Global Egalitarianism

Global Egalitarianism

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NationalResponsibilityandGlobalJusticeDavidMiller

Printpublicationdate:2007PrintISBN-13:9780199235056PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:January2008DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199235056.001.0001

GlobalEgalitarianism

DavidMiller(ContributorWebpage)

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199235056.003.0003

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapterexaminesglobalegalitarianismasafree-standingconceptionofglobaljusticeandprovidessomereasonsforrejectingit.Itarguesthatneitherequalityofresourcesnorequalityofopportunityrepresentsaworkableprincipleofglobaljustice.Inneithercasecanwemeasuretheresourcesoropportunitiesavailabletopeopleindifferentsocietiesinawaythatisneutralasbetweencultures,andsuchneutralityseemsindispensableinaglobalprincipleofjustice.Thechapterthenconsiderssomeotherreasonsforwantingthescaleoftheseinequalitiestobereduced—reasons,inotherwords,thatarenotdirectlyreasonsofjustice,eventhoughtheymayinvolveseeinginequality,indirectly,asasourceofinjustice.Thesearethatmaterialinequalitiesbroadlyconceivedwillnaturallytranslateintoinequalitiesofpower,whichthenbecomeasourceofongoingglobalinjustice;thatgrossinequalitybetweennationsmakesitdifficultifnotimpossibleforthoseatthebottomendoftheinequalitytoenjoyanadequatemeasureofself-determination,unlessoneimagines,counterfactually,thatrichnations'interestin


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self-determinationconcernsonlytheirowninternalaffairs,andnotwhathappensintheworldoutside;andthatlargeinequalitiesinwealthandpoweralsomakeitdifficulttoachieveaso-called‘fairtermsofcooperation’internationally.

Keywords:globaljustice,equality,inequality,resources,opportunity,inequalitiesofpower

IAnyonesurveyingthecurrentstateoftheworld'speoplescannothelpbutbestruckbythevastdisparityinlivingstandardsandlifeprospectsbetweentheglobalrichandtheglobalpoor.SomeofthemostrevealingfiguresarethosecontainedintheHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)publishedannuallybytheUN,whichrankscountriesusingthreebasiccriteria:lifeexpectancy,levelofeducation(adultliteracyplusschoolenrolment),andpercapitagrossdomesticproduct(GDP),adjustedtotakeaccountofpurchasingpowerdifferences(whichgivesareasonableestimateofaverageincome).1AtthetopofthescalewefindaclusterofEuropeanandotherdevelopedsocietieswherelifeexpectancyisaround80years,educationalratingsarecloseto1,andpercapitaGDPstandssomewhereintheregionof$30,000.Atthebottomthereisagroupofcountriesinsub‐SaharanAfrica,inwhichlifeexpectancyataround40yearsisonlyhalfthatinthedevelopedworld,educationalratingsrunbetweenabout0.2and0.6(correspondingtoadultliteracyfiguresthatrangebetween13%atthebottomto70%atthetop)andpercapitaGDPaveragesaround$1,000,withmanycountriesfallingwellbelowthatfigure.Itishardtograspthesignificanceofdifferenceslikethisinhumanterms.Moreover,overthelastfewdecadesthegapbetweenrichandpoorcountrieshastendedtowidenratherthanclose,andthereislittlesignofanupwardtrendoverallamongthecountries(p.52) thatscorethelowest(thepositionhasimprovedslightlyinsome,butgotworseinothers).

Globalegalitarianismisfuelledbyevidencesuchasthisabouttheextentofglobalinequality.Howcanwebelivinginajustworldwhenpeoplelivinginoneregionhaveaverageincomessomethirtytimeslargerthanthoselivinginanother(becausethefiguresareaverages,theyseeminglycannotreflectindividualfeatureslikehowtalentedpeopleareorhowhardtheywork),andcanalsoexpecttolivefortwiceaslong?Andhowmuchwouldthosefromtherichersocietieshavetogiveupinordertoraisethepositionofthoselivingonadollarorsoadaytogivethemsomethingwewouldconsideradecentlife?Thesearegoodquestions,andourtheoryofglobaljusticemustprovideanswers.Butitisimportanttoseethatwedonothavetoleaptotheconclusionthatwhatjusticerequiresissomeformofglobalequality.Thereasonswehaveforthinkingthattheexistingdistributionoflifeexpectancy,education,andincomeisunjustmightnotbeegalitarianreasons.

Tocanvasssomealternatives:wemightthinkthatglobaldistributionisunjustsimplybecauseofthelowabsolutepositionofthoselivinginthepoorestcountries.Wemightinotherwordsthinkthateveryhumanbeingshouldexpecttoliveforsomethingcloseto80years,shouldexpecttohaveatleastsecondaryeducation,andshouldbeabletoearnanincomesufficienttobuyarangeofnecessitiessuchasfoodthatprovidesadequatenutrition.Thiswouldsetathresholdthateveryoneasamatterofjusticemustreach,but


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inequalitiesabovethethresholdwouldnotbeunjustmerelybyvirtueofbeinginequalities.2Orwemightthinkthatglobalinequalitiesareunjustbyvirtueofthewaytheyhavearisen—becausethewealthoftherichercountriesisinsomewayresponsibleforthepovertyofthepoorercountries.WemaythinkthatthedevelopedWesthasexploitedtherestoftheworldhistorically,andthatcurrentinequalitiesarelargelyaresultofthatfact.Hadthesameinequalitiesariseninadifferentway,notinvolvingexploitation,theywouldnotbeunjust.

Thesearenottheonlyreasonswemighthaveforcondemningthehugedisparitiesweseeintheworldtoday.Theproblemtheyaremeanttoillustrateisthatourreactionstoglobalinequalitiesmaybe(p.53) overdetermined,andthisisaproblemifwearegoingtousethosereactionstohelpbuildatheoryofglobaljustice.Myaiminthischapteristoshowthatglobalegalitarianismisnottherighttheory:whatglobaljusticerequiresisnotthatpeopleeverywhereshouldbemadeequalincertainmaterialrespects(resourcesandopportunitiesarethetwo‘currencies’Ishallconsider).Butthatbynomeansentailsthatexistinginequalitiesareunproblematicfromthepointofviewofjustice;onthecontrary,itiscleartomethatajustworldwouldalsobeaworldinwhichdisparitiesbetweenrichandpoorcountrieswouldbefarsmallerthanthosethatnowexist.Whythisissowillemergeinduecourse.Fornow,thetaskistobreaktheholdthatglobalegalitarianismhashadonourthinkingaboutglobaljustice.

Manypeoplehavebeendrawntothisviewbecausetheyassumethatwhatjusticerequiresisalwaysandeverywhereacertainkindofequality:sincejusticerequiresequalitywithinsocieties,itmustalsorequireequalitybetweenthem(orbetweenpeoplewholiveindifferentsocieties).Butthisassumptionismistaken.Theonlykindofequalitythatjusticealwaysrequiresisformalequality:equalitybetweenpeoplewhoareinallrelevantrespectsthesame.Ifthereisnothingofanysignificancetodistinguishbetweentwopeople,thentheyshouldbetreatedinthesamewayasamatterofjustice.Everythingthenturnsonwhatshouldcountasarelevantdifference.Ishallsuggestthatsubstantiveratherthanformalequality—peopleactuallyreceivingthesamebundleofrights,orresources,orwhateveritiswhosedistributionisatissue—isonlyrequiredbyjusticeincertainquitespecificcircumstances.Inothercircumstances,afairdistributionmaybeoneinwhichwhatpeoplegetdependsontheirdeserts,choices,orneeds;itmaybeonethatsimplyguaranteeseveryoneacertainminimumlevelofresources;itmaybeonethatcomesaboutthroughfairprocedures—forinstancealotterythatpeoplehavevoluntarilychosentoenter.Itisfruitless,asIsuggestedinChapter1,totrytospecifywhatjusticerequireswithoutconsideringthecontextinwhichthedistributionistakingplace—whoisdistributingwhattowhomandunderwhatcircumstances.Sowhenshouldwesaythatwhatjusticerequiresissubstantiveequality?3

(p.54) Onecircumstanceiswheretherereallyarenorelevantdifferencesbetweenthepeopleamongwhomthedistributionisbeingmade,or,morelikelyperhaps,whereitisimpossibletoobtainreliableevidenceaboutdifferencesthatmightberelevantiftheywererevealed.Imaginehavingtoallocateasupplyoffoodbetweentenpeopleaboutwhomyouaregivennoinformationatall.Therearevariousreasonsthatwouldtellin


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favourofsharingthefoodequally.Someofthemmightbemalnourished,andbygivingeachanequalshareyouwouldminimizetheriskofleavinganyonestillhungry.Eveniftheyarealladequatelynourished,anunequaldistributionislikelytobenefitthewinnerslessthanitharmsthelosers.Moreover,giventhatfoodisanall‐roundbenefittohumanbeings,andgiventheabsenceofanyinformationabouttheten,perhapseachhasaclaimtothebenefitthatonlyanequaldistributioncanmeet.Howrobustthisclaimiscanbedisputed:mightitbeenoughtodistributethefoodusingafairproceduresuchasalotterywhichgaveeachpersonanequalchance?Wouldthatbeastrongenoughformofequalitytosatisfyjustice,leavingasidetheothergroundsfavouringanequaldistribution?Letusjustsaythattheabsenceofknownrelevantdifferencescansometimesbesufficienttogroundasubstantiveandnotmerelyproceduralclaimforequaltreatment.Somehavethoughtthatthisargumentcanbeappliedtotheearth'snaturalresources,andhaveusedthistojustifyaformofglobalegalitarianism.Ishallconsiderthispositionshortly.ButbeforethatIwanttoconsiderasecondsetofcircumstancesinwhichjusticemayrequiresubstantiveequality.

Thesearecasesinwhichtheclaimforequaltreatmentstemsfrommembershipofgroupsofvariouskinds.Thesearegroupsconstitutedonthebasisofequality—peoplewhoareadmittedtothemareadmittedasequalmembers,peoplewiththesamestatusasothermembers.Topreservethisequality,basicrightswithinthegroupmustbeequallyassigned,andmemberswhoaredeniedequalrightscanlegitimatelycomplainofunjusttreatment.Itisnotnecessarythatallbenefitsthatthegroupcreatesorprovidesshouldbeallocatedinthisway;theclaimforequaltreatmentappliesonlytothoserightsandopportunitiesthatarefundamentalinthesensethattheyservetodefineaperson'spositioninthegroup.Themostfamiliarexampleofthisphenomenoninthecontemporaryworldistheformofmembershipprovidedbycitizenshipinnation‐states.(p.55)Althoughcitizenshiphasnotalwaysbeenunderstoodasrequiringallcitizenstobetreatedasequals—earlierconceptionssometimesmaderoomfortwoormoreclassesofcitizen—thisunderstandinghasnowbecomedefinitiveoftheveryidea.Itthenfollowsthattointroduceinequalitiesinbasicrights—forinstancetooptforaformofpluralvotingofthekindonceadvocatedbyJohnStuartMill,ortocreateatwo‐tiersystemofwelfareprovision—wouldbetoactunjustlytowardsthosewithlesserrights,whowouldjustifiablyregardsuchpoliciesasdenyingtheirequalstatusasfullmembersofthecommunityinquestion.

Principlesofequalitybasedonmembershipareimportantcomponentsofdistributivejustice,buttheirobviouslimitationisthattheirscopeisrestrictedtothosewhoarealreadymembersofthegrouporcommunityinquestion.ThereisnoinjusticeinthefactthataFrenchcitizenenjoysrightsthatIasaBritishcitizendonothaveandviceversa.Toprovethatsuchaninequalitywasunjust,itwouldbenecessarytoshowthatwearebothmembersofsomelargercommunityandthatourstatusasequalmemberswasbeingunderminedbythedifferentsetsofrightsweenjoyed.Thismightinduecoursecometopass(sayasculturalandpoliticalintegrationwithintheEUincreases),soitisimportanttosaythatthescopeofegalitarianjusticebasedonmembershipisnotfixedforalltime.Ontheotherhand,itdoesnotseemthatamembership‐basedcasecanplausibly


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bemadeforglobalegalitarianism.Theideathatweareallmembersofaworldcommunityandthatourstatusasequalmembersisbeingdamagedbytheunequalrightsthatweenjoyseemsfar‐fetchedasthingsnowstand.IcommentedinChapter2ontheimplausibilityofpresenting‘cosmopolitancitizenship’assimplyanenlargedversionofnationalformsofcitizenship,giventhatthelatterrelyonculturalandpoliticaltiesamongcitizensthatstemfromtheircommonnationalidentity.Soitseemsthatanydefenceofglobalegalitarianismcannotrelyonargumentsthatmakesenseonlywhenappliedtothosewhobelongtogroupsofacertainkind.

Wemustthereforeconcludethatglobalprinciplesofequalitycanonlybedefendedinthefirstway,byshowingthattherearenorelevantdifferencesbetweenpeoplebelongingtodifferentsocietieswhenitcomestothedistributionofresources(understoodinabroadsense).Peoplehaveequalclaims,becausethereisnothingthatservestodistinguishbetweenthem.Butequalclaimstowhat?I(p.56) shallconsidertwocandidateprinciplesofglobalequalitythathavefounddefendersamongtheoristsofglobaljustice,equalityofnaturalresources,andequalityofopportunity.Eachprinciple,Ibelieve,issubjectedtothesametwobasicobjections.ThefirstIshallcallthemetricproblem:theproblemofestablishingaglobalmeasureofresourcesoropportunitiesthatwouldallowustodeterminewhethertwopeopledoinfacthaveequalresourcesoropportunities.ThesecondIshallcallthedynamicproblem:theproblemposedforglobalequalitybythefactthatpeoplebelongtoindependentpoliticalcommunitieswhichmakedecisionsthatinfluencethefutureavailabilityofresourcesandopportunities.Thenextthreesectionsofthischapterdeveloptheseobjections.

IIItiseasytoseewhyanequalentitlementtonaturalresourceshasprovedpopularasaprincipleofglobalequality.Ontheonehand,havingaccesstonaturalresourcesofgreaterorlesservalue—fertileland,mineralwealth,andtheharvestsofthesea—isoneimportantfactorthatdeterminestheoverallwealthorpovertyofthepeoplewhoenjoyit.Ontheotherhand,suchaccessisveryunequallydistributedbetweennations.Itisnotasthoughnationshavebidfortheterritoriestheyinhabitthroughsomekindofglobalauctioninwhicheachpersonisgivenachipofequalvalue.Territorieshavebeenacquiredhistoricallybymoreorlessdubiousmeans,andoftenwithoutforeknowledgeofthefuturevalueoftheassetstheycontained.Thatanation'sterritoryshouldturnouttocontainoilfields,ortobeparticularlysuitableforgrowingagrapefavouredforwinemaking,isthereforeapieceofgoodfortunethatmaynonethelesshavesignificantconsequencesforthelivingstandardsofthepeopleinquestion.Beingbornintoacountrywitharelativelyhighlevelofpercapitanaturalresourcevaluesseemslikeamorallyirrelevantformofadvantagethatisripeforcorrectionbyegalitarianredistribution.

Onemightofcoursechallengetheempiricalassumptionbeingmadeherethathavingaccesstovaluablenaturalresourcesalwaysorusuallycontributespositivelytothewealthandwelfareofnations.LaterinthisbookIshallpresentsomeevidencethatsupportsthis(p.57) challenge.ButforthemomentIshallcontinuetoaccepttheassumptionthathavingnaturalresourcesisnormallyasourceofrelativeadvantage.


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Shouldweconcludethatglobaljusticerequiresaredistributiveschemewhereby,forexample,resource‐richcountriesaretaxedtosupporttheresource‐poor?

Itisimportantheretodistinguishbetweentwodifferentmotivationsthatwemighthaveforintroducingsuchascheme.Wemightontheonehandbelookingforawayofraisingfundsthatcanbeusedtosupportaglobalminimumforpeopleeverywhere:wethinkthatallhumanbeingsareentitledasamatterofjusticetoresourcesthatwillenablethemtoleadminimallydecentlives,andthatthosewhohaveasurplusofresourcesareobligedtocontributetothisgoal.Aschemethattargetstheownershipofnaturalresourcesisattractivepartlybecausetheirpresenceisrelativelyeasytoidentify,andpartlybecausetheirdistributionseemsmorallyarbitraryforthereasonsjustgiven.ThusproposalssuchastheGlobalResourcesTaxfavouredbyThomasPogge,whichwouldtaxextractednaturalresourcesatafixedrate,mayseemaplausiblewayofhelpingtheworld'spoor,aswellasslowingtherateatwhichnaturalresourcesareusedup.4Suchproposalsarenot,however,egalitarianininspiration:theydonotseektoequalizeaccesstonaturalresources.SoalthoughtheystillrequiresomeanswertothequestionIshallberaisinginamoment,namelyhowarewetoattachavaluetonaturalresourcesofdifferentkinds,thatquestionislesstroublesomepreciselybecausetheaimisnottoachieveequalityinanyform.SomeroughandreadywayofvaluingextractedresourcesmightbesufficientforthepurposesoftheGlobalResourcesTax.

Aproposalthatisgenuinelyegalitarian,bycontrast,isHillelSteiner'sGlobalFund.5Startingfromthepremisethateachpersonisentitledtoanequalshareoftheworld'sunimprovednaturalresources,Steinerproposesthatanation'snaturalresourceholdingsshouldbecomputedbyaggregatingthepropertyvaluesofallthe(p.58) sitesthatfallwithinitsdomain:nationswhoseholdingspercapitaareabovetheglobalaveragewouldpayintothefund,andnationswhoseholdingsfallbelowtheaveragewoulddrawoutofit.Inotherwords,resource‐richnationswouldbetaxedaccordingtothepercapitavalueoftheirlandholdings;resource‐poornationswoulddrawfromthefundaccordingtothesizeoftheirpercapitashortfall.

Thequestionwemustaskishowthesepropertyvaluesaregoingtobecalculated,bearinginmindthatSteinerwantstodistinguish‘raw’naturalresourcesfromtheimprovementsthathavebeenwroughtbyhumanlabour:ifasitehasaskyscraperbuiltuponit,whatcountsisthevalueofthesitewithouttheskyscraper,notitscurrentvalue.Thesevaluescannotbedeterminedsimplybylookingatthephysicalcharacteristicsofaparticularparcelofland.Foronething,locationclearlymatters,asSteinerconcedeshimself:

EvidentlytheownershipofanacreintheSaharaDesertisofadifferentvalue,andconsequentlyattractsadifferentpaymentliability,fromtheownershipofanacreindowntownManhattanortheheartofTokyo.SimilarthingscanbesaidaboutrealestateintheSaudioilfields,theAmazonrainforests,theArcticTundra,theIowacornbelt,theBangladeshicoastandtheCityofLondon.6

Steiner'sexamplesmightleadtheunwaryreadertothinkthatwhatmattersin


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determiningthesepropertyvaluesisprimarilythephysicalfeaturesofasitesuchasthepresenceofoilundergroundorthefertilityofthesoil.Butthoughthesefeaturescertainlydomatterinsomecases,equallyormoreimportantislocationitself:anacreofgroundincentralLondonorTokyomighthavephysicalfeaturesnotallthatdifferentfromanacreintheIowacornbelt,butavastlydifferenteconomicvalue,asindicatedbythesellingpriceofthesiteortherentthatcouldbechargedforoccupyingit(Steiner'sownsuggestedindicators).Sohowarethesevaluesdetermined?

Physicalfeaturesaside,threetypesoffactorsseemimportant.Thefirstisthesetofrulesandconditionsunderwhichthesiteistobeheld.Isittobeheldasprivatepropertyorundersomeformofcommunalownership?Ifasprivateproperty,howrestrictivearetheconditionsonwhatmaybedonewiththesite,forinstancethekindsofbuildingthatcanbeerectedthere,ortheproductiveusestowhich(p.59) thesitemaybeput?Whattaxregimewillbeappliedlocally?Andsoforth.Answerstothesequestionscanmakeabigdifferencetothevalueofunimprovedproperty.Whatifapieceoflandcouldbeusedforgrowinggrapestomakefinewine,butlocallawprohibitswineproduction?OrwhatifthereisanoilfielddirectlyunderthecityofMecca,buttheSaudigovernmenthasdeclaredthattobeasacredsiteforalltime?Howaresitevaluestobedecidedinthesecases?Itistemptingtoresolvethisproblembydeclaringasite'svaluetobethevalueitwouldrealizeundersomeprivilegedsetofrulesandconditions—forinstanceunderalibertarianpropertyregimethatgavefullandunconditionalrightstotheownersofsites.Buttwoproblemsimmediatelyarise:whychoosethisparticularregime,andwhyregarditasfairtotaxnationsonthebasisoftheaggregatevaluetheirpropertywouldhavehadiftheyhadchosentoadoptalibertarianregime?Theproposedresolutionisnotneutralasawayofdefiningequalityofresourcesinaworldwherepeopleholddifferentsetsofculturalandpoliticalvaluesandapplythesevalueswhendeterminingtherightsofownershipattachingtositeswithintheirdomains.

Thesecondsetoffactorsinfluencingpropertyvaluesaretheabilitiesandthepreferencesofthepeoplewhomightusethepropertyandconsumewhatisproducedthere.Theexampleoflandfromwhichfinewinecouldbeproducedagainmakesthispoint.Forasitetobecomeavaluablevineyardrequiressomeonewithexpertiseintheplantingandcareofvines,andcustomerswhoarewillingtopayfortheproduct.Butwhatiftherearenoskilledviniculturalistsavailable,ornoconsumerswillingtodrinkalcohol?Itmightbesaidinreplyherethattherelevantconstituenciesareglobalratherthannational:viniculturalistscanbeflownin,andthereisaninternationalwinemarketonwhichtheproducecanbesold.Butthisisentirelyacontingentmatter.Whethertherearepeoplewillingtoworkonaparticularsite,whethertheproductsofthesitearesuchthattheyhavepotentiallyaglobalaswellasalocalsale,aremattersquiteunconnectedtothesiteitself,thoughpotentiallyimportantindeterminingitsvalue.TheaspectIwanttohighlightisthecontributionthatlocalculturesmaketositevalues,bydeterminingtheavailablesetofskills(throughtheeducationsystem,etc.),andbyshapingthepreferencesofbothproducersandconsumers.Thiscontributionstandsoverandabovetheformalsetofrulesand(p.60) conditions:wine‐growingmaybelegallypermitted,butitwillnotoccurifthelocalpopulationhasstrongreligiousconvictionsthatprohibitthe


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productionandconsumptionofalcohol.

Third,weneedtoconsiderwhatwecancallneighbourhoodeffectsonsitevalues.Whataparticularsiteisworthmaybeheavilydependentonwhatisalreadybeingdoneonsitescloseby.Why,afterall,isasiteincentralLondonorTokyoworthsomuchmorethanasitetwentyorthirtymilesawayontheedgeofthecity?Notprimarilybecauseofdifferentlegalrules,orthedifferentialavailabilityofwillingproducersandconsumers.Citycentresitesareworthalotsimplybecausetheystandnexttoothersonwhichvariousbusinessactivities,producingorconsuming,arebeingengagedin,andfromwhichthereforepeoplecaneasilymovetothesiteinquestion.Imagineforamomentthatitbecamewidelybelievedthataparticularcitycentrewaspollutedwithachemicalthatwasdangeroustohumanhealth,asaresultofwhichveryfewpeoplewerewillingtoshoporworkthere.Clearly,thevalueofallsitesinthatdistrictwouldplummetaseconomicactivitiessharplydeclined.Puttingittheotherwayround,thevalueofanacreindowntownManhattanisprimarilydeterminedbytheongoingpracticeofverylargenumbersofhumanbeingswhoseeitasbeingintheirinteresttogotheretoproduceandconsume,andwhotherebygeneratealevelofactivitywhichmeansthatafirmdecidingwheretoconductitsbusinesshasalargeincentivetolocatetoManhattan.

Theupshotofallthisisthatnaturalresourcevalues—thevaluesofunimprovedsites—arenotsetbynatureitself,butalmostentirelybyhumandecisionandbehaviour.Ifwearelookingatthewealthofnations,then,aggregatepropertyvaluesdependonpoliticaldecisionsabouttherulesandconditionsforholdingsites,culturalvaluesthataffectskillsandpreferences,andformsofhumanbehaviourthatdeterminethecharacterofparticularneighbourhoods.Itwouldbewrongtosaythatthephysicalavailabilityofresourcesmakesnodifferenceatall,butthepointisthatevenaresourcesuchasanoilfieldonlybecomesvaluablewhenlocatedwithinahumanenvironmentthatallowstheoiltobeextractedandsold.

Steiner'sproposaltotaxnationsaccordingtotheaggregatedpropertyvaluesofthesitestheycontainthereforeappearsarbitrary.Therationaleforthetaxisthatitservestocorrecttheunequalpercapitadistributionofnaturalresourcesbetweennations.Butwecannow(p.61) seethatpropertyvalues,evenofunimprovedsites,aretoalargeextentanartefactofhumanchoiceandhumandecision.Nationscontributetothecreationoftheirownaggregatepropertyvaluesinatleastthethreewayswehavejusttraced.Soiftheyaretaxedonthatbasis,theyaretoaconsiderableextentbeingtaxedaccordingtothevaluestheyadheretocollectivelyandthechoicestheyhavemade,whichiscertainlynotwhatSteinerintends.Indeed,thelinethathedrawsbetweenthe‘raw’naturalresourcevaluesofsitesandtheimprovementsmadebyhumanagencynowlooksuntenable.Ifabuildingiserectedonasitethatincreasesthevalueofthatsite,thetaxbasisisstillsupposedtobethepriorunimprovedvalue;butifbuildingsareerectedonfiveneighbouringsites,andthisalsoincreasesthevalueoftheoriginalsite,itistheenhancedvaluethatisusedfortaxpurposes.

Moregenerally,theideaofglobalequalityofresourcesremainsindeterminateintheabsenceofanon‐arbitrarywayofdeterminingresourcevalues.WhenRonaldDworkin


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famouslyproposedusingthedeviceofahypotheticalauctionasawayofidentifyinganequaldistributionofheterogeneousresourcesamongasetofpersonswithequallyheterogeneoustastes,hemadeitclearthatpriortotheauctiondecisionshavetobemadeabouttheprinciplesaccordingtowhichlotsaregoingtobedividedupandaboutthepubliclyenforceablerulesthatwillgoverntheuseofitemsacquiredthroughtheauction.7Untilthesethingsaredecided,nooneisinapositiontojudgehowvaluableaparticularresourcemightbetohimorher.Startingfromaliberalidealoffreedomofchoice,andarguingthattheauctioneermustprovidebidderswiththegreatestpossibleopportunitytousetheresourcestheyacquireinthewaythattheywish,Dworkindefendsprinciplesthatarelikewiseliberal—thusheadvocatesrulesgoverningtheuseofitemsthatwouldbroadlysupportafreemarket.8SoDworkin'smodeldoesgiveusametricthatcandefineequalityofresources,butonlyifwepresupposethisliberalbackground,accordingtowhich,forexample,enforceable(p.62) religiousrestrictionsontheuseofresourcesareexcludedasillegitimate:anyoneplanningtobidforapotentialvineyardknowsthathewillbepermittedtomakeandsellwineifhechooses.Butthismakesitinappropriateasawayofdefiningequalityofresourcesatgloballevelincircumstanceswherenotallculturesembracetheseliberalideals.Soevenifwewereconvincedthatglobaljusticeisbestunderstoodintermsofaprincipleofequality(pacetheargumentsinthefirstsectionofthischapter),andthatequalityofresourceswouldbetherightwaytocashthisout,weareleftwithnowayofdeterminingwhen,infact,adistributionofresourcesqualifiesasanequaldistribution—andthereforenowayofimplementingegalitarianproposalssuchasSteiner'sGlobalFund.

IIIOnemightinanycasecometothinkthatequalityof(unimprovednatural)resourcesistoonarrowaconceptionofegalitarianjustice,regardlessofwhetheritsscopeisnationalorglobal.Howwellaperson'slifegoesisdeterminedbymanyfactorsbesideshisorherentitlementtonaturalresources.Indomesticcontexts,therelevantconceptionisoftentakentobeequalityofopportunity.AninfluentialstatementofthisprincipleisbyJohnRawls,whodefines‘fairequalityofopportunity’asfollows:

…thosewhoareatthesameleveloftalentandability,andhavethesamewillingnesstousethem,shouldhavethesameprospectsofsuccessregardlessoftheirinitialplaceinthesocialsystem,thatis,irrespectiveoftheincomeclassintowhichtheyareborn.Inallsectorsofsocietythereshouldberoughlyequalprospectsofcultureandachievementforeveryonesimilarlymotivatedandendowed.9

Severalauthorshaveproposedthatglobaljusticeshouldbeunderstoodinsimilarterms,asrequiringthatpeopleofsimilartalentandsimilarmotivationshouldhavethesamelifechances(inparticularaccesstoeducationalandjobopportunitiesandtherewardstheybring)nomatterwhichsocietytheywereborninto.10Thisisclearly(p.63) ademandingprinciple,butsotooisitsdomesticanalogue,whichhasneverthelessprovedimportantasaguidingbeaconforpublicpolicy.Soisglobalequalityofopportunitythebestinterpretationofglobaljustice?


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Wemustbeginbyaskingwhatitmeans,moreprecisely,foropportunitiestobeequalatgloballevel.Doesitrequire,forinstance,thatpeoplewiththesametalentandmotivationshouldhaveidenticalopportunitysetsnomatterwhichsocietytheyareborninto?ThisseemstobetheimplicationofMoellendorf'sclaimthat‘ifequalityofopportunitywererealized,achildgrowingupinruralMozambiquewouldbestatisticallyaslikelyasthechildofaseniorexecutiveataSwissbanktoreachthepositionofthelatter'sparent.’11Butsurelysucharequirementwouldbetoostrong.Itwould,forinstance,requireunlimitedrightsofmigrationcoupledwithunrestrictedadmissiontocitizenship,giventhatsomepositions,suchaschiefexecutiveofCreditSuisse,orpresidentoftheUSA,presupposemembershipofparticularsocieties.Moreoverevenleavingasidethedifficultyofbeingabletoapplyformallyforcertainpositions,thechildfromruralMozambiquewouldbelessfluentinGerman,French,orItalianthanhisSwisscounterpart,andonthatgroundalonelesslikelytosucceedinthecompetitiontobecomeaSwissbanker.12SounlessadvocatesofglobalequalityofopportunityenvisageaborderlessworldinwhicheveryonespeaksEsperanto,itismoreplausibletointerprettheprincipleasrequiringequivalentopportunitysets.ItwouldbesatisfiedprovidedthechildfromruralMozambiquehadthesamechancetoattainanexecutivepostin(p.64)abanksomewhere,perhapsinMozambiqueitself,withthesamesalaryandotherbenefitsasthepositionaimedatbythe(equallytalentedandmotivated)childofaSwissbanker.

Bytakingthisspecificcase,wecanunderstandwhatitwouldmeanfortwoopportunitysetstobeequivalentbutnotidentical.Butnowconsidermorefullyhowwemightapplythisidea.Inordertodecidewhethertwoopportunitysetsareequivalent,wehavetoapplysomekindofmetric,andthemetricweusecaneitherbefiner‐grainedorbroader‐grained.Inthecasejustdiscussed,wefoundthatthebroader‐grainedmetric‘opportunitytobecomechiefexecutiveofanationalbank’waspreferabletothefiner‐grained‘opportunitytobecomechiefexecutiveofaSwissbank’:wedonotthinkthattheMozambiqueanchildisdisadvantagedinanysignificantwaybyhavingalesseropportunitytoheadaSwissbanksolongashehasagreateropportunitythantheSwisschildtoheadasimilarbankinMozambique.Soletusnowconsider,moregenerally,howfine‐grainedorbroad‐grainedourmetricofequalityshouldbe.Ifwemakeittoofine‐grained,thenwewillgetlotsofmeaninglessresultsliketheonejustmentioned—equalitiesandinequalitiesthatjustdonotmatterbecausetheyaretoospecifictoengageourethicalattention.Butifwetrytomakeitasbroad‐grainedaspossible,thenwerunintocontroversyabouthow,ifatall,differentcomponentsofourmetricshouldbeevaluatedrelativetooneanother.13

Letmeattempttomakethisclearerthroughanexample.Supposewehavetworelativelyisolatedvillages,broadlysimilarinsizeandgeneralcomposition.SupposethatvillageAhasafootballpitchbutnotenniscourt,andvillageBhasatenniscourtbutnofootball(p.65) pitch.Domembersofthetwocommunitieshaveequalopportunitiesornot?InthemorallyrelevantsenseIthinkthattheydo:footballpitchesandtenniscourtsseemtofallnaturallyintothebroadercategoryof‘sportingfacilities’,andmeasuredintermsofthismetricthetwocommunitiesaremoreorlessequallyendowed.Itwouldseem


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morallyperverseformembersofBtocomplainofinjusticebyusing‘accesstofootballpitches’astherelevantmetric.ButnowsupposealsothatvillageApossessesaschoolbutnochurch,andvillageBpossessesachurchbutnoschool.Canwestillsaythatpeopleinthesetwovillagesenjoyequalopportunities?Ithinkalmostallofuswouldsaythattheydonot.Wethinkthattheopportunitiesprovidedbyaschoolandachurcharejustdifferent,thatifsomeoneweretosuggestametricsuchas‘accesstoenlightenment’intermsofwhichthetwovillagesshouldbejudgedasequallyendowed,thiswouldjustbeapieceofsophistry.ItisalsoworthnoticingthatwhilemostofuswouldjudgethatthevillagersinAwerebetteroffbyvirtueofhavingavillageschool,thosewhothoughtthathavingachurchwasmoreimportantwouldalsoresisttheideathattherewassomeoverarchingmetricintermsofwhichthetwovillagescouldbejudged.TheywouldnotthinkthatthereligiousdeprivationsufferedbypeopleinAcouldsomehowbecompensatedforbytheireducationaladvantages.

Nowthequestionis:howareweabletojudgethatinthefootballpitch̸ tenniscourtcasethereisnosignificantinequalitybetweenAandB,whereasintheschool̸ churchcasethereissignificantinequality?Theanswermustbethatwehaveculturalunderstandingsthattellusthatfootballpitchesandtenniscourtsarenaturallysubstitutableasfallingunderthegeneralrubricofsportingfacilities,whereasschoolsandchurchesarejustdifferentkindsofthings,suchthatyoucannotcompensatepeoplefornothavingaccesstoonebygivingthemaccesstotheother.Theculturalunderstandingstellusthatthebroader-grained‘accesstosportingfacilities’isabettermetricthanthefiner‐grained‘accesstofootballpitches’whilethefiner‐grained‘accesstoschools’isabettermetricthanthebroader‐grained‘accesstoenlightenment’whichIsuggestediswhatsomeonewouldneedtoinventiftheywantedtoarguethatthetwovillageswereequallyendowedinthesecondcase.

Ifwelookathowthisquestionisansweredwithinnation‐states—inotherwordsathowthegeneralideaofequalopportunityis(p.66) cashedoutintermsofmoreconcreteformsofequality—thenwhatwefindisthatanumberofspecifictypesofresourceandopportunityaresingledoutassignificant,andthesearenotregardedatsubstitutable.Includedinthelistwouldbepersonalsecurity,education,healthcare,mobility,andsoon.Finer‐graineddistinctionswithinthesecategoriesarenotregardedasrelevant.So,forinstance,whileitisregardedasanessentialpartoftheeducationalpackagethateverychildshouldhavetheopportunitytolearnforeignlanguages,itisnotregardedasasourceofinequalityifoneschooloffersRussianandanotheroffersItalian.Mobilityopportunitiesmightmeanundergroundtrainsforsomepeopleandruralbusesforothers,andsoforth.Atthesametime,anyattempttouseabroader‐grainedmetric—tosuggest,forinstancethatpoorerhealthfacilitiescouldbecompensatedbybettereducationalfacilitieswhenopportunitiesaremeasured—wouldbestronglyresisted.Thepublicculturemarkseducationandhealthoutasdifferentkindsofgoodsinrespectofeachofwhichcitizensshouldhaveequalopportunities.

Whathappensifwetrytocarrythisunderstandingofequalityacrosstothegloballevel?Werunintoseriousdifficultiescreatedbythefactthatwecannolongerrelyona


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commonsetofculturalunderstandingstotelluswhichmetricormetricsitisappropriatetousewhenattemptingtodrawcross‐nationalopportunitycomparisons.Wefacedifficultiesbothwithinthefamiliarcategoriesandacrossthem.Ifeducation,forinstance,takesdifferentformsindifferentplaces,howcanwejudgewhetherachildincountryAhasbetterorworseeducationalopportunitiesthanachildincountryB?Andevenifwecanmakejudgementsofthatkind,howcanwedecidewhetheritisappropriateorinappropriatetomergespecificmetricsintomoregeneralones?Suppose,forinstance,thatwecanfindameasureofeducationsuchthatpeopleinIcelandplainlyhavebettereducationalopportunitiesthanpeopleinPortugal,butthatpeopleinPortugalequallyplainlyhavesuperiorleisureopportunitiesthanpeopleinIceland(sunnybeaches,swimmingpools,etc.).Isitlegitimatetosaythatpeopleinoneoftheseplacesarebetteroff(inaglobalsense)thanpeopleintheother,orcanwesayonlythataccordingtometricEIcelandersarebetteroffwhileaccordingtometricLthePortuguesearebetteroff,andnothingbeyondthis?

(p.67) GlobalegalitariansfacedwiththischallengewillprobablyrespondthatthemosturgentcasesarecasesofgrossinequalitywherenoreasonablepersoncoulddoubtthattheresourcesandopportunitiesavailabletomembersofAaresuperiortothoseavailabletomembersofB.WearenotprimarilyconcernedaboutIceland̸Portugalcomparisons,butaboutcomparisonssuchasthoseIintroducedatthebeginningofthischapter,between,say,anyofthemoredevelopedEUmember‐states,andanysub‐SaharanAfricancountry.Twothingsareworthnotingaboutthisresponse.First,bytakingcountriesastheoppositeendsofthedevelopmentscale,andusingthecomponentsoftheHDIasourmetric,itmayindeedbepossibletoconcludethatthesetofopportunitiesopentoatypicalcitizenofNiger,say,isstrictlysmallerthanthesetopentoatypicalcitizenofFrance—thereisnobasicdimensionalongwhichtheformerhasgreateropportunitiesthanthelatter.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatingeneralweareinapositiontomakesuchinter‐societalcomparativejudgements,eitherwithinthegroupofrichsocietiesorwithinthegroupofpoorsocieties,andsoalthoughwemightbeabletoidentifythemostegregiousformsofinequality,weremainunabletospecifywhatequality(ofopportunity)wouldmean.Second,wecanagreethattheexistenceofsocietiesscoringverylowontheHDIisaglobalinjusticewithoutagreeingaboutwhyitisaninjustice—whetherbyvirtueoftheinequalitybetweenrichandpoorsocieties,orsimplybyvirtueoftheabsolutelevelofdeprivationexperiencedbymostmembersofthepoorestsocieties.AsIsuggestedearlier,ourmoralresponsestotheglobalstatusquoareoverdetermined,andsowecanagreeinpracticeaboutwhatneedstobedonemosturgentlytopromoteglobaljusticewithouthavingtoformulateexplicitlytheprinciplesthatliebehindthisjudgement.

IwanttoendthissectionofthischapterbystressingthattheproblemIhaveidentifiedisnotatechnicalproblemofmeasurement:itisnotthatwelackthedatathatwouldenableustocomparesocietiesintermsoftheopportunitiestheyprovideforwork,leisure,mobility,andsoforth.Itisessentiallytheproblemofsayingwhatequalityofopportunitymeansinaculturallypluralworldinwhichdifferentsocietieswillconstructgoodsindifferentwaysandalsorankthemindifferentways.Themetricproblemarisesnotjust


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becauseitishardtodeterminehowmucheducationalopportunityanaveragechild(p.68) hasinanygivensociety,butbecausethemeaningofeducation,andthewayinwhichitrelatesto,orcontrastswith,othergoodswillvaryfromplacetoplace.Wecanonlymakejudgementswithanyconfidenceinextremecases;andinthosecases,whatseemsatfirstsighttobeaconcernaboutinequalitymaywellturnoutoncloserinspectiontobeaconcernaboutabsolutepovertyordeprivation,aconcernwhichsuggestsaquitedifferentgeneralunderstandingofglobaljustice.

IVIhavearguedinthelasttwosectionsthatneitherequalityofresourcesnorequalityofopportunityrepresentsaworkableprincipleofglobaljustice.Inneithercasecanwemeasuretheresourcesoropportunitiesavailabletopeopleindifferentsocietiesinawaythatisneutralasbetweencultures—andsuchneutralityseemsindispensableinaglobalprincipleofjustice.ButnowIwanttoturntothedynamicproblem:theproblemofwhethersubstantiveequalityofanykindisadefensibleprincipleforaworldmadeupofseparatesocietieseachofwhichaspirestobeself‐determining.Forthispurpose,Iamgoingtoassumethatwehavediscoveredsomeneutralcurrency—Ishallrefertoitsimplyas‘advantage’—intermsofwhichaprincipleofglobalequalitycanbecouched.Suppose,then,wecouldbringitaboutthatatacertainmomentpeopleeverywherehadequalaccesstoadvantage:nomatterwhichsocietyapersonbelongedto,heorshewouldhavethesamerights,opportunities,resources,etc.—allthevariouscomponentsthattogethermakeupadvantage.Whathappensaswemoveforwardintime,ontheassumptionthatrightsofculturalandpoliticalself‐determinationallowsocietiestomakechoicesanddecisionsthatwillaffectthelevelofadvantagetheirmemberscanenjoyinthefuture?:Toillustratetheproblem,Iimagined,inanearlierdiscussion,twosocietiesstartingoutfromanequalresourcebase,oneofwhichAffluenza,decidestouseupitsresourceendowmentrapidlytosustainahighlevelofconsumption,whiletheother,Ecologia,choosestoconserveresourcesbyadoptingastrictpolicyofsustainabledevelopment;similarlyIcontrastedProcreatia,whichencourageslargefamiliesandwhosepopulationthereforegrowsrapidly,withCondominium,whosestrictlyenforced(p.69) familyplanningpolicyachievesastablepopulationsize.14Assumingtherearenootherdifferencesbetweenthesesocieties,theoutcomemustbethataswemoveforwardintime,percapitaresourcelevelswillbegreaterinEcologiathaninAffluenza,andgreaterinCondominiumthaninProcreatia.Whereasatthebeginningmembersofeachofthesesocietiesenjoyedequalaccesstoadvantage,lateronthisceasestobetrue.15

Inintroducingtheseexamples,Iamassumingthatlevelsofadvantageineachsocietyaredeterminedbydomesticfactors,andespeciallybythepoliciespursuedbytheirrespectivegovernments.Thisisnot,ingeneral,arealisticassumption,andlaterinthisbookIshallbelookingmorecloselyatdifferentexplanationsthathavebeengivenfortherelativewealthandpovertyofnations.Theassumptionismadeheresimplyinordertoprobewhatglobalequalitymightmeanwhenappliedtocaseslikethis.Sohowcouldasupporterofglobalegalitarianismrespondtothesetwo‐countrystories?


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Onepossibilitywouldbetodenythatthereisanybreachofequality,intherelevantsense,asthecountriespursuetheirdifferentpathsofdevelopment.Providedthattheywereequallyplacedatthestart,andthesurroundingconditionsarethesameforeach,whathappenslaterdoesnotdestroyequality.ThisresponsecorrespondstotheversionofegalitarianismfavouredindomesticcontextsbyliberalpoliticalphilosopherssuchasDworkin,accordingtowhichequalityisnotcompromisedwhenindividualsmakechoicesastohowtousetheirequalinitialshareofresources,eventhoughlaterontheyarelikelytoenjoydifferentlevelsofresources:equalityissatisfiedso(p.70) longasfinalinequalitiescanbetracedtopreferencesanddecisionsforwhichtheindividualsinquestioncanrightlybeheldresponsible.16Butthereareobviousproblemsintransferringthisliberalformofegalitarianismfromindividualtocollectivelevel.Evenifallfourofourimaginedcountriesaredemocraticallygoverned,individualcitizensinAffluenzaandProcreatiamayverywelldissentfromwhattheyseeastheprodigalbehaviourofthemajorityoftheirfellow‐citizens.Why,then,isitfairthattheirlevelofadvantageshouldbediminishedovertimebydecisionsforwhichtheyarenotpersonallyresponsible?Andwhatofthosewhoarenotyetbornatthetimewhentheegalitarianstartinggateisintroduced?Theyenteraworldinwhichthelevelofadvantagetheycanenjoyhasalreadybeenpartlydeterminedbytheactionsoftheirpredecessors.Inwhatsenseisthereequalitybetweenthemandotherswhoarebornintosocietiesthathavechosendifferently?

Ofcoursethesequestionsalsoposeachallengetothoselikemyselfwhowanttodefendtheideathatnationscanbeheldresponsibleforthelevelsofadvantagetheirmembersenjoy,soinduecoursetheywillneedtobeproperlyaddressed.17Iintroducethemheretoshowthatwhateverplausibilityinitial‐equality‐qualified‐by‐choicemayhaveasaconceptionofsocialjustice,itdoesnottransfertoaworldinwhichcollectivechoicesremainanimportantdeterminantoftheresourcelevelsavailabletodifferentsocieties.Inthiscontext,theproposaltoimplementanegalitarianstartingpointissimplyfartooweakasaconceptionofequality.Sohowelsemightglobalegalitariansrespondtothetwo‐countryparables?

AsecondresponseistosaythatjusticerequiresredistributionfromEcologiatoAffluenzaandfromCondominiumtoProcreatiasoastopreserveequalaccesstoadvantageovertime.Butthisproposalseemsopentotwoveryseriousobjections.ThefirstisthatitleavesverylittleincentiveforstatesandtheircitizenstobehaveintheresponsiblewaythatEcologiaandCondominiumhavedone.Peopleinthesesocietieshaveforegoneopportunitiesforconsumption(p.71) andraisinglargerfamiliesonthegroundsthatitwasimportanttoconserveresourcesforthefutureontheonehandandtokeepthepopulationatasustainablelevelontheother.Butwhydothis,ifprofligatesocietiescanexpecttofindthemselvescompensatedfromthestocksofresourcessavedoraccumulatedbysocietiesthathaveshownthemselvestobemoreprudent?Whybeanant,ifthegrasshoppersareguaranteedequalaccesstoyourstoreofwinterprovisions?Aredistributiveschemeofthekindproposedwouldunderminetheresponsibilityanationhasforitsownterritoryandothercollectiveassets.ButasRawlsremarks:


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…animportantroleofgovernment…istobetheeffectiveagentofapeopleastheytakeresponsibilityfortheirterritoryandthesizeoftheirpopulation,aswellasformaintainingtheland'senvironmentalintegrity.Unlessadefiniteagentisgivenresponsibilityformaintaininganassetandbearstheresponsibilityandlossfornotdoingso,thatassettendstodeteriorate.18

Connectedtothefirstobjectionisasecond,whichholdsthatitissimplyunfairtotaxEcologiaandCondominiuminordertorestoreAffluenzaandProcreatiatoapositionofequality.Citizensintheformersocietieshavemadesacrifices—theyhaveconsumedfewernaturalresources,andraisedfewerchildrenthantheywouldideallyhaveliked—inordertoachievepoliciesthattheyseeaseitherintheirownlong‐terminterestsorasintheinterestsoftheirsuccessors.Theyarenowbeingaskedtosubsidizetheshorter‐termpreferencesofthemembersofAffluenzaandProcreatia,whohavemeanwhilebeenenjoyingtheirconsumptionbonanzaandtheirlargernumbersofoffspringrespectively.Butjusticedoesnotseemtorequiretransferswheninequalitiesinadvantagecanbetracedbacktopreferences,whetherindividualorcollective.19Theonlypeoplewithaprimafacieclaimforcompensationappeartobethosecitizens(p.72) ofAffluenzaandProcreatiawhocandemonstratethattheyhaveconsistentlyopposedthepoliciesoftheirgovernmentsandwould,ifgiventheopportunity,havevotedforandsupportedpoliciessuchasthoseadoptedinEcologiaandCondominium(whethertheydoinfacthavesuchaclaimdependsonhowweunderstandcollectiveresponsibilityforpublicpolicy,atopicIshallconsideratlengthinChapter5).

EvenifthecurrentcitizensofAffluenzaandProcreatiacannotcomplainofunfairnessastheiraccesstoadvantagedwindlesrelativetothecitizensofEcologiaandCondominium,whataboutchildrenbornintothefirsttwosocieties,whohaveclearlyplayednopartinenactingtherelevantpolicies?Whyisn'titunfairthattheybeginlifewithlowermaterialprospectsthantheircounterpartsinthesecondtwo?Noticethatifsuchachargeofunfairnesscanbelaid,itmustbedirectedinthefirstplaceagainsttheirpredecessorswhohavecausedtheshortfall,andonlysecondarilyagainstthecurrentgenerationinEcologiaandCondominium.Butwhatwouldthechargebe?Assumethatresourcelevelshavenotfallentothepointwheretherisinggenerationareunabletosecureminimallydecentlives.Thecharge,then,isthattheiraccesstoadvantageislowerthanitmightbeifthepreviousgenerationhadpursuedmoreprudentpolicies,ofthekindprevailinginEcologiaandCondominium.Butthisisnotaveryweightycomplaint:itdoesnotseemtobeamatterofjusticethatourpredecessorsshouldleaveuswithanyparticularlevelofpercapitaresources,solongastheleveldoesnotfallbelowthatrequiredtosustaintheinstitutionsthatmakeadecentlifepossible.(Preciselywherethatlevelshouldbesetneednotconcernushere;thepointisthatitdoesnotdependonthelevelachievedbythetwocounterpartsocieties).ThechildrenofAffluenzaandProcreatiamay,then,regretthattheirpredecessorschosetoactinthewaythattheydid,butthisbyitselfisnotsufficienttogivethemaclaimontheresourcesnowenjoyedbythecitizensofEcologiaandCondominium.

Ifwholesaleredistributiontorestoreequalitywouldnotonlycreateperverseincentives


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butalsobeunfairtothosewhoarerequiredtobenetcontributors,whatotheroptionsareopentothewould-beglobalegalitarian?Onepossibilitywouldbetodenynationsrights(p.73) ofself‐determinationinallthoseareasofpolicythathaveanimpactonlevelsofadvantage.Butsincealmostanypolicydecisionofanysignificancewillmakesomedifferencetoasociety'sfutureresourceandpopulationlevels,thisistantamounttodoingawaywithself‐determinationaltogether.Noticealsothatthepositioncannotbesavedbyrequiringthateachgeneration,atleast,shouldbeprovidedwithanequalstartingpoint.Inthiscontext,theideathatpeoplebelongtodiscretegenerations,eachofwhichpassescertainbenefitsontoitssuccessor,isinanimportantsenseafiction:therealpictureisoneofcontinualpopulationreplacement.Soifweimagineonceagainaworldinwhicheachnationstartsoutfromabaselineofequality,wecannotallownationstomakeautonomousdecisionsoverthecourseofonegeneration—thirtyyears,say—andthenapplyaninternationaltax‐and‐transferregimethatrestoresequalityforthenextgeneration.Inthemeantime,allthosereachingmaturityinnationsthatpursuewealth‐creatingorresource‐conservingpolicieswillbemateriallyadvantagedrelativetothosereachingmaturityinnationswithothergoals.Andthesameappliesifweconsidernationswithcontrastingpopulationpolicies.

Thereisonefinalegalitarianproposalthatweneedtoconsider:wemightpermitnationstocontinuemakingautonomousdecisionsinareassuchasresourceconservationandpopulationcontrol,butthenrequirethemtoprovidefreeaccesstoanyonewhowantstojoin.20Solongasthecostsofmovingbetweensocietiesarerelativelysmall,equalaccesstoadvantagewouldbepreserved.Peoplewhoarebornintosocietieswithrelativelylowpercapitalevelsofresourcesandthelikewouldnowhavethechoiceofmovingtobetter‐endowedsocieties.Itiseasytosee,however,thatthiswouldalsoundermineself‐determination,inanyworldthatwecanrealisticallyenvisage.Fordecisionsaboutadmissiontocitizenshipareinseparablefromotherdecisionsaboutthekindofsocietyonewantstobuild.Somenationssettingoutonapathofrapideconomicgrowthmaywelcomeall‐comers,oratleasteveryonewhopossessesmarketableskills.Othernationswithdemandingenvironmentalobjectivesmaypursuepoliciesaimedatreducingpopulationgrowthamongtheirexistingmemberstozero—policieswhich(p.74) wouldobviouslybeunderminedifsignificantnumberofimmigrantswerepermittedtoenter.Yetothernationsmaywanttopreservelinguisticorreligiousaspectsoftheirpublicculture,implyingselectiononthesegroundsamongpotentialcandidatesformembership.Anunlimitedrighttofreemovementwouldpre‐emptpolicychoicesofthiskind,andinadifferentwayhollowouttheideaofnationalself‐determination.21

Myobjectionstothelasttwowaysofimplementingglobalegalitarianism—abandonnationalself‐determination,orundermineitbyallowinganunlimitedrightoffreemovement—doofcoursedependontheassumptionthatself‐determinationissomethingtobevaluedandthatfreemovementisnotinanycaseahumanright.Ishallhavemoretosayaboutthesequestionslaterinthisbook.Butrecallherethatthedynamicobjectiontoglobalegalitarianismtakesitsplacealongsidetwoothersalreadyadvanced:thatthereisnoapriorireasontoassumethatglobaljusticemustbeexpressedintheformofaprincipleofequality,andthatatleasttwoofthemaincandidateprinciplesadvancedby


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politicalphilosopherssufferfromintractablemetricproblems.Ifacoherent,culturallyneutral,principleofglobalequalitycouldbeformulated,andifwehadstronggroundsforbelievingthatsuchaprincipleshouldplayacentralroleinourthinkingaboutglobaljustice,thenwemightbedriventoconclude‘somuchtheworsefornationalself‐determination’.Butsinceneitherantecedentconditionhassofarbeenfulfilled,andsincepeopleeverywhereappeartohaveacontinuingwishtocontroltheirowndestiniesasmembersofindependentnations,thedynamicobjectionseemstometohaveconsiderableforce.Providedthatweattachsomevaluetotheideathat,inaculturallydiverseworld,politicalcommunitiesshouldbeabletodeterminetheirownfutures,wehaveagoodreasontoallowsignificantdeparturesfromglobalequality.22Andthisinturnisagood(p.75) reasonforrejectingglobalegalitarianismasourtheoryofglobaljustice.

VIbeganthischapterbyremindingreadersofthesheerscaleofmaterialinequalityinthecontemporaryworld,whileatthesametimecautioningthatwemighthaveanumberofdifferentreasonsforfindingsuchinequalityobjectionable.Ihavenowexpendedsomeeffortstoshowwhyglobalinequalitiesshouldnotautomaticallybetreatedasunjust,simplybecausetheyareinequalities.ButIwanttoconcludethisdiscussionofglobalegalitarianismbyconsideringsomeotherreasonswemighthaveforwantingthescaleoftheseinequalitiestobereduced—reasons,inotherwords,thatarenotdirectlyreasonsofjustice,eventhoughtheymayinvolveseeinginequalityasindirectlyasourceofinjustice.23

Thefirst,andprobablymostpowerful,oftheseisthatmaterialinequalitiesbroadlyconceivedwillnaturallytranslateintoinequalitiesofpower,whichthenbecomeasourceofongoingglobalinjustice.24Thiscanhappeninanumberoffairlyobviousways.Whenrichcountriesorrichcorporationsinteracteconomicallywithcommunitiesorindividualswhoareverymuchpoorer,theycansetthetermsofexchangeand̸oremploymentlargelyintheirownfavour,simplybecausetheyarefarbetterplacedtowithdrawfromtheexchangethanarethosetheyexploit.Thisphenomenonhasbeen(p.76) widelydocumented,andallthatIneedtoemphasizehereisthattheprincipleofjusticethatisviolatedbysuchinteractionsisnotastronglyegalitarianone.ToprotestwhenworkersinThird‐Worldcountriesareemployedinsweatshopconditionsbypowerfulcorporations,onedoesnothavetobelievethattheseworkersoughttoenjoythesametermsandconditions,orhavethesameopportunities,astheircounterpartsinthedevelopedworld.Theinjusticeatstakeismorerudimentary.

Next,grossinequalitybetweennationsmakesitdifficultifnotimpossibleforthoseatthebottomendoftheinequalitytoenjoyanadequatemeasureofself‐determination,unlessoneimagines,counterfactually,thatrichnations'interestinself‐determinationconcernsonlytheirowninternalaffairs,andnotwhathappensintheworldoutside.Inreality,weknowthatinequalitiesinwealthandmilitarypowerplacesevereconstraintsonthepoliciesthatweakernationscanpursue.Soifourvisionofajustworldincludestheideathateachnationshouldhaveafairopportunitytopursuetheparticulargoalsthatitsmembersvaluemost—theinternationalequivalentofthedomesticideaoftoleration—thenweare


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boundtobedisturbedbyinequalitiesonthecurrentscale.

Finally,largeinequalitiesinwealthandpoweralsomakeitdifficulttoachievewhatwemightcall‘fairtermsofcooperation’internationally.Giventhatthereareanumberofareasinwhichnation‐statesneedtocooperatewithoneanothertotheirmutualadvantage—environmentalpolicyisperhapsthemostobvious—thedistributionofcostsandbenefitsintheagreementthatemergesislikelytobedeterminedlargelybytherelativebargainingpowerofthevariousparties.Ifrichcountriesrefusetocooperatealtogether,poorcountrieshavefewsanctionsthattheycandeploytobringtherecalcitrantsbacktothenegotiatingtable.TherefusaloftheUSAtosigntheKyotoagreementisaclearinstanceofthisphenomenon.Sincewecannotplacethepartiesbehindaveilofignorance,proceduralfairnessinpracticerequiresthattheyshouldstandtogainorloseroughlythesameamountwhencooperationsucceedsorfails,andlargeinequalitiesmakethisconditionimpossibletosatisfy.

Inadomesticcontext,therearetwopossiblewaysoftacklinginequalityasasourceofinjustice:reducetheinequality,orpreventitfromhavingunjustconsequences.Weemployabatteryofmeasuresdesignedtopreventinequalitiesofwealth,inparticular,from(p.77) creatinginjustice,rangingfromtheregulationofemploymentcontracts,throughlimitationsontheinheritanceofwealth,torestrictionsonthepoliticalusesofmoney.Itisnotsoeasytoenvisageglobalanaloguesofsuchmeasures.Sointhisrespect,wemayhavemorereasontoworryaboutglobalinequalitiesthanaboutdomesticones.Ofcourse,fortheverysamereasonsthatlargeglobalinequalitiesposeathreattojustice,theyarealsodifficulttocounteract.Itisdifficulttoenvisagerichstatesagreeingtonarrowthegapinwealthandpowerbetweenthemselvesandpoorstates.Perhapsthemosthopefulprospectisofaworldinwhichrichstates,orblocksofrichstates,competewitheachotheronroughlyequalterms,andtherebyalsocheckoneanother'spowervis‐à‐visthirdparties.Butratherthanspeculatefurtheralongtheselines,Iwanttoturntotwootherreasonswemighthaveforcombatinginequality,againdrawinginspirationfromdomesticanalogies.

Onesuchreasonisthevalueofwhatwemaycallequalityofstatusoralternativelysocialequality.Thisistheideaofasetofsocialrelationshipswithinwhichpeopleregardandtreateachotherasfundamentallyequal,despitespecificdifferencesbetweenthem,anditisvaluablebecauseofthequalityoftherelationshipsinquestion:whereitexistsnobodyhasreasontofeelsubservientordeferentialandontheotherhandnobodyhascausetobehaughtyorcondescending.25Now,whateveronethinksaboutthisidea,itmightseemthatitcanonlyapplywithinaboundedsocietyandnottotheworldasawhole.Ontheotherhand,sincetravelandcommunicationhavebrokendownperceptualbarriersbetweensocieties,wedoappearincreasinglytobelivinginaworldinwhichpeoplearelikelytocomparetheirownpositionswiththoseofpeopleinwealthiersocieties,andmayfindthecomparisonhumiliatingordegrading.Thusitseemsthattheremaybeaglobalversionofequalityofstatus,andthatthiswouldgiveusreasontobeconcernedaboutlargeinequalities,especiallyofwealthandincome,alongdimensionsthatgiverisetoperceivedstatusdifferences.


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Althoughthereissomethingtothisargument,Iaminclinedtobesceptical.Equalityofstatusisimportantamongpeoplewhoareindailycontactwithoneanother,andwhoshareacommonwayoflife.(p.78) Insofaraspeoplebelongtosmallercommunitiesandassociationswhichformtheirmainfocusofidentity,relationshipsbetweenthesesubgroupsmatterlessthanhowpeoplearetreatedwithinthem,sinceitistherethattheywillgainthesenseofself‐esteemthatcomesfrombeingtreatedasanequal(ornotasthecasemaybe).RawlsmakesthisargumentinthesectionofATheoryofJusticewhereheisrespondingtotheobjectionthatasocietygovernedbythedifferenceprinciplemaystillgiverisetowhathecalls‘excusableenvy’:

…wetendtocompareourcircumstanceswithothersinthesameorinasimilargroupasourselves,orinpositionsthatweregardasrelevanttoouraspirations.Thevariousassociationsinsocietytendtodivideitintosomanynoncomparinggroups,thediscrepanciesbetweenthesedivisionsnotattractingthekindofattentionwhichunsettlesthelivesofthoselesswellplaced.26

Ifthisargumentappliesdomestically,itseemsitshouldapplywithgreaterforcestillinternationally,sinceformostpeoplenationalboundariesmarkoutsalientspheresofcomparisonandnon-comparison.AdmittedlyinternationalsocietylacksonefeaturewhichRawlsseesascounterbalancingmaterialinequalities,namelyequalcitizenship:thereisnocommonpublicsphereinwhichglobalcitizensencounteroneanotherasequals.Ontheotherhand,culturaldifferencesbetweensocietiesmakeitlesslikelythatpeoplewillbedrawnintocomparingthemselveswitheachotheralongasingledimensionsuchasmaterialwealth.WemightaspiretoaninternationalversionofMichaelWalzer's‘complexequality’,wherepeopleindifferentsocietiesderivedtheirself‐esteeminpartfromtheirsociety'ssuccessinlivinguptoitsownstandards,whethermaterialisticoranti‐materialistic.27Isuggestthisnotinordertodefendtheexistingglobalorder,sinceextremesofpovertypreventnationalprojectsofallkindsfrombeingpursued,butasawayofthinkingaboutwhatsocialequalitymightmeaninaculturallypluralworld.

(p.79) Finally,equalityissometimesdefendedbecauseofitsconnectiontotheideaoffraternity:ifwewantpeopletolivetogetherinclose,solidaristicrelationships,thenweshouldensurethattheyliveinmuchthesamematerialconditions.Fraternityonaglobalscalemightseemanimpossibility:howeveraweakerversionofthesameclaimisthatifwewantaworldinwhichpeoplearewillingtocooperateandtosettletheirdifferencespeacefully,thenthismustalsobeaworldinwhichmaterialinequalitiesarenottoogreat.Insupportofthis,onemightciteargumentsmadeinrecentyearsthattheultimatesourceofinternationalterrorismisthematerialgulfthatexistsbetweentheaffluentWestandthepositionofnationsintheMiddleEastandelsewhere,givingrisetoangerandresentmentthatmanifestsitselfinhatredofallthingsWestern.

Onceagain,myresponsetothisargumentissomewhatsceptical.Whatinternationalcooperationrequiresisindeednotfraternity,butmutualrespectbetweenpoliticalcommunitieswhorecognizetheirdifferencesbutalsorealizethattheyneedtoworktogetherinanumberofpolicyareas.Andthepreconditionforthisisnotequality,buttheabsenceofseriousinjustice.Inotherwords,wehavefirsttoestablishwhatjustice


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requiresininternationalcontextsandhavingdonethatwecanthensetdowntheconditionsunderwhichinternationalcooperationislikelytoprovefeasible.Toassumethattherelevantprincipleofjusticehereissomeformofsubstantiveequalityistobegallthequestionsraisedinearliersectionsofthischapter.

Tosumup,oncewehavedisentangledtheissueofglobalinequalityfromquestionsaboutglobaljustice,andinparticularthedeprivationsufferedbypeoplelivinginpoorsocieties,wemaystillbeconcernedabouttheeffectsoflargeinequalities.Buttheseconcernswillbederivative,andwillcentremainlyondifferencesofpowerbetweenrichandpoorcountries,andthelikelyeffectsoftheseonglobaljusticeinthefuture.Ifwecouldpreventtheconversionofmaterialadvantageintopoliticaldomination,therewouldbenothinginherentlyreprehensibleaboutsomenationsbeingricherthanothers,andwemightregardsuchinequalityasaninevitablefeatureofaculturallydiverseworld.

OverthecourseofChapters2and3,Ihavebeenofferingacriticalappraisalofcosmopolitantheoriesofglobaljustice.Thesetheoriesareevidentlyveryradicalintheirimplications,ifwesettheirrequirementsagainsttheexistingworldorder.ButIhavenot(p.80) rejectedthemforthatreason:maybeglobaljusticedoesrequireustotransformourworldinquitefundamentalways.Ihaverejectedtheminsteadforignoringthespecialresponsibilitiesweproperlyowetoourcompatriots,forfailingtotakeproperaccountofthevalueofself‐determination,forinsufficientsensitivitytoculturaldifference,andsoforth—inotherwordsforphilosophicalandnotmerelypoliticaldeficiencies.ButIhavenotyetbeguntodevelopmyownalternativeview,orinparticulartodefendtheideaofnationalresponsibilitywhichwillplayacentralpartinthatview.ThisisthetaskofChapters4,5,and6thatfollow.

Notes:

(1)IhaveusedfiguresfromtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,HumanDevelopmentReport2005,availableathttp://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005.

(2)Cansuchathresholdbedefinedinanon‐arbitraryway?IdiscussthisissueinsomedetailinChapter7.

(3)Forafullerstatementofthepositionsetoutinthefollowingparagraphs,seemyPrinciplesofSocialJustice(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),ch.11.

(4)SeeT.Pogge,‘AnEgalitarianLawofPeoples’,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,23(1994),195–224.

(5)SeeH.Steiner,AnEssayonRights(Oxford:Blackwell,1994),ch.8;H.Steiner,‘TerritorialJustice’,inS.Caney,D.George,andP.Jones(eds),NationalRights,InternationalObligations(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1996);H.Steiner,‘JustTaxationandInternationalRedistribution’,inI.ShapiroandL.Brilmayer(eds),NomosXLI:GlobalJustice(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1999).

(6)Steiner,‘TerritorialJustice’,146.


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(7)SeeR.Dworkin,‘WhatisEquality?Part2:EqualityofResources’,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,10(1981),283–345andR.Dworkin,‘WhatisEquality?Part3:ThePlaceofLiberty’,IowaLawReview,73(1987–8),1–54,bothnowreprintedasR.Dworkin,SovereignVirtue:TheTheoryandPracticeofEquality(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2000),chs.2and3.

(8)Dworkin,‘ThePlaceofLiberty’,sectionsIII–IV.

(9)J.Rawls,ATheoryofJustice(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971),73.

(10)See,forinstance,S.Caney,‘CosmopolitanJusticeandEqualizingOpportunities’,inT.Pogge(ed.),GlobalJustice(Oxford:Blackwell,2001);S.Caney,‘GlobalEqualityofOpportunityandtheSovereigntyofStates’,inA.Coates(ed.),InternationalJustice(Aldershot,UK:Ashgate,2000);D.Moellendorf,CosmopolitanJustice(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,2002),ch.4.

(11)Moellendorf,CosmopolitanJustice,49.

(12)ThisissueisraisedbyBernardBoxhillin‘GlobalEqualityofOpportunityandNationalIntegrity’,SocialPhilosophyandPolicy,5(1987),143–68.BoxhilldiscussestheimplicationsofculturaldiversityforglobalequalityofopportunitywithoutdistinguishingassharplyasIwouldwishbetweenculture'sroleindefining‘success’andculture'sroleinmotivatingpeopletostriveforsuccess,howeverdefined.Inthepresentdiscussion,Iambracketingtheissueofmotivationbydefiningequalopportunityasopportunityforpeopleofsimilartalentandmotivation.ItmaywellbethecasethatchildreninruralMozambiquearenottaughttoaspiretobebankexecutives,butforpurposesofargumentIamassumingthatwehaveachildwiththeappropriatemotivation,andaskingunderwhatcircumstancessuchachildcouldbejudgedtohaveequalopportunitieswithhisSwisscounterpart.

(13)ReplyingtoBoxhill'sconcernaboutculturaldiversity,SimonCaneysuggeststhefollowing:‘Globalequalityofopportunityrequiresthatpersons(ofequalabilityandmotivation)haveequalopportunitiestoattainanequalnumberofpositionsofacommensuratestandardofliving.’(‘CosmopolitanJusticeandEqualizingOpportunities’,130).This,however,issimultaneouslytoonarrowandtoovague.Itistoonarrowinfocusingexclusivelyonopportunitiestoattainjobs;anditistoovaguewhenitusesthemetric‘acommensuratestandardofliving’tocomparethem.Whatdoesthismean?Doesitrefersimplytosalary,perhapsadjustedtotakeaccountofdifferencesinpurchasingpower?Ordoesitmean‘standardofliving’inamuchwidersense,inwhichcasewewouldneedtoknowhowthedifferentcomponentsthatmakeupsomeone'slifearetobeweighedagainsteachother?ForapenetratingcritiqueofCaney'sview,seeG.Brock,‘Egalitarianism,Ideals,andCosmopolitanJustice’,PhilosophicalForum,36(2005),1–30.

(14)SeeD.Miller,‘JusticeandGlobalInequality’,inA.HurrellandN.Woods(eds),Inequality,Globalization,andWorldPolitics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999).JohnRawlsusesasomewhatsimilarpairofexamplestounderminetheideaofglobal


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distributivejusticeinTheLawofPeoples(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),section16.

(15)InmyoriginaldiscussionIusedthetwo‐societyparablestochallengeequalityofnaturalresourcesasaconceptionofglobaljustice,and,asTimHaywardhaspointedout,thisiscompatiblewiththinkingthatoverallpercapitaresourcelevels—humanlyproducedaswellasnatural—willbemaintainedinAffluenzaandProcreatiaovertime:seeT.Hayward,‘GlobalJusticeandNaturalResources’,PoliticalStudies,54(2006),349–69.ButtheparablescaneasilyberecastsothatoverallpercapitaresourcelevelsinAffluenzaandProcreatiadecreaseovertime,astheircitizensenjoyhighlevelsofconsumptionandreproductionrespectively,where‘resources’areallthosethingsthatconstitutepersonaladvantage.Sorecast,theypresentageneralchallengetoglobalegalitarianism,understoodasrequiringequalaccesstoadvantage.

(16)SeeDworkin,‘EqualityofResources’,esp.304–6(SovereignVirtue,83–5).

(17)Forthischallenge,seeforinstanceC.Fabre,‘GlobalEgalitarianism:AnIndefensibleTheoryofJustice?’,inD.BellandA.De–Shalit(eds),FormsofJustice(Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefield,2003),315–30;C.Beitz,‘SocialandCosmopolitanLiberalism’,InternationalAffairs,75(1999),526–8;andT.Pogge,RealizingRawls(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1989),252–3.

(18)Rawls,TheLawofPeoples,8.

(19)Therearesomeridersthatneedtobeaddedtothisclaim:preferencesthathavearisenincertainways,orthattheagentinquestionwouldliketoridherselfofbutcannot,mayprovidegroundsforcompensatorytransfers.Thisisnottheplace,however,toengagewiththesedifficultquestions.Fordiscussion,see,forexample,theexchangesbetweenRonaldDworkinandJerryCohen:Dworkin,‘WhatIsEquality?PartI:EqualityofWelfare’,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,10(1981),228–40(reprintedinDworkin,SovereignVirtue),sectionVIII;Dworkin,‘EqualityofResources’,sectionIII;G.A.Cohen,‘OntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJustice’,Ethics,99(1989),906–44sectionIV;R.Dworkin,‘EqualityandCapability’,inDworkin(ed.),SovereignVirtue,sectionsII–III;G.A.Cohen,‘ExpensiveTasteRidesAgain’,inJ.Burley(ed.),DworkinandHisCritics(Oxford:Blackwell,2004);andDworkin'sreplyinthesamevolume.

(20)Foranargumentinfavouroffreedomofmovementalongtheselines,seeJ.Carens,‘AliensandCitizens:TheCaseforOpenBorders’,ReviewofPolitics,49(1987),251–73.

(21)IshallexplorethisissueinmuchgreaterdepthinChapter8.

(22)AsIshallpointoutinthenextsection,valuingself‐determinationalsogivesusareasontolimitglobalinequality.Iassumeherethatanethicallyacceptableformofnationalismmusttreatself‐determinationasauniversalvalue.So,ontheonehand,nationalcommunitiesmusthavetheopportunitytosettheirownprioritiesintermsofeconomicpolicy,environmentalpolicy,populationpolicy,andsoforth,eventhoughsuch


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collectivechoiceswillinevitablygenerateinequalityalongparticulardimensionsovertime.Ontheotherhand,thesedecisionsmaynotdepriveothernationalcommunitiesofopportunitiesforself‐determinationby,forexample,creatingglobaleconomicconditionsinwhichtheirchoicesarealmostcompletelyconstrainedbythedemandsofeconomicsurvival.Thisneedforabalancemayjustifytransferringsomepowers—sayovereconomicandenvironmentalissues—upwardstointernationalbodies.Valuingself‐determinationdoesnotmeanacceptingnationalsovereigntyinitstraditionalsense.

(23)Themoregeneralideasthatequalitycanbevaluedforreasonsindependentofjustice,andthatinequalitycanserveasasourceofinjusticewithoutbeingunjustinitself,havebeenexploredinT.M.Scanlon,‘TheDiversityofObjectionstoInequality’,LindleyLecture,UniversityofKansas,1996,nowreprintedinT.M.Scanlon,TheDifficultyofTolerance:EssaysinPoliticalPhilosophy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),andinsightfullyappliedtotheglobalcontextinC.Beitz,‘DoesGlobalInequalityMatter?’,inT.Pogge(ed.),GlobalJustice(Oxford:Blackwell,2001).

(24)SeealsohereDebraSatz,‘InternationalEconomicJustice’,inH.LaFollette(ed.),TheOxfordHandbookofPracticalEthics(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2003).

(25)Ihaveexploredthismorefullyin‘EqualityandJustice’,Ratio,10(1997),222–37andinPrinciplesofSocialJustice,ch.11.

(26)Rawls,TheoryofJustice,536–7.

(27)Fortheoriginalversion,seeM.Walzer,SpheresofJustice:ADefenceofPluralismandEquality(Oxford:MartinRobertson,1983),esp.chs.1and13,andfordiscussionmyessay‘ComplexEquality’,inD.MillerandM.Walzer(eds),Pluralism,JusticeandEquality(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995).

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