2008 MF Heyns A cosmopolitan and authentic education

Acta Academica 2008 40(4): 200-223

Prof M F Heyns, School of Philosophy, North-West University, Private Bag X6001, Potchefstroom 2520; E-mail: [email protected]

Michael Heyns

A cosmopolitan and authentic educationFirst submission: August 2007Acceptance: January 2008

The article discusses globalism and fragmentism and the problems associated with these isms, as well as the effect of these problems on education as the practical application. It suggests that these problems can be remedied if globalism is tamed by the cosmopolitan motive and fragmentism by the ideal of authenticity. The interesting question in this theme deals with conditions that will enable these acts of rectification. The hypothesis is that both the cosmopolitan ideal and authenticity depend on a broad and even a shared set of assumptions or conditions which, if applied in practice, will enhance the taming of globalism and fragmentism. The article further argues that, although the cosmopolitan perspective emphasises universality and the extraself as conditions, it must allow for particularity and subjectivity. Similarly, authenticity will not be able to function without the universal and the extraself although it focuses on subjectivity and particularity.

’n Kosmopolitiese en outentieke onderwysGlobalisme en fragmentisme en probleme verbonde aan hierdie ismes word aan die orde gestel met die uitwerking van hierdie probleme in die onderwys as praktiese toe passing. Dit word aangevoer dat die probleme reggestel kan word as glo balisme “ingebreek” of “makgemaak” word deur die kosmopolitiese motief en fragmentisme deur die ideaal van outentisiteit. Die vraag binne hierdie tema handel oor die voor waardes wat hierdie regstelaksie moontlik sal maak. My hipotese is dat die kosmopolitiese ideaal en outentisiteit beide afhanklik is van ’n breë en selfs gedeelde stel vooronderstellings of voorwaardes wat, indien dit in die praktyk aandag kry, die “makmaak” van globalisme en fragmentisme sal bevorder. Ek re deneer gevolglik dat alhoewel die kosmopolitiese perspektief die klem plaas op die universele en die ekstraself as voorwaardes, dit tog ook nie anders kan as om ruimte te maak vir partikulariteit en subjektiwiteit nie. Op soortgelyke wyse kan outentisiteit nie klaarkom sonder die universele en die ekstraself nie, alhoewel veral die subjektiewe en partikuliere die fokuspunt in hierdie ideaal is.

201

Heyns/A cosmopolitan and authentic educationHeyns/A cosmopolitan and authentic education

Education, like other areas of current society, is significantly influenced by two ostensibly opposite motives, namely globalism (a totalitarian process of globalisation driven by the

interests of big business) and fragmentism (an obsession with the politics of identity that can be noted in, for instance, malignant nationalisms and the socalled clash of civilisations). Fragmentism is characterised by particularism and subjectivism as its sole conditions whereas globalism seems to presuppose only universalism and extraself determinations. Moreover, these exclusive conditions not only characterise educational politics but also play an important role in teaching and learning.

This article investigates the possibility of following David Held’s (2003: 514) proposal that globalism can be “tamed” by the cosmopolitan perspective, and the possibility that fragmentism and its unacceptable mix of assumptions can similarly be substituted by authenticity. The argument therefore focuses mainly on ways to examine internationalisation and the politics of identity in educational practices that do not lead to totalitarian deformations.

The main question can be formulated as follows: What in our thinking about education are the conditions that will enable a moderate process of internationalisation as well as a politics of identity.

The article argues that authenticity and the cosmopolitan perspective capture the important traits of fragmentism and globalism while allowing for conditions that are not always explicit or visible in the processes of internationalisation and identity politics but nevertheless inescapable. For instance, authenticity’s emphasis on the subjective and particular is only valid if it is also presupposed by the extraself and the universal. Similarly, the cosmopolitan perspective emphasises the universal and the extraself, but can only manifest a proper form with the subjective and particular present. Therefore, rather than trying to eliminate one of, or striking some compromise between the two ideals, their shared conditions and how the cooperation of these conditions can achieve the worthwhile aims of both the authentic and cosmopolitan positions are emphasised.

Acta Academica 2008: 40(4)

202

The argument starts with two case studies on the influence of globalism and fragmentism on education in order to suggest that the totalitarianism of the latter two motives causes unacceptable conflicts. It then indicates the perspective and the way in which a philosophical reflection on the possibility of an authentic and cosmopolitan perspective on education are achieved. The remainder of the argument examines perceptions of authenticity and the cosmopolitan view in order to determine whether they can be moulded into moderate substitutes for globalism and fragmentism.

1. Two examples from educationIt is claimed in the introduction that education is significantly predisposed by globalism and fragmentism. This section will investigate two instances of educational politics that are infested with the traits of fragmentism and globalism in order to substantiate this claim. The aim of the original study of the first example from South Africa was to determine the attitudes of parents and children from different race groups that influence the academic achievement of children. From the account of these attitudes, it is clear that what I call globalist and fragmentist motives are the main stimuli for the prominent attitudes. In the second example the researcher intended to indicate more directly how globalism and fragmentism can shape the attitudes of people and give direction to a political struggle concerning educational policy. The point of comparison between the two examples is therefore clearly the influence of globalism and fragmentism on the present educational climate.

Crain Soudien (2007: 17) reports that in South Africa white Afrikaans parents and their children are unwilling to mingle in school with nonwhite children. Soudien ascribes this to the racism of parents and their inability to participate in the nationbuilding project of the new South Africa.

However, his account of the two reasons given by the “racist” culprits is interesting. They claim that nonwhite children are not members of their “own people” and that black children are not as intelligent as white children. Soudien acknowledges that black children

203

Heyns/A cosmopolitan and authentic education

from both poor and middleclass backgrounds are poor academic achievers. His reason for this is the parents’ failure to participate in the learning process, for instance to set fixed study hours and to cultivate a reading culture in order to “produce skilful and adaptable young people to the knowledge driven society” — a globalisation sentiment which, according to Soudien, is alive among Afrikaansspeaking parents and their children.

Afrikaans speakers move in two distinctive directions. The ar gument of “wanting to be among their own people” indicates a strong sense of particularity while the sentiment about “achievement” suggests an embracing of globalist values. In order to remedy the malaise of racism and ethnocentric particularism, Soudien wants to cast education along the lines of a broader South African nationalism. This nationbuilding project, of course, is still a form of particularism and will therefore clash with the demands of globalism — a clash that Soudien acknowledges.

These dialectical flights into fragmentism and globalism are not unique to Afrikaans speakers. They reflect a tendency noted in Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong who challenged the educational ethos of the Richmond district in Vancouver, Canada, between 1997 and 1999. In her account of this struggle, a Chinese immigrant May Leung claimed that her experience of the neighbourhood school had been a nightmare. Her children’s performance in both the academic and moral sense dropped considerably. She attributed this to the values instilled in children by the school system, namely selfconfidence, outspokenness, creativity, and the ability to simplify things. The values that she would rather see in her children are selfdiscipline, humbleness, selfmotivation and an ability to be organised. These values will lift academic standards and give her children an advantage in a “competitive society”. Responses from the original liberal residents were scathing. They strongly preferred creativity and nonconformance to authority, and accused the immigrants of hankering after an outdated repressive school system in which learners were forced to be obedient workers in a larger system of corporate management. They added that the immigrants sought classrooms of child ren who were essentially alike and excluded individuals and social groups


204

who differ from their homogenised picture. After a threeyear clash between these two groups, the liberal group made a number of compromises that emphasise morality, authority and efficiency in the implementation of school policy (Mitchell 2001: 645).

The liberal emphasis on creativity and nonconformance to authority represents a modern centring on the self; in other words, subjectivism as part of a tendency in the direction of fragmentism. But there is more to these conflicts than subjectivism. According to Mitchell’s (2001: 6970) interpretation, the ultimate compromise reflects a mild shift from educating children “to be members of a na tional community” to educating them “to be successful global citizens”. Furthermore, the immigrants regard their values as more conducive to forming high achievers in a global market. This goes against the emphasis of the liberal Canadian public school system and its goal of nation building. The liberalism of Canadian nationalism emphasises values that centre on individualism and multiculturalism. The latter inclusion of minorities nevertheless assumes that Western liberalism is philosophically superior and thus better for all. Because of their “Asian otherness”, the Chinese immigrants remain “the constitutive outside” of the Canadian nationbuilding project, according to Mitchell.

As is the case with the Chinese immigrants in Canada, a simple advocacy of a broader nationalism will not be the final solution to the problem of fragmentism in South African education as it will merely endeavour to combat one particularism with another. There is an unusually strong sense of particularity among white Afrikaans speakers. However, the new South African nationalism may also hesitate to allow for the “otherness” of Afrikaans speakers because of its implicit but different particularity. This repetition of particularism drives Afrikaans speakers either in the arms of ethnocentrism or in those of globalism.

In the case studies from Canada and South Africa the conflict of individualist, nationalist and ethnocentric sentiments, on the one hand, and the universalist and homogenising tendencies on the other, is obvious. The question arises whether these opposing trends are the irreparable products of the absolutism of fragmentism and

205


globalism or whether it is possible to reform educational practices influenced by authenticity and the cosmopolitan view, both of which show the potential to be more moderate motives.1

2. A transcendental approachThe latter goal suggests an important difference between the totalitarianism evident in globalism or fragmentism and a limitedness which should be associated with authenticity and the cosmopolitan perspective. In order to focus on this difference, the ontology and method used to make this distinction will now be discussed.

A transcendental approach to the topic will be pursued. According to Taylor (1995: 20), such approach starts with “some feature of our experience” which is considered “indubitable”. It shifts from this observation to “a stronger conclusion, one concerning the nature of the subject or the subject’s position in the world”. The latter step beyond the initial observation becomes a condition for the former: “the stronger conclusion must be so if the indubitable fact about experience is to be possible”.2

A more critical version of this transcendental approach also starts with an observation which is neither “unchallenged” nor “indubitable” and whose conditions are to some extent lacking or distorted. Globalism, for instance, creates the impression that it reduces all of reality to universalism, thus forcing particularity to a nonexistence. In the case of fragmentism, the first observation is that of an exclusive emphasis on particularity, with universality labelled as the main

1 The broader challenge, according to Mitchell (2001: 71), is to educate learners “in a nonnationalist framework” and simultaneously not to move from nationalism “directly into the netherworld of global capitalism”.

2 The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy describes transcendental arguments as a way of arguing that “elucidates the conditions for the possibility of some fundamental phenomenon” (Anthony Brueckner, Transcendental argument, Audi 2005: 9256). This kind of argument starts with a phenomenon that is regarded as “unchallenged or uncontroversial” and then “proceeds deductively” to a conclusion asserting some “enabling condition for the pheno menon” (Audi 2005: 925).


206

enemy to be eradicated. The transcendental step beyond the sense of distortion and lack therefore endeavours to retrieve the missing conditions. The distortions of globalism and fragmentism can in this way be reformed by authenticity and the cosmopolitan perspective, on condition that the latter motives allow for traits that are ignored by globalism and fragmentism.

The transcendental critique used in this instance assumes a specific ontology for the influence of motives developed from a Christianreformed perspective. Andree Troost’s version of this perspective — in particular his suggestion that two types of motive can be distinguished as conditions for the actions of human beings — is useful for the purposes of the present argument.

Troost (1958: 382) calls the first type of motive an ethos. This resembles what Herman Dooyeweerd called a religious ground motive, and shall be referred to as a “centred motive”. The following characteristics for this kind of motive can be “distilled” from Troost’s explanations:

•Acentredmotivehasareligious-directionalfunction Troost (1958: 372, 374, 382) argues that an ethos assumes a fundamental orientation and choice vis-à-vis what is regarded as the origin of reality.•Acentredmotivehasatotalitariancharacter Troost (1958: 3768) states that the Christian ethos, for example, assumes the demand of Christ that a person must seek the king dom of God in all of life.•Acentredmotiveplaysaprominenttranscendentalrole An ethos cannot be totalitarian and directional if, as Troost (1958: 378) points out, it is not positioned at the root of life.•Acentredmotivehasanintegratingrole According to Troost (1958: 37880), an ethos influences all pos sible structures and therefore weaves all of life together.•Acentredmotiveplaysanorderingrole For instance, the influence of every “thing” in a worldview is determined by this motive. Troost (1958: 3789) claims, for example, that it is a fundamental mistake, from a Christian per spective, for a single aspect or structure in creation to function independently and autonomously because this function or struc ture does not have a mere influential relationship with other as pects or structures but strives to determine everything in a to

207


talitarian manner. It is thus possible to distinguish between a motive that centres the kingdom of God and an idolatrous mo tive that absolutises some “value” from within creation itself.

Globalism and fragmentism may be regarded as centred motives in this sense. The two motives centre ostensibly opposite traits of creation, namely universality and particularity. These centred traits are used in a totalitarian, transcendental, integrating and ordering way to give a specific direction to the phenomena (for instance education) under their control. This centring explains why the particular in globalism and the universal in fragmentism disappear or are eclipsed.

In addition to the totalitarian, integrating, transcendental and directional characteristics of centred motives Troost (1958: 372, 374) distinguishes a second kind of motive with a more limited scope. He does not name these motives but merely refers to them as “dispositions” and “habitualities”. It can be inferred that these motives have the following characteristics.

They originate in the habits, beliefs, capacities and characteristics of human beings (Troost 1958: 374, 382). Because of these motives, the actions of human beings acquire a specific structure. Formulated differently, these motives give a particular style or form to the actions or practices of people. This style or form manifests itself, for instance, in the spirit of an age (Troost 1958: 374, 375). These motives therefore exert a prominent formgiving influence. However, this influence is not fundamentally directional and integrating in a totalitarian manner, and the motives do not function in a centred manner. In addition, they are not inclined to reductionism. According to Troost (1958: 375), these motives cause values to be shifted either into the foreground or into the background. It can nevertheless be inferred that this prioritising will not exclude other values and traits. The limitedness of these motives should also enable more than one motive to exist next to one another and to interact.

As limited motives, the cosmopolitan aspect and authenticity cannot function like centred ones without losing their identity as mere style motives. Furthermore, it can be argued positively that these style motives are in some cases even a necessity because they


208

represent dispositions and habits needed to deal effectively with that particular situation. If, for instance, the South African educational situation is treated from the perspective of authenticity, it can promote mothertongue education without running the risk of being used for ethnocentric purposes. It only promotes this goal and does not attempt to cast all education in a fragmentist style. Furthermore, because this motive does not aspire to centre its foregrounded dispositions, it means that other dispositions relevant to the particular situation are still prevalent. It can be argued that authenticity and the cosmopolitan perspective should function as style motives in this “generous” way without suffering from the distortions of globalism and fragmentism.

3. AuthenticityFrom Charles Taylor’s authoritative description of authenticity a number of transcendental deductions can be made on how a moderate understanding of subjectivity and particularity should be used to motivate human action.

What is the modern view of authenticity? What is our initial observation? Authenticity is the “moral ideal” that one should be “true to oneself”. However, Taylor (1991: 14, 15, 91) remarks that this ideal developed a “specifically modern understanding” which implies the practice of selffulfilment in which

... everyone has a right to develop their own form of life, grounded on their own sense of what is really important or of value [...] No one else can or should try to dictate its content.

This “modern understanding” takes the transcendental step back wards and prescribes conditions for authenticity. First, it assumes a very strong sense of subjectivity rather than a prominent role for the extraself. Secondly, it presupposes an emphasis on the particular rather than the universal. In addition, the modern understanding of authenticity demands that I be in contact with “my own inner nature” in order to escape the “pressures towards outward conformity”, thus emphasising a “principle of originality”; to be true to myself implies that I be “true to my own originality”, that I realise “a potentiality

209


that is properly my own” (Taylor 1991: 29). The concept therefore portrays, as third condition, the influence of the Romantic emphasis on the creative ability of the human being. Because of this influence one can suspect a fourth condition for authenticity, namely a reduction of the role of reason.

In light of this emphasis on the arational, the particular, the creative and the subjective, a transcendental critique of authenticity should be cautious not to degenerate into possible isms such as irrationalism, particularism, constructivism and subjectivism but rather to search for the justifiable places of the subjective, the particular, the creative and the arational in human life. Taylor is sensi tive to this critical aspect of the transcendental method.

Taylor (1991: 601, 67) is, for instance, critical of the emphasis on selfcreation in the “popular culture of authenticity”. He describes the powerful influence of a “high culture” on the culture of authenticity in which Nietzsche and his “critique of all values” (and the elaborations of neoNietzscheans like Derrida and Foucault with their deconstruction of all “our ordinary categories”) are pi votal. Taylor claims that this gives the impression that everything is created by human beings, leaving them ultimately “with a sense of untrammelled power and freedom before a world that imposes no standards”.

The totalitarian nature of modern subjectivism must be tamed albeit an important condition for an authentic life. An important but underemphasised transcendental condition for an ideal authenticity is therefore to assume that the authentic aspect “ha[s] to take as background some sense of what is significant”. Subjectivism implies that things have value not “of themselves” but simply because “people deem them to have it — as though people could determine what is significant, either by decision, or ... by just feeling that way”. But this is “crazy”, says Taylor; a person could for instance not “just decide” that the most important thing to do is “wiggling my toes in warm mud”. The point he wants to make is that things acquire meaning and value “against a background of intelligibility”. If, in the current understanding of authenticity, all emphasis is on “an affirmation of choice itself” the “preexisting horizon of significance” is denied as well as that which makes it intelligible why “some things


210

are worthwhile and others less so, and still others not at all” (Taylor 1991: 358).

Does this condition (an extraself horizon of meaning) not imply that Taylor in fact rejects the most important feature of authenticity, namely subjectivity? Can authenticity exist as a limited motive that allows a multitude of conditions? Smeyers suggests that it cannot. He begins his argument with a moderate intention, claiming that a potential position should be neither the subjectivism of simply making a choice nor that of Taylor which assumes a horizon of significance that gives an agent a range of choices. This third alternative, according to Smeyers (1996: 2), is the position in which people regard their values as “not open to questioning by others”. For Smeyers this implies that they “do not make a choice at all” and “just do something” because they “see things in a radically different way”.

However, not consciously considering the extraself horizon of meaning seems to involve a choice for an irrationalist perspective in which contact with the extraself is instinctive. Smeyers (1996: 23) acknowledges that people cannot generate their values ex nihilo; they cannot radically split with their past or with society around them — he is not a complete subjectivist. He nevertheless insists on the priority of “just doing something” and accuses Taylor of an “overly rationalistic vision of humanity”.

Smeyers is correct to reject rationalism and to emphasise the role of human action. However, his alternative hovers on the brink of irrationalism with his focus on pure action. Taylor, on the other hand, might be a mild rationalist, although Smeyers did not present the case for this label very convincingly. Taylor’s main argument, namely that extraself horizons of meaning should also be given a deliberated place in authenticity, appears to be more comprehensive than that of Smeyers.

Moreover, Taylor indicates how this cooperation between sub ject and the outer subject should be comprehended. He advocates a “subjectivation of manner” (Taylor 1991: 812). This implies that, although expression via the human subject is inescapable, it does not mean that all content of expression needs to be the creation of the subject. In fact, extraself sources express themselves via human beings.

211


Taylor explains that it is meaningless to separate the subjective and the extraself in our actions and practices. What we, as individuals and as groups, create and translate into actions originate in what we deem valuable in the structures of reality around us. Our actions therefore portray an inescapable subjective character: we pick what we think is important and not always what is objectively important. However, the fact that our actions also originate in horizons outside our choices means that we have to allow for a comprehensive set of values and not only for those we prefer.

4. Authenticity and educationThe two case studies on the influence of globalism and fragmentism on education prompted the following question: Can children be schooled with motives that avoid the extremities of fragmentism and globalism? Part of the hypothesis of this article is that the onesided motives of particularity and subjectivity in liberalism, multiculturalism and nationalism can acquire proper form if viewed in the light of the motive of authenticity. For a better understanding of this goal, this section will examine the connection between authenticity and education. The argument will refer briefly to constructivist theories of education in order to illustrate the kind of extreme subjectivist selfcreation that cannot be accepted. A discussion of a weak attempt to apply authenticity in its limited form to the practice of education and suggest ways to strengthen the attempt will follow.

Since the 1990s educationists have mentioned a “major paradigm shift” in education when referring to constructivist theories of learning. Constructivism rejects the traditional view that teachers transfer knowledge to learners, and argues that teachers are merely the facilitators for insightful learning. The assumption that “true learning involves active construction of meaning and knowledge” on the part of the learner is important — “learners progressively build up and reconstruct their own schemes of the world around them” (Van der Walt & Fowler 2006: 14). Radical constructivism argues that knowledge has “no permanent, objective and stable truth value”, that we are unable to know the world as it is, and that each of


212

us has only access to our own interpretations and experiences of the world. Equally important is the assumption that there is no “underlying order in reality” for human beings to discover. We construct and constantly revise our own life world. Therefore, knowledge can only be labelled true if it works. The task of educators is to help learners to choose their own values, with the emphasis on their autonomy (Van der Walt & Fowler 2006: 15).

This emphasis on learners as autonomous creators of their own meaning places constructivism in the ambit of the modern culture of authenticity. However, like the Chinese immigrants in the example mentioned earlier, the feeling is that the solipsism of radical constructivism which rejects all meaning, standards and authority outside the self is in serious danger of degenerating into practices of low standard and a loss of strong moral sensitivity. Radical constructivism should therefore be reconsidered from the perspective of an ideal of authenticity that allows for an extraself horizon of meaning.

This appears to be true of the authenticity in education as professed by Robert Leahy (1994: 450, 452) who emphasises the subjective focus of authenticity. He therefore rejects “inauthenticity” as a distortion of one’s “sense of selfcohesion”, which happens when the self is reduced to what society prescribes. Authenticity thus means to act against the moral expectations of one’s community. Leahy (1994: 4478, 161) rejects education’s emphasis on the ability “to control emotions with reason”. This rationalism is, for Leahy, the equivalent of the extraself because it means that “moral worth is judged by adherence to universalizable moral principles”. Authenticity, on the other hand, does not assume “strict adherence to universalizable moral principles”. The aim of authenticity is integrative while the emphasis is on “moral character” in individual situations and thus the ability to “integrate reason and emotion”. The aim of this integration is to place caring (or “a caring attachment to other”) as the central motive in education.

Leahy (1994: 454, 456, 460) argues that “care for another” in the educational process will help a pupil to “grow and actualize himself”. He then argues that an emphasis on caring, the ethical, emotions, dialogue and relationships can help one to escape the fear of

213


relativism — a fear that stems from the view that emotion is idiosyncratic irrationality. Relativism is not a significant danger because, in Leahy’s view, it does not imply capriciousness. In other words, “the crucial issue in ethics is not relativism but relation — not reason but care”. Leahy (1994: 461) therefore claims (in the spirit of William James) that

maybe at bottom this is the distinction between autonomy and authenticity […] reasondriven folks inclined toward autonomy connect by appeal to rules, and emotiondriven folks inclined toward authenticity connect through goodheartedness.

In his attempt to create a synthesis, Leahy prefers human aspects and abilities that are strongly associated with the arational subjectivity of the self, which is set against aspects such as rationality and rules that seem to make demands from the outside on the human being. In this cultivation of an attitude of care, one nevertheless has the sense that Leahy finds it difficult to give reason and the extraself a proper place in authenticity. There is of course a legitimate place for the subjective point of view. Hutchinson (1996: 1) points out that we should reject a “notion of the self as one that is constantly changing to meet the demands of the competing voices surrounding it” and seek “a vantage point from which to view the world and create a sense of self that persists through time”. However, an overemphasis of the inner self and its capabilities will make us lose sight of the extraself as is the case with Leahy’s undue belief in subjectivity.

The better way to proceed is to seek the entire range of conditions for a genuine or authentic education. In this attempt some conditions should not conflict with others. This will be unlike Leahy’s dialectic way of dealing with authenticity which portrays reason and the extrasubjective as something that is tolerated at best. In a detailed transcendental view of authenticity, reason and the extrasubjective are also treated as necessary conditions, forming a horizon of meaning and a benchmark that enables the self to make informed and responsible decisions. It is as part of such a horizon and benchmark that rationality, rules, authority and so on have a place in an education that cares about teaching young people to be authentic.


214

5. CosmopolitanismThis and the following section will argue that, although the centred motive of globalism is not acceptable, the good potential in the pro cess of internationalisation can be given direction from a limited cosmopolitan perspective. Attention will also be paid to those conditions that are not always obvious when cosmopolitanism is advocated.

Cosmopolitanism is usually regarded as an ideal for human coexistence. However, the way in which people live together will necessarily influence the way in which they view themselves and the world in which they live. In addition, their image of themselves and the cosmos will necessarily precondition their view on how their abilities and needs will be met in their coexistence with others.

With this general remark as background, the central idea of coexistence in cosmopolitanism can serve as the point of departure in an analysis of the wider conditions for this motive. Although there are a number of different modalities of cosmopolitanism (for example moral, political, cultural and economical) and although a distinction can be made between strict (radical) and moderate cosmopolitanism, they all share the idea that all human beings “do (or at least can) belong to a single community, and that this community should be cultivated” (Brown & Kleingeld 2002: 1).

Every human being regards all persons as equal;3 if they are equal they cannot be separated in strongly defined groups. In other words, differences between people are not sufficiently significant to necessitate collectivities that differ from each other as if their members were from different species.

In addition, a cosmopolitan way of living in which all human beings are equal will assume as condition a cosmos that ensures that this equality is enforced over a broad spectrum. Cosmopolitanism

3 According to Held (2003: 514, 515, 520), the equality of all human beings is the basic value of cosmopolitanism which implies that all “should enjoy, in principle, equal consideration of their interests”.

215


thus tends to argue that the world and society are structured in a single universally valid and rational manner.4

A disciple of the moderate moral cosmo politanism of the Stoics, Martha Nussbaum, distinguishes, according to the emphasis on universality, between “what in our practices is local and nonessential” and “what is more broadly or deeply shared”. She also emphasises rationality when she claims that cosmopolitanism is the only viewpoint that “recognizes in people what is especially fundamental about them”, namely “their aspirations to justice and goodness and their capacities for reasoning” (Nussbaum 1996: 8, 11).

Nussbaum tends to reduce our humanity to reason and the moral capacity. This kind of reductionism opposes the view that rationality and morality in their concrete and specific manifestations are influenced by a person’s culture, religion, the body, gender and so on, and that rationality will therefore not have the same meaning for all.5 If rationality is not immune to other aspects and abilities, the latter are equally important in our effort to being human.

Another tendency in Nussbaum’s thinking is her resistance against particularism, which can be endorsed. Nevertheless, powerful manifestations of particularity and locality challenge us to give a meaningful place to the particular in our view of being human and of

4 Toulmin (1992: 678) traces the meaning of cosmopolis to the ancient Greek distinction between the order of nature (cosmos) over which human beings have a mere marginal command, and the order of society, which is under human control. Cosmopolis represented the dream of an overall rational harmony and fusion between these two orders. The upshot of this fusion was the philosophical idea that the structure of nature reinforces a rational social order. My positive allusion to “cosmopolis”, however, will not be to a rationalist order but to the idea of a transcendental structure which gives coherence and positive direction to our social diversity.

5 Lehman (2002: 4246, 428) points out that a rightsbased and procedural approach (something akin to the rationalist morality of Nussbaum) is also the hallmark of cosmopolitans like Kant and Habermas. Such approach ignores the wider “dimensions of ‘being’ and ‘belonging’” of people. This critique is also given by Himmelfarb (1996: 747), McConnell (1996: 824), and Putnam (1996: 936) against Nussbaum’s rationalist motivation for the cosmopolitan viewpoint.


216

human coexistence.6 This challenge underlies, for instance, Sandel’s (1984: 837) wellknown portrayal of the liberal idea of an “unencumbered self” as the pretence to be free from the embeddings and determinations of nature and human communities on the self. Nussbaum’s focus on “the world community of justice and reason” can therefore be regarded as too abstract and thin to be seriously con sidered as the pivotal reason for human communality. The underlying threat of the unencumbered self in Nussbaum’s cosmopolitanism must be countered by identifying local embeddings and determinations as conditions for the existence of a common human community.

The idea of being embedded in arational modalities and particularity are some of the less obvious conditions for the cosmopolitan point of view. Other conditions that usually underemphasise the portrayal of the cosmopolitan motive are individuality and subjectivity. The latter are clearly present in the seven basic cosmopolitan principles of David Held, a wellknown champion of cosmopolitanism.

Held (2003: 513, 520) identifies the equal moral status of all human beings as the “basis” or “crux” for cosmopolitanism. Held (2003: 5158) underpins this universal foundation with con cepts such as “active agency” and “personal responsibility” and the subjective principles of “consent” (people should be able to negotiate their inter

6 In the Cynic tradition, which was revived in the eighteenth century, a radical cosmopolitanism is put forward that claims to not “being committed to anywhere”. This ultrauniversalism is contra the more moderate cosmopolitanism that draws on the Stoic tradition. The moderate view puts forward the “moral ideal of a universal human community” but does not see this as “inimical to more particular attachments” (Brown & Kleingeld 2002: 4). Vincent (2002: 24) nevertheless insists that current cosmopolitans usually assume that groups are not significant entities, that individuals are the true realities because they can be truly equal when they are devoid of race, sex, ethnicity, age or nationality. He observes (and emphasises that he does not want to encourage tribalism) that the tribal group is the more common experience of most people. This means that uncompromising cosmopolitans are out of touch with the social and political reality. There is also, according to Vincent, the argument that fragmentation, difference and the discovery of own habits, laws and culture represent a positive value and promote political development. The latter argument is once again morally suspect in the eyes of Vincent but simultaneously an inescapable reality.

217


connections and interdependence in a noncoercive process) and “collective decisionmaking”. This subjectivity is also obvious in the principle that those who are affected by public decisions should “have an equal opportunity ... to influence and shape them”. In fact, in a remark that clearly rejects the determinist claims of globalists, Held (2003: 5156) argues that the cosmopolitan aspect understands human agency not “merely as the product of coercive forces or as the passive embodiment of fate” but it “places at its center the capability of persons to choose freely”. Held adds that “actors have to be aware of and [be] accountable for the consequences of actions, direct or indirect, intended or unintended, that may restrict or delimit the choices of others”.

Held not only acknowledges conditions that implicate the subjectivity of human beings in the cosmopolitan ideal. His principles also acknowledge that plurality and locality (or particularity) are assumed in setting the goal of interconnectedness. Held (2003: 516) states, for instance, that people will inevitability choose different cultural, social, and economic projects and that these differences “need to be both recognized and accepted”. Held (2003: 515, 518) also assumes the “necessity of both the decentralization and centralization of political power”. Decentralisation is necessary to maximise the ability of individuals to determine the conditions of their lives. In fact, he argues that “decisionmaking should be decentralized as much as possible” and that “centralization is favored if, and only if, it is the necessary basis for avoiding the exclusion of persons who are significantly affected by a political decision”.

It is argued above not only that authenticity must allow for the outersubjective but also that the latter is needed as a horizon of meaning — subjectivity is only possible if it has nonsubjective choices. Held’s description of the cosmopolitan viewpoint clearly allows for conditions that are not usually prominent in the process of internationalisation. He is, however, not yet clear about the inescapable interdependency of ostensibly opposites in the cosmopolitan viewpoint. This interdependency underlies his emphasis on human agency which will become instrumental in dealing on an international scale with the large threats to human wellbeing. This interdependence


218

between the salient cosmological point of view and subjectivity in the form of political activism is a strong theme in education from a cosmopolitan perspective.

6. Cosmopolitanism and educationThe main assumption of Nussbaum’s argument for a cosmopolitan education is political agency and responsibility. Nussbaum (1996: 8, 123) insists that partisan loyalties tend to sabotage public political deliberation. Her example of what this implies refers to the coming ecological disaster because

... we live in a world in which the destinies of nations are closely intertwined with respect to basic goods and survival [...] any intelligent deliberation about ecology — as, also, about the food supply and population — requires global planning, global knowledge, and the recognition of a shared future.

Americans, for instance, have a very high living standard that “cannot be universalized”. This implies that they need to educate their children “to be troubled” by this reality. In addition, if liberal Americans “really do believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights”, they “are morally required to think about what that conception requires [them] to do with and for the rest of the world”.

Runte (2001: 42) clearly explains the need to view subjectivity as an essential ingredient of the cosmopolitan perspective when she argues that globalisation provides “focal points for political action” and that the linking of people by means of new technologies of communication “will place power in the hands of the people”. Therefore, when Runte argues that we should “adopt a global perspective” in which we “reeducate humankind” and “create a new form of education” because such an education will “take us beyond the haunting sense of hopelessness”, it must be acknowledged that human subjectivity in the form of political agency requires a more prominent role in the socalled “global perspective”.

A second issue that needs attention is the interdependency between universality and particularity (visible in the conditions of

219


otherness and locality) in education that cannot be sidestepped by the cosmopolitan ideal.

The image of cosmopolitan accounts is an attempt to avoid particularity as far as possible. Nussbaum (1996: 8, 11), for instance, recommends a cosmopolitan education which will let us “see ourselves more clearly when we see our ways in relation to those of other reasonable people”. An education that makes one think that “one’s own preferences and ways are neutral and natural” is irrational. If we see ourselves through the eyes of another, we shall be able to distinguish between inessential particularities and the really important uni versal motives. Runte (2001: 423) is also of the opinion that education should aim not only at understanding other cultures but also at seeing oneself and one’s own culture through the eyes of others. Such education must invert Descartes’ logic: instead of starting from individual and local concerns, a “global agenda” should start from “humanity and conclude with inclusive peace”.

It is, however, not possible to eliminate the importance of “Descartes’ logic” in order to “conclude with inclusive peace” because local needs and problems must be solved on a global scale. In fact, Runte (2001: 3940) paradoxically makes this point when she mentions that globalism creates the perception for many individuals and groups that they are losing control and identity. Citizens are frustrated with indirect democracy because a vote every few years cannot change much while all kinds of international bodies and conferences that are not responsible to any constituency make important decisions about the lives of people. People experience global environmental problems but are not able to do much about toxic emissions, pollution and acid rain. The loss of languages and cultures disempowers because language and culture give internal selfworth when recognised by others, and are decisive instruments in a world where knowledge is power.

Consequently, when directed by the cosmopolitan motive, internationalisation should include an attempt to improve local circumstances, in particular, and not enhance these problems, as globalism is accused of.


220

Issues concerning developmental psychology can also be used to argue that local attachments are necessary ingredients in the development of a cosmopolitan motive. When human beings grow up they develop ever wider loyalties, starting with their caregivers and ending with a loyalty to humanity. In addition, these allegiances need not compete with one another; one’s loyalty to family is not a stumbling block in the way of citizen loyalty (patriotism). Likewise, patriotism need not be in the way of a broader cosmopolitan loyalty (Brown & Kleingeld 2002: 9). In fact, the trend of this argument affirms the case against the “unencumbered self” in the cosmopolitan motive. It assumes that local loyalties are a learning school that prepares a person for (and do not necessarily compete with) wider loyalties. In other words, local loyalties are an important condition for the education of loyalty to humankind as a whole.

7. ConclusionThe current process of globalisation and the politics of identity need to be premised by a more comprehensive set of conditions than is usually the case. This is not possible within the reductionist distortions of globalism and fragmentism. However, with the authentic and cosmopolitan motives it might be possible to move more decisively in the direction of an inclusive perspective because the two ideals share, to a large extent, the same conditions and need not be involved in a struggle to deny the other. In developing a vision for education, human subjectivity, individuality and diversity need not leave learners with a nationalism that threatens to fragment their world, low standards and a lack of moral sensitivity. Neither is it necessary to despair about global forces that force learners to accept a dispensation of economic classes and cultural homogenisations that disempower them and pose a threat to their dignity.

The first step to this engagement and a renewal of agency is to develop a transcendental sensitivity in order to make obvious the broad range of structural conditions that make life possible. This sensitivity can also help us escape the narrowness of globalism and fragmentism and their excluding emphases, and to engage with as many dimensions of the reality in which we live as possible.

221


The universality of a global perspective we want to see in learners is not possible without making them aware of the locality of global problems and the need for subjective activism in order to combat these problems. Learning to be authentic, on the other hand, is not possible without a wider horizon that puts the various unique traits of people in perspective. An education that emphasises the genuine me but also the humanity I share with all human beings needs to weave all dimensions and aspects of my being human together.

The difference between authenticity and cosmopolitanism is that the complexity of human life is pursued by authenticity from the perspective of the particular subject or community, while cosmopolitanism tries to step outside the self and get a grip on life from the perspective of the greater entirety. However, authenticity cannot but make room for a stepping beyond the self and the cosmopolitan stance cannot but also pursue that which is important to the particular self and the local community. The foregrounded perspectives of authenticity and the cosmopolitan point of view are important in themselves for they impress on the people involved values and developments that are needed in their specific circumstances. In the case of the integration of Chinese immigrants in Canadian society it was necessary to introduce the cosmopolitan perspective to move beyond the subjectivism and particularism of Canadian nationalism. In the case of Afrikaans parents and learners, a stronger recognition of the cosmopolitan aspect will combat ethnocentrism. Similarly, authenticity will allow for a meaningful recognition of otherness in the face of the homogenising tendency advocated by the new South African nationalism. If we want to prepare young people for life in the current world, they need to be taught to view life from both perspectives and to develop the skills to persistently switch between them.


222

Hutchinson J N1996. The moral task of recognition: finding the self in a modern world. Philosophy of education society. <http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/coe/eps/pesyearbook/94_docs/ hutchins.htm>

Leahy R1994. Authenticity: from philosophic concept to literary character. Educational Theory 44(4): 44761.

Lehman G2002. Globalisation and the authentic self: cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor’s communitarianism. Global Society 16(4): 41937.

McConnell M W1996. Don’t neglect the little platoons. Cohen (ed) 1996: 7984.

Mitchell K2001. Education for democratic citizenship: transnationalism, multiculturalism, and the limits of liberalism. Harvard Educational Review 71: 5178.

Nussbaum M C1996. Patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Cohen (ed) 1996: 317.

Putnam H1996. Must we choose between patriotism and universal reason. Cohen (ed) 1996: 91116.

BibliographyAudi R (ed)

2005. The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brown E & P Kleingeld2002. Cosmopolitanism. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism>

Cohen J (ed)1996. For love of country: debating the limits of patriotism. Boston: Beacon Press.

De Muynck B & H van der Walt (eds)

2006. The call to know the world. Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn.

Gutman A (ed)1994. Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Held D2003. Cosmopolitanism: taming globalization. Held & McGrew (eds) 2003: 51429.

Held D & A McGrew (eds)2003. The global transformations reader: an introduction to the globali-zation debate. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Himmelfarb G1996. The illusions of cosmopolitanism. Cohen (ed) 1996: 737.

223


Runte R2001. Reeducating humankind: globalizing the curriculum and teaching international ethics for the new century. Higher Education in Europe 26: 3946.

Sandel M J1984. The procedural republic and the unencumbered self. Political theory 12(1): 8196.

Smeyers P1996. Authentic selves and edu cation. Philosophy of education society. <http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/coe/eps/pesyearbook/94_docs/ smeyers.htm>

Soudien C2007. Identiteitverwarring lei tot swak prestasie in kinders. Rapport 8 Julie 2007. <http://152.111.1.251/argief/berigte/rapport/2007/08/16/RH/17/mb0807.html>

Taylor C1989. Sources of the self: the making of the modern identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1991. The ethics of authenticity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

1994. The politics of recognition. Gutman (ed) 1994: 2573.

1995. Philosophical arguments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Toulmin S1992. Cosmopolis: the hidden agenda of modernity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Troost A1958. Casuïstiek en situatie-etiek: een methodologische terreinverkenning. Utrecht: Drukkerij Libertas.

Van der Walt J L & S Fowler2006. Constructivist teachinglearning theory: a stewardship approach. De Muynck & Van der Walt (eds) 2006: 1349.

Vincent A2002. Nationalism and particularity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2008 MF Heyns A cosmopolitan and authentic education

Documents

Transcript of 2008 MF Heyns A cosmopolitan and authentic education