Cooperation in EU disaster response and security provision: circulating practices

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Cooperation in EU disaster responseand security provision: circulatingpracticesChristopher C. Leitea

a School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, 120 University,Social Sciences Building, Room 7005, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5,CanadaPublished online: 13 Apr 2015.

To cite this article: Christopher C. Leite (2015): Cooperation in EU disaster response and securityprovision: circulating practices, European Security, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2015.1027767

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Cooperation in EU disaster response and security provision:circulating practices

Christopher C. Leite*

School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, 120 University, Social Sciences Building, Room7005, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Canada

(Received 30 September 2014; final version received 6 March 2015)

There is a profound disconnect between the practice and scholarly study of security inEurope. The 2010 Internal Security Strategy added disasters such as forest fires,earthquakes, and floods to the list of European Union (EU) internal security concerns,expanding on the more traditional anxieties over militaries, border protection, and theeffects of poverty. This article explores how evolving practices of disaster response, apolicy area once separate from EU security discourse, have become part of the EU’swider security provision and with what implications. Based on interviews conducted atthe Directorate-General (DG) for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), itprovides a detailed study of three EU disaster response practices – monitoring,training, and information co-ordinating – and their circulation to the wider field of EUinternal security provision. It uses this case to outline that new understandings of whatit means to “voluntarily co-operate” in European security projects have been radicallyunder-theorized.

Keywords: European Union; securitization; security practices; internal security; civilprotection

Introduction

The 2010 Internal Security Strategy (ISS) of the European Union (EU) notes that “Theconcept of internal security must be understood as a wide and comprehensive concept …including natural and man-made disasters such as forest fires, earthquakes, floods andstorms” (Justice and Home Affairs Council 2010, p. 8). This is a considerable changefrom the earlier 2003 European Security Strategy, which focused primarily on moretraditional, albeit expanding, areas of security: law enforcement, armed conflict, borderprotection, social instability, and the effects of poverty (High Representative for ForeignAffairs and Security Policy 2003). With this shift, the ISS links traditional areas ofinternal security – transnational organized crime, terrorism, and human trafficking – witha wider set of health, social, and civil protection services. This should be understood as astatement about something much larger than emergency or disaster management though.How did a policy area once separate from EU security discourse become part of the EU’ssecurity concerns? What are the implications of the discourse and practices of civilprotection or disaster response circulating to the wider field of EU internal securityproviders?

*Email: cleite@uottawa.ca

European Security, 2015http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2015.1027767

Civil protection projects have brought new ideas and practices into broader EUsecurity provision. Three practices in particular have become prominent: monitoring,training, and information coordinating. Monitoring, training, and coordinating informa-tion practices, respectively, have defined the parameters by which disasters are respondedto, created a field of expert disaster responders, and outlined how all others in their fieldsinteract. These three developments have altered the way states participating inmonitoring, training, and information coordinating practices understand what voluntarycooperation means in the field of disaster response – a change likewise being seen in thewider field of EU internal security provision.

To illustrate how this circulation of practices happened, this article unpacks thesepractices and their specific effects. It is based on nearly 30 hours of interviews andworking group meetings conducted at the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid andCivil Protection (DG ECHO) and which included lower-level policy officers andadministrators, as well as Heads of Units, Directors, and a former Director-General.These interviews and meetings emphasized ECHO’s use of a monitoring centre tocoordinate responses to natural disasters and how those institutional practices spread tothe wider area of EU emergency management. This circulation of practices has mostnotably been seen in the parallel establishment of an intelligence and risk assessmentmonitoring centre at DG HOME, the DG responsible for EU internal security – a processonly scantly mentioned in official EU Commission Communications (2013). Thisrevelation led to a further set of interviews conducted with DG HOME policy officers,Heads of Units, and Directors, as well as phone interviews with members of theCommission Executive.

In the early 2000s, the DG Environment developed what became the European CivilProtection (ECP) Teams. They were rapidly deployable, multifaceted assistance packages,organized as rapid response emergency teams. The teams were ad hoc, being formedwhenever a need arose and largely involved the services of national civil protectionexperts, with a heavy emphasis on forest firefighting and flood response. Parallel to this,monitoring processes developed at ECHO were beginning to play a larger role in generalEU crisis management operations. In 2010, there was a restructuring and the ECP teamswere moved to ECHO as part of its newly expanded mandate to deal with both naturaland humanitarian interventions. This meant the creation of a civil protection directorate atECHO, complete with its own formal disaster monitoring and response coordinationcentre. Shortly after, a similar centre was duplicated at DG HOME to monitor andcoordinate EU internal security response.

By tracing the practices involved in this process, the article puts into contact two setsof literatures. On one hand is the wealth of work that looks at DG ECHO and the EU’sdisaster response capabilities (Bremberg and Britz 2009, Larsson et al. 2009, Attinà 2012,Bossong and Rhinard 2013, Boin et al. 2013, Rhinard et al. 2013). Despite the cleartracing of the development of ECHO’s current capabilities, these works have notsufficiently explored the security implications for these institutional changes. On the otheris the wealth of research studying EU security and how practices of security shapeunderstandings of institutional behaviour (Balzacq et al. 2010, Huysmans 2011, Mavelli2013). ECHO does not usually factor into security practice researchers’ evaluations of thefield of EU security, despite the fact that its functions are explicitly and intricately tied tothose of HOME, as evident in both the ISS and the ISS implementation reports (Justiceand Home Affairs Council 2010, European Commission 2013). This article engages withboth sets of literatures by providing an in-depth analysis of EU disaster policy while

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using the security practices approach that is gaining popularity among EU scholarsbecause of its ability to clarify evolving political dynamics across different institutions.

Building from this literature, the article makes both theoretical and empiricalarguments. First, theoretically, the study of security in Europe has been inattentive toimportant changes to the way security is practised by EU institutions; this represents afundamental disconnect between everyday governmental security concerns and whatsecurity scholars think are important avenues of research. The current article remediesthis inattention by using the theoretical insights offered by the security practices approachto study an overlooked empirical puzzle. Empirically, civil protection and disasterresponse techniques have become dominant sets of institutional practices throughout theEU, changing the way that “co-operation” is understood by actors in Europe. Thesepractices have helped actors within ECHO gain a central role in their policy field, broughtdisaster policy into the general field of security provision, and, as a result, disasterresponse practices are circulating to other areas of security policy in the EU and changingwhat practices should be understood as part of EU internal security provision.

The rest of this article first reviews key EU disaster response and security practicesliterature and outlines the theoretical framework for the project. The second section thenfocuses on the specific practices of monitoring, training, and information coordinating inthe field of disaster response, teasing out the background, process, and implications ofeach of these practices. The third section then outlines how these types of practices havecirculated to the wider realm of EU internal security and the fourth section discusses theimplications of these transformations.

Literature Review, Framework, and Background

There has been a wealth of research focusing on the growing EU capacity to coordinatecrisis management and disaster response capabilities. Despite thorough examinations ofhow these capabilities have been developed, the impact they have had for understandingEU security is something that has not yet been explored. Likewise, there have been anumber of works that look at the changing discourses and practices of EU securityinstitutions. This work has neglected any account of the disaster response capabilities ofthe EU. The goal here is to counter these trends by putting the two literatures in contact,using the insights of security practices to explore an area of EU policy-making from anapproach that does not solely focus on the complicated relationship that the EU’s bodieshave with both their constituent Member States and other organizations – an important,but often overemphasized area of research. Thus, the article brings together theinstitutional literature of disaster policy and the largest set of security literature concernedwith security practices, itself inspired by the insights of securitization theory (ST).

First, studies of the EU’s disaster response capacities see them either as a public good(Bossong and Rhinard 2013, Rhinard et al. 2013), as a set of interrelated EU policyframework agreements (Attinà 2012), or as a set of pooled, institutionalized set ofcapacities in a given policy area (Boin et al. 2013). The most interesting and detailedstudy of the EU’s crisis management capacities, The European Union as Crisis Manager(Boin et al. 2013), maps the EU’s ability to manage crises, details the wide range of EUcrisis management capacities, and assesses the levels to which these capacities have beeninstitutionalized. It argues that EU bodies have emerged as central factors in crisismanagement and disaster response, thanks largely to their ability to allow closercooperation between Member States (Boin et al. 2013).

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They also argue, though, that the EU still lacks a crisis management ability “withteeth” (Boin et al. 2013, p. 17), which they say is because crisis management falls underthe traditional remit of national governments, and thus represents an area still not as fullyintegrated as others. Larsson et al. (2009) likewise argue that EU disaster response has notyet developed its own “self-image”, largely as a result of its own inconsistentdevelopment of capabilities. Similarly, Bremberg and Britz (2009) argue that there isno institutionalized logic of civil protection at the EU level, because of the diverseMember State approaches to disaster response. All of these studies echo much of theother work looking at the EU’s ability to coordinate disaster response. These approachesusually fall back in various ways to how ECHO’s disaster response capabilities representa tension between “solidarity” and “sovereign” crisis management capacities (Ekengrenet al. 2006).

There are some who have looked at the context of ECHO’s work more broadly. Forexample, Versluys (2009) looks at ECHO’s humanitarian aid policy, seeing it as apolitical tool of “soft power” – something Joseph (2013) thinks is a misguided andnarrow way to understand ECHO’s most recent turn to resilience policy. Similarly, Dukeand Ojanen (2006) see a number of areas that represent drastic or meaningful shifts inhow the EU understands its own security policies, especially in the area of civilprotection thanks to ECHO, but they again point out that not many of these areas arebeing studied or looked at in any meaningful way. Finally, Burgess (2009) points outhow, more generally, the EU has various different conceptions of security. He argues thatbecause of the segmented and differentiated processes of policy harmonization andstandardization across all of the policy areas the EU covers, including civil protection, itsbodies develop very different landscapes of security policies, which periodically need tobe realigned through processes like developing broad-level security strategies or strategyoutline reports.

There are two important points to take from this. First, it provides a window into civilprotection slowly becoming a formal security concern within the EU, thanks to theperiodic reviews of security policy offered by the security strategy writing process.Second, Burgess specifically argues that understanding EU security has less to do withthe ideas that European actors have about what it means to be secure or insecure andmore to do with the way that EU bodies embody into practice what being secure orinsecure looks like, something that can be seen by the way they cooperate in a givenpolicy area. This idea of constantly dealing with security threats was central to thedevelopment of Securitization Theory (ST) in the mid-1990s. ST was concerned with twoprocesses: the deepening of what how security practices should be understood as part ofthe construction of threats, and the broadening of what policy fields are implicated insecurity practices (Waever 1995, Buzan et al. 1998).

Practices and deepening security

The first contribution of ST, deepening understandings of security, has led to a wealth ofwork concerned both with the construction of specific things or events as threats (Balzacq2008, Hansen 2011, among others) and with the practices by which these constructed threatscontinue to shape behaviour (Huysmans 2011). This focus on security practices is somethingthat has been taken up more closely by security researchers engaging with the wayinstitutions include threat-creation practices as governance techniques (Balzacq et al. 2010).

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This means that a central point in the study of security practices is understanding howinstitutions conceive of security and the processes by which they deal with it.

Being taken up in this article, the security practices approach emphasizes how actorsstruggle in their fields, where they mobilize cultural, symbolic, social, or economicresources, or capital, to perform practices, aiming to gain a position of dominance in agiven social field (Bourdieu 1977[2011], Williams 2007, Adler and Pouliot 2011). Thisdoes not necessarily mean that actors in and between security institutions are necessarily“conflictual” or consciously trying to undermine each other, but that they are alwaystrying to work to further their own mandates, ensure their own budgets, and maintaintheir own existence. This means that institutions set up for one function, with time, willshift and change to be focused on something else instead, because the conditions thatensure their survival change. NATO’s post-Cold War shift towards post-conflict peace-keeping operations in the 1990s is a commonly cited example of this (Williams 2007,Gheciu 2008). This is because the shift notably ran counter to the EU’s then-growinghumanitarian intervention framework – de facto meaning many European states had tochoose which security institution to support with military involvement, with mostchoosing the older and more entrenched NATO framework.

It is through this institutional competition and processes of change that certain“practices of community” form, where at given times, certain types of practices are seento be more useful or dominant in a given field than others (Abrahamsen and Williams2011, p. 311). Actors use their internalized knowledge of the field and its dynamics toknow what types of practices are appropriate or useful at a given time, and perform themto improve their relative position in that field; they use practices strategically (Mérandand Forget 2012). Studies in this vein have traced the ways the career paths of individualswho move between fields have the ability to change institutional practices (Bigo et al.2007). These evolutions of practice are then understood to be more than mere changes ininstitutional norms or different calculations of sharing material capabilities. They arerepresentative of changing understandings and forms of power, “bottom-up” changes,which allow actors to perform new roles and change the way political relations areformed (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011, p. 311, Georgakakis and Weisbein 2012).

Disaster response and broadening security

For all that security practices research has done to deepen the theoretical innovations ofST, though, it has still fallen short. The second major contribution of ST was supposedlythe broadening of what “sectors” fall under security policy – but this has seemingly nothappened. To be fair, scholars interested in security practices have expanded the sub-fieldof security studies beyond the narrow scope of military or strategic security research byresearching specific areas of HOME policies, such as counter-terrorism or bordermanagement as security concerns (Balzacq and Carrera 2005, Bigo et al. 2007, Neal2009, Léonard 2010). To compare though, there has been relatively little written about thesecuritization of disaster policy. Buzan et al. (1998) include specific references tomanaging the effects of disasters, arguing for example that a “possible” threat to societalsecurity “could be depopulation, whether by plague…famine, natural catastrophe…”(1998, p. 121). For them, the effects of disasters are taken to be “threats to individuals …only if they threaten the breakdown of society do they become societal security issues”(1998, p. 121). This emphasis on the effects of disasters, and not the events themselves,means that there is no vocabulary in the original 1998 formulation, nor in subsequent

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works drawing on ST, for systematically looking at how disasters themselves havebecome treated as security threats in the way they currently are in the EU.

Studies of securitization and security practices have not yet paid adequate attention tothings like ECHO or the EU’s disaster response capabilities, nor to HOME’s new securitymonitoring coordination centre. Security scholars have equally neglected researchingmany of the different ways security practices in the field of disaster response havebecome security governance logics more generally – with the notable exception of LouiseComfort’s work (2005). This is especially surprising in light of the political andprocedural changes to how disasters are managed, for example, as found in the EU ISScited above, the US government’s restructuring of FEMA, and the Canadian govern-ment’s activities in establishing the Ministry of Public Safety. This represents afundamental disconnect between governmental security concerns and what securityscholars think are important policy areas for researching security.

This article remedies this lack by pointing to two institutional developments. First, thecreation of EU civil protection or disaster response capabilities is not only representativeof a larger conversation of EU-Member State sovereignty negotiations, as much of theEU disaster management literature points out. Neither is this a development confined to aspecific, largely isolated policy area devoid of security concerns, as security scholarsseem to assume by their non-engagement. Disaster management is part of the EU’sspectrum of general security provision, broadly defined. Instead of only being a specifiedpolicy area, often linked with development or aid projects, disaster management shouldbe understood as a distinct branch of non-military security policy. To demonstrate thisfact, the rest of the article understands the specific practices performed at ECHO as beingways by which actors within the DG alter understandings of voluntary cooperation in thefield of disaster response by shaping how other actors understand what a value-add is.Second, as a part of the more general field of non-military security, disaster responsepractices have begun to circulate to other areas of EU internal security provision, adevelopment in EU institutional politics that existing security practice approaches havemissed because they have not spent enough time studying EU disaster response.

The practices outlined in this article specifically revolve around one location withinDG ECHO: the centralized European Response Co-ordination Centre (ERCC). The dailyrunning of the DG is organized around the ERCC and civil protection, and with it,monitoring disasters and managing their responses. In addition to the ERCC being theprimary function of ECHO, the centre also plays an equally central role in the larger fieldof international disaster response because of the coordinating role it plays. This is done byits 33 duty officers, with one officer on call at all times, seconded from all of theparticipating states.1 They constantly monitor data designed to forecast natural disasters.This data arrives from systems designed to monitor for the possibility of imminentdisaster, such as tsunamis, earthquakes, or floods, as well as from some establishedinternational monitoring systems.

ECHO has agreements and partnerships with a host of international disastermonitoring bodies, all of which share their systems with the ERCC. The ERCC thenuses the data compiled to develop training programmes in conjunction with theparticipating states, creating a group of expert disaster responders. In a disaster, the ERCCalso uses its in-house emergency communication system to coordinate the deployment ofthe ECP disaster response teams, who are drawn from a list of specialists seconded fromparticipating states. From 2003 through the end of 2012, these ECP teams had performed74 full-mission deployments, and 395 deployments of any kind.2 The specific practices

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involved in this monitoring, the training of disaster responders, and the coordinating ofinformation are discussed below.

Practices

ECHO can only hope to capture some of the processes done by all of the different disastermanagement groups it coordinates. In any one disaster area, these bodies arguably have abetter grasp on monitoring or responding to a situation than ECHO possibly can. Despitethis, to maintain its pivotal role in disaster monitoring and response, ECHO is stillrecognized as providing competencies to the rest of the field, which would otherwise bedifficult to access. There are three sets of practices that the ERCC performs to achievethis: monitoring practices, training and professionalizing practices, and informationcoordinating practices. These three practices have changed the way participating statesunderstand what forms of disaster response cooperation are.

Monitoring

The 26 December 2004 9.1–9.3 magnitude earthquake and resulting tsunami that ravagedSouth Asia was a key point in the development of ECHO’s monitoring capabilities. EUstates wanted to immediately assist, but the tsunami caught them completely unaware.This was a key factor in the 2007 recasting of the Civil Protection Mechanism (CPM) thatwas adopted by the Council on 8 November 2007. Lawyers interviewed who worked onthis 2007 CPM decision pointed out that while some early warning monitoring andresponse capabilities were present before the 2007 agreement, there was no coordinatedeffort to focus on this in the 2001 casting (Interviews 3, 6). The 2010 restructuring led tothe formalization of the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), established after the2007 agreement but now expanded, requiring a drastic reorganization within ECHO(Interviews 1, 3). While the MIC and ECHO had previously serviced both humanitarianaid and civil protection communities, the DG’s focus came to be on civil protection,meaning the creation of a specific civil protection operations unit, separate from thegeneral policy development unit. This reorganization also meant converting the MIC intothe new ERCC.

The duty officers of the ERCC – personnel specifically trained to use the in-housesystems – monitor data that arrive from the EU Commission’s Joint Research Centre’s(JRC) various information systems designed to monitor for the possibility of imminentdisasters. ECHO uses the JRC to develop its disaster monitoring systems, which areimplemented into the ERCC. The DG contacts the JRC with specific request – forexample, a need to assess tsunami early-warning capabilities. The JRC then acts as aliaison with the scientific community most involved in developing these systems(seismologists, and/or oceanographers, for example) to develop a model and forward itto the requesting DG. The parameters by which the JRC then conducts its studies and setsup its systems are tailored to ECHO’s range of operations (Interviews 1, 3, 5, 9). Whilethe systems themselves may be highly specific and precise, the definition of what is beingstudied at all comes from a pre-existing policy decision that has already happened atECHO, according to ECHO’s JRC-liaison officers (Interview 3). The DG, by virtue beingan EU Commission body, is the only actor in the disaster response field that has thisability to devise a network of monitoring systems.

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This specialization of internal capabilities to focus on monitoring has beencontentious. As a result of the growing monitoring of disasters, ECHO’s civil protectioncapabilities have pushed humanitarian aid ones out of ECHO’s daily running, leading toat least one source of tension between the Commissioner’s office in the DG, and anotherbetween the majority and minority of the DG itself. The coordination of humanitarianassistance teams was shifted as a sub-set of the operations run through the EuropeAidagency at the DG for Development and Cooperation in 2011. ECHO still engages in awide number of food aid programmes, and ECHO’s Commissioner – the public, politicalface of the DG – is extremely active in a number of international humanitarianconferences and programmes. The higher-level bureaucrats interviewed agreed that thedaily running of the DG has become oriented more around civil protection, and with it,the monitoring of disasters and the management of their responses (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 5).

This internal tension is the context in which ECHO’s monitoring capabilities weredeveloped. These capabilities should be understood as a form of cultural capital: throughthem, the DG can claim expertise that the Member States cannot: the ability to useadvanced, scientific monitoring and evaluation techniques to decide what responseservices are needed. ECHO’s use of specialized monitoring capabilities allows them toframe the very parameters by which others in the field of disaster response determinewhat legitimate monitoring and response coordination entails. This points to the factECHO actors are able to maintain their authoritative position in the field of disasterresponse because the other actors in their field attribute this capability and its dailyfunctioning with having particular value. The same can be said of the ERCC’s exclusiveaccess to the JRC and thus access to scientific community networks. This is a carefullymaintained resource of social capital held by ECHO actors: not only do they takeadvantage of the networks they have, but they use the networks’ to be seen as a facilitatorby others in the field.

The implications of these practices and the cultural and social capital they mobilizeare that ECHO can offer other responders access to a variety of things being monitored:buoys in the Atlantic Ocean for early tsunami detection, soil testing to predict crop yields,or satellite radar to anticipate severe weather storms, for example. The DG portrays itselfto its participating states as providing a key capacity that they otherwise would not have.Three different ECHO officials cited the same example: the Italian coast guard andmaritime rescue forces have a large area that they need to monitor for potential disastersat sea, in addition to the coast guard’s other duties around customs and irregularimmigration; while they are still the best-suited to respond to situations taking placeacross the Mediterranean, in terms of political past and operational capabilities, the Italiangroups simply do not have the capacity to monitor both their own situations and others’simultaneously. ECHO’s ERCC offers them the ability to monitor patterns both internaland external to their own state, without the Italians having to actually externally monitorat all and all three officials pointed out that this means cooperating with both Italian civilprotection and foreign security officials to coordinate these shared capacities (Interviews1, 4, 5).

Training

The training curricula for the ECP disaster responders are decided through consultationsbetween the participating states and ECHO disaster monitors at the ERCC. The actualinstruction of disaster response experts happens in the participating countries themselves.

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This training usually happens at dedicated disaster response academies, and ECHO’sprogrammes currently revolve around 12 different courses, involving between 500 and800 personnel in 2012. The important role that this ECHO-led training plays is mostapparent in the selection process for a deployment team. When a team is needed in-field,the ERCC issues a “Call for Tender”, where the participating states submit the CVs of allof the disaster personnel that might be needed in a given case.

ECHO will then decide which responders get deployed in which types of situations,based on these CVs, with preference given to people who have been trained throughECHO programmes and whose names are then on the ECP roster lists. In selecting theseresponders, to deploy as an ECP team, ECHO prefers to use experts that either they havetrained through their existing programmes, or who have submitted to undergo ECHO-ledtraining, but who have not yet had it; preference is given to this personnel ahead of evenUNDAC-trained disaster experts. This is because ECHO operations managers placeparticular emphasis on the leadership training programmes as important qualities for allexperts to have in-field. Additionally, Heads of Units justify this process by saying that“we have our own interest at the European level in making sure that certain training levelsare met, when deploying” (Interview 1), and ECHO trainers want people who are goingto know both the technical specifications and the organizational structure of a givendeployment taking place (Interview 5).

These technical specifications raise an important point of tension in the trainingprocess. ECHO officials are very clear that when establishing training regimes for theECP disaster responders, the DG does not in any way set standards for trainingprogrammes. This is because when the ERCC was being established, a recurring fear ofthe participating states was that ECHO would mandate training standards and imposetraining programmes unilaterally (Interview 5). An example is illustrative of how it wasdealt with. In 2012, ECHO wanted to establish a unified water pumping capacity to helpfloods in areas with poor drainage infrastructure. They attempted to standardize a specifictype of pumping module, but there was immediate push-back, again from participatingstates fearful of ECHO-imposed standards (Interview 5). ECHO eased off and insteadestablished technical specifications about how these modules would pump, at whatvolume they needed to remove water, and what type of fuel they would have access to.They then let the participating states develop whatever pumping modules they liked – solong as they could match the specifications that ECHO said were needed in a crisissituation. This highlights the “bottom-up” approach to achieve something that couldresemble standards and how these instances of harmonization came about without settingup a top-down set of standards, which would have upset and deterred the participatingstate representatives. In one training coordinator’s words, they “reversed the problem:instead of establishing standards from above, we established requirements from below”(Interview 5) by setting minimum sets of requirements and letting the participating statestranslate that into a standardization of function, if not means.

Developing training programmes is another resource of cultural capital that ECHOmaintains. Training links economic capital – paying for training programmes – withcultural capital: ECHO plays a role in developing training curricula, discussed above, butdoes not have to pay for the actual training taking place in participating state responderschools. The Heads of Units interviewed especially emphasized the importance of thisresource, saying that training was the central element that has allowed ECHO’s civilprotection capabilities to happen at all. Controlling the way responders were socializedand socializing with one another was crucial to ECHO being understood as the de facto

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centre of the field of disaster responders. This is something that the DG responsecoordinators are incredibly conscious of: “That informal network between the disasteroperations specialists has been the backbone of this mechanism” (Interview 3). As withmonitoring, the importance was not that a capability was achieved, but that the method ofdoing so was recognized as legitimate by the other actors in the field of disaster response.

The outcome of controlling these training practices is that ECHO professionalizesparticipating states’ disaster response capabilities – a fact many high-ranking ECHOofficials are clearly aware of (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 5). One of the benefits of these trainingcourses, repeated by two Heads of Units in ECHO, was that at the end of the course,experts from different Member States “would go home having each others’ mobile phonenumbers in their pockets…to contact each other and stay in touch” (Interview 3). In fact,the ECHO training programmes were specifically designed to train roughly 2000 disasterresponse experts to “build a fantastic network of disaster response people, who knoweach other, who have done training courses together, who have had a beer together… andwho basically talk to each other whenever they’re in trouble” (Interview 3). The way ECPresponders are then trained and chosen for deployment creates a field of disaster responseexperts.

Communicating

The ERCC also allows ECHO to coordinate information relevant to disaster monitoringand response. Every morning, the ERCC gathers data from its in-house monitoringsystems and its international partnership monitors, publishing anything of note in its“ECHO Daily Flash”. In these flashes, there are three categories given: “International”,“Europe”, and “Fact Sheets”. Under the first two headings, anything that the monitorshave picked up gets listed, as well as supplementary information – history of disasters inthe region or background on conflict-caused human displacement. The “Fact Sheets” areusually detailed maps or briefing notes with even more information about an ongoingsituation – the amount of people affected, other potential hazards nearby, etc. In theseDaily Flashes published every morning, the ERCC includes information aside from thatgathered by its own monitors. It also gathers data from international monitors,government reports, or even news agencies. The ERCC thus acts as an intermediary fordisaster communications, centralizing reports from diverse agencies, and controlling whatparts of that information gets sent out to be acted upon. This is particularly important asthe ERCC also decides what disasters need to be responded to with the ECP teams.

If a disaster does require a response, then the ERCC has at its disposal CECIS, theCommon Emergency Communication and Information System, a peer-to-peer commun-ication system. CESIS works as a text-based messenger service, operating on a closedcommunication network, and only linking people actively on the network – it does notsend messages to regular email addresses or mobile phones. Signing in to CECIS isthrough the online ERCC Portal, and it is directed by ECHO, which outlines how it canbe used, when it can be used, or who has access, at least nominally connecting disasterresponders in all participating states of the ERCC, as well as some internationalresponders. Importantly, the system also runs through the individual state emergencysystems, allowing it to function more as a link with other networks than as the centralizedsystem it is. CECIS is also used for the “Calls for Tender”, mentioned above, where theERCC puts out a general request to those connected to the network, and the participatingagencies submit the CVs of individuals ready to be deployed. CECIS is also used to

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coordinate in-field disaster responders through a field-headquarters, once a response teamhas actually been deployed.

Coordinating information through ECHO was not always a by-gone conclusionthough. Upon its initial unveiling, the ERCC was simply called the European ResponseCentre. The website and domain name were developed as “ERC” and during the firstspring-summer of monitoring operations it was referred to as such. Continuing a debatethat began in late 2012 though, participating states petitioned ECHO’s CommissionExecutive offices to refer to the centre as the ERCC and communiqués and press releasesstarting simply calling the centre the ERCC, not even spelling out the entire name. ByOctober 2013, visitors to the ECHO website could access the ERCC Portal and web page,but on the ERC domain name – the name of the domain and the individual sites did notmatch, because the name was in such flux. By December 2013, all documentation andwebsites universally used the ERCC moniker.

Despite seeming like a surface-level change, the emphasis of coordination was acrucial point in developing ECHO’s capabilities. Between overages in transportation andduplications of capabilities, responding to disasters constituted blows to national disasterrelief budgets. These costs could only be reduced by coordinating efforts – a point ECHOseized on to. This represented a pivotal moment, because the ability to cut disasterresponse costs gave ECHO economic capital. This is why coordinating practices ofcentralizing transportation information became such a crucial part of what ECHO does.ECHO’s ability to coordinate disaster response information was specifically “about theeconomies of disasters, the preparedness levels, the major universal or more broadinterests and issues related to disasters – and so minimizing the effects of disasters”(Interview 5). By being able to share or disperse the costs of transportation, by ensuringthat information was shared, and by using this information to work with an emergencytransportation broker, ECHO was able to make sure that transportation would not be animpediment to participating states that wanted to contribute responders to a given disasterscenario. As with the training though, this was not a unilateral move, where ECHO actorssold themselves as cost-effective disaster managers. Instead, they were able todemonstrate that cooperation through ECHO was going to be the best way to savemoney – in sociological terms, “learning by doing” (Adler and Pouliot 2011, p. 23).

Controlling this kind of economic capital by coordinating pertinent responseinformation meant that ECHO was able to control more areas of the response processbut it was framed as a cost-saving measure. A senior ECHO response coordinatoroutlined the process as follows:

In transporting assistance, there is a lot of scope for sharing and pooling of capacities – andwe try to exploit this, and we try to encourage this, as much as possible. So we have a littlebit of a co-ordinating role in the sense that we exchange or share information among allMember States of available transport capacities. (Interview 3)

While the coordination of disaster response deployment is something that ECHO hascontrolled since before housing the full ECP deployment process, this fact does notnegate how central the ERCC is in the deployment of these responders, coordinating theaccess of both European and private transportation capabilities when needed. The deploy-ment of personnel that most clearly highlights the central coordinating role that the ERCCallows ECHO to play, in addition to the selection process of responders outlined above, iswhen it comes to transportation capacities.

European Security 11

Circulating Practices

The three primary practices performed at ECHO – monitoring, training, and coordinatinginformation – have changed how participating states understand cooperation inmonitoring, training, and responding to disasters. These practices have circulated to thewider field of EU internal security provision and are found at DG HOME and its StrategicAnalysis and Response (STAR) Centre. In fact, interviews with HOME Directors confirmthat the actual template for their own institutionalized monitoring centre was basedexclusively on the practices at ECHO (Interviews 2, 6). STAR’s subsequent use of thesepractices has begun to similarly place HOME at the centre of EU internal securityprovision. The goal here is not to outline a new case study in detail, but instead to pointout that the types of practices taking place at ECHO in the field of disaster response havecirculated to the wider field of EU internal security.

Monitoring

STAR was established in 2012, and is designed to mimic ECHO’s ERCC precursor, theMIC, as a coordinator in the EU’s field of internal security. While the ERCC coordinatesmonitoring amongst numerous international, EU, and Member State bodies, STAR’s roleis more specified, monitoring only EU-level threat assessments. It does this by receivingregular intelligence and risk assessment reports from monitors around the EU, sortsthrough the information for any event that requires a response, and then coordinates thatresponse. STAR does not develop any of its own in-house monitors, as it sees itself as anintelligence “customer”. One STAR policy officer and analyst went so far as to say“I want to be very straightforward and clear: we are not doing any intelligence, because itis not the mandate of the Commission … From this comes the concept of being anintelligence customer” (Interview 5).

It instead collects intelligence and risk analysis reports from a diverse set of monitorsfrom around the EU. These include Intelligence Monitors, Border Security and MigrationTracking monitors, General Policing agencies, specific issue-area monitors (for example,drug trafficking projects), and less-obvious internal security actors (such as reports fromthe DGs for Transportation and Energy). These analyses are sent to STAR to perform anadditional set of examinations, based on their own internally generated “new methodo-logical approaches”. Then, if the likelihood of those events happening passes this STAR-determined threshold, the information is passed on to the HOME CommissionerExecutive offices, to determine how to proceed or react. This gives STAR and HOMEa powerful agenda-setting ability to determine the parameters by which crises aremitigated. Whether it is determining thresholds of lives loss, cost to EU institutions, orsimply the likelihood of an event taking place, STAR develops the “methodological”approaches by which all other assessments are examined once they reach the STARsecured offices in Brussels.

Training

Unlike ECHO, HOME plays no direct coordinating ability in training procedures forpersonnel deployments. Despite that, HOME is present at sittings of the Justice andHome Affairs Council, including the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation onInternal Security (COSI), which acts as the governing body for all EU internal securityagencies. Through this, HOME plays a central role in budget meetings of any agency

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overseen by the COSI – which includes any of the agencies that forward their risk orintelligence analyses to STAR. HOME’s institutional cooperation agreements, combinedwith its various institutional cooperation personnel – who act as liaisons between theHOME executive and EU agencies – give it direct communication access to the internalsecurity providers around the EU. HOME means plays an advisory and consulting role ininternal security deployments: border guards deployed to the Greek-Turkish border, shipspatrolling the waters between the Canary Islands and the African continent, drug seizuresat airports, or undercover sting operations in organized crime networks in the south ofFrance, for example.

STAR is also responsible for communicating the need to respond to other securityproviders, and passing on the information it deems relevant to allow them to respond – animportant role when individual agencies submit their own calls for tender and developtraining parameters. In practice, this means HOME liaises with the individual respondingcapacities of the agencies and Member States that it cooperates with. This access is onlydue to the other internal security actors understanding HOME’s central coordinatingfunction, bolstered by the sheer amount of information it controls, to be a valuablecontribution to their own individual operations.

Coordinating Information

While not having a large direct presence in training internal security providers, STAR’scentralized coordination of information is what makes it such an important actor. STAR’sprimary duties include receiving weekly, daily, or even more frequent risk or intelligencepackages from the individual centres. Again, it is positioned as a security “customer”, andthus acts as a filter through which policy decisions are made based on previouslycompiled assessments. STAR receives sometimes-hourly updates from those centres, andthen decides if action is needed, and if so, who should be taking or leading that action.This allows STAR to be the only actor with the most complete view of a given securitysituation because of all of the different sets of information it receives. This allows STARto have the privileged position of deciding what information gets to the decision-makers.

HOME also collects the flagged reports or assessments from STAR, and using itsinstitutional cooperation personnel to work with the responders, passing crucialinformation through those channels. These responders include FRONTEX’s BorderGuard Teams, the various EUROPOL task forces, EEAS-run intervention teams, whichcan combine military with civilian personnel as needed, and of course, the variousindividual Member State police, paramilitary, military, and border guard forces. This is inaddition of course to liaising with the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response centre, justas the ERCC does in disaster situations. This all means that, again, while STAR itselfdoes not directly coordinate responses, it supplies HOME with the information thatsupports the DG’s role in overseeing specific operations.

Implications for EU security

ECHO is a supportive competence of EU bodies, meaning that it directly has noregulatory powers. This is important, because despite not having regulatory capacity,ECHO actors have worked to arrange cooperation on key disaster response policy areasby explicitly shunning attempts at being an “authority” and instead doing things thatframe the field in a particular way that means that the other actors will necessarily see

ECHO actors as being de facto leaders. That this way of navigating the disaster responsefield by ECHO actors is beginning to circulate into the wider field of EU internal securityprovision is not merely a coincidence. This section looks at how ECHO has alwaysconsidered itself to be a part of EU internal security provision, but has only recently cometo be recognized as such because of the way it is changing state understandings ofvoluntary cooperation. This means that circulating ECHO practices – as methodsof changing voluntary cooperation – are changing the way states understand practicesof security cooperation in the EU – something not yet captured by security scholars.

Disaster response in EU internal security

As mentioned at the outset of this article, Strategic Objective 5 of the ISS explicitlyattempted to link the management of natural and man-made disasters – something on-paper done at ECHO but not being practised. This only resulted in vague pronouncementsabout what EU internal security needs to focus on. The Second Report on theImplementation of the EU Internal Security Strategy clarified this desire into a concreteset of prescriptions for further institutional coordination. It particularly outlined twothings. First, it emphasized how important the opening of both the ERCC and STAR hasbeen in reducing the effects of natural and man-made disasters – the first time the twohave been linked in any official discourse. Second, perhaps more interestingly, it calledfor the “first cross-sectoral EU overview of natural and man-made risks” (COM 1792013, p. 15). So, while this definitely does not represent a bygone conclusion that ECHOand HOME’s activities will be linked institutionally, it certainly makes clear the fact thatECHO and its ERCC are now part of the regular gamut of EU internal security providers.

The ERCC and STAR function as emergency managers, seen through the “SolidarityClause” of the Lisbon Treaty. The Clause outlines the parameters by which MemberStates are obliged to offer or provide assistance to another Member State if they need it –where “assistance” can mean a variety of different types of things depending on theinstance. Exactly what a call for assistance means is still up for debate and negotiationsby legal scholars and lawmakers alike, but it is clear that the ERCC is now understood tobe the “entry point” for mobilizing the Solidarity Clause due to its role in coordinatingemergency response, based on its current ability to monitor and coordinate the responseto an emergency situation. Then, if an emergency situation moves to be more of amigration, police, or military issue, the “centre of gravity” for coordinating the responsecan move to STAR. While this “Solidarity” use is itself still speculative, the fact that it isbeing talked about like this is indicative of why it seems that ECHO and HOME are tiedclosely together in the wider field of EU internal security.

ECHO actors have long understood themselves to be part of EU security provision.They point out that in establishing the ERCC and during the earlier implementation of theMIC between 2007 and 2010, the processes cannot be separated from the responses to theMadrid Bombings, the London Tube attacks, the South Asian tsunami, and HurricaneKatrina in the US (Interviews 1, 3). When the centralized monitoring capability was beingestablished and then augmented, the goal was to include counter-terrorism and policingelements of risk analysis into the centre’s monitoring. Despite the intentions, this side ofthe process was eventually put aside as politically unfeasible, focusing instead on theintegration of more technical civil protection bureaucrats. This has led to the moreinclusive, bottom-up approach to gain competencies that was seen by ECHO actors

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including other actors in creating new EU capabilities, instead of imposing standards orregulations.

Voluntarily co-operating in ECHO to respond to disasters – its “bottom-up”competency-building approach – has been considered a norm in that field since at least2007. The ongoing debate in the field, then, has been more about how to professionalizeand establish cooperation before a disaster situation, especially in a situation whereregulatory policies are not an option (Interviews 3, 5). This is something worth unpackingin light of these three disaster response practices circulating to other EU securityinstitutions. ECHO’s practices in that field have fundamentally altered the way otherdisaster response actors understand what is useful or appropriate for their own responsecapabilities: ECHO actors have changed the way others calculate whether or not tocooperate.

Challenging broader understandings of security

Assessing what the impact of the three disaster response practices circulating from ECHOinto HOME will be – and with them, their method of ensuring co-operative support – islargely speculative. Actors at DG ECHO were able to gain support in the field of disasterresponse because all of the other participating actors adopted particular ways of doingthings that reinforced ECHO actors’ roles as central, leading figures in disaster response.More, they did so in a context of not having the mandate to enforce standards or setregulatory targets. That is a profound ability, especially if actors in other EU bodies seethis as a formula or loop-hole for establishing regulatory capacities at the expense of theirconstituent actors.

These practices of technical implementation have begun to migrate or circulate – notnecessarily copied, but transposed, merged, and re-used – to the more politically salientfield of EU internal security. The seemingly technical, scientific, or “apolitical” practicesof disaster response are in fact incredibly social, power-latent practices of jostling forposition in a political field of international actor-EU actor-state actor negotiations,though. So, then, even if security studies is not going to be interested in disaster responseon its own merits, it should at least be paying attention to the ways this subtle shift ishappening in the field of EU security provision.

Put another way, because all actions are a mixture of structural constraints andagential decision-making, the fact that participating states continually and consistentlyparticipate in any EU project voluntarily is revealing of how they interpret their ownpositions and roles, as well as those of ECHO actors. One ECHO Head of Unit put itas such:

In the earlier days of it, anytime I went to the Council and used the phrase “European co-ordination”, I would get a beating from the Member States, who would say that “it is theMember States responsibility, and should not be done at the EU level”. Now, though,whenever I use it, I get an applause. They all want EU co-ordination, they all want to worktogether on this…they all understand the added value of co-operating on something like this.(Interview 3)

This is seemingly at odds with the field of internal security providers, where cooperationis tentative and hesitant in most areas. The same was once said about the area of disasterresponse integration though. This cooperation is instead easily explained by returning tothe study of security practices: the specific collection of social, cultural, and economic

capital mobilized in co-operating with ECHO has altered the habitus of the other actors inthe field and is now poised to change the way internal security cooperation is understood.Security scholars have yet to account for this though, because of their inattention to thetypes of security practices taking place in the field of disaster response.

This lack of engagement is more striking in light of 2013 Eurobarometer statisticscompiled to celebrate the 20th anniversary of ECHO (Eurobarometer 2013). It found that75% of Europeans are either “Very Concerned” or “Fairly Concerned” about disasterssuch as oil spills or nuclear accidents. Only 64% are concerned about terrorist attacks ortheir effects. Despite the central place of disasters in the minds of EU citizens, as outlinedabove, there has been next to no research looking at the securitization or securitypractices of the disaster response field, nor to how these practices have migratedelsewhere. This is troubling and represents an area needing more rigorous study.

Linking disasters with other forms of threats, as the ISS attempts to do, means treatingtwo very different types of phenomena increasingly similarly. Threat creation andresponse are treated as social phenomena and as such as garnered a vast library of studiesinterrogating how it works and what the associated problems with it should be. Disasterresponse, though, is treated as a technical issue, at least for ECHO personnel and others inthe field of disaster response. This has meant that the way that ECHO actors have beenable to “get away” with standardization, integration, and coordination has been moresuccessful than in the more immediately contentious policy areas. The hope is thatsecurity scholars should raise alarms about this form of policy cooperation as it becomesthe de facto method of internal security provision in Europe.

Conclusion

This duplication of practices is possible in part because the habitus, the way actorsinterpret the practices of other actors in their field, is a transposable quantity (Williams2007, p. 26). It moves to other fields, it influences similarly structured decision-makingprocesses, and it helps assign value to different types of capital or resources. The habitusof the field of disaster response has circulated to the larger field of EU internal securityproviders, notably in establishing a similar monitoring centre at the DG responsible forinternal security, HOME, and the practices that this centre allows HOME to perform toassume a central position in its field through changing understandings of cooperation.

This article first outlined some of the existing literature on EU disaster responsecapabilities, as well as the workings of DG ECHO more generally. Finding this existing worklacking enough of an interrogation of the security or political implications of this set ofcapabilities, the article introduced the security practices theoretical lens. Social theories thatemphasize practices are clear that actions are much more nuanced, incoherent, and randomthan both rational actor or constructivist models that focus on institutionalization levelssuggest. This focus on security practices placed the practices of disaster response at ECHOinto a wider context of understanding structures of behaviour in institutional fields. Thisprovided the basis for first outlining that ECHO practices allowed it to become a centralfeature in EU security policy and that as a result, disaster response practices are changing howvoluntary cooperation in internal security provision works in the EU.

Looking at this migration of practices meant speculating about what this might meanfor the future of EU internal security provision. Tracing this circulation of practicesillustrated that the insights of security practices indicate that the decision to cooperate in agiven EU policy area has less to do with how actors calculate what their most viable

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options are and more to do with how their options are framed, presented, and interpreted.This type of deep engagement with how cooperation itself is understood in EU securityprojects in particular has received limited theorizing. These are reasons enough forexpanding the existing mandate of security studies.

Despite strides already taken to expand what political behaviours warrant examinationthrough a securitization or security practice lens, the sub-discipline is woefully far fromliving up to the promise of the initial broadening steps away from a sole focus onstrategic and defence studies. Security practices literature, with its particular history ofdrawing on more critical approaches to socio-political studies, needs to be expanded inthis direction, to deal more explicitly with the ever-broadening way that complexgovernance institutions like the EU are making overtures at amalgamating new policyareas into the remit of security policy. EU internal security governance laws, under theguidance of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, are made by “special legislativeprocedure”, circumventing EU Parliamentary procedures. The fact that somethingseemingly innocuous like disaster policy can so easily slip this closely to this governanceprocedure without serious academic interrogation raises questions about what it means tostudy security, and what function critical scholarship plays more generally.

AcknowledgementsResearch for this article was conducted whilst the author was a Visiting Researcher at the ‘Institutd’études européens (IEE)’ at the Université Saint-Louis, as well as whilst a Visiting ResearchFellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. The research for this articlewas conducted with the generous support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council(SSHRC) of Canada, as well as a Research Travel Fellowship from the Centre for European Studiesand Carleton University. The author wishes to thank the interviewees in Brussels, as well as thosewho insightfully commented on earlier versions of this article, in particular Claudia Aradau,Michael C. Williams, Claudia Morsut, Fulvio Attinà, Jonathan Joseph, Oliver Kessler, and RoccoBellanova, as well as ongoing feedback from Philippe M. Frowd, Can E. Mutlu, and Adam Sandor.

Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes1. “Participating states” here refers to the ECP team and ECHO membership of the EU-28 Member

States, plus Macedonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.2. All statistics gathered from interviews conducted in Brussels at the ECHO DG offices,

March 2013.

Notes on contributorChristopher C. Leite is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Political Studies at the University ofOttawa. His research lies at the intersection of International Relations and Political Sociology with aparticular emphasis on international institutions, the European Union, and transnational risks anddisasters.

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Cooperation in EU disaster response and security provision: circulating practices

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