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BACHELOR OF ARTS (HONOURS): RESEARCH THESIS
IN DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE
COLONIAL AUSTRALIAN SECURITY AND INTEGRATION
INTO IMPERIAL DEFENCE: 1856-1900.
Chad Alan Murphy B.A.
This thesis is submitted in the History Discipline of the School ofHumanities & Social Science in partial fulfilment of the Bachelor
Arts (Honours).
The University of Newcastle
Chad Murphy3047499
Statement of Originality
The thesis contains no material which has been accepted
for the award of any other degree or diploma in any
university or other tertiary institution and, to the best
of my knowledge and belief, contains no material
previously published or written by another person, except
where due reference has been made in the text. I give
consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the
School of Humanities and Social Science Thesis Library
being made available for loan and photocopying subject to
the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.
Signed:
_________________________________________________
Chad Alan Murphy 30 October,
2012
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Contents
Introduction…………………………………………………………………..4.
Chapter I: State of the Empire: Threats, Crises, Competition, & Reform - 1856 – 1900. ………………………………………………………………….....................11.
Chapter II: The First Line of Defence: Australian Colonies, the Royal Navy, and Foreign Imperialism - 1870-1900.
………………………………………………………………………………...27.
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Chapter III: Defend the Colonies, Defend the Empire:Colonial Defence and Security, Initiatives, and Contingents - 1870-1900.
…………………………………………………………………….................38.
Conclusion………………………………………………………………….53.
Bibliography………………………………………………………………..57.
Abstract
This thesis investigates the complications and
difficulties the colonies of Australia faced in securing the
defence of their interests under the umbrella of defence,
created by England and the Royal Navy from 1856 to 1900. The
initiatives undertaken by the colonial governments in relation
to the defence of their own borders from foreign aggression
are also covered. What is apparent throughout is the fact that
the defence policies of the colonies, although developed to
coincide with their own interests, were influenced greatly by
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the imperial defence policies of England. By the end of the
nineteenth century the security of the colonies and their
interests had integrated with imperial defence policy. This is
due to the Royal Navy maintaining its position as the linchpin
in the defence of entire empire, to which the defence units of
the Australian colonies would have to work with to secure
their own defence needs.
Introduction
With the decision of the British government to remove all
imperial troops from the colonies of Australia in 1870, the
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governments of the Australian colonies, in response, attempted
to expand local defence forces and improve coastal defences.
This course of action by England was a direct result of major
crises and increasing antagonism from continental Europe,
originating at the end of the Crimean War in 1856, which
threatened the stability and security of England and its
empire.1 These crises and threats forced the resources of the
Royal Navy and Imperial Army to become overstretched, and the
costs of policing the first truly global empire to
substantially increase beyond justification to the British
public. However, it is difficult to judge whether the
strategic goal of the British government was to integrate the
colonies into Imperial defence strategy, or whether it was
simply to reduce financial burdens and therefore become purely
a short term solution.
The new direction in defence policy by the British
government, under the Gladstone administration and championed
by Edward Cardwell, Secretary of State for War, to retrench
1 Neville Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-23 Volume 1: The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1976), 16.
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all imperial troops from those colonies with stable self-
government, forcing the colonies to begin taking
responsibility for their own defence. This also aided in
reducing some of the insurmountable costs carried by England’s
taxpayers regarding the defence England and the empire.2 With
this change in strategy, the Gladstone government tasked the
Royal Navy with maintaining its role as first line of defence
throughout the empire. The Royal Navy’s primary mission was
protecting the United Kingdom, followed by securing trade
routes and lines of communication, and lastly, defending the
colonies.
Whilst working under advice from British Naval and Army
Officers, notably Sir William Jervois, Major General Bevan
Edwards, and Rear-Admiral George Tryon, Colonial Australia’s
defence strategies from 1870 until Federation, would be
developed around the new Imperial defence policy of
integrating colonial defence with the Royal Navy. The colonies
embarked on a program of expanding their volunteer and militia
forces, even going so far as to establish a very small payed2 Eldridge, C.C. England’s Mission: The Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880 ( London: Macmillan, 1973), 56.
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colonial defence force. Alongside these developments, in 1877
the colonies following from William Jervois began a program of
constructing fortifications and gun emplacements in major
ports around the continent. However, this was undermined by
the fact that the efforts of the colonial governments were
undertaken on a colony-by-colony basis, and their simply was
no uniformity between any of the colonial defence units in any
shape or form.
The flaw in this strategy of defence, particularly the
disjointed independent efforts of the colonies, was noticed by
General Bevan Edwards who, in the first half of the 1890’s,
created and presented a major report of recommendations to be
considered and actioned by the colonial governments. These
included the need for a united defence sector based on
identical organisational structures and equipment, the
establishment of a common military academy for the training of
officers, inter-operability between colonial defence units,
and the freedom for military units from neighbouring colonies
to enter one another’s territory in matters of mutual defence.3
3 John Mordike, An Army for a Nation: A History of Australian Military Developments, 1880-1914 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), 12
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Edwards also recommended the creation of local facilities for
the manufacturing of war materiels to arm and supply defence
forces of the colonies. It is through Edwards’ assessment and
recommendations that a small push in the direction of
Federation, even if only thought of in terms of defence, had
occurred. However, the recommendations toward federation have
been under-stated in many contemporary academic works, perhaps
through the fact that England had advised the federation of
the colonies, for the purposes of defence, in the decades
previous to Edwards’ assessments.
Rear Admiral George Tryon, stationed as Commander of the
Australia Station in 1886, was concerned with the naval
defence of Australasia. Tryon had concluded the creation of
the Australian Naval Agreement in 1887, which instituted a
greater British commitment in the Australasian region than
previous years, and also allowed for the recognition of
official Colonial Auxiliary squadrons.4 However, this naval
defence strategy, although devised by the First Sea Lord,
Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key, was in fact derived from the4 Donald C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914 (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 87.
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work of John Colomb who was responsible for the conception of
Royal Navy strategy and the inter-operability of local defence
forces and fortifications, which inspired the advisory
recommendations and plans of Jervois, Edwards, and Key.
Within the issues between England and the powers of its
rival European Imperial states continually increasing, and in
response, the sudden diversion of naval resources back to
English waters. The Australian colonies understanding their
relative geographical isolation, willing financial
contributions toward defence of the empire, and the growing
threat to their security and interests, had come to the
realisation that they had differing defence needs, regarding
their interests, to those of the Mother Country. When brought
to the British government, and responded to with a lack of
solid assurances, these unique ideas were cemented in place.
For example, in the 1870’s, the idea of the arc of islands
(New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji, New Hebrides) being an
integral part of Australian defence and therefore of interest
to the colonies became apparent.5 The colonial political5 Roger C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist Era, 1820-1920 (Fitzroy: Melbourne University Press, 1980), 1.
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pressure placed upon England to annex Fiji into the empire in
1874 provides evidence for this.
In 1884, New Guinea became a major point of contention,
causing problems and damaging English prestige with the
Australians, following unheeded warnings from the colonies
regarding German intentions in relation to New Guinea. The
Queensland government attempted to annex the island on behalf
of the Empire before the Germans arrived, but was quickly
ordered to stand down due to the German threat being believed
to be unsubstantiated, according to British intelligence
reports. However, the following year Germany would annex the
northern portion of the island, and to their chagrin, as well
as Australian uproar, the British government was forced to
annex the southern half of the island into the empire.
In spite of this, the colonies remained loyal to the
Mother Country, rallying to its side and providing men and
materiels for war following news of the death of General
Gordon in the Sudan in 1885. The colony of New South Wales
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made history as being the first colony to send troops to fight
on behalf of the empire, outside of its own borders. This
action was not without its problems, for it placed the
colonies outside of their traditional position of neutrality.
However, what this does show is that the evidence put forward
by C.C. Eldridge, as noted earlier, came to fruition, and the
colonies had begun to integrate and define their future role
within the empire and its defence,6 as can be seen in post-
Federation years and the deployment of Australian troops
during the First World War in 1914 and again in the Second
World War from 1939.
Other previous academic works which have either focused
expressly on this area of history or simply referred to it in
order to explain a latter period of Australia’s history have
been touched upon, and or expanded. The use of four major
sources from four different scholars, namely; Neville Meaney,
John Mordike, Donald C. Gordon, Eldridge, and Paul Kennedy
have been of utmost importance in demonstrating the context
6 C.C. Eldridge, England’s Mission: The Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880. (London: Macmillan, 1973),
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for this thesis, and allowing it to find its niche as an
amalgamation and balance of the research previously
undertaken.
Neville Meaney’s research, an in depth study of Australian
defence and foreign policy covering the years 1901-23,
discusses the point that the security of the Australian
colonies was due to their geographical remoteness from any
major threat via an external enemy or Imperial power. European
expansion into the South Pacific and the Australasian region
introduces the concept of an Australian ‘Monroe Doctrine’,
which is of major importance in demonstrating a developing
Australian idea of security and interests external to its own
borders, and perhaps an early concept of the strategy of
forward defence, which became so prevalent in Australian
defence policy thereafter. The main theme throughout Meaney’s
work is to present the idea that the colonies had developed a
set of interests set apart from those of the British and the
rest of the empire, as well as defence needs which were unique
within the bounds of imperial defence policy.
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Mordike’s work, “An Army for a Nation”, focusses on the
establishment story of the Australian Defence Force from the
latter decades of the colonial period to the outbreak of the
First World War. It provides little into the influence or role
of the British government and its departments in regards to
the years being covered within this thesis, or the issues
facing the Empire which led to the opportunity for the British
to relinquish power and create the allowance of colonial
governments in taking over more localised facets of their own
defence. However, it is his description and research of
colonial defence units and developments within the colonies,
from a purely Australian perspective, which has aided in
developing an idea into colonial Australian defence and
interests, with minimal influence from England.
Paul Kennedy’s research presents key elements in regards
to the rise and fall of British naval mastery. It cites
economical and continental European threats as the deciding
factor of British policy and developments during the period in
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question for this thesis. Kennedy’s work concerns the wider
British Empire, with next to no mention of the Australian
colonies within this period; it seeks to explain much broader
pieces of history over a much grander scale of time. The
integration of economic issues, crises within the bounds of
the empire, as well military, naval, and political
developments within continental Europe, provides a chain of
effect which shaped new imperial policy and therefore
influenced colonial Australia.
Dominion Partnership and Imperial Defence by Donald C.
Gordon, an American historian, is a history of the direct
period in question and from an outsider’s perspective.
However, Gordon’s work is somewhat similar in its endeavour to
this thesis, in that it presents an overall account and focus
on both the Australian colonies and England, the relationship
between, and is the only manuscript in which there is any
prominent mention to Edward Cardwell and his reforms, which as
mentioned earlier in this introduction, were in fact the
catalyst for a great amount of change within the Australian
colonies.
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Discussions of British politics with respect to the
withdrawal of Imperial troops from colonies, was not a new
topic. C.C. Eldridge’s research in his book, England’s Mission,
states that British politicians believed the strength of the
bonds between England and its colonies would grow stronger, if
those stable colonies were to be given greater freedom and
influence over their own governance and defence. Therefore,
through the use of freedom and the right to self-governance,
the colonies would fight for and throughout the empire, for
love of the Mother Country.
CHAPTER ONE
State of the Empire:
Threats, Crises, Competition, and Reform, 1856 –
1900.
“The huge swathes of territory scattered all over the
globe, whose defence, so it seemed to late Victorians, was
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little short of a nightmare”,7 a passage by John Darwin,
eloquently describes the problem of defending such an
expansive empire. By the end of the Crimean War in 1856 to
1900, the primacy and prestige of England and its empire was
under threat from both internal and external sources. In the
context of this thesis, these threats to the stability and
security of England and its empire provide the catalyst for
major changes in policy, both politically and militarily (in
regards to both the Imperial Army and the Royal Navy), and
consequently the Australian colonies.
Leading with the Indian Mutiny in the late 1850’s, a
number of crises threatened major instability across the
entire empire, and at great financial cost, forced England to
intervene and suppress these issues. In the late 1850’s
through the 1860’s New Zealand and its European colonists were
struggling with the native Maori tribes, which eventually
broke out into war and did not fully calm down for a decade.
During the same period the islands of the West Indies were
struggling with differences arising between the freedmen and
7 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3.
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the European planters, and in South Africa the European
settlers were pushing further inland to acquire more farming
and grazing land, and coming into violent conflict with the
native tribes.
Externally, the power of continental European states
notably Russia, France, and Prussia (Germany) was on the
increase, following the relative peace of the Pax Britannica
within the first half of the nineteenth century, following the
defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte I in 1815. However, following the
Crimean War, ending in 1856, British relations with Russia had
remained very strained, and Russia continued to be the major
threat to the security of the empire, particularly in the
Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and India. Relations with
France returned to normalcy- one of suspicion and distrust,
and nearly bordering on war, even after both nations had been
allies against Russia during the Crimean War. An arms race
between England and France, as well as closer Franco-Russian
relations, heightened the threat of France and Russia,
especially when the two powers formed an entente to defend one
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another against hostility,8 which in turn led to a major piece
of British policy to be created, known as the two-power
standard.9
The military might of Prussia had always been of concern,
but following the Prussian victory over Austria, and its
thorough defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-
71, the organised and well trained Prussian military became a
major threat to British prominence and garnered greater
attention from British politicians and the public.10 The
unification of the fractured German states and Prussia in
1871, under Otto von Bismarck, and later Kaiser Wilhelm II,
placed the newly unified state as a serious threat to Britain
and its empire. After the German states unified, their
direction changed to that of becoming an imperial power and
claiming territory in Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and
Australasia therefore encroaching within the bounds of British
and Australian interests. It was, however, the efficiency,
8 Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture – 1857-1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 92.9 Meaney, The Search for Security, 27.10 Paul M. Kennedy The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: The Ashfield Press, 1992), 202.
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modern training, and the effectiveness of the Prussian/German
military that made such an initial impact on British policy
makers and forced them to evaluate their own defences against
such forces.11 The assessments reported unfavourable results,
the findings deeming the British military bordering on
antiquation in all aspects with respect to armaments and
organisation. This stark realisation of the military’s
inadequacies reinforced fears of invasion from across the
Channel. This relative ineffectiveness expedited major reforms
by the Gladstone administration during the late 1860’s and
early 1874, championed and developed by Edward Cardwell, in
which the decision was made to institute empire wide reforms.
In 1861, at the behest of the House of Commons, Arthur
Mills was ordered to form a committee “to inquire and report
whether any and what alterations may be advantageously adopted
in regard to the defence of the British dependencies, and the
proportions of cost of such defence as now defrayed from the
imperial and colonial funds respectively”.12 In 1862, following
11 Meaney, The Search for Security, 27.12 Robert Livingston Schuyler. “The Recall of the Legions: A Phase of the Decentralization of the BritishEmpire”, The American Historical Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1920), pp. 32.
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the committee’s reports, the House of Commons adopted the
resolution that those colonies enjoying the freedom and right
of self-government should be responsible for their own
internal security, and also aid in their own external defence.
For the Australian colonies, the reforms included the
removal and retrenchment of all Imperial troops garrisoning
those colonies which have reliable and stable self-government
to reduce the costs associated with defending a global empire,
but to also force the colonies to increase their own
activities in regards to defence. Research by Eldridge also
suggests that the concept to remove troops from self-governing
colonies, and the instigation to the creation of larger
colonial defence forces had been discussed at some length a
few years before the Cardwell reforms were initiated. These
discussions on colonial defence also developed ideas of future
integration of the colonies into imperial defence, and the
possibility of using colonial military forces alongside the
imperial army to defend the empire.
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The concept of the integration of the colonies, in
general, also resonated in the theories developed by John
Colomb. Colomb believed that “resources— whatever they may be—
are the common heritage and present common possession of the
whole British race. That they are available, can be developed,
and may be applied by a homogeneously constituted State.
Finally, that these resources are to be regarded practically
as factors of one great whole, the value of each factor being
relative to its use and adaptability in one common Imperial
plan of action in war.”13In reference to resources, Colomb was
thinking about men, materiels, food, and fuels such as coal.
All these resources must be available for defence, not only
for themselves, but for the empire as a whole. Colomb’s work
re-iterates that ideas of integration were prominent, and
necessary for defence of the empire.
The Australian colonies were recognised as a less likely
target of invasion or attack from the enemies of the empire,
13J. C. R. Colomb, The Naval and Military Resources of the Colonies (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, 1879), 2. *The primary resource by Colomb was discovered via a thorough search thorough the online database J-Store. The same can be said about all of the other primary documents used within the thesis.
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and native issues were not of any serious or notable threat to
the stability of the colonies.14 The driving force behind this
new policy, however, was the fact that by removing the
garrisons from those colonies established well enough to raise
their own defence units, the financial strains carried by the
British government and placed on its tax-payers would be, in
theory, alleviated.15 This was not the only reason for the
withdrawal, but also the initiation of reforms which hoped to
modernise the structure of the Imperial army and Royal Navy,
comparatively to that of a Prussian standard, and to also ease
the fears of possible invasion from across the channel.16
In the first few years of the 1860’s the colonies of
Australia had instituted, to a minimal extent, the creation of
local volunteer and militia units to aid in their defence
alongside the Imperial troops garrisoned around the continent.
The point of the garrisoned troops was to protect the colonies
from any external aggressors, whilst the local volunteers and
14 Meaney, The Search for Security, 15.15 Donald C. Gordon, “The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial Collaboration: 1885-1904”(Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 4, 1962), 526.16 John A. Moses & Christopher Pugsley, The German Empire & Britain’s Pacific Dominions, 1871-1919: Essays on the Role of Australia and New Zealand in the Age of Imperialism (Claremont: Regina Books, 2000), 157.
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militia were designated the duty of maintaining internal order
and security.17 Maintaining the volunteer and militia units
remained a difficult task across all six colonies, with the
main issue keeping the men enthused in their position, and
also attracting new enlistments sufficient enough to maintain
an effective strength. Incentive programs such as offering
land grants in return for five years’ service were offered by
the New South Wales and Queensland governments, and in South
Australia a payment scheme was introduced for part-time
soldiers.18
In 1863, a letter was dispatched from the Duke of
Newcastle, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the
Governors of each Australian colony. Within the letter was the
first mention of the idea of withdrawing the imperial troops
charged with garrisoning the colonies. The point was made,
however, that troops would only be removed from those colonies
which possessed responsible government.19 The demands of empire
over the coming years delayed the activation of this policy
17 Glen St. J. Barclay, The Empire is Marching: A Study of the Military Effort of the British Empire, 1800-1945 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), 9.18 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, 1.19 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 36.
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for some years, and until that time, the British government
offered to allot imperial troops to remain active as a
garrison within the Australian colonies under particular
considerations, that being a contribution subsidy of around
£54,000 per annum to the upkeep of the garrison from the
relative colonial governments.20 By the time of their
withdrawal, there were some five to six thousand troops
stationed in Australasia.21
While this was occurring within the Australian colonies,
other parts of the empire were facing a series of crises and
instability. These threats to British interests became a
priority within the scope of imperial internal security, and
needed to be quickly suppressed therefore assuaging internal
weaknesses of the empire to competitive imperial states. New
Zealand, Jamaica, and South Africa have been chosen to
demonstrate the size of the empire, and also the effect of
tyranny of distance in regards to policing so as to maintain
order within the regions of the empire which lacked the
stability of the Australian colonies. There is one common20 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership, 25.21 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 25.
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feature throughout these issues, and that is the interaction
and relations between Europeans and native populations, and
the means used by the British to disseminate these uprisings
and crises, which was based on the amount of force needed
relative to strength of the European populations and the
natives therein.22
In the case of New Zealand, the crisis arose over disputes
caused by differing customs relating to land ownership. To the
Maoris, ownership of land was based upon communal tenets, in
that the sale of land could only be made and approved by the
people as a whole, and not by an individual. European ideas of
ownership, in contrast, were based upon individual tendering.23
The conflict which broke out was sparked via a deal gone awry
between the British government, and a local Maori tribesman.
However, when the tribal elders became aware of this deal they
quickly interceded and held up the transaction for some time.
Eventually the British became impatient and moved in with
military units to take the land they had purchased. War was
22 Porter, The Lion’s Share, 50.23 John Bach, The Australia Station: A History of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific, 1821-1913 (Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1986), 189.
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declared between the British and the Maoris in 1860, and
lasted for three years.24 However, minor pockets of resistance
remained for almost a further decade. The remaining issues
within New Zealand, did not include British troops for the
government did not wished to get involved in the problems or
suffer the financial burdens with more conflict on behalf of
the colony and settlers which could be resolved with much
better local policy in regards to relations with the Maoris.25
The Jamaican crisis was based upon the fact that the
systems of hierarchy, between the planters and the workers,
were antiquated and from a period where the use of slave
labour was abundant. However, in the time period covered,
slavery had been outlawed within the empire and now the old
systems were crumbling. What caused the outbreak of violence
within Jamaica was the fact that the workers, now somewhat
free, were able to work the land and support themselves
without reliance on employment from planters. This self-
reliance, away from the plantations, impacted on the profits
24 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 18.25 George Odgers, Diggers: The Australian Army, Navy and Air Force in Eleven Wars – From 1860 to 5 June 1944 (Sydney: Lansdowne, 1994), 17.
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and productivity of the planters business, as well as lessened
the land in which plantations could be expanded. This was due
to the ex-workers of the plantations generally settling on the
unused land of the planters.26 When some planters took the
matter into their own hands and attempted to remove the new
settlers from their lands, rioting and violence broke out.
Outnumbered, the planters were forced to relinquish whatever
powers of governance they held in favour of intervention on
their behalf by the British government. The riots were
brutally quelled, and Jamaica was adopted as crown lands and
to be administered to by the British government.27
In New Zealand the strength in numbers of the European
settlers was sufficient to not only defend themselves
adequately, but to also improve relations with the Maoris
through better policy. The case of Jamaica is much different
in that the European planters were heavily and increasingly
out-numbered, compared to the redistributed West Africans.
Therefore, in order to protect the European settlers within
the Caribbean and their operations, the British were forced to26 Porter, The Lion’s Share, 54.27 Porter, The Lion’s Share, 54.
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use military and naval personnel to quell the violence, and
since the numbers and strength of the European population on
the island would never be strong enough to govern effectively,
the British were also forced to adopt the burden of governing
the island.28
South Africa on the other hand was in a situation
somewhere in between Jamaica and New Zealand. The European
colonists of the Cape were outnumbered and outmatched compared
to those of the native populations. But the British on further
analysis recognised that in a short span of time, the settler
population would be powerful enough to defend itself (which
became a stark reality with the outbreak of the Boer War in
late 1899).29 The other problem was also the fact that England
was not looking for another region of influence for which to
drain its already stretched resources, and therefore the
garrisons of the Cape colonies stuck to the ports and naval
bases on the coast, defending whatever was deemed as an
28 Porter, The Lion’s Share, 54.29 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 14.
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interest, thus ensuring commerce could make its way around the
Cape and access the Eastern markets without hindrance.30
However, the issues came with the lack of control England
had over the European settlers to the north, who continued to
push the bounds of their already considerable lands to
increase farming capabilities, and grazing larger herds of
cattle. But this brought them into contact with the native
African population, and therefore, inevitable conflict.
Britain managed to stay out of these issues between natives
and settlers through the sheer fact that there was little
incentive for it to become involved militarily, and the other
fact that British ownership of South Africa did not extend
that far north.31 This would all change in the 1870’s when the
discovery of gold and diamonds would herald a great rush to
subjugate the region under British suzerainty, before other
colonial competitors in the region attempted to claim it
first. But until that time, the Imperial units stayed within
30 Barclay, The Empire is Marching, 1.31 Ian Beckett and John Gooch, Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy, 1845-1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981), 9.
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the bounds necessary for the defence of the Simonstown naval
port.32
The increasing threat and influence of continental
European powers to the dominance of England and the security
of its empire was the primary concern for British policy
makers following the conclusion of the war with Russia in
1856. Russia during the late 1850’s to the end of the
nineteenth century remained a primary threat to England. The
issues between both nations were characterised by continuing
hostilities and faltering relations, and periods of war close
to breaking out. This was due, in part, to Russian expansion
and threat into two considerably major and important areas of
British interest, the Mediterranean and Asia, with particular
focus on India, known as the jewel of the empire.33
France, the old enemy of Britain, during this period had
come out of another revolution in 1870 and was now much more
politically stable, and began undertaking the initiation of a32 Denis Judd, Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874-1932 (London: Macmillan, 1968), 24.33 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 178.
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naval program. However, even though France would not rise to
become as serious a threat during this period as Russia or
Germany, the program caused enough of a stir in the United
Kingdom for it to have brought up some nagging issues of
deficiency regarding the state of the Royal Navy,34 and also
brought about greater discussion regarding the need for an
increase of troops on British soil, as well as the need to
redistribute the Royal Navy back to English waters and defend
against the threat from across the channel.35 Closer relations
between Russia and France were entering into dangerous
territory for England, and realistic fears of the two entering
into an entente placed greater urgency on the need for reform
and increased strain on the policy development within London
and for the defence of the empire.36
The rise of Prussia and the unification of the numerous
German states under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck,
brought to light the inadequacies in the strength of the
34 Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1964), 66.35 John Gooch, The Prospect of War: Studies in British Defence Policy, 1847-1942 (London: Frank Cass, 1981), 5.36 Streets, Martial Races, 92.
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Imperial Army. Prussians could raise a force of some 400,000
professional and combat ready soldiers, which far exceeded
that of England, in a number of days.37 Kennedy explains that
during the first days of the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussian
command managed to pass 1,183,000 men into the army in
eighteen days.38 The excellent training and efficiency of the
Prussian military would be shown to the world when war broke
out between France and Prussia in 1870. The war demonstrated
new and innovative forms of warfare involving greater use of
accurate and efficient use of artillery, the conscription and
training of civilians for larger unit formations, and most
importantly the introduction of rail systems to transport men
and materiels to the battlefront at a speed not seen before.39
The importance of noting the threat from Europe is due to
the fact that the policies and reforms instituted by the
Gladstone government. Under the guidance of Edward Cardwell,
then Secretary of State for War, the new reforms were designed
as a means by which Britain would be able to resist these
37Beckett and Gooch, Politicians and Defence, 33.38 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 190.39 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 190.
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threats and to also attempt to rectify the short comings of
the English military institutions and policies of the past and
bring them into the new era. Cardwell’s first policy, to
remove wherever possible, garrisoned imperial regiments from
across the empire were, as we will see, to play a crucial role
in Australian affairs. These reforms were based upon a similar
premise produced years earlier by the Duke of Newcastle, in
that garrisons would only be removed from those colonies
possessing reliable self-government, and of course, with
little threat from external sources.40
It is in regards to these criteria that the colonies of
Australia were the first to have their garrisons removed, and
with the retrenchment of said units, and as Gordon states in
his book, the removal was not followed by “cries of anguish
from the self-governing colonies”41, but there had been
questions raised as to the value of the subsidy system and
whether there would be assurances that imperial troops would
be available in times of war and peace.42 This was reinforced
40 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 56.41 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 27.42 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 28.
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by Victorian Premier, Sir James McCulloch, who announced to
the Legislative Assembly “that as long as the colony paid for
part of troop costs, it felt entitled to the services of the
class of troops which were of greatest use in local defence"43,
in the case of this statement McCulloch meant artillerymen,
rather than infantry. This request would fall on the deaf ears
of the imperial authorities who believed that such highly
trained forces were of no use to the greater imperial defence
effort if they were stationed in far off colonies where their
skills wouldn’t be utilised effectively. This thought process
was of course based off the absurd idea that a British
colony’s security from an international threat was in any way,
endangered. Cardwell himself backs this claim when he stated
that the true defence of the colonies rested under “the aegis
of the name England.”44
The removal of the garrisons in Australia then allowed
Cardwell to initiate the primary purpose of his policies, the
reforming of the British army, which was based around the
theory of decreasing expenditure and increasing its fighting43 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 28.44 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 33.
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strength. This objective was hidden from the colonies, and
reproduced as a policy which would strengthen the Mother
Country but also force the colonies to take responsibility for
their own defence.45 Other statesmen of the time have put
forward their own opinions on the matter, which followed along
the theory of a future Imperial federation where the colonies
would share in the duties of defending the empire, and have a
voice in directing imperial policy. This, however, turned out
to be pure idealism for neither Cardwell, or Gladstone, had
any future plans to implement such idealistic intentions.46
Prior to the removal of the imperial garrisons in 1870,
the Australian colonies (primarily New South Wales, Victoria,
Queensland, and South Australia) had engaged in the creation
of small volunteer and militia units to aid in maintaining
order within the colonies themselves, whilst the garrisons
defended them from external aggressors. These first steps
toward self-defence and the creation of a localised defence
force for the Australian colonies was based from an earlier
45. Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 38.46 Beckett and Gooch, Politicians and Defence, 33
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resolution passed by the British House of Commons, based on
recommendations found by the Mills Committee. The Committee
found that those colonies with rights to self-government, and
also under less pressure from native issues and hostilities
should take the “responsibility of providing for their own
internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own
external defence”.47
Throughout the 1860’s, England was faced with dealing with
multiple issues and threats, both within and outside the
empire, eventuating in problems of overstretched resources of
a military designation. Simply, neither the Royal Navy nor the
Army could be everywhere at once, and deal with every issue if
its strength was spread across the face of the globe. The
examples of New Zealand, Jamaica, and South Africa show that
these crises within the empire were complicated due to
variances in the nature of each issue, and had to be resolved
accordingly based upon their unique makeup.
47 Schuyler. “The Recall of the Legions”, 33.
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From outside the empire, threats came in the form of
France, Russia, and the rising of a unified Germany, to which
all powers had plans, and ideas of eventual colonial
expansion. An alliance being formed between Russia and France
also created policy issues, and debates in London. The mixing
of French naval programs, Russian ideas on expansion into Asia
also roused issues which needed to be confronted within the
political and military institutions of England. This affected
the Australian colonies in a profound way, for within England
the Gladstone government had decided that in order to tackle
these rising issues and threats to the integrity of the
empire, and the security of the Mother Country, major military
reforms and policies which involved the colonies had to be put
in place. This therefore led to the engagement of Edward
Cardwell’s policies, and the retrenchment of the imperial
troops garrisoned within the self-governing colonies of
Australia, and the forcing of these colonies to seek out their
own defence initiatives in throughout the following decades.
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Australian Colonies, the Royal Navy, and Foreign Imperialism, 1870-1899.
The primary concepts adopted by the upper echelons of the
Imperial Army and the Royal Navy, were largely the creation of
John Colomb, an ex-officer of the Royal Marine Artillery.
Colomb wrote prolifically on the defence of the Empire from
around 1867, and continued on with consistent expansion and
revision of his own work throughout the 1870’s.48 His doctrines
promoted the idea that the defence of the empire should be
based upon the Royal Navy. Being a blue water fleet, the
navy’s charge should be the protection of lines of
communication, as well as supply and trade routes.49 He
believed that hindering and forcing the Royal Navy to protect
the harbours and ports of England and its other colonies
abroad which were unable to defend themselves, and also police
the rest of the world wherever the interests of the empire
lie, was an overly expensive and unmanageable task to be
48 Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: The Politics, Economics, and Ideology of Empire, 1880-1932 (Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd, 2000), 111.49J. C. R. Colomb, Imperial Federation: Naval and Military (Foreign and CommonwealthOffice Collection, 1886), 8.
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burdened with, especially when the new threats and crises were
considered. With this in mind Colomb came upon the idea of
employing smaller attack vessels within the ports and harbours
of England with explicit orders for them to stay within the
bounds of these waterways, and not to enter open water.50
One convert to Colomb’s new defence ideas and one with
particular relevance to Australia was Sir William Jervois.
Jervois stated to the Carnarvon Commission in 1879, “That
whilst the imperial navy undertakes the protection of the
mercantile marine generally, and of the highways of
communication between several parts of the empire, the
Australian colonies themselves provide, at their own cost, the
local forces, forts, batteries, and other appliances requisite
to the protection of their principal ports”.51 To Jervois, the
primary basis of the strategies for the defence of the Empire
and the colonies, revolved around the effectiveness of the
Royal Navy in protecting the approaches to the colonies, and
the role of local naval forces to not only protect their own
50 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 59.51 MacAndie, The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, 18.
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ports and harbours, but also intersect with the task of the
Royal Navy.
According to G.L. MacAndie, Secretary of the Australian
Naval Board 1914-1946, prior to the amalgamation of colonial
vessels under the banner of a federated Australia and
Commonwealth government in 1901, the distribution of vessels
among the colonies were distributed as follows: New South
Wales, maintained two second-class torpedo boats. Victoria was
reckoned to have an ironclad monitor vessel which had been
modified for harbour defence, one first-class torpedo boat,
and three second-class torpedo boats under its command.
Queensland had two gun vessels and a second-class torpedo boat
at its disposal. Lastly, South Australia was endowed with a
cruiser, and a second-class torpedo boat.52 Therefore, the
colonies were undertaking initiatives to work within the
schemes of a greater Imperial defence strategy, and along the
guidelines detailed by Colomb’s concepts with the purchase of
small armed vessels for the defence of local ports and
harbours of importance.
52 MacAndie, Royal Australian Navy, 23.
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Naval defence, outside of local ports and harbours, was
met by the colonies paying financial subsidies to England for
the maintenance and upkeep of the vessels of the Royal Navy
stationed at the Australia station and designated for defence
of the colonies. This scheme of subsidy payments was inspired
by the proposal of Arthur Mills, in which he stated “that
colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to
undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own
internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own
external defence”,53 and instituted with the Colonial Naval
Defence Act of 1865. However, after the war scare with Russia
in 1878, the colonies became aware of the deficiencies of the
Royal Navy and its ability to successfully defend the
colonies, this led to the colonial governments to press upon
the British government the need for an increased presence of
Royal Navy in the Pacific, and in particular, Australian
waters.
53 Schuyler. “The Recall of the Legions”, 33
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The issue of encroachment into the Pacific by other
European powers became apparent to the colonial governments,
and with it, greater activity and threats in regards to
competition, and also towards the interests of the colonies
and England, there came calls for increased imperial expansion
within the Pacific and more importantly the arc of islands
around Australia.54 This press for greater expansionist ideas
within Australia’s areas of interest has garnered the title of
an Australian “Monroe Doctrine”, popularised by Neville
Meaney.55 However, this concept must be understood within the
context relative to the Australian colonies, in that the drive
for annexation of new islands in the Pacific and Australasian
region was not for Australian gain, but rather, for the
benefit of the Empire.
Fiji would become the first point of interest when it came
to the naval side of Australia’s interests. The colonies of
Australia were very vocal in their calls for the Fijian
islands to be annexed for the empire. However, until the
54 Donald C. Gordon, “Beginnings of an Australasian Pacific Policy” (Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 1, 1945), 84.55 Meaney, The Search for Security, 16.
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ousting of the conservative Gladstone administration and the
entry of the Disraeli government, enthusiasm was almost non-
existent within the preceding administration when it came to
further expansion of the empire. Prompted by the motivation
that if Britain did not annex the islands, which would serve
to be an important base for securing the long route from
Australia to North America (Canada), and described by Robert
Herbert “that Germany or Belgium may take the opportunity and
be urged to annex the islands”,56 Lord Carnarvon approved the
annexation of Fiji, and in 1874 the islands were added to the
empire and Queen Victoria became the sovereign of another
colony.57
Australian fears regarding the strength of the Royal Navy
in the Pacific, or rather lack thereof, resulted in
expressions of concern of the relatively defenceless state in
which the interests of the British within the Pacific at a
conference of the premiers of colonial governments in 1881.58
This was increasingly heightened when rumours of German
56 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 39.57 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 156.58 Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific, 49.
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interests toward New Guinea were mixed in with the movements
and designs of the French toward the islands of New Caledonia
and the New Hebrides. With all this activity within the realm
of interests of the Australian colonies, an appeal was sent to
the British government in 1883 outlining the plans of the
colony of Queensland to annex New Guinea to be approved.59
However, British intelligence found the rumours of German
intentions to annex the New Guinea to be unfounded. Soon after
to the surprise of the British, and the chagrin of the
Australian colonies, the northern portion of New Guinea was
annexed and set up as a protectorate by Germany.60
In response, the hand of Britain was forced and the south
eastern portion of New Guinea was annexed. An Australian
brochure published in 1883, as a response to defend
Queensland’s attempt to annex New Guinea in lieu of the
British unenthusiastic understanding of the colonies
interests, brings attention to the fact that Queensland
59 Peter Overlack, “Bless the Queen and Curse the Colonial Office’: Australasian Reaction to German Consolidation in the Pacific, 1871-99”, The Journal of Pacific History, Vol 33,No. 2 (1998), 138. 60 Merze Tate, “The Australasian Monroe Doctrine” (Political Science Quarterly, Vol.76, No. 2, 1961), 271.
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believed that in the event of inaction by the Royal Navy and
British government, the colony had the right to defend its
interests. In light of this, the annexation was indeed an
attempt of self-defence, and also act which garnered a greater
response of urgency when Germany moved into New Guinea.61
The damage caused by British inaction on behalf of the
interests of the colonies had already been done when Germany
became a new neighbour to Australia’s near north. This
inaction by Britain also caused the creation of the Federal
Council of Australia, which included all the colonies, with
exception to New South Wales. The feeling behind the council
was that if the colonies spoke with a united voice they would,
according to the Premier of Victoria Graham Berry, be “heard
in Downing Street, in regard to what we then called ‘our
foreign relations”.62 On a more positive note, the issue of
European infringement into the Pacific as well as waters
adjacent to Australia, reinforced the need for more naval
61An Australian, The Australian Crisis: or, Ought New Guinea and the Western Pacific Islands to be Annexed? (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, 1883), 6.
62 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 81.
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defence, and therefore instilled the fact that an increase in
subsidies would have to be made.63
This inadequacy on behalf of the British to safeguard the
interests of the colonies was responded to by the First Sea
Lord, Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key. Outraged by the apparent
lack of strength of the Royal Navy, and the increasing tension
with France in regards to Egypt, and Russian activity in the
north of India,64 Admiral Key recognised that the Australian
colonies were looking for a means to improve their actions and
activities in which they might find a way to increase, or
supplement, their defence with the Royal Navy.
Key had plans to introduce greater cooperation between the
Royal Navy and the colonial forces of Australia, and based
upon this concept he suggested a number of ideas which were
both new, and also took reference from the report developed by
the Imperial Royal Commission on the defences and trade of the
63 Tom Frame, No Pleasure Cruise: The Story of the Royal Australian Navy (Crow’s Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2004), 62.64 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 81.
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colonies of 1882, also known as the Carnarvon Commission.65 The
first concept would be in regard to the number and type of
vessel should be considered by the local government, and this
should be achieved in close consultation with the Admiral of
the Australia station. Secondly, the Admiralty would take
responsibility for the construction and maintenance of the
vessels chosen, as well as supply the officers and themselves,
which would be all held at the cost of colony. Thirdly, the
vessels, although under the command of the commander of the
Australia station, would not be permitted to leave the port or
harbour in which they have been commissioned to defend.66
The memorandum prepared by Admiral Key did not come into
fruition until the outbreak of the Sudan crisis. The campaign
to quell this uprising was well underway in 1885 when Lord
Derby of the Colonial Office circulated letters to the
governors of the various colonies, praising their activities
in regards to improving their naval defence capabilities.67 In
which case, he suggested that the time seemed right for the
65 Frame, No Pleasure Cruise, 58.66 MacAndie, Royal Australian Navy, 32.67 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 81.
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concepts of Admiral Key’s memorandum to be presented and
discussed. This would be achieved with the dispatching of
Rear-Admiral George Tryon, who was tasked with the duty of
commanding the Australia station, and presenting the
memorandum to the colonial governments to be discussed and
negotiated to a conclusive resolution.68
In 1886, Tryon was able to put pre-approved proposals from
the Admiralty, to a meeting of the Premiers of New South
Wales, Queensland, and Victoria. Tryon pushed vigorously to
get the negotiations to move along. This haste was due to the
fact that in due time the governments could acquire their own
ships, and that the people of the colonies would not long
accept from Britain that which in their opinion they could do
as well themselves. Sir Henry Loch, the Governor of Victoria,
in his communications with the Colonial Office remarked, in
regards to the fact that if the Royal Navy squadron in
Australia was not improved, the colonies would eventually gain
their own ships, and in so having he continued on, stating
that “there are men in these colonies who would not hesitate,
68 MacAndie, Royal Australian Navy, 35.
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under certain eventualities, to dispatch them to seize Samoa,
the New Hebrides, or any other place or island on which they
had set their desire”.69 This idea managed to find some
legitimacy when the issue of Queensland’s attempt to annex New
Guinea is considered.
The fears of possible Australian colonial aggression in
the future became unsubstantiated within the political realms
of the colonies, with the fact that after nearly three years
of negotiating and reviewing the memorandum conceived by
Admiral Key, pushed toward to a conclusion by Tryon had been
accepted. In 1887 at the end of the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee,
the Australian Naval Agreement was signed and with only
minimal issues, which revolved around the distribution of the
financial costs, associated with the agreement between the
colonies.
The final appraisal of this agreement heralds in what
would be informally known as the Australasian Auxiliary
squadron, with the final details which made up the agreement69 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 81.
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being based around, in essence, those principles designed by
Admiral Key. The main features being that the colonies would
have to contribute £126,000 per annum for the provision of the
vessels, the officers and crew, equipment, and maintenance of
the squadron.70 The other major features being that the
squadron would remain at full strength, even in times of war,
with some reserve ships set aside within the major ports, the
crew would remain up to date in regards to training, and
lastly, the squadron would not be allowed to operate outside
of the limits of the Australia stations jurisdiction without
the strict permission of the colonial governments.71
The introduction of the imperial defence concepts by John
Colomb mentioned previously, led to the discovery of a link
demonstrating that the developments and recommendations on the
defence of the provided by Jervois, were based upon the
principles of Colomb’s strategies, in that the Royal Navy
70 Arnold Forster & Hugh Oakeley, The Navy and the Colonies (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, 1895), 10. *The subsidy paid by the Australian colonies was severely inadequate to upkeep the men and materielskept within Australian waters. The British taxpayers were still responsiblefor covering the majority of the costs to defend the Australian colonies.
71 Bach, The Australia Station, 189.
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should not be hindered and bogged down with the defence of
ports and harbours. But rather, they should be an open water
defence mechanism designed to protect those interests which
are important to the empire as a whole, that being trade and
communication lines. The defence of ports and harbours,
according to his plans, should be relegated to local naval
forces based within the ports and harbours themselves, and
with orders never to enter open water. This compares well with
the fact that the recommendations of Jervois slot in nicely
with Colomb’s defence strategies, for Australia’s defence was
based on static fortifications, and localised vessels for
protecting of major ports and harbours, which then allowed for
the vessels of the Royal Navy to focus their forces upon the
trade and communication routes between the various regions of
the empire.
However the growing threat of other European powers, with
designs on colonisation and competing with British and
colonial Australian trade interests became a major issue,
which led to the expansion of the empire in the Pacific and
South East Asia. The annexation of Fiji was made to minimise
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the opportunities for other powers with interests in the
region, and to also ensure that the trade routes from
Australia to North America could be maintained.72 The matter of
the establishment of the German Protectorate of New Guinea,
making Germany a new neighbour in Australia’s near north,
caused many waves in relations between the colonial
governments and their faith in the strength of the Royal Navy
in Australasia, as well as the perception that colonial
interests were not as important to those of the British
interests. Most of this was caused by the inaction of British
authorities toward Australian reports that the Germans were
moving in and planning on colonising New Guinea, to which the
British government brushed off as unfounded rumours. Upon re-
evaluation and notification, after the Germans had already
annexed New Guinea, Britain quickly moved in and claimed the
south eastern portion of the island.
In regards to further integration and cooperation between
the colonies and the British government on the matter of
colonial defence, events moved into a new realm of activity72 Deryck M. Schreuder & Stuart Ward, Australia’s Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 236.
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and policy. This was initially sparked by the First Sea Lord,
Admiral Key, in response to the apparent lack of strength of
the Royal Navy based out of the Australia station. Admiral Key
had developed a number of new concepts, based somewhat on the
ideas of Colomb, which were to be put to the colonial
governments, and negotiated until they became policy and
ratified. This task was delegated to Rear-Admiral Tryon, who
was given command of the Australia Station. This new defence
policy was agreed to by the colonies, the only real hindrance
coming from the discussions how to divide up the subsidy which
was to be paid as part of the agreement, and in 1887, the new
policy was signed by all the colonial governments and became
known as the Australian Naval Agreement. This new policy would
herald a new age of cooperation and relations between the
Royal Navy and the Australian colonies, for not only did it
increase the amount of vessels allocated for defence of the
colonies, it also brought greater decision making powers as to
the deployment of the vessels, therefore increasing the role
of Australia within the greater imperial defence mechanism.
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CHAPTER THREE
Defend the Colonies, Defend the Empire:
Colonial Defence and Security, Initiatives, and
Contingents, 1870-1899.
The retrenchment of the imperial troops garrisoned in the
Australian colonies in 1870 sparked a greater undertaking of
defence activities by the colonial governments, particularly
those of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and South
Australia. These initiatives, although not especially new or
revolutionary in the scheme of defence undertakings within the
colonies, were driven in part by the colonial governments who
now became responsible, in a substantial respect, for their
own self defence. Although as mentioned in the previous
chapter, the Royal Navy was the first line of defence for
England and its colonies, the responsibility of local defence
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now fell to the colonies themselves as part of the new
imperial defence policy founded from the Mills Committee in
the mid-1860’s.
In response the colonies requested Sir William Drummond
Jervois, of the Royal Engineers, to be dispatched to the
colonies, along with Lieutenant Colonel Peter Scratchley, as
his assistant. Jervois and Scratchley were to survey the
defences of the colonies and report back with recommendations
as to how the colonies could improve their capabilities, and
fall in with the policy of imperial defence, and therefore the
Royal Navy. The report which was submitted followed a similar
vein to the ideas of John Colomb, minus the naval strategies,
which advocated a brick and mortar approach to defence. This
theory, from the perspective of land defence, revolved around
the construction of fortifications around major ports and
harbours of the colonies, backed by mobile land forces
designed to counter any landing of enemy troop formations.
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The war scare of 1878 found the colonial government’s
view of the static fortifications to be very negative,
especially since they were very expensive to build and
maintain. The strategy was also based upon the fact that the
Royal Navy was the first line of defence, and the
fortifications a secondary line. However, with the rumours of
Germany becoming a new colonial power within the Pacific, thus
threatening Australia’s interests, the sudden impotence and
inaction of the Royal Navy and British government in combating
this threat to the interests of the colonies, made the
soundness of a strategy based upon the navy being the first
line of defence seem somewhat lacking. Therefore, it is in
this chapter we see the increased activity of the colonies,
relative to the means at their disposal, building local forces
for defence on a colony-by-colony wide basis, as well as the
colonies pushing to garner a greater response from the British
government in regards to an increase in attention from the
Royal Navy within the Australasian region.
The Sudan crisis, and the response from the Australian
colonies, provides answers and insight into the amount of
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development which had taken place within the colonies,
primarily New South Wales, and also brings about the first
serious case of Australians taking to arms in the defence of
the empire. Although the contingent sent to Sudan did not see
any serious combat, being delegated labour and building
duties, the major point to be made from the colonial response
is in the fact that the colonies had grown to a state in which
they believed they must do their part in defence of the
empire, a phenomenon forecast decades earlier and brought
forward in Eldridge’s work.
The work of Major General Bevan Edwards and his reports on
Australian defences in the latter 1880’s is a major focus in
regards to Australian colonial defence policy, in which he
promoted a number of recommendations urging the colonies to
Federate their military forces in the interests of common
defence. The reports of Edwards led to discussions within the
Colonial Defence Committee, and the Inter-Colonial Military
Committee, which in the mid 1890’s had made amendments to
their militia and defence acts to allow forces from the
colonies to serve in any part of Australia in time of war, and
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to work towards the uniformity of defence forces, as well as
the suggestion that a large area be created for defence
activities. The other important factor which came from all of
this, is the informal recognition of a need for a united
colonial front, which could solidify and create a stronger
representative force for the interests of the colonies, which
had spread beyond the continent itself, and extended into the
regions of New Zealand, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, New
Guinea, portions of Borneo, Java, Fiji, and the Solomon
Islands.73
In 1870 the last of the British imperial troops garrisoned
in the colonies of Australia were withdrawn back to England or
placed in areas around the empire which were in need of
reinforcement. With this withdrawal, the Gladstone government
believed that the Australian colonial governments should be
able to take up the duties of their own land defence needs,
and at their own cost. Prime Minister Gladstone himself
remarked that “we have to bring about a different state of
things. The best way to do it is to raise their (the colonies)
73 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 111.
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political position to the very highest point we can bring it,
in order that with the elevated position their sense of
responsibility may likewise grow.”74 Cardwell also confirmed
that it was British policy to create “great and powerful
communities overseas, capable of defending themselves and
standing on their own feet.”75
The British perspective on the withdrawal from the
colonies was not about fleeing from the burdens of empire and
to simply reduce costs, but based in an idea from Britain’s
early imperial history and on a new ideological concept. From
past experiences, in regards to the mistakes made concerning
the United States and the Revolutionary War, it was now
believed that as colonies grow they cannot be ruled by the
sword, but must be ruled by their affections toward the Mother
Country. In the case of the Australian colonies, their
affections would be based on cultural and racial similarities,
and the necessity of defence. The Duke of Newcastle remarked
that bonds of “mutual affection and interest”76 would be so
74 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 37.75 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 37.76 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 43
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strong that in time of crisis the colonies would be “ready to
fight with us and for us to a man”.77
In the 1860’s the colonies struggled to maintain any form
of localised militia or volunteer forces for internal defence
purposes, but in the first few years of the 1870’s a void had
been created with the retrenchment of the imperial troops
which needed to be filled, and the responsibility of this
rested in the hands of the colonial governments. The initial
attempts at forming local defence forces of any size compared
to those created years earlier was done on a piecemeal basis,
for the major issue with creating a local defence
establishment was the fact the colonies acted on an
independent basis from one another.78 This led to the colonies
having differing arms and equipment, as well as varying levels
of training. Another issue during these years was the fact the
each colony’s military units were not allowed thoroughfare
into other colonial territory.79 It is for these reasons that
reference is made to each colony on an individual basis when
77 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 43.78 Nicholls, Colonial Volunteers, 58.79 Oppenheim, The Fragile Forts, 94.
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discussing troop formations and units, rather than under a
singular unifying title as is the case in the post-Federation
years.
By the latter half of the 1870’s, the colonies had made
some attempts to increase their defence capabilities, however,
their efforts still remained inadequate in contrast to the
size of the continent, and the relative professionalism of
those troops being trained in Europe, and even the United
States. Australian colonial defence forces were undertrained,
under-strength, and under-equipped with antiquated materiel
for war, and in some cases the guns being used by colonial
units were muzzle-loading cannons, throwbacks from the
Napoleonic wars in the early 1800’s, where modern armies were
using breech-loading and rifled field guns.80
The defences of the colonies themselves were almost non-
existent, generally undermanned and under-trained, with
minimal chance, if any, of successfully repelling or holding
up an attack or invasion. These problems did not go unnoticed80Oppenheim, The Fragile Forts, xiv
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by the colonial governments and in response, the Premier of
New South Wales and the other colonies appealed to the British
government and requested the services of Sir William Drummond
Jervois, of the Royal Engineers, to inspect and provide sound
professional advice and recommendations on the state of their
defences, and ways in which to improve their effectiveness,
relative to that of the imperial defence strategy employed at
the time.81 There seems to be some dispute among the sources as
to which Premier of NSW was responsible for this important
part of colonial defence policy, from what has been researched
and found Jeffrey Grey places the request in the hands of John
Robertson,82 whereas Bob Nicholls credits Sir Henry Parkes with
the appeal to England.83 All that can be discerned from this is
the sheer fact that the request took place, and the results
were that London approved the request and dispatched Jervois
to the colonies.
By August 1877 Jervois had arrived in Australia with
Scratchley. The reports and surveys which were to follow in
81 Barclay, The Empire is Marching, 10.82 Grey, Military History of Australia, 41.83 Nicholls, The Colonial Volunteers, 72.
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the months after their arrival would play a major part in
Australia’s colonial defence policy until federation, even
though as will be discussed later, Jervois’ initial strategies
would fall out of favour from the colonial governments. To
formulate their reports, and ascertain any advice and
recommendations Jervois and Scratchley first set upon the task
of a systematic survey of all the colonies, which was also the
first time surveys of this scale had been undertaken and
achieved by a single team of surveyors.84
Upon the completion of the surveys Jervois and Scratchley
presented their report to the colonies, which had a basis in
the idea of brick and mortar defence. The idea of brick and
mortar defence is based on the principles of fortifications
and defence networks, being supported by mobile land forces
designed to be reactionary forces made up of infantry,
cavalry, and horse-artillery which could mount swift counter-
offensives against any enemy troop formations which made
landings in an attempt to outflank and or storm the
84 Luke Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21.
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fortifications, which in the case of the Australian colonies,
were built around the major harbours and ports.85 This strategy
of defence found its basis in the principles developed by
Colomb, as discussed in the second chapter, and in fact can
logically be seen to be an expansion upon his concepts for it
revolves around the fact that the fortifications, and
formations of troops and mounted artillery were intended to
drive off, or hold, an enemy attack which had been able to
deploy ground forces, and await reinforcements in the form of
ships from the Royal Navy, and British troops garrisoned in
India.
However, the most important factor of the Jervois -
Scratchley strategy was the role of the Royal Navy in taking
its usual position as the first line of defence, or rather the
shield of the empire. An interesting point was brought up by
Glen Barclay in the fact that at the time Jervois and
Scratchley were presenting their findings to the colony of
Queensland, London had sent, what Barclay describes as
demoralising, a cable which expressed a warning that the Royal
85 Grey, Military History of Australia, 41.
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Navy “could not be expected to guarantee all parts of the
empire against attack at the same time”.86 This therefore
coincides with the idea put forward by Nicholls, that behind
the so-called shield of the Royal Navy, “the colonies were
going to have to stand on their own as far as defence of their
own territory was concerned”.87
After the Russian war scare of 1878, the Australian
colonial governments lost the enthusiasm they had shown
earlier to the recommendations of Jervois’ reports and advice
in regards to the establishment of a large scale fortification
heavy defence strategy. Jervois quickly appealed to the
British Colonial Secretary to step in and put the colonies
back in line with his strategies, and greater defence
activity.88 Sir Robert Meade, in response to Australia’s denial
of continuing on along the lines of Jervois’ recommendations,
stated that “millions of pounds have been sunk into
fortifications, which have turned out to be a great waste of
86 Barclay, The Empire is Marching, 10.87 Nicholls, The Colonial Volunteers, 88.88 G.L. MacAndie, The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy (Sydney: Government Printer, 1949), 18.
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money, tho’ highly applauded at the time”.89 The colonies,
however, still recognised that the primary case for their
defence rested with the Royal Navy, and in 1881 at the
Conference of the Premiers of the Colonial Governments,
concern was expressed over the relatively defenceless state of
British interests in the Pacific, and urging of strengthening
of naval power in Australian waters was paramount.90
Further advancement and maturity regarding Australian
colonial defence policy came in the form of the death of
General Gordon in the Sudan at the hands of the Mahdists. The
death of Gordon had resounded throughout the entire empire,
and reverberated as a call for imperial unity. In response,
the colony of New South Wales pledged a contingent of colonial
troops to aid in suppressing the crisis and to also avenge the
death of General Gordon. By the 3rd March, 1885 New South Wales
had recruited some seven hundred men, hundreds of horses, and
set sail for the Sudan from Sydney.91 The contingent was
created and sent on the orders of acting Premier and Attorney
89 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 78.90 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 78.91 Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism, 28.
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General of NSW, William Bede Dalley, who responded with a
statement that “New South Wales had not only astonished the
world, but astonished itself, both in the willingness to
dispatch the force and in the speed and effectiveness with
which had been organised and embarked”.92
Upon arrival, and throughout the few months it was
actually in Sudan, the contingent did not see much action
except for a few skirmishes. It was relegated to labour duties
and the construction of the Suakim railway, this however,
means little compared to the fact that the dispatch of the
contingent created a new precedent in colonial relations with
Britain.93 When this is coupled with the events which took
place as the colonial troops were returning home and relations
between England and Russia were beginning to deteriorate once
again in relation to India, were beginning to flare up once
more. The NSW government, and more specifically Dalley,
reinforced the actions of sending troops to the Sudan with a
statement noting that the intent of the contingent was, to
“assert the arms of England wherever our help was needed….92 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 90.93 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, 19.
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Wherever our contingent can be useful it should be available
to the mother country”.94
The assertion that the contingent was available for
general service in the name of the empire, created some
backlash back in Australia among the other colonial
governments and statesmen. The complaints put forward argued
the concept that the act had now brought Australia away from
being somewhat neutral in world affairs, to actually becoming
active, and going so far as to choose a side and abandoning
any chance of neutrality, should war manifest itself into a
reality.95 In the eyes of these colonists Australia had now
become a target, and an active member in the defence of the
British Empire.
The main issue regarding this, according to Gordon, was
not so much the fact that the colonies had now lost their
neutrality, but rather the fact that if the possibility of war
with Russia was so volatile, they would have preferred the
94 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 90.95 Grey, Military History of Australia, 41.
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contingent to be present back in New South Wales, and used in
defence of their own colony.96 However, when considering this
point, the fact remains that the creation and dispatching of a
colonial force to defend the interests of the empire, was a
most significant action to have taken place, and indeed
changed the future of Australian colonial defence policy, and
created a precedent for defence policy into the twentieth
century as seen with Australia’s decision to send an
Australian Imperial Force to war in 1914 and again in 1939.
Following the Sudan campaign, further developments
occurred within Australia at the behest of the Colonial
Defence Committee. The major initiative undertaken by this
committee regarding military matters came in 1887, at around
the same time the Australian Naval Agreement was being
discussed and negotiations between the colonies and England
were taking place, was the recognition that further inspection
of colonial defence forces and fortifications was again needed
to ensure development and new ideas to improve the efficiency
of colonial defence policy continued to evolve.97 It could also96 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 91.97 Nicholls, The Colonial Volunteers, 122.
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be practical to make the assumption that the application of
consistent inspections from British command personnel was
undertaken so that continued evolution and development of
colonial defence could follow closely and incorporate with
those of the greater imperial defence strategy.
Inspections were made with the arrival of Major General
Bevan Edwards. General Edwards had undertaken thorough surveys
and inspections of the defences of the colonies, and upon
their completion he had created a number of reports which were
presented to the various governments. Part of the reports were
concerned with the defence arrangements of the colonies, but
what is more important, is what was produced alongside these
reports. General Edwards had written a series of
recommendations in regard to new strategies which catered to
the idea of defending Australia as a whole, rather than the
standard colony-by-colony basis which had been produced in the
years previous under Jervois. The major feature of these
recommendations was the necessity of federating the defence
forces of the colonies into a single united entity, to which
Bevan stated, “The colonies have now been brought face to face
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with the fact, that an effective system of defence cannot be
established without federation”.98
General Edward’s recommendations also brought to attention
other deficiencies, as well as new developments which could
improve the effectiveness of the colonial defence situation.
The instituting of a colonial defence act should be the most
immediate actions of the colonial governments; this would then
bring all the defence forces under the umbrella of a single
unifying law, and promote the lessening of hindrances to
developments and movements of defence forces throughout the
entire continent and the multiple colonial territories.99
Edwards also pushed for the adoption of a federal military
college, a federal system of supplies and stores, the
manufacturing of arms, and the placement of an imperial
officer of the rank General to command the forces.100 The
completion of specific defence networks within Sydney and
Melbourne was also put forward to be completed, thus ensuring
98 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 109.99 Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism, 103.100 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 109.
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that if any attack came the two major cities would be
relatively well defended.101
The reactions of the colonial governments in regards to
General Edward’s initiatives were considerably mixed, the
urging for the completion of fortification works around Sydney
and Melbourne particularly, was of little interest to the
governments. This was due to a number of different theories on
the means in which the colonies should defend themselves. The
military advisers, starting with Jervois, Scratchley, and now
to Edwards, who had spent time in Australia and drawn up plans
and recommendations all followed similar plans of defence. In
contrast, advice received from the Colonial Office expressed
that the idea of establishing fortifications against hostile
attacks was unnecessary.102 This was due to the remoteness of
the colonies from any major enemy naval base, and because of
this, the chance of a massed attack on any of the colonies
remained severely remote. The only major threat to Australia
would most likely come in the form of attacks on trade routes,
101 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, 13.102 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 109.
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and communications lanes which in turn was the jurisdiction of
the Royal Navy.103
The colonies did however find favour with the
recommendation of moving toward a federal defence force, and
in 1894 the Colonial Defence Committee approved the
development of a general plan for Australian defence, which
was placed under the auspices of a committee made up of
military commandants and officers.104 By 1896 the Australian
defence plan was submitted to the colonial governments, and
then forwarded to the Inter-Colonial Military Committee to be
revised and drafted into an agreement. This plan was put on
hold for the time being, for political federation had come to
the forefront of political discussions. Whilst the ideas of a
greater political federation were moving along, the premiers
of the colonies made amendments to their current militia and
defence acts, allowing the freedom of movement between
colonies for military forces in time of war, and to move
103 Nicholls, The Colonial Volunteers, 79.104 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 110.
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toward a greater continuity within the organisation of defence
forces from colony to colony.105
In the wake of the retrenchment of the imperial troops
from Australia, the colonies did not stand idly by and simply
do nothing. Within the means available to them, the colonial
governments appealed for aid from the British government to
help with developing new plans which sat in close proximity
with British imperial defence policy and the Royal Navy. The
prime evidence for this is found from the arrival of Sir
William Jervois and Lieutenant Colonel Peter Scratchley at the
behest of the colonial governments, and further exemplified by
the fact that at the time, developments did occur in the
formation of defence force units, not of considerable large
size and manpower, and the increased activity in creating
fortifications to defend their own ports and harbours.
As developments took place in the home-front, the news
of the death of General Gordon in the Sudan aroused the ire
and spirit of imperial loyalty around the empire. In response105 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 110.
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to this affront toward British prestige, New South Wales, in a
short span of time managed to gather together a considerable
force which was pledged to go to the Sudan and avenge the
death of General Gordon. This was the first time in which a
colonial force was created and sent to fight for, and defend
the empire. This action would set a precedent for the future
of Australian defence forces, especially in the post-
federation era, common knowledge ascribes to us the
understanding that during the Boer War in South Africa, and
the Great War, Australia would send troops to fight for and
defend the empire. In relation to this, the arrival of Major
General Bevan Edwards and his recommendations of federal
defence would help to garner closer relations between the
colonies as they approached closer to complete federation, and
also set out some new concepts regarding the organisation of
the defence forces of the colonies.
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CONCLUSION
The years and the events leading up to the retrenchment of
imperial troops garrisoned within the colonies of Australia
shows that prior to their removal, the colonial governments
were heavily reliant upon the factor of deterrence created by
imperial troops and the Royal Navy, which negated the
necessity of having to seriously commit to the creation of
professionally trained, or large, formations of troops.
Relative to the policies of local governments, defence was not
very high on the priority list compared to other endeavours.
However, the reform policies instituted by Edward Cardwell in
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the latter 1860’s, attributed to the outbreak of empire-wide
internal crises, the growing threat of European rivalry from
Russia, Germany, and France, as well as the outbreak of the
Franco-Prussian War, forced the colonial governments to take
action, at a considerably higher level than they had once
done. These policies were in effect the catalyst for the
undertaking of defence initiatives and developments within the
colonies.
To fill the void created by the removal of garrisons, the
colonies were forced to look to their defences, and appealed
to the British government with a request for the services Sir
William Jervois, who was quickly dispatched to the colonies.
Upon his arrival, Jervois and his assistant Peter Scratchley
surveyed the colonies, and came back with recommendations and
advice as to the best way in which the colonies could defend
themselves. As we see from the chapter two and three, Jervois’
defence recommendations were based somewhat off the works of
John Colomb, who advocated the release of the Royal Naval
vessels from the burdens of providing for the defence of ports
and harbour, and to focus on the protection of sea lanes which
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carried the trade and communications between the colonies and
the Mother Country. The defence of local waterways would be
under the jurisdiction of localised vessels which were
provided with orders not to leave the area in which they were
designated, nor to enter open water. This can be seen in
Jervois’ defence plans, as they revolved around the idea of a
brick and mortar strategy. The concept of this strategy, which
was common throughout the colonies, was based around the
construction of fortresses and fortifications, and backed by
mobile response forces designed to counter landing of enemy
troop formations. However, all this would only come into play
if the shield of the empire, the Royal Navy, faltered in its
role as the first line of defence.
The further undertaking of greater integration into
imperial defence policy in regards to the Royal Navy, again
still based off the concepts developed by Colomb, the colonial
governments had signed what we now know as the Australian
Naval Agreement in 1887. The evidence, if stretched a little
and the facts of the increasing threat of Germany within the
realm of the Pacific and Australasia, which include the German
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annexation of New Guinea, and further ideas in regards to the
islands around New Guinea, as well as the failure of the Royal
Navy to effectively ensure the interests of the colonies (to
which they were subsidised financially), are taken into
account. The initiative of the Admiralty and the Colonial
Office in the creation of a Naval Agreement, which revolved
predominantly around the Australian colonies, can be seen as a
reactionary measure to the aforementioned failings and
weaknesses in ensuring the interests of the colonies, which
were of no means important to England. However, Australia’s
integration into a greater developing imperial defence
strategy was assured with the establishment of this agreement,
as well as a greater role to play in the future of imperial
policy defence policy within its immediate area. The other
importance of these occurrences is the fact that it lead to
the development of the concept that Australia’s defence lay
with the holding of the arc of islands, which includes Fiji,
New Guinea.
Further integration on a military level come in the form
of the New South Wales contingent which was volunteered for
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service in the Sudan in response to the crisis being faced
there and the death of General Gordon at the hands of the
Mahdists. Even though upon arrival, the contingent did not see
much in the way of combat, with the exception of a few minor
skirmishes, it is the fact that dispatch of the contingent
created a new precedent in colonial relations with Britain,
and the quote from Dalley, used within chapter two, that the
point of the contingent was to “assert the arms of England
wherever our help was needed…. Wherever our contingent can be
useful it should be available to the mother country”, which
only helped reinforced that in times of strife and upheaval
the empire still maintained a united front.
The arrival of Major General Bevan Edwards and his
recommendations for the necessity of federating the defence
forces of the colonies into a single united entity, which
after the colonies’ experiences in the Sudan, and now with
increased naval defence, Edwards stated that “The colonies
have now been brought face to face with the fact, that an
effective system of defence cannot be established without
federation”. The colonies did find favour with the
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recommendation of moving toward a federal defence force,
approved the development of a general plan for Australian
defence. This plan was put on hold for the time being for
political federation had come to the forefront of political
discussions. The premiers did however make amendments to their
current militia and defence acts allowing the freedom of
movement between colonies for military forces in time of war,
and to move toward a greater continuity within the
organisation of defence forces from colony to colony.
Therefore, from the initiation of the Cardwell reforms, to
the undertaking of the recommendations of the Jervois
Scratchley reports, right through to the signing of the
Australian Naval Agreement, and the further recommendations
toward closer defence ties between the colonies, established
by General Edwards. There is a clear line through these events
which link to a common outcome of Australia maturing as
colonies and eventually becoming a federal state with
interests unique to itself in relation to English interests,
but what is important is the fact that even though these
interests had importance to the colonies, they were able to
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set them aside in times of need and hardship within the
empire, and take up arms based on ideas of loyalty and duty to
the Mother Country and for the empire.
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