Parliamentary oversight of the armed forces in Cambodia,Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand: Status and prospects

Hans Born

Introduction

In this article the current status of parliamentaryoversight of the armed forces will be discussed in fourselected South East Asian states: Cambodia, Indonesia,Philippines and Thailand. The objective of the article isassess the role of parliament in overviewing defencepolicies, budget control, defence procurement, approvalof deploying troops abroad, military personnel policydecisions. The chapter also addresses the generaloversight powers of parliament which also apply to thedefence sector as well as the strengths and weaknesses ofthe functioning of parliamentary defence committee.Following an analysis of these parliamentary oversightpowers, the article continues with some main observationsand comparisons about the role of parliament in the fourSoutheast Asian states with parliaments in the Euro-Atlantic area. The article concludes with recommendationsfor strengthening the role of parliament in defencepolicy in Southeast Asia.

Parliaments: workshop of democracy

As termed by Winston Churchill, parliament is theworkshop of democracy and it is within that workshop thatthe limits to, the powers necessary, and the control ofactivities of the state, including defence activities,are determined. While parliaments may range from theornamental to significant governing partners, they havesome common characteristics, which include three basicfunctions that they perform: representing the people,making (or shaping) laws, and exercising oversight.Parliaments articulate the wishes of the people bydrafting new laws and overseeing the proper execution ofthose policies by the government. In short: the

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parliament is the mediator between government and thepeople.

Though we take it for granted that modern government mustbe democratic in the sense of deriving its authoritydirectly or indirectly from the people, states differ inshaping legislative-executive relations. Furthermore,there are no universal standards or best practices forparliamentary oversight given that accepted practices,legal procedures and parliamentary structures in oneestablished democracy may be unthinkable in another.Although there is no single set of norms for civil-military relations, there is a general agreement thatdemocracies adhere to principles of democratic civil-military relations. Parliamentary oversight of thesecurity sector is a sine qua non condition for democracy.

The ultimate power of parliament is to send thegovernment home (no-confidence mechanism), to blockbudgets or stop or delay the legislation of new laws.1

Generally speaking, the no-confidence vote ischaracteristically for parliamentary political systemsonly, as in presidential systems, in most cases, thepresident is elected by the people directly and not byparliament. From these powers (and the credibility to usethis power) derives all other powers vis-à-vis thegovernment. In more specific terms, with regards to thedefence sector, we can identify the followingparliamentary defence oversight powers:

1. General powers: these include powers which are inprinciple applicable to all fields of government. In mostcountries these powers include: the right to initiate orto amend laws, to raise questions, to summon members ofthe executive and their staff to testify, to summonmembers of civil society, access to classifiedinformation, to right to carry out parliamentaryinquiries and the right to hold hearings.2. Budget control: the right to allocate and amenddefence budget funds – on the level of programmes,projects and separate line-items; the right to approve ordisapprove any supplementary defence budget proposals

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(during the fiscal year) and having access to allrelevant defence budget documents.3. Peace support operations: the right to dis/approveto send troops abroad, the mandate, the budget, risks ofmilitary personnel involved, rules of engagement,command/control, duration of the mission and the right tovisit troops on missions abroad.4. Defence procurement: involvement of the parliamentin the government’s decision concerning contracts,specifying needs for new equipment, selection ofmanufacturer and assessing offers for compensation andoff-set.5. Security policy and planning documents: the right toamend or to dis/approve the security policy concept,defence concept, crisis management concept, forcestructure/planning and the military strategy.6. Military personnel policy: involvement of parliamentin the formulation of military personnel policy as wellas the approval of appointment and retention of seniormilitary and civilian personnel. Together, these control instruments cover the mostimportant aspects of any military, which is planning,operations, money, people, equipment and policy.

Before turning to assessing the role of parliaments inthese six areas of parliamentary oversight, the contextof the democratic control of armed forces in SoutheastAsia will be discussed.

Context: democratic governance of the security sector inSoutheast Asia

The role of political institutions like parliaments isshaped by history. The performance of parliament, customsand procedure that guide practice, the functioning ofparliamentarians as well as the expectations of othersabout what a parliamentarian should do, have all theirroots in the past. In general, the longer arepresentative institutions of a country, the greater thechance that democracy as a form of government has takenroot in society.2 Parliamentary democracy is a ratheryoung phenomenon in Southeast Asia and all states but

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Thailand have experienced long period of colonialism,during which parliament played only a very marginal role,if at all.

Table 1: Characteristics of Political Systems in FourSelected South East Asian States 1 2 3 4 5

Political System

Return to democracy

Constitutional provision on command authority

Declaration of War

Cambodia Parliamentary constitutional monarchy

1991 none Parliament (Art. 90 Const.)

Indonesia Presidential republic

1999 President (Art. 10 Const.)

President with consent of parliament (Art.11 Const.)

Philippines

Presidential republic

1986 President (Art. 7 sec.18 Const.)

Parliament (Art.6 sec. 23 Const.)

Thailand Parliamentary constitutional monarchy

1994 King (Art.10 Const.) Parliament (Art.193 Const.)

After decades of civil war and brutal Rouge dictatorship,under which 1.7 out 7 million Cambodians died of disease,overwork, starvation or execution, Cambodia became aparliamentary constitutional monarchy and had its firstfree parliamentary elections in 1993. The king has noreal powers, though he appoints two members of the Senateand he has a significant influence as symbol of unity.The government, led by the prime minister and ministers,needs to be approved by a two-third vote of confidence bythe National Assembly, which counts 123 seats. Itsmembers are elected by popular vote for a 5 year term.The Senate has 61 members, two members are appointed bythe King, two are elected by the National Assembly andthe others are chosen by functional constituencies for aterm of 7 years. In general, the National Assemblyconducts increasingly policy debates, but has only verylimited powers to scrutinize government policy andactivities. Concerning defence policy, the CambodianConstitution lacks any provision on democratic controland accountability of the armed forces (see Table One).

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This can only lead to confusion about the separation ofpowers between the King, government and parliament.3 Theparliamentary defence committee plays normally animportant role in overseeing the armed forces as itallows parliamentarians to specialize in defenceoversight while being endowed with a budget, staff andother resources. The defence committee of the Cambodianparliament, however, meets less than once per month,which is probably too infrequent to exercise regularoversight of the armed forces (see Table Two). It is hasno special committee budget and it has the lowest numberof staff among the four Southeast Asian states. Itsmeetings are secret which might be necessary on someoccasions. However, to meet in camera as a matter of arule, leaves the general public and journalist with theproblem that they have no information about the debates,possible votes and opinions of the committee members.This is a formidable blockade for holding themaccountable for their decisions.

After decades of dictatorship and ‘guideddemocracy’, the world third largest democracy Indonesiaheld its first free parliamentary elections in 1999.These first years were difficult as the young democracywas plagued by financial crisis, insurgency in Aceh,sectarian violence in the Moluccas, Sulawesi andKalimantan as well as wide-spread corruption, weak courtsand inadequate legal framework. The TNI (armed forces)left the political scene by giving up its seats in theparliament in 2004. Nevertheless, the TNI maintains a‘territorial network’ of military personnel in everydistrict and village, which gives the TNI substantialinfluence in local politics.4 The military gained prestigewhen it remained neutral during the impeachment of thefirst post-1999 president Wahid, even when Wahid calledupon the army to declare a state of emergency (which theTNI refused to follow up). Additionally, civilian controlwas strengthened by the appointment of a civilianminister of defence in the first post 1999 government.Parliamentary control remains rather problematic as longas the TNI receives only 30% of its funding from thestate; the rest is financed by private business of theTNI (see chapter of Sri Yunanto in this volume). In order

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to curtail these practices, the current civilian defenceminister has proposed that all private business of themilitary will be transferred to the state – it remains tobe seen whether this plan will succeed. With thepresident’s government party only holding 55 out of 500seats (and allied party can only bring 111 votes tobear), the government is forced to cooperate withparliament, which is facilitate parliamentary oversightof the armed forces. Table Two shows that 49 members andis supported by 20 staffers and has the disposition ofUSD 100’000. With three meetings per week, theparliamentary defence committee is rather active, whichis put into the spotlight because its meetings arepublic, except for hearings on the secret intelligencebudget.

Table 2 Parliamentary defence committee (2006).

committee members

CommitteeChair belongs to party of the

supporting staff

Committeebudget

Meetings are Frequencycommitteemeetings

Cambodia 7 Government

3 0 Secret Less thanonce per

monthIndonesia 49 Governmen

t20 USD

100’000Public, except for hearings on intelligence budget

3 perweek

Philippines

85 Government

5 0 Public, except for executive meetings

1 - 2 permonth

Thailand 22 Government

30 USD 39’900

Secret 1 perweek

With a return to democracy in 1986, the Philippines hasthe longest democratic experience of the four SoutheastAsian states. Even after 1986, the military interfered inthe political system on various occasions. Two formerpresidents have been ousted through army backed ‘peoplepower’ movements – Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 and JosephEstrada in 2001. IN 2006, under rumours of a coup bycertain groups of the armed forces, president Arroyo

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declared the state of emergency and the alleged militarycoup plotters were arrested.5 The press in the Philippinesis ‘vibrant and outspoken.’6 Control of the military iscomplicated by an ongoing civil conflict with communistrebels and Islamic militancy, compounded by a high levelof corruption among the security forces.7 The Philippineshas a bi-cameral legislature, with the 24 members of theSenate elected for six years and the 264 members of theHouse of Representatives for a 3 year term – which is arather short parliamentary term for acquiring expertiseon specific fields of government, particularly in thearea of national security armed forces. Of the fourselected Southeast Asian states, the Philippines’s haslargest defence committee consisting of 85 members,assisted, however, by only 5 staffers. The number of 85gives wide room for specialisation in the various fieldsof national security and defence policy. On the otherhand, unless well-managed, the danger exists that it istoo large for being effective and efficient. As a rule,the committee are public (except for the meetings of thecommittee executive) and meets twice per month (TableTwo).

Thailand is the only Southeast Asian state which wasnever colonized by European or American powers. Since1932, Thailand was periodically governed by the militaryuntil 1991, when the King Bhumibol Alduyadejy convincedthe military to appoint a civilian prime minister.Against the backdrop of street protests, widespreadcorruption and financial mismanagement, a reformistconstitution was adopted in 1997, introducing the directelection of the Senate and creating independent anti-corruption bodies. However, the new constitution did notend political turmoil and corruption, as signified byprime minister Thaksin resignation in 2006 after massivestreet protests and controversial elections. Thailand hasa bicameral legislature, consisting of 400 members of theHouse of Representatives (four year term) and the Senatewith 200 members who are elected for six years.8 With onemeeting per week, the parliamentary defence committee isthe most active of the four selected Southeast Asianparliaments. The committee has 22 members, supported by30 staff members (which is rather high) and a budget of

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USD 39’900. Both the budget and the large staff areimportant resources of the committee.

Methodology for analysing parliamentary defence oversightpowers

The date used in this article are based on aquestionnaire on ‘Provisions and powers of parliamentarycommittee of defence and national security’, which wasdistributed among parliamentarians, parliamentary staffand civil society representatives of Cambodia, Indonesia,Philippines and Thailand who attended the workshop on‘Parliamentary Accountability and security sectorgovernance’, Siem Reap, February 2006.9 The questionnaireaimed getting an comprehensive overview of all formalpowers in the possession of parliament to oversee thearmed forces in the four countries. Mostly the questionsrefer to the formal situation, and not to the praxis ofoversight, e.g. how many times the powers were used orwhether the intervention was successful.

Previously, in 2002, this questionnaire was used fora survey among parliaments of NATO member and associatedstates.10 The six areas of parliamentary defence oversightpowers as explained in the previous section are used fora questionnaire consisting of in total 104 powers. Anindex is constructed according to which parliament’spower to oversee the armed forces and defence policy canvary from full powers (100%) to zero oversight powers(0%). Using the same set of questions, it allows formaking comparisons between the four South East Asianparliaments and those of states in Northern America andEurope. In the next section the results per area ofparliamentary defence oversight power are analysed.

Parliamentary Oversight Powers

General powers

Table Three gives an overview of the 5 major legaloversight powers which apply to all fields of government,

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including defence. All four states, parliament has thepower to initiate new legislation or to adopt legislationproposed by the government. In all parliaments, thispower is not delegated to the defence committee, butremains a privilege of the plenary. Though allparliaments have the right to initiate legislation, mostparliaments exercise this right only in exceptionalsituations. Legislation is nowadays a very complex,specialist and time-consuming issue. Manyparliamentarians do not have the expertise nor the timeto go into the details of developing new legislation.Therefore, in practice, most parliaments have delegatedthe legislative function to the government and onlyapprove, reject or amend legislation.

Table 3: General Powers of ParliamentTo initiate legislation on defence issues

To question the minister of defence

To summonmilitary and othercivil servants to committeemeetings and to testify

To obtaindocumentsfrom the ministry of defence and military

To hold hearings and inquirieson defence issues

TotalGeneral

Powers ofParliamen

t (percountry)

Cambodia X X X X X 5 (100%)Indonesia X X X X X 5 (100%)Philippines X X X X X 5 (100%)Thailand X X X X X 5 (100%)

TotalGeneral

Powers ofParliament

(perspecificpower)

4 (100%) 4 (100%) 4 (100%) 4 (100%) 4 (100%) 20 (100%)

X: the parliament possesses the power; O: the parliament does not possess the power.

The powers to design and initiate defence legislation,are some of the greatest powers that a parliament canpossess to determine the defence policy of the country.The legal framework for defence is important to put thefunctioning of the armed forces on a legal footing. Thisframework is vast and includes the constitution and awide array of laws and decrees, including military

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service law, law on obligatory military service,conscientious objectors and alternative service law, lawon status of military personnel, law on reserve forces,laws on benefits and pensions, military discipline law,law on military justice, martial law, law on veterans,law on troops deployment abroad, law on the domestic useof the military, law on military intelligence, law onmilitary ombudsman and inspector-general, law on theorganisation of the armed forces. In addition, numerousgeneral laws also apply to the armed forces, such as thelaw on the state of emergency, laws on financialaccountability and budgeting, state secret laws, anti-corruption laws. Furthermore, a wide variety ofgovernment decrees apply, for example on militarypersonnel policy.11 By being able to influence where andwhen new legislation is required, or existing legislationis amended, the parliamentarian has the power to oversee,to a degree, the direction of defence policy.

All selected parliaments can question the ministerof defence. Similarly, the summoning of members of themilitary and civil servants to parliamentarycommittee/plenary meetings and to testify is a commonlegislative power in the selected states.

In all states examined, without exception, theparliament is granted the power to obtain documents fromthe ministry of defence and/or the military. This is animportant power that leads to greater transparency andaccountability of governmental and military decisions andactions. All parliament are granted the power to conductinquiries into defence issues and hold hearings on thoseissues.

The powers described above refer to the formalsituation. Indications exist that not always these powersare used. For example in Cambodia, the right to questionmilitary commanders, to question experts from civilsociety as well as the right to demand documents from themilitary, to organise parliamentary inquiries as well asto hold hearings was not used by the parliament ofCambodia.12 On the other hand, the defence committee ofthe House of Reprensatives conducted approximately 16investigations and hearings into defence related issues.13

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Budget Control

The power of the purse is at the heart of parliamentarycontrol and is parliament’s most important oversightpower together with its lawmaking powers. This powerbased on the principle government uses taxpayers’ moneyfor funding its activities. It is the task of parliamentto oversee whether the money is spent on the desiredpriorities in an efficient manner according to therequirements of the law. Principles alone are not enoughto assure the proper use of public funds. Therefore, manycountries around the world have developed or aredeveloping a systematic approach for evaluation andapproval of budget proposals, for example, a Planning,Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES).Basic characteristics of modern government defencebudgeting system in relationship to the role ofparliament include:14

Legality: All expenditure and activities should bein keeping with the law as enacted by parliament; Power of amendment and allocation: parliament has toright to amend and allocate defence budget funds; Transparent defence budgeting: parliament has accessto all necessary documentation to enable transparentdecision-making. Specificity: the number and descriptions of everybudget item should result in a clear overview ofgovernment’s expenditure, enabling parliament to controlthe budget at three levels, i.e., defence programmes,projects, and line items.

Table 4: Budgetary Powers of ParliamentHas access to all defence budget documents

Has the right to amend, approve andto allocate defence budget funds

Control the defence budgetby line-items

Total Budgetary Powers of Parliament (per country)

Cambodia O O O 0 (0%)Indonesia X X X 3 (100%)Philippines X O O (programme

level)1 (33%)

Thailand X X O 2 (67%)

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Total Budgetary Powers of Parliament (per specific power)

3 (75%) 2 (50%) 1 (25%) 6 (50%)

X: the parliament possesses the power.O: the parliament does not possess the power.

Our analysis shows that a mixed situation exists in thefour Southeast Asian parliaments. The Cambodianparliament does not posses any of the budget controlpowers. It has not access to all budget information, ithas not the right to approve, amend and to allocatedefence budgets and it has neither the right to controlgovernment spending down to the level of individual items1 Endnotes

?. Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. (1999), Government Accountability inParliamentary Democracy, in A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, and B. Manin,Democracy, Accountability and Representation, Cambridge University Press, p.281.

2 Jürgen Rüland, Clemens Jürgenmeyer, Michael H. Nelson and Patrick Ziegenhain (2005), Parliaments and political change in Asia, Singapore, ISEAS, p. 25.

3 ‘Freedom in the World – Cambodia (2005)’, Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org

4 ‘Freedom in the World – Indonesia (2005)’, Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org

5 ‘Emergency declared in the Philippines’, BBC News, 24 February 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4745716.stm

6 ‘Freedom in the World –Philippines (2005)’, Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org

7 ‘Freedom in the World –Philippines (2005)’, Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org

8 ‘Freedom in the World – Thailand (2005)’, Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org

9 The author is grateful to Congressman Mr. Mario ‘Mayong’ Joyo Aguja of the Philippines; Drs. Djoko Susilo, member of the parliament of Indonesia; Dr. Perapong Manakit, secretary of the of the Senate standing committee on military affairs of Thailand;and, Mr. Im Sithol, Research Fellow of CICP in Cambodia.

10 The results of this study are available in Hans Born and IngridBeutler (2006), ‘Between legitimacy and efficiency: A comparativeview on democratic accountability of defence activities in democracies’, in Guiseppe Caforio, Social sciences and the military: An interdisciplinary overview, London, Routledge, forthcoming, pp. 261-268.

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of the defence budget. The consequences for securitysector governance can be dramatic. Firstly, government’spower to allocate public funds is not check by thecountervailing power of parliament. Additionally, thelack of access to budget information facilitatescorruption as well as the abuse and mismanagement ofpublic funds. The parliament of the Philippines isslightly better off as it has access to budgetinformation, but has no power to correct governmentspending. These powers are possessed by the parliamentsof Indonesia and Thailand; the latter, however, lacks thepower to exercise budget control on a detailed level.

11 Hans Born and Vincenza Scherrer, ‘Democratic oversight and accountability’, in ‘OECD Manual on Implementation Framework for Security Sector Reform’, OECD, Paris, forthcoming.

12 Information from Cambodian civil society representatives to author, February 2006.

13 Communication between Congressmen and author, February 2006.14 . Born, H., Fluri, P., and Johnsson, A. (eds.) (2003), Parliamentary

Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices, Handbook forParliamentarians, IPU/DCAF, Geneva/Belgrade, pp. 131-132.

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Peace support operations

Another important tool of parliamentary oversight is theconstitutional or legal right to approve or the rejectthe deployment of troops abroad. Its importance lays inthe fact that peacekeeping operations have become apermanent phenomenon in international relations. Also thefour Southeast Asian states participate in UNpeacekeeping operations. As of 31 July 2006, Cambodia has151 troops deployed in UN peacekeeping operations abroad,Indonesia 200, Philippines 559 and Thailand 195.15

Table 5: Parliamentary oversight of Peace Support Operations1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Approvalof sending troops abroad apriori

Mandateof the mission

Approvalof the budget of the mission

Durationof the mission

Operational issues

Right tovisit the troops on missionsabroad

Total Power of Parliamentover PSOs (per country)

Cambodia O O O O O O 0 (0%)Indonesia O O X O O O 1 (17%)Philippines O O O O O X 1 (17%)Thailand X X X X X X 6 (100%)Total Power of Parliament over PSOs (per specific power)

1 (25%) 1 (25%) 2 (50%) 1 (25%) 1 (25%) 2 (25%) 8 (33%)

X: the parliament possesses the power.O: the parliament does not possess the power.

Of the four countries, only the Thai parliament has full oversight powers over peace support operations. The Cambodian parliament does not possess a single power. TheIndonesian parliament has the right to approve or to reject the budget of the peacekeeping operation. With this power, it eventually the opportunity to cancel or toalter the operation through the power of the purse. 15 ‘Contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations:

Monthly summary of contributions’, United Nations Department for peacekeeping operations (DPKO), Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/july06_1.pdf

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However, this power does not amount to prior authorisation of the operation. Once the government has sent troops abroad, it canceling the country’s contribution to the operation might harm the entire peacekeeping operation as well as the reputation of the country abroad. The Philippines’ parliament has only the right to visit troops when they are stationed abroad.

Regarding the prior authorisation of sending troops abroad as the most important power, four models of parliamentary involvement can be distinguished:16

1.  Parliament has the right of prior authorisation ofPSOs, including the right to discuss and influence thedetails of the PSO.2.  Parliament has the right of prior authorisation butnot the power to influence the detailed aspects of PSOs(including rules of engagement, duration of the missionand mandate), giving government full authority onceparliament has authorised the mission. 3.  The third group of parliaments does not have priorauthorisation power. Government can decide to send troopsabroad on peace missions without the legal obligation toconsult parliament. Nevertheless, parliament is informedabout the deployments. 4. A fourth type of parliament is those parliamentswhich have no authorisation power or right to informationabout future or pending PSOs.

Regarding the results presented in Table Five, the Thai parliament fits within the first category. Because the other parliaments do not the prior authorisation power, they do not belong to the second category either. As the Indonesian parliament exercises the power of the purse concerning peacekeeping operations, it is very likely that they are informed by the government about the activities and costs involved. For that reason one can assume that the Indonesian parliament belongs to the third category. It is unclear to what extent the Philippines’ and Cambodian parliaments belong to the third or fourth category.

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Defence procurement

Defence procurement is an important step in the sequenceof actions needed to set up and to implement any givensecurity policy. Parliament plays an essential role inensuring that procurement decisions focus on the rightissues and to remedy should there emerge a wrong trend orwrong doing. This would entail parliaments involvement inthe entire procurement process, from the preparationphase, during the procurement itself and after, duringthe life cycle of the programs. Whether parliament isgranted any powers in determining the procurement ofequipment, goods, ammunitions and services is a matter ofmuch variation in the countries studied.

In order to guarantee systematic defence planning,programming and budgeting, the procurement plans need tobe decided upon against the background of existingnational security plan, defence plan, military forcestructure plan as well as military personnel planning.Without these key documents, the danger exists thatpurchase of equipment are based on military requirementsonly, in stead of in combination with national prioritiesas elaborated in national security plans.

According to the IISS Military Balance, Cambodia,Indonesia (in particular), Philippines and Thailand wereinvolved in buying considerable amount of militaryequipment during the last decade, varying from militarytraining fighter planes, state of the art fighteraircrafts, European transport aircrafts, ultra-moderncombat helicopters, submarines, maritime patrolaircrafts, transport/tanker aircrafts and armoredvehicles.17

Table 5: Parliamentary Powers to influence Government’s Procurement Decisions

Parliament right to disapprov

Government obligedto provide

Parliament involved in

Parliament involvedin

Parliament involved in

Total Parliamentary power over

16 Hans Born and Heiner Hänggi (2005), The use of force under international auspices: Strengthening parliamentary accountability, DCAF Policy paper nr. 7, Geneva. Available at http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/pp07_use-of-force.pdf

17 ‘The Military Balance 2005-2006’, IISS, Routledge, pp. 310-314.

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e contracts

parliament with all information

specifying needs for new equipment

selecting producer

assessingoffers for compensation and off-set

Procurement(per country)

Cambodia O O O O O 0 (0%)Indonesia O X O O O 1 (20%)Philippines

O O X O O 1 (20%)

Thailand O O O O O 0 (0%)Total Parliamentary Powerover procurement (per specific power)

0 (0%) 1 (25%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (10%)

X: the parliament possesses the power.O: the parliament does not possess the power.

Our results show that generally Southeast Asianparliaments have very limited to no control over thegovernment’s procurement decisions. Only in Indonesia thegovernment is obliged to provide the parliament with allrelevant information about possible defence procurementdecisions. In the Philippines, the parliament is able toplay a role in the process of specifying needs for newequipment. Parliament plays no role in defenceprocurement in Thailand and Cambodia. The lack ofparliamentary involvement in defence procurement can havethe following consequences:

Parliament cannot play a counterbalancing roleagainst executive power.

Lack of public debates about defence spendingpriorities;

Unnecessary secrecy concerning procurementdecisions, leading to a greater chance thatmismanagement, abuse and corruption will occur.

Policy

Compared with other fields of government, generally,politicians have limited interest in defence policy andhave little active engagement in the formulation and

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supervision of national security and defence policy andthe armed forces. Yet, to ignore the importance ofparliamentary involvement and debate is to ignore thefact that the defence decisions made by the ministry ofdefence and the armed forces in any country concern vastresources, the lives of citizens and the welfare of thecountry. Furthermore, although politicians may not beroutinely occupied in matters of national defence, theymay become interested or involved during a crisis oremergency. It is at this point that it may be discoveredthat the defence policy is not as expected nor the armedforces as compliant and effective as they thought theywere.18 The civilian control of defence policy is anational responsibility and therefore any policy changeand decisions should focus on the processes ofdeliberation and justification in the national publicsphere.

Table 6: Parliamentary Powers to influence Government’sDefence Policy Decisions

Security policy concept

Defence concept

Force structure and planning

Military strategy

Total Parliamentary Power to influencedefence policy (per country)

Camobdia X X O X 3 (75%)Indonesia X X X O 3 (75%)Philippines - - - - - Thailand X X O O 2 (50%)Total Parliamentary Power to influence defence policy (per specific power)

3 (75%) 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 1 (25%) 8 (50%)

X: the parliament possesses the power.O: the parliament does not possess the power.- : not available or not applicable.

18 . See, Bland, D. L. (1999), Parliament, Defence Policy and the CanadianArmed Forces, School of Policy Studies, Kingston, Ontario, Canada,available at: http://www.queensu.ca/sps/defence/publications/claxton1/claxton1.pdf

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With regard to security and defence policy formulation,we see some interesting differences between theparliaments studied. With information on the Philippineslacking, it can be concluded that all parliaments areinvolved in policy formulation on the level of thenational security and defence concepts. The parliamentsconcerned are less involved when it comes to the moreoperation plans on the level of force structure planningand military strategy.

Military personnel

Parliamentary involvement in military personnel anddecisions implies that parliament oversees that thegovernment takes it responsibilities as employer serious.Military personnel includes, among other, the(multi-)yearly personnel plan, ceilings for militarypersonnel to be employed as well as decisions to appointor fire the top military commanders.

Table 6: Parliamentary Powers to influence armed forcespersonnel policy

Military personnel plan

Setting maximum number of armed forces personnel

Giving consentto senior personnel appointments

Total Parliamentary Power to influence defence policy(per country)

Camobdia O O O 0 (0%)Indonesia X O X 4 (67%)Philippines - X X 2(66%)Thailand O O O 0(0%)Total Parliamentary Power to influence defence policy (per specific power)

10 (63%) 9 (56%) 8 (50%) 23 (50%)

X: the parliament possesses the power.O: the parliament does not possess the power.- : not available or not applicable.

The study shows a mixed picture concerning parliamentaryinvolvement in military personnel decisions in Southeast

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Asia, varying to zero involvement in Cambodia andThailand and reasonable involvement in Indonesia andPhilippines. The power to give consent to seniorpersonnel is in particular important as it assures thatthe most important military leaders of the country aresubject to broad political consensus. It also assuresthat only purely military criteria for top appointmentsare taking into account, but also criteria which assuresthat the military commander has skills to functiondemocratic civil-military relations. However, in order toavoid politicization of top appointments, a politicalmature attitude is required from side of the members ofparliament. The power to impose ceilings on the maximumnumber of military personnel is an effective tool againstuncontrolled growth of the armed forces.

Comparisons

In this section some general comparisons are drawn between the four Southeast Asian parliaments as well as between these and parliaments of North American and European states. This section also tries to answer why parliaments differ in the level of oversight of the armedforces. Table Seven presents the comparisons per oversight power and Table Eight brings the parliaments together in comparative perspective – the latter Table also shows the selected parliaments in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Table 7: Parliamentary Powers over Defence Activities: Category Ranking

Ranking in order of defence activities over which parliaments is granted power

Average in selected 4 South East Asia states

Average Euro-Atlantic region states

1. General Powers of Parliament 100% 98%2. Budgetary Powers of Parliament 50% 81%3. Powers Concerning Peace Support

Operations33% 56%

4. Parliamentary Powers to influence 10% 35%

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Governments’ Defence Procurement Decisions

5. Parliamentary Powers to influence Security and Defence Policy

50% 50%

6. Parliamentary Powers to influence armed forces personnel policy

50% -

Table Seven shows that the general powers ofparliamentary oversight are shared by the four SoutheastAsian states. These powers include the right tolegislate, questioning defence minister and his staff aswell as the power to organise hearings andinvestigations. The same implies for states in the Euro-atlantic area. Contrary to parliaments in the Euro-atlantic area, it cannot taken for granted thatparliament posseses the power of the purse in SoutheastAsia: in total only 50% of all possible budget controlpowers are possessed by the four Southeast Asian statesas opposed to 81% in the Euro-atlantic area. Therefore,whereas both general oversight powers and budget controlpowers can be considered as baseline powers in the Euro-atlantic area, only the general oversight powers can beseen as baseline powers for Southeast Asian parliaments.In particular significant, in comparison with their NorthAmerican and European counterparts, is the virtual lackof parliamentary involvement in procurement decisions. Asmentioned before, this lack of involvement contributes toan imbalanced system of checks and balances; uncheckeddefence procurement priorities as well as excessivesecrecy leading to possible cover up of waste,mismanagement and corruption among military andgovernment circle.

From the four selected Southeast Asian parliaments, the Indonesian parliament is the strongest with possessing 16% of all possible parliamentary oversight powers, followed by the parliaments of Thailand, Philippines and Cambodia (Table Eight). Parliaments in the Euro-Atlantic area possess powers varying from 90% (USA and The Netherlands) to 35% (Turkey) of the total possible amount of oversight powers. It also follows thatSoutheast Asian group of parliaments ranges between 8-16%and their Euro-Atlantic counterparts between 93% and 35%.

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Table 8: Parliamentary Powers over Defence Activities: Ranking of States in Euro-Atlantic region

Parliament granted extensive powers over defence activities

Parliament granted limited powers over defence activities

Ranking Percentage Average of Powers Possessed by Parliament

Netherlands, United States

93%

Germany 87 %Czech Republic 82 %Switzerland 75 %Macedonia 72 %Sweden 69 %Denmark 60 %United Kingdom, France 57 %Romania 57 %Hungary 54 %Poland 51 %Spain 47 %Canada 41 %Turkey 35 %Indonesia 16%Thailand 14%Philippines 12%Cambodia 8%

One major question arises on the basis of theseresults: how can these differences be explained?Concerning the former question, a first explanation couldbe that governance structures function different in Asiaas compared with in the Euro-Atlantic area. Such anexplanation would fit within the so-called ‘Asian values’debate which flourished in the 1990s, referring to thebelief that Asian states posses an unique set of valuesand institutions, based on the region’s history andculture.19 However, this explanation cannot be given onthe basis of this research as some important Asian statesoutside Southeast Asia, in particular Japan, South Koreaand Taiwan might give a different picture. Furtherresearch into direction is necessary. A secondexplanation might be given by the level ofdemocratization in the countries concerned. For analysingthis explanation, the entire group of Euro-Atlantic andSoutheast Asian states into ‘new’ and ‘old’ democracies.Additionally, for analytical purposes all states are

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divided into the category ‘powerful parliament’ versus‘weak parliament’ (see Table Nine).20

Table 9: Parliamentary Powers over Defence Activities in‘New’ and ‘Old’ Democracies

‘Old’ Democracies ‘New’ DemocraciesParliamentary grantedextensive power over defence activities

United States, Netherlands Germany, Denmark, Sweden Switzerland

Czech Republic, Macedonia

Parliament granted fewer powers over defence activities

France, UK, Canada, Spain

Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Thailand, Turkey Hungary

Table Nine shows that there is a moderately strongrelationship between the length of democratic traditionin a country and parliamentary oversight powers. It leadsto the idea, that the longer a country has a democratictradition, the more the executive find itself in asituation in which it has to share its power with thelegislative. Perhaps finding a right system of checks ofbalances is something which can be only achieved overtime.

A second explanation for the difference inparliamentary powers might be found in thecharacteristics of the political system. The combinedselection of Euro-Atlantic and Southeast Asian statesbelong to three groups of political system: presidentialrepublics, parliamentary democracies and Westministerparliamentary democracies. In Table 10 the countries areshown according to their political system, related to thelevel parliamentary oversight powers.

19 See for example Amartya Sen, ‘Human rights and Asian values: What Lee Kuan Yew and Le Peng don’t understand about Asia’, in The New Republic, 14 July 199720 New democracies include states who have democratized after 1986 (including Turkey); ‘Old’democratic states have had their democratic institutions and traditions before 1986. Powerful parlaments are those in the 50% highest percentile; weak parliaments are those in the 50% lowest percentile.

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Table 10: Parliamentary Powers over Defence Activities inDifferent Democratic Systems

Presidential Democracies

Parliamentary Democracies

Westminster System Democracies

Parliamentary grantedextensive power over defence activities

United States Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Switzerland Czech Republic Macedonia

-

Parliament granted fewer powers over defence activities

France, Indonesia, Philippines, Poland Romania, Turkey Hungary

Cambodia, Spain,Thailand

UKCanada

The results of Table 10 shows that parliaments withstrong oversight powers are more likely to be found inthe parliamentary democracies; parliaments with weakoversight powers are likely to be found in presidentialdemocracies and Westminster type of democracies – withimportant exceptions such as the US, Cambodia, Spain andThailand.

The second and last question to be addressed is howmuch parliamentary oversight powers is sufficient.

Conclusions

The objective of the article was to compare and analyseparliamentary oversight of the armed forces in SoutheastAsia. A survey was used to compare the four parliamentsof Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, whichwas also used among parliaments in the Euro-Atlanticarea, enabling to make cross-comparisons. The survey isbased on a questionnaire distributed amongparliamentarians, staffers and civil society experts whoattended the Siem Reap February 2006 workshop onparliamentary accountability and security sectorgovernance in Southeast Asia.

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The main conclusions are: The four Southeast Asian parliaments posses all the

power to initiate and amend legislation, to questionthe defence minister, to summon military officialsand civil society experts to parliamentary hearingsas well as the right to conduct investigations andto organise hearings.

The parliamentary defence committee are betterresourced and staffed in Indonesia and Thailand; thedefence committees of Indonesia and Thailand meetthe most frequent. The Cambodian parliament is theleast active and the least resourced parliament.

Indonesia can be considered as possessing strongparliamentary budget control, which has importancebeyond the financial process. Through the power ofthe purse, a parliament can influence procurementdecisions and peacekeeping operations as well as thenumber of personnel on the pay roll. Cambodiapossesses a very marginal to no role in the defencebudgeting process. The Philippines take in a middleposition.

Only the parliament of Thailand posseses fulloversight powers of deploying troops abroad inpeacekeeping operations. The Cambodian parliament isnot involved in decisions to send troops abroad,whereas the parliaments of Indonesia and thePhilippines play a rather marginal role.

All Southeast Asian parliaments have a weak to noimpact on government’s decisions to procure defenceequipment.

According to the collected date, the parliaments ofIndonesia and Cambodia are able to discuss andpossibly to influence the policy concepts for thearmed forces and the defence of the country.

The consent of the Philippines’ and Indonesianparliaments is needed for appointing senior militarypersonnel. The Cambodian and Thai parliament are notinvolved in these type of personnel issues.

The Euro-Atlantic parliaments are compariblystronger than their Southeast Asian counterparts,which can be partly explained by the level ofgeneral democratization. Further research is needed.

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On the basis of the analysis, some suggestions can bederived for strengthening parliamentary oversight of thesecurity sector. We distinguish three avenues forstrengthening parliaments: legal powers; capabilities andwillingness of parliamentarians to exercise oversight.

Legal powers: Parliaments might consider to demandgreater participation in decisions to send troopsabroad, approval of defence budgets and defenceprocurement. The analysis above demonstrates whichparliaments are lacking what type of powers, as anindication in which direction these parliamentsmight want to advance their oversight.

Capabilities: to have legal powers to exerciseoversight is not sufficient. Parliamentarians needto have a well-managed defence committee in order toguarantee efficient and effective debates andspecialisation in defence issues. They also need tobe backed up by sufficient staff and budget. To thisextent, it is advised to change rules of procedurein order to guarantee that the defence committeemeets at least once per week. It might also to beconsidered to appoint a member of the oppositionparty to the chair of the defence committee or atleast as vice-chair, in order to enable the membersof opposition to exercise their oversight task.

Willingness: Legal powers and capacity to overseedefence policy are necessary but not sufficientconditions for effective oversight. Ifparliamentarians are not aware of the importance ofsome executive decisions and policies or if they arenot willing to hold the government to account, theselegal powers and capacities are to no avail.Therefore, it is important to exposeparliamentarians and their staff to internationalmeetings in which best practices and experiences areexchanged.

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