, we see many military innovations, and the biggest reason for this was

their perception of threat, especially after the First World War. The level of external threat was so high in their

perceptions; they made both many military weapons innovations and military planning innovations. For

instance, Blitzkrieg was a striking development for both tactical and strategic level planning of armies. NATO

has been the most powerful alliance organization in the history depending mostly on the fact that the perceived

level of threat to the West was higher than ever been in the history.

Blitzkrieg is a military innovation which is a genuine new concept and combined arms warfare. As a

recent example, Israel improved blitzkrieg substantially from its traditional fighting doctrine. Israel is an

important example for military innovations because it exposed a very high level of external threat from the time

of its foundation. The Israeli example is also very important because although militaries tend not to change

within the military organization itself and unless there is a civilian contribution to the mainstream, Israeli

military had the motivation to military innovations both from outside of the organization and within the

organization.

Another point to note is that military innovations do not promise victory. There might be factors that

cannot be controlled in the battle field, such as weather conditions, the structure of the terrain, and the like, can

influence negatively the expected outcome from the military innovations. Those exogenous factors also most of

the time play important roles in the outcomes of wars.

Although external threats to a state provide incentives for innovations in many areas, states, at first, tend to

prioritize military innovations or the successful adoption of military innovations. The neorealist paradigm

posits that international system is anarchical and that this creates a very competitive environment. Since there is

no upper authority of rule-making, states put the survival and security concerns as their most important

determinants of their foreign policy behaviors. Since all states tend to behave in this way under the self-help

environment, they want to build power balances against each other, and alliances are the important agencies for

these goals. Alliance configuration is determined according to the balance of power between states, and the

most important determinant of power according to structural realism is military power. Therefore military

innovations play a significant for in changing power balances.

Case Studies: The Doctrine of Blitzkrieg and Alliance Configurations (NATO)

Blitzkrieg is a military doctrinal innovation, and innovations similar to Blitzkrieg require a certain level of

technology. For example, tanks, anti-tank weapons, sophisticated fire support units including dive-bombers and

artillery are all integral parts of this strategy. These are also related with economic power in addition to

organizational arrangements for successful diffusion of military doctrines.

Blitzkrieg describes a method of warfare in which the mobilization and maneuvers are very important

because this strategy intends to encircle the enemy through swift maneuvers. Rather than seeing troops in a row,

Blitzkrieg warfare uses spearheaded moving troops in order to penetrate the defending forces in a row of

trenches. The importance of speed is seen with the penetration of the first front of the enemy line because the

enemy will be unable to use its secondary mobile units against the penetrating units. Therefore, mobilized

troops, tanks, panzers, effective and close fire support of artillery, and air forces are vital for the success. After

THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES

94

penetrating and reaching the back of the primary, main, and subsidiary fronts of defense forces, with swift

maneuvers, the enemy gets encircled and trapped inside the circle by the cutting of its communication and

support, such as the channels of logistics which provide maintenance of the enemy’s fighting.

However, the influence that Blitzkrieg wielded during the Second World War attracted interest from all

over the world. Blitzkrieg began to be adopted with the latest technological changes and new defense tactics,

such as mobile defense and avoiding concentration of power stationary in a specific area, over years. This was

easier for states to adopt because when it comes to the doctrinal aspects, it is difficult to keep the know-how

under the monopoly of its innovators. This has been in this way in the international system, traditionally;

therefore, the emergence of each new doctrine has been effective over many years and became a paradigm.

One of the biggest difficulty of the diffusion of the military innovations on strategy and planning aspects is

doctrinal innovations are difficult to see, and discerning the influence of the creativity becomes similarly

problematic. However, it was explicit, on the outcome of the war. For example, when German troops invaded

Poland in 1939, the collapse of the Polish troops was mainly viewed in such a manner as to suggest that the

defeat was not attributable to the superiority of the doctrine, but instead due to the ineptitude of the Polish

troops. Thus, France did not need to make changes to its defense plans and continued the First World War

trench warfare defense doctrine. However, it became obvious after the fall of France that Germans applied a

superior doctrine in its victories. But the result was different for Germans on Russian soil.

Even during the inter-war period, great powers began to adopt Blitzkrieg and started the diffusion process.

States began to give importance to mobility and to use military decision weapons, such as tanks, and heavily

use of air force fire support. However, it did not spread before Germany conquered most of the Europe, and

allied powers could not imitate Germany before suffering enormous causalities and losses. For example, the

Blitzkrieg diffused to Japan and the United States before they fought with each other during the Second World

War. However, toward the end of the war, nearly all countries, having the technological means to build

required military weapons for this doctrine, adopted the Blitzkrieg.

With the United States’ military innovation of nuclear weapons, the blitzkrieg doctrine began to be

replaced with other doctrines over years, however, it remained important to shape the subsequent doctrines.

However, updated doctrines have been adopted easily, again. For instance, the United States’ nuclear weapon

monopoly did not last long because the Soviet Union acquired the technology after only four years. Nuclear

weapons were intended to serve for strategic purposes of retaliation instead of using conventional weapons.

However, when the Soviet Union became nuclear weapons capable, then the blitzkrieg doctrine changed into

mutually assured destruction (MAD) and limited war doctrines.

One of the salient influences of nuclear weapons on the doctrinal military innovations is that nuclear

weapons diffused before an appropriate doctrine for their use by the United States had been forged. After the

emergence of other nuclear weapons countries in the international system, states began to adopt mutually

assured destruction and limited war strategies similar to the US and Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the MAD and

limited war doctrines still required mobile troops similar to the way as it was introduced by the Blitzkrieg

doctrine beforehand; therefore, we see the vicious cycle of action-reaction pattern, again.

However, in the limited war doctrines, the use of large number of troops became outmoded between

nuclear weapons states because of the massive retaliation possibility with nuclear weapons. The only one war

between nuclear weapons states show that crises and wars between nuclear weapons states have not escalated to

all-out wars, as seen in the Kargil War in 1999. Nevertheless, the number of proxy wars between the great

THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES

95

powers have increased, and the density of militarized international disputes over years have continued to

increase up-to-date.

We can assume that the primary aspects of Blitzkrieg were shaped by the continued efforts during

industrialism, especially with the combined help of the steam, rifle and telegraph to defeat the Austrian Empire

by the Prussians in 1866. This is followed by the introduction and effective use of machine guns and artillery

supports and applied during the trench warfare of the First World War. Then the stability of trenches turned

into mobile trenches with the effective introduction of armored vehicles in the battlefield. This mobility reached

its peak at the Second World War period. Battles became more decisive over the years of industrialization.

Blitzkrieg is a significant example of military innovation because it caused a huge impact on international

politics and it provided a noteworthy relative advantage to its innovators before it began to diffuse. However, it

also provided many strategic advantages to those who adopted this doctrinal innovation early periods of its

innovation. Those who could not adopt or left in the laggard position could not gain as much advantage relative

to earlier adopters.

One of the main reasons why Blitzkrieg spread so fast is particularly because of the existence of highly

competitive environment of the Second World War created in the international system. As a result of this,

major countries became much more alert to any changes among the relative capabilities of states. Although

bilateral or multilateral information channels were closed between them, there was a considerable flow of

information on the changes within the relative capabilities especially between the fighting states.

When the threat is eminent or inevitable and its early shocks are felt, states, as if, tend to open their

receptors to gain more information and deduce their following course of action to the more goal oriented way.

During the time of both the First World War and the Second World War, states spent enormous time and

energy to provide relative advantages especially in terms of military aspects and the acquisition of information

about the new use of weapons and doctrines. That is why the German Wars (WWI and WWII) increased the

diffusion military innovations and especially the Blitzkrieg during the Second World War.

Germany could not avoid spreading its military innovation—Blitzkrieg—as a gatekeeper because it could

not hide it from others over time. Moreover, after the successes of this strategy were witnessed by the other

warring states, it became important for them to adopt this doctrine for their security and also for their survival

in the anarchical international order. The environment of competitiveness made other states act in a similar way

in the adoption of new advantages.

Not only did Japan adopt this doctrine successfully, but other states, such as the United States, Britain, and

the USSR also adopted it. Although organizational changes are related with the societal aspects, when the need

for security requires the changes, these happen very quickly, as seen with examples derived from between 1941

and 1945. Since doctrinal changes are also related with the organization and societal aspects, the incubation

period should be higher when compared with the use of a new weapon or system of communication or change

in the logistic systems. Therefore, it was more difficult for the adopters to get used to the mobile

combined-arms warfare rather than the weapons innovation, such as nuclear weapons.

Considering the Blitzkrieg, we can assume that there is a payoff for making institutional arrangements due

to many reasons but mainly because of the available time and instinct of survival. Long-term institutional

changes are less costly and are adopted more efficiently than the abrupt and sudden ones. For example, because

of their geographic locations, states can apply different fighting doctrines. We can think the Finnish-Russian

War (also known as Winter War because of the harsh weather conditions during fighting) in 1939 and 1940 in

THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY STRATEGIES

96

terms of this situation.

This war was started with the Soviet’s unsuccessful invasion of Finland, the Winter War, which lasted

more than one year and caused the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations. The interesting

aspect of this war was the power differentials between the armies of the two states. Russia had almost ten times

more troops than Finland and had more than 100 times number of tanks and armored vehicles than Finland.

Soviet generals admired the Blitzkrieg but it was not a good idea to use a highly mobile army and change the

formation and organization of the army according to it. Moreover, there were not pavements but many

obstacles of rivers, lakes, ice, and the like. Therefore, advantages provided by the geography would provide

tremendous benefits to any side. It was the Finnish army that obtained this advantage of cold weather, snow,

long hours of night-time, and forest.

It is also important to note that, however, the main characteristics of the Blitzkrieg strategy was to bring

out mobilized troops of various units together. Nevertheless, each country adopted the doctrine according to

their conditions. As seen in the Winter War, the side that who could adapt according to their conditions better

suffered less causality.

For example, at the beginning of the German Wars, the Unites States did not have much mechanized

troops, Britain and France had very low numbers of motorized units, and Soviet Union was not that much

different than the others. However, at the end of the war, all had their main combatant units motorized. The

biggest change was seen in the United States because other states had to adopt Blitzkrieg when engaging in a

war, and therefore, their observations could not provide them adequate time required. Therefore, they had

difficulty in using the doctrine effectively at the beginning of their adoption.

When it comes to the United States, the situation was different because it could observe the battle theatre

and adopt the doctrine more thoroughly than the others. However, United States could not have the opportunity

to test its own doctrine and determine its deficiencies as effectively as other states who engaged actively for the

duration of the War.

It was especially difficult for the Soviet army to reorganize its doctrine because they had a huge

experience of fights not only in the Eastern side of the Second World War, but also against the Turkic

minorities on the Central Asia steps, the Ottomans in the Balkans, and other minorities in the Caucasus regions.

Moreover, historically, Russia engaged many wars with others such as, the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian

Empire, and with Asian states. This has posed some organizational rigidity on its military structure over years.

However, for the United States, the situation was completely different because it did not have much war

experience; therefore, it has less organizational power to resist the doctrinal changes. In addition to this, it could

easily build its own doctrine by modifying the Blitzkrieg more appropriately in a relatively shorter period of

time. When the factors of more accurately observing the war theatre and less resistance to institutional change,

and high degree of external threat came together, this brought about the best modification of the Blitzkrieg. But

being away from the war theater and being unable to measure the possible outcomes of the doctrinal changes,

nevertheless, the United States adopted the Blitzkrieg most effectively and efficiently than the others.

For example, units under General George S. Patton’s command in the northern Africa swept the Axis

Power from the region successfully. He was later regarded as turned the general who turned the Blitzkrieg

against its own originators (Mayer, 2009) and compared with the victories on the battlefield with German Field

Marshall Erwin Rommel always. Patton’s Third Army introduced a new style of fighting doctrine based mainly

on the Blitzkrieg. His doctrine mainly depended on the heavily use of armored vehicles together with

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continuously pushing forward and moving so fast but abstaining from entranced infantry warfare.

It might be misleading if we were to rely solely on security concerns as being more successful for

innovations or adoption of military innovations for the diffusion of military innovations because of the role of

the gatekeepers also determine the future course of the diffusion. If there is little chance that gatekeeper has the

power to impede the diffusion process, then the motion of the diffusion becomes slowed. However, alliances

can serve to ease the diffusion process.

Since the security is priority, states can sometimes share their innovation and voluntarily if it helps their

security. This is related with the security concerns because of the anarchical structure of the international

system. For example, Britain shared the know-how required to build powerful naval forces. It is also striking to

see that there had been no great power wars between the power transitions processes from Britain to the United

States and Britain share its military innovations with the United States. Therefore, however possible to see

gatekeepers voluntary share innovations, it is very rare in history.

The internal potentials of the United States can be assumed as a combination of many factors, such as

education, economic development, urbanization, and industrialization, etc. All these factors are mutually

reinforcing and helping the maintenance of global power position. The systemic influence, when combined

with the internal potential of the United States, causes the international system to feel America’s influence in a

more pronounced manner.

Therefore, it is also important to mention the Unites Stated in the diffusion of military planning and

strategy. The experiences of the United States’ troops in the Second World War together with the Patton’s

enhanced Blitzkrieg strategy also influenced the current military doctrine of the Western Armies. Today,

NATO doctrine is the main fighting doctrine for the member states, and each member state has had to arrange

its military organizations according to the rules of the alliance. The same was true for the Warsaw Pact

countries.

The accurate information on the security concerns and military solutions are extremely important because

it creates the pool of experiences of the member states and enable to select best course of action in the future

confrontations. Therefore, what we see today is the remnants of the Blitzkrieg, but with constant development

efforts of trials errors over years. This is especially important for the world’s superpower, the United States, in

order to maintain its international superiority from the feedback.

In sum, it is important to consider the payoff because the experience might also be important. Since states

most of the time have developed more efficient adoption of innovations by first observing and detect their

problems with less participation at first and develop their adoption accordingly. As seen in the United States

and Russia example. Russians could not use Blitzkrieg efficiently because of their traditional military doctrine,

but they learned a lot from the shameful Winter War. Then the question becomes why the United States could

easily learn from the Second World War theater and applied the Patton’s more innovative Blitzkrieg

successfully lies under the reason that American military did not engage with wars with other states historically

and this gave the United States and low level of organizational block for the new doctrinal arrangements.

Conclusion

Since the pillars of the theoretical edifice argued in this study reinforce and complement each other, each

dimension has different, dynamically changing relations with each dimension (structural realist, organizational,

and societal). Given this relationship between the theoretical pillars and the theoretical dimensions, the different

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levels of analysis show the dynamic and, although interconnected, self-help environment of the international

system for the diffusion mechanisms of military innovations. If they are put in an order of importance, system

level (conflict contiguity) influence plays larger role than the others, and it is followed by the hybrid level

(economic factor) and eventually followed by the state level (organizational factor).

Within its own dynamism, the international system is a system of rivalry and one of the most important

aspect for relative advantage of one arty over the others is to halt one way or another process of diffusion. If it

is not possible, then try to find new innovations in order to maintain the current advantageous position.

Otherwise, states are doomed to fail and to lose their advantage relative to the other competing actors.

This brings us to the conclusion that states are still the key players in the relatively complex international

system. As the theory argued in this paper shows, the only way to impede the diffusion of nuclear weapons is

through the role of the gatekeepers, otherwise, diffusion is inevitable. Since the influence of gatekeepers on

military strategies is not effective, it is easier to see the diffusion of doctrinal innovations than that of the spread

of military weapon innovations.

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International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 99-115

doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.002

Religious War: Al-Qaradawi During the Wars in Gaza

Shaul Bartal

Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

Since Israel‟s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, it has already conducted over three wars and a few

other operations against Hamas. The last Gaza War lasted 50 days (July 7-August 26, 2014). This article shows

how this conflict is in actuality a war between Islamic nationalism (represented by Hamas) and Jewish nationalism

(represented by Israel). In this constant state of conflict, Hamas is supported by the famous Sheikh Yusuf

al-Qaradawi, a Muslim Brotherhood scholar and the head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars and other

well-known Islamic institutions. An analysis of Qaradawi‟s views on the wars in Gaza explains why jihad in

Palestine will continue and why there is no possible compromise solution. According to Qaradawi, the war against

Israel is the most important type of jihad in the Arab world today (and not in Syria and Iraq). This is the first and

foremost of all Muslim problems and must be supported by all Muslims. The Gaza Strip is only one battlefield in

this war.

Keywords: Gaza War, Hamas, Israel, Qaradawi, Palestine, Egypt, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades

Religious War: Al-Qaradawi During the Wars in Gaza

In June 2006, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) began military operations with the purpose of harming

Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The first Gaza Strip operation began as a response to the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit

on 25 June 2006 and was called “Summer Rain”. It was discontinued due to the break out of the second

Lebanese War one week later. On 31 October 2006, operation “Autumn Clouds” began. In this operation, the

IDF entered the Gaza Strip in the area of Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahia which are located in the northern end of

Strip. On 26 November 2006, after the deaths of over 400 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, the operation drew to

a close (Ali, 2009, pp. 85-89). These two military actions took place at a time when the Fatah organization,

under the leadership of Muhammad Dahlan, was still the ruling factor in the Gaza Strip under the Palestinian

Authority. At this time, Dahlan was still fighting his opposition and dealing with rising criticism by the Hamas

organization on his performance. The June 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas and the establishment of

Hamas control over the Strip by the removal of all Fatah operatives, led to a period of repeated rounds of war

between Israel and the Hamas organization and its supporters in the Strip, a policy which has been described as

“lawn mowing” (Inbar, September 1, 2014).

In the period of time since the Hamas revolution in June 2007 until today, there have been four Israeli

military operations aimed at weakening the Hamas regime and reducing the amount of rockets launched at

Israel from the Gaza Strip as much as possible. Although operations “Warm Winter” (27 Feb. 2008-4 Mar.

2008) and “Cast Lead” (27 Dec. 2008-1 Jan. 2009), cost over 1,600 deaths, it led only to a relative period of

Shaul Bartal, Ph.D., Middle Eastern Studies Department, Bar Ilan University.

DAVID PUBLISHING

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quiet. Israel‟s success in these operations was limited (Ali, 2009, pp. 87-95). Hamas was able to rehabilitate

itself, renew its rocket strength and even successfully increase the firing range of the air strikes on Israeli

targets. A large part of the Hamas organization‟s success in retaining its abilities stems from the financial and

military aid that it received from Qatar. This financial aid enabled Hamas to not only rehabilitate the Strip

physically but to purchase weapons as well. The financial, political and public support given to Hamas from

around the world also included monies from the charity committees. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi‟s support

which stemmed from his position as the Director of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) and

head of the trustees of the International Jerusalem Institute insured that a major part of the monies collected as

part of tithing in the Islamic law (zakat) went to the Hamas organization (The General National Security

Service, Shabak, September 2009; Drori, 2014, pp. 3-4).

After the “Cast Lead” operation in 2009, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi actively raised significant funds for

the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip after the Israeli attacks. He did this in the framework of his position as the

Director of IUMS by diverting donations from the international charity organizations that he had established,

E‟itilaf Al-Khair (The Charity Coalition), to Hamas. In addition, Qaradawi, operating from Qatar (his place of

residence), convinced the local ruler (Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani) to support the Hamas organization

economically and politically (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, January 29, 2009). This article will survey

Qaradawi‟s contributions to Hamas during the last two Israeli operations.

Qaradawi’s Support for Hamas During “Operation Pillar of Defense”

On 14 November 2012, the IDF began Operation “Pillar of Defense”. The operation‟s purpose was to limit

the amount of rockets fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip. This operation began with the assassination of

Ahmed al-Jabari, the Deputy Commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (the military arm of Hamas),

who was the actual commander in the field. Under Hamas rule, over 169 Gaza residents died and over 800 were

injured during the operation. In addition, there was mass destruction of foundations and public buildings. The

operation led not only to an Israeli military achievement but to a Hamas political achievement as well (Bartal,

November 18, 2012). This operation took place during the period of the blossoming of the Arab spring where

the Islamic parties won elections in Tunis, Morocco, Egypt and Yemen. It appeared as if the Muslim

Brotherhood would, in another minute, win control over the whole Arab world thereby making it possible for

their vision of an Islamic Empire to become a reality. For the first time, Hamas was granted political

recognition for the legitimacy of its rule from the states of the Arab League. Ismail Haniyeh, the prime minister

of the Hamas government, began to receive Arab foreign ministers and the heads of the Arab governments who

expressed support and unequivocal recognition for Hamas in Gaza to the dissatisfaction of the President of the

Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas (Abu „Amer, January 2013, pp. 32-33). Credit for these

achievements should also be given to Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi who, already on the second day of Operation

Pillar of Defense, came to the aid of the Hamas organization. In his visit to Egypt he was able to find fertile

ground for stirring up anti-Israel feelings in the state where the president, Mohamed Mursi, was a member of

the Muslim Brotherhood.

Sheikh al-Qaradaw also serves as a member of the al-Azhar Committee of Muslim scholars, the most

influential law institution in the Islamic world. Qaradawi‟s words from within the al-Azhar organization were

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widely broadcast throughout the Arab states. Qaradawi called for Islamic Arab unity against the mutual enemy

of the Islamic nation and the strengthening of the spirit of the children of Palestine in Gaza. Qaradawi‟s words

were broadcast on Friday, 16 November 2012, on the same historic day that the Egyptian Prime Minister

Hesham Mohamed Qandil visited the Gaza Strip. Qaradawi said: “They [the Muslim States] have to prove to

the whole world that they are one [Islamic] nation which can clash with all of the [aggression] of a nation from

among its people [like in Palestine]” (Maktab al-Filastini lil-l'alam, November 16, 2012). Qaradawi also added

a condemnation of “those same religious leaders of the Islamic nation who do not arise against Israel and its

evil, boastful deeds” (Maktab al-Filastini lil-l‟alam, November 16, 2012).

The revolutions in the Arab world, where the Islamic movements connected to the Muslim Brotherhood,

came into power in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Yemen. This led to an Islamic Arab world much more willing

to aid the Palestinians in their struggle. In his sermon, which was broadcast throughout the Arab world from

al-Azhar, Qaradawi called for a joint mass march of all Arabs for the freedom of Gaza and for aid to the

children of Palestine. In his call to the Arab states and especially to the rule of the Brotherhood in Egypt,

Qaradawi demanded the cancellation of the peace agreement, the breaking off of relations with Tel Aviv and

the return of the Arab ambassadors to their own countries. Qaradawi‟s call did not fall on empty ears. A

number of Arab states expressed support for the Hamas government and this included a procession of Arab

foreign ministers to Gaza. Thus, Hamas‟ political gain became an actual one—de facto recognition for its

government (Bartal, November 18, 2012). For example, Egypt recalled its ambassador from Israel as a result of

the Israeli operation, but it did not cut off its diplomatic relations with Israel and even took a significant role in

stopping the fighting between the two sides. This shows that despite the evident influence of Qaradawi on the

supporters of the Moslem Brotherhood throughout the world with an emphasis on Egypt, his political influence

on the regime was limited. In the meantime, the regime of the Muslim Brotherhood prefers its political interests

over its political recommendations. Likewise, despite widespread support, as much as it was, not a single Arab

state went out of its way to help Hamas in its war against Israel. Hamas senior personnel expressed their

disappointment with the reactions of the Arab world which were not effective enough in putting enough

pressure on Israel as had been expected (Kam, 2012, pp. 22-23).

What is Qaradawi‟s contribution to Hamas‟ political achievements for that same period? The contribution

is enormous. He aided in the realization of the first visit to the Gaza Strip by an Arab leader since the Hamas

Revolution in June 2007—the visit of the Emir of Qatar Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani on 23 October 2012.

During this visit, the Emir of Qatar purposely skipped over a similar visit to the Palestinian Authority in

Ramallah thereby, through his actions and his monetary support, showing his belief in the legitimacy of the

regime and in the Hamas ideology. His shunning of the Palestinian Authority led to criticism by the

government of Salam Fayad and the president of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas. Heniyah also

announced the establishment of a new city near Khan Yunis which would carry the name Hamad in honor of

the historic visit which symbolized an historical turnabout in the diplomatic recognition of the Hamas regime.

Nothing was left for Mahmoud Abbas other than to express his objections to the visit and to hope that it would

not affect the efforts which in the end succeeded—the signing of an appeasement agreement between the two

movements (Issacharoff, October 24, 2012; Haaretz, October 23, 2012).

In an article published on the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades‟ site, Qaradawi is quoted as saying that it

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was his influence on Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani which was responsible for the historical visit of the

Emir of Qatar to the Gaza Strip during Operation Protective Edge and for the actions of the rest of the

governmental factors in Duha where he has lived since the 1960s (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, January 23,

2013). Qaradawi explains that his close ties with the president of Qatar began right after the Gaza War which

resulted in the deaths of 1,415 martyrs and left 5,450 people injured. As head of a delegation of religious sages,

Qaradawi met with the Emir of Qatar and asked him to intercede on the behalf of the Hamas government in

Gaza to help fight the Israeli aggression. According to al-Qaradawi, it was him who succeeded in awakening

the enthusiasm of the Emir of Qatar to the distress of Gaza and to the Palestinian matter and that the Emir

committed himself in front of him to do as much as he could in regard to the Gaza problem (Izz ad-Din

al-Qassam Brigades, January 29, 2009). In the beginning, the Emir of Qatar did, in fact, try to aid in the

realization of an internal appeasement with the sponsoring of the Duha Agreement between the two

sides—Fatah and Hamas, signed in Qatar on 6 Feb. 2012 (Issacharoff & Khuri, February 6, 2012). But, when

this agreement failed to lead to the awaited for appeasement, the Emir took independent political action which

was in opposition to the stand of the Palestinian Authority and the official stand of the Arab League at that time.

The Emir came to the Gaza Strip on an official state visit—the first time of an Arab leader to the Strip since the

Hamas gained control in 2007.

Operation Protective Edge

On July 8, the “Operation Protective Edge” broke out in the Gaza Strip. This operation was carried out in a

number of stages that included air strikes, limited ground entry and the assassination of the leaders of the Izz

al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The most high profile assassinations were against the leaders and founders of the

Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades: Muhammad Ibrahim Salah Abu Shamala (Abu Khalil), a member of the upper

military council, Raed Subhi Ahmad al-Attar (Abu Eyman), the commander of the Rafah district, the

“mastermind behind the abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit” (Albany Tribune News, March 14, 2014)

and a member of the upper military council and Mohammed Hamdan Barhoum, (Abu Osama) (Izz ad-Din

al-Qassam Brigades, August 21, 2014). Also included the attempted assassination of Muhammad Deif (chief

commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades). During the assassination attempt the following were

killed: Deif‟s wife, Widad, his son, Ali, and his daughter Sara were killed (Levi, Kais, & Somfalvi, 2014).

From the first day of the operation, Qaradawi supported Hamas and encouraged it and the rest of the

Palestinian factions to continue with their opposition and their jihad against Israel. IUMS, in an opinion written

by Qaradawi which was already published on the second day of the war, on July 9th, called on all the

governments and the Islamic and the Human Rights organizations to stop the Zionistic violence. At the same

time, Qaradawi called for the “Palestinian nation to continue in its struggle through a third intifada” and for the

“Palestinian nation to continue to steadfastly hold on to the land of Palestine against the exploiting Zionist

occupier” (Qaradawi, July 9, 2014a).

Qaradawi‟s messages, as expressed in the last Gaza war, are a continuation of the consistent content in his

speeches and sermons in regard to the duty of jihad in Palestine. A number of these messages were repeated in

different contexts even during the Cast Lead Operation (27 December 27 2008-18 January 2009) and the Pillar

of Defense Operation (14-21 November 2012). The fifty-day battle in this round of fighting enabled Qaradawi

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to decisively express his views supporting Hamas and to emphasize many other additional motifs.

The Most Important Jihad is in Gaza

For those fighting on the land of al-sham [a nickname for the land of Greater Syria which includes Jordan,

Lebanon and Israel] and to all those who turn to Gaza [and who carry out] the jihad in Gaza, this is the most

important jihad on the land of al-sham. This is my ruling for this hour, everything that is related to [the struggle]

on the land of Gaza. Gaza is calling you!! Where are the jihad fighters and the free men? Hey, the children of

Umar-al-Faruq [a nickname for Amar Ibn al-Khatib, the second Caliph during whose reign Jerusalem and the

land of Israel were captured]! (Qaradawi, July 23, 2014).

The struggle in the Gaza Strip is part of the ongoing struggle between the Zionistic Jews and the Islamic

nation. This crucial struggle demands to be resolved in a way which is in favor of the children of the nation

who are protecting themselves from an anti-Muslim attacking force which the Egyptian regime of Abdel Fattah

Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi put together. In light of this, the drafting of every son of the nation is the

requirement of the hour. In a declaration made by at the beginning of the fighting, Qaradawi warned of

fabricated religious rulings and emphasized that his religious stand is constant and is expressed in his books, his

writings and his sermons which deal with the issue of Palestine and which require fighting in

Palestine—against people and property (Qaradawi, August 9, 2014).

From among his books, Qaradawi indicates three significant ones which emphasize his ideas on the

importance of jihad in Palestine. He believes that jihad is a defensive jihad and therefore it is within the realm

of personal responsibility (fard al-'ayn). These are: (1) A lesson in the second nakbeh [1967]—Why we were

defeated and how we can win). This book was published immediately after the Six-Day War (Qaradawi, 1993);

(2) Jerusalem, the problem of every Muslim (Qaradawi, 2001a); (3) The encyclopedia of the laws of jihad

(Qaradawi, 2009).

Fighting for jihad in Gaza takes religious precedence over fighting for jihad in other sectors where there is

a struggle between Muslim and Muslim such as in Syria and Iraq. Fighting in Gaza against the Jews proceeds

any fighting against Christian infidels such as the United States fighting in Afghanistan. Jihad is graded

according to the level of the importance of the area to Islam. This ideology also stems from Qaradawi‟s

anti-Semitic approach which describes the struggle against the Jews as a cosmic struggle between good and evil

that began at the dawn of Islam (Qaradawi, 2001b, pp. 61-69).

The understanding that jihad is on a graded scale with jihad in Palestine at the top of the list of priorities is

expressed by the words of the members of the Islamic movement in Israel such as Sheikh Ra‟ed Salah

Mahagana and Sheikh Kamal Khatib. The Islamic Movement in the Northern sector is headed by Raed Salah

and is part of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and is a sister organization to Hamas in Palestine (Bartal,

2012, pp. 84-95). But, keep in mind that these Islamic leaders, like their counterpart Hamas activist Dr. Ismail

Heniyah, are members of the IUMS headed by al-Qaradawi.

Palestine, according to Sheikh Kamal Khatib, is a central problem of the nation and will stay like that. The

crisis in Iraq in which the Islamic State of al-Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) organization is involved, and the crisis in

Syria, Lebanon and Egypt are not the central problems of the Islamic nation. The importance of jihad in

Palestine stems from the position of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa in Islam. Khatib emphasized that the qibla (the

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direction of the Islamic prayer) towards al-Aqsa is the Muslims‟ important qibla. It was the first qibla in Islam

and it will return to that status. It is the role of the religious sages to support the Palestinian struggle which will

indicate the renewed importance of Jerusalem in Islam (Qaradawi, August 21, 2014).

The reason for Khatib‟s strong stand as he expressed it at the General Assembly of the IUMS which took

place in Istanbul is:

Due to the religious ruling of the Jewish sages who permit the settlers to break into the al-Aqsa mosque and to plan its

destruction while rebuilding the fake Holy Temple (al-Hikal al-Mazoum). How can it be that the Jews would make such a

religious ruling and the Islamic sages will be quiet? (Qaradawi, August 21, 2014)

This stand by Khatib is not new and represents the ideas of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. In a

proclamation published by the Harakat al Kifah al Islami [Islamic Struggle Movement] before the first intifada

in July 1983, which was, already, at that time, identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, it said:

Hey, masses of the Muslim nation, what are the Jews, the descendants of the apes and pigs, doing to us?… What is

this pure blood of our sons that flows every day between us without being avenged?… What is this violence that is being

carried out against us by our armed enemies which satisfies its lust for blood?… The Jews‟ program is one since they came

to your Holy Land, settlement, harassment, acts of slaughter, wholesale migration, the hostile hearts spit from their hatred

to Islam and as a preparation for their decisive attacks on our holy places in order to erase the al-Aqsa Mosque and rebuild

their false Holy Temple… There is nothing before us except to rise up and there is nothing in front of us except for jihad,

there is nothing before us except for war against the enemies of Allah. We must fight them with every possible means and

all of the places, without pity. (Shabi & Shaked, 1994, pp. 62-63)

The content of this proclamation is repeated time and time again, up until today, by the people of Hamas

and the Islamic Jihad and you can find these expressions in Qaradawi‟s works as well.

On 10 July 2014, during Ramadan, after Muhammed Abu Khdeir was murdered and his murderers

revealed, and after Operation Protective Edge and after the first reports and sights of the destruction in Gaza,

Qaradawi publicized his call to come and protect Jerusalem, “Palestine and Jerusalem are the #1

Islamic problems in importance” (Qaradawi, July 10, 2014). The struggle in Jerusalem today is an additional

struggle,

The division [of the Temple Mount] and the expulsion, oppression and Judaization of the city in order to turn it into a

Jewish capital. This is while destroying the Arab and Islamic character and the expulsion of its Jerusalemite residents. The

[Zionist] occupation is in a race against time and therefore it is trying to set facts on the ground. (Qaradawi, July 10, 2014)

According to Qaradawi, Israel is using the internal instability in many areas of the Muslim nation in order

to carry out the dangerous plan. The dangerous plan referred to by Qaradawi is the destruction of the al-Aqsa

Mosque and the building of a temple on its ruins.

The enemies‟ [the Jews‟] plans, which are using the events in Syria and Egypt, are gradually advancing… They are

building beneath al-Aqsa and they are creating a blockade on top of al Aqsa. Thus, they are preventing the entry of Muslim

worshippers. The threat against al-Aqsa is one that has been going on a long time and is permanent. That is why I am

declaring that the problem of Palestine and the problem of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa is a Muslim problem of the first degree.

(Qaradawi, July 10, 2014)

It is not just the problem of the Palestinians alone but of all the Muslims. Thus, despite the fact that

Muslims in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq also face internal difficulties, the most important place for jihad is

still in Palestine due to the holiness of Jerusalem and the constant threat on it by the Jews. Qaradawi, as head of

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the trustees of Muasasat al-Quds al-Dawliya (International Jerusalem Institution) calls for the religious leaders

to be aware of their job and their responsibility to support the struggle over Jerusalem and to endow Islamic

awareness on the city. In addition, Qaradawi called out to all Muslims, wherever they are, to support Jerusalem

and the struggle of the sons of Palestine for it. The struggle of Hamas in Gaza is a part of the religious struggle

between the Muslim believing community and the infidel community (Qaradawi, July 10, 2014).

In light of this, it is not surprising that at the conference of the IUMS, which took place in August 2014

immediately after the Gaza Operation, Salah Aruri raised his voice. Aruri is a member of Hamas‟ political

bureau and a founder of the Hamas‟ military arm in the West Bank. Aruri, originally from the village of Arura

near Ramallah) today lives in Turkey and is the man who approved the action of the kidnapping of the three

boys. This kidnapping led to the war in Gaza. At the general conference he made no mention of the kidnapping

at all. It was reported that Aruri:

Updated those present on what was generally happening in Palestine and what was specifically happening in Gaza. He

detailed what happened during the racist and barbaric [Zionist] wars, the strangling blockade [on Gaza]. He described the

exploiting settlements and the Judaization of the respected Jerusalem—a Judaization which is expressed by a change in the

building and the division of al-Aqsa according to the timetable [a time for Jews and a time for Muslims] and also in the

division of the al-Aqsa plaza between the sides [Jewish space and Islamic space. (Qaradawi, August 24, 2014)

The Forth IUMS Conference was organized in Istanbul, the capital of Turkey between 20-22 Aug 2014.

Those attending the conference included Rashid al-Ghannushi, the leader of the Islamic party, Al-Nahda

(Rebirth) which won the elections in his country. The combination of Kamal Khatib, Salah Aruri and Qaradawi

once again shows the ties among the Islamic movement in Israel, Hamas and Sheikh al-Qaradawi.

In addition to the holiness of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa in Islamic tradition which justifies the fact that jihad

in Palestine is the most important today, al-Qaradawi argues that the war in Gaza, is, in practical terms, a war of

existence, a war without a choice:

Israel is the one that started the war in Gaza which the opposition will of course use and will behave heroically… for

the Palestinians] the war is a matter of existence… the opposition is linked and God will enable it to win. (Qaradawi, July

21, 2014)

The way to Jerusalem passes through the victory of the opposition in Gaza as expressed by the Hamas

leaders after the Protective Edge operation was concluded (Madina al-Quds, September 5, 2014a; Madina

al-Quds, September 5, 2014b).

Jihad in Palestine is a Religious Obligation That Falls on Every Muslim

The kidnapping of the three Israeli boys and Israel‟s military operations against the Hamas in the month of

June led to the opening of another round of Palestinian-Israeli blood-letting. These events led to a barrage of

rockets toward Israel from the Hamas side. As a result of this, Operation Protective Edge broke out. Mass

demonstrations by Palestinians took place in Hebron area, Qalandiya, Nablus, Jerusalem and in the refugee

camps while searches took place for the three young men. It made a deep impression on Qaradawi that they

were called a third intifada. Already in the first days of the military operation against Hamas in Gaza, the IUMS

publically called out to all of the Islamic and Arabic countries and to all of the nation‟s children to break out

and support the struggle of the Palestinian nation (Qaradawi, July 9, 2014a). In another public declaration,

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Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi, Qaradawi‟s deputy, called for an Islamic and Arabic intifada for Palestine and

Jerusalem (Qaradawi, July 7, 2014a; Qaradawi, July 9, 2014a).

On 2 July 2014, the shocking murder of Muhammed Abu Khdeir of the Shu‟afat neighborhood in

Jerusalem took place. An energetic police investigation resulted in the arrest of a number of Jewish suspects for

the deed. According to the confessions of the suspects, the murder was carried out as revenge for the three boys,

Ayal Yifrach, Gilad Shaar and Naftali Frenkel who had been killed earlier by Hamas members. The media

exposure of the murderers and their motives, on July 6th, led to an IUMS public declaration which called for

violent opposition to the Zionists and Israel. The fatwa (religion order) of Qaradawi was publicized on 7 July

2014, the day that the war broke out according to the Hamas organization.1 In this fatwa, al-Qaradawi

criticized the inappropriate silence of the Arab and Islamic world and all of the rest of the nations of the world

and the international community:

Jewish extremist criminals murdered a Palestinian boy and burned him in occupied Palestine… In light of this the

Palestinian nation has the full right to protect its occupied land in any way possible without any limitations of any kind…

(Qaradawi, July 7, 2014a)

That is how a single event, condemned by all Israeli government factors, was turned into a justification for

Hamas‟ terrorist activities and the IUMS position. As a result of the exposure of Muhammed Abu Khdeir‟s

murderers on the first day of the new Gaza War a detailed clear call was issued:

We, IUMS call on the Islamic and Arabic nations, their people and governments to wake up and support the

Palestinian nation. One needs to solve the Palestinian problem and strengthen the Palestinian nation which is fighting for

its just rights and for the protection of its holy places which have fallen prey to a wicked conqueror. They must carry the

responsibility as God, may He be praised commanded: “O you who have believed, if you support Allah, He will support

you and plant firmly your feet”. (Surat Muhammad (47), v. 7)

In a different interview which was publicized after the war, on September 2nd, Sheikh al-Qaradawi

indicated that, “Islamic law demands that we as Muslims together protect Gaza” (As-Sharq channel, September

2, 2014).

In a fatwa publicized by the IUMS on July 27th, Sheikh al-Qaradawi, the head of the organization,

together with Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi, the general secretary of the organization, announced that: The support

for Gaza is a religious requirement (wajeb shar’ai) on all Muslims. Muslims must take all steps that they have

at hand in order to remove the aggression from the people of Gaza (Qaradawi, July 7, 2014b).

This is the most significant steadfast position and the Muslims are required to support it. How will this

support be expressed? In a public declaration, Qaradawi detailed all of the steps that need to be taken by the

Muslims worldwide. Qaradawi is aware of the general character of the campaign and that jihad is not only in

the soul but also with money, in the pen, in demonstrations and awareness.

(1) Inside of Palestine: It is up to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem to demonstrate and

protest against the Israeli activities in Gaza. They must make the Palestinian cities burn until the world intifada

will awaken—especially the intifada in the Arab countries, in other words, a continuation of the revolutions

against the Arab leaders.

(2) To reveal unity of the entire public by standing steadfast alongside the people of Gaza.

1 According to Israel, the first day of the war was July 8, 2014.

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(3) A call to all of the free nations of the world to act for the true and just rights of the Palestinian nation in

Gaza which includes the removal of the blockade, the opening of the crossing points, the enabling of every son

of Palestine to pray at the al-Aqsa Mosque, the return of the sons of Palestine to their land and an end to the

Zionist occupation.

(4) A demand to the whole Arab and Islamic nation to support the struggle of the people of Gaza and to

act inside of their countries and inside of the international community in order to put pressure on the occupation

to stop the aggression in Gaza.

This public declaration concludes with the verse: “And Allah is not unaware of what you do” (al-Baqarah

(2), v. 74). The explicit call by Qaradawi and the IUMS, whose home base is in Europe, to Muslims to take all

steps including encouraging “spontaneous” demonstrations against the aggression in Gaza, led to dozens of

stormy mass demonstrations around Europe—in Berlin, Paris, London, Belgium with most of them made up of

Muslims living in Europe. These demonstrations were aimed against the Israeli fighting in Gaza. “Israel is a

Terrorist State” cried the masses. In addition, they also called for the boycotting of Israeli products since

economic support for Israel is also support for the Israeli War Machine.

Hamas is not a Terrorist Organization

One of the songs heard over and over again on the al-Aqsa Radio and Radio al-Quds which are identified

with the Hamas organization and which are active in the Gaza Strip, was a song that dealt with jihad and its

significance. The chorus of the song emphasized that jihad is not terror. Due to the Egyptian definition of the

Islamic Brotherhood as a terror organization, Qaradawi comes out strongly against the description of Hamas as

a terrorist organization, especially by the Egyptian regime. Hamas is an organization that protects the

Palestinian people and represents the Islamic nation. The political approach of the Egyptians, Israel, the

European states and the United States which present Hamas as a terrorist organization causes a disaster and

disrupts the attempt of awareness of the Islamic opposition. “Muslims have a right to continue with their

opposition until the freedom of their land” (Qaradawi, July 21, 2014). The argument that Hamas is a terrorist

organization is in the realm of “continuous brainwashing but the opposition will continue to stand steadfast and

Allah will grant it victory” (Qaradawi, July 21, 2014). In his book, Fiqh al-Jihad, Qaradawi described Israel as

the real terrorist state (Qaradawi, 2009, pp. 1078-1080). Hamas irhab (terror) is legitimate according the Sari‟a.

Israel counterterrorism acts are not legitimate (Qaradawi, 2009, pp. 1082-1085).

This is also the reason that the spokespersons for Hamas over the years explain time after time that the

activity of the kidnapping soldiers or settlers is not terror, Thus, for example, Ibd al-Aziz Rantisi, the head of

Hamas from Gaza who was assassinated in April 2004 about a month after Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was

assassinated in similar circumstances, explained after the first abduction of policeman senior sergeant, Nissim

Toledano in December 1992:

This activity is not a terrorist activity. The Hamas movement is characterized by activities against Israeli soldiers. If

there is something that can be called terror it is the actions of the armed Israeli army against our nation‟s unprotected

citizens…activities against soldiers is not terrorism in any sense of the word. (Shabi & Shaked, 1994, p. 17)

In a spine-tingling manner, similar words were said by Khaled Mash‟al, chief of Hamas Political Bureau,

when he referred to the responsibility of his organization in the abduction of the three boys, who were

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kidnapped at the Gush Etzion junction by a Hamas cell from Hebron under the command of Hossam

Qawasmeh. Qawasmeh received the money for this action from the Hamas government in Gaza (Lake,

August 5, 2014). On the Shubaka Palestine Ll-Hawar site, which is identified with Hamas, and on additional

sites, it is emphasized (according to Mash‟al) that:

The soldiers and the settlers in the West Bank are aggressors who are living in a way that is against [international] law

on stolen land. Therefore, the Palestinian nation has the right to resist [which includes hurting them]…Netanyahu‟s

comparison of the Hamas [organization] to “extremist groups” [like ISIS] is a lie and is aimed at influencing the general

opinion of the community. We are an independence movement and not a violent organization. (Ynet, August 23, 2014;

Shubaka Filastin lil-hawar, August 23, 2014)

In an interview on al-Jazeerea on July 15th, al-Qaradawi explained that the reason for the rejection of the

Egyptian initiative by the Hamas organization stems from the fact that the Egyptians defined the Hamas and the

Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organizations. How can Egypt define the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist

organization, remove a president elected in democratic elections, Muhmmad Mursi, arrest over 40,000 Muslim

Brotherhood activists and torture them? Egypt cooperates with Israel on the blockade on Gaza and then

presents itself as a mediator. Al-Qaradawi asks: “How can one have faith in the regime of [Abdel Fattah]

al-Sisi?” (Al-Jazeera, July 21, 2014).

Islamic Solidarity

That is the motif that is repeated in all of Qaradawi‟s declarations and in all of his campaigns against Israel.

Qaradawi used his stand as the head of the IUMS and ruled that it is necessary to support the people in Gaza.

The behavior of the Arab nations was described by him as “a scandalous embarrassment” (Qaradawi, July 21,

2014). It is “up to the Muslims to extricate themselves in order to support the men of Gaza in any way that they

can, in spirit, with money and in prayer” (Qaradawi, August 9, 2014).

Haram [It is a sin] to the Muslim nations which sit [all over the world] in the East and the West. They are watching

Gaza which is under attack by [Israel] Land Sea and Air Force and they will abandon her to her fate [without help].

(Qaradawi August 9, 2014)

Every Muslim must aid as much as he can, even adding an additional plea for the people of Gaza is

acceptable. During the Ramadan holiday and after ten days of war, al-Qaradawi indicated that:

At the beginning of the tenth night [of the war] we turned to God, the believers, that he would grant victory to our

brothers in Gaza and that he would destroy their enemies and ours and the extorting Jew. (Qaradawi, July 19, 2014)

The struggle by the men of Gaza influences the respect of the entire Islamic nation. From this it follows

that the success of the opposition in Gaza positively influences the members of the entire Islamic nation and not

just the men of Gaza.

The courageous steadfastness of the members of the Gaza family raised up the heads of the [Islamic] nation. They are

fighting with great strength against the Zionists and others. I am with them and strengthen the hands of the children of

Gaza and the [West] Bank!!! (Qaradawi, July 26, 2014)

The fighting force against the children of Palestine is made up not only of Zionists but also of those who

support Zionists. Qaradawi does not describe who the others are, but all those who support Israel from

among the Christian nations are immediately turned into the enemies of Islam and everything that stems from

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that.

Because of this, it is clear that one cannot abandon the children of the Palestinian nation to their fate.

Islam imposes an obligation on the Arab and Islamic states to support the opposition in Gaza with food, medicine and

arms. Islam requires the unity of the nation in all of the many countries of the Islamic Motherland, despite the distances

between them. It is not possible that we will abandon the opposition alone [in the campaign]. (Qaradawi, July 22, 2014)

According to al-Qarawadi, the idea of an Islamic nation is not an amorphous concept lacking meaning.

When part of the nation is hurt, it is the responsibility of the other part of the nation to protect it. The battle for

Palestine, the struggle between Israel and Hamas, is seen as a cosmic struggle, one between the Jewish-Zionist

nation which is supported by those who oppose Islam and the Muslim world. The battle has no borders because

in the end we are talking about a struggle of life and death between Judaism and Islam. Thus, Qaradawi adopts

Sayyid Qutb‟s view of the world as it was described in his book, Our war against the Jews (Qutb, 1993,

pp. 20-38).2

From a practical point of view, Qaradawi presents fundamental criticism against the Arab nations which,

in his opinion did not do enough in order to support the opposition and abandoned it in its struggle against

Israel. According to him, it is the duty of the Arab and Muslim states to support the opposition just as the Jews

support the State of Israel (Qaradawi, July 21, 2014).

Qaradawi‟s deputy, the general secretary of IUMS, Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi, was more blunt. On July

20th, after what was called the “Shuja‟iyya slaughter”, the Sheikh criticized the:

Arab and Islamic silence on these acts of slaughter which hurt the rights of our Palestinian brothers in Gaza…the

denouncement of their happiness at the misfortune of the Palestinians and the continuation of their coordination with Israel

to the detriment of the Palestinians. (Qaradawi, July 20, 2014)

He asked: What type of Islamic unity is this? Who is supposed to lead the Islamic nation in its continuing

struggle against the forces opposing Islam?

According to al-Qaradawi, he would like this to be Egypt but, to his sorrow, at this time there is an evil

regime which he believes will quickly disappear (Qaradawi, July 22, 2014). In light of this, Qatar and Turkey

are the leading countries in the Muslim world today. The harsh criticism by Qaradawi about Egypt under the

leadership of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi touches many parameters of Egypt‟s conduct. Thus, for example, consider his

attitude toward the Rafah crossing as an Egyptian-Arab-Islamic crossing. Qaradawi asks:

By what right does Abdel Fattah al-Sisi allow himself to take away the natural rights of all of the rest of the members

of the united Islamic nation to pass through this crossing. “Are we not one nation and one Islamic entity”? (Al-Jazeera,

July 21, 2014)

The Islamic nation is 1.7 billion Muslims. There is not one country or any Muslim who lives alone. It

cannot be that Muslims will be killed at the same time that other Muslims are saying we are alone; we are not

connected to them. Egypt is not alone, neither is Tunisia, etc. (Al-Jazeera, July 21, 2014).

While it is true that Egypt does indeed receives a lot of fundamental criticism for standing on the sidelines

and cooperating with Israel, the rest of the Arab states are not absolved from criticism either. This criticism is

expressed in the caricatures and the many articles on the various Hamas sites.

2 Sayyid Qutb (died 1966) was one of the leading philosophers of the Muslim Brotherhood who is originally from Egypt.

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Personal Example

In light of all this, al-Qaradawi tries to serve as a personal example in his honest attempt to solve the

Palestinian problem:

All my life I am proclaiming the obligation of jihad in Palestine against Israel the occupier and extortioner. From the

year 1948 until today, I have not stopped doing this and if at this time I was able, I would hurry to Palestine to fight. I have

called and I have not stopped shouting out for jihad in Palestine. The problem of Palestine is first and foremost our

problem and it will not be forgotten [by us]. (Qaradawi, August 9, 2014)

According to Qaradawi, the last war in Gaza in the summer of 2014 is not a specific war that was aimed at

protecting the people of Gaza from the cruel Israeli attacks. We are not talking about a war between an Islamic

organization and a sovereign nation that is fighting against the attacks upon its citizens. We are talking about a

crucial battle, a stage in the war for the freeing of Palestine, a war that began from the moment that the State of

Israel was created in the year 1948 and which has continued until today. It is a war that will only end when the

jihad organizations succeed in destroying the Israeli army and freeing Palestine. Qaradawi remembers with

yearning the year 1948, when the military companies of the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the fighting in

the land of Israel (Khaled as-Sa'ad, 2003, p. 180). Qaradawi himself was of course one of those youngsters who

practiced for the war in Palestine, but, due to his bad luck, he did not fight in Palestine (Qaradawi, 2002,

p. 264).

What is the purpose of the 'ulamā (religious sages) in the present round of the Jewish-Islamic

struggle in Gaza? According to Qaradawi, the job of the religious sage is an active one of leading the nation.

This view brings al-Qaradawi very close to the world outlook of Ruhollah Khomeini which is based on the

religious principles of the religious sages who are leading the nation on a straight path (Khomeini, 1969).

The job of the men of the cloth is not only to explain the Qu‟ran and the Hadith but it is “their responsibility to

rise up and stand alongside the Palestinian Opposition” to aid in the resistance, to lead the masses and to

aid all of the believers in every part of the Islamic Motherland (Qaradawi, July 22, 2014; Qaradawi, July 26,

2014).

Qaradawi and the rest of the religious sages who were members with him in IUMS attacked the religious

leaders who opposed them. This applies to the religious sages who came out against the Hamas organization

because it rejected the Egyptian initiative which was announced by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi after only one

week of war on July 15th. As a result of this, Qaradawi related with disdain toward the 'ulamā who criticized

the Hamas organization:

Those from among the 'ulamā of Egypt who attack Gaza, the majority of whom are from among the supporters of

Husni Mubarak and the rest of the corrupt organizations. (Qaradawi, July 21, 2014)

The Islamic religion, according to Qaradawi‟s view of the world, requires a united stand among all of the

'ulamā for their support of the people of Gaza. The ‘ulamā who dare to express a different view are condemned

for their views. According to Dr. Ahmad al-Risuni, the religious sages who support the steps that Egypt has

taken are demonstrating their corruption (Qaradawi, July 9, 2014a). Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi came out with a

moving call to the Muslim governments to support Hamas and he warned the religious sages and the rulers that

“God will punish those who engage in treason and will give him what he deserves” (Qaradawi, July 20, 2014)

Any criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood or of the Hamas organization is seen as treason against the Islamic

nation and as a type of heresy in the eyes of Qaradawi and the rest of the ‘ulamā in IUMS.

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Qaradawi emphasizes that he has nothing against the Egyptian people and that his criticism of Egypt is

one that stems from his role as a religious leader. He is a part of IUMS which has many members from among

the ‘ulamā of Egypt. It is his responsibility to criticize the Egyptian regime. “I am a part of the nation… fellah

[peasant] Ibn Fellah and the whole Egyptian nation love me…” (Al-Jazeera, July 21, 2014). According to

Qaradawi, a religious leader, especially one in our time, bears a responsibility. A religious leader needs to say

his words without fear according to the shriy’a.

In a conference which took place after the conclusion of the Protective Edge operation, a whole session

was held dedicated to the role of the religious Muslim sages and their responsibility in the present time. Seven

sessions were dedicated to the role of the religious sages. Thus, for example, the first session dealt with the role

of the religious leaders in building a base on the way of wasatiyyah (the Islamic middle path about which

al-Qaradawi preached) and its renewal. The seventh session dealt with the role of the religious sages in the

problems of the nation in light of international law. In addition, there was a special session dedicated to

Palestine and Jerusalem. The purpose of the religious sages is not just to guide the believers in the matters of

the shriy’a but also to lead, support and aid them in problem solving, especially in regard to the most difficult

and complicated problem of them all—the problem of Palestine (Qaradawi, August 24, 2014).

In light of this, it is not surprising that in the summation meeting of the conference the conclusions of

IUMS in regard to the problems of Palestine were in the spirit of Hamas and included a call to aid the

Palestinian nation as much as possible.

What took place in Gaza throughout the month of Ramadan and in these days was the crude aggression of the enemy

Zionist occupier, an enemy which undertook deeds of a massacre and war crimes against innocent citizens by destroying

their homes, refugee shelters, government buildings, educational institutions, mosques and others. (Qaradawi, August 24,

2014)

The bodies of the United Nation and the Security Council did nothing to aid the refugees and even

supported the occupier.

In light of this, IUMS made five practical decisions:

(1) Jerusalem retains its respected religious and historical place. It is the center of the Islamic nation and

represents its pride. All of the plans to Judaize the occupation will not change in light of this truth;

(2) There is no replacement for the role of Jerusalem in the Islamic nation and therefore we cannot allow

any concessions on it—not even on a little finger of the holy city;

(3) IUMS announces its loyalty to and responsibility for the protection of the nations‟ holy places. The

Palestinian nation takes part in the burden willingly, without being coerced. One cannot grant a present to

whoever does not work to achieve this;

(4) The union announces its opinion to all parts of the nation headed by the religious sages who stand at

the head of the nation and who will act to prevent the occupation and the division of the al-Aqsa Mosque or

control of it. Likewise, they will act to stop the series of daily attacks and outbreaks against al-Aqsa;

(5) Opposition to the occupation is a legal right that has been bought as part of God‟s plan and

international charters. That is why the union announces that one should keep the ammunition of the opposition

in all of Palestine and especially in Gaza. The union also announces and calls with all of its might that it is

strictly prohibited to leave the ammunition of opposition which is one of the items that believers are

commanded to do.

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And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of

Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows (Surat al-„Anfāl (8), v.

60).

These are the proclamations of the IUMS organization on the issue of Palestine. In a public statement

summary, hope is expressed that the freeing of al-Aqsa is coming close and the day will come when the

children of Palestine will come to pray in the blessed mosque when they are “free and winners”. They bring the

full support of the participating negotiating delegations on the part of the Palestinians and represent the unity of

the Palestinian nation against the occupier and wish them success in achieving the victory (Qaradawi, August

24, 2014).

Conclusions

In the Arab/Muslim world, there are no other problems that have received so much attention in books and

articles as the Palestinian problem has—not the Syrian regime which is slaughtering its own people, not ISIS

which is a threat to the Shiites in Iraq, nor Lebanon which represents the world outlook of the Muslim

Sunni-Salafi radicals. If there is one thing that can unite the entire Islamic world, radicals and moderates, it is

against a common hated enemy—Israel and the Jewish people. According to the speeches of Sheik Yussuf

al-Qaradawi who is seen as a central Islamic philosopher with relatively moderate views when it comes to the

many Islamic issues, his views in regard to Israel are seen as very similar to those of the other Islamic Jihad

organizations.

Qaradawi‟s outlook is consistent and loyal to his words which were already publicized in his books in

1968 as a reaction to the Arab defeat in the Six Day War (Qaradawi, 1993, pp. 41-42). The war against the

Zionist Jews is a religious war. It is a war between a mighty Islamic nation which has over 1.7 billion and the

Jewish nation which has about 14 million Jews. There are no separate Arab nationalities. There is just one

nation—the Islamic nation. In the Pillar of Defense Operation in 2012, this Arab Islamic unity was expressed

through visible political expression conducted by the victory of Muhmmad Mursi. In contrast, in the Protective

Edge Operation, under the leadership of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the songs changed. During the 50 days of

Operation Protective Edge, the Arab League did not meet even once to discuss the problem of Palestine. The

feeling among Hamas was that unlike the political blossoming that took place in 2012, in 2014 they were alone.

This feeling was also expressed in al-Qaradawi‟s speeches.

Egypt received special criticism from Qaradawi. To his consternation, the Egypt of Salāh ad-Dīn al-Ayubi

(who died 1193) remained uninvolved and on the sidelines during this war. They instituted closures of the

Rafah crossing and they arrested over 40,000 Muslim Brotherhood activists. Instead of leading the nation and

providing aid and support to Hamas and the Palestinians, it did just the opposite, it pressured the opposition and

helped the Israeli occupation. According to Qaradawi, there is no Egyptian nationalism; there is only Islamic

nationalism (al-Jazeera, July 21, 2014). The Egyptian behavior is especially grating when compared with the

conduct of Muhmmad Mursi in the previous round of fighting in 2012 when the head of his government,

Hesham Qandil was sent to the Gaza Strip during the days of the Israeli operation.

In dozens of speeches, Qaradawi makes it clear that jihad against Israel is the most important type of jihad

in the Arab world today. This is the first and foremost of all Muslim problems and all must support it. This is

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Qaradawi‟s permanent opinion and reflects the views of Hamas as expressed in speeches by Khaled Mash‟al,

Ismail Heniyeh, Kamal Khatib and Ra‟ed Salah, all of them IUMS members. The Islami nation must lead this

jihad until the defeat of the Zionist entity.

Why is the jihad in Palestine the most important? How is it different than the jihad in Iran, Afghanistan,

Somalia and Syria? One can simply say that we are talking about protecting the holy items of Islam in

Jerusalem. The historical argument that the Jews are going to destroy al-Aqsa and build a temple on its ruins is

the central reason for this. But, an analysis of the declarations and the writings of al-Qaradawi show that we are

talking about an existential war between Islam and Judaism. We are not talking about a war between groups of

Muslims who are divided between themselves in regard to the meaning of faith. We are talking about an

existential war which will conclude with only one winning side and that will be Islam. From here flows the

importance of Palestine and the struggle with Israel. Therefore, one can say that the next round between Israel

and Hamas will come soon. It is the obligation of every Muslim to do what he can in order to defend the

Islamic lands and most of all Palestine. Hamas is not a terrorist organization, according to this definition, but

the Islamic spearhead to destroy the Jewish state.

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15, 2014, from http://www.albanytribune.com/14032013-hamas-military-wing-denies-report-linking-leaders-to-egypt-attack/

Ali, Y. (Ed.) (2009). Al-Majajer al-Ishraeliya bi-haq al-sha'ab al-Filestini. Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies &

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International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 116-122

doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.003

Female Traditional Rulers in Eastern Nigeria: Eze-Ogo Alu

Ibiam as a Case Study

F. A. OLASUPO

Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria

Over a period of three years, research activities were embarked upon to verify the claim that female traditional

rulers also exist in significant degree in the Eastern part of the country, particularly among the Igbo speaking people.

The essence of the research was to find out whether there are some correlations between the findings here and those

of other parts of Nigeria—Western and Northern part of the country in particular. The paper intends to find out how

symmetrical and asymmetrical the finds female traditional rulers are with those of their counterparts in the Western

and Northern part of the country.

Keywords: traditional ruler, female king, regent and gender

Introduction

Notable historians over the years have proven the existence of female traditional rulers in the Eastern part

of Nigeria not only in the pre-colonial period but more recently in colonial and post-colonial periods while

Bolanle Awe stated there was once an “Omu, which means Queen, at both Osomari where she was born and at

Onitsha, where she achieved fame”. The Omu in question was Okwei (Awe, 1992, p. 104). Moreover, Nwando

Achebe proved there was once a female traditional ruler known as Ahebi Ugbabe, who “became the only

woman in all of colonial Nigeria to be chosen to sit as a member of the Native Court as warrant chief” (Achebe,

2011, p. 105).

Recently, there have been more recent proofs of female traditional rulers in this region and the Igbo

speaking areas of the Delta state. While Olasupo proves the existence of a sovereign female ruler in Unwana,

Regent Alu Ibiam but now known as Ezeogo II of Unwana; Emordi and Osiki also proved the existence of

female kings (traditional rulers) known as Omu in the Delta area of Asaba: Ogwashi Uku, Ubulu-Uku,

lulehaIbuso and others (Oseghale & Osiki, 2010, p. 539; Agborh, 2007, p. 9).

In faraway Calabar is also Queen Duke, “which was given to her by the European traders who saw in her

such qualities as royalty, elegance, grandeur, towering physique as well as the air of magnificence and celebrity,

which surrounded her personality” (Akoda, 1999, p. 85).

As in Yorubaland, there are also three categories of female traditional rulers in Igboland: substantive

female traditional ruler having sovereignty over both male and female in the community; female regency; and a

gender balance in which there existed male and female kings as in Onitsha, OgwashiUku, Ubulu-Uku, luleha,

Ibuso and others. But amongst the Baatonu people of northern Nigeria, one of these three

categories—Regency—does not exist. The question is, to what extent are these female chieftaincy: female

F. A. OLASUPO, Ph.D., Department of Local Government Studies, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University.

DAVID PUBLISHING

D

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traditional sovereigns, regency and female kings, symmetrical and asymmetrical across the broader Nigerian

spectrum? In my previous work on female traditional rulers, I have considered those of Western and Northern

Nigeria. Now, it is the turn of Eastern Nigeria and its relativity with other regions.

Sovereign Female Monarch

The origin of the sovereign female monarch in Igboland in particular Eastern Nigeria in general is not yet

certain but Achebe made a discovery that indicated that there was at least one in Igboland before the advent of

colonialism in Nigeria. It was Monarch Ahebi Ugbabe, who the colonial authority incorporated into the system

of warrant chiefs and the only woman known to have been a member of warrant chiefs in Eastern Nigeria. A

different but similar case of colonial authority recognizing a woman as a monarch is the case of Queen Duke of

Calabar who never made it to the point of being made a warrant chief. Thus, apart from these two, there are no

known facts of women becoming sovereigns in this area (Eastern Nigeria) until September 29, 2012 when

Regent AluIbiam was crowned as Ezeogo (Opara, 2012, p. 1).

Figure 1. Women sovereigns in Eastern Nigeria until September 29, 2012.

The journey to the coronation was rough in three important and interesting ways. One, until now, no

women had ever become the ruler of Unwana. The father of Princess AluIbiam who became one did so at the

twilight of his life and after years of meritorious service as the Governor of Eastern Nigeria (The Nation

newspaper of December 30, 2007, p. 54). He was EzeOgo I of Unwana. Secondly, just as her father was the

first EzeOgo of Unwana, Princess AluIbiam became the first princess to become female Regent, not only in

Unwana but the whole of Eastern Nigeria. Thirdly, her coronation as EzeOgo II of Unwana was a bit turbulent.

Starting from when she became Regent, as presage to full and substantive female king, some disgruntled

elements within the Unwana community were not comfortable with her resulting in her regency being subjected

to electoral review. But each time this came up she had always won the support of the traditional council,

“including standing for an election during which titled men, youths and women endorsed her re-election” as

Regent (Online, AluIbiam in her father’s shoes).

However, her coronation was to be the highest point in the theatrics of her challengers especially from Mr.

Ikechukwu Njoku, whose opposition platform—Unwana Reformation Committee—described her coronation as

“an aberration of the traditional norms of the community”. According to them “it should be disregarded in its

entirety as the matter was already in court and the youths and elders of the community had on June 15, 2012,

crowned Mr. Ikechukwu Njokuas the rightful traditional ruler of the community” (Opara, 2012, p. 1).

Regardless of the antics of few miscreants who felt that woman should not be a leader over them, Regent

AluIbiam was “crowned as the Uwana-Afikpo’s traditional ruler by a popular majority of the community”. She

bears the title Ezo-Ogo II of Unwana.

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Figure 2. Queen Okpanam receiving homage from the coordinator Olasupo.

Note. In the pictures above, from left, are Omu (Queen) of Okpanam, Dr. Marthia Dunkwu; Omu of Onitsha, Mrs

Onochia, former Regent of Unwanna, Princess AluIbiam, And the only Female Warrant Chief in the colonial days,

Queen Ahebi Ugbage ; Omu of Oguwashi-Uku, Her Royal Highness, Mrs. Clara RafuaKinke; and at the bottom is the

researcher, Olasupo, paying homage to the recently crowned Eze-Ogo II of Unwana, EzeAluIbiam, in Afigbo area of

Eboyin State.

Figure 3. The Executives of Council of Ekiti State Regents receiving homage from the coordinator RGFIN, F.A

Olasupo.

Note. Standing from left are Retired Regent Falade Moradeke Aladesanmi (President), Jinadu Temilola (PRO),

Owoeye Juliana, Awolusi Esther (Vice President), Eunice Falade, Adebomi Adenike (Secretary), Ademuyi

Madojutola, and Adeyemo Kehindo (Treasurer).

The female regency institution is a new phenomenon in Igboland. It is a traditional crisis management

institution that came on board immediately after the death of an Oba (King) in specific Yoruba speaking areas

FEMALE TRADITIONAL RULERS IN EASTERN NIGERIA

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of Ekiti, Ondo and Osun States. The stipulated minimum period of stay as regent in Yorubaland is three months

with six months seen as the maximum period. How this became adopted to be in the eastern part of the country,

for the first time, as was the case of Princess AluIbiam, is an interesting topic to investigate. Eze Ogo II

narrated this herself. According to her:

I came back on holiday to visit my father, to see how he was doing. But then his health started failing, and I decided

to stay with him for a while. And it turned out to be the very last period of his life. So, when he passed on, I decided to go

back to Canada to carry on with my life there. But I was invited to take the Regency, caretaker traditional rulership. I was

informed that it was going to be for a very short period, like a maximum of six month. But here I have been, running along

for the past ten years. (Orisakwe, 2005, p. 29)

What is unstated but most likely to be the reason for the rationalization of the adoption of the female

Regency institution in Igbo land for the first time, is AluIbiam’s maternal background Miss Eudora Olayinka

Sasegbon, delete later Lady Olayinka Onikepo Ibiam, was a Yoruba woman from the western part of Nigeria

(Orisakwe, 2005, pp. 28-29). Female regency is known in the Yoruba parts of Ekiti, Ondo and Osun states.

There could be some other areas where this institution of female regency exists but the states mentioned earlier

are the bastion of the regency institution in Yorubaland. The theory behind this tradition is that,

Traditional Yoruba culture provides that the throne should not be totally vacant, particularly during interregnum… As

a rule, Regents are largely selected among women in the ruling houses. If a male child is made the Regent, he may refuse

to leave the throne at the appropriated time. This is why Regents are mostly chosen from women in the ruling houses.

(Olomola, Ajuwon, & Omotoso, 2003, pp. xx-xxi)

Over their neglect by the government as well as their male counterparts, Council of Ekiti State Regents

(CESR) recently paid a protest visit to the coordinator, Research Group on Female Traditional Rulers in

Nigeria (RGFIN) located in Department of Local Government Studies, Faculty of Administration of Obafemi

Awolowo University. “Their mission, according to the President of the Council, Ex-Regent Falade, Moradeke

Aladesanmi, is to call the attention of (RGFIN) to the puerile and insensate attitudes of some of their

communities, Obas, Local Government and State government to their plight” (Olasupo, 2014b, p. 58). Figure 3

is the images of the Executives of Council of Ekiti State Regents.

If the Igbos copied this idea of female Regency from the Yorubas, there is something important that the

Yorubas must also have copied from the Igbos—transition from Regency to sovereign monarch. After 16 years

at Alu Ibiam Regency, the elders in Unwana that having passed all the necessary traditional tests including high

performance, Regent AluIbiam was due to be elevated to substantive monarch and was accordingly elevated to

this position on September 29, 2012. In the Yoruba areas of the Ekiti, Osun and Ondo states, woman regents in

some places spend 10, 20, 30, 40 and even 60 years without being confirmed as substantive monarchs

(Adegbola, 2014, p. 50; Olasupo, 2014b, p. 58; p. 33; Okwuofu, 2014, p. 30). Her Royal Highness, Eze-Ogo II

has set a record for Yorubas to emulate.

Omu

The origin of Omu (Igbo gender balance in traditional governance) has a somewhat background. For Awe,

the first Omu of Viz., appeared to be around 1872 to 1943. Oseghale and Osiki however state that the origin of

Omuship, for Ubulu-Uku people of Delta State, could be traced back to 1349-1400. Regardless of the

conflicting date, what is certain is that there still is a female traditional institution in Igbo land called Omu

(Queen). Yet, another account from Onitsha says that “the stool of Omu (Queen) of Onicha has been vacant for

FEMALE TRADITIONAL RULERS IN EASTERN NIGERIA

120

more than hundred years now. Our last queen was Omu Nwagboka. She was from Ogbendida village and was

married into the Egwuatu family of Ogbeotu. The Omu was never the wife of the King in Onicha but was

appointed by the King”1. The Omu tradition flowed from Onitsha to Anioma, the Igbo speaking area of the

Delta State, or the other way round, is a different issue altogether.

Like their Yoruba and Baatonu counterparts, women of advanced age in the past, were made Omu (female

kings) (Agborh, 2007, p. 13). Again, like the Baatonu people, Omus normally are daughters of reigning Obis

who had been married out or were of marriageable age and the persons so appointed as Omus remain in office

until they died and new ones were appointed (Oseghale & Osiki, 2010, p. 541). They, according to Oseghale

and Osiki, were “women arm of male political institutions and their selections were oracular determined like

their male counterparts”.

Like their male counterparts, Obis, they had their own palaces and other insignia of office such as sword,

drums and fan like those of male Obis (Oseghale & Osiki, 2010, p. 543). Regarding their operations, they had

their own cabinet (the OtuOmu) and their offices entailed both physical and spiritual responsibilities (Agborh,

2007, p. 13). Part of the duties of the Omus are presiding over matters, dispute settlement among women and

the offering of “living” advices to their monarchs, especially on religious and administrative matters. In short,

as Oseghale and Osiki put it, Omus are mini-kings in their small palaces in the sense that they are attended to

by retinues of advisers (that included few men who the Omus had conferred with traditional titles) and

domestic assistants (Oseghale & Osiki, 2010, p. 542; Agborh, 2007, p. 13). Omus represented women folks in

the council of state and were considered more powerful than Obis male chiefs (Oseghale & Osiki, 2010, p. 542).

In other words, Omus are female kings next to Obis in royalty in their various communities. This is very, very

similar to Baatonu peoples’ female traditional institutions. Among the Baatonu people of Baruten Local

government in Kwara State, Female Emirs are next to the Male Emirs in the administrative structures of their

communities (Olasupo, 2014a)

Statistics of male Obis and female Obis in Igbo land and Igbo speaking areas of Delta States are: Onitsha:

Obi of Onitsha (Alfred Achebe) and Omu (female Obi) of Onitsha (Onocha); Okpanam: HRM. Obi V.A.

Nwaokobia IV and the Omu (female Obi) Dr. Marthia Dunkwu; Ogwashi-Uku: Obi Prof. Chukwuka Okonjo

and Omu (female Obi) Clara RafuaKinke; Ibusa: Obi Prof. Chelunor Nwoboshi and Omu (female Obi) of Ibusa

(whose name is not yet known). There are many more that are yet to be explored.

Today however, the institution itself and the roles performed by these women monarchs in gender balance

are gradually fading out particularly in those communities where, according to Agborh, “Omus are not literate

enough and are still holed up by the ancient traditions. But for the Omus that are highly educated like Dr.

Martha Dunkwu, the Omu of Okpanam and her Royal Highness, Mrs. Clara Rafua Kinke, the Omu of Ogwashi,

they have “injected positive ideas into the OtuOmu and focused it to bring positive changes to lives of women

in their communities” (Agborh, 2007, p. 13).

Conclusion

It has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that three types of female traditional rulers institutions exist in

Nigeria: Sovereign Substantive female traditional rulers, Female Regency in only Igbo and Yoruba land, and of

course the most spectacular one, gender balance in traditional ruler ship (Male king-Female king). Note that the

1 Retrieved from http://www.onitshaadounion.com/files/ABOUTUS/AdoUnionHistory0.html

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issue of gender is African Origin and not 1971 Beijing declaration.

Like in other parts of Nigeria, a substantive female traditional ruler, Eze-Ogo, Alu Ibiam, has been found

in Eboyin State to join her counterparts in the West and the North. Just as there is only one substantive

sovereign female traditional ruler in the East so is there only one so far found in the West. Oba Mary Alari

Igbayilola, though dead now, is found in Maya, a town very close to Ogbomosho in Oyo State. Surprisingly but

interestingly, two sovereign substantive female traditional rulers are found in the North; Kumbada in Niger

State and Ganye in Adamawa State. Both were duly turbaned by Emirs of Mina and Ganye respectively.

Interestingly, apart from public opinion, institutional pressures have begun to ratchet-up on the question of

female traditional rulers in Nigeria. Arguably, the statue of traditional rulers in today’s modern Nigerian

government is said to be that of civil servant and must therefore obey civil service rule. A test of this was the

case between the late Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero and one of his kingmakers, Alhaji Aminu Babba Dan

Agundi as the DarkinMaituta (one of the four kingmakers of Kano) purportedly sacked by Ado Bayero way

back in 2003 and, had to be reversed by Justice Mohammed Salamato (Magbo, 2011, p. 63).

To fault sacked decision of Ado Bayero and his traditional council, Justice Salamato relied not on the

emirate traditional process but that of the statute of traditional rulers in the state. Justice Mohammed Salamato

resolved the case in favor of the fact that (1) traditional rulers are public servants; (2) the emirate council itself

is a creation of statue adding that it derives its own life from the Local Government Laws of Kano State; (3)

that kingmakers are invested with high public responsibilities in their domains; and (4) that the deposed

kingmaker’s office did not exist at the pleasure of the Emir of Kano, but regulated by the rules of the public

service of the state (Magbo, 2011, p. 63).

Another booster to this was the recent Supreme Court judgment that “nullified age long tradition in some

parts of Igbo land which excluded women from such inheritance”. By this Supreme Court ruling, “wives and

daughters can share in the inheritance of their spouses or fathers” (Onu & Odogwu, 2014, p. 37). Expectedly,

this generated heated arguments among traditional rulers, community leaders and opinion molders in the

Eastern part of Nigeria. For the Chairman of Anambra North Traditional Council, Igwe Rowland Odegbo, the

judgment “is in line with international practice”. Igwe Odegbo who “is traditional ruler of Nteje in Oyi Local

Government area, wondered why men should be enjoying everything about women but once their husband is

dead they became pariahs”. “My opinion is that our female children and women are part of our community and

part of us. It is inhuman to deny them inheritance. Why can’t they inherit their fathers’ properties” (Onu &

Odogwu, 2014, p. 37).

For retrogressive and ultra-patriarchal traditional ruler of Njikoka Local Government Area, Chijioke

Nwankwo, and his callous counterpart, Igwe Elias Nneli, from Umueje, in Ayamelum Council Area, “the

judgment was a way of rubbishing the Igbo culture and tradition; arguing that customary courts were supposed

to deal with such cases”. In any case the “Oracle”, Supreme Court, has spoken and it is unappeasable.

These two judgments have serious and positive implication on the vex question of Princess becoming

female traditional rulers; Regents transmuting to substantive female traditional rulers; and gender-balance in

traditional rulership (male king and female king) as upheld by some cultures in Nigeria.

Thus, these discoveries are parts of intensive two decades of research on traditional rulers across Nigeria.

Authorities at all levels of government in Nigeria should take note of these and accord recognition to

FEMALE TRADITIONAL RULERS IN EASTERN NIGERIA

122

institutions of female traditional rulers in Nigeria.

References

Achebe, N. (2011). The female king of colonial Nigeria: Ahebi Ugbade. USA: Indiana University Press.

Adegbola, T. (2014, May 14). Female traditional rulers need to be recognized. Nigerian Tribune.

Agborh, A. (2007, July 9). Queen mother in N/ Delta society. Nigerian Tribune.

Akoda, W. E. (1999). The political and religious roles of Efiki Women in pre-colonial Calabar. Calabar Journal of Religious

Studies, 1(1), 84-95.

Awe, B. (1992). Women and politics in historical perspective in women and politics in Nigeria. Ikeja: Malt house Press Limited.

Magbo, D. (2011, July 17). Royal rumble: The unmaking of an Emir. Sunday Sun.

Olasupo, F. A. (2014a). A case for female traditional rulers. The Guardian Newspaper, June 29 and July 6.

Olasupo, F. A. (2014b). Revolution in emirate system in Nigeria. International Relations and Diplomacy, 2(3), 212-226.

Olomola, I., Ajuwon, B., & Omotoso, D. (Eds.). (2003). Prominent traditional rulers of Yorubaland. Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo

University & Celebrity Publication Limited, Ibadan.

Onu, N., & Odogwu, E. O. (2014, April 29). Female inheritance: More communities react to supreme court verdict. The Nation

Newspaper.

Okwuofu, O. (2014, May 14). Royal rumble: Women traditional rulers complain of neglect, suppression. The Nation Newspaper.

Opara, G. (2012). Controversy trails Ibiam coronation as Unwana Monarch. Blueprint.

Orisakwe, S. (2005, August 13). Akanu Ibiam’s house should be a national monument. The Guardian Newspaper.

Oseghale, B. E., & Osiki, O. M. (2010). Women chieftaincy institutions: A comparative study of the Oluaship title in Luleha Clan,

Edo State and the Omushiptitle in Ubulu-Uku, Delta State, 1400-2000. In T. Babawale, A. Alao & B. Adesoji (Eds.), The

chieftaincy institution in Nigeria (p. 539). Lagos: Center for Black African Arts and Culture.

The Nation. (2007, December 30). AkanuIbiam resurrects at Okotie’s church. The Nation Newspaper.

International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 123-133

doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.004

Malaysia‟s Contemporary Political and Economic

Relations with Iran

Asmady Idris, Remali Yusoff

Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia

Traditionally, Malaysia‟s relations with the Middle Eastern World boil down to narrow-limited interaction with

only a handful of countries, mainly Egypt, Saudi Arabia (before known as Hejaz), and Turkey. The underlying

reasons behind are largely owing to the established ancient relations and religious fulfillments like performing

pilgrimage as well as pursuing religious studies in highly respected institutions. Malaysia‟s relation with the Islamic

Republic of Iran, however, has shown steady progress of development since the end of 1960s and onwards.

Although Iran has become an Islamic Republic after the eruption of the Revolution in 1979, the relations remain

intact in spite of the potential expansion of Iran‟s religious ideology, Shi’ah, among Malaysian Muslim

communities. On top of that, with Iran now facing economic sanctions due to its nuclear programs, both countries

continue to bolster their relations, especially in political and economic interactions. Contemporarily, both Malaysia

and Iran are closely working together to further enhance the level of their relations. The leaders of both countries

have quiet regularly exchanged visits and have also actively ventured into promising business opportunities. Iran

ranked as the Malaysia‟s third West Asian trading partners along with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi

Arabia, provides a lot of opportunities for Malaysia to seize onto. In other words, Malaysia‟s contemporary

relations with Iran will evolve beyond the dogma of the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Keywords: politics, business, economics, co-operations, bilateral relations

Introduction

Malaysia has steady relations with most of the Middle Eastern nations including the Islamic Republic of

Iran. Although in the early years of post-World War II, particularly during 1957-1962, Malaysia‟s relations

with these nations were only confined to two states, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. During this

period, Malaysia had only two foreign offices, namely a Malayan Consulate in Jeddah (later Malaysian

Embassy established in Riyadh in 1964) (Idris, 2006) and the Malayan Embassy in Cairo, Egypt which were set

up in 1958 and 1960 respectively. This was due to the nature of the early interactions which was mainly

concentrated in the form of religious activities such as performing pilgrimage in the Holy City of Mecca and

pursuing religious studies at Al-Azhar University in Egypt1 (Boyce, 1968; Dalton, 1967; Dato‟ Abdullah, 1984;

Idris, 2006).

Nevertheless, from mid-1960s and onwards, Malaysia has begun to enhance its diplomatic relations with

other Middle Eastern nations. Among those countries are Turkey (1964), Oman (1973), Kuwait (1974), UAE

Asmady Idris, Ph.D., Faculty of Humanities, Heritage and Arts, Universiti Malaysia Sabah.

Remali Yusoff, Ph.D., Faculty of Business, Economy and Accountancy, Universiti Malaysia Sabah. 1 National Archive of Malaysia (1083/1963).

DAVID PUBLISHING

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MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN

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(1983), Jordan (1994), Yemen (1999), Bahrain (2003), Qatar (2004), and Lebanon (2005).2 Meanwhile,

Malaysia‟s diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran began with the establishment of its embassy

in Tehran in 1970, and followed by the setting up of an Iranian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in 1980 (Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, 2014).

Despite facing various issues and challenges, Malaysia‟s relation with Iran up until today has been

diplomatically stable. The relations are never broken off in spite of the eruption of the Iranian Revolution in

1979 which turned Iran into an Islamic Republic. Since becoming an Islamic state, however, Iran has been

facing tougher challenges in maintaining its diplomatic relations, especially with the western world as well as

with Muslims counterparts. Prior to the revolution, Iran was governed by the Pahlavi dynasties and formed

close allies with the United States vis-à-vis containing the former Soviet influence in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Iran‟s close relations with the US have turned sour due to the downfall of the Pahlavi regime

when it was overtaken by Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Ruler of the Islamic Republic.

Concerned with the abrupt political changes that took place in Iran, Malaysia continues to look after its

relations with this new government. Although realizing the potential spread of Shi‟ah ideology among Muslim

communities, the Malaysian government has not taken any bold actions that could jeopardize the established

relations. Therefore, this is the main task of this study to re-look and re-investigate the approaches that have

been taken by the Malaysian government in accommodating the new Iranian political changes. The study

believes that Malaysia‟s continuous steady relations with Iran until the present have been confined mainly in

the form of diplomatic-political and economic relations without ignoring the curtailment of the potential spread

of Shi‟ah ideology among local Muslim communities.

Before discussing this further, the study will divide the scope of discussion into four: Firstly, a brief

outlook on the existing models of foreign policies that is shaping a state‟s foreign policy, especially from

developing countries viewpoints; Secondly, on Malaysia‟s diplomatic-political relations with Iran since the

post-Revolution until today; Thirdly, on contemporary economic interactions; And fourthly on Malaysia‟s

diplomatic accommodation in dealing with Shi‟ah ideology.

State’s Foreign Policy Approaches

There are various models applied in understanding a state‟s foreign policy. The models range from

leadership theory, bureaucratic-decision makers, and comparative foreign policy to the overwhelming systemic

structure in the international political system. Each model has its own advantages over another but one thing is

for sure, in a more complex world of today, one researcher cannot single-handedly depend on one model alone.

He or she must take into consideration all variables that could influence the formation of a state‟s foreign policy.

In other words, there is a possibility that a researcher will combine more than one model to understand the

direction of a states‟ foreign policy determinants.

Nevertheless, in the case of developing countries, two models are considered domineering in determining

their foreign policy directions: leadership and systemic structure. This is probably due to the emergence of a

number of visionary leaders like Mahatma Ghandi of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam,

Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, Mahathir of Malaysia and others which caused some to argue that most of the

2 The stated years are in conjunction with the establishment of a Malaysian Embassy in those Middle Eastern countries. An early

diplomatic relation may have been formed earlier. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014. Retrieved June 26, 2014, from

http://www.kln.gov.my/

MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN

125

foreign policy formation is heavily orchestrated by these leaders. Moreover, these states are also unfavorably

claimed that they are toothless in designing their own foreign policies vis-à-vis systemic pressure either during

the bipolar era or with the presence of a unilateral hegemonic power like the United States which

overwhelmingly control the international political system (Saravanamuttu, 1983; Korany; 1984; Nathan, 1995;

Neack, Hey, & Haney, 1995; Neack, 2003; Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; Nonneman, 2005; Idris, 2006).

Happily, this study does not intend to lengthen this debate but more focus will be given to analyze those

underlying variables that could play significant role in determining Malaysia‟s relations with Iran. Most of the

studies done on Malaysia‟s relations with Middle Eastern states, especially since the post-World War II, to cite

only a few like Fadzillah (1988), von der Mehden (1993), Redzuan (1994), Nair (1997), Idris (2006), Harun

(2009), Joseph (2013), the religious element is one of the most consistent variables that could play a significant

role to strengthen the level of relations. In discussing the variables that may influence Malaysia‟s relations with

Iran, religious elements could be less vital compared to others. This is due to Shi‟ism, commonly associated

with Iran as its strong hold ideology. However it is found less compatible with the Muslims in Malaysia for

they have been practizing the Sunni ideology or „Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jamaah since the 15th Century during the

the Malacca Sultanate era or even earlier.

Besides that, since Iran has become an Islamic Republic after the 1979 Revolution, the systemic structure

variable is also insignificant in understanding Malaysia‟s relations with Iran. Prior to the 1990s, the

international political system had been dominated by two superpowers, namely the US and the former Soviet

Union. Most of the states‟ political movements, especially developing countries, were rather limited and they

were entangled in these two superpowers‟ rivalries either to be in the US-camp or the Soviet-camp.

Nonetheless, Iran had freed herself from this political entrapment. It was neither joining the US nor the Soviet

but chose her own political destination through the revolution by becoming an Islamic state during the tense of

the Cold War era. Iran‟s political stance which jeopardized its close allies with the Western-liberal bloc, the US

in particular, has not hampered the character of her relations with Malaysia. The government of Malaysia

instead remained firm to keep the relations growing with the new regime, the Ayatollah Khomeini‟s

government. Furthermore, the current economic sanctions imposed mainly by the US and EU against Iranian

nuclear program (based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 which demanded Iran to halt

its uranium enrichment program on July 31, 2006) also did not give much implication upon their relations.

Thus based on this argument, the study believes that, with an exception of the religious element and systemic

structure, other variables like diplomatic-political and economic interactions could be considered as the most

pivotal variables that have safeguarded Malaysia‟s relations with Iran until the present moment.

Diplomatic-Political Relations

It is a huge task to trace back the exact date of the earliest interactions between Malaysia and Iran,

particularly in the pre-modern period or prior to the emergence of state-system3 in the international political

system. Nevertheless, since the present Shiite ideology in Iran was generally associated with the Alids family

(ahlul bait), therefore the earliest note that can be recalled was most probably on the arrival of these families in

the Southeast Asian region in the seventh century where they took refuge in Champa (could be considered

3 State-system here is referred to the outcome of the post-Westphalia treaty in 1648 which ends the Thirty Years War in Europe

and gives birth to the establishment of modern state system based on sovereignty replacing the old religious defined territories

mostly controlled by the Holy Roman Empire (particularly within the context of imperial-papal cooperation since 800 AD).

MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN

126

nearby Malaysia) after their expulsion during the Umayyad periods. For Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas

(2011, pp. 13-15)4, however, he does not consider these Alids family as the Shi‟ites who adhered to the legal

and theological doctrines of the School (madhab) that developed much later and established a separate state of

their own since the early 16th century during the Safavid era. But they were simply the children of „Ali Bin Abi

Talib by his wife Fatimah r.a, the daughter of the Holy Prophet p.b.u.h, and Ali‟s children by his other wives

whom he married after the death of Fatimah.

On another note the study can relate to Malaysia‟s earliest interactions with Iran based on Tome Pires‟

report about the arrival of various traders in Malacca during the 15th century that to include not only Arabs but

also Parsees, Turks, Armenians and others (Cortesao, 1944; Tibbets, 1979). The word “Parsees” (or Persian is

the majority ethnic in Iran) is indicative enough to notify as some of the earliest Iranian traders that had ever set

foot in Malacca or other areas in Malay Peninsula. Even Musa (2013) wrote that there were about three

thousands Khorasones or Persians during the fall of Malacca in 1511. Nonetheless, the stories of Arabs were

more popular than other foreign merchants including the Parsees due to their roles as the ones, alongside the

Gujerat, southern Indian and Chinese traders, who were generally believed to have introduced Islam into the

Malay Peninsula (Fatimi, 1963; Majul, 1964). Despite this, the Parsees traders who probably brought along the

ideology of Shiah (but this is not to conclude that all Persians are Shiite followers), to some extent, had left

some influential marks among a group of people in Malaysia nowadays.

From a diplomatic-government point of view, after both Malaysia and Iran become modern states, among

the initial official interactions between the two (from Malaysian point of view) might begin in 1968 when 13

Iranian businessmen led by Mr. Ali Akbar Mahnoudji, Iranian Chief Trade Council, met Malaysian Trade

Minister, Dr. Lim Swee Aun in Kuala Lumpur. As a result of the meeting, the first Malaysian Prime Minister,

the late Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj, and Dr. Manoutchehr Marsbar, Iranian ambassador to Malaysia,

signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on trade agreements on January 15, 1968. In fact, this meeting

was in conjunction with the visit of His Highness the King Shahanshah and the Queen Shabanou to Malaysia to

seek audience with the King of Malaysia5. A year later on October 2, 1969, another Iranian delegation led by

Dr. Assehi Khonsari, Director of the Teachers and Parents Education Association of Iran, who accompanied

Tun Faridah Diba, the mother of Queen Shahbanou of Iran, came to meet the Queen of Malaysia. Dr. Asehi

also had a visit with the Ministry of Education, Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur6.

Furthermore upon The Shah of Iran‟s invitation, the King of Malaysia and the Queen made a returned visit

to Iran to attend this country‟s 2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire on October 10, 19717. A series of

official visits then continued up until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. These included such visits by Iran‟s

Prince Gholam Reza Pahlavi and his Princess Marigeh Pahlavi to Malaysia on August 26, 19738. However,

when the revolution erupted in Iran in 1979, the then Prime Minister, the late Tun Hussein Onn, was in no

hurry to make any official statement regarding the Iranian case. This was duly believed to safeguard

harmonious relations that had previously been established between the two countries. At the early stage, Tun 4 In contrast with the view of the Malaysian Shiite Council, it regarded this as the point of the earliest arrival of the Shiite

ideology in the Malay Archipelago, especially in the Malay Peninsula. Majlis Syiah Malaysia, MEMORANDUM Majlis Syiah

Malaysia Kepada Yang DiPertuan Agong Malaysia. Retrieved May 5, 2014, from

http://www.al-ahkam.net/home/content/memorandum-majlis-syiah-malaysia-kepada-yang-dipertuan-agong-malaysia 5 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0036501; 2001/0036503. 6 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0037893. 7 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0040573. 8 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0042225.

MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN

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Hussein seemed to have no “suitable answer” for such a revolution, although there were some actions taken by

the Malaysian non-governmental organization, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), which through its

President—Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, visited Ayatollah Khomeini after the event occurred. It was only 18

months later, via a Malaysian Foreign Minister, Tengku Ahmed Rithauddeen, that it was announced that

relations between Malaysia and the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue, and that the revolution was

considered to be Iran‟s internal matter (Ali, 1984; Nair, 1997). In other words, the Iranian Revolution has not

hampered Malaysia‟s relations with Iran.

Heading towards the 1980s and 1990s, the relations had been growing positively. A few official

encounters through diplomatic office continuously took place in Kuala Lumpur; these included a meeting

between Mr. Majid Hedayatzadeh Razri (Iranian ambassador to Malaysia) and Dr. Mahathir, the fourth

Malaysian Prime Minister, on January 11, 19839, Mr. Mohamed Reza Motshed‟s (Iranian ambassador to

Malaysia) visit with the former Malaysian Information Minister, Dato‟ Mohamad Rahmat on January 18,

198810

, and Omer Suleiman al-Hashmi‟s (Iranian ambassador to Malaysia) visit to seek an audience with the

King of Selangor on July 22, 199211

.

Nonetheless, the most historical moment was the visit by the former President of Iran, Mohammad

Khatami (1997-2005) to Malaysia on July 21-24, 2002. During this meeting, another MoU of economic

cooperation was signed in the areas of tourism, trade agreement and the agreement on the promotion and the

protection of investments12

. The Khatami‟s visit to Malaysia indicates that the bilateral relations had grown in

maturity, and both governments were full of enthusiasm to venture into various economic activities. The most

current notable diplomatic activities are the former Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi‟s

two-day visit to Tehran on 21-22 December 2008 to sign three agreements on cooperation in technology,

anti-drug campaign and car manufacturing, and also Tun Dr. Mahathir‟s presence in Hassan Rohani‟s

inauguration ceremony as the new President of Iran on August 4, 2013 last year. During this visit, Tun Dr.

Mahathir congratulated the new Iranian President on his election to the position and expressed optimism that

Tehran- Kuala Lumpur ties would improve in line with the interests of both nations and governments (Press TV,

2013).

Although in recent times a number of issues have constantly beleaguered Kuala Lumpur-Tehran

interactions, especially as a result of the Malaysian government‟s harsh stance on Syiah but the relations remain

unharmed. Even the call from certain parties to cut off Malaysia‟s relations with Iran which have been blamed

for spreading banned Syiah teachings, Malaysian current Foreign Minister, Datuk Anifah Aman has firmly

rejected the call by arguing that the Syiah issue was a domestic matter and to be dealt with internally by the

concerned authorities. At the same time he also explained clearly the importance of Iran for Malaysia by saying:

“Iran is an important partner to Malaysia and it is Malaysia‟s foreign policy to be friendly with all countries,

based on mutual respect, to foster goodwill and cooperation in all areas of interest for mutual benefit….The call

does not in any way reflect the views of the Government of Malaysia,” he said here yesterday” (The Star, 2013).

On the issue of Iranian nuclear program, Malaysia has clearly stated its position that all signatories to the

nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including Iran, should have the right to develop nuclear power as long

9 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0048095. 10 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0050841. 11 National Archive of Malaysia, 2001/0054184. 12 National Archive of Malaysia, 2006/0003714.

MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN

128

as it is to be used as peaceful energy, and not to build nuclear weapons which could destabilize world‟s stability

(Farrar-Wellman & Frasco, 2010).

Table 1

Trade between Malaysia and Iran, 1990-2013

Year Total trade Export Import Balance of trade

1990 246,001,358.0 150,058,481.0 95,942,877.0 54,115,604.0

1991 165,790,413.0 119,838,323.0 45,952,090.0 73,886,233.0

1992 176,751,922.0 109,959,517.0 66,792,405.0 43,167,112.0

1993 303,206,779.0 151,298,704.0 151,908,075.0 -609,371.0

1994 269,707,843.0 159,942,891.0 109,764,952.0 50,177,939.0

1995 405,455,951.0 289,181,124.0 116,274,827.0 172,906,297.0

1996 357,337,605.0 234,712,509.0 122,625,096.0 112,087,413.0

1997 387,019,473.0 295,990,450.0 91,029,023.0 204,961,427.0

1998 529,977,173.0 318,990,695.0 210,986,478.0 108,004,217.0

1999 514,082,081.0 336,581,621.0 177,500,460.0 159,081,161.0

2000 881,802,203.0 493,303,254.0 388,498,949.0 104,804,305.0

2001 1,233,404,793.0 678,086,676.0 555,318,117.0 122,768,559.0

2002 1,349,193,703.0 870,521,087.0 478,672,616.0 391,848,471.0

2003 1,613,656,008.0 1,246,060,768.0 367,595,240.0 878,465,528.0

2004 2,291,380,789.0 1,314,166,589.0 977,214,200.0 336,952,389.0

2005 2,672,420,781.0 1,357,895,516.0 1,314,525,265.0 43,370,251.0

2006 3,749,515,836.0 1,616,154,987.0 2,133,360,849.0 -517,205,862.0

2007 3,594,869,442.0 2,122,187,076.0 1,472,682,366.0 649,504,710.0

2008 4,995,771,012.0 2,447,102,215.0 2,548,668,797.0 -101,566,582.0

2009 3,538,431,262.0 2,400,761,124.0 1,137,670,138.0 1,263,090,986.0

2010 4,009,656,924.0 2,730,508,055.0 1,279,148,869.0 1,451,359,186.0

2011 4,982,570,913.0 3,214,059,302.0 1,768,511,611.0 1,445,547,691.0

2012 4,582,311,640.0 3,523,025,611.0 1,059,286,029.0 2,463,739,582.0

2013 3,268,421,320.0 3,139,650,626.0 128,770,694.0 3,010,879,932.0

Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 2014.

Based on the above account, it is quite convincing that Malaysia always gives emphasis to its diplomatic

relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, Malaysia has been consistent with its foreign policy since

the era of the second Prime Minister, Tun Razak who introduced a “Non-Alignment” policy, a big swing from

the Tunku Abdul Rahman‟s old pro-Western policy to befriend all countries irrespective of differences in

ideology or systems of government. This policy also had been nurtured by the longest Malaysian Premier, Tun

Dr. Mahathir who threw strong support behind the idea of “prosper thy neighbor” as he had put into: “… we

realized that the best way to help ourselves was to help others. By doing so you don‟t simply generate gratitude

and goodwill, you also create partners and friends” (Mohamad, 2011, pp. 618-626).

Contemporary Economic Interactions

As had been mentioned before, along with diplomatic-political variable, the economic element also plays a

significant role in strengthening of Malaysia‟s relation with Iran. For Malaysia, Iran is its third largest trading

partner in the Middle Eastern region after the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Based on the trade percentage in 2010

(Mohd Perai, 2010), among five Malaysia‟s close trading partners in the region, the UAE acquired 38.4%,

MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN

129

followed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (20.3%), Iran (20%), Oman (6.7%), and Kuwait (5.4%). Furthermore,

it was reported that the total value of Malaysia‟s trade with Iran in 2012 was RM4.58 billion with exports

valued at RM3.52 billion and imports at RM1.06 billion. Up to 2013, however, Malaysia‟s trade with Iran had

slightly decreased with the total trade of RM3.26 billion. This has been largely argued due to US unilateral

economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic over its nuclear programme (New Straits Times, 2013).

Malaysian exports to Iran include palm oil, crude rubber, chemical and chemical products, wood products,

rubber products and machinery, appliances and parts. Meanwhile, about 83% of Malaysia‟s imports from Iran

consist of crude petroleum and petroleum products (MATRADE, 2013; G15 Organization, 2008). For further

information on Malaysia‟s trade with Iran, especially from 1990 until 2013 (see Table 1).

Analyzing the economic performance shown above, it could be said that Malaysia‟s economic relations

with Iran, especially in trading activities, is full of potential to be further developed. The study believes that

apart from a number of trade agreements that had been signed such as the 1968, 1989 and 2002 Trade

Agreements, several joint-ventures in economic cooperation, as the result of the MOUs, were also undertaken.

These included a $6 billion deal to develop areas of Iran‟s massive offshore gas fields in 2007, a joint

automotive industry between Iran Khodro and Proton in 2008, a joint company between the National Iranian

Oil Engineering and Construction Company and Malaysian SKSD to construct the Kedah Refinery in Malaysia

in 2009, and the formation of the Iran-Malaysia Businessmen Council in Kuala Lumpur in 2009 which to some,

points to further enhancing Malaysia‟s economic relations with Iran (MATRADE, 2013; Farrar-Wellman &

Frasco, 2010; Ilias, 2010).

Moreover, through Malaysia‟s active participation in Iranian Trade Fairs, it indirectly helped diversifying

the nature of economic dimensions, and not merely depending on petroleum-based products (particularly in

Malaysia‟s imports from Iran). It also promotes other Malaysian products that could attract more Iranian

companies to execute a joint-venture project. Among the success of the Malaysian participation in Iranian

Trade Fairs were the Ninth Tehran International Industry Fair in 2009 which succeeded in securing export

orders worth RM13.39 million (Muin, 2009), and the latest was in the 13th Tehran International Industry

Exhibition held from 6-9 October 2013 where nine Malaysian companies, through the Malaysia External Trade

Development Corporation (MATRADE), participated in the fair and they also fruitfully succeeded in

generating business worth RM664.65 million. The participating Malaysian companies marketed various

products such as health supplements, LED Lights and fittings, personal care products, adhesive sealants and

coating products, security systems, busbar systems, electric and telecom poles, garment accessories, etc.

(MATRADE, 2013). In addition, Malaysian palm oil has recently made the headlines where through the

Malaysian Plantation Industries and Commodities Minister, Datuk Amar Douglas Uggah Embas, the Islamic

Republic had imported 671,384 tonnes of Malaysian palm oil during January-November 2013, which reflects

the importance of Iran as a major export destination for Malaysian palm oil in the Middle East (Malaysian Palm

Oil Council, 2014). In other words, the encouraging performance of the Malaysian companies in Iranian Trade

Fairs as well as the current penetration of Malaysian palm oil into Iranian society have further consolidated the

degree of economic cooperation between these two countries for the coming years ahead.

Malaysia’s “Diplomatic Accommodation” with Shi’ah Ideology

Undeniably, the issue of Syi‟ah could become the thorn in the flesh in relation to Malaysia‟s harmonious

relations with Iran. Without a careful approach, and being moderate in Malaysian foreign policy in particular,

MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN

130

the bright climate of the relations might be changed into cloudy. Thus, in dealing with this issue, the

government of Malaysia seems to apply a double-edged sword that is, being stricter at home, and at the same

time looking appeasing and wise in justifying its domestic policy in the eyes of the Iranian counterparts.

For the domestic policy, Malaysia through its National Fatwa of the Malaysian Religious Council has

issued, at least, two resolutions in curbing the spread of Syiah ideology among the local Muslim community.

The first was in 1984 where it only allowed two Syi‟ah sects; Zaidiyah and Ja‟fariyah, to be practiced in

Malaysia. The second was in 1996, but it runs until today, where the 1984 Fatwa was annulled. All Muslim

communities were not allowed to practice any Syiah sects, and they were obliged to practice Islam in

accordance with the teachings of Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jamaah. It was generally understood that after the Iranian

Revolution erupted, the Islamic Republic had drafted a new constitution which declares the official religion is

Islam of the Ja‟fari sect, but other Islamic sects, including Zeydi, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafe‟I and Hanbali, are valid

and will be respected. Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians will be recognized as official religious minorities

(Lunn, 1991). Since then, the call for the ban for Syiah was made when it was allegedly claimed that Iran were

“exporting” its Islamic ideology, the Ja‟fari sect or the Ithna ‘ashariyya (also called as the 12 Imams) to other

Muslim countries including Malaysia. In the opinion of the National Fatwa, the Ithna „ashariyya Shia‟s

teachings were against the Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jamaah. Prior to this, Malaysia had been friendly to the other two

sects of Syiah, namely Syiah Taiyibi Bohra (Dawood Bohra) and Syiah Ismailiyah Agha Khan which limited

their movement among their own families and friends only (Ustaz Bongsu @Aziz Jaafar, personal

communication, July 14, 2014; The Malaysian Insider, 13 Disember 2013)13

.

Moreover, when the issue of Syiah was suddenly brought up in the Parliament in 2011, Datuk Seri Jamil

Khir, Minister in the Prime Minister Department, had stated that Malaysian government permits Shi‟ism to be

practiced in Malaysia with a condition it cannot be propagated to others. This statement, however, to some was

confusing. But again, looking through the 1996 Fatwa it is clear that Syiah is no longer welcomed in Malaysia.

This is largely due to the fact that Muslims in Malaysia have been traditionally accustomed to the teachings of

Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah under the Shafie School, and the government does not want any confusion that could

threaten national unity and domestic stability.

At the international level, the Malaysian stance is certainly incompatible with the openness principle of the

Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC‟s position on Syiah was based on the Amman Message in

2004 (Tun Abdullah Badawi, the former Malaysian Prime Minister was among the signatories) where in July

2005 CE, H. M. King Abdullah II convened an international Islamic conference of 200 of the world‟s leading

Islamic scholars including Shaykh Al-Azhar; Ayatollah Sistani and Sheikh Qaradawi (Musa, 2013; Zulkifli,

2014). The outcome of this conference clearly declared that:

They specifically recognized the validity of all 8 Mathhabs (legal schools) of Sunni, Shi'a and Ibadhi Islam; of

traditional Islamic Theology (Ash’arism); of Islamic Mysticism (Sufism), and of true Salafi thought, and came to a precise

definition of who is a Muslim. (The Official Website of the Amman Message, 2007)

This declaration has been used by some parties (Musa, 2013; Zulkifli, 2014) to heavily criticize the way

Malaysia‟s handling the issue of Syiah. They demand the Malaysian government to adhered to the principle of

global human rights. For Malaysia, however, since it is a sovereign country, it has a free hand to manage this

13 E-Fatwa, Portal Rasmi Fatwa Malaysia. (2014). National archive. The Malaysian Insider. Retrieved December 13, 2013, from http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-kebangsaan/syiah-di-malaysia

MALAYSIA‟S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN

131

issue with its own ways without any interference from outside.

In justifying this banned policy against Syiah for the Iranian government, the Najib administration, as had

been mentioned before, has kept firmly reiterating that this issue is merely a domestic matter and it will be dealt

with by the relevant authorities. Although this creates some uneasines among Iranian officials in Malaysia

(Torki, personal communication/interview with April 3, 2014) but to conclude that this policy may affect

Malaysia‟s relations with Iran, especially on the existence of more than 80,000 Iranian plus with 15,000 Iranian

students here, in the future remains to be seen (New Straits Times, 2013).

Conclusion

Malaysia‟s relationship with Iran is one of the most important interactions that may represent the former‟s

connection with the rest of the Middle Eastern nations. These relations have been traditionally developed either

in the form of commercial trading activities or the conveying message of Islam since the 15th century or earlier.

Till the present, this liaison has been growing and both countries are venturing into various activities as the

result of the signings of a number of trade agreements…

Against the bedrock of the foreign policy of most developing countries which are mainly influenced by

leadership or systemic influence, this study to some extent is able to show that diplomatic-political and

socio-economic variables are the pivotal elements that keep Malaysia‟s relations with Iran close until today.

Apart from that, this study also demonstrates that although religion has been long considered as the main key

variable to strengthen Malaysia‟s affiliations with the Middle Eastern world, but in the case of Iran, religious

elements play a less significant role in cementing the bilateral relations. Even, this element could become the

thorn in the flesh that could jeopardize Malaysia‟s relations with Iran in the future. Nevertheless, so far both

countries are happily understanding on the different approaches that had been taken, especially in dealing with

the issue of Syiah at a domestic level. On the issue of Iran‟s nuclear power, Malaysia has shown its strong

support as long as there is no violation against Non-Proliferation Treaty principles. What both countries need is

a continuous dialogue in order to minimize all differences so that a better relationship can be built upon in the

years to come.

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ore-ir

International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 134-140

doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.005

Judicialization of Catalonian Language and Identity Politics

Walter F. Carnota

Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Since the adoption of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, the relationship between the Spanish State and the Catalonian

autonomous region has been considerably strained. Originally, many remembered the dictatorship of Francisco

Franco (1936-1975), when centralization was heavily imposed on all parts of the country, irrespectively of ethnicity,

language or traditions. As the constitutional bargain (Title VIII of the 1978 Constitution) worked for smaller

regions (Madrid) or poorer regions (Extremadura), it did not pan out for an economic powerhouse as Catalonia. For

over 30 years, Catalonian regional political parties (notably Convergencia e Unio) have held the balance of power

within the Spanish parliamentary system. Autonomous regions were allowed to write their own “statutes”, a sort of

sub-national constitution subject to national approval. Anti-Spanish sentiment is running high in Catalonia, and a

straw poll was conducted in 2014, as voters were asked if they wanted to remain part of the Spanish kingdom.

Many Catalonians would sever all ties with Madrid while attempting to remain in the European Union, a move

preemptively vetoed by the European Commission. Inevitably, more judicialization is expected, whether on a

federal scenario (intergovernmental relations: who does what) or if secession ultimately happens and economic

compensation becomes necessary. The ruling Popular Party is adamant to any concessions; left-wing parties are

more open to nationalistic demands. But the strictly political negotiations between the Popular party and the

Socialists (who favor federalism) are stalled and nationalism is being overplayed by regional forces. As political

solutions seem to falter momentarily, Courts will experience more demands based on identity grounds.

Keywords: Spain, Catalonia, independence, constitutional design, European integration

Introduction

The Spanish national Constitution celebrated its 35th anniversary in late 2013. During its three and a half

decades, the Constitution provided Spain with the necessary stability to transition peacefully from the Franco

era dictatorship to become a full-fledged member in 1986 of the then European Economic Community (now the

EU). Although partisan bickering is pretty common between the two major political forces, the Popular Party

(PP) and the Socialists (PSOE), parliamentary monarchy under former King Juan Carlos enabled the country to

achieve minimum consensus on democratic governance, dismantling the previous centralized state (García

Morales & Arbós Marín, 2010, p. 44) and upholding the rule of law, even in the midst of the severe 2010

economic crisis (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2013).

Political decentralization sketched by the Constitution remained an unfinished business, a thorny issue to

be redefined later on by political means. The first decades of the new cycle were signaled by Basque terrorism

spearheaded by ETA, despite the overall success of the constitutional design of parliamentary monarchy.

Lately, ETA has renounced its violent means and the ECtHR in October 2013 enabled prominent terrorists to

Walter F. Carnota, Ph.D., Law School, Universidad de Buenos Aires.

DAVID PUBLISHING

D

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be sent home from jail, tossing away the so-called “Parot doctrine” concocted by the Spanish courts. ETA is

currently in a cumbersome process of giving up its weaponry and accepting the democratic political process.

Now that Basque separatism has ebbed considerably, Catalonia-Spain’s most vibrant economy-threatens

with independence. First, it scheduled a referendum for November 9, 2014, based on two questions: (1) Is

Catalonia a state? (2) Should it be independent? Catalonian leading political coalition CiU (Convergencia e

Unió) and other regional parties such as ERC aggressively promoted a “yes” answer to both questions on the

ballot, based on the premise that Catalonia was entitled to “decide to decide” (a local version of the right to

self-determination) and paving in this fashion the way for outright independence from Spain (the so-called

“soberanismo”, meaning the position which defends the “sovereign rights of Catalan people”). The Catalonian

Executive headed by Artur Mas conducted a highly visible international campaign (mainly within the EU and

even the U.S.), so as to elicit eventual support from the international community.

The Spanish central government in Madrid, in turn, coordinated policy with the British government of

Prime Minister David Cameron in order to link Catalonia with other parallel situations such as that of Scotland

(which held a referendum on September 16, 2014, when independence from the UK lost). In sum, the

pro-independence forces dislike Catalonia’s current status (“encaje”) within Spain; they would gleefully retain

EU membership, despite qualms from Brussels as to how to achieve this goal. Catalonia is part now of the EU

because it is a portion of Spain: how an independent Catalonia could retain this status in the future remains an

open question.

Spanish majority parties have different stances towards Catalonia. The current PP government flatly

denies any right to regional self-determination without explicit approval from the national Parliament (Cortes).

The opposing PSOE is prone to the adoption of a federal model, replacing the instability of autonomous

communities for good.

Regionalism has been a key component of Spanish party politics, as PNV in the Basque country and CiU

in Catalonia eloquently illustrate. As Hamann (1999) observed,

Compounded representation is a crucial concept in understanding the development of patterns of political

representation in Spain. The existence of regional administrative and political units, including regional parliaments and

executives, provides a strong incentive for regional parties to form and compete in regional elections, as well as in national

and European elections, by emphasizing the distinct interests of the voters in that particular region. (p. 112)

Why did this particular conflict begin to flare up again? Catalonia strongly supported the democratic

transition from Franco and its final outcome the 1978 Constitution, which was only resisted by Basque

nationalists (Peces-Barba Martínez, 1988, p. 252). The “territorial model” adopted by Title VIII of the

Constitution was a unitary decentralized hybrid called “Estado de las autonomías” or “state of autonomies”

(Aja, 2014, p. 16)

Authority is vested mainly on the central government; however, a significant number of tasks may be

performed by CUs (constituent units) autonomously. Yet, the judicial decision of June, 2010, invalidating some

parts of Catalonia s new sub-national constitution (EAC) fueled the flames of the current conflict. Catalan

people saw the ruling as a response to “a political climate that it is widespread in Spain in which one of the

objectives is to put an end to the development of regional autonomy” (Cardús, 2011, p. 26).

The Spanish Constitutional Court twice became involved in the Catalonian question during 2014. First, it

ruled that the Nov. 9 referendum as such was unconstitutional since it was not called under the aegis of the

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national Constitution. Subsequently, it also suspended on Nov. 4, 2014 a diluted version of the referendum (a

so-called “participation process” election). Anyway, people voted on November 9 as scheduled in the straw

poll format, where as expected pro-independence forces won.

Historical and Sociological Context

Catalonian grievances date back from 1714, when the Spanish Succession War ended and Bourbonic rule

suppressed Catalonian freedoms (“Decreto de Nueva Planta”). From that moment on, Spain and Catalonia

faced diverse development and social paths. Catalonia remained an integral part of Spain, but disputes lingered

on. Centralism was rampant in the 19th century and first seven decades of the 1900s.

Internal migrations fostered the widespread use of the Spanish language in the 1800s. Catalan was mainly

confined to rural areas and became a secondary language of sorts. Linguistic imperialism took hold: major

newspapers in the capital city of Barcelona (such as “La Vanguardia”, for example) were published in Spanish,

instead of Catalan.

John E. Joseph (2006) further observed that:

Catalonia was the center of the left-wing movement that briefly established an anarco-syndicalist government in the

region in 1936, and it continued to be the center of resistance to the Franco government over the following decades. For

Madrid, the suppression of the Catalan language thus had a clear political-symbolic motivation. For Catalans, in turn, the

laws forbidding the use of the Catalan language made it the symbol for all their political and cultural aspirations. Retaining

their language, using it despite the laws forbidding it, was a political and cultural imperative. Catalan attained its symbolic

force from its suppression by the “other” power. (p. 40)

Catalonia’s relationship with the centralist Franco government (1936-1975) was confrontational. Boix

(2011) added that:

Our current problem… started in the 1950s, when large-scale Spanish immigration doubled Catalonia s population. It

was a time when all the practical mechanisms for promoting functional assimilation were outlawed by the Franco

government. From the start, the regime was brutal in its repression of the Catalan language…In the 50s and 60s, the

situation was made even worse by radio and television, which were exclusively in Spanish and were absolutely Spanish in

content and ideology. (p. 22)

Catalonia endorsed the new constitutional framework of 1978, which was put in place after Franco had

died in 1975. But the most recent focal point of discussion involved a highly controversial judicial decision

(STC 31/10). The Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010 struck down as unconstitutional certain key provisions

of the Estatut d´Catalunya (Catalonia’s de facto sub-national constitution1). This step was seen by many in

Catalonia as another evidence of the supremacist stance of the Spanish state over historic regions and rights.

Constitutional Framework

The autonomous state is a rather vague idea. It was purportedly devised as a work in progress, an initially

open-ended model prone to subsequent fine-tuning and flexible scenarios (Díaz Ricci, 2009, p. 87; Villaverde

Menéndez, 2012, p. 76). Some authors even labeled it as a “never-ending federal state” (Valdés, 2001, p. 163),

to emphasize that it involves a process rather than a finished product. To compound the problem, Article 2 of

the Spanish Constitution contains two joint principles which could eventually collide: indivisible unity of the

1 Ironically, each autonomous community has its Statute, but it is actually enacted by the national Cortes in Madrid as an organic

law, a hard proposition for a federal state to swallow.

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State and autonomy rights of regions and “nationalities”2.

A constitutional issue develops when individual and social rights are recognized both at the national and

sub-national levels, and courts at both levels of government face similar problems. In federal states, this is

called “jurisdictional redundancy” (Cover, 1981, p. 639).

Famous scholar Daniel Elazar (1987) pondered that,

[R]edundancy was considered to be one of the unattractive aspects of federalism, something to be tolerated because of

federalism’s political virtues but minimized whenever possible. This view became especially prevalent after the rise of the

modern science of public administration, which is built on hierarchical principles and the notion that the larger the

institution or organization, the more efficient it will be. (p. 30)

Spain’s Estatutos de Autonomía , like American state constitutions (Gardner, 2007), often duplicate rights

recognized at the center (Aparicio, 2008). And the Spanish Constitutional Court had a relevant role in defining

the terms of autonomy since its very inception (some even spoke about a “judicial autonomous state”,

Fernández Ferreres, 2005, p. 17), as the Catalonian Supreme Court also had on a lesser degree (see below).

However, the Constitutional Court issued two very important judgments, the first concerning the Valencia

Statute3 and the second one, most importantly, about the Catalonian Statute (EAC)

4.

A Most Important Judicial Decision (STC 31/10)

Judgment 31/2010 proved to be pivotal in the conflict between Spain and Catalonia. Ninety-nine

legislators from the-then disgruntled opposition conservative party PP (now in government)5 challenged the

2006 reforms to the EAC as unconstitutional6. The Constitutional Court partially agreed, holding that fourteen

clauses were inconsistent with the Spanish Constitution. Simultaneously, in a long and complex ruling

spanning more than 800 print pages (López Aguilar, 2011, p. 224), it also validated many other clauses.

The whole reform process of autonomy statutes was halted. Colino and Olmeda (2012) contended that:

Due to a protracted process of reform and to the final intervention of the Constitutional Court with a landmark ruling

on the Statute of Catalonia, this round of reforms has raised many questions about the real reform capacity of the system,

on its capacity to achieve integration, accommodation, and adaptation to changing social circumstances and therefore

legitimacy and stability without formal constitutional reform. (p. 192)

Firstly, the Court held that the EAC Preamble, replete with references to Catalan nationhood, had no legal

effect whatsoever. It also struck down article 6, section 1, which mandated for preferential use of Catalan in

public administration, public mass media and education. “Preferential” was deviant from a bilingual policy of

equal footing between the Spanish and Catalan languages. Other stricken provisions involved Catalonian

powers vis-à-vis the central government in Madrid, which the Constitutional Court is entitled to referee

(Biglino, 2007, p. 154).

Are the national and linguistic aspects intertwined? Undoubtedly, yes. Major (2013) stressed that:

2 The first principle is relevant as far as constitutional amendments are concerned, since they require a nation-wide will to reform

the Constitution (Sánchez Agesta, 1980, p. 344). 3 STC 247/2007. 4 STC 31/2010. 5 The PP had been excluded from the reform deal which was struck between the three-party sub-national Catalonian government

and the PSOE-led Administration in Madrid. 6 These amendments were the first to be made to the 1979 Catalonian Statute. Its text mushroomed from 57 articles to 223 articles,

becoming in effect a fully-fledged sub-national Constitution (Castella Andreu, 2010, p. 6).

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Catalans are no different from any other society in the world in that their culture has a particular language as its

proper vehicle. And, no differently from every other society in the world, they see in their language a central element of

their national character. (p. 86)

EAC Preamble references to nationhood (“Catalonia is a nation”, “national reality of Catalonia”) are

deliciously vague and not prone to a straightforward constitutional interpretation. It is not easy to tell, for

example, whether they fall inside or out of the Article 2 perimeter. Several times the Catalonian Legislature

(“Parlament”) had issued unilateral nationhood declarations (1989, “Catalonia is a differentiated national reality

which does not resign its right to self-determination”; 1998, It confirms the right of the Catalan people to freely

choose its future), but the nationalist references were now entrenched in the EAC).

Judicially, the Catalonian Executive argued in briefs that the Constitutional Court had given no legal

effects to preambles in prior decisions7, so nationhood as it stood was a mere political statement with no

binding legal character. The Court, however, disagreed: it held that Preambles had no dispositive effects as

legal norms regularly do, but that they still represent useful yardsticks for constitutional interpretation

(Solózabal Echavarría, 2011, p. 216), according to its own criteria espoused in STC 36/81. Consequently,

Preambles were not entirely “off-limits” to some kind of judicial scrutiny.

The Constitutional Court was bent on defusing EAC’s own imprint as a whole sub-national Constitution.

Many Constitutions worldwide have preambles and they serve as helpful tools to sharpen constitutional

identity.8 The Court wanted to send a clear message to Barcelona, in the sense that nationhood was ambiguous

and that it did not entertain the idea that a distinct citizenship (i.e., a political concept) could be derived from a

cultural or social reality. Technically, it did not strike down the Preamble as unconstitutional, but it gave it no

effect as far as nationhood was concerned. Undoubtedly, it was a big blow to Catalan identity politics. Salvador

Cardús sums it up (2013):

Awareness of the complete failure of the [reform] project, which began in 2006, was widespread by 2010. The

Catalonian people leapfrogged the political class by demanding a new sovereigntist political framework. The final

denouement arrived with the demonstration in September 11, 2012, the day that Catalonia celebrates its National Day.

(p. 98)

Former Catalonian President Jordi Pujol-himself a recent subject of criminal investigation due to money

transfers to Andorra- has termed the ruling as “harmful” and “morally damaging” (2011, p. 59).

Language Politics in Court

One of the most delicate areas of identity politics is language. Language permeates everyday life and

almost every identity politics equation (Canada, Belgium) has had linguistic implications as a substantial part of

it.

STC 31/10 also meddled in language politics. Its criticism of Catalonian identity politics did not stop at

nationhood or national reality. One of the most visible consequences of national affirmation is language, and it

has a reverse effect on national politics: A common language (English in Canada) is heightened and the

minority/majority language (French in Québec) seems to suffer. The same happens with Spanish and Catalan,

even though Spanish is also the first language in Catalonia (a rough 36%-51% ratio currently exists).

7 STC 36/81 at paras. 2 and 7. 8 With the exception of the Netherlands, Austria, Uruguay and Chile Constitutions, among other countries, which do not include

Preambles.

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The 2006 EAC had provided for a language policy bent on a preferential treatment of Catalan so as to

bolster national identity. It was not a new stand: previous sub-national legislation on language use had a

manifest pro-Catalan bias.

Recently, Catalonia’s top Court has ruled in favor of a 25% use of Spanish in five schools as “lengua

vehicular” (lingua franca). Many object to a fixed percentage determined by courts.

Catalonia has pursued a policy of linguistic immersion, where Catalan is prevalent and Spanish remains a

secondary option, having to make room for other languages such as English. Controversies abound, since

business and commerce with the rest of the country is obviously conducted in Spanish and internationally in

English. Increasing globalization has compounded the linguistic issue:

In our globalizing world, the distinction associated with geography, including statehood and language differences, are

fading as English becomes ubiquitous and even nation states that have not restructured officially are dealing with

non-national normative claims, entailing legal changes of a non-national nature (Grosswald Curran, 2006, p. 700)

STC 31/10 objects to Article 6.1 of EAC which gives preference to Catalan. The Court states that

preference is not just an empirical observation such as “linguistic normalcy”. If Spanish and Catalan are on an

equal footing “official language” status, it would seem contradictory to upgrade one of them to a preferential

rank. In that case, the “equilibrium” among the two official languages would be affected.

Future Trends

It seems, after the 9-N voting, that the Spanish government and its top Court would not be able to catalog

Catalonia’s claims as “illegal” forever9. At some point, negotiations between Madrid and Barcelona should start

in earnest, paving for a “third way” or a nuanced version of regionalism. The Socialist Party continues to vouch

for a federal option; the new party Podemos is eager to pursue a “Scottish solution”, meaning more dialogue

and consensual solutions. Gridlock is for the moment gaining the upper hand.

Catalans are keen to continue as EU members, despite some formal objections from the European

Commission. Some contend that were Catalonia leave the Spanish state altogether, it would have to reapply for

admission to be fully approved by the 28 Member States. Probably, this issue will end up at the ECJ sitting in

Luxembourg, which would imply a new round of judicialization.

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International Relations and Diplomacy, February 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 141-150

doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.02.006

Understanding The Restavèk Phenomenon in Haiti Through

Storytelling and Film

Marcela Moyano

St. Thomas University, Miami Gardens, Florida, USA

Known as the Pearl of the Antilles, Haiti was the first black republic to win its independence from the French in an

uprising by slaves. Two hundred years after the revolt, Haiti’s children, the most vulnerable population of the

nation, endure modern day slavery. Extreme social, economic, and political instability have led the country to adopt

and accept this practice. This qualitative study reveals audiences’ narratives of their experiences as guardians of

Restavèks and their reflections after watching the documentary film Blooming Hope (2010). The documentary

features Tata Dumasie, an artisan woman who narrates her life story growing up as a Restavèk. This ethnographic

research concludes that documentary films serve as tools for popular education. Furthermore, narrative discourse

can reconstruct identities of former Restavèks and positively transform guardians’ perceptions of the Restavèk

phenomenon.

Keywords: Restavèk, narrative discourse, Haiti

Understanding the Restavèk Phenomenon in Haiti Through Storytelling

This research paper originates after several screenings of the documentary Blooming Hope (2010) in rural

Haiti and in South Florida. Audience members approached the film’s director to engage in deeper conversation

about the Restavèk phenomenon. As a result, the researcher designed a qualitative study through in-depth

personal interviews with six audience members who share their most intimate untold narratives of their

experiences as Restavèks’ guardians. This study is the result of a storytelling process that aids participants to

reconcile their negative attitudes towards their domestic child servants. Finally, this paper demonstrates the

power of documentary films to scrutinize social issues commonly accepted and how such representation of

hidden social issues can result in social transformation.

Historical Context of Haiti and Slavery

In an attempt to understand the root cause and context of child-indentured servitude in Haiti, the

researcher studies historical texts of the French colonization and the slaves’ revolt to gain the nation’s

independence. These texts demonstrate the conflict between the powerful class, predominantly French and

Caucasian decent, and the disadvantaged class, predominantly slaves of African descent. Furthermore, the

author presents social and economic indicators of the Haitian society.

Haiti constitutes one third of the Island of Hispaniola. The French colonization was remarkable in Saint

Marcela Moyano, Assistant Professor, Institute for Communication, Entertainment & Media School of Leadership Studies, St.

Thomas University.

DAVID PUBLISHING

D

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142

Domingue due to the large numbers of people who were brought from Africa as slaves to work the land and to

serve the dominant colonial class. Saint Domingue became the largest producer of sugar cane and coffee as the

result of the exploitation of the land and extreme human labor (Moyano & Rosero, 2010).

The independence of Haiti was the result of a revolt of slaves who did not tolerate any longer the abuse

and subjugation of the French colonizer. Bell’s All Souls Rising novel illustrates the story of the independence

of Haiti. One passage of the novel depicts the main character raising this question: “For all creatures, there is

only fertility within their kind… if a white man and a black woman come together, what will you call their

offspring? Is it something else or is it human” (Bell, 1995). The problem of racism and discrimination in Haiti

is perfectly illustrated in this questioning of human nature based on skin color.

Furthermore, historical records tell the magnificent story of the liberation of the slaves from the French

(Dubois & Garriqus, 2006). In August of 1791, numerous slaves gathered in a Choiseul plantation known as

Caiman and carried out a religious ceremony in preparation for the revolt against the French colonists. A black

woman slit the throat of a black pig that was sacrificed; the slaves present at the ceremony drank the pig’s

blood. They all had bristles of the pig that they believed had magical properties and would make them invisible

during the revolt. This ritual is known as a voodoo cult that some understand as a night when the African slaves

made a pact with the devil. Some blame the cult for the misfortune of the country that has faced extreme

political turmoil, continuous generations of dictatorships, natural disasters, and human rights violations.

A few nights after the cult was executed, slaves revolted against the French masters of plantations and

their families. One young slave confessed the intention of all slaves to “fight the death against the whites”

(Dubois & Garriqus, 2006, p. 91). A group of slaves who had a torch in one hand and a dagger in the other, and

led by a man known as “Boukman”, violently massacred all the whites that could not escape through the sugar

cane fields. The revolt illustrates the burning of plantations. “Twenty Thousand slaves who were once peaceful

and submissive were now cannibals” (Dubois & Garriqus, 2006, p. 93). The independence concludes on

January 1st of 1804 when Saint Domingue is declared as a free and independent nation.

The history of liberation clearly represents the struggle of the oppressed over the oppressor. Fischer (2004)

argued that the truth of the Haitian revolution lies on the displacement of the ruling class of Haiti and former

slaves taking power. The disavowal of revolutionary antislavery became an ingredient in Creole nationalism

and, eventually, in hegemonic conceptions of modernity (Fischer, 2004, p. 273). A robust comprehension of the

liberation of Haiti is vital to reach a deeper understanding of the class struggle that Haiti faces today, which can

be merely reduced to a matter of skin color.

The history of Haiti is exemplary of courage and freedom. Haiti is the first country in the world that

became an independent nation with a rebellion led by slaves to free themselves from the French colonists.

However, the independence was then followed by a demand from the French for reparations of $28 million for

having lost their colony commonly known as the Pearl of the Antilles. This sank Haiti into an endless debt

(Bracken, 2006). Many Haitians refer to their lives as living in Iamise, a Creole term that refers to Economic

Despair. Today, Haiti is the country with the lowest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of the Western

Hemisphere (United Nations Statistics Division, 2015).

According to the United Nations Statistics Division (2015), 35% of the Haitian population is comprised by

children under 14 years old. Life expectancy is only 61 years old. Haiti has the highest infant mortality rates in

the western hemisphere and there is a 2.1% of the population living with the prevalent HIV virus. 52% of the

population is illiterate. Twenty five percent of children between 5 and 14 years old work (UNICEF, 2015).

UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI

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According to UNICEF (2015), approximately 2,000 children are victims of human trafficking taken to

Dominican Republic often with their parental/custodian support. Today, approximately 300,000 children are

victims of domestic slavery known as Restaveks (End Slavery Now, 2015).

The Haitian population is divided between two social systems (1) comprised of light skinned, French

speaking, Catholic, urban residents who hold powerful roles in the workforce and (2) comprised of people of

darker skin, Haitian Creole speaking, voodoo practicing, illiterate, rural residents who are severely

impoverished (Wagner, 2008). Consequently, the duality between oppressed and oppressor and the dichotomy

of power relationship is a clear example of the treatment given to children who are victims of the structural

violence in Haiti and the Restavèk phenomenon as one simple example of such class violence (Wagner, 2008).

The restavèk phenomenon can be best described as the result of a prevalent colonization of the ruling class over

the most disempowered group of any nation: its children.

The Haitian Restavèk Phenomenon

This section of the paper attempts to define the Restavèk Phenomenon and provides facts of the current

Haitian Restavèk population. The term Restavèk stems from French rester avec translated as “stay with”

(Balsari et al., 2010; Bracken, 2006; Wagner, 2008) and is a historical practice in Haiti to send children away to

live with wealthy families who can provide them food and shelter. The social connotation of the restavèk is one

who is “motherless or unwanted”. Restavèk is a term, which is often used as an insult and characterizes an

individual with lack of personality or self empowerment (Campbell, Miers, & Miller, 2011).

Article I (d) of the UN Supplementary Convention of the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and

Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956) defined Child Servitude as:

Any institution of practice whereby a child or young person under 18 years is delivered by either or both his/her

natural parents or guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or

young person or of his labor. (p. 3)

Therefore, according to this definition of Child Servitude, the restavèk phenomenon falls under this

category of modern slavery.

For the purpose of this study, the person who owns the restavèk children is labeled as guardian. The

restavèk phenomenon is based on the assumption that the children do not receive monetary compensation for

their labor; therefore, caregivers cannot be denominated as employers. Furthermore, the nature of

institutionalization of children rests on the belief that guardians compensate children’s work through supplying

their basic needs as food and shelter.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this paper is based on poplar education and storytelling. The researcher

designs the methodology based on these two approaches.

Popular Education

Popular education is a vehicle of social transformation, which engages learners with usually unheard

narratives and personal stories (Freire, 1970). Some of the premises of popular education are: (1) Learner and

educator engage in a process of reciprocity benefiting from the educational experience; (2) open-ended

UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI

144

questions to entice answers to learners’ own problems; (3) a commitment to political change fostering more

egalitarian societies. A key component of popular education is practice, which revolves around the idea of act

upon the knowledge acquired toward a more just and equal society (Crowther, Galloway, & Martin, 2005).

When popular education is applied to this study, the researcher identifies the learners as the documentary’s

audience and subsequently the interviewees. Participants of this research engage in the learning process when

they watch the documentary for the first time and listen to the story of the restavèk woman depicted in the film.

The process of popular education takes place when participants answer the questionnaire as an attempt to

organize their experiences and better understand the restavèk phenomenon in Haiti.

Storytelling

Storytelling is the practice of sharing narratives with self, others, or with researchers (Vannini, 2012,

p. 935). Narratives are stories about personal and/or collective memories that result in storytellers reliving

previous experiences with the aim to better make meaning of them. Thus storytelling can be viewed as means

for ordering potentially disconnected experiences into mutually interrelated, meaningful episodes of a larger

plot, be that a biography or a common history (Vannini, 2012, p. 936).

Furthermore, Vannini (2012) emphasized the importance of discursive frames that shape narratives based

on the storyteller’s cultural background, morals, and common popular knowledge. Researchers must understand

narratives considering the storyteller’s encoding and interpretation of his/her memories based on cultural

conventions (Vannini, 2012). The value of storytelling lays on the fact that people negotiate their identity

through the re-count of their narrative and thus construct their reality based on how they verbalize and organize

their lived events (Vannini, 2012).

Furthermore, when studying storytelling, films are texts that can be analyzed and meaning can be

negotiated through personal stories of depicted subjects (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2004). Therefore, Blooming

Hope (2010) is a documentary film that depicts a woman who was a victim of the restavèk phenomenon in

Haiti and who shares her narrative in the film. In addition, each of the participants tell their personal stories

while engaging in a process to better understand their past experiences with restavèk children and often as an

attempt to narrate an apologetic discourse for themselves.

Methodology

This ethnographic study consisted of in-depth personal interviews. Participants (1) answered a

pre-questionnaire related to personal experiences with restavèks; (2) then, participants watched the

documentary film Blooming Hope (2010); and (3) they responded to a post-questionnaire related to their

perceptions of restavèks after having watched the documentary and having listened the story of Tata Dumasie,

the restavèk woman featured in the film.

Participants

The researcher used purposeful sampling to select participants for this study. Each of the six participants

approached the researcher after having watched Blooming Hope (2010) at public screenings, and expressed

their desire to further discuss the restavèk phenomenon in Haiti. All of the participants had restavèks living

with them in their homes and are recognized as guardians in this study. The researcher assigned different names

to each of the participants for this paper. They all signed consent forms.

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Instrument

This study consists of a pre-questionnaire, a screening of Blooming Hope (2010), and a post-questionnaire.

The pre-questionnaire inquires about the participants’ experiences with restavèk children in Haiti. As

participants tell their stories, they reconstruct their realities and awareness of the restavèk phenomenon.

Blooming Hope (2010) is a documentary film that portrays three long-term sustainable projects in the

Northwest region of Haiti. One of the projects is a women’s artisan cooperative that features Tata Dumasie, a

woman who grew up as a restavèk in Port-de-Prince and is a member of the artisan cooperative. She tells her

personal story as a restavèk and demonstrates how her artwork represents a sustainable economic solution for

her family of five children.

When Tata Dumasie was six years old, her mother sent her to Port-de-Prince to live with a family as a

domestic servant. The family, or guardians, took Dumasie and promised her mother that they would offer her

food, shelter, and education in exchange of her work. Dumasie worked for this family for six years. She had to

do all the house chores and walk the children of the family to school every day. When she tells her story in the

documentary film, she cries while recalling memories of her physical pain and hard work. Her back and feet

hurt so much of ironing clothes and cleaning all the time. The most traumatic fact of her experience as a

restavèk child is that her guardians never sent her to school. She assures that if she had been sent to school, she

would have been able to offer a better future for her kids. On the contrary, she states “sometimes my children

are hungry, and I do not have any food to give them” (Moyano & Rosero, 2010).

Finally, the post-questionnaire attempts to bring to the surface the experience of participants after

watching Blooming Hope (2010) and hearing the personal story of Tata Dumasie growing up as a restavèk

child.

Results

The researcher used content analysis to organize the raw data collected through the study. This section

consists of participants’ experiences with restavèks followed by their reactions after watching Blooming Hope

(2010). The major themes identified in this content analysis through the pre-questionnaire are restavèks’ origins,

duties, and abuse. Abuse branches into emotional, physical, and sexual abuse. Themes identified through the

post-questionnaire after having watched Blooming Hope (2010) are discomfort, regret, and awareness.

Participants’ Experiences with Restavèks

The researcher organized the personal experiences of participants with restavèks in to three themes based

on their responses, such as restavèks’ origin, duties and abuse.

Restavèks’ Origin

All of the participants resided in Port-de-Prince when they had restavèks living with them in their homes.

When asked about the process of recruiting restavèks as servant domestic workers, they said that most of them

came from the countryside. Some of the participants’ families found the children homeless in the streets and

took them as restavèks. In other cases, mothers offered their children to be taken as restavèks.

Rachel: Growing up I remember having many restavèks living with us. Some of them lasted a really long time, like

about eight to nine years, and some of them just months or weeks. The first restavèk that I ever knew was given to my

mom because her parents were deceased. She was from Cap-Haitian. She grew up with us, went to school, and even got

UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI

146

pregnant with a baby boy while living in my house. The other ones also came from the countryside because their families

were not able to care for them. My mom found two of the restavèks of my house right outside our block in Port-au-Prince.

Alcid: I was probably eight years old. This woman came and she had a young little girl. She may have been 11 years

old. I did not know what was going on. My mom gave her food. Before I knew it, the mother left and she stayed with us.

She had a bag of belongings with her.

Some of the restavèks are children who do not have parents or caregivers. In other cases, their parents

cannot sustain them and prefer to send them away to be domestic servants as a solution for subsistence.

Duties

Most of the restavèks are assigned hard working routines. Some of them are responsible for accomplishing

particular house chores such as cooking, laundry, or cleaning. Alcid remembers that “they wake up before

everyone else around 4:30 a.m. or 5:00 a.m. They make coffee, make beds, do the laundry, iron clothes, cook,

and constantly clean”. Other Restavèks are assigned to assist and accompany their guardian’s children.

Paulmarie says “She [her restavèk] removed my uniform, bathed me, was behind me everywhere. She was just

like my mother”.

Abuse

The researcher classified abuse into three themes such as emotional, physical, and sexual abuse.

Emotional Abuse. Most of the restavèks are victims of emotional abuse. Participants explained that there

is always a clear power difference between restavèks and guardians’ family members. Even though some

guardians attempt to treat restavèks with as much dignity as possible, there is always the clear line that

identifies them as servants and inferior to anyone else in the family. Therefore, guardians constantly remind

them that they are restavèks, evidently implying the derogatory meaning of the term. Alcid recalls situations of

emotional abuse against the restavèks, “My sister always reminded them that she had education that they could

not get because of their restavèk status”. In the story of Dumasie, the fact that her guardians did not send her to

school was the most traumatic episode of her life. “I also experienced my dad yelling at them at times and not

treating them fairly when they did not get the job properly done—Rachel”.

Physical Abuse. Restavèks are expected to perform difficult house chores that usually young children are

not capable of accomplishing. As a result, guardians abuse their Restavèks physically when they do not perform

house chores as expected. Paulmarie recalls that her aunt mistreated one of the restavèk children, “They are

expected to perform difficult house chores that usually young children are not capable of accomplishing. She

did not send her to school. She used to beat her every time she did not do anything right. She was a little girl

and she could not do things right [as an adult]”. All of the participants agree that the reasons that lead guardians

to abuse restavèk children rest on their inability to perform house chores. “My mom used to spank her every

time she did something wrong or did not do her chores—Alcid”. Physical abuse escalates to episodes like what

Rachel recalls, “My sister once threw hot water at her because she had not done her chores” .

Sexual Abuse. Sexual abuse is different from emotional or physical because it is not based on the

restavèks’ inability to perform domestic duties. Sexual abuse against restavèks is a major issue in the Haitian

community. Some of the participants claim that male guardians “use” female restavèks to satisfy their sexual

needs. All of the participants knew about an episode of sexual abuse against their restavèks.

UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI

147

Paulmarie: Usually males in the family rape the restavèk girls. I heard about a case in my neighborhood. They

[restavèks] do not talk about it. These children are so scared that they do not tell the adults that they are molested.

Alcid afflicted with anguish recalled occasions when he sexually abused the female restavèks living in his

house.

Alcid: I remember me touching the girls. I was 13 years old. I was the result of my society. Superiority allows me to

dehumanize them and mom justified the behavior by saying that it was a male necessity or desire.

Two participants reported that sexual abuse against restavèk girls was socially accepted. “…I remembered

her telling my auntie about what my cousin did and they never believed her and when she got pregnant, they

said she went looking for it—Rachel”. Restavèks do not have custodians who can protect them, which

facilitates male adults to sexually abuse them. They know that if the female children denounce the abuse, no

one will even care to defend them.

Participants’ Reactions after Watching Blooming Hope

The researcher classified responses of participants after watching Blooming Hope (2010) into three themes

such as discomfort, regret and awareness.

Discomfort

The Restavèk phenomenon in Haiti is an accepted practice rarely publicly discussed. “I knew about it [the

reality of the Restavèks], but every time you hear a story is like something new. It makes you really

uncomfortable—Paulmarie”. Restavèks are not expected to be active communicators, but are rather constrained

to listen and obey their guardians’ orders. Therefore, they do not have the right to voice their concerns. “It was

difficult to see. Yes, I had seen the restavèks speaking on international media. They never talk about these

stuff—Crystal”.

Regret

All of the participants regret having physically or psychologically mistreated the Restavèk children. “I

regret all the times that I may have ever disrespected one of them or made them feel less than me—Rachel.”

Before watching Blooming Hope (2010), participants had never consciously evaluated the restavèk

phenomenon. After seeing Dumasie telling her story as a restavèk in the documentary, participants remembered

their experiences with restavèks and feel guilty about their abuse against them. “In her voice I hear the cry of

these girls asking for justice and I feel responsible for it… It is as if she was talking to me and telling me why

you did this to me—Alcid”.

Awareness

Most of the participants had never seen a woman telling her story as a restavèk from her perspective.

“After watching Blooming Hope (2010), I understand their [restavèks] story and their struggle—Rachel”.

Dumasie represents all the children in Haiti who face domestic slavery. When audiences see Dumasie telling

her afflicting story, they are able to recognize her as a human being rather than a property or object that serves.

“She put a face to the suffering of all these kids. They do not have voices… they are not given the

space—Alcid”.

Alcid said that Blooming Hope (2010) deeply impacted him because he was able to reflect about the

UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI

148

restavèk phenomenon in Haiti. Also, he confessed that he had never spoken to anyone about his experiences

with the restavèk children and his great regret. “It helps me to confess this past that very few know, because I

can make sense of what I did, and really reflect on how wrong I was—Alcid”.

Participants recognized the impact of Blooming Hope (2010) as an instrument to spark dialogue and to

uncover the unheard violence against children. “The story of Dumasie brings to light the unheard personal story

of Haitian restavèks—Crystal”.

Arthur: The story of Dumasie is the movie to me because it gives a voice to all the Restavèks who are

speechless in our Haitian society. This demonstrates the power struggle that we face in our modern society in

Haiti.

Furthermore, most participants also realized the permanent psychological distress of Dumasie and most

restavèks as a result of their experiences as domestic servants. “Even though she [Dumasie] made a way out of

it, she lived something that destroyed her real person and she will not get counseling—Paulmarie”. Alcid

reflected that he has become a successful professional because he was allowed to have dreams and accomplish

them; while the numerous restavèks that served him throughout his life were never allowed to dream and were

just struggling to satisfy their basic needs. He concludes, “I am who I am today thanks to all the work that

restavèks did for me along the years. Now, I wonder how their lives unfolded”.

Discussion

This research demonstrates that documentaries can be used as tools for popular education to facilitate

members of featured communities to engage in reflection of social issues portrayed. All of the participants of

this study felt the urge to discuss the restavèk phenomenon with the researcher after watching Blooming Hope

(2010). They were willing to share their most intimate personal stories to better understand the restavèk

phenomenon and to find a solution for this entrenched social problem. This study is the result of a request of

Haitian audiences who watched Blooming Hope (2010) and were eager to engage in conversation about the

restavèk phenomenon in Haiti.

Narratives told by individuals who are restavèks or were restavèks in their childhood are significant for the

re-construction of the social fabric of Haiti as they serve as vehicles to connect the dichotomy of social

differentiation between the poor and the rich (Vannini, 2012). One of the most important outcomes of this study

is that participants came to the realization that restavèks suffer an abysmal social subjugation that neglects their

freedom to develop personally and professionally.

Most of the participants identified episodes of mistreatment of the restavèks that someone else had

performed. Some of them mentioned family members or neighbors treating the restavèks poorly. However,

only one participant recognized that he had mistreated the restavèks while growing up and confessed that he

had sexually abused the female restavèks living in his house. This may be the result of the collective shame

experienced in the Haitian community for such atrocious crimes against children, but yet an accepted practice.

Restavèk girls are often called la pou sa, a Creole term meaning “available for that” which defines girls as

sexual objects at the disposition of the men or boys of the household. Clair (1993) and Townsley and Geist

(2000) stated that this type of sexual harassment is the result of the hegemonic discourse of an oppressive

system against the restavèk children.

UNDERSTANDING THE RESTAVÈK PHENOMENON IN HAITI

149

Another outcome of this study is that participants came to become aware of the severity of the restavèk

phenomenon in Haiti through a process of discomfort, regret and awareness.

This study reveals that this sexual abuse breeds two kinds of victims: (1) female restavèks who are

sexually molested and (2) men who are socially pressured to sexually abuse the girls. Therefore, violence

resulting from the restavèk phenomenon produces a volatile social composition of individuals who constantly

regret their obscure past. Popular education serves as a tool to confess victims’ past and liberates them from

such traumatic aggression.

Further research must be dedicated to child modern day slavery. In addition, film producers and directors

should use storytelling to portray narratives of victims of child modern day slavery, who are often socially

neglected. Such documentary films can result in social movements that ignite social consciousness and change.

Conclusion

Historically adopted practices are challenged when the human story is brought to the surface. Even though

Haiti became a free republic as a result of the revolution of the slaves over their ruling class, two hundred years

later, Haiti still endures practices of oppression commonly known in colonial times. And, the restavèk

phenomenon can be best described as the result of a prevalent colonization of the ruling class over the most

disempowered group of any nation: its children. This ethnographic research concludes that documentary films

serve as tools for popular education. Furthermore, narrative discourse can transform guardians’ perceptions of

the restavèk phenomenon.

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