BACHELOR OF ARTS (HONOURS): RESEARCH THESIS

IN DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE

COLONIAL AUSTRALIAN SECURITY AND INTEGRATION

INTO IMPERIAL DEFENCE: 1856-1900.

Chad Alan Murphy B.A.

This thesis is submitted in the History Discipline of the School ofHumanities & Social Science in partial fulfilment of the Bachelor

Arts (Honours).

The University of Newcastle

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October 2012

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Statement of Originality

The thesis contains no material which has been accepted

for the award of any other degree or diploma in any

university or other tertiary institution and, to the best

of my knowledge and belief, contains no material

previously published or written by another person, except

where due reference has been made in the text. I give

consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the

School of Humanities and Social Science Thesis Library

being made available for loan and photocopying subject to

the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.

Signed:

_________________________________________________

Chad Alan Murphy 30 October,

2012

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Contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………………..4.

Chapter I: State of the Empire: Threats, Crises, Competition, & Reform - 1856 – 1900. ………………………………………………………………….....................11.

Chapter II: The First Line of Defence: Australian Colonies, the Royal Navy, and Foreign Imperialism - 1870-1900.

………………………………………………………………………………...27.

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Chapter III: Defend the Colonies, Defend the Empire:Colonial Defence and Security, Initiatives, and Contingents - 1870-1900.

…………………………………………………………………….................38.

Conclusion………………………………………………………………….53.

Bibliography………………………………………………………………..57.

Abstract

This thesis investigates the complications and

difficulties the colonies of Australia faced in securing the

defence of their interests under the umbrella of defence,

created by England and the Royal Navy from 1856 to 1900. The

initiatives undertaken by the colonial governments in relation

to the defence of their own borders from foreign aggression

are also covered. What is apparent throughout is the fact that

the defence policies of the colonies, although developed to

coincide with their own interests, were influenced greatly by

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the imperial defence policies of England. By the end of the

nineteenth century the security of the colonies and their

interests had integrated with imperial defence policy. This is

due to the Royal Navy maintaining its position as the linchpin

in the defence of entire empire, to which the defence units of

the Australian colonies would have to work with to secure

their own defence needs.

Introduction

With the decision of the British government to remove all

imperial troops from the colonies of Australia in 1870, the

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governments of the Australian colonies, in response, attempted

to expand local defence forces and improve coastal defences.

This course of action by England was a direct result of major

crises and increasing antagonism from continental Europe,

originating at the end of the Crimean War in 1856, which

threatened the stability and security of England and its

empire.1 These crises and threats forced the resources of the

Royal Navy and Imperial Army to become overstretched, and the

costs of policing the first truly global empire to

substantially increase beyond justification to the British

public. However, it is difficult to judge whether the

strategic goal of the British government was to integrate the

colonies into Imperial defence strategy, or whether it was

simply to reduce financial burdens and therefore become purely

a short term solution.

The new direction in defence policy by the British

government, under the Gladstone administration and championed

by Edward Cardwell, Secretary of State for War, to retrench

1 Neville Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-23 Volume 1: The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1976), 16.

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all imperial troops from those colonies with stable self-

government, forcing the colonies to begin taking

responsibility for their own defence. This also aided in

reducing some of the insurmountable costs carried by England’s

taxpayers regarding the defence England and the empire.2 With

this change in strategy, the Gladstone government tasked the

Royal Navy with maintaining its role as first line of defence

throughout the empire. The Royal Navy’s primary mission was

protecting the United Kingdom, followed by securing trade

routes and lines of communication, and lastly, defending the

colonies.

Whilst working under advice from British Naval and Army

Officers, notably Sir William Jervois, Major General Bevan

Edwards, and Rear-Admiral George Tryon, Colonial Australia’s

defence strategies from 1870 until Federation, would be

developed around the new Imperial defence policy of

integrating colonial defence with the Royal Navy. The colonies

embarked on a program of expanding their volunteer and militia

forces, even going so far as to establish a very small payed2 Eldridge, C.C. England’s Mission: The Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880 ( London: Macmillan, 1973), 56.

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colonial defence force. Alongside these developments, in 1877

the colonies following from William Jervois began a program of

constructing fortifications and gun emplacements in major

ports around the continent. However, this was undermined by

the fact that the efforts of the colonial governments were

undertaken on a colony-by-colony basis, and their simply was

no uniformity between any of the colonial defence units in any

shape or form.

The flaw in this strategy of defence, particularly the

disjointed independent efforts of the colonies, was noticed by

General Bevan Edwards who, in the first half of the 1890’s,

created and presented a major report of recommendations to be

considered and actioned by the colonial governments. These

included the need for a united defence sector based on

identical organisational structures and equipment, the

establishment of a common military academy for the training of

officers, inter-operability between colonial defence units,

and the freedom for military units from neighbouring colonies

to enter one another’s territory in matters of mutual defence.3

3 John Mordike, An Army for a Nation: A History of Australian Military Developments, 1880-1914 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), 12

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Edwards also recommended the creation of local facilities for

the manufacturing of war materiels to arm and supply defence

forces of the colonies. It is through Edwards’ assessment and

recommendations that a small push in the direction of

Federation, even if only thought of in terms of defence, had

occurred. However, the recommendations toward federation have

been under-stated in many contemporary academic works, perhaps

through the fact that England had advised the federation of

the colonies, for the purposes of defence, in the decades

previous to Edwards’ assessments.

Rear Admiral George Tryon, stationed as Commander of the

Australia Station in 1886, was concerned with the naval

defence of Australasia. Tryon had concluded the creation of

the Australian Naval Agreement in 1887, which instituted a

greater British commitment in the Australasian region than

previous years, and also allowed for the recognition of

official Colonial Auxiliary squadrons.4 However, this naval

defence strategy, although devised by the First Sea Lord,

Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key, was in fact derived from the4 Donald C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914 (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 87.

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work of John Colomb who was responsible for the conception of

Royal Navy strategy and the inter-operability of local defence

forces and fortifications, which inspired the advisory

recommendations and plans of Jervois, Edwards, and Key.

Within the issues between England and the powers of its

rival European Imperial states continually increasing, and in

response, the sudden diversion of naval resources back to

English waters. The Australian colonies understanding their

relative geographical isolation, willing financial

contributions toward defence of the empire, and the growing

threat to their security and interests, had come to the

realisation that they had differing defence needs, regarding

their interests, to those of the Mother Country. When brought

to the British government, and responded to with a lack of

solid assurances, these unique ideas were cemented in place.

For example, in the 1870’s, the idea of the arc of islands

(New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji, New Hebrides) being an

integral part of Australian defence and therefore of interest

to the colonies became apparent.5 The colonial political5 Roger C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist Era, 1820-1920 (Fitzroy: Melbourne University Press, 1980), 1.

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pressure placed upon England to annex Fiji into the empire in

1874 provides evidence for this.

In 1884, New Guinea became a major point of contention,

causing problems and damaging English prestige with the

Australians, following unheeded warnings from the colonies

regarding German intentions in relation to New Guinea. The

Queensland government attempted to annex the island on behalf

of the Empire before the Germans arrived, but was quickly

ordered to stand down due to the German threat being believed

to be unsubstantiated, according to British intelligence

reports. However, the following year Germany would annex the

northern portion of the island, and to their chagrin, as well

as Australian uproar, the British government was forced to

annex the southern half of the island into the empire.

In spite of this, the colonies remained loyal to the

Mother Country, rallying to its side and providing men and

materiels for war following news of the death of General

Gordon in the Sudan in 1885. The colony of New South Wales

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made history as being the first colony to send troops to fight

on behalf of the empire, outside of its own borders. This

action was not without its problems, for it placed the

colonies outside of their traditional position of neutrality.

However, what this does show is that the evidence put forward

by C.C. Eldridge, as noted earlier, came to fruition, and the

colonies had begun to integrate and define their future role

within the empire and its defence,6 as can be seen in post-

Federation years and the deployment of Australian troops

during the First World War in 1914 and again in the Second

World War from 1939.

Other previous academic works which have either focused

expressly on this area of history or simply referred to it in

order to explain a latter period of Australia’s history have

been touched upon, and or expanded. The use of four major

sources from four different scholars, namely; Neville Meaney,

John Mordike, Donald C. Gordon, Eldridge, and Paul Kennedy

have been of utmost importance in demonstrating the context

6 C.C. Eldridge, England’s Mission: The Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880. (London: Macmillan, 1973),

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for this thesis, and allowing it to find its niche as an

amalgamation and balance of the research previously

undertaken.

Neville Meaney’s research, an in depth study of Australian

defence and foreign policy covering the years 1901-23,

discusses the point that the security of the Australian

colonies was due to their geographical remoteness from any

major threat via an external enemy or Imperial power. European

expansion into the South Pacific and the Australasian region

introduces the concept of an Australian ‘Monroe Doctrine’,

which is of major importance in demonstrating a developing

Australian idea of security and interests external to its own

borders, and perhaps an early concept of the strategy of

forward defence, which became so prevalent in Australian

defence policy thereafter. The main theme throughout Meaney’s

work is to present the idea that the colonies had developed a

set of interests set apart from those of the British and the

rest of the empire, as well as defence needs which were unique

within the bounds of imperial defence policy.

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Mordike’s work, “An Army for a Nation”, focusses on the

establishment story of the Australian Defence Force from the

latter decades of the colonial period to the outbreak of the

First World War. It provides little into the influence or role

of the British government and its departments in regards to

the years being covered within this thesis, or the issues

facing the Empire which led to the opportunity for the British

to relinquish power and create the allowance of colonial

governments in taking over more localised facets of their own

defence. However, it is his description and research of

colonial defence units and developments within the colonies,

from a purely Australian perspective, which has aided in

developing an idea into colonial Australian defence and

interests, with minimal influence from England.

Paul Kennedy’s research presents key elements in regards

to the rise and fall of British naval mastery. It cites

economical and continental European threats as the deciding

factor of British policy and developments during the period in

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question for this thesis. Kennedy’s work concerns the wider

British Empire, with next to no mention of the Australian

colonies within this period; it seeks to explain much broader

pieces of history over a much grander scale of time. The

integration of economic issues, crises within the bounds of

the empire, as well military, naval, and political

developments within continental Europe, provides a chain of

effect which shaped new imperial policy and therefore

influenced colonial Australia.

Dominion Partnership and Imperial Defence by Donald C.

Gordon, an American historian, is a history of the direct

period in question and from an outsider’s perspective.

However, Gordon’s work is somewhat similar in its endeavour to

this thesis, in that it presents an overall account and focus

on both the Australian colonies and England, the relationship

between, and is the only manuscript in which there is any

prominent mention to Edward Cardwell and his reforms, which as

mentioned earlier in this introduction, were in fact the

catalyst for a great amount of change within the Australian

colonies.

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Discussions of British politics with respect to the

withdrawal of Imperial troops from colonies, was not a new

topic. C.C. Eldridge’s research in his book, England’s Mission,

states that British politicians believed the strength of the

bonds between England and its colonies would grow stronger, if

those stable colonies were to be given greater freedom and

influence over their own governance and defence. Therefore,

through the use of freedom and the right to self-governance,

the colonies would fight for and throughout the empire, for

love of the Mother Country.

CHAPTER ONE

State of the Empire:

Threats, Crises, Competition, and Reform, 1856 –

1900.

“The huge swathes of territory scattered all over the

globe, whose defence, so it seemed to late Victorians, was

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little short of a nightmare”,7 a passage by John Darwin,

eloquently describes the problem of defending such an

expansive empire. By the end of the Crimean War in 1856 to

1900, the primacy and prestige of England and its empire was

under threat from both internal and external sources. In the

context of this thesis, these threats to the stability and

security of England and its empire provide the catalyst for

major changes in policy, both politically and militarily (in

regards to both the Imperial Army and the Royal Navy), and

consequently the Australian colonies.

Leading with the Indian Mutiny in the late 1850’s, a

number of crises threatened major instability across the

entire empire, and at great financial cost, forced England to

intervene and suppress these issues. In the late 1850’s

through the 1860’s New Zealand and its European colonists were

struggling with the native Maori tribes, which eventually

broke out into war and did not fully calm down for a decade.

During the same period the islands of the West Indies were

struggling with differences arising between the freedmen and

7 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3.

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the European planters, and in South Africa the European

settlers were pushing further inland to acquire more farming

and grazing land, and coming into violent conflict with the

native tribes.

Externally, the power of continental European states

notably Russia, France, and Prussia (Germany) was on the

increase, following the relative peace of the Pax Britannica

within the first half of the nineteenth century, following the

defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte I in 1815. However, following the

Crimean War, ending in 1856, British relations with Russia had

remained very strained, and Russia continued to be the major

threat to the security of the empire, particularly in the

Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and India. Relations with

France returned to normalcy- one of suspicion and distrust,

and nearly bordering on war, even after both nations had been

allies against Russia during the Crimean War. An arms race

between England and France, as well as closer Franco-Russian

relations, heightened the threat of France and Russia,

especially when the two powers formed an entente to defend one

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another against hostility,8 which in turn led to a major piece

of British policy to be created, known as the two-power

standard.9

The military might of Prussia had always been of concern,

but following the Prussian victory over Austria, and its

thorough defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-

71, the organised and well trained Prussian military became a

major threat to British prominence and garnered greater

attention from British politicians and the public.10 The

unification of the fractured German states and Prussia in

1871, under Otto von Bismarck, and later Kaiser Wilhelm II,

placed the newly unified state as a serious threat to Britain

and its empire. After the German states unified, their

direction changed to that of becoming an imperial power and

claiming territory in Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and

Australasia therefore encroaching within the bounds of British

and Australian interests. It was, however, the efficiency,

8 Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture – 1857-1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 92.9 Meaney, The Search for Security, 27.10 Paul M. Kennedy The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: The Ashfield Press, 1992), 202.

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modern training, and the effectiveness of the Prussian/German

military that made such an initial impact on British policy

makers and forced them to evaluate their own defences against

such forces.11 The assessments reported unfavourable results,

the findings deeming the British military bordering on

antiquation in all aspects with respect to armaments and

organisation. This stark realisation of the military’s

inadequacies reinforced fears of invasion from across the

Channel. This relative ineffectiveness expedited major reforms

by the Gladstone administration during the late 1860’s and

early 1874, championed and developed by Edward Cardwell, in

which the decision was made to institute empire wide reforms.

In 1861, at the behest of the House of Commons, Arthur

Mills was ordered to form a committee “to inquire and report

whether any and what alterations may be advantageously adopted

in regard to the defence of the British dependencies, and the

proportions of cost of such defence as now defrayed from the

imperial and colonial funds respectively”.12 In 1862, following

11 Meaney, The Search for Security, 27.12 Robert Livingston Schuyler. “The Recall of the Legions: A Phase of the Decentralization of the BritishEmpire”, The American Historical Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1920), pp. 32.

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the committee’s reports, the House of Commons adopted the

resolution that those colonies enjoying the freedom and right

of self-government should be responsible for their own

internal security, and also aid in their own external defence.

For the Australian colonies, the reforms included the

removal and retrenchment of all Imperial troops garrisoning

those colonies which have reliable and stable self-government

to reduce the costs associated with defending a global empire,

but to also force the colonies to increase their own

activities in regards to defence. Research by Eldridge also

suggests that the concept to remove troops from self-governing

colonies, and the instigation to the creation of larger

colonial defence forces had been discussed at some length a

few years before the Cardwell reforms were initiated. These

discussions on colonial defence also developed ideas of future

integration of the colonies into imperial defence, and the

possibility of using colonial military forces alongside the

imperial army to defend the empire.

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The concept of the integration of the colonies, in

general, also resonated in the theories developed by John

Colomb. Colomb believed that “resources— whatever they may be—

are the common heritage and present common possession of the

whole British race. That they are available, can be developed,

and may be applied by a homogeneously constituted State.

Finally, that these resources are to be regarded practically

as factors of one great whole, the value of each factor being

relative to its use and adaptability in one common Imperial

plan of action in war.”13In reference to resources, Colomb was

thinking about men, materiels, food, and fuels such as coal.

All these resources must be available for defence, not only

for themselves, but for the empire as a whole. Colomb’s work

re-iterates that ideas of integration were prominent, and

necessary for defence of the empire.

The Australian colonies were recognised as a less likely

target of invasion or attack from the enemies of the empire,

13J. C. R. Colomb, The Naval and Military Resources of the Colonies (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, 1879), 2. *The primary resource by Colomb was discovered via a thorough search thorough the online database J-Store. The same can be said about all of the other primary documents used within the thesis.

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and native issues were not of any serious or notable threat to

the stability of the colonies.14 The driving force behind this

new policy, however, was the fact that by removing the

garrisons from those colonies established well enough to raise

their own defence units, the financial strains carried by the

British government and placed on its tax-payers would be, in

theory, alleviated.15 This was not the only reason for the

withdrawal, but also the initiation of reforms which hoped to

modernise the structure of the Imperial army and Royal Navy,

comparatively to that of a Prussian standard, and to also ease

the fears of possible invasion from across the channel.16

In the first few years of the 1860’s the colonies of

Australia had instituted, to a minimal extent, the creation of

local volunteer and militia units to aid in their defence

alongside the Imperial troops garrisoned around the continent.

The point of the garrisoned troops was to protect the colonies

from any external aggressors, whilst the local volunteers and

14 Meaney, The Search for Security, 15.15 Donald C. Gordon, “The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial Collaboration: 1885-1904”(Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 4, 1962), 526.16 John A. Moses & Christopher Pugsley, The German Empire & Britain’s Pacific Dominions, 1871-1919: Essays on the Role of Australia and New Zealand in the Age of Imperialism (Claremont: Regina Books, 2000), 157.

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militia were designated the duty of maintaining internal order

and security.17 Maintaining the volunteer and militia units

remained a difficult task across all six colonies, with the

main issue keeping the men enthused in their position, and

also attracting new enlistments sufficient enough to maintain

an effective strength. Incentive programs such as offering

land grants in return for five years’ service were offered by

the New South Wales and Queensland governments, and in South

Australia a payment scheme was introduced for part-time

soldiers.18

In 1863, a letter was dispatched from the Duke of

Newcastle, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the

Governors of each Australian colony. Within the letter was the

first mention of the idea of withdrawing the imperial troops

charged with garrisoning the colonies. The point was made,

however, that troops would only be removed from those colonies

which possessed responsible government.19 The demands of empire

over the coming years delayed the activation of this policy

17 Glen St. J. Barclay, The Empire is Marching: A Study of the Military Effort of the British Empire, 1800-1945 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), 9.18 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, 1.19 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 36.

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for some years, and until that time, the British government

offered to allot imperial troops to remain active as a

garrison within the Australian colonies under particular

considerations, that being a contribution subsidy of around

£54,000 per annum to the upkeep of the garrison from the

relative colonial governments.20 By the time of their

withdrawal, there were some five to six thousand troops

stationed in Australasia.21

While this was occurring within the Australian colonies,

other parts of the empire were facing a series of crises and

instability. These threats to British interests became a

priority within the scope of imperial internal security, and

needed to be quickly suppressed therefore assuaging internal

weaknesses of the empire to competitive imperial states. New

Zealand, Jamaica, and South Africa have been chosen to

demonstrate the size of the empire, and also the effect of

tyranny of distance in regards to policing so as to maintain

order within the regions of the empire which lacked the

stability of the Australian colonies. There is one common20 Gordon, The Dominion Partnership, 25.21 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 25.

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feature throughout these issues, and that is the interaction

and relations between Europeans and native populations, and

the means used by the British to disseminate these uprisings

and crises, which was based on the amount of force needed

relative to strength of the European populations and the

natives therein.22

In the case of New Zealand, the crisis arose over disputes

caused by differing customs relating to land ownership. To the

Maoris, ownership of land was based upon communal tenets, in

that the sale of land could only be made and approved by the

people as a whole, and not by an individual. European ideas of

ownership, in contrast, were based upon individual tendering.23

The conflict which broke out was sparked via a deal gone awry

between the British government, and a local Maori tribesman.

However, when the tribal elders became aware of this deal they

quickly interceded and held up the transaction for some time.

Eventually the British became impatient and moved in with

military units to take the land they had purchased. War was

22 Porter, The Lion’s Share, 50.23 John Bach, The Australia Station: A History of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific, 1821-1913 (Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1986), 189.

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declared between the British and the Maoris in 1860, and

lasted for three years.24 However, minor pockets of resistance

remained for almost a further decade. The remaining issues

within New Zealand, did not include British troops for the

government did not wished to get involved in the problems or

suffer the financial burdens with more conflict on behalf of

the colony and settlers which could be resolved with much

better local policy in regards to relations with the Maoris.25

The Jamaican crisis was based upon the fact that the

systems of hierarchy, between the planters and the workers,

were antiquated and from a period where the use of slave

labour was abundant. However, in the time period covered,

slavery had been outlawed within the empire and now the old

systems were crumbling. What caused the outbreak of violence

within Jamaica was the fact that the workers, now somewhat

free, were able to work the land and support themselves

without reliance on employment from planters. This self-

reliance, away from the plantations, impacted on the profits

24 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 18.25 George Odgers, Diggers: The Australian Army, Navy and Air Force in Eleven Wars – From 1860 to 5 June 1944 (Sydney: Lansdowne, 1994), 17.

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and productivity of the planters business, as well as lessened

the land in which plantations could be expanded. This was due

to the ex-workers of the plantations generally settling on the

unused land of the planters.26 When some planters took the

matter into their own hands and attempted to remove the new

settlers from their lands, rioting and violence broke out.

Outnumbered, the planters were forced to relinquish whatever

powers of governance they held in favour of intervention on

their behalf by the British government. The riots were

brutally quelled, and Jamaica was adopted as crown lands and

to be administered to by the British government.27

In New Zealand the strength in numbers of the European

settlers was sufficient to not only defend themselves

adequately, but to also improve relations with the Maoris

through better policy. The case of Jamaica is much different

in that the European planters were heavily and increasingly

out-numbered, compared to the redistributed West Africans.

Therefore, in order to protect the European settlers within

the Caribbean and their operations, the British were forced to26 Porter, The Lion’s Share, 54.27 Porter, The Lion’s Share, 54.

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use military and naval personnel to quell the violence, and

since the numbers and strength of the European population on

the island would never be strong enough to govern effectively,

the British were also forced to adopt the burden of governing

the island.28

South Africa on the other hand was in a situation

somewhere in between Jamaica and New Zealand. The European

colonists of the Cape were outnumbered and outmatched compared

to those of the native populations. But the British on further

analysis recognised that in a short span of time, the settler

population would be powerful enough to defend itself (which

became a stark reality with the outbreak of the Boer War in

late 1899).29 The other problem was also the fact that England

was not looking for another region of influence for which to

drain its already stretched resources, and therefore the

garrisons of the Cape colonies stuck to the ports and naval

bases on the coast, defending whatever was deemed as an

28 Porter, The Lion’s Share, 54.29 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 14.

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interest, thus ensuring commerce could make its way around the

Cape and access the Eastern markets without hindrance.30

However, the issues came with the lack of control England

had over the European settlers to the north, who continued to

push the bounds of their already considerable lands to

increase farming capabilities, and grazing larger herds of

cattle. But this brought them into contact with the native

African population, and therefore, inevitable conflict.

Britain managed to stay out of these issues between natives

and settlers through the sheer fact that there was little

incentive for it to become involved militarily, and the other

fact that British ownership of South Africa did not extend

that far north.31 This would all change in the 1870’s when the

discovery of gold and diamonds would herald a great rush to

subjugate the region under British suzerainty, before other

colonial competitors in the region attempted to claim it

first. But until that time, the Imperial units stayed within

30 Barclay, The Empire is Marching, 1.31 Ian Beckett and John Gooch, Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy, 1845-1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981), 9.

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the bounds necessary for the defence of the Simonstown naval

port.32

The increasing threat and influence of continental

European powers to the dominance of England and the security

of its empire was the primary concern for British policy

makers following the conclusion of the war with Russia in

1856. Russia during the late 1850’s to the end of the

nineteenth century remained a primary threat to England. The

issues between both nations were characterised by continuing

hostilities and faltering relations, and periods of war close

to breaking out. This was due, in part, to Russian expansion

and threat into two considerably major and important areas of

British interest, the Mediterranean and Asia, with particular

focus on India, known as the jewel of the empire.33

France, the old enemy of Britain, during this period had

come out of another revolution in 1870 and was now much more

politically stable, and began undertaking the initiation of a32 Denis Judd, Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874-1932 (London: Macmillan, 1968), 24.33 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 178.

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naval program. However, even though France would not rise to

become as serious a threat during this period as Russia or

Germany, the program caused enough of a stir in the United

Kingdom for it to have brought up some nagging issues of

deficiency regarding the state of the Royal Navy,34 and also

brought about greater discussion regarding the need for an

increase of troops on British soil, as well as the need to

redistribute the Royal Navy back to English waters and defend

against the threat from across the channel.35 Closer relations

between Russia and France were entering into dangerous

territory for England, and realistic fears of the two entering

into an entente placed greater urgency on the need for reform

and increased strain on the policy development within London

and for the defence of the empire.36

The rise of Prussia and the unification of the numerous

German states under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck,

brought to light the inadequacies in the strength of the

34 Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1964), 66.35 John Gooch, The Prospect of War: Studies in British Defence Policy, 1847-1942 (London: Frank Cass, 1981), 5.36 Streets, Martial Races, 92.

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Imperial Army. Prussians could raise a force of some 400,000

professional and combat ready soldiers, which far exceeded

that of England, in a number of days.37 Kennedy explains that

during the first days of the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussian

command managed to pass 1,183,000 men into the army in

eighteen days.38 The excellent training and efficiency of the

Prussian military would be shown to the world when war broke

out between France and Prussia in 1870. The war demonstrated

new and innovative forms of warfare involving greater use of

accurate and efficient use of artillery, the conscription and

training of civilians for larger unit formations, and most

importantly the introduction of rail systems to transport men

and materiels to the battlefront at a speed not seen before.39

The importance of noting the threat from Europe is due to

the fact that the policies and reforms instituted by the

Gladstone government. Under the guidance of Edward Cardwell,

then Secretary of State for War, the new reforms were designed

as a means by which Britain would be able to resist these

37Beckett and Gooch, Politicians and Defence, 33.38 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 190.39 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 190.

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threats and to also attempt to rectify the short comings of

the English military institutions and policies of the past and

bring them into the new era. Cardwell’s first policy, to

remove wherever possible, garrisoned imperial regiments from

across the empire were, as we will see, to play a crucial role

in Australian affairs. These reforms were based upon a similar

premise produced years earlier by the Duke of Newcastle, in

that garrisons would only be removed from those colonies

possessing reliable self-government, and of course, with

little threat from external sources.40

It is in regards to these criteria that the colonies of

Australia were the first to have their garrisons removed, and

with the retrenchment of said units, and as Gordon states in

his book, the removal was not followed by “cries of anguish

from the self-governing colonies”41, but there had been

questions raised as to the value of the subsidy system and

whether there would be assurances that imperial troops would

be available in times of war and peace.42 This was reinforced

40 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 56.41 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 27.42 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 28.

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by Victorian Premier, Sir James McCulloch, who announced to

the Legislative Assembly “that as long as the colony paid for

part of troop costs, it felt entitled to the services of the

class of troops which were of greatest use in local defence"43,

in the case of this statement McCulloch meant artillerymen,

rather than infantry. This request would fall on the deaf ears

of the imperial authorities who believed that such highly

trained forces were of no use to the greater imperial defence

effort if they were stationed in far off colonies where their

skills wouldn’t be utilised effectively. This thought process

was of course based off the absurd idea that a British

colony’s security from an international threat was in any way,

endangered. Cardwell himself backs this claim when he stated

that the true defence of the colonies rested under “the aegis

of the name England.”44

The removal of the garrisons in Australia then allowed

Cardwell to initiate the primary purpose of his policies, the

reforming of the British army, which was based around the

theory of decreasing expenditure and increasing its fighting43 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 28.44 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 33.

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strength. This objective was hidden from the colonies, and

reproduced as a policy which would strengthen the Mother

Country but also force the colonies to take responsibility for

their own defence.45 Other statesmen of the time have put

forward their own opinions on the matter, which followed along

the theory of a future Imperial federation where the colonies

would share in the duties of defending the empire, and have a

voice in directing imperial policy. This, however, turned out

to be pure idealism for neither Cardwell, or Gladstone, had

any future plans to implement such idealistic intentions.46

Prior to the removal of the imperial garrisons in 1870,

the Australian colonies (primarily New South Wales, Victoria,

Queensland, and South Australia) had engaged in the creation

of small volunteer and militia units to aid in maintaining

order within the colonies themselves, whilst the garrisons

defended them from external aggressors. These first steps

toward self-defence and the creation of a localised defence

force for the Australian colonies was based from an earlier

45. Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 38.46 Beckett and Gooch, Politicians and Defence, 33

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resolution passed by the British House of Commons, based on

recommendations found by the Mills Committee. The Committee

found that those colonies with rights to self-government, and

also under less pressure from native issues and hostilities

should take the “responsibility of providing for their own

internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own

external defence”.47

Throughout the 1860’s, England was faced with dealing with

multiple issues and threats, both within and outside the

empire, eventuating in problems of overstretched resources of

a military designation. Simply, neither the Royal Navy nor the

Army could be everywhere at once, and deal with every issue if

its strength was spread across the face of the globe. The

examples of New Zealand, Jamaica, and South Africa show that

these crises within the empire were complicated due to

variances in the nature of each issue, and had to be resolved

accordingly based upon their unique makeup.

47 Schuyler. “The Recall of the Legions”, 33.

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From outside the empire, threats came in the form of

France, Russia, and the rising of a unified Germany, to which

all powers had plans, and ideas of eventual colonial

expansion. An alliance being formed between Russia and France

also created policy issues, and debates in London. The mixing

of French naval programs, Russian ideas on expansion into Asia

also roused issues which needed to be confronted within the

political and military institutions of England. This affected

the Australian colonies in a profound way, for within England

the Gladstone government had decided that in order to tackle

these rising issues and threats to the integrity of the

empire, and the security of the Mother Country, major military

reforms and policies which involved the colonies had to be put

in place. This therefore led to the engagement of Edward

Cardwell’s policies, and the retrenchment of the imperial

troops garrisoned within the self-governing colonies of

Australia, and the forcing of these colonies to seek out their

own defence initiatives in throughout the following decades.

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CHAPTER TWO

The First Line of Defence:

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Australian Colonies, the Royal Navy, and Foreign Imperialism, 1870-1899.

The primary concepts adopted by the upper echelons of the

Imperial Army and the Royal Navy, were largely the creation of

John Colomb, an ex-officer of the Royal Marine Artillery.

Colomb wrote prolifically on the defence of the Empire from

around 1867, and continued on with consistent expansion and

revision of his own work throughout the 1870’s.48 His doctrines

promoted the idea that the defence of the empire should be

based upon the Royal Navy. Being a blue water fleet, the

navy’s charge should be the protection of lines of

communication, as well as supply and trade routes.49 He

believed that hindering and forcing the Royal Navy to protect

the harbours and ports of England and its other colonies

abroad which were unable to defend themselves, and also police

the rest of the world wherever the interests of the empire

lie, was an overly expensive and unmanageable task to be

48 Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: The Politics, Economics, and Ideology of Empire, 1880-1932 (Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd, 2000), 111.49J. C. R. Colomb, Imperial Federation: Naval and Military (Foreign and CommonwealthOffice Collection, 1886), 8.

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burdened with, especially when the new threats and crises were

considered. With this in mind Colomb came upon the idea of

employing smaller attack vessels within the ports and harbours

of England with explicit orders for them to stay within the

bounds of these waterways, and not to enter open water.50

One convert to Colomb’s new defence ideas and one with

particular relevance to Australia was Sir William Jervois.

Jervois stated to the Carnarvon Commission in 1879, “That

whilst the imperial navy undertakes the protection of the

mercantile marine generally, and of the highways of

communication between several parts of the empire, the

Australian colonies themselves provide, at their own cost, the

local forces, forts, batteries, and other appliances requisite

to the protection of their principal ports”.51 To Jervois, the

primary basis of the strategies for the defence of the Empire

and the colonies, revolved around the effectiveness of the

Royal Navy in protecting the approaches to the colonies, and

the role of local naval forces to not only protect their own

50 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 59.51 MacAndie, The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, 18.

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ports and harbours, but also intersect with the task of the

Royal Navy.

According to G.L. MacAndie, Secretary of the Australian

Naval Board 1914-1946, prior to the amalgamation of colonial

vessels under the banner of a federated Australia and

Commonwealth government in 1901, the distribution of vessels

among the colonies were distributed as follows: New South

Wales, maintained two second-class torpedo boats. Victoria was

reckoned to have an ironclad monitor vessel which had been

modified for harbour defence, one first-class torpedo boat,

and three second-class torpedo boats under its command.

Queensland had two gun vessels and a second-class torpedo boat

at its disposal. Lastly, South Australia was endowed with a

cruiser, and a second-class torpedo boat.52 Therefore, the

colonies were undertaking initiatives to work within the

schemes of a greater Imperial defence strategy, and along the

guidelines detailed by Colomb’s concepts with the purchase of

small armed vessels for the defence of local ports and

harbours of importance.

52 MacAndie, Royal Australian Navy, 23.

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Naval defence, outside of local ports and harbours, was

met by the colonies paying financial subsidies to England for

the maintenance and upkeep of the vessels of the Royal Navy

stationed at the Australia station and designated for defence

of the colonies. This scheme of subsidy payments was inspired

by the proposal of Arthur Mills, in which he stated “that

colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to

undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own

internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own

external defence”,53 and instituted with the Colonial Naval

Defence Act of 1865. However, after the war scare with Russia

in 1878, the colonies became aware of the deficiencies of the

Royal Navy and its ability to successfully defend the

colonies, this led to the colonial governments to press upon

the British government the need for an increased presence of

Royal Navy in the Pacific, and in particular, Australian

waters.

53 Schuyler. “The Recall of the Legions”, 33

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The issue of encroachment into the Pacific by other

European powers became apparent to the colonial governments,

and with it, greater activity and threats in regards to

competition, and also towards the interests of the colonies

and England, there came calls for increased imperial expansion

within the Pacific and more importantly the arc of islands

around Australia.54 This press for greater expansionist ideas

within Australia’s areas of interest has garnered the title of

an Australian “Monroe Doctrine”, popularised by Neville

Meaney.55 However, this concept must be understood within the

context relative to the Australian colonies, in that the drive

for annexation of new islands in the Pacific and Australasian

region was not for Australian gain, but rather, for the

benefit of the Empire.

Fiji would become the first point of interest when it came

to the naval side of Australia’s interests. The colonies of

Australia were very vocal in their calls for the Fijian

islands to be annexed for the empire. However, until the

54 Donald C. Gordon, “Beginnings of an Australasian Pacific Policy” (Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 1, 1945), 84.55 Meaney, The Search for Security, 16.

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ousting of the conservative Gladstone administration and the

entry of the Disraeli government, enthusiasm was almost non-

existent within the preceding administration when it came to

further expansion of the empire. Prompted by the motivation

that if Britain did not annex the islands, which would serve

to be an important base for securing the long route from

Australia to North America (Canada), and described by Robert

Herbert “that Germany or Belgium may take the opportunity and

be urged to annex the islands”,56 Lord Carnarvon approved the

annexation of Fiji, and in 1874 the islands were added to the

empire and Queen Victoria became the sovereign of another

colony.57

Australian fears regarding the strength of the Royal Navy

in the Pacific, or rather lack thereof, resulted in

expressions of concern of the relatively defenceless state in

which the interests of the British within the Pacific at a

conference of the premiers of colonial governments in 1881.58

This was increasingly heightened when rumours of German

56 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 39.57 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 156.58 Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific, 49.

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interests toward New Guinea were mixed in with the movements

and designs of the French toward the islands of New Caledonia

and the New Hebrides. With all this activity within the realm

of interests of the Australian colonies, an appeal was sent to

the British government in 1883 outlining the plans of the

colony of Queensland to annex New Guinea to be approved.59

However, British intelligence found the rumours of German

intentions to annex the New Guinea to be unfounded. Soon after

to the surprise of the British, and the chagrin of the

Australian colonies, the northern portion of New Guinea was

annexed and set up as a protectorate by Germany.60

In response, the hand of Britain was forced and the south

eastern portion of New Guinea was annexed. An Australian

brochure published in 1883, as a response to defend

Queensland’s attempt to annex New Guinea in lieu of the

British unenthusiastic understanding of the colonies

interests, brings attention to the fact that Queensland

59 Peter Overlack, “Bless the Queen and Curse the Colonial Office’: Australasian Reaction to German Consolidation in the Pacific, 1871-99”, The Journal of Pacific History, Vol 33,No. 2 (1998), 138. 60 Merze Tate, “The Australasian Monroe Doctrine” (Political Science Quarterly, Vol.76, No. 2, 1961), 271.

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believed that in the event of inaction by the Royal Navy and

British government, the colony had the right to defend its

interests. In light of this, the annexation was indeed an

attempt of self-defence, and also act which garnered a greater

response of urgency when Germany moved into New Guinea.61

The damage caused by British inaction on behalf of the

interests of the colonies had already been done when Germany

became a new neighbour to Australia’s near north. This

inaction by Britain also caused the creation of the Federal

Council of Australia, which included all the colonies, with

exception to New South Wales. The feeling behind the council

was that if the colonies spoke with a united voice they would,

according to the Premier of Victoria Graham Berry, be “heard

in Downing Street, in regard to what we then called ‘our

foreign relations”.62 On a more positive note, the issue of

European infringement into the Pacific as well as waters

adjacent to Australia, reinforced the need for more naval

61An Australian, The Australian Crisis: or, Ought New Guinea and the Western Pacific Islands to be Annexed? (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, 1883), 6.

62 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 81.

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defence, and therefore instilled the fact that an increase in

subsidies would have to be made.63

This inadequacy on behalf of the British to safeguard the

interests of the colonies was responded to by the First Sea

Lord, Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key. Outraged by the apparent

lack of strength of the Royal Navy, and the increasing tension

with France in regards to Egypt, and Russian activity in the

north of India,64 Admiral Key recognised that the Australian

colonies were looking for a means to improve their actions and

activities in which they might find a way to increase, or

supplement, their defence with the Royal Navy.

Key had plans to introduce greater cooperation between the

Royal Navy and the colonial forces of Australia, and based

upon this concept he suggested a number of ideas which were

both new, and also took reference from the report developed by

the Imperial Royal Commission on the defences and trade of the

63 Tom Frame, No Pleasure Cruise: The Story of the Royal Australian Navy (Crow’s Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2004), 62.64 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 81.

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colonies of 1882, also known as the Carnarvon Commission.65 The

first concept would be in regard to the number and type of

vessel should be considered by the local government, and this

should be achieved in close consultation with the Admiral of

the Australia station. Secondly, the Admiralty would take

responsibility for the construction and maintenance of the

vessels chosen, as well as supply the officers and themselves,

which would be all held at the cost of colony. Thirdly, the

vessels, although under the command of the commander of the

Australia station, would not be permitted to leave the port or

harbour in which they have been commissioned to defend.66

The memorandum prepared by Admiral Key did not come into

fruition until the outbreak of the Sudan crisis. The campaign

to quell this uprising was well underway in 1885 when Lord

Derby of the Colonial Office circulated letters to the

governors of the various colonies, praising their activities

in regards to improving their naval defence capabilities.67 In

which case, he suggested that the time seemed right for the

65 Frame, No Pleasure Cruise, 58.66 MacAndie, Royal Australian Navy, 32.67 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 81.

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concepts of Admiral Key’s memorandum to be presented and

discussed. This would be achieved with the dispatching of

Rear-Admiral George Tryon, who was tasked with the duty of

commanding the Australia station, and presenting the

memorandum to the colonial governments to be discussed and

negotiated to a conclusive resolution.68

In 1886, Tryon was able to put pre-approved proposals from

the Admiralty, to a meeting of the Premiers of New South

Wales, Queensland, and Victoria. Tryon pushed vigorously to

get the negotiations to move along. This haste was due to the

fact that in due time the governments could acquire their own

ships, and that the people of the colonies would not long

accept from Britain that which in their opinion they could do

as well themselves. Sir Henry Loch, the Governor of Victoria,

in his communications with the Colonial Office remarked, in

regards to the fact that if the Royal Navy squadron in

Australia was not improved, the colonies would eventually gain

their own ships, and in so having he continued on, stating

that “there are men in these colonies who would not hesitate,

68 MacAndie, Royal Australian Navy, 35.

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under certain eventualities, to dispatch them to seize Samoa,

the New Hebrides, or any other place or island on which they

had set their desire”.69 This idea managed to find some

legitimacy when the issue of Queensland’s attempt to annex New

Guinea is considered.

The fears of possible Australian colonial aggression in

the future became unsubstantiated within the political realms

of the colonies, with the fact that after nearly three years

of negotiating and reviewing the memorandum conceived by

Admiral Key, pushed toward to a conclusion by Tryon had been

accepted. In 1887 at the end of the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee,

the Australian Naval Agreement was signed and with only

minimal issues, which revolved around the distribution of the

financial costs, associated with the agreement between the

colonies.

The final appraisal of this agreement heralds in what

would be informally known as the Australasian Auxiliary

squadron, with the final details which made up the agreement69 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 81.

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being based around, in essence, those principles designed by

Admiral Key. The main features being that the colonies would

have to contribute £126,000 per annum for the provision of the

vessels, the officers and crew, equipment, and maintenance of

the squadron.70 The other major features being that the

squadron would remain at full strength, even in times of war,

with some reserve ships set aside within the major ports, the

crew would remain up to date in regards to training, and

lastly, the squadron would not be allowed to operate outside

of the limits of the Australia stations jurisdiction without

the strict permission of the colonial governments.71

The introduction of the imperial defence concepts by John

Colomb mentioned previously, led to the discovery of a link

demonstrating that the developments and recommendations on the

defence of the provided by Jervois, were based upon the

principles of Colomb’s strategies, in that the Royal Navy

70 Arnold Forster & Hugh Oakeley, The Navy and the Colonies (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, 1895), 10. *The subsidy paid by the Australian colonies was severely inadequate to upkeep the men and materielskept within Australian waters. The British taxpayers were still responsiblefor covering the majority of the costs to defend the Australian colonies.

71 Bach, The Australia Station, 189.

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should not be hindered and bogged down with the defence of

ports and harbours. But rather, they should be an open water

defence mechanism designed to protect those interests which

are important to the empire as a whole, that being trade and

communication lines. The defence of ports and harbours,

according to his plans, should be relegated to local naval

forces based within the ports and harbours themselves, and

with orders never to enter open water. This compares well with

the fact that the recommendations of Jervois slot in nicely

with Colomb’s defence strategies, for Australia’s defence was

based on static fortifications, and localised vessels for

protecting of major ports and harbours, which then allowed for

the vessels of the Royal Navy to focus their forces upon the

trade and communication routes between the various regions of

the empire.

However the growing threat of other European powers, with

designs on colonisation and competing with British and

colonial Australian trade interests became a major issue,

which led to the expansion of the empire in the Pacific and

South East Asia. The annexation of Fiji was made to minimise

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the opportunities for other powers with interests in the

region, and to also ensure that the trade routes from

Australia to North America could be maintained.72 The matter of

the establishment of the German Protectorate of New Guinea,

making Germany a new neighbour in Australia’s near north,

caused many waves in relations between the colonial

governments and their faith in the strength of the Royal Navy

in Australasia, as well as the perception that colonial

interests were not as important to those of the British

interests. Most of this was caused by the inaction of British

authorities toward Australian reports that the Germans were

moving in and planning on colonising New Guinea, to which the

British government brushed off as unfounded rumours. Upon re-

evaluation and notification, after the Germans had already

annexed New Guinea, Britain quickly moved in and claimed the

south eastern portion of the island.

In regards to further integration and cooperation between

the colonies and the British government on the matter of

colonial defence, events moved into a new realm of activity72 Deryck M. Schreuder & Stuart Ward, Australia’s Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 236.

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and policy. This was initially sparked by the First Sea Lord,

Admiral Key, in response to the apparent lack of strength of

the Royal Navy based out of the Australia station. Admiral Key

had developed a number of new concepts, based somewhat on the

ideas of Colomb, which were to be put to the colonial

governments, and negotiated until they became policy and

ratified. This task was delegated to Rear-Admiral Tryon, who

was given command of the Australia Station. This new defence

policy was agreed to by the colonies, the only real hindrance

coming from the discussions how to divide up the subsidy which

was to be paid as part of the agreement, and in 1887, the new

policy was signed by all the colonial governments and became

known as the Australian Naval Agreement. This new policy would

herald a new age of cooperation and relations between the

Royal Navy and the Australian colonies, for not only did it

increase the amount of vessels allocated for defence of the

colonies, it also brought greater decision making powers as to

the deployment of the vessels, therefore increasing the role

of Australia within the greater imperial defence mechanism.

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CHAPTER THREE

Defend the Colonies, Defend the Empire:

Colonial Defence and Security, Initiatives, and

Contingents, 1870-1899.

The retrenchment of the imperial troops garrisoned in the

Australian colonies in 1870 sparked a greater undertaking of

defence activities by the colonial governments, particularly

those of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and South

Australia. These initiatives, although not especially new or

revolutionary in the scheme of defence undertakings within the

colonies, were driven in part by the colonial governments who

now became responsible, in a substantial respect, for their

own self defence. Although as mentioned in the previous

chapter, the Royal Navy was the first line of defence for

England and its colonies, the responsibility of local defence

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now fell to the colonies themselves as part of the new

imperial defence policy founded from the Mills Committee in

the mid-1860’s.

In response the colonies requested Sir William Drummond

Jervois, of the Royal Engineers, to be dispatched to the

colonies, along with Lieutenant Colonel Peter Scratchley, as

his assistant. Jervois and Scratchley were to survey the

defences of the colonies and report back with recommendations

as to how the colonies could improve their capabilities, and

fall in with the policy of imperial defence, and therefore the

Royal Navy. The report which was submitted followed a similar

vein to the ideas of John Colomb, minus the naval strategies,

which advocated a brick and mortar approach to defence. This

theory, from the perspective of land defence, revolved around

the construction of fortifications around major ports and

harbours of the colonies, backed by mobile land forces

designed to counter any landing of enemy troop formations.

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The war scare of 1878 found the colonial government’s

view of the static fortifications to be very negative,

especially since they were very expensive to build and

maintain. The strategy was also based upon the fact that the

Royal Navy was the first line of defence, and the

fortifications a secondary line. However, with the rumours of

Germany becoming a new colonial power within the Pacific, thus

threatening Australia’s interests, the sudden impotence and

inaction of the Royal Navy and British government in combating

this threat to the interests of the colonies, made the

soundness of a strategy based upon the navy being the first

line of defence seem somewhat lacking. Therefore, it is in

this chapter we see the increased activity of the colonies,

relative to the means at their disposal, building local forces

for defence on a colony-by-colony wide basis, as well as the

colonies pushing to garner a greater response from the British

government in regards to an increase in attention from the

Royal Navy within the Australasian region.

The Sudan crisis, and the response from the Australian

colonies, provides answers and insight into the amount of

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development which had taken place within the colonies,

primarily New South Wales, and also brings about the first

serious case of Australians taking to arms in the defence of

the empire. Although the contingent sent to Sudan did not see

any serious combat, being delegated labour and building

duties, the major point to be made from the colonial response

is in the fact that the colonies had grown to a state in which

they believed they must do their part in defence of the

empire, a phenomenon forecast decades earlier and brought

forward in Eldridge’s work.

The work of Major General Bevan Edwards and his reports on

Australian defences in the latter 1880’s is a major focus in

regards to Australian colonial defence policy, in which he

promoted a number of recommendations urging the colonies to

Federate their military forces in the interests of common

defence. The reports of Edwards led to discussions within the

Colonial Defence Committee, and the Inter-Colonial Military

Committee, which in the mid 1890’s had made amendments to

their militia and defence acts to allow forces from the

colonies to serve in any part of Australia in time of war, and

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to work towards the uniformity of defence forces, as well as

the suggestion that a large area be created for defence

activities. The other important factor which came from all of

this, is the informal recognition of a need for a united

colonial front, which could solidify and create a stronger

representative force for the interests of the colonies, which

had spread beyond the continent itself, and extended into the

regions of New Zealand, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, New

Guinea, portions of Borneo, Java, Fiji, and the Solomon

Islands.73

In 1870 the last of the British imperial troops garrisoned

in the colonies of Australia were withdrawn back to England or

placed in areas around the empire which were in need of

reinforcement. With this withdrawal, the Gladstone government

believed that the Australian colonial governments should be

able to take up the duties of their own land defence needs,

and at their own cost. Prime Minister Gladstone himself

remarked that “we have to bring about a different state of

things. The best way to do it is to raise their (the colonies)

73 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 111.

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political position to the very highest point we can bring it,

in order that with the elevated position their sense of

responsibility may likewise grow.”74 Cardwell also confirmed

that it was British policy to create “great and powerful

communities overseas, capable of defending themselves and

standing on their own feet.”75

The British perspective on the withdrawal from the

colonies was not about fleeing from the burdens of empire and

to simply reduce costs, but based in an idea from Britain’s

early imperial history and on a new ideological concept. From

past experiences, in regards to the mistakes made concerning

the United States and the Revolutionary War, it was now

believed that as colonies grow they cannot be ruled by the

sword, but must be ruled by their affections toward the Mother

Country. In the case of the Australian colonies, their

affections would be based on cultural and racial similarities,

and the necessity of defence. The Duke of Newcastle remarked

that bonds of “mutual affection and interest”76 would be so

74 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 37.75 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 37.76 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 43

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strong that in time of crisis the colonies would be “ready to

fight with us and for us to a man”.77

In the 1860’s the colonies struggled to maintain any form

of localised militia or volunteer forces for internal defence

purposes, but in the first few years of the 1870’s a void had

been created with the retrenchment of the imperial troops

which needed to be filled, and the responsibility of this

rested in the hands of the colonial governments. The initial

attempts at forming local defence forces of any size compared

to those created years earlier was done on a piecemeal basis,

for the major issue with creating a local defence

establishment was the fact the colonies acted on an

independent basis from one another.78 This led to the colonies

having differing arms and equipment, as well as varying levels

of training. Another issue during these years was the fact the

each colony’s military units were not allowed thoroughfare

into other colonial territory.79 It is for these reasons that

reference is made to each colony on an individual basis when

77 Eldridge, England’s Mission, 43.78 Nicholls, Colonial Volunteers, 58.79 Oppenheim, The Fragile Forts, 94.

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discussing troop formations and units, rather than under a

singular unifying title as is the case in the post-Federation

years.

By the latter half of the 1870’s, the colonies had made

some attempts to increase their defence capabilities, however,

their efforts still remained inadequate in contrast to the

size of the continent, and the relative professionalism of

those troops being trained in Europe, and even the United

States. Australian colonial defence forces were undertrained,

under-strength, and under-equipped with antiquated materiel

for war, and in some cases the guns being used by colonial

units were muzzle-loading cannons, throwbacks from the

Napoleonic wars in the early 1800’s, where modern armies were

using breech-loading and rifled field guns.80

The defences of the colonies themselves were almost non-

existent, generally undermanned and under-trained, with

minimal chance, if any, of successfully repelling or holding

up an attack or invasion. These problems did not go unnoticed80Oppenheim, The Fragile Forts, xiv

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by the colonial governments and in response, the Premier of

New South Wales and the other colonies appealed to the British

government and requested the services of Sir William Drummond

Jervois, of the Royal Engineers, to inspect and provide sound

professional advice and recommendations on the state of their

defences, and ways in which to improve their effectiveness,

relative to that of the imperial defence strategy employed at

the time.81 There seems to be some dispute among the sources as

to which Premier of NSW was responsible for this important

part of colonial defence policy, from what has been researched

and found Jeffrey Grey places the request in the hands of John

Robertson,82 whereas Bob Nicholls credits Sir Henry Parkes with

the appeal to England.83 All that can be discerned from this is

the sheer fact that the request took place, and the results

were that London approved the request and dispatched Jervois

to the colonies.

By August 1877 Jervois had arrived in Australia with

Scratchley. The reports and surveys which were to follow in

81 Barclay, The Empire is Marching, 10.82 Grey, Military History of Australia, 41.83 Nicholls, The Colonial Volunteers, 72.

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the months after their arrival would play a major part in

Australia’s colonial defence policy until federation, even

though as will be discussed later, Jervois’ initial strategies

would fall out of favour from the colonial governments. To

formulate their reports, and ascertain any advice and

recommendations Jervois and Scratchley first set upon the task

of a systematic survey of all the colonies, which was also the

first time surveys of this scale had been undertaken and

achieved by a single team of surveyors.84

Upon the completion of the surveys Jervois and Scratchley

presented their report to the colonies, which had a basis in

the idea of brick and mortar defence. The idea of brick and

mortar defence is based on the principles of fortifications

and defence networks, being supported by mobile land forces

designed to be reactionary forces made up of infantry,

cavalry, and horse-artillery which could mount swift counter-

offensives against any enemy troop formations which made

landings in an attempt to outflank and or storm the

84 Luke Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21.

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fortifications, which in the case of the Australian colonies,

were built around the major harbours and ports.85 This strategy

of defence found its basis in the principles developed by

Colomb, as discussed in the second chapter, and in fact can

logically be seen to be an expansion upon his concepts for it

revolves around the fact that the fortifications, and

formations of troops and mounted artillery were intended to

drive off, or hold, an enemy attack which had been able to

deploy ground forces, and await reinforcements in the form of

ships from the Royal Navy, and British troops garrisoned in

India.

However, the most important factor of the Jervois -

Scratchley strategy was the role of the Royal Navy in taking

its usual position as the first line of defence, or rather the

shield of the empire. An interesting point was brought up by

Glen Barclay in the fact that at the time Jervois and

Scratchley were presenting their findings to the colony of

Queensland, London had sent, what Barclay describes as

demoralising, a cable which expressed a warning that the Royal

85 Grey, Military History of Australia, 41.

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Navy “could not be expected to guarantee all parts of the

empire against attack at the same time”.86 This therefore

coincides with the idea put forward by Nicholls, that behind

the so-called shield of the Royal Navy, “the colonies were

going to have to stand on their own as far as defence of their

own territory was concerned”.87

After the Russian war scare of 1878, the Australian

colonial governments lost the enthusiasm they had shown

earlier to the recommendations of Jervois’ reports and advice

in regards to the establishment of a large scale fortification

heavy defence strategy. Jervois quickly appealed to the

British Colonial Secretary to step in and put the colonies

back in line with his strategies, and greater defence

activity.88 Sir Robert Meade, in response to Australia’s denial

of continuing on along the lines of Jervois’ recommendations,

stated that “millions of pounds have been sunk into

fortifications, which have turned out to be a great waste of

86 Barclay, The Empire is Marching, 10.87 Nicholls, The Colonial Volunteers, 88.88 G.L. MacAndie, The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy (Sydney: Government Printer, 1949), 18.

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money, tho’ highly applauded at the time”.89 The colonies,

however, still recognised that the primary case for their

defence rested with the Royal Navy, and in 1881 at the

Conference of the Premiers of the Colonial Governments,

concern was expressed over the relatively defenceless state of

British interests in the Pacific, and urging of strengthening

of naval power in Australian waters was paramount.90

Further advancement and maturity regarding Australian

colonial defence policy came in the form of the death of

General Gordon in the Sudan at the hands of the Mahdists. The

death of Gordon had resounded throughout the entire empire,

and reverberated as a call for imperial unity. In response,

the colony of New South Wales pledged a contingent of colonial

troops to aid in suppressing the crisis and to also avenge the

death of General Gordon. By the 3rd March, 1885 New South Wales

had recruited some seven hundred men, hundreds of horses, and

set sail for the Sudan from Sydney.91 The contingent was

created and sent on the orders of acting Premier and Attorney

89 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 78.90 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 78.91 Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism, 28.

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General of NSW, William Bede Dalley, who responded with a

statement that “New South Wales had not only astonished the

world, but astonished itself, both in the willingness to

dispatch the force and in the speed and effectiveness with

which had been organised and embarked”.92

Upon arrival, and throughout the few months it was

actually in Sudan, the contingent did not see much action

except for a few skirmishes. It was relegated to labour duties

and the construction of the Suakim railway, this however,

means little compared to the fact that the dispatch of the

contingent created a new precedent in colonial relations with

Britain.93 When this is coupled with the events which took

place as the colonial troops were returning home and relations

between England and Russia were beginning to deteriorate once

again in relation to India, were beginning to flare up once

more. The NSW government, and more specifically Dalley,

reinforced the actions of sending troops to the Sudan with a

statement noting that the intent of the contingent was, to

“assert the arms of England wherever our help was needed….92 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 90.93 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, 19.

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Wherever our contingent can be useful it should be available

to the mother country”.94

The assertion that the contingent was available for

general service in the name of the empire, created some

backlash back in Australia among the other colonial

governments and statesmen. The complaints put forward argued

the concept that the act had now brought Australia away from

being somewhat neutral in world affairs, to actually becoming

active, and going so far as to choose a side and abandoning

any chance of neutrality, should war manifest itself into a

reality.95 In the eyes of these colonists Australia had now

become a target, and an active member in the defence of the

British Empire.

The main issue regarding this, according to Gordon, was

not so much the fact that the colonies had now lost their

neutrality, but rather the fact that if the possibility of war

with Russia was so volatile, they would have preferred the

94 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 90.95 Grey, Military History of Australia, 41.

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contingent to be present back in New South Wales, and used in

defence of their own colony.96 However, when considering this

point, the fact remains that the creation and dispatching of a

colonial force to defend the interests of the empire, was a

most significant action to have taken place, and indeed

changed the future of Australian colonial defence policy, and

created a precedent for defence policy into the twentieth

century as seen with Australia’s decision to send an

Australian Imperial Force to war in 1914 and again in 1939.

Following the Sudan campaign, further developments

occurred within Australia at the behest of the Colonial

Defence Committee. The major initiative undertaken by this

committee regarding military matters came in 1887, at around

the same time the Australian Naval Agreement was being

discussed and negotiations between the colonies and England

were taking place, was the recognition that further inspection

of colonial defence forces and fortifications was again needed

to ensure development and new ideas to improve the efficiency

of colonial defence policy continued to evolve.97 It could also96 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 91.97 Nicholls, The Colonial Volunteers, 122.

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be practical to make the assumption that the application of

consistent inspections from British command personnel was

undertaken so that continued evolution and development of

colonial defence could follow closely and incorporate with

those of the greater imperial defence strategy.

Inspections were made with the arrival of Major General

Bevan Edwards. General Edwards had undertaken thorough surveys

and inspections of the defences of the colonies, and upon

their completion he had created a number of reports which were

presented to the various governments. Part of the reports were

concerned with the defence arrangements of the colonies, but

what is more important, is what was produced alongside these

reports. General Edwards had written a series of

recommendations in regard to new strategies which catered to

the idea of defending Australia as a whole, rather than the

standard colony-by-colony basis which had been produced in the

years previous under Jervois. The major feature of these

recommendations was the necessity of federating the defence

forces of the colonies into a single united entity, to which

Bevan stated, “The colonies have now been brought face to face

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with the fact, that an effective system of defence cannot be

established without federation”.98

General Edward’s recommendations also brought to attention

other deficiencies, as well as new developments which could

improve the effectiveness of the colonial defence situation.

The instituting of a colonial defence act should be the most

immediate actions of the colonial governments; this would then

bring all the defence forces under the umbrella of a single

unifying law, and promote the lessening of hindrances to

developments and movements of defence forces throughout the

entire continent and the multiple colonial territories.99

Edwards also pushed for the adoption of a federal military

college, a federal system of supplies and stores, the

manufacturing of arms, and the placement of an imperial

officer of the rank General to command the forces.100 The

completion of specific defence networks within Sydney and

Melbourne was also put forward to be completed, thus ensuring

98 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 109.99 Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism, 103.100 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 109.

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that if any attack came the two major cities would be

relatively well defended.101

The reactions of the colonial governments in regards to

General Edward’s initiatives were considerably mixed, the

urging for the completion of fortification works around Sydney

and Melbourne particularly, was of little interest to the

governments. This was due to a number of different theories on

the means in which the colonies should defend themselves. The

military advisers, starting with Jervois, Scratchley, and now

to Edwards, who had spent time in Australia and drawn up plans

and recommendations all followed similar plans of defence. In

contrast, advice received from the Colonial Office expressed

that the idea of establishing fortifications against hostile

attacks was unnecessary.102 This was due to the remoteness of

the colonies from any major enemy naval base, and because of

this, the chance of a massed attack on any of the colonies

remained severely remote. The only major threat to Australia

would most likely come in the form of attacks on trade routes,

101 Mordike, An Army for a Nation, 13.102 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 109.

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and communications lanes which in turn was the jurisdiction of

the Royal Navy.103

The colonies did however find favour with the

recommendation of moving toward a federal defence force, and

in 1894 the Colonial Defence Committee approved the

development of a general plan for Australian defence, which

was placed under the auspices of a committee made up of

military commandants and officers.104 By 1896 the Australian

defence plan was submitted to the colonial governments, and

then forwarded to the Inter-Colonial Military Committee to be

revised and drafted into an agreement. This plan was put on

hold for the time being, for political federation had come to

the forefront of political discussions. Whilst the ideas of a

greater political federation were moving along, the premiers

of the colonies made amendments to their current militia and

defence acts, allowing the freedom of movement between

colonies for military forces in time of war, and to move

103 Nicholls, The Colonial Volunteers, 79.104 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 110.

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toward a greater continuity within the organisation of defence

forces from colony to colony.105

In the wake of the retrenchment of the imperial troops

from Australia, the colonies did not stand idly by and simply

do nothing. Within the means available to them, the colonial

governments appealed for aid from the British government to

help with developing new plans which sat in close proximity

with British imperial defence policy and the Royal Navy. The

prime evidence for this is found from the arrival of Sir

William Jervois and Lieutenant Colonel Peter Scratchley at the

behest of the colonial governments, and further exemplified by

the fact that at the time, developments did occur in the

formation of defence force units, not of considerable large

size and manpower, and the increased activity in creating

fortifications to defend their own ports and harbours.

As developments took place in the home-front, the news

of the death of General Gordon in the Sudan aroused the ire

and spirit of imperial loyalty around the empire. In response105 Gordon, Dominion Partnership, 110.

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to this affront toward British prestige, New South Wales, in a

short span of time managed to gather together a considerable

force which was pledged to go to the Sudan and avenge the

death of General Gordon. This was the first time in which a

colonial force was created and sent to fight for, and defend

the empire. This action would set a precedent for the future

of Australian defence forces, especially in the post-

federation era, common knowledge ascribes to us the

understanding that during the Boer War in South Africa, and

the Great War, Australia would send troops to fight for and

defend the empire. In relation to this, the arrival of Major

General Bevan Edwards and his recommendations of federal

defence would help to garner closer relations between the

colonies as they approached closer to complete federation, and

also set out some new concepts regarding the organisation of

the defence forces of the colonies.

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CONCLUSION

The years and the events leading up to the retrenchment of

imperial troops garrisoned within the colonies of Australia

shows that prior to their removal, the colonial governments

were heavily reliant upon the factor of deterrence created by

imperial troops and the Royal Navy, which negated the

necessity of having to seriously commit to the creation of

professionally trained, or large, formations of troops.

Relative to the policies of local governments, defence was not

very high on the priority list compared to other endeavours.

However, the reform policies instituted by Edward Cardwell in

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the latter 1860’s, attributed to the outbreak of empire-wide

internal crises, the growing threat of European rivalry from

Russia, Germany, and France, as well as the outbreak of the

Franco-Prussian War, forced the colonial governments to take

action, at a considerably higher level than they had once

done. These policies were in effect the catalyst for the

undertaking of defence initiatives and developments within the

colonies.

To fill the void created by the removal of garrisons, the

colonies were forced to look to their defences, and appealed

to the British government with a request for the services Sir

William Jervois, who was quickly dispatched to the colonies.

Upon his arrival, Jervois and his assistant Peter Scratchley

surveyed the colonies, and came back with recommendations and

advice as to the best way in which the colonies could defend

themselves. As we see from the chapter two and three, Jervois’

defence recommendations were based somewhat off the works of

John Colomb, who advocated the release of the Royal Naval

vessels from the burdens of providing for the defence of ports

and harbour, and to focus on the protection of sea lanes which

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carried the trade and communications between the colonies and

the Mother Country. The defence of local waterways would be

under the jurisdiction of localised vessels which were

provided with orders not to leave the area in which they were

designated, nor to enter open water. This can be seen in

Jervois’ defence plans, as they revolved around the idea of a

brick and mortar strategy. The concept of this strategy, which

was common throughout the colonies, was based around the

construction of fortresses and fortifications, and backed by

mobile response forces designed to counter landing of enemy

troop formations. However, all this would only come into play

if the shield of the empire, the Royal Navy, faltered in its

role as the first line of defence.

The further undertaking of greater integration into

imperial defence policy in regards to the Royal Navy, again

still based off the concepts developed by Colomb, the colonial

governments had signed what we now know as the Australian

Naval Agreement in 1887. The evidence, if stretched a little

and the facts of the increasing threat of Germany within the

realm of the Pacific and Australasia, which include the German

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annexation of New Guinea, and further ideas in regards to the

islands around New Guinea, as well as the failure of the Royal

Navy to effectively ensure the interests of the colonies (to

which they were subsidised financially), are taken into

account. The initiative of the Admiralty and the Colonial

Office in the creation of a Naval Agreement, which revolved

predominantly around the Australian colonies, can be seen as a

reactionary measure to the aforementioned failings and

weaknesses in ensuring the interests of the colonies, which

were of no means important to England. However, Australia’s

integration into a greater developing imperial defence

strategy was assured with the establishment of this agreement,

as well as a greater role to play in the future of imperial

policy defence policy within its immediate area. The other

importance of these occurrences is the fact that it lead to

the development of the concept that Australia’s defence lay

with the holding of the arc of islands, which includes Fiji,

New Guinea.

Further integration on a military level come in the form

of the New South Wales contingent which was volunteered for

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service in the Sudan in response to the crisis being faced

there and the death of General Gordon at the hands of the

Mahdists. Even though upon arrival, the contingent did not see

much in the way of combat, with the exception of a few minor

skirmishes, it is the fact that dispatch of the contingent

created a new precedent in colonial relations with Britain,

and the quote from Dalley, used within chapter two, that the

point of the contingent was to “assert the arms of England

wherever our help was needed…. Wherever our contingent can be

useful it should be available to the mother country”, which

only helped reinforced that in times of strife and upheaval

the empire still maintained a united front.

The arrival of Major General Bevan Edwards and his

recommendations for the necessity of federating the defence

forces of the colonies into a single united entity, which

after the colonies’ experiences in the Sudan, and now with

increased naval defence, Edwards stated that “The colonies

have now been brought face to face with the fact, that an

effective system of defence cannot be established without

federation”. The colonies did find favour with the

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recommendation of moving toward a federal defence force,

approved the development of a general plan for Australian

defence. This plan was put on hold for the time being for

political federation had come to the forefront of political

discussions. The premiers did however make amendments to their

current militia and defence acts allowing the freedom of

movement between colonies for military forces in time of war,

and to move toward a greater continuity within the

organisation of defence forces from colony to colony.

Therefore, from the initiation of the Cardwell reforms, to

the undertaking of the recommendations of the Jervois

Scratchley reports, right through to the signing of the

Australian Naval Agreement, and the further recommendations

toward closer defence ties between the colonies, established

by General Edwards. There is a clear line through these events

which link to a common outcome of Australia maturing as

colonies and eventually becoming a federal state with

interests unique to itself in relation to English interests,

but what is important is the fact that even though these

interests had importance to the colonies, they were able to

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set them aside in times of need and hardship within the

empire, and take up arms based on ideas of loyalty and duty to

the Mother Country and for the empire.

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