CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Natural resources are blessings from God to a

people. Resources are meant to be harvested, tapped

or “exploited” for economic, social and political

development of the society. Unfortunately, resources

in Nigeria have become what some people tag “a curse”

or what Bayode, Adewunmi and Odunwole (2001) refer to

as a woe.

A resource is something that is utilized by

people (Environmental Awareness in Geography, n.d).

Natural resources in the other hand are anything

obtained from the environment to satisfy human needs

and want (Wikipedia, 2012). There are materials and

components (something that can be used) that can be

found within the environment. Some natural resources

are existing as separate entities, such as fresh

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water, air, fish, or existing in an alternative form

which must be processed to abstain the resource, such

as oil and most forms of energy (Wikipedia, 2012).

There is much debate worldwide over natural

resource allocations; this is partly due to

increasing scarcity (depletion of the resources) but

also because the exploitation of natural resources

(like petroleum) is the basis for many economies

(particularly Nigeria). Petroleum resources are

exhaustible. There occur in small sporadic areas, and

are referred to as localized resources. They are

capable of depletion if managed improperly

(Wikipedia, 2012) because they are finite. Resource

(Petroleum) exploration and exploitation to satisfy

human needs and wants has triggered adverse

environmental impacts in the Nigeria Niger Delta

Regions through incessant environmental, socio-

economic and physical disasters that have accumulated

2

over the years due to limited scrutiny and lack of

assessment (Bayode, Adewunmi and Odunwole, 2011). In

Nigeria, immense tracts of mangrove forests have been

destroyed as a result of petroleum exploitation in

the mangroves. These have not only caused degradation

to the environment and destroyed the traditional

livelihood of the region, but have caused

environmental pollution that has affected weather

conditions, soil fertility, water ways, aquatic

habitats and wildlife. This in human situation

continues to attract the interest of conscious

indigenes and conscientised Nigerians.

As stated early, resources are utilized to

satisfy economic needs and want of the people, but

reverse is the case in the oil producing regions of

Nigeria, most especially, the Niger Delta region. The

rates at which the oil and gas are exploited have

become alarming with no regard for the environment.

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The proceeds from the oil are not used to develop the

area. The Niger Delta region is only developed by

continues pollution of the environment. The socio-

economic status of the majority of the people is

worst than that of a pauper. This is an area where

people live in squalor. The above scenery has moved

the people of the region to agitate for resource

control.

Resources control. According to king (2009) is

the control and management of resources by state or

Local Government from whose jurisdictions the

resources are extracted, is the key to the emergency

of a modern federal Nigeria. The states or their

territories under federal guidelines (especially

environmental ones), and then remit taxes to the

federal centre (king, 2009). For king (2009), a truly

federal Nigeria would have a centre which is almost

fully dependent on taxation for its running. If this

4

happens, for king (2009), with its income much

reduced, it would be far less attractive to political

entrepreneurs, thus reducing competition for its

control and the attendant problems.

The issue of resource control in Nigeria has

generated a lot of controversies between the people

and the government, and between ethnic groups. The

discontentment of the people of Niger Delta, (where

the bulk of the Nigeria revenue comes from) about the

sharing formula that does not take into account their

degraded environment, has led to mounting of pressure

on the Federal Government to adjust the sharing

formula in favour of the minorities that produced the

bulk of the mineral resources (Orji and Jaja, 2012).

Discordant voices in respect of revenue allocation in

the country arise every passing year, because louder

and discernable, when in 1994, under the late general

Sani Abacha, a constitutional conference was set up

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to midwife civilian rule, concerned citizens seized

the opportunity to firm up their demands (Orji and

Jaja, 2012).

Responding to the demand of resource control, the

federal Government had made some attempts in

addressing the problem of oil bearing communities.

The several attempts are not good enough for the oil

bearing communities, or because most attempts have

been jettisoned by corrupt leaders and non-oil

producing regions. The demands of the people have not

been met by these measures largely because of the

insincerity of the Nigerian state and its ruling

elites (Orji and Jaja, 2012). The culture of neglect

has breed hostilities and violent reactions from oil-

bearing communities (Orji and Jaja, 2012).

The resource control Saga has been politicized

before independent. Revenue sharing formula, to start

with was done not in consideration of the region the

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resources are derived from, but on the basis of who

is in charge of the sharing and the interest of the

majority. Before independent, Revenue proceeds were

shared to favour the regions that resources like

Cocoa were gotten from. As noted by Orji and Jaja

(2012), during Cocoa boom, Awolowo was put to draw

revenue sharing formula, the west was accrued the

highest, the North followed, while the East got the

least. In the time of oil, which has the potential to

destroy the environment, fair sharing principle came

in (Orji and Jaja, 2012).

There exist divergent views about whether the

demand for resource control has some political under

tone or is borne out of intentions. Other people,

especially the agitators see any efforts to truncate

it as political. “In the first republic (1963 to

1966), there was no oil. The revenue of the country

was distributed based on derivation principle. Fifty

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percent of the revenue from mineral resources was

given to the region from where the minerals were

extracted. Then 30 percent was put into a

distributable pool, which was divided among all the

regions while the remaining 20 percent went to the

federal Government. But the formula changed when oil

becomes Nigeria’s main source of revenue” (Okpi,

2012). The sharing formula dropped to 20 percent in

1979 to 1981. in 1982 and 1992 the oil states got one

and a half percent, and was raised to 13 percent in

1999 (Okpi, 2012). As a result, the Niger Delta

minority group sees this as political (Okpi, 2012).

Many scholars see resource control as political.

The legality of resource control has been a

serious issue of debate in Nigeria. On the part of

the agitators, it is a natural law which must be

obeyed, but for the defenders the federal government

and non-oil producing states, it is unconstitutional.

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Severally, the Southern States have taken the Federal

Government to court agitating for resource control

and derivation.

This study is poised to critically access the

issue of resources control from three perspectives:

conflict, political and legality. The major focus is

on how to foster peace and unity in Nigeria.

Appropriate recommendations for redistribution of

revenue allocation formula are what the research is

set to achieve.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The issue of resource control agitation

culminating from social identity, marginalization and

environmental degradation (resulting from oil

exploration and exploitation) by various ethnic

groups within the Niger Delta region in the last four

decades, has posed serious challenges to the ideals

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of peaceful living, sustainable development and good

governance in the area.

The root cause of this problem is that the oil

bearing Niger Delta communities have basically

remained grossly socio-economically dependent and

under-developed, persistently disempowered, socio-

economically marginalized and psychologically

alienated. The people of the region, looking back

into history know that when there was no oil, the

revenue sharing formula was equitably distributed.

Then fifty percent of the revenue went to the region

it was derived from. But now that it is the oil time

and because it is from the minority ethnic groups,

the sharing formula has changed. As such, the people

engage in both inter and intra communal conflicts as

predicted by an undercurrent of massive exploitation

of natural resources, marginalization and

underdevelopment in the area. There has been a rise

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of ethnic-nationalism which has led to the explosive

social identity and resource control agitations in

the Niger Delta region. This has destroyed a sense of

nationalism and patriotism in Nigeria. This has led

to the emergency of more social identity movement

such as Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and

the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

(MOSOP). These groups exerted of the Ogoni people,

aggressively campaigning for the dismemberment of

Nigeria and proposed the creation of sovereign state

based on ethnicity.

The issue of resource control is a burning issue

of discourse in Nigeria today. Analyzing the problem

of resource control and Niger Delta as an entity goes

on an on. The concept of resource control straddles

the key questions of whether the people of Niger

Delta are actually marginalized and deprived, or its

citizens or subjects are slaves in their own country.

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The questions which this study seeks to address are

as follows: what are the root causes of conflict in

Niger Delta region? Why should ethnic issue or

sentiment overwhelm national interest? Why should the

issue of resource control be political? What is the

legality of resource control?

1.3 Purpose/Objective of the Study

This study was set to achieve these main

objectives:

1). To critically access the conflict associated with

resource control in Nigeria.

2). To evaluate the politics of resource control in

Nigeria.

3). To examine the legality of resource control in

Nigeria.

1.4 Research Question

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The researcher raised the following research

questions to guide the study:

1). Why should resource control issue brings about

conflict?

2). What are the politics of resource control in

Nigeria?

3). What is the legality for agitation for resource

control?

1.5 research Hypotheses

The under listed hypothesis were formulated by

the research in order to be tested in the course of

writing:

1. There is no significant association between

resource control and conflict Nigerian Niger

Delta region.

2. There is no politics in resource control in

Nigerian.

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3. There is no legality about the agitation for

resource control in Nigeria.

1.6 Significant of the Study

The significance of this study cannot be

overemphasized. Any critical study on resource

control and its attendant problems cannot be

overlooked. As such it would be relevant to, most

especially the Niger Deltas and Nigerians as a whole.

This Present study, most especially has bridged a gap

in literature as no material has existed before now

on these three variables of issue of resource

control- conflict, politics and legality.

In a nut-shell, the study will be significant to

policy makers in the policy making process concerning

resource control so that peace will be restored and

fostered in Nigeria. The study will be of great

relevance to researchers as this study though is on

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popular issue in Nigeria, the variables it looked at

are not all embraced in the existing literature. The

study will be relevant as it will help in creating

awareness on the issue of revenue sharing. The study

will help to foster peace and tranquility among

different ethnic groups in Nigeria. The study will

help Nigerians to know that resource is a blessing

and not a cause. The study will also help to let

Nigeria know the danger of depending only on one

source of income.

1.7 Definition of Major Terms

The researcher has operationally defined some

major terms used in the study for clarification.

1. Resource: petroleum products obtained or

extracted from the environment for satisfying

human economic want and needs.

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2. Control: Take charge of ones property or

exercise authority over something. Maintain

ownership and management of something.

3. Resource Control: The control and management of

resources by state or local government from

whose jurisdictions the resources are

extracted.

4. Conflict: A disagreement or argument between

individuals, or groups of people, or ethnic

groups or between the people and a government,

which sometimes results to a serious battle or

fight (Killing, destruction of lives and

properties.)

5. Politics: The act of manipulating or

influencing people over an issue of relevance.

The game of playing down the truth for selfish

reasons or ethnical consideration. Politics in

its context also means power relations,

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competing interests and claims for recognition,

conflicting assertions of simple truths.

6. Legality: The state or quality of the demand

for resource control being legal and lawful. It

is the lawfulness by virtue of conformity to a

legal statute

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section of the study makes an appraisal of

some of the available literature on resource control.

The researcher also explored literature on the

variables of resource control like conflict, politics

and legality. The body of literature revealed that

the issue of resource control is not an exclusive

domain of political service, public administration,

policy studies or the field of social science alone.

It is a societal problem that has captured the

interest of everyone, both in pure and applied

sciences, including those in the art line.

The literature is reviewed under the following

subheadings:

2.1 Literature Review

2.1.1 The Concept of Resource Control

2.1.2 Conflict in Resource Control

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2.1.3 Politics of Resource Control

2.1.4 Legality of Resource Control

2.2 Theoretical Framework

2.1.1 The Concept of Resource Control

Resource control has been viewed differently by

different authors. King (2009) conceptualizes

resources control as the control and management of

resources by state or local government from whose

jurisdictions the resources are extracted. King

(2009) looks at resource control as a key to the

emergence of a modern Federal Nigeria. King (2009)

envisages that state or local government would manage

the resource from their territories under Federal

guidelines taxes to the federal centre.

For Dafinone (2001), resource control is the

practices of true federalism and natural law in which

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the federating units express their rights to

primarily control the natural resources within their

borders and make agreed contribution towards the

maintenance of common services of the government at

the centre. Mr. Lucky Igbinedion in Dafinone (2001)

puts forward that, “resource control means that if I

as a Bini man goes to Kebbi State and find gold, the

resource should belong to me and not the State or the

federal government. All I owe the federal government

is to pay tax and royalties. The same principle

should apply if a Kano man comes to Edo, Delta or

Bayelsa and strikes oil. He only pays royalties and

taxes to the State or federal government.”

Resource control as conceived by Grandiose

Parlor (2005) is about equity in resource allocation,

exploitation, and utilization. The concept of

resource control in Nigeria means, different thing to

different people (Grandiose parlor, 2005). To the

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Niger Delta region of Nigeria the minorities of the

former Eastern and western region of Nigeria, it is a

noble cause worth dying for. To other far way

communities, it evokes negative images that should at

best be suppressed. Basically, the oil producing

states are demanding a greater input in the control

and management of oil business in the country. Ige

(n.d.) defines resource control as the control of the

proprietary use of resources subject to taxation by

the central government.

According to Ige (n.d.) resource control is not the

control of ownership of the resources as such;

because resources ownership belongs to the Almighty

who ensure that the resources are located defector

and de jure in their place of abode. Ige (n.d.) goes

on that, resource control is acquiring direct

political power over resource production, management

and utilization in the area of location to ensure

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regeneration of environment and overall sustainable

human development of the people. Ige (n.d.) posits

that, resource control is acquiring the political

power to take control of their lives. Ige (n.d.)

third definition of resource control according to him

is found in the fulfillment of fundamental human

right of a people, as you cannot come from any where

and plunder the resources of another group of people

by whatever means, either through constitutional

provision or military control over which they have

little or no say given their minority ethnic states

in the assembly.

Ako (2012) looks at resource control from

different perspectives. According to Ako (2012) the

definition of resource control is based on two phases

in connection with oil resources in Niger Delta-the

absolute and principal resource control, as well as

derivation. According to Ako (2012) the proponents of

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absolute resource control take the stance proffered

by the Kalama Declaration that “Every region should

control its resources 100 percent. Advocates of

principal resource control” defines resource control

as the Niger Delta region having ‘a direct and

decisive role in the exploitation for, the

exploitation and disposal of, including sales of the

harvested resources’ (Ako, 2012). Ako (2012) further

defines resource control as the right to control or

mange the revenue accruing from oil and other natural

resources in line with the tenets of true federalism.

2.1.2 The Issue of conflict over Resource control in

Nigeria

The issue of resource control has always been a

bone of contention in the Nigeria polity, now it has

polarized delegates at the Nigerian national

political reform conference. For the people of Niger

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Delta region, resource control cause is worth dying

for, while to the non-oil producing states,

especially the North it must not survive the rising

sun.

Resource control has brought about controversy in

the polity of Nigeria. According to Iyobhebhe (n.d.),

the debate and argument concerning resource control

has created tension and friction between those who

feel they are being short changed by the Nigerian

Federation (mainly the State, tribes and people of

the Niger Delta region), the non-oil producing states

and the Federation Government in Abuja. Iyobhebhe

(n.d.) says that, the Niger Delta people feel that

because the oil from which Nigeria gets 95% of her

foreign exchange is located on their land that they

should have a greater share from the proceeds of oil

sales for the development of the Niger Delta. That

the area has no tangible benefit from their God given

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wealth and that in actual fact the pollution and

environmental degradation has completely destroyed

their traditional way of live-fishing and farming.

There are also issues that the political/powers

Status of the bread –basket of the nation, vise visa

other regions of the country have not been given fair

share in the government. There is also conflict that

results from the argument that the federal

Government, the oil majors and the Nigerian Elites

have got rich and fat on the petrol-dollars from the

Niger Delta whilst the indigenes live in abject

poverty; that the oil revenue has been used by

Nigerian State to develop other parts of the country

at the expense of the Niger Delta; that some States

in Nigeria are enjoying more than the people of the

Niger Delta (Iyobhebhe, n.d.). According to Iyobhebhe

(n.d.) as well as many other literatures, the people

of Niger Delta argue that during the first Republic

25

when agriculture was the main stay of the economy of

Nigeria, derivation was on a 50-50 basis between the

Regions and the Centre. They would like to see the

same derivation principle for oil revenue today.

Iyobhebhe (n.d) contains that, the political leaders

class in the Niger Delta argue that if the Nigerian

state does not agree to a just and fair settlement

for the Niger Delta, that the militants will continue

to get stronger and may one day challenge the

sovereignty of the Nigerian State in the region. He

goes on that, the people also want to know what

happened to the billions of dollars derived from oil

in the Niger Delta.

Iyobhebhe (n.d.) concludes that there is no doubt

that resource control is a major political issue for

the Nigerian state and will continue to be so for a

long time to come. Orji and Jaja (2007) input that

the change in sharing formula that did not favour the

26

oil producing areas based on derivation as it used to

be in the time of agriculture and solid mineral

resulted to conflicts and discordant voices and the

then Bendel State took the Federal Government to

court and won. Irrespective of that verdict, the

Federal Account Act of 1981 only revised version of

the nullified Act was passed into law which came into

law in 1982. This Act gave Federal Government 55%,

states 35% Local Government 10%. In 1984, only 2% was

to be paid to mineral producing Areas, while 1.5% was

to be used for the development of oil producing

Areas. There were a lot of pressures until the 13%

derivation to oil producing Areas was made a law

(Orji and Jaja, 2007).

Still there are growing agitations and violent

reaction from the people of Niger delta for what they

consider an injustice matted on them by the other

people of Nigeria. The conflict had reached alarming

27

proportion. The militant became restive. Orji and

Jaja (2007) observe that the militants groups have

gone as far as holding hostages of some expatriate

staff working for multi-national companies. Delegates

from Niger delta demanded for 100% control to remit

tax to the federal Government.

According to Orji and Jaja (2007), the political

Reform conference rejects the 100% agitation on the

ground that it was outrageous, but recommended 17%

which could not make for environmental degradation

and neglects, the scourge of wasted gas, absentee

landlordism, and environmental devastation,

unemployment, lack or poor infrastructure, etc.

Ako (2012) argues that the introduction of

Federalism into resource control debate contributes

to the misunderstanding the resource control debate.

Ako (2012) posits that the Governors of the Southern

States in Nigeria also refer to this notion as ‘true

28

federalism’ in the discourse of resource control. For

Ako (2012) the Southern Governors do so to promote

their agenda that States ought to control their

resources and contribute (usually smaller percentage

of such revenues) to the federal coffers. Ako prefers

the Southern demand to be called fiscal federalism,

wherein the federating units own and manage their

resources and revenues but make a contribution to the

central government to fund federal responsibilities.

Ako (2012) also takes a different stand that “it

should be noted though that fiscal federation might

also be an arrangement where by the central

government generates most revenues and shares such

revenue with other strata of government. Ako appears

to know more than others. A mere look at Ako (2012)

assertion tells any reader that Ako is among the

antagonists of resource control, and that Ako is not

from oil-producing region. Ako (2012) again puts

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forward that “A fourth category of resource control-

the ‘local variant’-ought to be recognized in

addition to the three broad conceptions highlighted.

Local resource control simply refers to availing the

inhabitants of the Niger Delta region the

opportunities to enjoy access to the environmental

resources and benefits of their ancestral land. The

relevance and importance of this fourth conception is

borne out of the failures of the political class and

militants alike to make any palpable positive changes

to the lives of the ordinary Niger Delta citizens

they claim to represent.” Ako (2012) goes on that the

Niger Deltas are from history known for resource

control agitation, which according to Ako started

with oil palm after slave trade abolition. Probably,

Ako does not see the agitation as a worthy course.

2.1.3 The Politics of Resource Control in Nigeria.

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It has been generally agreed among those

agitating for resource control and their sympathizers

that there is politics in resource control in

Nigeria. The proponents see it as a political play by

the majority ethnic group to deprive them of their

right of resources, which their environment is fasthy

being degraded on a daily basis.

Iyobhebhe (n.d.) observes that, the current

position of the anti resource control is that all oil

discovered on an off shore belongs to the Nigerian

State. These group maintain that, all receipts are

due to the federal Government and the FG has a

constitutional duty to remit 13% of the revenues back

to the source of its derivation in the Niger delta.

Iyobhebhe (n.d.) sees this as political, because, in

the past as he posits, before oil became the main

source of national sustenance the Nigerian

arrangement was based on a 50-50 derivation between

31

the Regions and the centre. Iyobhebhe (n.d.) points

that it is political not a just position of the non-

oil producing States. According to Iyobhebhe (n.d.)

the non-oil producing States, know that Nigeria is

totally dependent on the Niger Delta oil for

survival, and all the states survive on the monthly

pay cheque or allocation received from the Federation

Account at the centre which without it, they cannot

pay salaries, they cannot run schools, the cannot

build roads, they can’t do nothing politic against

resource control.

Iyobhebhe (n.d.) asserts that the political-

economic consequences of under development in Nigeria

leading to resource control agitation has given birth

to political agitations, campaigner, gangsters,

protectionism, racketeering, lobbyists and outright

stealing of crude oil (a.k.a oil bunkering) .As

maintained by Iyobhebhe (n.d.) the problems of the

32

Niger Delta under development, poverty and

environmental degradation has given rise to various

resource control Groups. According to him some of

those movements are genuine campaigners for a better

life future; other simply saw it as an opportunity

for political relevance over a very sensitive and

important national and local issue. The third group

of economic opportunists and contractors still linked

to politics saw it as their meal ticket out of the

poverty of Nigeria or as an opportunity to amass even

more wealth than they had already by acting as meddle

men, contractors, suppliers, facilitators and peace

brokers between the FGN, Oil companies and the

militant wing of the movement threatening to hold the

oil companies to ransom and consequently the daily

bread of the entire Nigerian nation.

According to Iyobhebhe (n.d.) argument, the

political wing of the campaign against resource

33

control has clear political objectives in mind and

understand that the entire issue could not be

separated from vexed question of the nature of the

Nigerian State and the division or allocation or

perceived hijacking of political/economic power by a

certain group of people in the country to the

exclusion. Iyobhebhe (n.d.) acknowledges that the

established political group is the dominant group

today in the resource control debate. They are

established people and have no interest whatsoever in

wrecking the Nigerian State as they have been

beneficiaries of Nigeria. The political groups from

the Niger Delta region have achieved great and

reasonable level of “Success” for the resource

control cause. “Their relationship with the Federal

Government has been “fruitful” to their cause and to

them personally. Most of the leading figures have

enjoyed Federal Government patronage as Ministers,

34

State Civil Service posts, leadership role in the

educational and health sectors and as contractors to

the federal Government and its institution”

(Iyobhebhe, n.d.).

Looking at the political economy of resource

control, Orji and Jaja (2007) look at the

justification from historical perspective. According

to them, the fulcrum of the core issue involved in

revenue allocation was laid in the evolution of

Nigeria as a nation after the amalgamation of 1914.

The 1914 phase of amalgamation was more economic than

political. Through this convenient arrangement, the

wealthier Southern Nigeria relieved the colonial

government of the financial burden of administering a

less economically viable Northern Nigeria. In this

fact lies the genesis of all the unwholesome

imbalances that have characterized Federalism in what

later came to be known as independent Nigeria (Orji

35

and Jaja, 2007). Orji and Jaja (2007) observe that

the colonial administration addressed the issue of

revenue generation and allocation in the Richard

constitution of 1946 which tended to grant some level

of autonomy to the regions. The revenue was shared

thus: northern region, 46%, western region 30%,

Eastern region 24%, in 1951, the critical factors of

independent revenue, derivation, needs and national

autonomy or common national interest were applied in

the allocation of resources (Orji and Jaja, 2007).

The raison d’ etre for employment such an allocation

was to ensure that the region were independent to a

large extent and to encourage fiscal responsibility

(orji and Jaja, 2007).

Orji and Jaja (2007) assert that when cocoa was

the mainstay of the economy and chief Obafemi

Awolowo, the former premier of western region

championed the course of derivation principle, in

36

revenue allocation, the Western got as much as N53

million, the North received N24 million based on

cotton, groundnut, hides and skins with the Eastern

region receiving n16million based on palm kernel and

timber, while the Federal Government got N7million.

As the derivation favoured the West, Awolowo had

enough money to organize his politic and eventually

the Action Group (AC) won Seventeen seats in the 1954

election (Orji and Jaja, 2007). The West had enough

to provide free education and built the first ever

television station in Africa at Ibadan, establishment

of Cocoa House, and infrastructural facilities (Orji

and Jaja, 2007).

The politics of resource control and revenue

sharing goes on and on. Orji and Jaja (2007) note

that the 1963 midwifed some administrative changes as

the federal Government in 1964, appointed Mr. J. K

Binns as the sole Commissioner to design anew revenue

37

allocation formula that would draw inspiration from

the new constitution. They observe that the

commission did not favour the principle of derivation

rather opted for the financial comparability mode

which provided that the region retained a share of

50% mining rents and loyalties, the Federal

Government 15% with distributable Pool Account

increased to 35%. The new formula of financial

comparability allocated to the North 42%, the West

20%, the East 30, the mid-West 8%, it was based on

the principle of “need and even development” (Orji

and Jaja, 2007).

Orji and Jaja (2007) observe that during the time

of oil, the revenue formula changed. It became a 50-

50 affair to all the State. Federal government

carried 53%, State 30%, Local Government 10%, and 7%

for reserve as special fund. This was followed by 55%

for the Federal Government, 43.5% for State

38

government 8%for local government, 43.5% for State

government 8% for local government and 2.5% for the

development of F.C.T (Orji and Jaja, 2007).

Okpi (in punch, march 4, 2012) like other

supporters of resource control asserts that before

independence, different region in Nigeria clamoured

for their control of the natural resources in their

territory or certain percentages of the revenue

generated from certain percentages of the revenue

generated from exploitation of such resources as

statutory allocation. Okpi (2012) argues that

agitation for resource control, which has been one of

the most crucial aspects of national conferences

constitutional amendments and discourages of national

unity, is presently rousing the polity in a fierce

debate particularly between leaders of the North and

oil producing states of the south. The north

maintains that the sharing formula is imbalance,

39

while the South says they are “the goose that lay the

golden egg” (Okpi, 2012). The punch (2012, March, 4)

also points out that, in the first republic (1963 to

66) where there was no oil the revenue of the country

was distributed based on derivation principle.

According to the report, fifty percent from the

mineral resource was given to the region from where

the minerals were extracted. Then 30 percent was put

into a distributable pool which was divided among all

the regions, including the producing region while the

remaining 20 percent went to the Federal Government.

But the formula changed when oil became Nigeria’s

main source of revenue. According to Igbuzor’s paper

(in punch, March 4, 2012) national revenue derivation

and allocation went from 50 percent for the producing

states and 50 percent for the federal government

between 1967 and 1969 to 45 percent for producing

40

State and 55 percent for the Federal Government

between 1969 and 1971.

After a slight variation between 1971 and 1975,

the derivation of oil producing states dropped to 20

minus offshore proceeds, while the federal Government

had 80 percent plus offshore proceeds between 1975

and 1979. Between 1979 and 1981, oil producing States

got no derivation. All oil proceeds went to the

Federal Government. Then between 1982 and 1972, oil

states derived one and a half percent of the revenue

from oil, while the Federal Government had 98 and a

half percent (punch, March 4, 2012). Okpi (in punch,

March 4, 2012) suggests that, probably, in response

to the agitation for more resource to tackle the

gross environmental degradation, which had been the

consequence of the oil exploitation in the Niger

Delta, the then military government raised the

41

derivation of the oil states to3 percent in 1992 and

to 13 percent in 1999.

The question that comes to ones mind is that why

the derivation formula should change the turn of oil.

In his analysis professor Itse Sagay (in punch 4th

march, 2012) argues that the reduction of the

derivation of producing states was mainly because

Niger Delta ethnic groups were in minority, while the

majority ethnic groups controlled the federal

Government. The lawyer further asserted that in 1960,

there were no petroleum resources of any

significance. That the main income earning exports

were Cocoa (Yoruba West); groundnuts, Cotton and

hides and Skin (Hausa/Fulani); and palm oil (Igbo

East); therefore it was convenient for these majority

groups usually in control of the Federal Government

to emphasis derivation, hence its strong showing in

the 1960 and 63 constitutions (punch, March 4, 2012).

42

From his analysis, it means the issue of resource

control in Nigeria has great political undertone.

The professional lawyer, professor Itse Sagay (in

punch, march 4, 2012) posits that by 197 and

certainly by 1969 petroleum particularly the mineral

oil, was becoming the major resource in terms of

total income and foreign exchange earning in the

country; it was therefore not difficult for the

majority groups (in the Federal Government) to reduce

the revenue allocation with regard to petroleum

resources. According to him, they were in control of

the Federal Government and therefore in the control

of the mineral resources. He maintains that, that

means the resources of the Niger Delta were being

transferred to the majority group in control for the

Federal Government at any point in time (Punch, March

4, 2012).

43

Sagay (in Punch, March 4, 2012) laments that,

instead of establishing true fiscal Federalism, in

which the Federating units would develop the natural

resources in their territories, and pay royalties to

the central government, the political class has been

satisfied with practicing unitary government, which

concentrate power and resources at the centre.

In his own observation from comments from

University dons and politicians, Awoyinfa (2013) put

forward the position of Professor Olusoga Safola, who

according to him frawned at state creation, rather

supported resource control. According to Awoyinfa,

(2013) Sofola favoured regional government that would

allow federating units control the resources in their

domain. Egom (2008) views resource control from

ethnical, micro-economic and the political dimension

of the concept of resource control urges us Nigeria

to say whether it is the Oligocentric and outward-

44

looking or the polycentric and inward-looking price

power us to distribute work and its rewards evenly

among all of us Nigerians. The view of Egom is not

clear. One cannot actually see the position of Egom

on the issue of resource control. Adisa (2012) in his

publication on “resource Control, Derivation: A

Blessing or Curse?” also recognizes the politics in

resource control as he argues that in the past the

majority ethnic groups were in control of their

natural resources and agricultural produce. He also

points out that, the agitation culminated from the

response to the growing unease in the Niger Delta

over environmental degradation amidst plenty of

resources being drained from the area. He adds that

it was a partial response to the growing militancy in

the area.

The Northern region’s claim of sustaining the

south during colonial era has been seriously

45

disproved by political economist who claims all the

claims of the north were fallacy. Ochonu (n.d.)

refers to the northern claim and position on resource

control as “Northern Arrogance and Historical

Distortion”. According to Ochonu (n.d.), the history

that the north was distorted shows that the southern

economy was the one sustaining the north as the

agricultural products of the South commanded world

market than that of the north. He also argues that

the agricultural production of the north was

restricted by weather condition. Ochonu (n.d.) posits

that if the oil in the south was to be in the north,

they would not have allowed it to be taken over by

the federal government. He points that the north

received several grants and emergency funds from

revenue pools which originated largely from the more

expensive agricultural exports of the South-Cocoa,

timber, rubber, palm product and from customs and

46

excise receipts collected on Southern coasts. He

reiterated that the agricultural resources of the

South commanded higher price in the world produce

market than those of the North. The North’s range of

agricultural resources was narrower, owing to its

ecological realities. The North was also more

susceptible to crop failures, droughts, and reduced

harvests than was the South. Thus in the largely

agricultural colonial economy of Nigeria, the South

naturally provided the bulk of the colonial State’s

revenue (Ochonu n.d.).

2.1.4 Legality of Resource Control

The issue of legality in resource control in

Nigeria has become a contextual issue. Actually,

there has been series of argument on whether it is a

legal thing for a region to control its resources or

not.

47

Cotula (2007) asserts that where there is no

legal empowerment or where it is weakened, investment

project may undermine the ability of local groups to

access the resources on which they depend. According

to Cotula (2007) this may take the form of

expropriation or otherwise loss of resource access

without adequate compensation; or of environmental

degradation such as the pollution of water and other

resources essential to the local population. Weakened

of local resource right may also undermine the

position of local resource users in their

negotiations with incoming investors, and therefore,

limit their ability to benefit from investment

project through negotiated benefit-sharing

arrangements (Cotula, 2007). Cotula (2007) accesses

the situation of Africa, insinuates that, in much of

Africa the law-whether national or international

tends to provide greater protection to the legal

48

entitlement of foreign investors than to those local

resource users. This reinforces powers as asymmetries

and increases the vulnerability of local resources

right (Cotula, 2007). No wander Cotula figures that

law, like spider’s web, catches the flies and let the

hawks go free.

Cotula (2007) says that legal empowerment can

increase local resource control. Is that then the

case with the Nigerian Niger Delta? Should one

appropriately say when the hawk was in possession of

resource, the spider’s web could not catch it, but

now that the flies (South) is in possession, the

spider’s web (the Nigerian law) gets hold of it?

Cotula (2007) maintains that appropriate legal

arrangements and adequate capacity to use them can

help local resource user in Africa have greater

control over the natural resources on which they

depend. Cotula (2007) defines legal empowerment as

49

the legal processes to improve disadvantaged

populations control over their lives. He further

asserts that, legal empowerment to increase resource

control requires actions at different levels,

including:- Law reform to establish or sharpen

arrangement (‘legal tools’) that strengthen the

protection of local resource right, or that provide

greater say in decision-making process affecting

these rights;- strategies, approaches and support

materials to help local group make the most of the

opportunities offered by the law (‘Para-legal

tools’), including legal literacy training, legal

assistance, individual and public interests

litigation, and representation and advocacy.

Dafinone (2001) in his own part looks at the

legality of resource control from the natural law

which says rent of usage of land should be paid to

the owner of land. Quoting Adam Smith says that

50

resource control is a basic economic that says land,

labour, capital and entrepreneur are factors of

production. According to Dafinone (2001), just as the

price of labour is wages, capital has interest;

entrepreneurship is driven by profit, while rent and

royalties are rewards for land ownership. He argues

that, the continental shelf belongs to the ethnic

nationalities adjoining it, and if section 3 of the

1999 constitution is construed in accordance with the

spirit upon which it was framed as the Federal

Government has no land except the Federal Capital

Territory. Dafinone (2001) argues further that, the

land Act of 1978 does not vest the land on the

Federal, State and indeed the “Section 3 of the 1999

constitution recognized 36 States, and the Federal

Capital Territory. There is no-where the Federal

Government is said to own the land. In States land is

vested on Government to hold in trust for the people,

51

and in the local Government, to the chairman and the

Traditional Rulers, also to hold in trust for the

people. But when land is occupied before the Decree

came into effect, the land is vested on the owners

because they have the statutory right of occupancy”.

He also argues that the section 3 of the 1999

constitution does not say that the rent (13%) should

be paid to the State, rather it should be paid to the

Local people whose land is being degraded, polluted

and whose means of livelihood is destroyed. Grandiose

Parlor (2005) maintains that refusing the minorities

Niger Deltas the right to control their resources is

injustice. That implies that that resource control

agitation is legal and just.

Ikpang (n.d.) in his legal chasm between resource

control and the determination of the Seaward

Boundaries of the littoral state in Nigeria asserts

that, the apportioning of the territorial sea to the

52

coastal state is automatic because according to

McNair J.: “To every state whose land is at any place

washed by sea, international law attaches a

corresponding portion of maritime territory…

(Territorial waters). The possession of this

territory is not optional, not dependent on the will

of the State, but compulsory”. Ikpang (n.d.) making

inference from McNair J. input that, “Thus every

coastal state, in this context, Nigeria, possesses a

terrestrial sea or internal waters to a maximum of

12-miles from the low-water mark (baseline). The

internal water consist of waters to the landward side

of the territorial sea baseline or straight baseline

and include harbours, ports, rivers, lake, Canals

closed-in bays, gulfs and waters enclosed by

archipelagic Islands …” What Ikpang (n.d.) is

positing is that the state has a legal right to

control any resource (especially oil) found around

53

this area. Using America as an illustration, Ikpang

(n.d.) maintains that in Federalism, the federating

units (States) control resources found and explored

in their regions.

Anam-Ndun (2007) explores all the constitutional

provisions before independent and observes that they

provided right for federating units or regions to

control their resources and then remitted some

percentages to the Federal or central government.

According to Anam-Ndun (2007) the issue of ownership

of mineral is traceable to colonial times when the

colonial administration, acting under the mandate of

British imperial interest appropriated by law,

territories, including natural resources that were

not their own, as the property of the British crown.

But “during the making of the 1960 constitution,

provided in section 134 (6) that ‘for the purpose of

this section, the continental shelf or a region shall

54

be deemed to be part of that Region’. This provision

was repeated in section 140 of the Republican, 1963.

He noted that 50% was for the regions while 50% was

pooled for allocation at the federal level. Anam-Ndun

(2007) sees the court failure to play a mediatory

role in the matter of resource control as a betrayal

and more of political actor than an independent

judge.

Ako (2012) though observes that the constitution

does not permit regional resource control, calls for

reforms in the law to favour land use, oil

operations, oil-related compensation, access to

information, participation in decision making and

access to justice in environmental matters. According

to his assertion, the amendment of these laws will

avail local communities the opportunity to

participate in decision-making process concerning

their land and natural resources while providing

55

access to legal avenues to resolve. Matters

militancy. Ako (2012) posits that local resource

control is the most practicable at this time in the

country’s history.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

2.2.1 The Theory of Accountability (King, 2009)

The theory of accountability is proposed by Henry

King. King’s theory of accountability assumes that

(1) no government can be accountable unless the

people demand it (2) The people will not demand

accountability and probity unless their taxes almost

solely pay for running of the government. (3) No

representation without taxation. Henry further

assumes that (4) Resource control will help curb

corruption at every level of government. (5) At the

centre, with greatly reduced income, profligacy is

bound to fall (6) At the state and local government

56

levels, one people come to realize that the people

are being called from their local capitals, which are

accessible. Rather than Abuja, which is not? They are

bound to impose themselves, eventually. (7) King

strongly assumes that resource control will

accelerated the process of development, by forcing

the states and local government with allocations from

the centre greatly reduced or non-existent, to

develop the resources within their jurisdiction in

other to survive.

According to kings (2009) every state has given

the motivation to explore their riches. King (2009)

posits that the need to survive, in the face of

limited or zero allocation would prove ample

incentive. King (2009) believes that the argument

that these communities cannot manage their resource,

because of the performance of certain elected

official is spurious.

57

2.2.2 Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffe and

Salancik, 1978).

The proponents of Resource Dependence Theory are

Pfeffe and Salancik in 1978. This theory utilized the

previous environment literature to develop resource

dependence theory resource dependence theory is based

on the notion that environments are the source of

scarce resources and organizations are dependent on

these finite resources for survival. The theory is

assumption that, the lack of control over these

resources thus acts to create environment.

According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) the

element structural characteristics of environmental

are concentration, the extent to which power and

authority in the environment are widely dispersed;

munificence, or the availability or scarcity of

critical resources; and interconnectedness, the

58

number and pattern of linkages, or connections, among

organization. This structural characteristic,

according to El-Nadi (n.d.) in turn, determine the

relationships among social actors-specifically, the

degree of conflict and interdependence present in the

social system. Conflict and interdependence, in turn,

determine the uncertainly the organization confronts

(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).

Pfeffer and Salancik determined three factors

that influenced the level of dependence organizations

had on particular resources. First, the overall

importance of the resource to the firm was critical

in determining the resource dependence of the firm.

Second, the scarcity of the resource was also a

factor. The scarcer a resource was the more dependent

the firm became. Finally another factor influencing

resources dependence was the competition between

organizations for control of that resource. Together,

59

all these three factors acted to influence the level

of dependence that an organization had for a

particular resource.

Resource dependence theory also inferred that a

firm’s strategic options were determined to a great

extent by the environment (El-Nadi, n.d.). Since

firms were dependent on the environment for

resources, they needed to enact Strategies that would

allow them to acquire these resources. Therefore, the

external environment had already been little

strategic choice (El-Nadi, n.d.).

This theory is relevant in the study of the issue

of resource control. This is because the scarcity of

resource (Crude oil), which makes it only limited to

the Niger delta region of the country, has created

uncertainly in the nation between different ethnic

groups, the “Government” and the people the resource

are found in their domain. The uncertainly has

60

resulted to a lot of conflict. The over dependence on

just oil in Nigeria has aggravated a lot of

uncertainly and conflict.

The theory also posits that since the resource is

source where this scarce resource is determined, the

organization (host communities) need to determine

strategies on how the resources are acquired-hence

the agitation for resource control in order for

proper management to avoid over exploitation,

environmental degradation, and exhaustibility.

61

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section of the research presented the

method/design employed for the study and the

processes of data collection and analysis. The

chapter is discussed under the following subheadings:

Research Design

Study Area

Population of Study

The Sample

Sampling Technique

Sources of Data

Data Collection Procedure

Instrument for Data Collection

Technique for Data Analysis

3.1 Research Design

The design adopted for this study is the survey

research design. Survey research design is used to

62

describe or predict phenomena based on their result.

A survey design is a kind of ex-post facto design

which is a study designed to determine what the

preexisting causal condition are between groups. It

also requires some interactions with the respondents.

A survey research is a method of collecting

information by asking questions. Sometimes interviews

are done face-to face with people, observation, or

data are gathered through the use of questionnaire.

In this research, the researcher adopted both

qualitative and quantitative research method and

design. Quantitative approaches to data collection

usually involve direct interaction with individuals

on a one to one base or in a group setting. The study

also used documentary studies, where the information

were gather in the form of words, descriptive,

narrative and documentary studies of official

documents, library materials, internet (websites),

63

etc. Individual interviews, focus group discussion

and personal observation were also involved.

The quantitative method was used to gather

information through the use of questionnaire. This

method was used by the researcher to carryout a cross

sectional survey on the issue of resource control in

Nigeria- conflict, politics and legality.

The researcher decided to use both qualitative

and quantitative approaches because of the

limitations faced by both approaches. For instance,

data collection through qualitative approach is rich

and provides deeper insight into phenomena under

study. Example, the use of extensive literature

review provides the researcher deeper insight into

the issue of resource control. Also, the observation

and interview approach gave the researcher

opportunity to probe deeper and understand better the

issue surrounding resource control in Nigeria. The

64

researcher also used quantitative approach because

the qualitative data cannot be analyzed

statistically, and because data from quantitative

studies are often locally based. Both approaches were

used so that both quantitative and qualitative data

methods of data analysis would be used for effective

result.

3.2 The Study Area

The study was carried out in Nigeria, which

served as the universal set and where part of the

qualitative data was generated. The oil producing

States in the Niger Delta form the sub-set of the

universal set. The qualitative data were generated or

gather in the subset (the Niger Delta States).

The former Nigeria Delta of the Niger River is a

very densely populated region sometimes called the

oil Rivers, because it was once a major producer of

65

palm oil. The area was the British oil River

protectorate from 1885 until 1893, when it was

expanded and become the Niger coast protectorate

(Wikipedia, 2013).

The Niger Delta, as now defined officially by the

Nigerian government, extends over about 70,000km2 and

make up 7.5% of Nigeria’s land mass. Historically and

cartographically, it consists of present day Bayelsa,

Delta, and Rivers state. In 2000, however, Obasanjo’s

regime included Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Edo,

Imo and Ondo States in the region (Wikipedia, 2013).

Some 31 million people of more than 40 ethnic groups

including the Bini, Efik, Ibibio, Anang, Oron, Ijaw,

Ilsekiri, Isoko, Urhobo, Ukwani, and Kalabari, are

among the inhabitants in the Niger Delta, speaking

about 250 different dialects.

The research was carried out in Akwa-Ibom,

Bayelsa, Imo, Delta, Edo, and Ondo States. The Delta

66

is an oil-rich region, and has been the centre of

international controvercy over devastating pollution

and ecocide, kleptocracy (notably by Abacha regime),

and human right violations in which Royal Dutch shell

has been implicated (Wikipedia, 2013).

3.3 population of Study

Nigeria has a population of about 160 million

people (2006, national population Census). The Niger

Delta has an estimated population of 31 million

people. For the study the population covers all the

residents of the Area. For the qualitative data, the

population covers all the articles, journals,

Newspapers, periodicals (that is, all the literature)

available on resource control.

3.4 The Sample

67

The sample drawn from the entire population of

study was 300. The sample was drawn mainly from the

population of the six states selected. Fifty

respondents each were selected from each State for

quantitative data and analysis. While the qualitative

sample were the literature drawn out of the available

literature for review and qualitative analysis.

3.5 Sampling Technique

The study adopted purposive sampling technique,

according to Enukoha, Emeh and Umo’Inyang (1995) is

when a researcher purposively selects areas or

elements from a given population, which meet the

criteria he has established. The choice of selecting

depends on the subjective judgment of the researcher.

For instance, the choice of the topic under research

68

was borne out of the subjective judgment of the

researcher.

The number of sample selected was purposive. The

researcher also sample responded believed to be well

vested with information on resource control issue.

The stakeholders/key players and the victims of the

resource control Saga were the respondents selected

out of the subjective judgment of the researcher.

3.6 Sources of Data

The data for this study were derived from two

major sources. The primary and secondary sources of

data were the avenues the researcher used to gather

the data used for the study and analysis. The

researcher used questionnaire, interview, and

observation. The questionnaire was used to gather

primary data. Also, the observation and interview

69

methods gathered primary data that assisted in both

qualitative and quantitative analysis.

The secondary source of data was through the

libraries, internet and personal materials. Journals,

articles, seminar papers, text books, etc were the

main secondary sources of data.

3.7 Data Collection Procedure

The research went to the filed by himself and

gathered information through the use of questionnaire

and interview. The researcher officially informed the

respondents about the purpose of the research and

guided them on how to complete the questionnaire by

himself. The researcher also followed the

questionnaire with interview, and gave opportunity to

the respondents to ask questions concerning the

subject matter. Information provided were recorded

and jotted down by the researcher.

70

For the qualitative data, the researcher went

online, browsed and printed relevant materials for

information, jotted down and photocopied relevant

information that were used in the literature section.

3.8 Instrument for data Collection

Questionnaire and interview method were used to

collect data for the study. The questionnaire

consisted of two sections. Section A gathered

demographic information of respondents, while the

section B elicited information on the issue of

resource control, conflict, politics and legality.

3.9 Data Analysis Techniques

The data were analyzed using Chi-square and

Pearson product-Moment Correlation Co-efficient.

Statistical test instruments Chi-Square is given as:

X2 = (fo -fe)∑ 2, where: fe

71

X2 = Chi-Square

∑ = Summation

FO = Frequency observed

Fe = Frequency expected

2 = Square of fo-fe

While Pearson product-Moment Correlation Co-efficient

is given as:

r2 = N XY –( X) ( Y)∑ ∑ ∑ [N X∑ 2 – ( X)∑ 2]. [N Y∑ 2-( Y)∑ 2]

Where:

r2 = Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Co-efficient

N = Sample population

∑ = Summation

X = Positive response or independent variable

Y = negative response or dependent variable

- = Subtraction

. = Multiplication

72

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSION

Chapter four of the project (thesis) presents the

data derived from the field survey presents and

interprets the result of the hypotheses tested as

well as discussion of the findings.

4.1 Demographic Charatistics of Respondents

Table 4.1 Gender Characteristics of Respondents

Gender Frequency of respondent Percentage Male 217 72.33Female 83 27.67Total 300 100Sources: Field survey, 2012

Table 4.1 above shows that 217, representing

72.33 percent of the sampled respondent were males,

while 83, which represents 27.67 percent of the total

respondents were females.

73

Table 4.2: Age Characteristics of Respondents

Age Frequency of respondent Percentage Below 20 0 020-30 54 1831-40 97 32.3341-50 80 26.6751-60 46 15.3361 and above 23 7.67Total 300 100Source: Filed Survey, 2012

Table 4.2 above shows that 54 (18 percent) of the

total sample respondents were between the age of 20

to 30. The table indicates that 97 (32.33 percent)

were under the ages of 31 to 40. The table also

represents that 80 (26.67 percent) of the respondents

were between the ages of 41 to 50. the table

indicates also that 46 (15.33 percent) of the

respondents fell under the ages of 51 to 60, while

those above 60 years or from 61 years and above were

74

23 (7.67 percent). The table shows that in respondent

was below the ages of 20 years.

Table 4.3 Educational Characteristics of Respondents

Level of Education Frequency of

respondent

Percentag

e No Formal

education

0 0

Primary Education 0 0Secondary

Education

15 5

OND and Equivalent 38 12.67Bsc and Equivalent 102 34Msc 64 21.33PHD 81 27Others 0 0Total 300 100Source: Field Survey, 2012

The educational distribution table 4.3 shows that

none of the respondent had below secondary education.

75

The table shows that 15 (5 percent) of the

respondents had secondary education qualification. 38

(12.67 percent) of the respondents had either OND or

its equivalent. 102 (24 percent) respondents out of

300 (100 percent) were degree holders, or its

equivalent. The respondents that had Msc and its

equivalent were 64 (21.33 percent). 81 (27 percent)

of the sample respondents were OHD holders.

Table 4.4 Occupation Distribution of Respondents

Occupation Frequency ofrespondent

Percentage

Farmer 51 17Trader 29 9.67Student 10 3.33Civil servant 20 6.67Lecturer 42 14Politician 21 7Unemployed 127 42.33Others 0 0Total 300 100Source: Field Survey, 2012

76

Occupation distribution table 4.4 above indicate

that farmer were 51 (17 percent) among the total

respondents of 300. the table shows that traders were

29 (9.67 percent). Student as shown on the table were

10 (3.33 percent). The table shows that civil servant

were 20 (6.67 percent). As indicated on the table

above, 42 (14 percent) of the respondents were

lecturers. The table shows that 21 (7 percent) of the

total sample were politicians. As shown on table 4.4

127 (42.33 percent) of the respondents were

unemployed. That means that only 62 (20.67 percent)

were employed properly by the government. These class

of people or respondents were the civil servants and

lecturers in the tertiary institutions in the study

area. 80 (26.67 percent) were on their own. These

group, mostly farmers were mostly subsistent farmers.

Adding the number of petty traders and farmers with

77

the unemployed, the number is over 200 (70 percent)

out of the 300 sampled.

4.2 Data presentation and Analysis

Table 4.5: Statistic of Respondent Views on Conflict

Issue in Resource Control

Variables

Samplesize

Actual Response Grand %

SA A Total % D SD Total

%

Q1 300 166 107 273 91 20 7 27 9 100Q2 300 84 136 220 73.3

352 28 80 26.6

7100

Q3 300 149 113 262 87.33

30 8 38 12.67

100

Q4 300 110 127 282 94 18 0 18 6 100Q5 300 68 151 219 73 81 0 12 27 100Q6 300 204 84 288 96 4 8 84 4 100Q7 300 49 167 216 72 60 24 15 28 100Q8 300 111 174 285 95 15 0 99 5 100Q9 300 160 41 201 67 59 40 33 100Grand 2700 1101 1145 2246 748.

7339 11

5454 151.

33900

Source: Field Survey, 2012

78

Table 4.6: Statistics of Response on Politics of

Resource Control

Variable

Samplesize

Actual Response Grand %

SA A Total

% D SD Total

%

Q10 300 119 93 212 70.67

66 22 88 29.33

100

11 300 120 108

228 76 57 15 72 24 100

12 300 47 145

192 64 72 36 108 36 100

Total 900 286 346

632 210.67

195 73 268 89.33

300

Source: Field Survey, 2012

Table 4.6: Statistics of Response on Legality of Resource

Control

Variable

Samplesize

Actual Response Grand %

SA A Total

% D SD Total

%

Q13 300 206 78 284 94.67

14 2 16 5.33 100

14 300 98 124

232 74 70 8 78 26 100

15 300 127 66 193 64.33

48 59 97 35.67

100

16 300 75 120

195 65 70 35 105 35 100

Total 1200 506 388

894 298 202 104 306 102 400

Source: Field Survey, 2012

79

The table 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 above show the sample

size actual responses on strongly agree, agree,

disagree and strongly disagree on the variables on

the situations highlighted in the questionnaire. The

questionnaire is shown on the appendix.

4.3 Testing and Interpretation of the Hypotheses

The result of the hypotheses formulated for the

study is presented as analyzed in this section.

Hypothesis 1

Ho: There is no significant association between

resource control and conflict in Niger Delta Region

Hi: There is significant association between resource

control and conflict in Niger Delta region.

This hypothesis is tested with Chi-square

statistics test instrument. The researcher utilized

questionnaire items 4 to 9 in testing the hypothesis.

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Table 4.8: Chi-square Statistical Analysis Result for

Resource Control and Conflict in Niger Delta

Fo Fe Fo-Fe (Fo-Fe)2

(Fo-Fe)2/Fe

110 117 -7 490.42172 131.5 40.5 1640.2512.4718 39.5 -21.5 462.2511.700 12 -12 1441268 117 -49 240120.52151 131.5 19.5 380.252.8981 39.5 41.5 1722.2543.600 12 -12 14412204 117 87 756964.6984 131.5 -47.5 2256.25

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17.164 39.5 -35.5 1260.2531.918 12 -4 161.3349 117 -68 4,62439.52167 131.5 35.5 1260.259.5860 39.5 20.5 420.2510.6424 12 12 14412111 117 -6 360.31174 131.5 42.5 1806.2513.7415 39.5 -24.5 600.2515.200 12 -12 14412160 117 43 184915.8041 131.5 -90.5 8190.2562.2859 39.5 19.5 380.259.6340 12 28 78465.33

Total497.02 n =300X2 =497.02DF =(r - 1) (c - 1)DF = 4-1 x 6-1DF =3 x 5 DF =15

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Table value =25

Decision: Before we decide whether or not the

response frequencies among the respondents is

significant or not, there is a “rule of the thumb we

need to recite. “If the critical value under the

relevant level of significance is greater than the

calculated value of X2, the relationship is not

significant at that particular level” (Odu and

Ihejiamaizu, 2001).

In our case above, 25 is require for significance

at 0.05 level; and our calculated value of X2 is

497.02, which is greater than the critical value of

25. In that case, our decision is to reject the null

hypothesis (Ho) and accept the alternative hypothesis

(Hi). Therefore we reject the Ho, which stated that

there is no significant association between resource

control and conflict in Niger Delta region, and

accept the Hi and conclude that, there is significant

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association between resource control and conflict in

the Nigerian Niger delta region.

Hypothesis II

Ho: There is no politics in resource control in

Nigeria.

Hi: there is politics in resource control in Nigeria.

This hypothesis analyzed by employing Pearson

product-Moment Correlation Co-efficient.

Table 4.9: Pearson product-Moment Correlation Co-

efficient analysis for Resource Control and Politics

in Nigeria N =300

Variable X Y X2 Y2 XY r-∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑

cal r-crit Resource

control X

Politics

632 133792

55808

1 0.139

268 24592Significant at 0.05; df =n -2 =298

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Critical =0.139.

Decision: reject Ho and accept Hi if the calculated

value is greater than the critical value, and accept

Ho and reject Hi if the calculated value is less than

the critical.

The result of the analysis as shown on table 4.9

revealed that the calculated r-value of 1 (one) is

greater than the critical value of 0.139 at 0.05

level of significant under 298 degree of freedom.

Therefore, the result of the analysis is significant.

Since the calculated value is greater than the

critical value, we reject the null hypothesis (Ho)

which stated that there is no politics in resource

control in Nigeria and accept the alternative

hypothesis (Hi), which stated that, there is politics

in resource control in Nigeria.

Hypothesis III

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Ho: There is no legality in resource control in

Nigeria

Hi: There is legality in resource control in Nigeria

Pearson product-moment Correlation Co-efficient

Analysis was employed in testing the hypothesis

Table 4.10: Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Co-

efficient Analysis for resource control and legality

N =300

Variable X Y X∑ ∑ ∑ 2 Y∑ 2 XY r-∑cal r-crit

Resourcecontrol X

894 205214 610560.82 0.139

LegalityY

306 26774

Significant at 0.05; Df =300 – 2 = 298

The analysis as shown on table 4.11 above reveals

that the calculated r-value is 0.82; while its

critical value is 0.139. Following the rule, we

reject the null hypothesis, which stated that there

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is no legality in resource control in Nigeria and

accept the alternative hypothesis and conclude that,

there is legality in resource control.

The analysis is therefore significant it means

that 82 percent of the behaviour of Y is determined

by X.

4.4 Discussion of Findings

The discussion is done on the basis of the field

work survey and the data analyzed, and supported by

literature in chapter two. The study was done both

qualitative and quantitative; so the discussion is

done in the same manner.

In the qualitative study, several findings have

made. These findings are not different from the ones

gotten from the quantitative study and analysis. From

the observation and interview, the Niger delta region

of Nigeria where bulk of national income is derived

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from is in a pitiable condition. The majority of the

people live in abject poverty. Human being live in

slums made up of thatches, and is beaten by heavy

rainfall. There are no accessed roads, and other

infrastructures are in short supply; in some extreme

cases, they are in none existing. The physical

environment has been seriously degraded and pollution

is rapidly increasing. The formal agricultural land no

longer grows or sustains crop growth. The finishing

occupation has been hampered as the water body has

been contaminated with pollutants form oil spillage

and other oil production activities.

The unemployment rate in the region has reached

an alarming rate. This is one of the reasons for the

carrying of arms and militant activities in the area.

As the environment is polluted and degraded, and as

agricultural and farming activities are no more

encouraging, everybody depends on the government and

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others alternative means of living. The people then

went to control their land and resource since the

government of Nigeria is that is in charge of the

resources does not live up to the expectation of the

people. Some of the people interviewed alleged that

resource control in Nigeria was in existence, even

before the independence. They side that when the three

major region-the Yoruba, Hausa, and Ibo were in

control of resources (agricultural specifically) they

were controlling their resources then remitting some

percentage in form of tax to the Federal Government.

They also side that, there were times that, it was

divided 50-50 between the region and the centre, but

when it comes to the turn of the minorities, it was

either zero derivation, or 2 percent and now 13

percent after series of conflicts. The respondents

side the oil in their right that they have the right

to control it.

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Kings (2009) says resource control is the control

and management of resources by State or Local

Governments from whose jurisdictions the resources are

controlled. Dafinone (2011) says it is the practice of

true federalism, and natural law. Grandiosepalor

(2005) calls it equity in resource allocation,

exploitation and utilization. Iyobhebhe (n.d.) argue

that the Niger Delta should have a greater share of

the revenue from oil which gives Nigeria over 95

percent of its foreign exchange. Iyobhebhe, (n.d.)

Orji and Jaja (2007) say the conflict in Niger Delta

is as a result of unfair sharing of revenue like it

was in the days of agriculture and solid mineral.

Iyobhebhe (n.d.), Orji and Jaja (2007), Okpi (2012),

Professor Itse Saga (in punch, 4th April, 2012), Egom

(2008), Adisa (2012), Awoyinfa (2013), and Ochanu

(n.d.) see resource control in Nigeria as a political

90

because the major ethnic groups and States that are

not producing oil are against resource control.

On the legality of resource control, Dafinone

(2001) says naturally it is the right of the Niger

Delta to control their oil resources. He also posts

that the 1999 constitution does not recognize the

federal government to own any land, rather it is the

States and Local Government. He also argues that the

1978 Land Act does not vest the land on the Federal,

State, and indeed the Local Government. Dafinone

(2001) says the only land the federal Government has

is the federal Capital Territory. Grandiose Parlor

(2005) says it is an injustice refusing the minorities

of Niger delta right to control their resources. It is

also found that, international law permits a state to

control a land within 12 miles from the low-water

mark. It is discovered that in Federalism, the

federating units control their resources on their land

91

(Kpang, n.d.). The right to control resource is traced

back to the colonial days (Anan-Ndun, 2007).

The quantitative data were analyzed using Chi-

square, and Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Co-

efficient statistical test tools at 0.05 levels of

significance. Hypothesis one stated that there is no

significant association between resource control and

conflict in Nigeria Niger Delta region. The hypothesis

was tested with Chi-square statistics instrument. The

result of the analysis revealed that there is

significant association between resource control and

conflict in the Nigerian Niger Delta region. This

finding is in agreement with Iyobhebhe (n.d.) who

accounts that the people of Niger delta feel that

because the oil from which Nigeria gets 95 percent of

her foreign exchange while they are impoverished is

located on their land, the should have a greater share

from the proceeds of oil sales for the development of

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the Niger Delta Iyobhebhe (n.d) maintains that

militancy in the area is because of unfair share of

oil proceeds. The finding is in complete agreement

with Orji and Jaja (2007) input that the change in

sharing formula as it used to be during agriculture

and solid mineral is the cause of conflict in the

areas of Niger Delta.

Hypothesis two stated that there is no politics

in resource control. The hypothesis was tested with

Pearson product-moment Correlation co-efficient. The

result of the analysis shows that there is political

issue in resource control agitation in Nigeria. The

finding is in support of Iyobhebhe (n.d.) which says

that there is politics in resource control. The result

also agrees with Orji and Jaja (2007), that resource

control issue has been politicized by non-oil

producing States. Okpi (in Punch, March 4, 2012) Itse

(2012), Egom (2008), Awoyinfa (2013), Adisa, (2012)

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and Ochonu (n.d) findings are in agreement with the

finding that there are politics surrounding resource

control in Nigeria.

Hypothesis three stated that, there is no

legality in resource control. This hypothesis was

tested with Pearson product-Moment Correlation Co-

efficient. The result of the test shows that there is

legality in resource control agitation. This finding

supports Cotula (2007), grandiose parlor (2005),

Ikpang (n.d), Adam-Ndu (2007) and Ako (2012) who

quoted domestic, international and natural law in

support of resource control.

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CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Chapter five of the study is where the researcher

drew the curtain to the study. In this chapter,

summary of the finding was done, conclusion drawn and

recommendation made based on the findings.

5.1 Summary of findings

The study was carried out to examine the issue of

resource control: conflict, politics and legality.

The objectives of the study were to critically

access the conflict associated with resource control

in Nigeria; to evaluate the politics of resource

control in Nigeria; to examine the legality of

resource control in Nigeria and to proffer solutions

to the problems facing resource control in Nigeria.

To achieve the objectives, hypothesis were formulated

and tested, data were gathered through the use of

questionnaire and literature was reviewed. In the

95

course of the research work, a number of findings

have been established based on factual data collected

from the field survey and analyzed together with

elaborate review of literature. These findings are

summarized below:

1) There is significant association between

resource control and conflict in Niger Delta

region of Nigeria.

2)There is politics in resource control in Nigeria.

3)There is legality in resource control in Nigeria

5.2 Conclusion

A discourse on conflict resolution in the Niger

Delta in particular and Nigeria as a whole in

relation to resource control must take cognizance of

development in the entire African continent. A global

view reveals that the entire continent is involved in

one form of conflict or the other.

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From the foregoing, it becomes very obvious that

the political stability and socio-economic

development of Nigeria is at a threshold. No nation

elopement can dream of meaningful development in a

State of violence and in security. No responsible

government can afford to play the ostrich game in the

face of obvious realities. The hydra headed tussle

for resource control has been identified as the arrow

ahead in the constant conflicts that have bedeviled

that Niger Delta region in recent times. It only

needs to be added that he conflagration has been

fueled by the seeming insensitivity of the Federal,

State and Local governments to the subjects they

swore to protect. Nigerians should see the issue of

resource control from an objective view instead of

being political about some objective agitation. The

only way out of the quagmire is an unhypocritical

approach with transparency and accountability as the

97

watchword. The proposal of 17% derivation formula

should be re-examined with the intention of beefing

it up to 25%-to 40%, considering environmental

degradation and poverty in the area.

From the study, it is obvious that there are a

lot of issues surrounding resource control in

Nigeria. Resource control is the heart of ethics, of

micro-economic and politics. It is all about planning

every Nigerian firmly, from the womb to the tomb, at

the beginning, at the center and at the end of every

aspect of Nigeria’s public policy. It is indeed ass

about justice, all about social inclusion and all

about giving every Nigerian. This rightful due at all

times.

To think about it, resource control is all about

taking us Nigerians back to our equalitarian and

communitarian roots. It is simply the bottom –to-top

market development of Nigeria. In addition, Nigeria

98

is a Federal State. The essence of true federalism is

to allow each State in a federation a significant

measure of autonomy to manage its affairs. The

federalist debate in Nigeria centres essentially on

the need to understand the basis of the contract of

true federalism and resource control. The debate is

longstanding, passionate and inconclusive. Despite

the contrived arrangement as articulated by the

ruling class, the systematic dysfunction has resulted

in a series of violent, dramatic and traumatic inter-

ethno regional confrontation, ventilating the

essences of a debate (Ihejiamaizu, 2001). Indeed, the

must spectacular and deliberate expression of the

centrality of the contention is the current

unprecedented demand of the Niger Delta State for

resource control. Political observers, especially

those of them from the Niger Delta region have argued

that the agitation for resource control is litmus

99

test for the enthronement of true federalism. What

made the region strong in the first republic was

their financial independence. Each region took care

of itself and its needs within the limits of its

internal revenue resources. What the regions received

from the federal government through the principles of

fiscal federalism which obliged the State to provide

such assistance, was minimal. Contrary to the opinion

from certain quarters, especially in the Northern

part of the country that resource control would

benefit only the oil producing states, it will

clearly benefit all states of the federation. After

all, the six geo-political zones in the country are

endowed with abundant natural resources waiting to be

explored and exploited. We must recognize the

position of the Niger Delta on this issue as a vital

contribution to the resurrection of true federalism

in Nigeria. All the 36 States will benefit from this,

100

as they will also exercise exclusive jurisdiction

over the natural resources in their respective

territories. The crude oil production has been by far

the most important activities in the Nigerian economy

since the early 1970s is not subject to debate. Its

impart is not limited to its contributing

approximately 90% of Nigeria’s total foreign exchange

earnings but also to the fact that the budget are

predicted on the expected annual production and price

of crude oil. That being the case, it would be quite

reasonable to expect that the areas producing the

nation’s oil would be very highly developed as

compensation for what is taken away as well as for

the devastation on the land engendered by the

exploration process.

The study has been able to review critically and

constructively the contributions of many scholars on

the issues of resource control along side the result

101

of the field work analysis as the affect the Niger

Delta and Nigeria as a whole.

5.3 Recommendation

In view of the research finding, the following

recommendations were made:

1. The national assembly should make the local

government an autonomous arm of government.

2. The local government allocation should go

straight to local government account.

3. The state should only serve as a check on local

government on financial matters, and advice it on

how to run the local government for effective

service delivery.

4. Corruption should be fought against. Any

government official caught involved in financial

misappropriation should be made to face the law.

102

5. People of credible character should be elected /

appointed into political offices.

6. The state and the multinational oil partners

should formulate appropriate policies for the

development of Niger Delta.

7. It has become glaring that privatization and

diversification of the Nigerian economy represent

our best hope for economic vitality. On that not,

the researcher recommends diversification of

Nigerian economy through resource control.

8. The government should serve as a supervisory and

advisory body to the private sectors or the

regions that are controlling their natural

resources.

9. Nigerians should patronize made in Nigerian

product to encourage more research and

production.

103

10. Nigerian producers should aim at producing

quality products to encourage long term

profitability.

11. Nigerian government should strive to produce

the petroleum products it consumes locally. It

should build and repair its refineries to stop

importing what it has in abundance at home.

12. The Federal, State and Local Governments in

the Niger Delta with all Stake holders like the

multi-national companies and non-governmental

organizations should meaningfully fashion out

pragmatic measures for the sustainable

development of the Niger Delta region. Areas to

be considered include: civil Servant, farmers,

fishermen, the self-employed, the jobless,

education, the provision of public utilities like

water and electricity, quality of educations,

good road network, etc.

104

13. Our politicians should allow the principle of

true federalism to thrive in an atmosphere that

will allow federating units to have a sense of

belonging.

14. The researcher also recommends that all the

traces of unitary system of government in Nigeria

should be removed from the Nigerian federalism.

This will allow the state some level of freedom

and autonomy.

105

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