HUMANITY, ASSOCIATIONS, AND GLOBAL JUSTICE:IN DEFENCE OF HUMANITY-CENTREDCOSMOPOLITAN EGALITARIANISM

The question of whether there are global principles of distributivejustice, and, if so, what they are has preoccupied political philosophers inthe last three decades. There remains considerable disagreement at thesubstantive level about what principles of distributive principle, if any,should apply at the global level. Moreover, in addition to these substan-tive differences, there are also disagreements at a more foundational level.That is, there are profound disagreements about the fundamental normativeprinciples that ground the scope of principles of distributive justice.

Speaking very broadly, one can discern two different approaches tothinking about global distributive justice—what I shall term ‘association-al’ approaches1 and ‘humanity-centred’ approaches. According toassociational approaches, the scope of all principles of distributive justiceis determined by who belongs to a particular given association. I employthe term ‘association’ as a catch-all term to refer simply to instanceswhere people are related through some kind of activity or rules to oneanother. I employ this term in a broad sense because many politicalphilosophers emphasize the significance of membership in social andeconomic relationships but, at the same time, they often employ differentterms—such as the ‘basic structure’ (Rawls 1999, 6–10) or ‘institutionalschemes’ (Pogge 1989, 8)—and have different kinds of relationships inmind. Indeed as we shall see, associational theorists differ importantly onwhat particular kinds of associations have moral significance.

Note that ‘associational’ accounts are not identical with what AndreaSangiovanni calls “relational” accounts (2007, 5–8). Sangiovanni definesrelational accounts as follows: “[t]hose who hold that principles of dis-tributive justice have a relational basis hold that the practice-mediatedrelations in which individuals stand condition the content, scope, and

“Humanity, Associations, and Global Justice:In Defence of Humanity-Centered Cosmpolitan Egalitarianism” by Simon Caney,

The Monist, vol. 94, no. 4, pp. 506–534. Copyright © 2011, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354.

justification of those principles” (2007, 5). However, associationalaccounts, as I define them, are concerned only with the “scope” of princi-ples of distributive justice, and are not necessarily committed to the claimthat the “content” of those principles and their “justification” should bederived from reflection on the nature of these associations.

The associational approach can be contrasted with what I shall term‘humanity-centred’ accounts. These hold that the scope of some principlesof distributive justice is not determined by membership of any associa-tions. On this account, persons should be included within the scope ofdistributive justice simply because they are fellow human beings.2 Twoaspects of a humanity-centred approach should be noted. First we shouldrecord that a humanity-centred approach is not necessarily committed tothe claim that all principles of distributive justice include all persons. Toput this in terms coined by H.L.A. Hart, they insist that persons maypossess certain ‘general’ rights qua human beings but they may also holdthat persons may employ these rights to form relationships and associa-tions from which they then acquire ‘special’ rights and duties (Hart 1955).All that a humanity-centred approach insists is that some entitlementsinhere in persons simply as human beings.

A second point concerns the content of the principles of distributivejustice. Some might cleave to a fairly minimal humanity-centred account,arguing for instance that all persons are entitled to a certain standard ofliving (Shue 1996). Others, however, argue that egalitarian principles ofdistributive justice obtain at the global level, and they obtain even if thereis not a global association. Let us term this view humanity-centred cos-mopolitan egalitarianism. I endorse this more ambitious humanity-centredapproach. In this paper I shall not seek to provide positive arguments indefence of it, but I shall try to defend this kind of humanity-centred, ornonassociational, cosmopolitan egalitarianism from two kinds of objection.

More precisely, I seek to achieve three goals. First, I shall examinetwo leading associational accounts—what have come to be known as ‘rec-iprocity’ arguments and ‘coercion’ arguments. Adherents of theseapproaches have argued that egalitarian principles of distributive justicedo not apply at the global level. These arguments have attracted consider-able critical attention. However, those who have criticised thesearguments have almost all focused on the empirical assumptions made bythese arguments against global egalitarianism. I adopt a different approach,

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disputing the normative premises that underpin these associational views(Sections II and III). My aim is to show how a humanity-centred cos-mopolitan egalitarianism can resist these claims.

Second, I shall draw attention to a general problem with associationalaccounts of distributive justice (Section IV). Finally, I seek to show howa humanity-centred cosmopolitanism can accommodate the insights asso-ciated with an associational approach (Section V).

1. Methodological Preliminaries

Prior to considering the Reciprocity Argument and the CoercionArgument it may be useful to set out some of the questions that any asso-ciational account should be able to answer. I believe that there are at leastfour questions.

Q1: Moral Relevance of Associations. First, we need to know howmembership of an association is said to have moral relevance for an accountof distributive justice. As noted above, associational accounts make a linkbetween the membership of an association and the scope of some/all prin-ciples of distributive justice. There are, however, several different optionshere. For example, some, like Nagel, maintain that all principles of dis-tributive justice apply only within the state (Nagel 2005). Others, however,affirm a more moderate position. Blake (2001), for example, argues thategalitarian principles apply only within the state but states that other prin-ciples apply outside any association. So our first question is: What is themoral relevance of associations for distributive justice?

Q2: Type of Association. Second, we need to know what kind of associ-ation has this moral relevance.What is the type of relationship that is requiredfor certain principles of distributive justice to apply?We need some accountof the morally relevant property (MRP) that an association must possessto generate principles of distributive justice. Within the literature one canfind, at least, four proposals about what constitutes the appropriate type ofassociation, each stressing a different morally relevant property. These include:

(a) Reciprocity Arguments: these maintain that some/all principles ofdistributive justice apply within schemes of reciprocity (Sangio-vanni 2007).

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(b) Coercion Arguments: these maintain that some/all principles ofdistributive justice apply within schemes of coercion (Blake2001, Nagel 2005).

(c) Communitarian Arguments: these maintain that some/all princi-ples of distributive justice apply within communities with ashared identity (Miller 1995, 2009).

(d) Causal Interdependence Arguments: these maintain that some/allprinciples of distributive justice apply between people whose livesare profoundly interdependent (Beitz 1999, Moellendorf 2009).

For reasons of space I shall focus primarily, but not exclusively, on thefirst two types of association.3

Q3: Relationship between the Type of Association and DistributivePrinciple. Third, associations vary in the extent to which they exemplifythe morally relevant properties identified in the answer to Q2. Associa-tions vary in the extent to which they possess any of the four MRPsreferred to in the last paragraph. For example, a social and political systemmay vary in the extent to which it exercises coercion over its members. Ora group of people may vary in the extent to which they have a commoncultural identity. Groups may also vary in the extent of interdependencebetween co-members. Now given these potential variations in the extentto which a group possesses any one given MRP, the following questionarises: What is the relationship between (i) the extent to which an associ-ation possesses a MRP and (ii) the content of the distributive principle?

I will discuss this issue much more fully in Section VI. In the meantimeit is worth noting that associational approaches have two options here(Nagel 2005, 140–43). One is to hold that if, and when, a group embodiesa MRP to a certain extent (say, a specified amount of interdependence)then a particular principle of distributive justice applies. A second quitedifferent view holds that the more and more a group possesses a MRP thenthe more redistributive is the principle that applies to them. Associationalviews must choose between these two options, and must be able to explainhow variations in the extent to which an association exhibits a morallyrelevant property—e.g., interdependence or extent of reciprocal interac-

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tion or coercion or a sense of community—affects the content of the dis-tributive principle.

Q4: Normative Justification. Finally, of course, we need a normativeargument showing that membership of associations—of the kind specifiedin the responses to Q2—enjoys the moral relevance that they are said tohave in response to Q1 and Q3.

With these methodological preliminaries in mind I now wish toconsider two commonly advanced associational arguments, both of whichseek to challenge cosmopolitan egalitarianism, in general, and humanity-centred cosmopolitan egalitarianism, in particular.

2. ReciprocityWe can begin by examining those who appeal to the notion of reci-

procity to explain the moral relevance of associations. A prominent recentaccount has been developed by Andrea Sangiovanni (2007). Sangiovanniargues that egalitarian principles of distributive justice apply only withinsystems of economic and political cooperation. He further argues that thestate is a context of reciprocity but that the world economy is not, andhence concludes that egalitarian principles of distributive justice apply atthe state level but not at the global level. Sangiovanni’s main target hereis humanity-centred cosmopolitan egalitarians. However, he also arguesthat associational theorists who believe that egalitarian principles of dis-tributive justice apply within all systems of profound interdependence arealso misguided (2007, 34–35). Against both, then, he insists that egalitarianprinciples of distributive justice apply only within the context of a schemeof reciprocity.

To evaluate Sangiovanni’s argument it is helpful to break down theargument into its component parts. Sangiovanni makes three key points.First, he makes the empirical claim that states, unlike global factors, playan enormous role in people’s lives. He emphasizes two contributions thatstates make. First they provide a legal system which protects their citizensfrom violence, and which provides a legal infrastructure within which peoplecan act. Second, they provide people with opportunities. They may, forexample, provide people with an educational system within which their

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talents are nurtured (2007, 25–26). Sangiovanni further argues that globalfactors do not play such a major role (2007, 20–21). His first claim then is

Premise 1: the empirical claim: the state provides the context within whichpeople are able to develop.

Sangiovanni then argues—and this is the second step in the argument—that those who have benefited from their membership of a state because ofthese two factors owe a duty of reciprocity to their fellow citizens.As San-giovanni puts it:

others are owed a fair return for what they have given you, just as you areowed a fair return for what you have given others. More specifically, thosewho have submitted themselves to a system of laws and social rules in waysnecessary to sustain our life as citizens, producers, and biological beings areowed a fair return for what those who have benefited from their submissionhave received. (2007, 26–27)

Sangiovanni thus asserts the following premise:

Premise 2: the “fair return” principle: where people contribute to a processthat creates benefits for others then they are owed a “fair return” for theircontribution from those who benefit from this process.

Sangiovanni employs this principle to determine the scope of distributivejustice. Having established the scope of distributive justice, Sangiovannithen adds that we need an additional principle to tell us how goods shouldbe distributed. What is a “fair” return to our fellow citizens? Sangiovanniadopts the view that—in the context of a state—social and natural contin-gencies should not determine people’s fate. In light of this he affirms thefollowing:

Premise 3: The egalitarian conception of reciprocity: a fair return to one’sfellow citizens should be conceived along egalitarian lines.

He argues on this basis that global egalitarianism is false and that equalityonly applies within the state.

Now one response to Sangiovanni’s argument takes an empiricalform and objects that the global order also contributes to people’s devel-opment and, as such, the scope of egalitarian justice is global (Armstrong2009, 308–12; Barry and Valentini 2009, 492–93; Ypi, Goodin, and Barry

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2009, especially 118–22). Though I think this objection has considerableforce I shall stay neutral on this issue, and wish instead to focus on thenormative premise in Sangiovanni’s argument. I believe that Sangiovanni’snormative claim is mistaken.

§1. The central problem with Sangiovanni’s argument is that thethree key premises outlined above do not entail his conclusion. Consideragain the three premises. If one accepts Sangiovanni’s empirical consid-erations about the role of the state (P1), his “fair return” principle (P2),and his claim that a fair return to others requires some kind of equality(P3) then we reach the following conclusion:

Conclusion-1: egalitarian principles of distributive justice applyamong co-citizens.

Sangiovanni, however, seeks to show:

Conclusion-2: egalitarian principles of distributive justice only applyamong co-citizens: global egalitarianism is false.

To reach conclusion-2 we need additional argumentation. Even if it is thecase that the presence of schemes of reciprocal cooperation is sufficient togenerate egalitarian principles this clearly does not entail that the presenceof schemes of reciprocal cooperation is necessary to generate egalitarianprinciples.4 Sangiovanni, however, says little that might explain why egal-itarian principles only apply within schemes of reciprocity. He immediatelymoves from his discussion of the “fair return” principle (2007, 26–27) onto the conclusion that there can be no case for egalitarian principles whenthere is no interaction (2007, 27).

§2. At this point Sangiovanni might respond that he gives threeexamples that bridge this gap and show that egalitarian principles onlyapply within schemes of reciprocity. Now, prior to examining theseexamples I think it is worth recording that a series of examples on its owncan only provide a weak foundation for holding conclusion-2. What onewants is an argument or explanation as to why egalitarian principles canonly apply among co-citizens. With such an argument in hand, one couldthen employ examples to illustrate and support the principled argument.

However, even if we set this methodological concern aside, the threeexamples he gives are unpersuasive. The examples are as follows:

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Example 1: The Disability Rights Movement. Sangiovanni argues thatthe complaint made by disability rights activists like (the late)McBryde Johnson is that American institutions have discriminatedagainst her. She is “denied the basic capabilities to engage others, onan equal footing, in a common social and political space” (2007, 30).Speaking more generally, the disability rights movement has cam-paigned against the way in which institutions like the state deny thehandicapped an equal status and the same opportunities as their co-citizens (2007, 30, 30–31).

In reply: this example forcefully brings out the wrongness of institu-tions that discriminate. The disability rights movement has, for example,rightly criticised the fact that buildings have been constructed and workarrangements have been designed in such a way that they needlessly denyaccess to those who are disabled. However, a humanity-centred cos-mopolitan egalitarian can readily accept all this. What they will add is thatthis example does not entail that it is morally acceptable—from the pointof view of justice—for others, in other countries, who are equally handi-capped and suffer discrimination from their own institutions to sufferthrough no fault of their own. Compare a handicapped person in Namibiawith McBryde Johnson. Suppose that they are equally handicapped andthat Namibian institutions are not designed in such a way that they areable to enjoy the same opportunities as able-bodied persons elsewhere.This may be because of lack of the resources needed to constructbuildings or transport networks that provide genuine access to thedisabled. Or it may be because of indifference to, or hostility towards, thehandicapped. In such a case, a humanity-centred cosmopolitan egalitarianwould say that people have (i) negative duties of justice not to denypeople equal opportunities in their own society5 and also (ii) positiveduties of justice to ensure that people in other societies also enjoy thesesame opportunities. Now what the McBryde Johnson example forcefullybrings out is the importance of the first set of duties (and, I would add, theimportance of seeing the condition of the disabled as a matter of justicerather than charity). However, I fail to see why it provides any reason atall to deny the second set of duties of justice.

Example 2: The Chinese Compensation Case. Sangiovanni’s secondexample is one in which three Chinese girls suffered the same accident

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but one of whom received less in compensation than the other becauseher family, unlike theirs, is from a rural district (2007, 31–32). San-giovanni objects that this is unfair and he suggests that the unfairnessis explained by his account: the family of the girl from the ruraldistrict has contributed to the maintenance of the Chinese state and soshe should be treated the same as her co-citizens.6

In reply: a humanity-centred cosmopolitan egalitarian can agree thatinequalities between co-citizens can be especially pernicious, though I donot think in this case that this is necessarily because the co-citizens havecontributed equally to the maintenance of their state. It may be especiallybad because (regardless of their contribution) where people live side byside and they receive differential treatment it can be humiliating and stig-matizing for like cases to be treated differently. Furthermore, inequalitieswithin a state can be especially undesirable because they may lead to agreater likelihood of domination and oppression.7

Again, however, a humanity-centred egalitarian can add ‘but the fact(if it is a fact) that inequalities in treatment are especially perniciousbetween those in an association simply does not entail that it is not perni-cious at all if non-citizens enjoy worse or better treatment.’ That would bea non sequitur.

Furthermore, if we vary Sangiovanni’s example slightly his ownview seems highly counterintuitive. Suppose that, as in Sangiovanni’sexample, there is a traffic accident in one country in which three peopleare injured. Suppose, however, that unlike his example two are membersof that state and the third is a foreigner backpacking round the world. Nowthe third victim has not, in any way, contributed to the formation of thelegal system or the provision of opportunities. They cannot be said to havehelped uphold that legal system (they flew in the day before); they havenot paid taxes which fund that state’s educational system, and so on. Insuch a situation, Sangiovanni’s approach—his emphasis on equaltreatment being dependent on whether one is a member of that scheme ofcooperation—entails that this third victim is not entitled to the same levelof compensation as the other two. But this seems highly implausible. Thethird person can surely complain ‘but I was injured to the same extent bythe same person and so I am entitled to the same compensation’.Ahumanity-centred egalitarian captures this and would insist that, other things being

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equal, all three receive commensurately equal compensation. I thereforeconclude that the amended example shows Sangiovanni’s scope-restrictedegalitarianism to be less credible in this particular case than a humanity-centred cosmopolitan egalitarianism.

Example 3: The Welfare State. Consider now Sangiovanni’s thirdexample. He argues that the modern welfare state exemplifies an idealof reciprocity—for people cooperate by paying into a fund which theyand their fellow citizens can rely on in times of need—and, further-more, it enjoys support for this reason (2007, 32–33).

In reply: again, however, this is inconclusive. For a humanity-centredcosmopolitan egalitarian can reply that what Sangiovanni has done here isdescribe an attractive ideal—one that social and political arrangementsshould embody. A system of provision animated by this idea of reciprocity(Sangiovanni 2007, 26) is an appealing one. However, it does not followfrom this value that we should simply continue with a system of nationalwelfare states (which is Sangiovanni’s preferred instantiation of thatvalue) rather than design a global system that also seeks to perform thesame role and embody the same value (which is what humanity-centredegalitarians would endorse). As Arash Abizadeh puts it, the argumentunder scrutiny confuses what is a “constitutive” feature of a just order(that is, the values that a just order embody) with an “existence condition”for the application of principles of justice (that is, the conditions that mustexist for questions of distributive justice to arise) (Abizadeh 2007, espe-cially 330–31).8 Sangiovanni’s ‘welfare state’ example treats the existingboundaries of the system of reciprocity embodied in the welfare state as anecessary condition (an “existence condition”) for the application of prin-ciples of egalitarian justice, whereas the point brought out by the exampleof the welfare state is that it is desirable to have a system in whichmembersmake a contribution into a common fund and then they and their fellowmembers enjoy the corresponding health, educational, and other benefits.Sangiovanni’s third example, therefore, does not show that egalitarianprinciples only apply within existing schemes of reciprocity.

My first objection thus stands. Sangiovanni has not shown that equalityonly applies within schemes of reciprocity. In the first place we need anargument for why egalitarian principles only apply within schemes of rec-

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iprocity. The three examples are no substitute for an argument. Moreover,in each case the examples do not give us any reason to think that egalitarianprinciples only apply within schemes of reciprocity.

§3. This conclusion is further reinforced by a second argument—what might be called the Incompleteness Argument. This draws on a lineof reasoning first presented by Brian Barry in three seminal papers in theearly 1980s (1980, 1991a, b). Barry explicitly discusses the implicationsof ideas of reciprocity for global justice. He rejects the idea that the globaleconomy constitutes a scheme of reciprocity in the relevant sense (1991a,194). However, he argues that reciprocity arguments rest on assumptionsthat may in turn ground global principles of distributive justice. Thereasoning proceeds as follows:

(Pi) Reciprocity arguments hold that when people engage in coopera-tion they acquire “special rights” to the product and “specialduties” to their fellow cooperators.9

However:

(Pii) any system of “special rights” presupposes that those engaged inthe cooperative process have a legitimate claim to the resourcesthat they employ in that process.

When citizens provide goods that enable their co-citizens to be au-tonomous agents they do so using resources. Thus if we are to adopt areciprocity theory of justice we also need an account specifying (i) therights people have over the resources that they employ in the cooperativeprocess and (ii) any pre-cooperation duties of distributive justice that theyhave to others. We need to know whether they are entitled to all of theseresources or whether others are the rightful owners of these resources.Reciprocity arguments are, thus, incomplete until they are supplementedwith an additional principle governing the resources people employ in thecooperative process. They presuppose some independently defined ‘fairshare’ (Barry 1980, 35; 1991a, 195; 1991b, 235ff).10

To this we may now add:

(Piii) Sangiovanni gives us no reason to think that egalitarian principlesshould not apply to these pre-cooperation entitlements.

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His argument (his “fair return” principle) simply tells us that when peopleengage in a cooperative venture then they are entitled—as a matter ofjustice—to a fair return from their coparticipants and that this fair returnshould be defined in egalitarian terms. As such it is silent on what princi-ples should specify their entitlements to the resources that they employ inthis process. His reasoning, therefore, does not give us any reason to thinkthat equality does not also guide the pre-cooperation set of entitlements.For aught that it shows, a humanity-centred cosmopolitan egalitarianismshould define this set of entitlements. This indeed was the position Barryhimself sought to defend (1980, 35ff; 1991a; 196ff; 1991b, 237–39).11 Onthis view, global economic and political institutions should be designed toensure a broadly equal distribution. Now within these parameters peoplemay use their ‘fair share’ of resources when participating in associa-tions—including within their state as well as in economic enterprises.Then duties of reciprocity apply within these associations. In this way werecognize both the importance of ‘reciprocity’ but also the fact that thereciprocity principle is incomplete, and thus needs to be located in abroader theory of distributive justice.

In short: The claim that egalitarian principles apply in contexts ofreciprocity is a plausible one. However, accepting this gives us no reasonto think that equality applies only in such contexts. Sangiovanni’s premisedoes not entail his conclusion (§§1–2); furthermore, his argument presup-poses an additional principle governing fundamental entitlements—aprinciple that, for all that Sangiovanni has shown us, might be governedby egalitarian principles of justice (§3).

3. CoercionLet us turn now to a second leading associational approach. In recent

years some have argued that the scope of some principles of distributivejustice is a function of who is bound together by a common coercivepower. Michael Blake, for example, argues that while a principle of suffi-ciency applies globally, egalitarian principles of distributive justice applyonly within a system of coercion. Drawing on this he concludes that egal-itarian principles of distributive justice apply only within the state (2001).Thomas Nagel has adopted an even more radical view, arguing that prin-ciples of distributive justice apply only within the state because the stateis a coercive power that acts ‘in the name of’ its citizens (2005, 121, 128,129, 130, 138, 140, and 142). From this very short presentation of their

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views we can thus see that their arguments are united in an emphasis onthe relevance of coercion for the scope of distributive justice. We can alsosee, though, that there are two important differences in Blake and Nagel’sviews. First, Blake thinks some principles of distributive justice applyoutside of a system of coercion, whereas Nagel does not. Nagel thinks thatonly humanitarian duties apply outside of the coercive framework that isthe state. Second, Blake appeals simply to the coercive nature of the state(2001), whereas Nagel’s account appeals to the fact that states arecoercive and that they seek to act in the name of the people they govern(2005). I shall argue that neither argument is persuasive.12

§1. One response to Coercion Arguments (and one often directedagainst Blake) is to accept the normative premise and then argue thatcoercion thus understood actually applies at the global level. Many, forexample, argue that the international system—with immigration restric-tions and international institutions such as the WTO, IMF and WorldBank—is a coercive framework. Thus they conclude that Coercion Argu-ments, when combined with a proper understanding of the facts, supporta cosmopolitan conclusion.13

A second, related, response (one often directed against Nagel) is toargue that the normative premise needs to be revised but that when revisedwe find that the revised version applies at the global level. For example,many dispute Nagel’s claim that distributive justice applies only whenthere is a coercive actor that acts in the name of people governed by it andargue that the italicised clause should be omitted.14 They further argue thatif it is dropped then the remaining normative premise, when again combinedwith an accurate understanding of global politics, entails that principles ofdistributive justice apply globally.

I shall pursue a different tack. Both preceding replies have force butneither challenges the normative assumption that the existence ofcoercion is a necessary condition for the application of some or all prin-ciples of distributive justice,15 and thus neither helps one to defend ahumanity-centred cosmopolitan egalitarianism. However, a humanity-centred perspective can make two powerful points in reply.

§2. To see the first consider the following society:

Anarchia: This includes the following people. A1 undertakes unpleas-ant jobs so maybe is entitled to compensation for doing a job no onewant to do; B1 is very needy and so maybe is entitled to support to

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cover their basic needs; C1 is talented and hardworking and so ismaybe entitled to remuneration for that; D1 is now elderly but hascontributed a great deal to the community in the past; E1 is at the startof their adult life and we might think is entitled to given assistance tobe get a decent start in life. This society is anarchic. No one exercisescoercion over anyone else.

Compare this society with a second society:

Coercia: This society is identical to Anarchia save for one difference.Thus A2 undertakes the same kind of unpleasant job as A1; there is aperson, B2, who is as needy as B1; there is a third person, C2, who isas talented and hardworking as C1; D2 has made the same contributionas D1; and E2, like E1, is at the start of their adult life and we mightthink is entitled to be given assistance to get a decent start in life. Theone difference with Anarchia is this: in Coercia, unlike in Anarchia,there is a person Z (or, if you prefer, a group of people) who run thesociety coercively.16

Two preliminary comments are in order. The first concerns the definitionof coercion. The question of how one should define coercion has beenaddressed in a number of sophisticated analyses—including, for example,works by Nozick (1972), Raz (1986, 148–49: cf. also 149–57), Day (1977,265) and Wertheimer (1987) among many others. My argument does notdepend on adopting any one particular characterization of coercion out ofthese rival accounts. It can be couched by either (i) employing the coreconcept of coercion that is shared among the leading accounts of coercionor by (ii) employing any one of the leading accounts (say, Raz’s or Nozick’s).My argument is, thus, robust across different accounts of coercion. I shalljust say that whether one defines coercion along the lines of approach (i)or (ii), we should assume that Z possesses this in Coercia and that coercionis absent in Anarchia.

Second, someone might object that a society without coercion is im-possible. Now it can surely be conceded that the number of societies likeAnarchia is very small. However, it is simply false that such societies areimpossible. Consider the core idea of coercion (found in all leadingaccounts of coercion) according to which coercion exists where one agentmakes threats to others to impose a disadvantage on them if they do not

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do what the threatener wants. To imagine a society without coercion issimply to imagine one where people do not make threats against oneanother and do not force people to do things against their will.

Let us return to the example. Now it seems to me that whatever principleof distributive justice one thinks is correct the distribution should be thesame in both societies. If we think that A1 is entitled to receive assistancebecause they are needy then surely it follows that their analogue, A2,should also receive the same amount of assistance. Or, if we think that weshould reward the talented and industrious (in line with a desert theory ofjustice) it would seem to mean that the equally deserving C1 and C2 shouldreceive equal amounts. If we consider the criteria invoked by standard theoriesof distributive justice—neediness, compensation for unpleasant work,desert, or simply not being penalized through no fault of their own—thennone of these criteria would prescribe different principles for the two societies.

The reason for this is that distributive justice is concerned with prop-erties of persons, such as what they have done or what condition they arein. To illustrate the former: We may think, for example, that ‘A1 and A2should be compensated for doing an unpleasant job’ and/or that ‘B1 andB2 deserve to be remunerated for their contribution’. So, if two people inthe different societies are equally deserving then should they not betreated equally? Justice also concerns what conditions people are in. Forexample, do they have basic needs that are unmet? But if we follow thisreasoning through then those who are equally needy surely have just asstrong a claim in both societies.

Coercion arguments, however, would issue in counterintuitive con-clusions here for they would produce different verdicts on the two societies.Nagel’s version would generate the extraordinary conclusion that princi-ples of distributive justice should not apply to Anarchia. And Blake’sversion would be that whereas Coercia should aim for an egalitarian dis-tribution Anarchia has no such reason of justice to do so. Sufficiencywould be the appropriate principle here.

§3. But does this mean that being coerced has no moral significance?This would seem very implausible. The appropriate response to this is thatcoercion does have moral significance but not for egalitarian distributivejustice. And this is my second response to CoercionArguments. They mis-diagnose the moral relevance of coercion. Coercion does not bear directlyon distributive justice but it does bear on the legitimate exercise of political

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power. Consider again Coercia and Anarchia. The key difference is, ofcourse, that in the former Z is in charge. And the fact that he coercivelyruns the society is highly relevant. For it is then appropriate for his fellowcitizens to ask ‘what gives you the right to exercise coercive power?’Weneed to know whether his exercise of coercion is legitimate, where by le-gitimate I mean, following Allen Buchanan, that he has the right toexercise power over others (Buchanan 2004).17

Now, as Buchanan, among others, brings out ‘political legitimacy’ isnot the same as ‘justice’ (Buchanan 2004, chapters 5–7, especially 234 and432: cf. Brock 2009, 31). One might think, for example, that a politicalpower has legitimacy if it respects fundamental civil, political, andeconomic rights and it has a fair decision-making process that includes allrelevant actors and is conducted in an impartial manner. A political actorthat has these features, we might say, has the right to exercise power.

Interestingly Nagel’s own language brings out the plausibility of thisresponse to coercion. For he writes that “it is the existence of concentratedsovereign power that prompts the demand, and makes legitimacy an issue”(2005, 145: my emphasis). Moreover, he writes that in a sovereign state,

Without being given a choice, we are assigned a role in the collective life ofa particular society. The society makes us responsible for its acts, which aretaken in our name and on which, in a democracy, we may even have someinfluence; and it holds us responsible for obeying its laws and conforming toits norms, thereby supporting the institutions through which advantages anddisadvantages are created and distributed. Insofar as those institutions admitarbitrary inequalities, we are, even though the responsibility has been simplyhanded to us, responsible for them, and we therefore have standing to askwhy we should accept them. This request for justification has moral weighteven if we have in practice no choice but to live under the existing regime.The reason is that its requirements claim our active cooperation, and thiscannot be legitimately done without justification—otherwise it is purecoercion. (2005, 128–29, my emphasis, footnotes omitted)

Now my suggestion is that if a state “makes us responsible for its acts”and acts “in our name”, and if we are “held responsible for obeying itslaws” then a natural response to this is to see this as calling simply for alegitimate decision-making procedure—one that respects our rights(including economic rights) and gives us a fair say in the decision-makingprocess. And this conception of political legitimacy is distinct from, anddoes not require, egalitarian distributive justice.

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4. A Problem for Associational ApproachesHaving considered two challenges to a humanity-centred view and

found each wanting, I now want to outline and press home a seriousproblem for any associational account and to show that a humanity-centred approach copes with it much better.

To introduce this problem we need to return to the second and thirdquestions identified in Section I. As we saw there, Associational Argumentsmust identify some morally relevant property or properties (MRPs) thatan association must possess if it is to generate, say, principles of distribu-tive justice (or egalitarian principles of distributive justice). Associationswill vary in the extent to which they exhibit these morally relevant prop-erties (such as the extent of coercion or of the contribution they make tothe production of basic goods). Now as I observed in Section III, Associ-ational Accounts must answer the following question:

Q3: what is the relationship between (i) the extent to which an asso-ciation exhibits a morally relevant property and (ii) the content of thedistributive principle?

Associational Accounts have two options here. They can either adopt whatNagel terms a “continuous” approach or a “discontinuous” approach (2005,140–43). The two views can be represented diagrammatically below. Figure1 shows a discontinuous version and Figure 2 a continuous version.

Figure 1: Discontinuity

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Extent to which theassociation exhibits themorally relevant property (egthe extent of coercion orinterdependence).

x

Egalitarian characterof the distributiveprinciple

Figure 2: Continuity

§1. Consider first a discontinuity view. This holds that where peopleare not in an association which possesses the morally relevant property tothe requisite degree then no distributive principle applies but that once theappropriate relationship obtains then a certain principle (e.g., a differenceprinciple) applies. Though they differ radically in the conclusions theyreach, both Nagel and Charles Beitz affirm versions of this view. We cansee the problems in this discontinuity view by considering each in turn.

Consider Nagel first. He explicitly affirms a discontinuous view(2005, 141) and holds that only where there is a fully sovereign state doesdistributive justice apply. But this has the following counterintuitive im-plication. Imagine a political community that is the supreme authorityover a given territorially defined people and acts in their name on allissues but one. It is not a fully sovereign state because in one area it is notthe supreme authority. Suppose, for example, that in the European Unionthe member states no longer have supreme authority over foreign policyand that that function is held by the European Parliament. Since it is not afully sovereign state and since Nagel explicitly adheres to a discontinuityapproach then it follows that no principles of distributive justice applywithin those nonsovereign political communities. But this seems an in-credible conclusion.

Consider now the position taken by Charles Beitz in Political Theoryand International Relations. In the latter work Beitz adopts what I have

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Extent to which theassociation exhibits themorally relevant property (egthe extent of coercion orinterdependence).

Egalitarian characterof the distributiveprinciple

termed a Causal Interdependence account (Section I) and he defends aglobal difference principle on the basis that there is a system of global in-terdependence. In part III section 5 of Political Theory and InternationalRelations (1999) Beitz considers what level of integration is necessary forthe difference principle to apply. His answer is that where there is minimaltrade it does not apply but above a certain point the difference principleapplies. As he writes: “there is a threshold of interdependence above whichdistributive requirements like a global difference principle are valid, butbelow which significantly weaker principles hold” (1999, 165, 165–67).

However, this approach encounters several difficulties. The first isthat we lack any normative criteria to determine where we should specifythe threshold for a given principle. Beitz does not provide much guidance.He says that international interdependence must “produce significantaggregate benefits and costs that would not exist if states were economi-cally autarkic” (1999, 152, my emphasis). The difference principle, hewrites, applies when there are “substantial aggregate economic benefits”(145, my emphasis). But we stand in need of substantive normative criteriaand an argument for them. What constitutes “significant” or “substantial”benefits and costs? Consider Figure 1. What should determine where pointx occurs? Moreover, why does a subthreshold level of interdependencenot generate a global difference principle, and a post-threshold level of in-terdependence generate it? Furthermore, why does a level of interdependencejust above the threshold level, x, justify it and a level of integration wayabove point x have the same principle?18

§2. In light of these difficulties one might adopt a continuity view. Onemight, that is, hold that the more an association is characterised by an MRP(say, the more coercive it is, for a Coercion approach, or the more it createsbasic goods, for a Reciprocity approach) then the more redistributive thecontent of the principles of distributive justice. Cohen and Sabel explicitlyadopt this view, calling for egalitarianismwithin the state and other less egal-itarian principles of justice for the world given the kinds of relationshipsthat now exist at the global level (2006, 149, 163–64, cf. also 164–75).

This view, however, suffers from two problems. First, before we canaccept it we need an argument for it, and an explanation for why weshould not adopt a discontinuity account or even a humanity-centredaccount. (I will suggest below that the latter best fits our intuitions.)

Second, it is hard to see what normative criteria an associationaltheory can draw on to explain what the precise nature of the relationship

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should be between (i) the extent to which the association exhibits theMRP and (ii) the content of the distributive principle. To put it in dia-grammatic terms, we need a normative account of the gradient of the linein Figure 2. The slope could be drawn in steeper or in flatter ways or as astraight line or a curve so we need a normative criterion to determine thegradient. It is not enough to say that the more the association possesses theMRP then the more egalitarian the distributive principle for that stillleaves unsaid what the precise relationship between changes in the MRPand changes in the content of distributive justice should be. Cohen andSabel’s (2006) view that equality applies within the state and that somethingmore than humanitarianism but less than equality applies globally is thusincomplete until they provide guidance on how we determine what thisprinciple (or principles) should be.

Both the discontinuity and the continuity approaches are thus implau-sible.19 Therefore Associational Accounts cannot answer one of the keyquestions that they must be able to address. This matters for at least tworeasons. First, without this they are unable to provide guidance in our currentworld in which the global order involves a considerable amount of inter-dependence and coercion but not to the same extent as within the state.

Second, it means that associational accounts cannot capture the powerfulintuition that increases in the extent to which associations involve the useof coercion, and increases in the extent to which the fate of their membersdepends on their co-members, have normative implications for our under-standing of justice and what we owe each other.

Moreover, I believe, that contrary to what one might expect, a humanity-centred approach can capture this intuition. In the next section I will drawattention to several ways in which humanity-centred cosmopolitan egali-tarians can accommodate the thought that increased ties have normativeimplications for people’s entitlements and obligations of distributive justice.

5. The Accommodating Nature of Humanity-Centred EgalitarianismTo do so I wish to advance and defend three separate theses.§1. My defence of the first starts with the problem that beset Associ-

ational Accounts—namely that they seem unable to explain how principlesof distributive justice relate to associations with different levels of inter-dependence or coercion or common identity. To see why a humanity-centred approach can provide a compelling account of why increased coer-cion/reciprocity/sense of community/interdependence between members

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of a group can have moral relevance it is helpful to distinguish between,on the one hand, a distributive principle, and, on the other hand, what Ishall term the substantive implications of a given distributive principle. Toexplain: by a ‘distributive principle’ I mean simply the criterion thatshould govern the distribution of burdens and benefits. Familiar distribu-tive principles include equality, or priority for the least advantaged, orsufficiency. I employ the phrase ‘the substantive implications of a givendistributive principle’ to refer to what the distributive principle means inreality for entitlement bearers and duty bearers. The meaning of this un-familiar phrase will, I hope, become clearer in the paragraphs that follow.

My suggestion is this: although humanity-centred cosmopolitan egal-itarians hold that some distributive principles apply independently of persons’membership of a common association, the substantive implications of thoseprinciples will be affected by the extent to which persons belong to acommon association and the extent to which that association is coerciveand characterised by high levels of interdependence.

To give a (sufficientarian) example, suppose that a humanity-centredtheorist proposes the human right to health where this is defined as “theright of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard ofphysical and mental health” (the International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966,Art 12.1). Let us suppose thatwe accept this proposed right and, moreover, that we think it inheres in allpeople. We might then ask, what does this mean in practice? Twoquestions are particularly important, namely ‘How much healthcare issomeone entitled to?’ and ‘What does this right demand of others?’ Bothquestions concern the substantive implications of this right.

Now it seems very likely that the amount of healthcare that onemight think covered by the right will vary depending on how much peoplebelong to a common association and by the features of that association.Suppose, for example, that there are people in a remote valley with noroads or flights. Suppose now that over the next thirty years that valleybecomes much more integrated with the rest of the world. There are nowroads and much more transportation. This has two implications. The firstis that it may now be possible (because of this increased interdependenceand interaction) to transport medicines there that one could not previouslytransport (the ‘ought implies can’ consideration). The second is that evenif it might have been possible to transport some medicines there thirty

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years earlier, it is much less costly to do so now because of the increasedinteraction and transport networks. So whereas it might have been toodemanding to transport particular medicines 30 years ago because thetransportation costs were prohibitive, that is no longer the case (the ‘de-mandingness’ consideration). And it is no longer the case because thereare stronger ties. The point then is that though the distributive principle—all have a right to the highest attainable standard of health care—does notvary at all with changes in the nature of associations, the substantive im-plications of what that means in practice do vary, and the more we havecloser ties with others then the more medical care (in this case) they areentitled to receive and the more we are required to give.

I have illustrated this with a sufficientarian principle but the samepoint would clearly also apply to a prioritarian approach that requires usto maximize the condition of the least advantaged. What this means inpractice will vary as interdependence increases. With this in mind we cannow formulate the first thesis:

Thesis 1: The Variability Thesis. Humanity-centred egalitarianism canexplain the strong intuition that greater interdependence does havenormative implications for what people owe to others and what othersare entitled to receive. Even though the same fundamental principlemay apply whatever level of integration, the extent of integrationaffects what I have termed the ‘substantive implications’ of those fun-damental principles.

§2. Consider now a second way in which humanity-centred egalitarian-ism can accommodate intuitions about the moral importance of membershipof associations. By contrast with the first thesis that concerned the substantiveimplications of people’s entitlements, the second thesis concerns theextent to which we condemn inequalities as undesirable. It reads as follows:

Thesis 2: The Magnitude Thesis. Humanity-centred egalitarianismcan accommodate the thought that inequalities within associationsmay be worse than inequalities between people who are not part of acommon association (and, moreover, that the harmful effects of in-trasocietal inequality may be more harmful the more an association isinterconnected).

HUMANITY, ASSOCIATIONS, AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 527

It is widely recognized that intrasocietal inequalities can have a number ofvery serious effects on their members. A useful taxonomy has beenprovided by Martin O’Neill who notes that inequality may result instigma, domination, a lack of self-respect, servility, and a lack of community(2008, 121–23). Furthermore, there is now an extensive empirical literaturewhich concludes that inequalities within societies lead to stigma, anxiety,and poorer health for all (Marmot 2004; Wilkinson 2005, Wilkinson andPickett 2009).

Now humanity-centred cosmopolitan egalitarianism affirms that egal-itarian principles of distributive justice apply even where people are notcurrently part of a common global association. However, to affirm that in-equalities between people who are not part of a common association areunjust is quite compatible with the Magnitude Thesis’s claim that in-equalities between people who are part of a common association may beeven worse.20 Humanity-centred cosmopolitan egalitarianism simply insiststhat even where the evils that are said to be generated by intrasocietal in-equalities do not exist there is still an unfairness that should be addressed.

One might think that recognizing this point (and assuming that in-trastate inequalities will have more harmful effects than inequalities betweenpeople linked through the global market) weakens the case for interna-tional distribution on egalitarian lines. This, however, would be mistaken.For suppose that one distributes from wealthy Americans to the poorestmembers of an African country that is both poor and marked by consider-able inequality (say, Liberia). Such a policy, of course, would lessen globalinequalities. It should, however, also be endorsed by those concernedabout intrasocietal inequalities that result in stigma and the other evilslisted above, because redistributing wealth from the most affluentAmericansto the least affluent Liberians would also improve equality in the USA andequality in Liberia (and thus lessens all the ill effects noted by O’Neill andothers). So a humanity-centred cosmopolitan egalitarian animated byThesis 2 has three reasons to call for global distribution of the kind justdescribed. The points about the harmful inequalities within societiesprovide no reason to eschew globally egalitarian measures.21

To this we should add that if the Magnitude Thesis is correct, it followsthat the more that the global economy becomes integrated, the more moralimportance we may attach to the value of global equality (even though thecontent of the principle of distributive justice is invariant).22

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§3. I turn now to a third way in which humanity-centred egalitarianscan capture the ways in which associations have moral relevance for dis-tributive justice. In particular it is worth noting how membership of somekinds of association bears on one’s responsibilities. Consider, for example,membership of a political community like a state. One may say that in virtueof such a membership one acquires certain special responsibilities both (i) touphold the legitimate entitlements of one’s fellow citizens and also (ii) tocompensate others whom one’s state has harmed.What is important to note,in this context, is that this point can be recognized by humanity-centred egal-itarians for their central claim is a claim about people’s entitlements: everyoneis entitled, say, to roughly equally good prospects in life.As such, it is com-patible with holding that some have special responsibilities to ensure thatsome specific others to whom they are related enjoy their legitimate enti-tlements, as well as having general responsibilities to all. This thus leadsto the following thesis:

Thesis 3: The Special Responsibility Thesis. Humanity-centred egali-tarianism can accept that a person’s moral responsibilities may be afunction of their membership of associations. One may have specialobligations qua member of an institution that nonmembers do nothave whilst still also having general duties.23

8. ConclusionIt is time to conclude. In this paper I have sought to defend humanity-

centred cosmopolitan egalitarians from two leading associational theories—what I have termed the ReciprocityArgument and the CoercionArgument.My argument has been not that these arguments are empirically mistakenbut, rather, that their normative premises are unpersuasive and that theyexaggerate and misconstrue the normative significance of associations. I havethen argued that all associational arguments—including both cosmopolitanand noncosmopolitan associational theories—are unable to deal with the vari-ations in the internal nature of associations. Finally, I have argued that a humanity-centred cosmopolitan egalitarianism can rightly accommodate three insightsthat one might think are the preserve of associational approaches.24

Simon CaneyDepartment of Politics and International RelationsOxford University

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NOTES

1. For a similar concept see Darrel Moellendorf’s (2009, 33) “principle of associa-tional justice.”

2. See Arneson (2011, 153ff and especially 157–61), Beitz (1983, 595), Buchanan(1990, 2004), Barry (1989, 238–39; 2005, 17 & 33–34); Caney (2001, 2005, 2009);Richards (1983, especially 289–92); Tan (2004). The humanity-centred view is, note, anaccount of justice, and should not be confused with Tom Campbell’s (1974) well-knowndefence of ‘humanity’ as an alternative to ‘justice’.

3. The first three approaches can be found in Miller (2009). For a related, but nonethe-less distinct, taxonomy see Cohen and Sabel’s distinction between “Institutionalism,”“Cooperativism,” and “Interdependence” (Cohen and Sabel 2006, 153). Their second twocategories map onto my first and fourth respectively but they omit the Coercion Accountand the Communitarian Account, and I have omitted what they call Institutionalism. I donot claim my account is exhaustive but I believe it captures most of the main contenders.

4. I am indebted to Andrew Williams for discussion of this point as it applies to San-giovanni’s argument. This is a common weak point in associational arguments againstglobal egalitarianism. For example, many argue that Coercion Arguments might show thatthe existence of coercion is sufficient to generate egalitarian principles of distributivejustice but that their proponents wrongly conclude that the existence of coercion isnecessary for egalitarian principles of distributive justice: Abizadeh (2007, 353–55),Cavallero (2010, 29–30) and Moellendorf (2009, 25).

5. I think Pogge’s formulation of this negative duty (2008) is a compelling one. Pogge,of course, wishes to eschew any appeal to positive duties of justice and so would not affirmmy second set of duties.

6. This example appeals to notions of rectificatory justice rather than distributive justiceand so it is not obvious to me that the points that Sangiovanni makes there (if correct) wouldnecessarily apply to distributive justice. However, for the sake of argument I set this aside.

7. This response is also made against Sangiovanni by Gabriel Wollner (2010, 294).See, more generally his excellent critique of Sangiovanni’s examples (Wollner 2010, es-pecially 291–94). The importance of associational arguments that do not appeal toreciprocity but instead condemn inequality on the grounds that it results in ‘stigma’, ‘dom-ination’, a loss of ‘self-respect’, and ‘servility’ is well brought out by Martin O’Neill in hisdiscussion of “non-intrinsic egalitarianism” (O’Neill 2008 121–23: cf. also Scanlon 2002).

8. For Abizadeh’s distinction between an “existence condition,” a “constitutivecondition,” and an “instrumental condition” seeAbizadeh (2007, 324). The term “existencecondition” was originally coined in this context by Beitz (1983, 595).

9. For the concept of “special rights” and “special duties” (and “general rights”) seeHart (1955, 183–88).10. See Tan (2004, 175) and, more generally, Shue (1983, 603–606). For a distinct but

related point see Parfit (1997, 209).11. See also Hillel Steiner’s discussion. He also argues that special rights presuppose a

prior set of entitlements (1999, 172ff) and proposes (for his account of people’s pre-coop-eration entitlements) that each person has a right to an equal share of the Earth’s naturalresources (1994, chaps 7 and 8; 1999).12. For other Coercion Arguments see Risse (2006) and Valentini (2009).13. See Abizadeh (2007, 348–50); Barry and Valentini (2009, 494–95); Cavallero

(2010, 17–28); Cohen and Sabel (2006, 166–68); Tan (2004, 176–77); Ypi, Goodin &Barry (2009, esp 108–18).

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14. For examples seeAbizadeh (2007, 351–52), Armstrong (2009, 298, 301–303), BarryandValentini (2009, 495–96), Julius (2006, esp. 178, 182–84), andMoellendorf (2009, 31–32).15. Almost all critics of the Coercion Argument adopt either the first and/or second

response. Two exceptions are Richard Arneson and Ryan Pevnick. Both focus on thenature of justified coercion and argue that the best justification of coercion makes noreference to distributive issues (Arneson 2005, especially 137–38, 146, 149; Pevnick 2008,esp. 401–403). I adopt a different approach and focus on what I take to be our best under-standing of distributive justice and then seek to show that the presence or absence ofcoercion is not of fundamental moral importance for distributive justice. (See also Pevnick(2008, 403–406) for a different argument for the same conclusion.) The two kinds ofarguments are thus distinct and complementary.16. For a similar, but nonidentical, example see Sangiovanni (2007, 10–13). Sangio-

vanni imagines a society where the state’s coercive powers are disabled. One difference isthat Sangiovanni is keen to stress that the post-coercion state is an involuntary association(2007, 12). This, though, is not the case in Anarchia.17. For a brief earlier version of this argument see Caney (2008, 502; 2009, 403 and

405, footnote 21). See also Miller (2009, 301).18. Liam Murphy advances a related argument against Pogge’s theory of global justice

(1999, 274). Murphy does not distinguish between continuity and discontinuity approach-es and appears to assume that associational theories are committed to the latter. I believethat because of this Pogge is not vulnerable to Murphy’s argument. Nonetheless the pointMurphy raises does have force against discontinuity approaches.19. Space precludes an evaluation of other analyses of the choice between continuity

and discontinuity approaches (e.g., Julius 2006, 191–92).20. For a different argument for the same conclusion see Wollner (2010, 296).21. For a similar argument see Singer (2002, 174–75). As this argument illustrates, the

Magnitude Thesis should not be confused with what Robert Goodin terms the “magnifiermodel” (1988, 671–72). Th Magnitude Thesis is a claim about the badness of intra-asso-ciational inequalities (not a claim about special duties), whereas the Magnifier Model is aclaim about special duties (claiming that membership of associations “magnifies” persons’duties to co-members).22. On this point see also Caney (2009, 399–400) and Mandel (2006, especially 618–20).23. Note this claim is neither identical to nor reliant upon Robert Goodin’s (1988,

678–86) argument that special duties can be justified as the most effective way of realizingsome general (cosmopolitan) objective. Thesis 3 holds that the obligations exist simply invirtue of membership of a certain kind of political association.24. I am grateful to Ka-Wai Ip for discussions about the issues examined in this paper.

This paper was written while I held an ESRC research grant on Equity and ClimateChange, and I am grateful to the ESRC for its support.

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