Post on 28-Apr-2023
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the study
Natural resources are blessings from God to a
people. Resources are meant to be harvested, tapped
or “exploited” for economic, social and political
development of the society. Unfortunately, resources
in Nigeria have become what some people tag “a curse”
or what Bayode, Adewunmi and Odunwole (2001) refer to
as a woe.
A resource is something that is utilized by
people (Environmental Awareness in Geography, n.d).
Natural resources in the other hand are anything
obtained from the environment to satisfy human needs
and want (Wikipedia, 2012). There are materials and
components (something that can be used) that can be
found within the environment. Some natural resources
are existing as separate entities, such as fresh
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water, air, fish, or existing in an alternative form
which must be processed to abstain the resource, such
as oil and most forms of energy (Wikipedia, 2012).
There is much debate worldwide over natural
resource allocations; this is partly due to
increasing scarcity (depletion of the resources) but
also because the exploitation of natural resources
(like petroleum) is the basis for many economies
(particularly Nigeria). Petroleum resources are
exhaustible. There occur in small sporadic areas, and
are referred to as localized resources. They are
capable of depletion if managed improperly
(Wikipedia, 2012) because they are finite. Resource
(Petroleum) exploration and exploitation to satisfy
human needs and wants has triggered adverse
environmental impacts in the Nigeria Niger Delta
Regions through incessant environmental, socio-
economic and physical disasters that have accumulated
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over the years due to limited scrutiny and lack of
assessment (Bayode, Adewunmi and Odunwole, 2011). In
Nigeria, immense tracts of mangrove forests have been
destroyed as a result of petroleum exploitation in
the mangroves. These have not only caused degradation
to the environment and destroyed the traditional
livelihood of the region, but have caused
environmental pollution that has affected weather
conditions, soil fertility, water ways, aquatic
habitats and wildlife. This in human situation
continues to attract the interest of conscious
indigenes and conscientised Nigerians.
As stated early, resources are utilized to
satisfy economic needs and want of the people, but
reverse is the case in the oil producing regions of
Nigeria, most especially, the Niger Delta region. The
rates at which the oil and gas are exploited have
become alarming with no regard for the environment.
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The proceeds from the oil are not used to develop the
area. The Niger Delta region is only developed by
continues pollution of the environment. The socio-
economic status of the majority of the people is
worst than that of a pauper. This is an area where
people live in squalor. The above scenery has moved
the people of the region to agitate for resource
control.
Resources control. According to king (2009) is
the control and management of resources by state or
Local Government from whose jurisdictions the
resources are extracted, is the key to the emergency
of a modern federal Nigeria. The states or their
territories under federal guidelines (especially
environmental ones), and then remit taxes to the
federal centre (king, 2009). For king (2009), a truly
federal Nigeria would have a centre which is almost
fully dependent on taxation for its running. If this
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happens, for king (2009), with its income much
reduced, it would be far less attractive to political
entrepreneurs, thus reducing competition for its
control and the attendant problems.
The issue of resource control in Nigeria has
generated a lot of controversies between the people
and the government, and between ethnic groups. The
discontentment of the people of Niger Delta, (where
the bulk of the Nigeria revenue comes from) about the
sharing formula that does not take into account their
degraded environment, has led to mounting of pressure
on the Federal Government to adjust the sharing
formula in favour of the minorities that produced the
bulk of the mineral resources (Orji and Jaja, 2012).
Discordant voices in respect of revenue allocation in
the country arise every passing year, because louder
and discernable, when in 1994, under the late general
Sani Abacha, a constitutional conference was set up
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to midwife civilian rule, concerned citizens seized
the opportunity to firm up their demands (Orji and
Jaja, 2012).
Responding to the demand of resource control, the
federal Government had made some attempts in
addressing the problem of oil bearing communities.
The several attempts are not good enough for the oil
bearing communities, or because most attempts have
been jettisoned by corrupt leaders and non-oil
producing regions. The demands of the people have not
been met by these measures largely because of the
insincerity of the Nigerian state and its ruling
elites (Orji and Jaja, 2012). The culture of neglect
has breed hostilities and violent reactions from oil-
bearing communities (Orji and Jaja, 2012).
The resource control Saga has been politicized
before independent. Revenue sharing formula, to start
with was done not in consideration of the region the
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resources are derived from, but on the basis of who
is in charge of the sharing and the interest of the
majority. Before independent, Revenue proceeds were
shared to favour the regions that resources like
Cocoa were gotten from. As noted by Orji and Jaja
(2012), during Cocoa boom, Awolowo was put to draw
revenue sharing formula, the west was accrued the
highest, the North followed, while the East got the
least. In the time of oil, which has the potential to
destroy the environment, fair sharing principle came
in (Orji and Jaja, 2012).
There exist divergent views about whether the
demand for resource control has some political under
tone or is borne out of intentions. Other people,
especially the agitators see any efforts to truncate
it as political. “In the first republic (1963 to
1966), there was no oil. The revenue of the country
was distributed based on derivation principle. Fifty
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percent of the revenue from mineral resources was
given to the region from where the minerals were
extracted. Then 30 percent was put into a
distributable pool, which was divided among all the
regions while the remaining 20 percent went to the
federal Government. But the formula changed when oil
becomes Nigeria’s main source of revenue” (Okpi,
2012). The sharing formula dropped to 20 percent in
1979 to 1981. in 1982 and 1992 the oil states got one
and a half percent, and was raised to 13 percent in
1999 (Okpi, 2012). As a result, the Niger Delta
minority group sees this as political (Okpi, 2012).
Many scholars see resource control as political.
The legality of resource control has been a
serious issue of debate in Nigeria. On the part of
the agitators, it is a natural law which must be
obeyed, but for the defenders the federal government
and non-oil producing states, it is unconstitutional.
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Severally, the Southern States have taken the Federal
Government to court agitating for resource control
and derivation.
This study is poised to critically access the
issue of resources control from three perspectives:
conflict, political and legality. The major focus is
on how to foster peace and unity in Nigeria.
Appropriate recommendations for redistribution of
revenue allocation formula are what the research is
set to achieve.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The issue of resource control agitation
culminating from social identity, marginalization and
environmental degradation (resulting from oil
exploration and exploitation) by various ethnic
groups within the Niger Delta region in the last four
decades, has posed serious challenges to the ideals
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of peaceful living, sustainable development and good
governance in the area.
The root cause of this problem is that the oil
bearing Niger Delta communities have basically
remained grossly socio-economically dependent and
under-developed, persistently disempowered, socio-
economically marginalized and psychologically
alienated. The people of the region, looking back
into history know that when there was no oil, the
revenue sharing formula was equitably distributed.
Then fifty percent of the revenue went to the region
it was derived from. But now that it is the oil time
and because it is from the minority ethnic groups,
the sharing formula has changed. As such, the people
engage in both inter and intra communal conflicts as
predicted by an undercurrent of massive exploitation
of natural resources, marginalization and
underdevelopment in the area. There has been a rise
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of ethnic-nationalism which has led to the explosive
social identity and resource control agitations in
the Niger Delta region. This has destroyed a sense of
nationalism and patriotism in Nigeria. This has led
to the emergency of more social identity movement
such as Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and
the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
(MOSOP). These groups exerted of the Ogoni people,
aggressively campaigning for the dismemberment of
Nigeria and proposed the creation of sovereign state
based on ethnicity.
The issue of resource control is a burning issue
of discourse in Nigeria today. Analyzing the problem
of resource control and Niger Delta as an entity goes
on an on. The concept of resource control straddles
the key questions of whether the people of Niger
Delta are actually marginalized and deprived, or its
citizens or subjects are slaves in their own country.
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The questions which this study seeks to address are
as follows: what are the root causes of conflict in
Niger Delta region? Why should ethnic issue or
sentiment overwhelm national interest? Why should the
issue of resource control be political? What is the
legality of resource control?
1.3 Purpose/Objective of the Study
This study was set to achieve these main
objectives:
1). To critically access the conflict associated with
resource control in Nigeria.
2). To evaluate the politics of resource control in
Nigeria.
3). To examine the legality of resource control in
Nigeria.
1.4 Research Question
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The researcher raised the following research
questions to guide the study:
1). Why should resource control issue brings about
conflict?
2). What are the politics of resource control in
Nigeria?
3). What is the legality for agitation for resource
control?
1.5 research Hypotheses
The under listed hypothesis were formulated by
the research in order to be tested in the course of
writing:
1. There is no significant association between
resource control and conflict Nigerian Niger
Delta region.
2. There is no politics in resource control in
Nigerian.
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3. There is no legality about the agitation for
resource control in Nigeria.
1.6 Significant of the Study
The significance of this study cannot be
overemphasized. Any critical study on resource
control and its attendant problems cannot be
overlooked. As such it would be relevant to, most
especially the Niger Deltas and Nigerians as a whole.
This Present study, most especially has bridged a gap
in literature as no material has existed before now
on these three variables of issue of resource
control- conflict, politics and legality.
In a nut-shell, the study will be significant to
policy makers in the policy making process concerning
resource control so that peace will be restored and
fostered in Nigeria. The study will be of great
relevance to researchers as this study though is on
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popular issue in Nigeria, the variables it looked at
are not all embraced in the existing literature. The
study will be relevant as it will help in creating
awareness on the issue of revenue sharing. The study
will help to foster peace and tranquility among
different ethnic groups in Nigeria. The study will
help Nigerians to know that resource is a blessing
and not a cause. The study will also help to let
Nigeria know the danger of depending only on one
source of income.
1.7 Definition of Major Terms
The researcher has operationally defined some
major terms used in the study for clarification.
1. Resource: petroleum products obtained or
extracted from the environment for satisfying
human economic want and needs.
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2. Control: Take charge of ones property or
exercise authority over something. Maintain
ownership and management of something.
3. Resource Control: The control and management of
resources by state or local government from
whose jurisdictions the resources are
extracted.
4. Conflict: A disagreement or argument between
individuals, or groups of people, or ethnic
groups or between the people and a government,
which sometimes results to a serious battle or
fight (Killing, destruction of lives and
properties.)
5. Politics: The act of manipulating or
influencing people over an issue of relevance.
The game of playing down the truth for selfish
reasons or ethnical consideration. Politics in
its context also means power relations,
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competing interests and claims for recognition,
conflicting assertions of simple truths.
6. Legality: The state or quality of the demand
for resource control being legal and lawful. It
is the lawfulness by virtue of conformity to a
legal statute
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This section of the study makes an appraisal of
some of the available literature on resource control.
The researcher also explored literature on the
variables of resource control like conflict, politics
and legality. The body of literature revealed that
the issue of resource control is not an exclusive
domain of political service, public administration,
policy studies or the field of social science alone.
It is a societal problem that has captured the
interest of everyone, both in pure and applied
sciences, including those in the art line.
The literature is reviewed under the following
subheadings:
2.1 Literature Review
2.1.1 The Concept of Resource Control
2.1.2 Conflict in Resource Control
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2.1.3 Politics of Resource Control
2.1.4 Legality of Resource Control
2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.1.1 The Concept of Resource Control
Resource control has been viewed differently by
different authors. King (2009) conceptualizes
resources control as the control and management of
resources by state or local government from whose
jurisdictions the resources are extracted. King
(2009) looks at resource control as a key to the
emergence of a modern Federal Nigeria. King (2009)
envisages that state or local government would manage
the resource from their territories under Federal
guidelines taxes to the federal centre.
For Dafinone (2001), resource control is the
practices of true federalism and natural law in which
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the federating units express their rights to
primarily control the natural resources within their
borders and make agreed contribution towards the
maintenance of common services of the government at
the centre. Mr. Lucky Igbinedion in Dafinone (2001)
puts forward that, “resource control means that if I
as a Bini man goes to Kebbi State and find gold, the
resource should belong to me and not the State or the
federal government. All I owe the federal government
is to pay tax and royalties. The same principle
should apply if a Kano man comes to Edo, Delta or
Bayelsa and strikes oil. He only pays royalties and
taxes to the State or federal government.”
Resource control as conceived by Grandiose
Parlor (2005) is about equity in resource allocation,
exploitation, and utilization. The concept of
resource control in Nigeria means, different thing to
different people (Grandiose parlor, 2005). To the
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Niger Delta region of Nigeria the minorities of the
former Eastern and western region of Nigeria, it is a
noble cause worth dying for. To other far way
communities, it evokes negative images that should at
best be suppressed. Basically, the oil producing
states are demanding a greater input in the control
and management of oil business in the country. Ige
(n.d.) defines resource control as the control of the
proprietary use of resources subject to taxation by
the central government.
According to Ige (n.d.) resource control is not the
control of ownership of the resources as such;
because resources ownership belongs to the Almighty
who ensure that the resources are located defector
and de jure in their place of abode. Ige (n.d.) goes
on that, resource control is acquiring direct
political power over resource production, management
and utilization in the area of location to ensure
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regeneration of environment and overall sustainable
human development of the people. Ige (n.d.) posits
that, resource control is acquiring the political
power to take control of their lives. Ige (n.d.)
third definition of resource control according to him
is found in the fulfillment of fundamental human
right of a people, as you cannot come from any where
and plunder the resources of another group of people
by whatever means, either through constitutional
provision or military control over which they have
little or no say given their minority ethnic states
in the assembly.
Ako (2012) looks at resource control from
different perspectives. According to Ako (2012) the
definition of resource control is based on two phases
in connection with oil resources in Niger Delta-the
absolute and principal resource control, as well as
derivation. According to Ako (2012) the proponents of
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absolute resource control take the stance proffered
by the Kalama Declaration that “Every region should
control its resources 100 percent. Advocates of
principal resource control” defines resource control
as the Niger Delta region having ‘a direct and
decisive role in the exploitation for, the
exploitation and disposal of, including sales of the
harvested resources’ (Ako, 2012). Ako (2012) further
defines resource control as the right to control or
mange the revenue accruing from oil and other natural
resources in line with the tenets of true federalism.
2.1.2 The Issue of conflict over Resource control in
Nigeria
The issue of resource control has always been a
bone of contention in the Nigeria polity, now it has
polarized delegates at the Nigerian national
political reform conference. For the people of Niger
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Delta region, resource control cause is worth dying
for, while to the non-oil producing states,
especially the North it must not survive the rising
sun.
Resource control has brought about controversy in
the polity of Nigeria. According to Iyobhebhe (n.d.),
the debate and argument concerning resource control
has created tension and friction between those who
feel they are being short changed by the Nigerian
Federation (mainly the State, tribes and people of
the Niger Delta region), the non-oil producing states
and the Federation Government in Abuja. Iyobhebhe
(n.d.) says that, the Niger Delta people feel that
because the oil from which Nigeria gets 95% of her
foreign exchange is located on their land that they
should have a greater share from the proceeds of oil
sales for the development of the Niger Delta. That
the area has no tangible benefit from their God given
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wealth and that in actual fact the pollution and
environmental degradation has completely destroyed
their traditional way of live-fishing and farming.
There are also issues that the political/powers
Status of the bread –basket of the nation, vise visa
other regions of the country have not been given fair
share in the government. There is also conflict that
results from the argument that the federal
Government, the oil majors and the Nigerian Elites
have got rich and fat on the petrol-dollars from the
Niger Delta whilst the indigenes live in abject
poverty; that the oil revenue has been used by
Nigerian State to develop other parts of the country
at the expense of the Niger Delta; that some States
in Nigeria are enjoying more than the people of the
Niger Delta (Iyobhebhe, n.d.). According to Iyobhebhe
(n.d.) as well as many other literatures, the people
of Niger Delta argue that during the first Republic
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when agriculture was the main stay of the economy of
Nigeria, derivation was on a 50-50 basis between the
Regions and the Centre. They would like to see the
same derivation principle for oil revenue today.
Iyobhebhe (n.d) contains that, the political leaders
class in the Niger Delta argue that if the Nigerian
state does not agree to a just and fair settlement
for the Niger Delta, that the militants will continue
to get stronger and may one day challenge the
sovereignty of the Nigerian State in the region. He
goes on that, the people also want to know what
happened to the billions of dollars derived from oil
in the Niger Delta.
Iyobhebhe (n.d.) concludes that there is no doubt
that resource control is a major political issue for
the Nigerian state and will continue to be so for a
long time to come. Orji and Jaja (2007) input that
the change in sharing formula that did not favour the
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oil producing areas based on derivation as it used to
be in the time of agriculture and solid mineral
resulted to conflicts and discordant voices and the
then Bendel State took the Federal Government to
court and won. Irrespective of that verdict, the
Federal Account Act of 1981 only revised version of
the nullified Act was passed into law which came into
law in 1982. This Act gave Federal Government 55%,
states 35% Local Government 10%. In 1984, only 2% was
to be paid to mineral producing Areas, while 1.5% was
to be used for the development of oil producing
Areas. There were a lot of pressures until the 13%
derivation to oil producing Areas was made a law
(Orji and Jaja, 2007).
Still there are growing agitations and violent
reaction from the people of Niger delta for what they
consider an injustice matted on them by the other
people of Nigeria. The conflict had reached alarming
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proportion. The militant became restive. Orji and
Jaja (2007) observe that the militants groups have
gone as far as holding hostages of some expatriate
staff working for multi-national companies. Delegates
from Niger delta demanded for 100% control to remit
tax to the federal Government.
According to Orji and Jaja (2007), the political
Reform conference rejects the 100% agitation on the
ground that it was outrageous, but recommended 17%
which could not make for environmental degradation
and neglects, the scourge of wasted gas, absentee
landlordism, and environmental devastation,
unemployment, lack or poor infrastructure, etc.
Ako (2012) argues that the introduction of
Federalism into resource control debate contributes
to the misunderstanding the resource control debate.
Ako (2012) posits that the Governors of the Southern
States in Nigeria also refer to this notion as ‘true
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federalism’ in the discourse of resource control. For
Ako (2012) the Southern Governors do so to promote
their agenda that States ought to control their
resources and contribute (usually smaller percentage
of such revenues) to the federal coffers. Ako prefers
the Southern demand to be called fiscal federalism,
wherein the federating units own and manage their
resources and revenues but make a contribution to the
central government to fund federal responsibilities.
Ako (2012) also takes a different stand that “it
should be noted though that fiscal federation might
also be an arrangement where by the central
government generates most revenues and shares such
revenue with other strata of government. Ako appears
to know more than others. A mere look at Ako (2012)
assertion tells any reader that Ako is among the
antagonists of resource control, and that Ako is not
from oil-producing region. Ako (2012) again puts
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forward that “A fourth category of resource control-
the ‘local variant’-ought to be recognized in
addition to the three broad conceptions highlighted.
Local resource control simply refers to availing the
inhabitants of the Niger Delta region the
opportunities to enjoy access to the environmental
resources and benefits of their ancestral land. The
relevance and importance of this fourth conception is
borne out of the failures of the political class and
militants alike to make any palpable positive changes
to the lives of the ordinary Niger Delta citizens
they claim to represent.” Ako (2012) goes on that the
Niger Deltas are from history known for resource
control agitation, which according to Ako started
with oil palm after slave trade abolition. Probably,
Ako does not see the agitation as a worthy course.
2.1.3 The Politics of Resource Control in Nigeria.
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It has been generally agreed among those
agitating for resource control and their sympathizers
that there is politics in resource control in
Nigeria. The proponents see it as a political play by
the majority ethnic group to deprive them of their
right of resources, which their environment is fasthy
being degraded on a daily basis.
Iyobhebhe (n.d.) observes that, the current
position of the anti resource control is that all oil
discovered on an off shore belongs to the Nigerian
State. These group maintain that, all receipts are
due to the federal Government and the FG has a
constitutional duty to remit 13% of the revenues back
to the source of its derivation in the Niger delta.
Iyobhebhe (n.d.) sees this as political, because, in
the past as he posits, before oil became the main
source of national sustenance the Nigerian
arrangement was based on a 50-50 derivation between
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the Regions and the centre. Iyobhebhe (n.d.) points
that it is political not a just position of the non-
oil producing States. According to Iyobhebhe (n.d.)
the non-oil producing States, know that Nigeria is
totally dependent on the Niger Delta oil for
survival, and all the states survive on the monthly
pay cheque or allocation received from the Federation
Account at the centre which without it, they cannot
pay salaries, they cannot run schools, the cannot
build roads, they can’t do nothing politic against
resource control.
Iyobhebhe (n.d.) asserts that the political-
economic consequences of under development in Nigeria
leading to resource control agitation has given birth
to political agitations, campaigner, gangsters,
protectionism, racketeering, lobbyists and outright
stealing of crude oil (a.k.a oil bunkering) .As
maintained by Iyobhebhe (n.d.) the problems of the
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Niger Delta under development, poverty and
environmental degradation has given rise to various
resource control Groups. According to him some of
those movements are genuine campaigners for a better
life future; other simply saw it as an opportunity
for political relevance over a very sensitive and
important national and local issue. The third group
of economic opportunists and contractors still linked
to politics saw it as their meal ticket out of the
poverty of Nigeria or as an opportunity to amass even
more wealth than they had already by acting as meddle
men, contractors, suppliers, facilitators and peace
brokers between the FGN, Oil companies and the
militant wing of the movement threatening to hold the
oil companies to ransom and consequently the daily
bread of the entire Nigerian nation.
According to Iyobhebhe (n.d.) argument, the
political wing of the campaign against resource
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control has clear political objectives in mind and
understand that the entire issue could not be
separated from vexed question of the nature of the
Nigerian State and the division or allocation or
perceived hijacking of political/economic power by a
certain group of people in the country to the
exclusion. Iyobhebhe (n.d.) acknowledges that the
established political group is the dominant group
today in the resource control debate. They are
established people and have no interest whatsoever in
wrecking the Nigerian State as they have been
beneficiaries of Nigeria. The political groups from
the Niger Delta region have achieved great and
reasonable level of “Success” for the resource
control cause. “Their relationship with the Federal
Government has been “fruitful” to their cause and to
them personally. Most of the leading figures have
enjoyed Federal Government patronage as Ministers,
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State Civil Service posts, leadership role in the
educational and health sectors and as contractors to
the federal Government and its institution”
(Iyobhebhe, n.d.).
Looking at the political economy of resource
control, Orji and Jaja (2007) look at the
justification from historical perspective. According
to them, the fulcrum of the core issue involved in
revenue allocation was laid in the evolution of
Nigeria as a nation after the amalgamation of 1914.
The 1914 phase of amalgamation was more economic than
political. Through this convenient arrangement, the
wealthier Southern Nigeria relieved the colonial
government of the financial burden of administering a
less economically viable Northern Nigeria. In this
fact lies the genesis of all the unwholesome
imbalances that have characterized Federalism in what
later came to be known as independent Nigeria (Orji
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and Jaja, 2007). Orji and Jaja (2007) observe that
the colonial administration addressed the issue of
revenue generation and allocation in the Richard
constitution of 1946 which tended to grant some level
of autonomy to the regions. The revenue was shared
thus: northern region, 46%, western region 30%,
Eastern region 24%, in 1951, the critical factors of
independent revenue, derivation, needs and national
autonomy or common national interest were applied in
the allocation of resources (Orji and Jaja, 2007).
The raison d’ etre for employment such an allocation
was to ensure that the region were independent to a
large extent and to encourage fiscal responsibility
(orji and Jaja, 2007).
Orji and Jaja (2007) assert that when cocoa was
the mainstay of the economy and chief Obafemi
Awolowo, the former premier of western region
championed the course of derivation principle, in
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revenue allocation, the Western got as much as N53
million, the North received N24 million based on
cotton, groundnut, hides and skins with the Eastern
region receiving n16million based on palm kernel and
timber, while the Federal Government got N7million.
As the derivation favoured the West, Awolowo had
enough money to organize his politic and eventually
the Action Group (AC) won Seventeen seats in the 1954
election (Orji and Jaja, 2007). The West had enough
to provide free education and built the first ever
television station in Africa at Ibadan, establishment
of Cocoa House, and infrastructural facilities (Orji
and Jaja, 2007).
The politics of resource control and revenue
sharing goes on and on. Orji and Jaja (2007) note
that the 1963 midwifed some administrative changes as
the federal Government in 1964, appointed Mr. J. K
Binns as the sole Commissioner to design anew revenue
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allocation formula that would draw inspiration from
the new constitution. They observe that the
commission did not favour the principle of derivation
rather opted for the financial comparability mode
which provided that the region retained a share of
50% mining rents and loyalties, the Federal
Government 15% with distributable Pool Account
increased to 35%. The new formula of financial
comparability allocated to the North 42%, the West
20%, the East 30, the mid-West 8%, it was based on
the principle of “need and even development” (Orji
and Jaja, 2007).
Orji and Jaja (2007) observe that during the time
of oil, the revenue formula changed. It became a 50-
50 affair to all the State. Federal government
carried 53%, State 30%, Local Government 10%, and 7%
for reserve as special fund. This was followed by 55%
for the Federal Government, 43.5% for State
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government 8%for local government, 43.5% for State
government 8% for local government and 2.5% for the
development of F.C.T (Orji and Jaja, 2007).
Okpi (in punch, march 4, 2012) like other
supporters of resource control asserts that before
independence, different region in Nigeria clamoured
for their control of the natural resources in their
territory or certain percentages of the revenue
generated from certain percentages of the revenue
generated from exploitation of such resources as
statutory allocation. Okpi (2012) argues that
agitation for resource control, which has been one of
the most crucial aspects of national conferences
constitutional amendments and discourages of national
unity, is presently rousing the polity in a fierce
debate particularly between leaders of the North and
oil producing states of the south. The north
maintains that the sharing formula is imbalance,
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while the South says they are “the goose that lay the
golden egg” (Okpi, 2012). The punch (2012, March, 4)
also points out that, in the first republic (1963 to
66) where there was no oil the revenue of the country
was distributed based on derivation principle.
According to the report, fifty percent from the
mineral resource was given to the region from where
the minerals were extracted. Then 30 percent was put
into a distributable pool which was divided among all
the regions, including the producing region while the
remaining 20 percent went to the Federal Government.
But the formula changed when oil became Nigeria’s
main source of revenue. According to Igbuzor’s paper
(in punch, March 4, 2012) national revenue derivation
and allocation went from 50 percent for the producing
states and 50 percent for the federal government
between 1967 and 1969 to 45 percent for producing
40
State and 55 percent for the Federal Government
between 1969 and 1971.
After a slight variation between 1971 and 1975,
the derivation of oil producing states dropped to 20
minus offshore proceeds, while the federal Government
had 80 percent plus offshore proceeds between 1975
and 1979. Between 1979 and 1981, oil producing States
got no derivation. All oil proceeds went to the
Federal Government. Then between 1982 and 1972, oil
states derived one and a half percent of the revenue
from oil, while the Federal Government had 98 and a
half percent (punch, March 4, 2012). Okpi (in punch,
March 4, 2012) suggests that, probably, in response
to the agitation for more resource to tackle the
gross environmental degradation, which had been the
consequence of the oil exploitation in the Niger
Delta, the then military government raised the
41
derivation of the oil states to3 percent in 1992 and
to 13 percent in 1999.
The question that comes to ones mind is that why
the derivation formula should change the turn of oil.
In his analysis professor Itse Sagay (in punch 4th
march, 2012) argues that the reduction of the
derivation of producing states was mainly because
Niger Delta ethnic groups were in minority, while the
majority ethnic groups controlled the federal
Government. The lawyer further asserted that in 1960,
there were no petroleum resources of any
significance. That the main income earning exports
were Cocoa (Yoruba West); groundnuts, Cotton and
hides and Skin (Hausa/Fulani); and palm oil (Igbo
East); therefore it was convenient for these majority
groups usually in control of the Federal Government
to emphasis derivation, hence its strong showing in
the 1960 and 63 constitutions (punch, March 4, 2012).
42
From his analysis, it means the issue of resource
control in Nigeria has great political undertone.
The professional lawyer, professor Itse Sagay (in
punch, march 4, 2012) posits that by 197 and
certainly by 1969 petroleum particularly the mineral
oil, was becoming the major resource in terms of
total income and foreign exchange earning in the
country; it was therefore not difficult for the
majority groups (in the Federal Government) to reduce
the revenue allocation with regard to petroleum
resources. According to him, they were in control of
the Federal Government and therefore in the control
of the mineral resources. He maintains that, that
means the resources of the Niger Delta were being
transferred to the majority group in control for the
Federal Government at any point in time (Punch, March
4, 2012).
43
Sagay (in Punch, March 4, 2012) laments that,
instead of establishing true fiscal Federalism, in
which the Federating units would develop the natural
resources in their territories, and pay royalties to
the central government, the political class has been
satisfied with practicing unitary government, which
concentrate power and resources at the centre.
In his own observation from comments from
University dons and politicians, Awoyinfa (2013) put
forward the position of Professor Olusoga Safola, who
according to him frawned at state creation, rather
supported resource control. According to Awoyinfa,
(2013) Sofola favoured regional government that would
allow federating units control the resources in their
domain. Egom (2008) views resource control from
ethnical, micro-economic and the political dimension
of the concept of resource control urges us Nigeria
to say whether it is the Oligocentric and outward-
44
looking or the polycentric and inward-looking price
power us to distribute work and its rewards evenly
among all of us Nigerians. The view of Egom is not
clear. One cannot actually see the position of Egom
on the issue of resource control. Adisa (2012) in his
publication on “resource Control, Derivation: A
Blessing or Curse?” also recognizes the politics in
resource control as he argues that in the past the
majority ethnic groups were in control of their
natural resources and agricultural produce. He also
points out that, the agitation culminated from the
response to the growing unease in the Niger Delta
over environmental degradation amidst plenty of
resources being drained from the area. He adds that
it was a partial response to the growing militancy in
the area.
The Northern region’s claim of sustaining the
south during colonial era has been seriously
45
disproved by political economist who claims all the
claims of the north were fallacy. Ochonu (n.d.)
refers to the northern claim and position on resource
control as “Northern Arrogance and Historical
Distortion”. According to Ochonu (n.d.), the history
that the north was distorted shows that the southern
economy was the one sustaining the north as the
agricultural products of the South commanded world
market than that of the north. He also argues that
the agricultural production of the north was
restricted by weather condition. Ochonu (n.d.) posits
that if the oil in the south was to be in the north,
they would not have allowed it to be taken over by
the federal government. He points that the north
received several grants and emergency funds from
revenue pools which originated largely from the more
expensive agricultural exports of the South-Cocoa,
timber, rubber, palm product and from customs and
46
excise receipts collected on Southern coasts. He
reiterated that the agricultural resources of the
South commanded higher price in the world produce
market than those of the North. The North’s range of
agricultural resources was narrower, owing to its
ecological realities. The North was also more
susceptible to crop failures, droughts, and reduced
harvests than was the South. Thus in the largely
agricultural colonial economy of Nigeria, the South
naturally provided the bulk of the colonial State’s
revenue (Ochonu n.d.).
2.1.4 Legality of Resource Control
The issue of legality in resource control in
Nigeria has become a contextual issue. Actually,
there has been series of argument on whether it is a
legal thing for a region to control its resources or
not.
47
Cotula (2007) asserts that where there is no
legal empowerment or where it is weakened, investment
project may undermine the ability of local groups to
access the resources on which they depend. According
to Cotula (2007) this may take the form of
expropriation or otherwise loss of resource access
without adequate compensation; or of environmental
degradation such as the pollution of water and other
resources essential to the local population. Weakened
of local resource right may also undermine the
position of local resource users in their
negotiations with incoming investors, and therefore,
limit their ability to benefit from investment
project through negotiated benefit-sharing
arrangements (Cotula, 2007). Cotula (2007) accesses
the situation of Africa, insinuates that, in much of
Africa the law-whether national or international
tends to provide greater protection to the legal
48
entitlement of foreign investors than to those local
resource users. This reinforces powers as asymmetries
and increases the vulnerability of local resources
right (Cotula, 2007). No wander Cotula figures that
law, like spider’s web, catches the flies and let the
hawks go free.
Cotula (2007) says that legal empowerment can
increase local resource control. Is that then the
case with the Nigerian Niger Delta? Should one
appropriately say when the hawk was in possession of
resource, the spider’s web could not catch it, but
now that the flies (South) is in possession, the
spider’s web (the Nigerian law) gets hold of it?
Cotula (2007) maintains that appropriate legal
arrangements and adequate capacity to use them can
help local resource user in Africa have greater
control over the natural resources on which they
depend. Cotula (2007) defines legal empowerment as
49
the legal processes to improve disadvantaged
populations control over their lives. He further
asserts that, legal empowerment to increase resource
control requires actions at different levels,
including:- Law reform to establish or sharpen
arrangement (‘legal tools’) that strengthen the
protection of local resource right, or that provide
greater say in decision-making process affecting
these rights;- strategies, approaches and support
materials to help local group make the most of the
opportunities offered by the law (‘Para-legal
tools’), including legal literacy training, legal
assistance, individual and public interests
litigation, and representation and advocacy.
Dafinone (2001) in his own part looks at the
legality of resource control from the natural law
which says rent of usage of land should be paid to
the owner of land. Quoting Adam Smith says that
50
resource control is a basic economic that says land,
labour, capital and entrepreneur are factors of
production. According to Dafinone (2001), just as the
price of labour is wages, capital has interest;
entrepreneurship is driven by profit, while rent and
royalties are rewards for land ownership. He argues
that, the continental shelf belongs to the ethnic
nationalities adjoining it, and if section 3 of the
1999 constitution is construed in accordance with the
spirit upon which it was framed as the Federal
Government has no land except the Federal Capital
Territory. Dafinone (2001) argues further that, the
land Act of 1978 does not vest the land on the
Federal, State and indeed the “Section 3 of the 1999
constitution recognized 36 States, and the Federal
Capital Territory. There is no-where the Federal
Government is said to own the land. In States land is
vested on Government to hold in trust for the people,
51
and in the local Government, to the chairman and the
Traditional Rulers, also to hold in trust for the
people. But when land is occupied before the Decree
came into effect, the land is vested on the owners
because they have the statutory right of occupancy”.
He also argues that the section 3 of the 1999
constitution does not say that the rent (13%) should
be paid to the State, rather it should be paid to the
Local people whose land is being degraded, polluted
and whose means of livelihood is destroyed. Grandiose
Parlor (2005) maintains that refusing the minorities
Niger Deltas the right to control their resources is
injustice. That implies that that resource control
agitation is legal and just.
Ikpang (n.d.) in his legal chasm between resource
control and the determination of the Seaward
Boundaries of the littoral state in Nigeria asserts
that, the apportioning of the territorial sea to the
52
coastal state is automatic because according to
McNair J.: “To every state whose land is at any place
washed by sea, international law attaches a
corresponding portion of maritime territory…
(Territorial waters). The possession of this
territory is not optional, not dependent on the will
of the State, but compulsory”. Ikpang (n.d.) making
inference from McNair J. input that, “Thus every
coastal state, in this context, Nigeria, possesses a
terrestrial sea or internal waters to a maximum of
12-miles from the low-water mark (baseline). The
internal water consist of waters to the landward side
of the territorial sea baseline or straight baseline
and include harbours, ports, rivers, lake, Canals
closed-in bays, gulfs and waters enclosed by
archipelagic Islands …” What Ikpang (n.d.) is
positing is that the state has a legal right to
control any resource (especially oil) found around
53
this area. Using America as an illustration, Ikpang
(n.d.) maintains that in Federalism, the federating
units (States) control resources found and explored
in their regions.
Anam-Ndun (2007) explores all the constitutional
provisions before independent and observes that they
provided right for federating units or regions to
control their resources and then remitted some
percentages to the Federal or central government.
According to Anam-Ndun (2007) the issue of ownership
of mineral is traceable to colonial times when the
colonial administration, acting under the mandate of
British imperial interest appropriated by law,
territories, including natural resources that were
not their own, as the property of the British crown.
But “during the making of the 1960 constitution,
provided in section 134 (6) that ‘for the purpose of
this section, the continental shelf or a region shall
54
be deemed to be part of that Region’. This provision
was repeated in section 140 of the Republican, 1963.
He noted that 50% was for the regions while 50% was
pooled for allocation at the federal level. Anam-Ndun
(2007) sees the court failure to play a mediatory
role in the matter of resource control as a betrayal
and more of political actor than an independent
judge.
Ako (2012) though observes that the constitution
does not permit regional resource control, calls for
reforms in the law to favour land use, oil
operations, oil-related compensation, access to
information, participation in decision making and
access to justice in environmental matters. According
to his assertion, the amendment of these laws will
avail local communities the opportunity to
participate in decision-making process concerning
their land and natural resources while providing
55
access to legal avenues to resolve. Matters
militancy. Ako (2012) posits that local resource
control is the most practicable at this time in the
country’s history.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 The Theory of Accountability (King, 2009)
The theory of accountability is proposed by Henry
King. King’s theory of accountability assumes that
(1) no government can be accountable unless the
people demand it (2) The people will not demand
accountability and probity unless their taxes almost
solely pay for running of the government. (3) No
representation without taxation. Henry further
assumes that (4) Resource control will help curb
corruption at every level of government. (5) At the
centre, with greatly reduced income, profligacy is
bound to fall (6) At the state and local government
56
levels, one people come to realize that the people
are being called from their local capitals, which are
accessible. Rather than Abuja, which is not? They are
bound to impose themselves, eventually. (7) King
strongly assumes that resource control will
accelerated the process of development, by forcing
the states and local government with allocations from
the centre greatly reduced or non-existent, to
develop the resources within their jurisdiction in
other to survive.
According to kings (2009) every state has given
the motivation to explore their riches. King (2009)
posits that the need to survive, in the face of
limited or zero allocation would prove ample
incentive. King (2009) believes that the argument
that these communities cannot manage their resource,
because of the performance of certain elected
official is spurious.
57
2.2.2 Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffe and
Salancik, 1978).
The proponents of Resource Dependence Theory are
Pfeffe and Salancik in 1978. This theory utilized the
previous environment literature to develop resource
dependence theory resource dependence theory is based
on the notion that environments are the source of
scarce resources and organizations are dependent on
these finite resources for survival. The theory is
assumption that, the lack of control over these
resources thus acts to create environment.
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) the
element structural characteristics of environmental
are concentration, the extent to which power and
authority in the environment are widely dispersed;
munificence, or the availability or scarcity of
critical resources; and interconnectedness, the
58
number and pattern of linkages, or connections, among
organization. This structural characteristic,
according to El-Nadi (n.d.) in turn, determine the
relationships among social actors-specifically, the
degree of conflict and interdependence present in the
social system. Conflict and interdependence, in turn,
determine the uncertainly the organization confronts
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Pfeffer and Salancik determined three factors
that influenced the level of dependence organizations
had on particular resources. First, the overall
importance of the resource to the firm was critical
in determining the resource dependence of the firm.
Second, the scarcity of the resource was also a
factor. The scarcer a resource was the more dependent
the firm became. Finally another factor influencing
resources dependence was the competition between
organizations for control of that resource. Together,
59
all these three factors acted to influence the level
of dependence that an organization had for a
particular resource.
Resource dependence theory also inferred that a
firm’s strategic options were determined to a great
extent by the environment (El-Nadi, n.d.). Since
firms were dependent on the environment for
resources, they needed to enact Strategies that would
allow them to acquire these resources. Therefore, the
external environment had already been little
strategic choice (El-Nadi, n.d.).
This theory is relevant in the study of the issue
of resource control. This is because the scarcity of
resource (Crude oil), which makes it only limited to
the Niger delta region of the country, has created
uncertainly in the nation between different ethnic
groups, the “Government” and the people the resource
are found in their domain. The uncertainly has
60
resulted to a lot of conflict. The over dependence on
just oil in Nigeria has aggravated a lot of
uncertainly and conflict.
The theory also posits that since the resource is
source where this scarce resource is determined, the
organization (host communities) need to determine
strategies on how the resources are acquired-hence
the agitation for resource control in order for
proper management to avoid over exploitation,
environmental degradation, and exhaustibility.
61
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section of the research presented the
method/design employed for the study and the
processes of data collection and analysis. The
chapter is discussed under the following subheadings:
Research Design
Study Area
Population of Study
The Sample
Sampling Technique
Sources of Data
Data Collection Procedure
Instrument for Data Collection
Technique for Data Analysis
3.1 Research Design
The design adopted for this study is the survey
research design. Survey research design is used to
62
describe or predict phenomena based on their result.
A survey design is a kind of ex-post facto design
which is a study designed to determine what the
preexisting causal condition are between groups. It
also requires some interactions with the respondents.
A survey research is a method of collecting
information by asking questions. Sometimes interviews
are done face-to face with people, observation, or
data are gathered through the use of questionnaire.
In this research, the researcher adopted both
qualitative and quantitative research method and
design. Quantitative approaches to data collection
usually involve direct interaction with individuals
on a one to one base or in a group setting. The study
also used documentary studies, where the information
were gather in the form of words, descriptive,
narrative and documentary studies of official
documents, library materials, internet (websites),
63
etc. Individual interviews, focus group discussion
and personal observation were also involved.
The quantitative method was used to gather
information through the use of questionnaire. This
method was used by the researcher to carryout a cross
sectional survey on the issue of resource control in
Nigeria- conflict, politics and legality.
The researcher decided to use both qualitative
and quantitative approaches because of the
limitations faced by both approaches. For instance,
data collection through qualitative approach is rich
and provides deeper insight into phenomena under
study. Example, the use of extensive literature
review provides the researcher deeper insight into
the issue of resource control. Also, the observation
and interview approach gave the researcher
opportunity to probe deeper and understand better the
issue surrounding resource control in Nigeria. The
64
researcher also used quantitative approach because
the qualitative data cannot be analyzed
statistically, and because data from quantitative
studies are often locally based. Both approaches were
used so that both quantitative and qualitative data
methods of data analysis would be used for effective
result.
3.2 The Study Area
The study was carried out in Nigeria, which
served as the universal set and where part of the
qualitative data was generated. The oil producing
States in the Niger Delta form the sub-set of the
universal set. The qualitative data were generated or
gather in the subset (the Niger Delta States).
The former Nigeria Delta of the Niger River is a
very densely populated region sometimes called the
oil Rivers, because it was once a major producer of
65
palm oil. The area was the British oil River
protectorate from 1885 until 1893, when it was
expanded and become the Niger coast protectorate
(Wikipedia, 2013).
The Niger Delta, as now defined officially by the
Nigerian government, extends over about 70,000km2 and
make up 7.5% of Nigeria’s land mass. Historically and
cartographically, it consists of present day Bayelsa,
Delta, and Rivers state. In 2000, however, Obasanjo’s
regime included Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Edo,
Imo and Ondo States in the region (Wikipedia, 2013).
Some 31 million people of more than 40 ethnic groups
including the Bini, Efik, Ibibio, Anang, Oron, Ijaw,
Ilsekiri, Isoko, Urhobo, Ukwani, and Kalabari, are
among the inhabitants in the Niger Delta, speaking
about 250 different dialects.
The research was carried out in Akwa-Ibom,
Bayelsa, Imo, Delta, Edo, and Ondo States. The Delta
66
is an oil-rich region, and has been the centre of
international controvercy over devastating pollution
and ecocide, kleptocracy (notably by Abacha regime),
and human right violations in which Royal Dutch shell
has been implicated (Wikipedia, 2013).
3.3 population of Study
Nigeria has a population of about 160 million
people (2006, national population Census). The Niger
Delta has an estimated population of 31 million
people. For the study the population covers all the
residents of the Area. For the qualitative data, the
population covers all the articles, journals,
Newspapers, periodicals (that is, all the literature)
available on resource control.
3.4 The Sample
67
The sample drawn from the entire population of
study was 300. The sample was drawn mainly from the
population of the six states selected. Fifty
respondents each were selected from each State for
quantitative data and analysis. While the qualitative
sample were the literature drawn out of the available
literature for review and qualitative analysis.
3.5 Sampling Technique
The study adopted purposive sampling technique,
according to Enukoha, Emeh and Umo’Inyang (1995) is
when a researcher purposively selects areas or
elements from a given population, which meet the
criteria he has established. The choice of selecting
depends on the subjective judgment of the researcher.
For instance, the choice of the topic under research
68
was borne out of the subjective judgment of the
researcher.
The number of sample selected was purposive. The
researcher also sample responded believed to be well
vested with information on resource control issue.
The stakeholders/key players and the victims of the
resource control Saga were the respondents selected
out of the subjective judgment of the researcher.
3.6 Sources of Data
The data for this study were derived from two
major sources. The primary and secondary sources of
data were the avenues the researcher used to gather
the data used for the study and analysis. The
researcher used questionnaire, interview, and
observation. The questionnaire was used to gather
primary data. Also, the observation and interview
69
methods gathered primary data that assisted in both
qualitative and quantitative analysis.
The secondary source of data was through the
libraries, internet and personal materials. Journals,
articles, seminar papers, text books, etc were the
main secondary sources of data.
3.7 Data Collection Procedure
The research went to the filed by himself and
gathered information through the use of questionnaire
and interview. The researcher officially informed the
respondents about the purpose of the research and
guided them on how to complete the questionnaire by
himself. The researcher also followed the
questionnaire with interview, and gave opportunity to
the respondents to ask questions concerning the
subject matter. Information provided were recorded
and jotted down by the researcher.
70
For the qualitative data, the researcher went
online, browsed and printed relevant materials for
information, jotted down and photocopied relevant
information that were used in the literature section.
3.8 Instrument for data Collection
Questionnaire and interview method were used to
collect data for the study. The questionnaire
consisted of two sections. Section A gathered
demographic information of respondents, while the
section B elicited information on the issue of
resource control, conflict, politics and legality.
3.9 Data Analysis Techniques
The data were analyzed using Chi-square and
Pearson product-Moment Correlation Co-efficient.
Statistical test instruments Chi-Square is given as:
X2 = (fo -fe)∑ 2, where: fe
71
X2 = Chi-Square
∑ = Summation
FO = Frequency observed
Fe = Frequency expected
2 = Square of fo-fe
While Pearson product-Moment Correlation Co-efficient
is given as:
r2 = N XY –( X) ( Y)∑ ∑ ∑ [N X∑ 2 – ( X)∑ 2]. [N Y∑ 2-( Y)∑ 2]
Where:
r2 = Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Co-efficient
N = Sample population
∑ = Summation
X = Positive response or independent variable
Y = negative response or dependent variable
- = Subtraction
. = Multiplication
72
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSION
Chapter four of the project (thesis) presents the
data derived from the field survey presents and
interprets the result of the hypotheses tested as
well as discussion of the findings.
4.1 Demographic Charatistics of Respondents
Table 4.1 Gender Characteristics of Respondents
Gender Frequency of respondent Percentage Male 217 72.33Female 83 27.67Total 300 100Sources: Field survey, 2012
Table 4.1 above shows that 217, representing
72.33 percent of the sampled respondent were males,
while 83, which represents 27.67 percent of the total
respondents were females.
73
Table 4.2: Age Characteristics of Respondents
Age Frequency of respondent Percentage Below 20 0 020-30 54 1831-40 97 32.3341-50 80 26.6751-60 46 15.3361 and above 23 7.67Total 300 100Source: Filed Survey, 2012
Table 4.2 above shows that 54 (18 percent) of the
total sample respondents were between the age of 20
to 30. The table indicates that 97 (32.33 percent)
were under the ages of 31 to 40. The table also
represents that 80 (26.67 percent) of the respondents
were between the ages of 41 to 50. the table
indicates also that 46 (15.33 percent) of the
respondents fell under the ages of 51 to 60, while
those above 60 years or from 61 years and above were
74
23 (7.67 percent). The table shows that in respondent
was below the ages of 20 years.
Table 4.3 Educational Characteristics of Respondents
Level of Education Frequency of
respondent
Percentag
e No Formal
education
0 0
Primary Education 0 0Secondary
Education
15 5
OND and Equivalent 38 12.67Bsc and Equivalent 102 34Msc 64 21.33PHD 81 27Others 0 0Total 300 100Source: Field Survey, 2012
The educational distribution table 4.3 shows that
none of the respondent had below secondary education.
75
The table shows that 15 (5 percent) of the
respondents had secondary education qualification. 38
(12.67 percent) of the respondents had either OND or
its equivalent. 102 (24 percent) respondents out of
300 (100 percent) were degree holders, or its
equivalent. The respondents that had Msc and its
equivalent were 64 (21.33 percent). 81 (27 percent)
of the sample respondents were OHD holders.
Table 4.4 Occupation Distribution of Respondents
Occupation Frequency ofrespondent
Percentage
Farmer 51 17Trader 29 9.67Student 10 3.33Civil servant 20 6.67Lecturer 42 14Politician 21 7Unemployed 127 42.33Others 0 0Total 300 100Source: Field Survey, 2012
76
Occupation distribution table 4.4 above indicate
that farmer were 51 (17 percent) among the total
respondents of 300. the table shows that traders were
29 (9.67 percent). Student as shown on the table were
10 (3.33 percent). The table shows that civil servant
were 20 (6.67 percent). As indicated on the table
above, 42 (14 percent) of the respondents were
lecturers. The table shows that 21 (7 percent) of the
total sample were politicians. As shown on table 4.4
127 (42.33 percent) of the respondents were
unemployed. That means that only 62 (20.67 percent)
were employed properly by the government. These class
of people or respondents were the civil servants and
lecturers in the tertiary institutions in the study
area. 80 (26.67 percent) were on their own. These
group, mostly farmers were mostly subsistent farmers.
Adding the number of petty traders and farmers with
77
the unemployed, the number is over 200 (70 percent)
out of the 300 sampled.
4.2 Data presentation and Analysis
Table 4.5: Statistic of Respondent Views on Conflict
Issue in Resource Control
Variables
Samplesize
Actual Response Grand %
SA A Total % D SD Total
%
Q1 300 166 107 273 91 20 7 27 9 100Q2 300 84 136 220 73.3
352 28 80 26.6
7100
Q3 300 149 113 262 87.33
30 8 38 12.67
100
Q4 300 110 127 282 94 18 0 18 6 100Q5 300 68 151 219 73 81 0 12 27 100Q6 300 204 84 288 96 4 8 84 4 100Q7 300 49 167 216 72 60 24 15 28 100Q8 300 111 174 285 95 15 0 99 5 100Q9 300 160 41 201 67 59 40 33 100Grand 2700 1101 1145 2246 748.
7339 11
5454 151.
33900
Source: Field Survey, 2012
78
Table 4.6: Statistics of Response on Politics of
Resource Control
Variable
Samplesize
Actual Response Grand %
SA A Total
% D SD Total
%
Q10 300 119 93 212 70.67
66 22 88 29.33
100
11 300 120 108
228 76 57 15 72 24 100
12 300 47 145
192 64 72 36 108 36 100
Total 900 286 346
632 210.67
195 73 268 89.33
300
Source: Field Survey, 2012
Table 4.6: Statistics of Response on Legality of Resource
Control
Variable
Samplesize
Actual Response Grand %
SA A Total
% D SD Total
%
Q13 300 206 78 284 94.67
14 2 16 5.33 100
14 300 98 124
232 74 70 8 78 26 100
15 300 127 66 193 64.33
48 59 97 35.67
100
16 300 75 120
195 65 70 35 105 35 100
Total 1200 506 388
894 298 202 104 306 102 400
Source: Field Survey, 2012
79
The table 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 above show the sample
size actual responses on strongly agree, agree,
disagree and strongly disagree on the variables on
the situations highlighted in the questionnaire. The
questionnaire is shown on the appendix.
4.3 Testing and Interpretation of the Hypotheses
The result of the hypotheses formulated for the
study is presented as analyzed in this section.
Hypothesis 1
Ho: There is no significant association between
resource control and conflict in Niger Delta Region
Hi: There is significant association between resource
control and conflict in Niger Delta region.
This hypothesis is tested with Chi-square
statistics test instrument. The researcher utilized
questionnaire items 4 to 9 in testing the hypothesis.
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Table 4.8: Chi-square Statistical Analysis Result for
Resource Control and Conflict in Niger Delta
Fo Fe Fo-Fe (Fo-Fe)2
(Fo-Fe)2/Fe
110 117 -7 490.42172 131.5 40.5 1640.2512.4718 39.5 -21.5 462.2511.700 12 -12 1441268 117 -49 240120.52151 131.5 19.5 380.252.8981 39.5 41.5 1722.2543.600 12 -12 14412204 117 87 756964.6984 131.5 -47.5 2256.25
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17.164 39.5 -35.5 1260.2531.918 12 -4 161.3349 117 -68 4,62439.52167 131.5 35.5 1260.259.5860 39.5 20.5 420.2510.6424 12 12 14412111 117 -6 360.31174 131.5 42.5 1806.2513.7415 39.5 -24.5 600.2515.200 12 -12 14412160 117 43 184915.8041 131.5 -90.5 8190.2562.2859 39.5 19.5 380.259.6340 12 28 78465.33
Total497.02 n =300X2 =497.02DF =(r - 1) (c - 1)DF = 4-1 x 6-1DF =3 x 5 DF =15
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Table value =25
Decision: Before we decide whether or not the
response frequencies among the respondents is
significant or not, there is a “rule of the thumb we
need to recite. “If the critical value under the
relevant level of significance is greater than the
calculated value of X2, the relationship is not
significant at that particular level” (Odu and
Ihejiamaizu, 2001).
In our case above, 25 is require for significance
at 0.05 level; and our calculated value of X2 is
497.02, which is greater than the critical value of
25. In that case, our decision is to reject the null
hypothesis (Ho) and accept the alternative hypothesis
(Hi). Therefore we reject the Ho, which stated that
there is no significant association between resource
control and conflict in Niger Delta region, and
accept the Hi and conclude that, there is significant
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association between resource control and conflict in
the Nigerian Niger delta region.
Hypothesis II
Ho: There is no politics in resource control in
Nigeria.
Hi: there is politics in resource control in Nigeria.
This hypothesis analyzed by employing Pearson
product-Moment Correlation Co-efficient.
Table 4.9: Pearson product-Moment Correlation Co-
efficient analysis for Resource Control and Politics
in Nigeria N =300
Variable X Y X2 Y2 XY r-∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
cal r-crit Resource
control X
Politics
632 133792
55808
1 0.139
268 24592Significant at 0.05; df =n -2 =298
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Critical =0.139.
Decision: reject Ho and accept Hi if the calculated
value is greater than the critical value, and accept
Ho and reject Hi if the calculated value is less than
the critical.
The result of the analysis as shown on table 4.9
revealed that the calculated r-value of 1 (one) is
greater than the critical value of 0.139 at 0.05
level of significant under 298 degree of freedom.
Therefore, the result of the analysis is significant.
Since the calculated value is greater than the
critical value, we reject the null hypothesis (Ho)
which stated that there is no politics in resource
control in Nigeria and accept the alternative
hypothesis (Hi), which stated that, there is politics
in resource control in Nigeria.
Hypothesis III
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Ho: There is no legality in resource control in
Nigeria
Hi: There is legality in resource control in Nigeria
Pearson product-moment Correlation Co-efficient
Analysis was employed in testing the hypothesis
Table 4.10: Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Co-
efficient Analysis for resource control and legality
N =300
Variable X Y X∑ ∑ ∑ 2 Y∑ 2 XY r-∑cal r-crit
Resourcecontrol X
894 205214 610560.82 0.139
LegalityY
306 26774
Significant at 0.05; Df =300 – 2 = 298
The analysis as shown on table 4.11 above reveals
that the calculated r-value is 0.82; while its
critical value is 0.139. Following the rule, we
reject the null hypothesis, which stated that there
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is no legality in resource control in Nigeria and
accept the alternative hypothesis and conclude that,
there is legality in resource control.
The analysis is therefore significant it means
that 82 percent of the behaviour of Y is determined
by X.
4.4 Discussion of Findings
The discussion is done on the basis of the field
work survey and the data analyzed, and supported by
literature in chapter two. The study was done both
qualitative and quantitative; so the discussion is
done in the same manner.
In the qualitative study, several findings have
made. These findings are not different from the ones
gotten from the quantitative study and analysis. From
the observation and interview, the Niger delta region
of Nigeria where bulk of national income is derived
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from is in a pitiable condition. The majority of the
people live in abject poverty. Human being live in
slums made up of thatches, and is beaten by heavy
rainfall. There are no accessed roads, and other
infrastructures are in short supply; in some extreme
cases, they are in none existing. The physical
environment has been seriously degraded and pollution
is rapidly increasing. The formal agricultural land no
longer grows or sustains crop growth. The finishing
occupation has been hampered as the water body has
been contaminated with pollutants form oil spillage
and other oil production activities.
The unemployment rate in the region has reached
an alarming rate. This is one of the reasons for the
carrying of arms and militant activities in the area.
As the environment is polluted and degraded, and as
agricultural and farming activities are no more
encouraging, everybody depends on the government and
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others alternative means of living. The people then
went to control their land and resource since the
government of Nigeria is that is in charge of the
resources does not live up to the expectation of the
people. Some of the people interviewed alleged that
resource control in Nigeria was in existence, even
before the independence. They side that when the three
major region-the Yoruba, Hausa, and Ibo were in
control of resources (agricultural specifically) they
were controlling their resources then remitting some
percentage in form of tax to the Federal Government.
They also side that, there were times that, it was
divided 50-50 between the region and the centre, but
when it comes to the turn of the minorities, it was
either zero derivation, or 2 percent and now 13
percent after series of conflicts. The respondents
side the oil in their right that they have the right
to control it.
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Kings (2009) says resource control is the control
and management of resources by State or Local
Governments from whose jurisdictions the resources are
controlled. Dafinone (2011) says it is the practice of
true federalism, and natural law. Grandiosepalor
(2005) calls it equity in resource allocation,
exploitation and utilization. Iyobhebhe (n.d.) argue
that the Niger Delta should have a greater share of
the revenue from oil which gives Nigeria over 95
percent of its foreign exchange. Iyobhebhe, (n.d.)
Orji and Jaja (2007) say the conflict in Niger Delta
is as a result of unfair sharing of revenue like it
was in the days of agriculture and solid mineral.
Iyobhebhe (n.d.), Orji and Jaja (2007), Okpi (2012),
Professor Itse Saga (in punch, 4th April, 2012), Egom
(2008), Adisa (2012), Awoyinfa (2013), and Ochanu
(n.d.) see resource control in Nigeria as a political
90
because the major ethnic groups and States that are
not producing oil are against resource control.
On the legality of resource control, Dafinone
(2001) says naturally it is the right of the Niger
Delta to control their oil resources. He also posts
that the 1999 constitution does not recognize the
federal government to own any land, rather it is the
States and Local Government. He also argues that the
1978 Land Act does not vest the land on the Federal,
State, and indeed the Local Government. Dafinone
(2001) says the only land the federal Government has
is the federal Capital Territory. Grandiose Parlor
(2005) says it is an injustice refusing the minorities
of Niger delta right to control their resources. It is
also found that, international law permits a state to
control a land within 12 miles from the low-water
mark. It is discovered that in Federalism, the
federating units control their resources on their land
91
(Kpang, n.d.). The right to control resource is traced
back to the colonial days (Anan-Ndun, 2007).
The quantitative data were analyzed using Chi-
square, and Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Co-
efficient statistical test tools at 0.05 levels of
significance. Hypothesis one stated that there is no
significant association between resource control and
conflict in Nigeria Niger Delta region. The hypothesis
was tested with Chi-square statistics instrument. The
result of the analysis revealed that there is
significant association between resource control and
conflict in the Nigerian Niger Delta region. This
finding is in agreement with Iyobhebhe (n.d.) who
accounts that the people of Niger delta feel that
because the oil from which Nigeria gets 95 percent of
her foreign exchange while they are impoverished is
located on their land, the should have a greater share
from the proceeds of oil sales for the development of
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the Niger Delta Iyobhebhe (n.d) maintains that
militancy in the area is because of unfair share of
oil proceeds. The finding is in complete agreement
with Orji and Jaja (2007) input that the change in
sharing formula as it used to be during agriculture
and solid mineral is the cause of conflict in the
areas of Niger Delta.
Hypothesis two stated that there is no politics
in resource control. The hypothesis was tested with
Pearson product-moment Correlation co-efficient. The
result of the analysis shows that there is political
issue in resource control agitation in Nigeria. The
finding is in support of Iyobhebhe (n.d.) which says
that there is politics in resource control. The result
also agrees with Orji and Jaja (2007), that resource
control issue has been politicized by non-oil
producing States. Okpi (in Punch, March 4, 2012) Itse
(2012), Egom (2008), Awoyinfa (2013), Adisa, (2012)
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and Ochonu (n.d) findings are in agreement with the
finding that there are politics surrounding resource
control in Nigeria.
Hypothesis three stated that, there is no
legality in resource control. This hypothesis was
tested with Pearson product-Moment Correlation Co-
efficient. The result of the test shows that there is
legality in resource control agitation. This finding
supports Cotula (2007), grandiose parlor (2005),
Ikpang (n.d), Adam-Ndu (2007) and Ako (2012) who
quoted domestic, international and natural law in
support of resource control.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Chapter five of the study is where the researcher
drew the curtain to the study. In this chapter,
summary of the finding was done, conclusion drawn and
recommendation made based on the findings.
5.1 Summary of findings
The study was carried out to examine the issue of
resource control: conflict, politics and legality.
The objectives of the study were to critically
access the conflict associated with resource control
in Nigeria; to evaluate the politics of resource
control in Nigeria; to examine the legality of
resource control in Nigeria and to proffer solutions
to the problems facing resource control in Nigeria.
To achieve the objectives, hypothesis were formulated
and tested, data were gathered through the use of
questionnaire and literature was reviewed. In the
95
course of the research work, a number of findings
have been established based on factual data collected
from the field survey and analyzed together with
elaborate review of literature. These findings are
summarized below:
1) There is significant association between
resource control and conflict in Niger Delta
region of Nigeria.
2)There is politics in resource control in Nigeria.
3)There is legality in resource control in Nigeria
5.2 Conclusion
A discourse on conflict resolution in the Niger
Delta in particular and Nigeria as a whole in
relation to resource control must take cognizance of
development in the entire African continent. A global
view reveals that the entire continent is involved in
one form of conflict or the other.
96
From the foregoing, it becomes very obvious that
the political stability and socio-economic
development of Nigeria is at a threshold. No nation
elopement can dream of meaningful development in a
State of violence and in security. No responsible
government can afford to play the ostrich game in the
face of obvious realities. The hydra headed tussle
for resource control has been identified as the arrow
ahead in the constant conflicts that have bedeviled
that Niger Delta region in recent times. It only
needs to be added that he conflagration has been
fueled by the seeming insensitivity of the Federal,
State and Local governments to the subjects they
swore to protect. Nigerians should see the issue of
resource control from an objective view instead of
being political about some objective agitation. The
only way out of the quagmire is an unhypocritical
approach with transparency and accountability as the
97
watchword. The proposal of 17% derivation formula
should be re-examined with the intention of beefing
it up to 25%-to 40%, considering environmental
degradation and poverty in the area.
From the study, it is obvious that there are a
lot of issues surrounding resource control in
Nigeria. Resource control is the heart of ethics, of
micro-economic and politics. It is all about planning
every Nigerian firmly, from the womb to the tomb, at
the beginning, at the center and at the end of every
aspect of Nigeria’s public policy. It is indeed ass
about justice, all about social inclusion and all
about giving every Nigerian. This rightful due at all
times.
To think about it, resource control is all about
taking us Nigerians back to our equalitarian and
communitarian roots. It is simply the bottom –to-top
market development of Nigeria. In addition, Nigeria
98
is a Federal State. The essence of true federalism is
to allow each State in a federation a significant
measure of autonomy to manage its affairs. The
federalist debate in Nigeria centres essentially on
the need to understand the basis of the contract of
true federalism and resource control. The debate is
longstanding, passionate and inconclusive. Despite
the contrived arrangement as articulated by the
ruling class, the systematic dysfunction has resulted
in a series of violent, dramatic and traumatic inter-
ethno regional confrontation, ventilating the
essences of a debate (Ihejiamaizu, 2001). Indeed, the
must spectacular and deliberate expression of the
centrality of the contention is the current
unprecedented demand of the Niger Delta State for
resource control. Political observers, especially
those of them from the Niger Delta region have argued
that the agitation for resource control is litmus
99
test for the enthronement of true federalism. What
made the region strong in the first republic was
their financial independence. Each region took care
of itself and its needs within the limits of its
internal revenue resources. What the regions received
from the federal government through the principles of
fiscal federalism which obliged the State to provide
such assistance, was minimal. Contrary to the opinion
from certain quarters, especially in the Northern
part of the country that resource control would
benefit only the oil producing states, it will
clearly benefit all states of the federation. After
all, the six geo-political zones in the country are
endowed with abundant natural resources waiting to be
explored and exploited. We must recognize the
position of the Niger Delta on this issue as a vital
contribution to the resurrection of true federalism
in Nigeria. All the 36 States will benefit from this,
100
as they will also exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over the natural resources in their respective
territories. The crude oil production has been by far
the most important activities in the Nigerian economy
since the early 1970s is not subject to debate. Its
impart is not limited to its contributing
approximately 90% of Nigeria’s total foreign exchange
earnings but also to the fact that the budget are
predicted on the expected annual production and price
of crude oil. That being the case, it would be quite
reasonable to expect that the areas producing the
nation’s oil would be very highly developed as
compensation for what is taken away as well as for
the devastation on the land engendered by the
exploration process.
The study has been able to review critically and
constructively the contributions of many scholars on
the issues of resource control along side the result
101
of the field work analysis as the affect the Niger
Delta and Nigeria as a whole.
5.3 Recommendation
In view of the research finding, the following
recommendations were made:
1. The national assembly should make the local
government an autonomous arm of government.
2. The local government allocation should go
straight to local government account.
3. The state should only serve as a check on local
government on financial matters, and advice it on
how to run the local government for effective
service delivery.
4. Corruption should be fought against. Any
government official caught involved in financial
misappropriation should be made to face the law.
102
5. People of credible character should be elected /
appointed into political offices.
6. The state and the multinational oil partners
should formulate appropriate policies for the
development of Niger Delta.
7. It has become glaring that privatization and
diversification of the Nigerian economy represent
our best hope for economic vitality. On that not,
the researcher recommends diversification of
Nigerian economy through resource control.
8. The government should serve as a supervisory and
advisory body to the private sectors or the
regions that are controlling their natural
resources.
9. Nigerians should patronize made in Nigerian
product to encourage more research and
production.
103
10. Nigerian producers should aim at producing
quality products to encourage long term
profitability.
11. Nigerian government should strive to produce
the petroleum products it consumes locally. It
should build and repair its refineries to stop
importing what it has in abundance at home.
12. The Federal, State and Local Governments in
the Niger Delta with all Stake holders like the
multi-national companies and non-governmental
organizations should meaningfully fashion out
pragmatic measures for the sustainable
development of the Niger Delta region. Areas to
be considered include: civil Servant, farmers,
fishermen, the self-employed, the jobless,
education, the provision of public utilities like
water and electricity, quality of educations,
good road network, etc.
104
13. Our politicians should allow the principle of
true federalism to thrive in an atmosphere that
will allow federating units to have a sense of
belonging.
14. The researcher also recommends that all the
traces of unitary system of government in Nigeria
should be removed from the Nigerian federalism.
This will allow the state some level of freedom
and autonomy.
105
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