IN TRO D U CTIO N 1.1 Background of the Study

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Public policy emerges from decision-making, which is the most deliberate aspect

of social conduct. Policy deals with a variety of sectored issues ranging from defence,

health and agriculture to education, among others. One of its components is housing

policy.

In the past, in Nigeria, the provision of housing has traditionally been the

responsibility of the private sector. Public housing has for a considerable period been

limited to the provision of housing for the senior staff in the secluded area called

Government Reservation Area (GRA), provision of barracks for soldiers, police and

quarters for clerks usually called clerks quarter. Public involvement in housing became

only noticeable in the late 1950.

Nigeria is a rapidly developing country with enormous need for the provision of

housing for the teeming populace. It is therefore not surprising to find in the world

today, that government in order to become popular and be acceptable among their

citizenry usually places as top priority housing development in their National

Development Plan. The United Nations Organisations “such as United Nation

Conference on Human Settlements (UNCHS) otherwise called Habitat 11 have over the

years pursued a variety of programmes and policies aimed at resolving the issue of

inadequacy and shortfall of housing stock” (Oyejide, 2001). The need for housing policy

in Nigeria became an important issue only when the country achieved independence in

1960. An attempt will be made to understand the policy by studying various

governments’ actions and public pronouncements on housing.

As governments and individuals struggle to improve the economic, educational

and social condition of their communities, households find the need to recondition their

2

family affairs, and to readjust their living situations. These circumstances would under

conditions of accelerating economic growth for all, dictate a steady pattern of shift either

from the occupation of single rooms to flats or from older and dilapidated flats to more

modern ones, or to even modern bungalows. It is perhaps in full recognition of this

crucial role of the human habitat in individual and national development that part of the

economic objectives under the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of

State Policy, entrenched in Chapter II of the Nigerian Constitution required the State to

direct its policy towards ensuring that suitable and adequate shelter is provided for ALL

citizens, (FMI, 1979:9).

The Federal Government, aware of the importance of housing, has encouraged

the establishment of Housing Authorities, Institutions and Agencies charged with the

responsibility of housing the citizens of this nation. Such institutions and agencies set up

by the Federal Government are “the Federal Ministry of Housing, Urban Development

and Environment, the Federal Housing Authority, the Nigerian Building and Road

Research Institute (NBRRI), and the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria, among others”

(Bamai, 1988), The Housing Policy in Nigeria became necessary in order to provide

housing accommodation affordable to the general public. It was formulated and

enunciated in 1980 after a Ministry of Housing and Environment was set up and it was

to accord priority for those in the low-income groups. An adequate understanding of the

Housing Policy therefore depends on the prior mastery of the concept of policy itself.

Policy, characterized as instrument for the use of some form of centralized

planning which government protects its attributes is significant for development. It is a

proposed course of action of a person, group or government within a given

environment, providing obstacles and opportunities which the policy was proposed to

utilize and overcome in an effort to reach a goal or realize an objective or a purpose”,

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(Friedrich, 1963). It is the official actions or course of actions that are goal-oriented,

taken with the aim of solving problems that led to its initiation, adoption and

implementation. In the formulation of policy, all relevant information and

recommendations are usually passed upwards, and even after a given policy has been

promulgated, there should be a regular feedback of results to confirm that policy as

being right or suggest a need for revised policy.

The second democratic experiment in Nigeria began on October 1,1979 as an

earlier experiment failed on January 15, 1966, following the seizure of power by the

Army after five years of chaotic civil political administration. In September 1978, the

military government lifted the ban on partisan politics imposed since August 31,1966.

The pre-election resulted in the formation of five political parties, namely: the National

Party of Nigeria (N.P.N.), the Unity Party of Nigeria (U.P.N.), the Nigeria People’s Party

(N.P.P.), the Great Nigeria People’s Party (G.N.P.P.) and the People’s Redemption

Party (P.R.P.). “The election resulted in the N.P.N. as the Fulani party winning an

overall plurality of votes in nineteen (19) States. The U.P.N. as the Yoruba party came

second, the N.P.P. as the Igbo party came third, the P.R.P. and the G.N.P.P.

represented the Kanuri and Hausa parties respectively trailed behind” (Njoku, 2004).

It was on that note that Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria

assumed office on October 1, 1979 as the President and Commander-in-Chief of the

Armed Forces of Nigeria. This was a democratic regime. Powell Jnr listing the features

of democracy states that “the legitimacy of the government rests on a claim to represent

the desires of its citizens, that is, the claim of government’s obedience to its laws is

based on the government’s assertion to do what the people want; and that citizens and

leaders enjoy basic freedom of speech, press, assembly and organization”

(Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, (1829). The desire of the federal and state

4

governments in Nigeria to “improve housing conditions and ownership is now well

orchestrated by their public announcement. Provision of ‘shelter for all’ has also

become a cardinal point of the NPN federal government” (Mohammed, 1980). In April,

1980, following the National Council on Housing and Environment Conference in Port

Harcourt, the government of Shehu Shagari embarked on a ‘housing for all’ programme

for the country.

Imo State, my case study, is one of the then nineteen States of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria, (see Appendices I and II – maps of Nigeria and Imo State). “The

State was created when the former East Central State of Nigeria was split into Anambra

and Imo State on 3rd February, 1976 by the Murtala/Obasanjo regime. It has a

population density of 590 persons per square kilometer” (MOF, 2000). Its population at

the end of 2006 National Census was 3.9 million. With the inception of the Second

Republic in 1979, the Federal Government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari decided to construct

low cost houses throughout the federation. According to the President, the goal of his

administration in the area of housing was to, as much as possible, “make sure that

every Nigerian had access to a decent and affordable accommodation in a clean

environment” (Imo, 1985). The decision was borne out of the desire to provide

affordable houses to low-income earners in various parts of the country.

In Imo State, the Federal Low-Cost Housing Scheme was located at Egbu and

Umuguma in Owerri Local Government and the eleven other Local Governments in Imo

State (excluding nine local Governments that are now part of Abia State). Out of the

8,000 housing units slated for Imo State by the Shagari Administration, a total of seven

hundred and eighty-one (781) houses were constructed. Those in the rural areas were

one bedroom bungalows while those at Owerri – the capital of Imo State consisted

essentially of three housing types – one-bedroom, two bedroom and three-bedroom, all

5

semi-detached bungalows. “The Estate covered about 25 hectares and each house

was designed to accommodate two families separated by a party wall “(Igbozuruike,

1988). A total of twelve contractors were employed to execute this housing programme

while the Federal Ministry of Housing and Environment engaged the services of two

firms of architects to supervise the project on its behalf. The form of tender adopted

was ostensibly open tender but in reality, the contractors were awarded to members of

the defunct National Party of Nigeria.

The low cost houses on completion were allocated by the Presidential Liaison

Officer in the State, on behalf of the Federal Government to the occupants not on rental

but on owner-occupier basis. In the allocation exercise, “only the indigenes of Imo State

and non-indigenes that have been resident in the State for at least three years were

entitled to apply for the houses. This was on the condition that their annual income did

not exceed N5000 (five thousand Naira)” (Igbozuruike, 2004).

The one-bedroom single family unit was sold for N6,000.00 (Six thousand

Naira) while the three-bedroom single family dwelling was sold for N15,000.00 (fifteen

thousand Naira). This is against the sums of N6,077.68 and N14,714.14 which these

two units cost the government to erect. The allotees were required to pay an initial

deposit of ten percent of the cost of the houses and subsequent monthly installment

payments for twenty years until the cost was defrayed. The occupants made these

payments by cheque or cash to the government through the Federal Mortgage Bank,

Owerri Branch. It was discovered that many of the allotees sublet their houses to

tenants who paid them rent. The two-bedroom housing units which were abandoned

but completed much later in the year 2003 were sold at N200,000.00.

Policy evaluation, as a functional activity, is as old as policy itself. Policy makers

and administrators have always made judgments concerning the worth or effects of

6

particular policies, programmes and projects. Evaluation is the act of considering or

examining something in order to judge its value, quality, importance, extent or condition.

It involves defined goals and specific measures of impact. It is a productive entry point

for analysis as it inevitably draws one into problem definition, goal setting and other

functional activities. The programme impact evaluation type - an assessment of overall

programme impact and effectiveness will be used in this study. It will involve “the

establishment of units of measures of implementation, assessment of the costs and

benefits and actual accomplishment, justifying its existence as well as proposing

changes” (Anderson, 1975:133).

It is against this background that the researcher intends to focus on the need to

determine the extent to which the Federal Government Housing Policy Implementation

in Imo State (1979-2007) was successful in achieving the basic objectives.

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Rapid urbanization due to high economic growth rate appears to generate a

range of problems, usually of national significance for most developing countries like

Nigeria. The recognition of this problems as well as strategies to cope with them has, in

the case of some countries, led to the formation of a cluster of development policies

which as a group form some sort of national urbanization policies. Nigeria currently

seems to lack an established tradition on how to formulate housing policy under civilian

dispensations. No serious study has been conducted to establish how housing policy

was made during the First and Second Republics. This might be due to the high degree

of political instability that has besieged the country since it achieved independence. For

example, “between 1960-1985, Nigeria witnessed nine regimes; five of them were

military regimes. Consequently, housing policy formulation had been dominated by the

7

military and their political appointees. When the country witnessed the first military

coup, elected civilians were carefully eliminated from public policy formulation, the

exception being the short interlude of civilian regime during the Second Republic (1979-

1983)”, (Haruna, 1987:31-32).

To own a comfortable home as a reward for hard work and self sacrifice has

long been “an unattainable goal for the majority of workers, particularly the low-income

group and the peasants in the rural areas” (Gana, 1988:14). A review of past policies

and programmes of both public and private sectors reveals that overall national housing

delivery appears to be inadequate. Effective solution to housing delivery is yet to be

found. This becomes more critical when viewed against the background of both urban

and rural areas, where housing need is dominated by the poor and low-income group,

who constitute an estimated 70% of the population. Nigeria appears to be in the throes

of shelter crises. A large number of the population live in slums and squatter settlement

while sizeable segment of both urban and rural population live in poor shelter, in

unhealthy, ill-maintained houses. The situation is graphic enough.

A look at the housing Policy of Nigeria’s Second Republic reveals deep-rooted

constraints. These include lack of sound leadership as well as competent personnel,

inadequate mortgage institutions, duplication of responsibilities, lack of autonomy, acute

housing shortage and lack of affordability, corruption, lack of due process mechanism,

lack of easy access to land with infrastructure, high cost of building materials, high cost

of funds for housing, lack of sustained research into raw materials used in the housing

industry, weak enforcement of contracts, government laws and policies, uncontrolled

population explosion and its resultant uncontrolled housing demands with illegal

construction of shanties, economic recession , etc.

8

The urgency and necessity of this housing problems call for concern by all. The

government is supposed “to harness the political, social and economic resources in

Nigeria to improve the standard of living of her people as enjoyed in the more advanced

countries of Europe, Asia and America" (Hanson, 1990:76). The housing policies in

Nigeria were supposed to have provided accommodation services to the masses at

cheap and affordable prices, but from what is available or obtainable, or judging from

the plethora of commentaries from many scholars, like Nwosu (1981:44), Abrams

(1964), Riggs (1963:18), Dale (1941:46), Blitz (1956:82), Oyediran (1980), Marris

(1970:19), it appears that this dream is not realizable. Consequently, the questions that

will guide this study are:

What is the link between formulation and Implementation?

2. What were the contributions of the Legislature, the Executive, the interest groups, the mass media and the people towards

housing policy iplementation during the Second Republic? 3. What led to the promulgation of the low-cost housing policy

during Nigeria’s Second Republic?

4. Did the Second Republic housing policy implementation improve the housing situation in Imo State?

5. What factors militated against housing policy implementation in Imo State?

6. What are the lessons learnt from the Second Republic housing policy in Imo State?

What are the measures for improving housing delivery in Nigeria, with particular reference to Imo State?

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As a result of the identified problems, the general objective of this study is to

evaluate how housing policy was made in concrete term by the Federal Government

and how it was implemented, especially in Imo State. To achieve this aim, the

researcher has adopted the Housing Programme of Ahaji Shehu Shagari who was at

9

the helm of affairs during this period (1979-1983) and how and how it was implemented

in Imo State.

The specific objectives are:

To link Formulation and Implementation.

To examine the roles played by the Legislature, the Executive and pressure groups and the mass media in policy formulation during Nigeria’s Second Republic.

3. To find out what led to the promulgation of the low-cost housing policy during Nigeria’s Second Republic? To ascertain whether the implementation of this Federal Government

Housing Policy improved the housing situation in Imo State.

5. To find out the factors that militated against successful implementation of the Federal Government Housing Policy in Imo State.

6. To highlight the lessons learnt from the Second Republic Housing Policy in Imo State. 7. To suggest measures for improving housing delivery in Nigeria with

particular reference to Imo State.

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To the writer’s knowledge, the strategy of housing policy implementation in

Nigeria during the Second Republic has remained a paradox both to the experts and

laymen. This is because Nigeria has not established a stable political transition in spite

of these almost five decades of existence. This situation was worsened not only by

constant and interminable military coups, but also by lack of indigenous political culture

and the short interlude of civilian democratic regimes in the country.

This study is significant because in the writer’s opinion it intends to highlight the

roles of the Legislature, the Executive and the interest groups in policy making and may

establish the fact that most studies on policy formulation and implementation

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concentrated on the advanced countries and only a very few in the developing nations.

Again, “those who have studied policy formulation in Nigeria have largely concentrated

on the military regimes where there is no popular forum for interest articulation, interest

aggregation and political communication”, (Igwe, 1988:17).

Theoretically, this study may not only extend the study of housing policy

implementation in Nigeria, but also may advance the use and application of Group

Theory to the analysis of housing policy implementation in the developing countries.

The study also hopes to sharpen the insight of African scholars to the unexplored areas

in the field of housing policy studies in Africa and Nigeria in general and Imo State in

particular.

On the social aspect, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the study would

contribute to the existing stock of knowledge and reveal to Government and the general

public the extent the Second Republic accomplished the aims and objectives of its

Housing Policy in Nigeria, especially in Imo State and its fundamental deficiencies. This

will contribute in filling the inadequacies or gap in literature.

The study to the writer’s opinion may be useful to politicians in the subsequent

Republics, policy makers, policy implementers, and the public policy experts in Nigerian

Universities. It hopes to reveal to them how housing policy was made in the first and

second Republics and this it is hoped would help them to device the best approach to

the issue in the future. The study may also be useful to foreign embassies, multi-

national corporations and international organizations that are interested in National

Housing Policy of the Second Republic.

11

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The scope of the study covers “An Analysis of Federal Government Housing

Policy Implementation in Imo State, Nigeria (1979-2007”. Imo State is chosen because

the researcher was aware of the objectives of the housing policy and partially observed

its execution and implementation in Imo State. The result obtained from the research

may not be exhaustive, but may give an insight into the extent this housing policy was

implemented in Imo State.

This study was limited by unverifiability of some facts due to passage of time

(with attendant change in personnel), inaccessibility to useful records for fear of

exposing some classified information about the Office. The reliability and validity of the

sources of both primary and secondary data are limitations since the study is subject to

weakness inherent in the interview guide and questionnaire, for example, bias in

responses cannot be ruled out. The researcher spent much time explaining to the

respondents, what they were required to do. Despite these limitations, the researcher

continued the work with data collected, which were enough for the work.

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The essence of a literature review is to simplify the work of the researcher, by

making her aware of the existing work and reveal the experiences and opinions of

others in the area of investigation. In an attempt to get at the root of “An Analysis of the

Federal Government Housing Policy Implementation in Imo State, Nigeria:1979-2007),

the literature is thematically organized under the following sub-themes:

Housing, Policy and Its Formulation in Nigeria.

2. Link between Formulation and Implementation.

3. Housing Policies in Nigeria – Pre and Post Independence.�

4. The nature of President Shehu Shagari’s Housing Policy and the New National Housing Policy.

5. The factors that militated against the implementation of Federal Government housing programmes with particular reference to Imo State.

"�� 1 2�� -��0�� 3� �4 � -� �� 1 ��

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Globally, shelter is accepted as an essential basic human need. It is regarded as

a social responsibility by all nations of the world. The World Health Organisation

describes housing as “an enclosed environment in which man finds protection against

the elements”. This definition, according to Nwosu, (1981:13) “is partial and narrow and

may have sufficiently served the pre-historic man whose main objective was to achieve

bare existence within the circumstances dictated by his natural environment”. Instead,

as Nigeria’s Third National Development Plan 1975-80 aptly puts it, “housing does not

13

only represent one of the most basic human needs in terms of protection against natural

elements, it also no doubt has “a profound impact on the health, welfare and

productivity of the individual” (FRN 1975:3097).

According to Abrams, (1964:x), “housing is not only shelter but part of the fabric

of neighbourhood life and of the whole social milieu, it touches on many facets of

industrialization, economic activity and development”. Housing, Iyortyer, (1984:4)

opines “is a strong indispensable casual element in all manner of progress initiated and

sustained by both the individual and his society. Housing is the second most important

requirement to man. It transcends simple shelter”. According to Willey, (2001:30),

“housing includes utilities and community services like electricity, water supply, good

access roads, sewage and requires disposal facilities and access to employment”.

Housing is important to the development of the society in both economic, social and

welfare terms. Njoku, (1998:39) opines:

the quality and quantity of housing stock is a reliable barometer of the standard of living, the level of technology, culture and civilization of any nation. To the English man, his house is his castle, which protects him from all comers; to a Nigerian, status in society is difficult to establish if one has no house. In many Nigerian cultural settings, a chieftaincy title cannot be bestowed on an individual who does not own a house within the locality. In modern society, housing constitutes between twelve and twenty per cent of household expenditures and is usually the major goal of family saving efforts.

In the realm of private and public investment, Ajanlekoo, (2002:7) writes, “the

built environment (which includes shelter) represents man’s most tangible material

asset representing up to 20 to 30 per cent of fixed capital formation in areas with

vigorous housing programmes and it is increasingly recognized as a profitable

investment item, yielding a flow of income”. Housing is “a very expensive capital

investment, which forms substantial proportion of every nation’s Gross Fixed Capital

14

Formation (GFCF). No nation in the world can boast of having economic capability of

providing housing to all her citizens without other amenities suffering” (FMI, 1979:12).

For Gana, (2002:6), “a home may indeed be regarded as the greatest antidote

for man against the vagaries of modern living. It is the last bastion of peace and

relaxation of mind and body, and therefore the sine qua non for sanity in a world of toil,

sweat, tribulations and even happiness”. (Nwosu,1981:24) states that “it represents the

most sanguine and restful primary nest for the nurturing of new generations of the

human species. A good homestead is thus the precious life-blood of civilization itself”,

Housing at different epoch, remains “strategic asset to man, irrespective of his

social-economic status, colour or creed. The passion and emotional attachment to

housing in African cultural setting was underscored by the fact, that one is not

considered a man until he owns a house” (Okupe, 2002:14). As opined by Ajanlekoko,

(2002:13) “at the center piece of all human endeavours is the ambition to bequeath a

lasting legacy to his family or off-springs. Majority of this dream is seen in the context of

home ownership. Housing is generally believed to be the ultimate reward or outcome of

a successful life accomplishment”. “A man who has not built or acquired a house is

regarded as a non-achiever in the society. So, globally, over the millennium, man has

always pursued with the fulfillment of this singular goal with determination” (Okupe,

2002:19).

Mohammed, Haninaya, Olu and Achebe, (1980:4) observe that:

Housing has become an important part of the National Development Plan. Government now accepts it as part of its social responsibility to participate actively in the provision of housing for all groups and will intervene on a large scale in this sector during this plan period. Ever since, the government actions have been geared towards housing Nigerians whether in the urban or in the rural areas.

15

The question is, to what extent has adequate and affordable houses been

provided for the citizenry? “It however appears that housing has become a thorny issue

in the mind of government and it was not until the democratic government, that a

comprehensive government plan was designed to find a lasting solution to this mind-

occupying issue” (Agbola, 1998:14).

Affordable housing, according to Oyediran, (1980:165) “has seemingly become

impossible for an average Nigerian. While the real income of the people continues to

drop, the cost of developing housing and purchase of same continue to be on the rise”.

The problem of housing is enormous and complex, exhibiting apparent and marked

regional differences.

In most of our urban centers,

the problem is not only restricted to quality, but also to quantity of available housing units and the environment. The scene is only slightly different in the rural areas where the problem is primarily that of quality of housing and inadequacy of infrastructure facilities like roads, drainage, water, power supply etc. Government is now concerned with the provision of houses for all citizens whether employed or not, whether in urban or rural setting ( Lindblom, 1980:24).

"��" ��%'�!��

Much has been written in the area of housing policy initiative, formulation and

implementation but not much has been written about housing formulation and

implementation during civilian regimes in Nigeria. Sweet and Maxwell, (1984:10)

opines, “the number of books, articles and anthologies on housing policy formulation

suggests a growing awareness among public administration experts that the whole

discipline of public administration is based on adequate mastery of the concept of

policy”.

16

In their massive study of policy in the San Francisco Bay Region, Eulav and

Premit arrived at the same opinion. According to them,

policy is strictly theoretical construct inferred from the pattern of relevant choice behaviour. Policy is distinguished from policy goal, policy intensions and policy choices. It is a studying decision characterized by behavioural consistency and repetitiveness on the part of both those who make it and those who abide by it. The operative words in the above definition are behavioural consistency and repetitiveness associated with government efforts to resolve public problems (Eulav and Premit,1977:21).

Policy is regarded as the “guidelines laid down in general or specific terms, to

enable a company or other organizations reach the long-range targets set by the

objectives. It is a rule of action for the rank and file to show them how they are

expected to attain the desired results” (Coventry, 1982:93). In his own definition of

policy, Nwachukwu, (1997:70) opines, “it is official guidelines or a set of guidelines for

the intentions, goals and actions of an organization in accomplishing specific

objectives”. Policy is also “a definite course of method of action selected from among

alternatives, and in the light of given conditions to guide and determine present and

future decisions” (Njoku, 1999:33).

One may ask why policy is critical for the achievement of a desired result.

According to Opara, (2002:14), a policy is “a plan of action, statement, objectives and

ideals made by a government in pursuance of certain goals and tackling of perceived

problems”. A problem, “is a condition or situation that produces a human need,

deprivation or dissatisfaction, self-identified or identified by others for which relief is

sought” (Smith, 1964:44). The laying down of policy clearly helps to achieve uniformity

of action throughout a nation and consistency as from one time to another.

Purpose-built definitions of policy include that of Broom, (1969:7) which states

that ”policy is a broad, precedent-setting decision that becomes standard management

17

practice and subsequent management decision-making. Thus, plans will be coherent

and effective action more likely”. Titmuss, (1977:23) states that “policy refers to the

principles that govern action directed towards given ends”. The concept denotes action

about means as well as end, and it therefore implies change: changing situations,

systems, practices and behaviour.

Policies can be put in writing as “manuals or procedures, office instructions and

memoranda. These written, normally in statement form, or sometimes unwritten rules

guide every staff in what is expected of them in any normal set of circumstances or in

exceptional circumstances or emergencies” (Kempner, 1980:62).

Besides the Boards of directors of companies, a major policy also “emanates

from the Legislature, Judiciary, Executive arms of government, Union pressures or

action of competitors” (Omoile, 1994). Finally, “policy statements must be made to

cover three aspects of an organization - its objectives, the means of achieving them and

the constraints” (Drucker, 1977:268).

"��5 � �'�'��%'�!�3��# �%��'��'�� '��'�

As stated by Anweh, (1991:9), “policy formulation started in Nigeria long before it

achieved independence. It was characterized by the domination of the colonial

administrative officer who monopolized policy making, policy execution and policy

adjudication during colonial era”. In support of this assertion, Balogun, (1976:375)

observes that:

the colonial administrator combined three roles in one person and served in three major capacities – legislative (policy formulation), executive (policy implementation) and judicial (policy adjudication). The political officers, were all in all whether as part of the central secretariat or as representatives of the colonial government in the provinces. They laid down rules, outlawing slavery, cannibalism and other barbaric acts, implemented the rules and dispensed justice based on the same rules.

18

In most cases, these administrators had no secretariat. For example, “up to

1921, Lord Lugard ruled Nigeria without a secretariat, without any coordinating

machinery, without a central office where the decisions of government with their

parliamentary papers might be recorded” (Anweh, 199144). When Hugh Clifford

succeeded Lugard, attempts were made to establish institutions of government

including Legislative Council. Later, he assigned executive functions to lieutenants

governors. According to Sweet and Maxwell, (1965:82),

the actual policy making machinery was established in 1946 by Authur Richard’s Constitution which created

a Legislative Council consisting of an unofficial majority to meet successfully in Lagos, Kaduna and Enugu;

three Regional Houses with selected members who through electoral colleges, in turn selected representatives to the central Legislative Council; and Regional Houses with advisory roles on matters referred to them by the Regional Governors.

Continuing, Sweet and Maxwell opine “he wanted to create a system within which the

diverse elements might progress at varying speed amicably and smoothly towards a

more closely integrated economy, social and political unity without sacrificing the

principles of ideals inherent to their divergent ways of life”.

In the study of policy making in Nigeria, examining the nature of policy making

between 1960 and 1975, it was discovered that “much emphasis was laid on the role of

the civil servants in policy formulation during military regimes; that the Administrators

could not avoid some policy-making responsibility since much of the policy making

responsibility on the part of the Administrator took place in the course of the application

of administrative processes” (Oyediran, 1980:18).

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"��*��(�%��'�� !��# '�)�� )'��'�� '��'�� For the purpose of a comparative study of Nigeria’s housing policy, it may be

necessary to have a brief look at the housing policy of developed countries like Britain

and the United States of America. Britain, whose longest history of policy dates back to,

according to Emiwole, (2002:23), “the early eighteenth century for reason of Public

Health; Housing credit markets; Planning Regulations; subsidy Payment;

Encouragement and support for Voluntary non-profit association; Urban renewal; Social

development; Welfare Assistance and Provision of housing”. Continuing, Emiwole

states that:

effective action in housing followed the Local Govern- ment Act in 1888. London country council took steps to accelerate the provision of public housing. It also became a political issue from the enactments of the

Housing of Working Class Act in 1890. London and the other large cities set about expanding local government housing in reaction to the explosive

overcrowding in the cites.

Writing on the Housing policy of Britain, Okupe, (2000:29) opines:

Over the years, housing became centrally directed with the department of the environment at the helm of the affairs. The necessary parameters for the design and costing of housing have been established. Local

Governments send their proposed schemes to the department ensuring that the laid down requirements with respect to space, standards and cost are adhered to. It must be noted that the provision of housing was

aimed at providing relief for the poor working class who were most disadvantaged in terms of providing suitable housing for themselves.

The government of the United States of America is adopting several approaches to

solving housing problems of its citizenry. Among these are:

Freddie Mac (Federal Mortgage Association), Fannie Mae (Federal Loan Mortgage Corporation) and the Federal Housing Loans Finance Board, which provides the bulk of required finances to prospective home owners and most of stakeholders in the industry. Specifically, they operate

20

with private capital on a self sustaining basis as they receive no government funding or backing but work to make sure mortgage money is available for people in the communities all across America, (Anthonio, 2002:34).

America’s housing policy is people oriented and meaningful with legislated objectives.

Jones, (1977:193) in his Pubic Housing meets the Housing Public states that:

massive mobilization of resources for the war effort in the early 1940s interrupted the normal course of economic affairs. One of the many effects was to create a housing shortage at war’s end. With millions of service men returning to civilian life, replenishing the nation’s housing supply became a major priority. What better time then, to set a national housing goal? The Housing Act of 1949 (a major amendment to the Housing Act of 1937 did just that.

2.1.2 -'��$��6 ��3��# �%��'��# ,%�# ��'��

According to Stoner, Freeman and Gilbert, (2004: 284), to “explain the key

aspects of policy formalation and its relationship to policy implementation is vital in any

policy study.” Public policy makers as stated by Schffman and Kanuk, (1998:12) “have

a responsibility to protect the interest and wellbeing of their constituents and so

formulation is based on specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time bound

factors”. In his contribution, Broom, (1969:36) opines, “formulation of policy is not a

guessing game. Certain definite steps should be followed by decision-makers seekng

to establish new or altered policies”. Continuing, Broom states that these steps are:

studying the objectives; determining the need for a policy in the given area; collecting all possible pertinent facts; considring all possible alternative statements of such a policy; analysing, using all the scientific tools available, the probable outcome of each such alternative; deciding tentatively on the best policy statement, considering the expected outcomes and likely application problems; reviewing this policy statement with employees and others who would be affected by its application; checking also to make sure that the new policy, as stated, is clear and in line with all other policies of the firm; making the policy decision including a decision on the effective date.

21

Implementation, on the other hand, according to Stoner, Freeman and Gilbert,

(2004: 30) “consists of institutionalising and operationalising the policies that have been

developed”. Implementation depends on the organisation, structure, strategy, systems,

style, staff skills, superordinate goals...”. “Strategies and operational plans provide the

details of implementation. They are in deed the action elements of policy

implementation. Implementation consists of those steps that bring a solution along a

formulated strategy” (Broom, 1969:44). In their contribution, Schffman and Kanuk,

(1998:10) opine that

implementation is basically the administrative tasks needed to put formulated strategy into practice. It depends on organisation’s structure and the adoption of total quality management (TQM).

Implementation requires a more team oriented, worker-empowered approach in thinking about quality in new ways and it changes operations through improved processes, clarified instruction, modeling of behaviour by top management and training in new ways to accomplish work. Unless organisations adequately understand this process, implementation cannot be achieved.

According to (Stoner, Freeman and Gilbert, 2004: 296)

formulation is a standing plan that establishes general guideline for decision making. It is a powerful tool for implementation. Policy formulation is a result of problem when an actual state of affairs differs from a desired state of affairs and this formulation poses less of a problem than their implementation. Successful implementation depends in part on how the nation’s activities are divided, organised and coordinated.

"��5�� )'��%'�'�)�'�� '��'��7��)��,��

"��5�� %��'�%�� )'��%'�!�'�� '��'��

Housing policy in Nigeria started with the coming of the Europeans into Nigeria.

Until then, as earlier stated, “the provision of individual houses was the responsibility of

individuals aided by the community. “Attempts to address the issue of housing in

Nigeria predate our Independence in 1960. It dates back to that historical, but now

controversial year of amalgamation, 1914 when the British Colonialist introduced

22

Ordinance No. 9, which gave it power to acquire land compulsorily for public use”

(Onibukun, 1985:52). With the coming of the Colonial administration, there was need to

provide cheap and decent accommodation for the expatriate workers” (Ibrahim,

2000:18).

This was followed by Road and Township Ordinance No. 29 of 1917 which

provided for different grades of urban settlements, established broad physical layout of

town into categories and construction of staff housing at Government Reservation Areas

(GRAs) in the State Capitals. Until then, the provision of individual housing was “the

responsibility of individuals aided by the community. With the coming of the colonial

administration, there was need to provide cheap and decent accommodation for the

expatriate workers” (Anweh, 1991:76).

However, the need for housing policy in Nigeria became an important issue

only when the country achieved Independence in 1960. According to Okupe, (2002:21)

“the search for solution to this critical need of the people continued at Independence as

reflected in the first National Development Plan spanning five years”.

The policy of the British Colonial government was to provide housing at minimal

rents to all colonial staff and their few indigenous support staff like clerks, prison

officials, police and Army. “This gave rise to clerks’ quarters, Government Reservation

Areas, Police Barracks ad so on found in all Colonial towns in Nigeria” (Bingel,

1978:12). The policy of government towards the masses moving from rural areas into

the new administrative towns,

ranged from benign neglect to the establishment of building lines and issuance of building plots at nominal cost to individual households. The new building lines became known as Sabongari in the Northern States or township areas. In addition to the township areas, there was usually an indigenous built-up areas annexed to the town. For many years, no visible effort was made to develop these areas, variously referred to as native town in Jos, Tudan Wada

23

in Zaria and so on (Agbola, 1998:19).

As stated by Anweh, (1991:48), “due to lack of government’s interest in these

areas, the local chiefs assumed effective control of life and property in the areas. Thus,

things were allowed to remain in the hands of the local chiefs, who made decisions in

very much the same way as they had occurred before the advent of European

colonization and domination”. Continuing, Anweh opines, “the creation of Lagos

Executive Development Board (LEDB) in 1928 and the establishment of the Nigerian

Building Society (NSB) in 1956 to provide mortgage loans for prospective home owners

also represent efforts at addressing the needs of Nigerians by the Colonial

Administration”. The Colonial Housing Policy made efforts at different times to address

the issue of housing.

"��5�"� ��)��,�� )'��%'�!�

The need for housing policy in Nigeria became an important issue only when the

country achieved independence in 1960. According to Okupe, (2002:21) “the search

for solution to this critical need of the people continued at independence as reflected in

the first National Development Plan spanning five years”.

During this Plan Period, 1962-1968, “housing did not prominently feature in the

plan. There was a short reference to housing in Lagos, where the Federal Government

proposed to build 24,000 housing units in order to reduce over-crowding and prevent

further deterioration” (Mohammed, Haninaya, Olu and Achebe, 1980:18). “The public

sector produced less than 500 units per annum and only 38 percent of these for low-

income groups. In other words, direct building by governments and government

agencies met only 1.06 percent of the country’s needs” (Koenigsberger, 1980:67).

24

Prior to 1970 apart from staff housing scheme for senior civil servants, “public

sector activity was limited to efforts of the Lagos Executive Redevelopment Board, the

Nigerian Building Society and the Regional Housing Corporations. The scope of their

work was highly restricted due to lack of finance and technical personnel” (Okupe,

2002:42). During the Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974,

the Federal Government declared the intention to construct a total of 59,000 housing units. Effort during this time included capital allocation totaling N47 million by both the Federal and State Governments. For instance, the Federal Government set aside N1.4 million for

the expansion of the Nigerian Building Society;

the granting of loan of about N6 million to Nigerian Building Society for onward ending;

(iii) the allocation of N1.6 million for the construction of

staff quarters and transit blocks of flat in Lagos;

the allocation of about N5 million for the construction of 59,000 housing units across the nation;

and the allocation of about N33 million by the then

State Governments for urban housing development (Onibukun, 1985:34).

The first serious attempt at highlighting the issue of housing to a national focus

was marked by the “the formation of the National Council on Housing in 1971,

consisting of all the Commissioners responsible for housing in the federation”.

According to Balogun, (1976:8),

the year 1972 to 1974 also witnessed two other positive and progressive acts of government intervention. In 1972, the Federal Government acquired the shares of the Commonwealth Development Corporation in the Nigerian Building Society to make it a national limited liability company. More importantly, substantial amounts of money were granted to the society in two successive years to enlarge its activities.

25

Haninaya, (1980:5) states that

in May 1972, the Federal Staff Housing Board was established to take over from the African Housing Scheme of the Colonial era. The Board was empowered to grant to eligible members of the Public Service loans amounting to five times the applicant’s annual salary or N20,000 whichever is less. Later this was increased to N40,000 with further request for increasing it to N100,000 .

Hananiya continued, “it was not until Decree No. 40 of 1973 establishing the

Federal Housing Authority that a comprehensive programme on housing was evolved.

At this stage the National Housing programme was to be very dependent on the States’

involvement and acceptance”. As the programme paper said, “the programme has to

originate, grow and be executed in the state. It is designed to meet the particular needs

of each state and the Federal Housing Authority was to coordinate the housing activities

going on in all the states of the Federation” (Achebe, 1980:23). Appendix IV is the

Federal Housing Authority Offices at a glance in the nineteen States of the Federation

during the Second Republic.

Federal Ministry of Economic Planning and Reconstruction (1970:418) states that

“the Federal Government accorded importance to housing policy. Government’s efforts

towards housing policy are evidenced in its Fiscal Outlay on housing during the Second

National Development Pan (1997-74)”. Commenting on Federal Government’s efforts

during this period, Ebie, (1980:5) observes that “Housing and Town Planning were still

tied together in some votes, for example, in Lagos State, N1 million was earmarked for

Housing and Town Planning. However, the housing effort during this period was not

entirely reflected in the table overleaf as presented by the Federal Government:

26

�$%��8� 3')��%�� %�!�� )'��$!� ��1 �(��# ��

� ��'��"�� '��%�� (�%�,# ��%��9�:;�8;*<�

State Planning Activity Outlay for Housing (m)

Benue/Plateau Nil -

East Central Housing Development 0.300

Kano Nil -

Kwara Housing for officials 0.600

Lagos Housing and Town Planning 1.00

Mid-West Housing Scheme 1.04

North Central Survey and Housing 1.2

North Eastern Housing Scheme 0.7

North Western Nil -

Rivers Housing Scheme 1.0

South Eastern Housing Scheme 2.8

Western Town Planning and Housing 1.9

Source: 2nd Development Plan 1970-74, Federal Ministry of Economic Planning and Reconstruction. 1970, p. 418”.

In the Third National Development Plan (1975-1980) according to Iyortyer,

(1984:24), “there was a slight improvement over the Second National Development Plan

because shelter was featured prominently as shown in this table unlike the previous

Development Plan where allocation made under the Town and Country Planning sector

included housing, surveys, preparation of master plans, resettlement and so on:

27

�$%��"�� 8� ��,'��%��# # ��(�)�# ��

� � � � ��$%'�� 2�9�:;+8=�<�___________________________________________________________

State Total Expenditure (N000) ___________________________________________________________ Anambra 9,500

Bauchi 3,500

Bendel 45,000

Boorno 5,000

Gross River 5,000

Gongola 15,000

Imo 3,000

Kaduna 15,000

Kano 13,000

Kwara 23,000

Lagos 3,500

Niger 16,000

Ogun 15,000

Ondo 10,000

Oyo 10,000

Plateau 10,000

Rivers 10,000

Sokoto 10,000

Total 232,660

�� !��!��2�9�:=*<5�� '��%�� (�%�,# ��%��2�3��%�

�� 4 '�')��!��# '��%��'��)��'��2��

��:;+2�,��*"5>��

��

The period saw the creation of many federal and State Low cost housing

estates at the various State capitals in the federation. It also witnessed the “emergence

of State Housing Corporations’ medium-income low density housing estates in most

State capitals throughout the country. It was during this period that the number of

States increased from 12 to 19. Each Corporation was set up by its State Government”

28

(Njoku, 1999:18). However, “the success of the plan was far below the expectation, as

the progress report of 1977 showed that only 15,000 housing units were completed by

that time. The houses were not built all over the country but concentrated in Lagos and

Kaduna in order to accommodate visitors for the World Festac” (Falegun, 1985:7).

The plan during this period,

clearly recognized the housing problem and aimed to increase the housing supply to a substantial degree. In this regard, four principal strategies were adopted;

The federal government decided to participate

actively in the provision of housing instead of leaving the responsibility to the private sector. To achieve this, objective, the government recognised the need for housing related institutions:

i. A new Housing Unit in the Cabinet Office –

early in the Plan period, the federal Ministry of Housing Urban Development and Environment was created.

ii. A Housing Authority was already set up as an implementation Unit.

iii. A Housing Mortgage Bank – the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria was established in 1976 to replace the Nigerian Building society, with an initial capital grant of N150 million.

(b) The government decided to subsidize the housing costs for low-income groups by directly constructing housing units.

(c) A total of N1,837 billion was allocated for capital

investment in the housing sub-sector during the Third National Development Plan period.

(d) The government took specific measures to minimize existing bottlenecks in the construction industry, for example, increasing investment in

domestic production of cement and burnt bricks and also increasing importation of other building materials” (Ajanlekoko, 2002:5-7).

29

It was later discovered that Federal funds were not inexhaustible and according

to Mohammed, Olu, Hananiya and Achebe (1980:14), “the oil boom which led the

Federal Government to embark on the plan in the first place soon ran into financial

constraints on the execution of the plan and hence housing naturally suffered. In fact

the Ministry of Housing, Urban Development and Environment was wound up in 1978”.

“Although Nigeria’s housing problem may not have been exhaustively studied, “there is

enough information to conclude that the magnitude of the problem is quite serious”

(FRN, 1985:35). However, more serious efforts were made to improve the lots of the

low-income earners by establishing low cost housing units during Nigeria’s Second

Republic.

"��*�� )'��%'�!�� '��'�?)� ��

��,�$%'��9�:;:8�:=5<��)�� '��%�� )'��%'�!�

"��*�� )'��%'�!�� '��'�?)� ��,�$%'��

The change in Government in October, 1979 added impetus to housing

development as all the political parties identified housing as one of the problems they

would like to tackle when voted into power. Hananiya, (1984:3) observes that “the

elections has come and gone and the tempo of housing has assumed an important

place in the programme being announced by many governments – States and Federal”.

For example, Governor Lateef Jakande of Lagos State “mandated his State Housing

Corporation to deliver 50,000 low-cost housing units annually. Bauchi State

Government announced that it will spend N135 million for low cost housing in the next

five years” (Kanu, 1988:22).

At the Federal level, the President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari was said to announce

that “since housing construction was of top priority to his party – National Party of

30

Nigeria, the Federal Government, which he now heads would make housing a top

priority of his government” (Olu, 1988:13). Oyediran (1980:14) opines, “it is in

furtherance of this goal, that the Minister of Housing and Environment promised the

nation that the Federal government planned to build 200,000 low-cost housing units

annually with the support of the State government and private sector for the low-income

earners”. What are low-cost houses, one may ask?

"��5�"� -�6 ��)�� )�)

The definition of low cost housing is not clear. As stated by Hananiya, Olu and

Achebe, (1981:168), “in the layman’s view, a low-cost house comprises one bedroom

(preferably two), one living room, one store, one kitchen, one bath and one toilet and a

terrace space”. They stated however, that:

these in our opinion are rock bottom minimum requirement. People in the low income group whom the policy tends to profess to give these so-called low cost houses to, are invariably prone to having the largest number of children and wives and consequently need to be given larger space accommodation to live decently. Therefore to house them conveniently they need additional room, a minimum of three bedrooms is considered adequate. This creates a big contradiction of how to make a bigger area of accommodation low costing.

”According to Anweh, (1991:84), “in Apri, 1980, following the National Council on

Housing and Environment Conference in Port Harcourt, the government of Shehu

Shagari embarked on a “Housing for all” programme for the country.” Imo, (1985:68)

states that

the President said: the goal of my administration in the area of housing was to as much as possible that every Nigerian has access to a decent and affordable accommodation in a clean environment . The specific objective of the programme were given as follows:

(a) an increased production of affordable owner/ occupier houses in the urban areas;

31

(b) adequate provision of financial resources to institutions charged with the responsibility of house financing and building construction industry; and

(c) support local initiative and activities in home production.

In pursuance of this policy, Ibeanu, (1985:68) states that:

the Federal Government announced its commitment to the provision of 200,000 housing units yearly through both private

and public efforts. The Ministry of Housing and Environment was on its part to be directly involved with the construction of 2,000 housing units yearly in each State including Abuja. The emphasis ostensibly was on affordable owner/occupier houses for the low income urban worker.

In their own contribution, Mohammed and Olu, (1989:2) state that

the government now accepts it as a part of its social responsibility to participate actively in the provision of housing for all groups and will intervene on a large scale in this sector during this period. Under this programme, Government was to provide 202,000 housing units scattered all over the 19 states of the Federation distributed as follows:

(a) Each State except Kaduna State was to have 8000 x 18 = 144,000

(b) Kaduna State was to have 12,000 = 12,000

(c) Lagos area under Federal Housing Authority 46,000 = 46,000

202,000

In realization of this programme, Oyediran (1986:10) observes that

all the existing designs of housing units have been critically reappraised in terms of building and infrastructure with the view of using their standard designs to form the basis for the award of contracts for the housing units to be constructed in State capitals and headquarters of Local Governments for low in-come earners. In addition, the Minister announced that self-help housing programmes by inhabitants of small towns and villages to build their own houses should be encouraged.

According to Oluoma, (1988:30) “the announcement naturally gladdened the

heart of those who need shelter over their heads”. The question is how feasible were

these promises? What were the constraints on the paths of implementation of this lofty

programme? What strategy of co-ordination was employed to realize this programme?

32

These are some of the questions to which this study would attempt to provide some

answers.

In his assessment of the housing programme during this period, Ezeala, (2006:3)

states that “the programme was for a minimum of 8,000 low-cost housing units in each

State except Kaduna State and metropolitan Lagos. But the success in each State

varied and the overall percentage achievement rate was only about 13%” as shown in

Table 3 below:

�$%��5��8�� )'��%'�!��# ��)�# �� )�

�� '�� '?�� # '�')��'��

State % of success

Imo 0.06%

Sokoto 12.5%

Bauchi 22.0%

Oyo 18.0%

Federal Government 8,000

out of 46,000 17.391%

Gongola built 382 out of 8,000 4.775% �

�� %�2�� 9�:=�<2�� )'��'�� '��'�2�,�*��

This means that out of the 202,000 housing planned for the period only 26,260 units

were completed.” This means that the plan target was not successful. The search for

solution to this seemingly interaction problems continued in the1980-1985 National

Development Plan. �

In Benue State, the low cost housing programme during this period under review,

according to Egba, (1990:34) “performed so poorly that the effect of the oil boom was

not felt in most of the Local Government Areas. The good ambition of the

33

Administration was frustrated in this State and so, the result was a failure”, as shown in

the table below:

�$%��*� 8� �� -�6 ��)�� )'��# ��9�:=�8�:=5<�

��

��

Makurdi 1,000 400 600 units abandoned by the contractor

Giwer 200 30 170 units not constructed

V/Ikya 200 80 120 units not constructed

Idah 200 20 180 units not constructed

Ankpa 200 40 160 units not constructed

Gboko 200 Nil The contractor did not show appearance

Result 2,000 510 (34%) The programme was a failure �� $�2�9�::�<2��%%��'�� +2�/ �%��)�� # $��2��

�� )'�� !2�4 ��'2�,��5*��

Continuing in the assessment of the Second Republic Housing Programme,

Egba, (1990:4) observes that “the critical point to note in the table above is that the

good ambition of the Administration was frustrated here in Benue State and the result

was failure. Further investigation revealed that most of the housing units in the local

governments were given to incompetent contractors because of pressure from the

interest groups”.

In Anambra State, according to Imo, (1991:36), “out of the six thousand housing

units budgeted for construction within three years - 1980-83, only 1,300 housing units

(21.6 %) were actually constructed”, as could be seen in the table next page.

34

�$%��+� 8� � ��# $�� -�6 ��)�� )'��# # ��9�:=�8=5<�

Local Government/ Building Site Number constructed

Enugu 100 Abakaliki 100 Aguata 50 Anambra 50

Awgu 50 Awka - Ezeagu - Ezza 50 Idemili 50

Igbo Etiti 50 Igbo Eze 50 Ihiala 50

Ikwo 50 Ishienu 50 Isiuzo 50 Njikoka - Nkanu 50 Nnewi 100 Nsukka 50 Oji River 50 Onitsha 150 Udi 100 Uzo Uwani 50

Total 1,300 (21.6%)

�� # �2��9�::�<2��%%�,)�� ,�$%'��'��

� '��'�2�,�5@��

� The critical perspective was that Alhaji Shehu Shagari’s Housing Policy was

progressive and mass oriented though it was poorly executed. The fundamental reason

for the failure of Shehu Shagari Housing policy was the inability of his aids to implement

the beautiful and mass-oriented Housing Policy he conceived” (Imo, 1991:11).

Deducing from the above, housing as one of the cardinal policies of the Second

Republic Administration failed simply because the project was given to incompetent

contractors owing to pressure from interest groups, some influential legislators and

other unforeseen forces. This has proved the research question very positively that

35

interest groups, pressure groups, group politics from the ruling party and legislators

contributed significantly to the housing policy not only when it was in the making, but

also by shaping it negatively.

In his own contribution while appraising the housing programme, Kanu,

(1985:10), stated that

the Minister for Housing and Environment, Alhaji Banu claimed that the response from Nigerians to buy these houses was staggering and that allocation exercise have been completed in many of the States and the allotees have started to move in. While the minister was praising the Shagari Administration for its mass oriented housing programme, Alhaji Lateef Jakande, the Governor of Lagos State at the commissioning of Dolphin Low Cost Housing Scheme on 23rd April, 1982 said many

uncomplimentary things about the Housing programme.

According to Njoku, (1999:46) “while these efforts are commendable, however,

certain loopholes which existed led to the emergence of sinister phenomena, which

made proper implementation of the Government Housing Policy a white-elephant

project.” From the above historical excursion of Housing Policy formulation, the decade

1973-1985 saw unprecedented levels of government action in housing. Although

Nigeria’s housing problem during the Second Republic may not have been exhaustively

studied, there is enough information to conclude that the housing programme was a

lofty one with populist conception but the magnitude of the failure was quite serious.

"��5�"�� 6 �� '��%�� )'��%'�!�

The efforts and failures of the past regimes in formulating and implementing a

functional housing policy, having been evaluated,

the military administration in May, 1985 set up a 10-man committee which was mandated to examine the issues associated with housing and draw up a ‘blue print’ for improving performance of housing delivery in the country. To get a proper appraisal of this issue, a

National debate was launched and the response was tremendous. All over the country workshops and seminars were organized and all spectra of society expressed their

36

views on the recommendations of the Special Committee on the new Housing Policy. (Njoku, 1999:13).

Following this and a series of other developments, the Armed Forces Ruling

Council “deliberated on the new Housing Policy, and approved the document on the 10th

of April,1990 which was officially launched by the presidency in February 1991. Its goal

which was a reflection of the United Nations Resolution was to ensure that all Nigerians

own or have access to decent housing accommodation at affordable cost by the year

2000” (Ajanlekoko, 2001). The Federal Government unfolded a new agenda and

established a new National Housing Programme (NHP) in March, 1994 with

the aim of providing adequate and affordable shelter for the needs of Nigerians within the Low, Medium and High income groups. About 121,000 housing stocks were to be delivered under the programme. As usual, the outcome was a dismal failure. Only a total of 292 housing units valued at N2, 328 billion have been completed (Mustapha, 2002).

However, the actual provision of housing units has always been far below the

housing targets in each National Development Plan or Annual Budgets and Nigeria’s

journey towards housing provision has been substantially characterized by motion

without movement. In fact, “access to decent shelter has worsened for increasing

segments of the urban population in Nigeria. For instance it was reported that out of the

121,000 housing units slated to be built between 1994 and 1995, only 1,014 houses

were completed” (CBN, 1994 and 1998). It was also estimated that:

85% of urban population live in single rooms and the number of occupants per room range from 8 to 12 with adverse effects on sanitation and health. And yet, it has been projected that the total annual housing needs for the next 15-20 years considering the prevailing occupancy ratio of about 3-4 persons, per room is between 5000,000 and 600,000 units. If we were to have met the target of 8 million units by the year 2000 AD, the slogan ‘housing for all’ by the year 2000 would not have been a dream consigned to the trash bin! (Agbola, 199:23).

37

The new National Housing Policy is a document which, “among other things

analysed the magnitude of the housing problems both in the urban and rural areas and

also focused on past policies and programme – its failures, achievements and financial

allocation. It also sets out the goals and objectives of the new policy as well as

strategies for achieving them” (FMEWH, 2005:34). It reviewed the role of the Federal

Mortgage Bank of Nigeria, the constraints militating against the effective performance of

the Bank and suggests the creation of a new housing finance system. Under this new

arrangement,

a two-tier structure has been created. The Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria will now operate as an annex institution, concentrating on wholesale mortgage institution, forming the second-tier, shall perform retail mortgage lending at the grassroots. Strategic mobilization of funds for housing finance through the establishment of a mandatory home savings scheme within the framework of a National Housing Fund, voluntary schemes and government budgetary allocations and financial transfers are expatiated under

this chapter as well (FHA, 2002:10)

Its focus also was, according to Eniola, (2002:6)

on a wide range of topics from trends in building materials and construction costs, building research and manpower development and training, to private sector participation in housing delivery. It

acknowledges the role of monitoring and evaluation in policy implementation and establishes the relevant institutions that effect

- the Legislations, which require amendments to make the implementation of the policy functional.

According to Ajanlekoko, (2002:13), the “National Rolling Plans (NRPs) 1990-

2000) explicitly recognized the importance of providing adequate housing in the country

as a tool for stimulating the national economy”. According to NBS, (2005:9), “in this

millennium, many other efforts have been made to alleviate housing problems in Nigeria

but none has actually materialized”. In summarizing Government efforts towards

solving housing problems in Nigeria, Bichi, (2007:16) writes:

38

Government direct interventions in housing provision included the setting up of the Nigerian Building society (NBS) in 1956; the creation of National Site and Services Scheme (NSSS) in 1986, to provide land with essential infrastructure facilities such as roads, drainage and sewerage system, water supply, and electricity for housing development in a well environment. The scheme is planned to provide 2000 well laid out and serviced plot, in each of the State capitals of the federation, including the Federal Capital, Territory, Abuja.

Continuing on the efforts towards solving housing problems in Nigeria Bichi opines:

Government established the National Prototype Housing Programme (NPHP) by the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing to complement the objectives of the NSS). The Project was embarked upon to demonstrate the feasibility of constructing functional, cost effective and affordable housing units, through imaginative designs, judicious specification of materials and efficient management of construction; the setting up of the State Housing Corporations (SHC) to provide housing to the populace at affordable prices; the creation of the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) in 1977, to finance housing loans to prospective housing developers at minimal interest rate; the setting up of the National Housing Programme (NHP) in 1991 and the National Housing Fund (NHF) scheme by Decree No. 3 of 1992, to provide soft loans to prospective housing developers and also monitor developments in the housing sector;

NBS, (2005:10) stated that the efforts towards solving housing problems in

Nigeria, among others, included:

the decomposition of the FMBN through the establishment of the Federal Mortgage Finance Limited to take over retail mortgage portfolio previously handled by the bank, and also facilitate effective management of the NHF scheme; the setting up of a Housing Policy Council (HPC) to monitor developments in the housing sector and also to sep up the machinery for the review of the 1978 Land Use Decree (LUD), in order to make land available for large scale land developers; the National Housing Policy (NHP) in 1981, Infrastructural Development Fund (IDF) in 1985, and Urban Development Bank (UDB) in 1992 (NPC, 1998 and Vision 2010 Main Report).

39

A global searchlight beamed on housing during second United Nation

Conference on Human Settlements, otherwise called Habitat 11, which took place in

Istanbul, Turkey from 3rd to 14th June, 1996:

reaffirmed that access to adequate standard of living is part of the inalienable rights of man. Therefore state parties were encouraged to ensure its progressive realization. Right to adequate housing as universal human right includes not only a roof over one’s head but implies access to all the system considered essential to a healthy life, particularly urban life including access to safe water and other infrastructural necessities of life (UN, 1997:145).

Despite these lofty initiatives and efforts by the governments, actual

achievements in terms of providing adequate housing in the country remain essentially

minimal. For instance, “all the good intentions, evinced by the government through the

National Housing Policy, and in spite of huge resources committed to housing and

housing related matters by the government over the years, Nigeria’s housing problems

still remain intractable” (Abumere, 2006). Onibokun, (2007:5) states “the housing

problems remain unresolved”. In this same view, according to Soladoye in Hananiya

(1990:13), “it would be self-deceit if any government hoped that it could provide houses

for all its citizens”.

As stated in the Federal Republic of Nigeria National Housing Policy, (2006:11)

from May 29, 1999 to date, the Federal Government comtemplated a new National Housing Programme under which it would build twenty thousand (20,000) housing units throughout the federation over a four year period at the rate of five thousand (5,000) per annum, as a demonstration of its commitment to the eradication of homelessness among Nigerians. However, the implementation of the programme as envisaged is yet to commence.

One can therefore see that Nigeria has not witnessed any successful housing

delivery programme since Independence in 1960. The announcement of fantastic

housing units to be built by various governments could not solve the existing housing

40

problem, until the promises are practically fulfilled at least fifty per cent. What then

were the factors that militated against the achievement of successful implementation of

housing policies in Nigeria?

3��)��4 '%'�� '�)��# ,%�# ��'��

�� '��'�?)�� )'��%'�'�)� The problem of housing construction has been with us from the earliest times.

“Nwosu, 1985:13) opines: “while the efforts of government towards improving the

housing situation of the populace are commendable, however, certain loopholes led to

the emergence of sinister phenomena which militated against their effective

implementation.” Chigbundu, (1971:72) states that “every administration in this country

has been faced with the problem but the size of the problem clearly demonstrates that

perhaps the right remedies have not been discovered or if discovered have not been

applied.” The following are however some of the obvious problems that militated

against the effective implementation of Nigeria’s housing policies:

-��%'�!��)�A� $&��'(�)�

“There was absence of a comprehensive national policy framework for the

operation and maintenance of Second Republic housing policy for the development of

infrastructures” (Bichi, 2001:12). Some of the steps that should be taken according to

Rogers, (2004: 11) include:

i. Identification of major causes of poor operation and maintenance of rural development infrastructures.

ii. Enacting laws on the institution and practices

required for effective operations and maintenance. iii. Identification and classifications of various

stakeholders for different aspects of rural development maintenance.

41

iv. Enhanced national capacity development in the operation and maintenance of rural infrastructures especially water, electricity, roads, health and educational facilities.

In his own contribution, Adeniran, (1978:7) observes that “policy objectives are

imperative if rural dwellers are to benefit from the investments made in the rural

development housing units dotted in the various local government areas of the country”.

�

-��%��'��

As observed in SEEDS, (2004:89), “planning, the first and perhaps most

important function of management was not the priority of successive administrations

including the Second Republic. It is particularly very important in a developing country

where resources are relatively scarce”. “A work plan is a written document detailing

specific work action aimed at specific objectives within the framework of an identified

environment. The greatest value of a work plan is that it provides you with a working

document aimed squarely at specific results and determining how they are to be

achieved” (Ekeanyanwu, 20085).

Balogun, (2003:1) states that “many projects and programmes have failed in this

country because adequate plans were not made to identify all the important variables

likely to bear on the projects that would determine their failure or success.” Ukwu,

(1980:17) observes that:

the policy as of now was simply to deliver housing units irrespective of the quality and habitability of such units.

They did not meet the culturally determined needs or values of Nigerians in whatever part of the country they were sited and its unlikely that they would be patronized or fully utilized by many Nigerians. A shift of housing projects to the rural areas since this would decelerate growing urbanization, its many attendant ills and its prejudice in favour of the urban elite. It might be more appropriate to delegate responsibility for housing to local governments and to make funds available to them.

42

Discussing social welfare and environment, among which is Housing Policy, “the

social quality of the rural environment – the human setting, organization and interaction

patterns of household and settlement units with the deprived quality of its material

culture, Sada pointed out that a good number of programmes planned by the

government was not executed eventually” (Sada 1980:17). During this period, the

housing policy and programmes introduced by the Federal Government became “an

abysmal failure as reflected by failure of architectural designs to take cognizance of the

various cultural and climatic factors; and politicization of project location and the

appointment of contractors, which gave little or no consideration to competence and

experience” (Ebie,2001:12).

When the Housing Programme was being conceptualized, according to Bamai,

(1988:3), “it was evident that the prices of low-income house types could not cover

construction costs. The intention, however, of the initiators of the programme was to

keep prices of the low-income category houses low and affordable to enable the

greatest number benefit from the programme”. Consequently, as stated by Ebie,

(2001:26), “the disposal prices were, in some cases, fixed below cost of construction of

house, let alone infrastructure, in other cases prices provided a slim margin over

contract costs. In no case were prices of low-income houses expected to cover all

development costs”. For Bwari (1984:20),

there is still a serious snag and that is the lack of an articulated policy guideline that will clearly define who provides what and

would take into consideration the critical factors in modern housing provision which include the number of housing units in the urban/rural communities, which determines the room occupancy ration. The cost effectiveness of housing provision vis-à-vis affordability or the capacity of the end-users to rent or buy. The provision of enabling environment viz, mortgage facilities, private sector involvement and other funding agencies on housing previsions. The architectural quality and aesthetic quality in harmony with the natural environment.

43

The effect of the military rule was also a militating factor to the achievement of a

successful implementation of Second Republic housing programme. According to

SEEDS (2004:98), “the long period of military in governance weakened budgetary

processes and institutions, and there was a backlog in the production of audited

Annual Accounts and Financial Statements of the State. The same situation was also

prevalent at the Local Governments.

��-��)�',��# ,��. ��)�

According to Ikegwuoha, (1994:151),

the administration started with abuses of democratic and presidential principles. The National Assembly and various States’ House of Assembly witnessed open duels, minority parties’ members walking away from the Houses, violation of human rights; some State Governors shared public offices between few families, thus casting doubts to the public on the integrity and seriousness of government.

The events in Nigeria’s politics show that the practice of democracy and

government by the civilians and soldiers have been the practice of grafts. “Since there

was manifest indiscipline in the leadership itself, the Buhari-Idiagbon regime enunciated

an ethical revolution – War Against Indiscipline (WAI), the banner being, leadership by

example. A belief that from the fountain of a disciplined leadership would issue clean

waters of an equal disciplined fellowship” (Ikegwuoha, 199424).

In his own contribution, Nigro & Nigro (1973:46), observes that

there was also concentration of leadership and policy making at the top and this killed initiative and sense of belonging that would have produced new ideas for the housing delivery and growth. It is a known fact that this problem is often created by political patronage as well as socio-cultural value orientation of favouring friends, relatives and kinship affiliations.

Evo, (2008:4) quoting Hal Halladay states that “as a leader going into the battle

of business, you will go as far as your team. No matter your expertise, your dedication

44

and tenacity, without a supporting team, you will not succeed. And without leaders in

that supporting team, you will fail”. According to Yusuf, in Emezue, (2008:8),

Previous studies are full of proof that inadequacies in both in the stock and quality of leaders in this country have badly hindered social progress, at the national as well as individual level. Two factors which had retarded (and which continue to retard) successful implementation of housing programme/ projects in Nigeria were inadequate leadership acumen and poor quality subordinate employees”.

In the same vein, Schatz, (1965:55) opines “It was not the lack of capital or other

economic factors that constitute the greatest constraints in the development of the

second republic housing programme but lack of leadership talents”.

As stated in SEEDS, (2004:89) “the informal and ad hoc approach to public

administration also permeated staff recruitment and promotion processes and

procedures. Merit was displaced as the most important criterion for hiring as entry into

the service came to depend more on “whom you know’ than “what you can do”. In the

same vein, (Ugwu and Doran, 1994: 24) opine “the major consequence of this was the

displacement of efficiency and effectiveness and the enthronement of incompetence

and indiscipline”.

“One of the cardinal principles needed to deliver the housing sector is that

leaders must be examplary. A knowledge-based leadership provides a foundation for

the social transformation and optimal utility of available resources to achieve set

objectives” (Adams, 1996:22).

� (��(�%�� # )�� $��# ��&��)�

As stated by Ikegwuoha, (1994:153), “a combination of executive and political

“class” in collaboration with foreign agents dipped hands into the robust resources of the

nation; they selfishly and consciously appropriated them through highly inflated

45

contracts. Sharing this view that contractors were part of the problems to achieving the

objectives of housing policy in Nigeria, Mohammed, (1980:168) opines,

the projects in the State ran into a problem which plagued most government projects. Contractors over-value the works. Some contractors ran away after collecting the mobilization fees. Many of the contractors employed for the job were inexperienced and incompetent resulting in many of the houses being abandoned half way through.

According to Madu, (2008:5) states that “the structures numbering about ten

most of which had reached roofing stage but have remained abandoned since 1983 As

at today, the project has been overgrown by weeds and some of the buildings yielding

to the natural consequences of their continued exposure to the vagaries o weather. In

his own contribution, (Alozie, 2008:5) opines, “successive administrations in the State

had refused to pay attention to the project and hoped that this administration would

remember this abandoned project of the Second Republic”.

-��3'��

Finance is perhaps the most apparent, if indeed not the most serious of the

problems of housing in this country. According to Gana, (1988:6),

the Nigerian housing finance system as was constituted during the Shagari regime was seriously ill-equipped to mobilize and channel resources towards housing production on a massive scale…. The Bank has also found it very difficult to mobilize adequate funds for the housing sector. Apart from the equity capital of N150 million, the Bank’s major sources of funds appear to be loans from the Federal Government and the Central Bank of Nigeria. Such loans amounted to

N220.8 million from the Federal Government and N25.7 million from the Central Bank. Funds from savings deposits rose from

about N21.4 million in 1979 to only N113.2 million in 1984.

Muhammed, Olu and Achebe, (1980:17) state that,

on the basis of statistics supplied by the various housing authorities in the country, an average housing unit of three Bedroom Bungalow costs approximately N30,000.00 Assuming each State is

46

to build 20,000 housing units in a year, it will require N600 million to meet its target. If the States abandoned everything else and concentrated all efforts in financing housing construction, all their resources would not be adequate to the task. Federal Government on the other hand would require six billion Naira to meet its housing programme to the nation. It is clear therefore, that alternative sources of finance have to be sought if our requirements for housing in the next few years are to be met.

Finance and credit, especially for housing, have been difficult to mobilize for a

number of reasons but most these are “attributable to the absence of a viable housing

finance system. Finance constitutes a fundamental centerpiece in any housing

development project, the ability of a developer to mobilize enough funds for the project

determines largely the success of the housing policy” (Okupe, 2002:14). Most

Nigerians, in achieving the dream of owning a house, were forced to look for funds from

many sources including the financial institutions, which most of the time:

charged the same interest rate required for other businesses, for transactions involving housing development. Not even the provision of the National Housing Funds (NHF) Decree 3 of 992, which required every commercial or merchant bank to invest rate of one per cent (1%) above the interest rate payable on current accounts by banks have provided the required magic (Oyediran, 1990:12).

In his own contribution, Igbozuruike, (1988:20) opines “the Second Republic

housing programme which was conceived and started was suspended, owing to

financial constraints in 1984”. In their own contribution, Mohammed, Olu, Hananiya,

and Achebe (1980:3) write: “according to the programme, each State shall achieve the

programme within the limits of funds available to it from Federal Government”. On the

other hand, Ajalenkoko (2002:17) writes, “among the components of finance are high

rate of default in loan repayment by mortgagors, and delays in the release of refund by

the governments”.

47

��B��!��4 ��3��'%'�'�)�

It is noteworthy to mention that the housing programme would not be complete

without an exhaustive and effective mortgage system in place. As stated by Ebie,

(1980:7), “the fund, since inception, has been ineffective to adequately address the

yearning needs of most Nigerians. Accessing the fund is somehow difficult because of

the stringent conditionality for obtaining the National Housing Fund loans by

individuals”. Akeredo-Ale in his contribution writes “the Nigerian Mortgage system

needs an urgent restructuring if the housing crisis is to be addressed. The application

of short-term mortgage where a house buyer would be required to pay 50% down

payment and the balance within six years as currently practiced by some developers is

not the solution to the mortgage market”, while Ani, (1998:12) states that “the mortgage

facility of the National Housing Fund (NHF) is a commendable option for affordable

long-term facility for home ownership and not for short-term home ownership in the

country” as shown in the table below:

Table 6 - Mortgage Loan Applicable/Funds

Year Applications for Loans Available Funds (N million) (N million)

1979 223.8 95.8

1980 350.9 128.9

1981 584.5 89.7

1982 676.8 74.0

1983 535.0 68.5

1884 318.6 81.5

TOTAL 2,686.6 538.4 Source: Gana, (1988), Towards Improved Rural Housing

In Nigeria, Housing Today, A Journal of the Association of Housing Corporations of Nigeria (AHCN), Jan/April, p. 7.

48

As stated by Mohammed, Olu, Hananiya, and Achebe (1980:4), “the Federal

Mortgage Bank could not satisfy the yearning needs of those who wanted money to

build their private houses. The NHF however requires proper management adjustment

that will enhance greater access by a sizeable number of people”. Ebie, (1980:26)

opines, “the fund, since inception, has been ineffective to adequately address the

yearning needs of most Nigerians. I examined many intellectual errors and housing

policy aberrations have kept the country off course”.

� $)��%�)��)��$!�1 �(��# �� '�'�%)��

� ��8� �'%'C��'��%��)��

The Public Sector is established to provide services to the community and cater

for its well being rather than be there for self enrichment and aggrandisement resulting

in frustrating persons having something to do with government. As stated in Akwa,

(2000:7) quoting Section 2 of the Civil Service Handbook 1997, “A Civil Servant is

expected to assist in formulating and implementing the policies approved by

Government whatever his personal or private opinions or attitudes may be. He has the

duty to advice on the implications of a policy or action”.

“The desire to boost the strength of professional skills available for the

programme execution led to the transfer of technical staff of the Federal Ministry of

Works and Housing to Federal Housing Authority (FHA). This was done in a haphazard

manner and resulted in lack of effective controls” (Mustapha, 2002:4) while Akwa,

(2008:9) observes that “some government policy makers are characteristically deficient

in necessary management knowledge and expertise. We need a well informed and

articulated public opinion composed of citizens who will not exchange their birth right

(conscience) for a plate of red porridge (Naira)”.

49

Another problem is contractual default. According to Mustapha, (2002:29),

the concept of mass housing in the circumstances of Nigeria, necessarily implies the involvement of people in construction work, who may not qualify to execute them. This was equally true of the National Housing Programme (NHP), as political consideration weighed heavily on contract patronage. The unattractive construction costs discouraged many good contractors from participating while also frustrating those involved. This resulted in many instances of non- performance or mal-feasance.

“Accountability, doubtless good management of government is a critical factor in

Nigeria’s housing sector turn around. Our National history shows that we had passed

through regimes of government that were either accountable to the wrong people or to

no one else” (Mansifield, Ugwu & Doran, 1994:76). In their contribution to the obstacle

posed by government officials, Ounlana, Promkuntong and Jearkjirim, (1996:47) state

that:

the Colonial government was accountable to the British Government and not to the Nigerian people. During the Military era, since they were not voted into office, neither did they feel oblige to account to anyone. Execution of the housing policy requires a government that respects the Constitution and the rule of law and that practices sound leadership that is both responsible and accountable to the people.

In his contribution, Wells, (1986:4) opines “there must also be institution that

counter-balances government power and that could hold government officials

accountable both while in office and even after leaving office”. As stated in Rogers,

(2004:4), “the failure or inability of public opinion to insist on a culture of accountability

from public office holders has been a large contributor to the under performance of the

housing sector”.

Another important factor that militated against the effectiveness of the Second

Republic Housing Policy/programme implementation, according to Ogunna, (1999:83)

50

was inadequate utilization of available potential/proven talents and skills. Neither were they rewarded and encouraged. Consequently, the skills of such competent officials were left to rot in or out of the Service. For instance, a Principal Architect in the former Anambra State Ministry of Works and Housing revealed to the State Asset Tribunal that he resigned from the Service because of bungle in the Service, stating that for twelve years as an Architect in the Ministry, the Service did not tap his knowledge. He designed so many houses but none of his designs over came to fruition.

��,�%��'��D,%�)'��

Among the major problems identified in the urban environment is the gross overcrowding in the poor districts where most of the urbanites live, a situation aggravated by institutional barriers to the development of mass housing caused by population explosion. Nigeria is the largest country in Africa with a population of 120 million in 1979 and now 140 million, out of which 71,709857 are males while 68,293,683 are females (NPC, 2007:13).

Oyediran, (1980:15) opines “the increase in the population especially in urban

centers does not help matters as it compounds the rate of demand for housing over

supply”.

According to Bwari, (1999:2), “large population implies the provision of large amount of

services, especially housing, to satisfy all the inhabitants of the country and it was noted

that the present planning and execution of housing projects left much to be desired”.

In his views, Okupe, (2002:21) states that “the teeming population in Nigeria’s

urban centers is still confronted with the dilemma of acute housing shortage and the

National Housing Policy has performed so poorly that it seems to have failed the real

test of success - consumer satisfaction”. According to Ifuero (1987:11),

the large population of Nigeria, therefore, has a major implication on the implementation of housing policy. Though construction is poorly done, yet, the houses were scrambled for by the teeming populace confirming that the percentage of the population of a country that is well housed (in terms of quality, quantity and at affordable prices) is an important indicator of the quality of life available in that country.

51

��%��'��!��

There was the problem of coping with the inflationary trend that arose during the

life of the housing projects in Nigeria. As stated by Bichi, (2002:25),

the cost of building materials, diesel, fuel, etc went up as a result of strikes or shortages, and as these were not probably articulated or planned for, the housing projects suffered setbacks. However, some of these events were difficult to anticipate. For example, one cannot know when NUPENG or tanker drivers will strike and for how long, therefore, it affected the developers’ projections. The oil workers strike of post-annulment of June 12, 1993 is a case in point.

Mustapha, (2002:30) opines that

the escalating cost of construction and materials has led to cost over-runs and failed targets. It has also led to price changes of the housing units, which have invariably affected the demand position. For instance, government announcement of changes in selling prices of petrol, diesel and gas by 250% increase within the period affected the cost of materials and labour in the open market, cement increased by 150% while skilled and unskilled labour have done same by about 75%. In spite of these changes, the selling prices of the housing units were to remain unchanged for the first phase.

Although bulk procurement and distribution of building materials had the

advantages to bringing about savings and stabilization of materials costs, “it was

subjected to abuses, which to some extent affected the programme. For instance, there

was diversion of materials meant for construction by some unscrupulous contractors in

Nigeria” (Omotola, 1998:17).

-�� )��

Okoye, (2007:20) writes that “the Land Use Decree unfortunately vested

ownership of land in the State to the Chief Executive of such State. The land law did

not address the traditional ownership of the land and the extant land laws but made a

whole sale proposal which neglected the sentimental attachments that people have to

52

the land”. The bigger the ownership of resources, the more inefficient it is to manage.

For Mohammed, Olu, Hananiya and Achebe, (1980:167),

it was the responsibility of each State Government to make land available for the execution of the housing programme. Compensation for land for general purpose i.e. governments use various methodsfrom one part of the country to another. Some States then,found themselves unable to fulfill the requirements of the Federal Housing Authority that calls for a WORKABLE PROGRAMME which includes land and layout plans.

Six critical areas of problems identified Ajanlekoko, (2002:15) opines are

“the local resistance against the authorities in their bid to take possession and develop lands acquired by them or for them (by the State government in spite of Land Use Decree of 1978; the cumbersome procedure for the land acquisitions; the high cost of providing infrastructure on the land; the high cost of securing land and of settling compensation demands; the delay in the release of funds by government to the housing authorities for land acquisition and settlement of compensation.

��)��'%�'��4 ��'�%)�

“High cost of building materials constitutes a serious constraint to the housing

development effort of the country, as individuals who cannot afford the cost of the

products might not be able to build their own houses (Gana, 2002). In his contribution to

cost of material, Ajalenkoko, (2002:21) opines “cost of construction is prohibitive in the

country in terms of building materials and equipment, cost of labour and inadequate

funds from governments to pay construction cost”. In support of this assertion,

Igbinedion and Olowe (2007:20) opine

the Federal Government reform programames have received knocks for their lack of penetrating reach and failure to address the fundamentals of the real estate sector in the country… Whatever achievement the Obasanjo administration could lay claim to have achieved is eroded by the fact that the way things stand, a cement monopoly is being created in the country and that is adversely affecting the cost of the vital building commodity in the market.

53

Presently, according to Ajanlekoko (1997:18) “houses are built and rely solely on

cement. The nation needs about 8.5 million metric tones yearly. While our cement

companies are only able to produce about 2-3 million metric tones, this short fall has

always accounted for the galloping cost of cement every year” as shown in the table

below:

Table 7 - Cost of Cement per 50kg bag

YEAR 1970 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1990 2000 2005 2007

AMOUNT IN N 32 85 180 410 750 850 950 1,000 1,200 1,500 ��: Ajanlekoko, (1997), Housing Today, A Journal of the Association of

Housing Corporations of Nigeria (AHCN), Jan/March, 1997, p.18

Continuing, Ajanlekoko opines that over half of Nigeria’s cement need is

imported. According to recent survey, Nigeria is the world largest importer of cement

with about 70.5% dependence on importation. “The chances of the local industry rising

to the task remain very slim as only four (4 No) out of the seven (7 No) of the cement

companies in the country are still limping along at various levels of the capacity

utilization”. According to Falegun, (1985:19), “the campaign to use less of cement

blocks in housing construction, especially the low income housing has not yielded

result, but rather fizzled out”.

3%��4 ')# ��# �� '��'��# !��,�'��

According to Eluemuno, (2007:2) “the emergence of the colonialists brought

class consciousness and social class segmentation with the following social strata next

page:

54

Society

Uppermost Class

Upper Class

Middle Class

Lower Class

Each of these classes is a symbol of social achievement. The

people at the uppermost level are said to have attained self actualization because this is the social level where the individual could get whatever he desired with less difficulty. This class is associated with wealth. The upper class category is regarded as achievers and is thus, respected. The middle class are described as modest but very ambitious and eager to move forward. Those at the lower class are burdened with great expectations. They are ever seeking ways and means to attain their God-given pride of place in the land of the living. They are described as beginners and sometimes they envy those at the higher levels. These categories of people in an effort to be socially acceptable may resort to corrupt practices in order to be at par with people at the higher levels. Notwithstanding the abun- dant wealth of Nigeria, it is in this lower class that the greatest percentage of Nigerians belongs. Hence the endemic nature of corruption in Nigeria.

Corruption has been a great impediment to economic development in Nigeria.

“The African is corrupt through and through” says the white man in Achebe’s “No

Longer at Ease”. This is to say that all blacks have corrupt tendencies in their veins,

which cannot be wiped out even with western education. Corruption is something that is

associated with base instinct” (Achebe, 1958:12). Eluemuno, (2007:4) states that:

According to the World Bank’s Federal Public Expenditure Review published in 1995, approximately US$200 billion was invested in Nigeria, between 1973 and 1993 with very little to show for it. In fact, before the re-emergence of democracy in Nigeria in 1999, public infrastructure had deteriorated to the extent that no meaningful economic growth could be supported. The corollary of insfrastructural collapse and a corrupt business environment had propelled decline in domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country.

55

Corruption as stated by Akunyili, (2007:1),” is a fluid and continually evolving

concept hence it is difficult to define. Perhaps exppressing corruption in some of its

synonyms may help us understand it better and perceive its inherent abhorable nature”.

Continuing, Akunyili opines:

The Collins compact thesaurus offers synonyms of corruption as dishonesty, breach of trust, bribery, crookedness, demoralization, extortion, fiddling, fraud, graft, jobbery, profiteering, shady dealings, unscrupulousness, venality.

Depravity, baseness, decadence, degeneration, degrading, evil, immorality, impurity, iniquity, perversion, profligacy, sinfulness turpitude, vice, viciousness, wickedness. Rotting, adulteration, defilement, foulness, infection, pollution, putrefaction, putrescence, distortion, doctoring and falsification. The World Bank, (2007:5), states that corruption is “the abuse of public office for

private gains. When an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. When private agents

actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive

advantage and profit, or through patronage and nepotism the theft of state assets or the

diversion of state resources”. Annan in Akunyili (2007:2) observes that “Nigeria has

huge potentials and resources to afford its estimated 140 million people a decent and

qualitative life. Potentials to make it stand up and be counted as one of the richest and

developed countries in the world. Corruption brought gains to a few people over a time

but impacted negatively on the vast majority of Nigerians who have been reduced to

living deaths and beggars”.

There was progressive deficit budgeting and huge external borrowing since

1981. For instance, as stated by Ade, (1984:12), “at the Federal Government level, a

budget surplus of N1.461 million in 1979 fell to a budget surplus of N696.79 million. But

in 1981, it was a deficit budget of N2.675 million. In 1982, there was another deficit

balance of N4.727 million and in 183, there was further, a deficit budget of N3.989

million”. In his contribution, Ani, (1998:4) states that “the economy was grossly wrecked

56

by economic sabotage such as foreign exchange racketeering, illegal printing and

circulation of fake currency notes”.

In his own contribution on corruption during the Second Republic housing

programme/projects, Akanbi, (2002:4) opines:

It is global contagion that leaves destruction in its wake in every country that offers it hospitality and eventual residence. Corruption is destructive to the nation-state in all ramifications – political, economic, social and moral. It is a direct threat to democracy as it fosters social chaos and disequilibrium. It creates a gaping hole in government finances, promotes borrowing at high cost, makes inflation soar and reduces the purchasing power of the currency. It puts the economy in ruins and denies the people essential infrastructure. It dislodges the moral foundations of a society as the people get caught up in the suicidal game of if you can’t beat them, join them

Ade, (1984:12) sees Nigerian economy as “utter disregard of ethical norms and

values which results into indiscipline and unproductive which are the monsters that

constitute the bane of contemporary Nigerian society as well as persistent hindrances

to the achievement of sound implementation of Nigeria’s housing policies and

programme development”. Continuing, Ade opines

this cankerworm militated against the implementation of the previous Housing policies and programmes in Nigeria, particularly in Imo State. To cover up the corruption of the Nigeria’s Second Republic, public buildings were routinely set ablaze. The Ministries of Education, Internal Affairs and the Nigerian Telecommunication buildings were torched while a bewildered nation watched. With the level of corruption in the Second Republic, it was not surprising that the economy went into serious crises.

Writing on corruption during the Second Republic, Okadigbo, (2000:14) observes:

The essence of my thesis is that the much talked about corruption manifest in the public service in the way business is conducted and in the conception and execution of public works, is conceived by the political authorities, midwifed, nurtured and sustained by the professionals. As it takes to tango without the active support and participation of the professionals to give stamp of authority and approval to any scam or corrupt practice the people in authority cannot perpetrate their acts – short of blatant physical misappropriation of the resources involved.

57

In his view, Mustapha, (1988:29) opines “other forms of corruption prevalent in

the second republic include low level of transparency and accountability. Advanced fee

fraud (a.k.a. 419), money laundering and other forms of economic and financial crimes

which have eaten deep into the fabrics of society - misappropriation or diversion of

funds, over invoicing, bribery, kickbacks and false declaration were also prevalent ”.

Corruption, Nwachukwu, (2008:11) opines

has remained a very serious factor that has decimated Nigeria’s democratic progress. Attempts to check corrupt practices among public office holders have led to the establishment of agencies like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the code of conduct bureau. Unfortunately, the activities of these agencies have failed to reverse the corrupt tendencies of public office holders. In fact, Nigeria is still rated as one of the five most corrupt countries in the world today.

Igbinedion and Olowe, (2007:32) state that

three years after the government came on board, President Shehu Shagari’s government in October 1979 inherited about US $5.5 billion in foreign reserves from the Military.

By July, 1980 this rose to US $8.2 billion. By the time the President was overthrown in December, 1983, Nigeria owed foreign creditors over US $ 28-30 billion. The Nigerian economy is non cultural, capitalistic, dependent on the foreign capitalist economy, seriously depressed, unstable, undeveloped and grossly mismanaged.

Mustapha, (1988:28) observes that “the low-cost housing programme consumed

about N600 million, yet majority of the low income earners live in slums”. In his own

opinion on corruption, Klitgaard (1990:4) writes:

corruption is a crime of calculation not passion. When bribes are large, the chances of being caught small and penalties if caught meagre, many officials will succumb to corruption. Corruption tends to occur when a person or organisation enjoys monopoly of power and discretion on whom to be favoured with goods or services without being accountable to anyone. Therefore, corruption may be represented as a model; corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability (C=M+D-A).

58

��# ��$!��)��'��)��!�

According to Adams, (1996:41), “housing delivery is also affected by the poor

performance of the construction industry. The poor performance associated with small

to medium sized indigenous contractors includes protracted delay in paying the artisans

for work done”. Aniekwu and Okpala, (1998:11) state that “high fluctuations in work

load, inadequate resources, lack of technical expertise, and lack of managerial skills are

some of the impeding factors that led to poor performance by the construction industry”.

� ��$��%�/ '�$'%'�!�

As stated by Ozuruigbo, (2007:1) “in eleven out of fourteen States where

governments paid deposits to attract the programme, it was clear that there was no

effective demand from the citizenry based on the number of private deposits”. In his

opinion, “the programme, however, had to identify with the development needs of the

said States, which were new. The doubtful viability of these locations is bound to affect

the programme since recovery of the outstanding balance is tied to the fortunes of the

respective state governments” (Ebie, 2001:3).

Finally, appraising the Nigeria’s Second Republic housing programme, Umanah,

(1995:5) observes that “the Federal Government of Nigeria builds houses for the rich

people while the poor people continue to suffer. In the United States of America, if

there is anything like housing scheme, it is mainly for those poor people, those on

welfare and it is called low income houses and truly is still occupied by poor group of

people”

In summary therefore, the factors that militated against the implementation of

Nigeria’s housing polices and programmes were many. According to Catherin Wurster

59

in Jones, (1977:195), “given the factors so far, it is not surprising to learn that the

housing program has not fared too well”.

"��@� ��1 � �� E � � �0�� -��

From the review of literature, it is clear that serious studies had been conducted

to identify reasons for the persistent failures of the housing policies in Nigeria,

especially, during implementation stage. In successive governments, different policy

programmes had been developed and launched with fan fare but at the end of the day,

it is found out that they all failed to achieve the vision, purpose and targets and

timeliness, which at the end, result in the failure of achievement of that particular

administration.

Many writers have always propounded that the problem with Nigeria is not

sound policy formulation but poor implementation of these policies. People also blame

corruption which is a general term, but none of them has taken time to identify the

reason for the persistent poor implementation nor traced this perversion to its roots

which led to Nigeria’s housing policy failures. The researcher is of the view that this

persistent past policy mistakes and failures are attributable to the application of negative

and unhealthy strategies and actions. Why is it that in every activity, in every

transaction or relationship, there is always the tendency for the partners to cheat each

other or one another? Why is corruption so pervasive in our society?

This writer has traced this unwholesome pattern of life to a primary source, and

that primary source can be traced to sophistry and guile in our culture. The foundation

of this corrupt pattern of life is the family. Our culture is based on sophistry and guile,

therefore, our upbringing is encapsulated in it. Nigerians thus trade on sophistry and

60

guile. This is what is carried to many work places and the larger society – the church,

office, social organizations, market and even among Committee of friends, etc.

In the Igbo culture, many people undermine the efforts of others, for example, in

the family, many children are taught to wish their trader parents F��$��6 �� '�

��'�2��'��'��$��6 �%��gi” meaning, “may you cheat your customers and

may your customers never cheat you”. Many children therefore grow up with this

sophistry and guile culture. With this mentality, these children therefore are never

straightforward in their dealings with people, even among their family members.

Even though the so called sound cultural and Christian values are widely

orchestrated in our culture, it has no depth. This bankrupt cultural orientation is what is

transferred to all economic, social, political, administrative and contractual activities and

programmes. Even in the formulation and execution of both public and private policies,

they are skewed to benefit a few corrupt and selfish individuals. The same people who

formulated the housing policy, fraudulently implemented it, are the same people who

awarded the contracts themselves, executed the contracts, advertised the sale and

purchased the houses themselves, leaving out the intended beneficiary – the low-

income earners.

It is, therefore, the researcher’s view that the failure of the housing policies in

Nigeria, with particular reference to the Second Republic Housing Programme in Imo

State, Nigeria was significantly caused by this weak and toxic culture that cheats, steals

and destroys the system. The cheat and grab culture, which aspects include “crash and

crush” mentality results in unfaithfulness in service. The fundamental problem of our

housing policies as well as other policies in Nigeria is at times, the flaw in our culture.

61

This will be discussed in detail in my Chapter IV of this research work, in order to bridge

the gap or inadequacy in literature.

2.2 Operationalization of Key Concepts

i. Policy: Guidelines laid down in general or specific terms, to enable the Federal Government of Nigeria and Imo State reach the long-range targets set by the objectives of the housing policy.

ii. Housing Policy: A comprehenive course of action for attainment of the

housing goals of a society. iii. Goals: Activities and intentions which the housing policy attempted to

accomplish.

iv. Social Development: The actions, which has direct impacts on the welfare of the citizens through the provision of services such as housing and infrasturctural development.

v. Development: A new stage or event.

vi. Federal Government: A group of people governing a country at the national level.

vii. State Government: A group of people governing a country at the State

level. viii. Government Officials: Men and women employed by the State Government

for the purpose of executing Government policies by delivering goods and rendering services to the citizens.

ix. Implementation: To give effect to a promise, action plan or policy. x. Society: A community of people living in a particular country or society

having shared customs.

"�5�� !��

The area is housing. There was a time when food was given priority over other

basic needs, but today, when one travels out of one’s home, the immediate need is

where one can sit down – a house – before food. Shelter is therefore the most

62

important requirement to man. Housing however transcends simple shelter. It includes

utilities and community services like electricity, water supply, good access roads,

sewage and requires disposal facilities…” (Njoku,1998:12). It has a profound impact

on the life style, health, happiness as well as productivity. However, the need for

housing policy in Nigeria became an important issue only when the country achieved

independence in 1960.

The study is state based, that is, Imo State which has boundaries with Anambra,

Enugu, Abia and Ebonyi States. Imo State has three political zones – Owerri, Orlu and

Okigwe – with twenty-seven Local Government Areas. Imo State, is one of the then

nineteen States of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (see Appendices I and II – maps of

Nigeria and Imo State). “The State was created when the former East Central State of

Nigeria was split into Anambra and Imo State on 3rd February, 1976 by the

Murtala/Obasanjo regime. It has a population density of 590 persons per square

kilometer” (MOF, 2000:14).

In Imo State, the housing situation was very deplorable in Owerri, the State

Capital, Orlu and Okigwe which are zonal headquarters. The situation became worse

with the ever increasing migration of low or no-income earners from the surrounding

neighbourhoods into the towns. This has resulted, among other things, in the increase

of the number of petty businesses, which competed for accommodation with

households in the same buildings and, therefore, has aggravated the problem of

dwelling units. As was clearly evident, the above lumping of various economic activities

with residential accommodation in the high density areas of the towns, not only

generated health problems including that of unabated noise, but also the resultant

congestions further increased the incidence of social and psychological conflict for the

individual and the nation.

63

The study on housing was carried out in the Owerri Municipality and four rural

local government areas – Aboh Mbaise, Ahaizu Mbaise, Ikeduru and Obowo (please

see Appendices 6A to 7E). The area of coverage is not every aspect of housing policy

implementation in Nigeria, but that known to be very relevant to this study – An Analysis

of Federal Government Housing Policy Implementation in Imo State, Nigeria:1979-2007.

64

5�� METHODOLOGY�

5��Sources and Method of Data Collection�

The survey research design was used for this study. Survey design studies the

characteristics of a large population and adopted three instruments – formal

discussion/interview, questionnaire and extant literature. The formal

discussion/interview was held using structured and unstructured questions as shown

in Appendix VIII. The questions were coined in such a way that they would enhance the

receipt of reliable information. The information received from the interviewees

complemented the information received through the questionnaire.

� fifty-item survey questions was constructed for use in the data collection.

Items included in the survey instrument were developed from statements and questions

included in the Housing policy formulation in Nigeria with particular reference to the

Second Republic Housing Programme and Public Administration, especially as it

concerns Policy Making and Policy Implementation.

In administration of instruments and scoring, copies of the questionnaire were

distributed�personally to several respondents using purposive sampling method. The

reason was to ensure that copies of the questionnaire were given to the right

respondents, the respondents being guided as certain questions were explained to

them. The two questionnaires named Form 1 and Form 2 which are attached as

Appendices XA and XB were designed in such a way that they included both structured

and unstructured questions. The reason was to give the respondents the opportunity to

express their views in relation to the objective of the research work. Two cover letters

were written by the researcher, describing the purpose of the study and solicited the co-

operation of subjects in the completion and return of the survey instrument. In

65

completion of either Form 1 or Form 2 of the survey instrument, subjects used two

numerical scales as contained in the Procedure for Data Analyses. The Questionnaire

and formal discussion/interview represent the primary source of data.

The survey instrument constructed for use in this study was hand delivered to

each of the fifty subjects made up of senior, middle and junior workers of the Federal

Ministry of Environment, Housing and Urban Development, Federal Housing Authority,

Ministry of Works, Housing & Transport, Ministry of Public Utilities and Rural

Development, Imo State Housing Corporation, Federal Mortgage Bank, Imo State

Building Investment Company Ltd., Okigwe Construction Company, Ahiazu Local

Government Area and Obowo Local Government Area - thirty-five males and fifteen

females.

Extant Literature

The contribution of renowned authors and scholars in Textbooks, Journals,

Newspapers, Magazines, Internet, and other relevant documents (both published and

unpublished) were the instruments for secondary data collection. The data obtained

from these sources were used mainly in the review of literature. This represented the

secondary source of data. Using the American Philological Association (APA)

referencing system, the sources of the data were acknowledged in bibliography.

Design of the Survey Instrument

A thirty-five and fifty item survey instruments were constructed for use in data

collection (Interview Guide and Questionnaire respectively). All items included in the

survey instruments were derived from the research questions, housing goals and

statements in the National Housing Policy Documents for Nigeria. In the format for the

66

survey instruments was modeled upon “a forty-seven item survey instrument designed

by Gross and Grambsch and used in their baseline study” (Edoziem, 1982:ii).

Population of Study

The subjects of this study included professionals working in the Federal Ministry

of Environment, Housing and Urban Development, Federal Housing Authority, Federal

Mortgage Bank, Imo State Ministries of Works, Housing & Transport, Public Utilities and

Rural Development, Imo State Housing Corporation, Imo State Building Investment

Company Ltd., Okigwe Construction Company, Ahiazu Mbaise and Obowo Local

Government Areas of Imo State, Nigeria.

The researcher sought the opinion of seventy (70) persons such as Architects,

Quantity Surveyors, Town Planners, Estate Managers and Valuers, artisans in the

building industry (masons, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, etc), and Technicians

etc., that is, purposive random sampling technique. The fifty subjects who

responded to the questionnaire were divided into two groups – Groups 1 and 2 – with

25 persons in each group. Subjects in Group 1 were requested to rate in Form 1 the

degree to which housing policy in Nigeria were perceived to be attained or achieved in

Imo State. Subjects in Group 2 were requested to rate in Form 2 the degree to which

the housing policy in Nigeria were perceived to be preferred goals, that is, what the

policy was supposed to have achieved Imo State.

Validity of the Instruments �

As observed by Runkel and Mcgrath in Anyanwu, (1994:85), “validity is the

process of finding out the degree to which a researcher or a test indeed measures what

it purports to measure”. In this study, a pilot test was done. This involved a situation

where a sample group of twenty-five was selected for the pilot study. The instruments

67

were administered on them to determine whether their responses corresponded with the

ideal responses as supplied by the researcher or deviated much. The correspondence

was 80%, proving that the instruments were valid.

Reliability of the Instrument

This is the characteristic of research instrument which allows it to be used to

measure or evaluate the same object at different period in time and at each time,

receiving the same or similar result (Anyanwu, 1994). Here, the test-retest was done.

This is a process which allowed the researcher to administer one of her research

instruments – questionnaire – on a sample group of twenty people twice but at different

time intervals of five weeks. The first test and the retest were compared and reliability

of the instrument was established.

Return of Questionnaire

� �ut of the eighty copies of the research questionnaire distributed to the

government officials (professionals in the building industry), only fifty were duly

completed and returned while forty-six were useable. The numerical responses given

by subjects were keypunched on computer cards for use in computations and

tabulation. All data summaries and analyses were performed by use of the facilities of

the UCHON Computer Centre in Owerri, Imo State. This information would be

confirmed in Chapter IV, Tables 10 and 11.

3.2 Method of Data Presentation and Analysis

� For convenience sake and with due regard to the need of the study, the data

collected for the research work were analysed by both manual and computer

techniques. As the data involved classification of nominal variables, relative percentage

68

of tables was used to analyse the information collected. Content analysis was used to

ensure that what is sought for from the literature was obtained. According to Festinger

(1976), content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic and

qualitative description of the manifest content. The objective of content analysis is to

convert recorded raw phenomena into data, which can be treated in essentially scientific

manner so that a body of knowledge may be built up.

The above method helped to match the responses with the relevant questions for

easy comparison. Fifty percent and above of those who responded were taken to be

positive, while forty-nine per cent and below were regarded as negative response.

The Means (values of typical or representative responses of the population) were

calculated for each item to determine the degree to which a statement was perceived as

being attained or preferred or to determine the success rate of implementation of the

Nigeria’s Second Republic housing programme with particular reference to Imo State.

The decision to use the mean “score” for an item as a basis for determining the degree

of attainment or degree of preference in the implementation of housing policies and

goals was based upon guidelines suggested by Gross and Grambsch (1968:75):

…. The “score” which a given goal received at a research study provided us with a measure of the degree of emphasis (extent of importance) it receives, whether the outputs are clearly visible or are not clear. Essentially, a given respondent might be uninformed through lack of opportunity to observe or perceive the actual importance of a goal. However, not everyone is, and it is a fair assumption that the average is a reasonable estimate of what a goal really is. …. we require consensus, not because we are sure the average is near the truth, but because it is probably closer to the truth than any other estimate.

In rating the degree to which housing programme goals and policies were

attained or were preferred, a seven point scale was used as shown next page:

69

7 = Essential

6 = Very important

5 = Above average importance

4 = Average importance

3 = Below average importance

2 = Little importance

1 = No importance

The score for each category of response is a measusre of the respondents’ attitide.

Subjects, in responding to items which requested for their perception of sources

of power and decision making, were requested to rate how much “say” differing roles or

role groups had in the formulation or implementation of housing policies and goals, a

four point scale was used:

4 = Absolute Say

3 = Much say

2 = Some say

1 = Little say

�# # ��!�

In this chapter, the Sources and Method of Data Collection and the Method of

Data Presentation, comprising the procedure followed in identifying the subjects of the

study; constructing and validating the survey instruments used for the data collection;

collecting the data of the study and establishing decision rules for interpretation of data

have been described. In the next chapter, the findings and discussion (In-depth

analyses of the Research Questions) are presented and discussed.

70

*�� / � 3�� 1 ��

��

Prior to the presentation of findings, selected demographic characteristics of the

subjects are reported. Data were collected about eight characteristics of the subjects

who completed the survey instrument. These eight characteristics were degree level

completed; year of degree completion for the highest degree earned; where highest

degree was earned; position or role; length of service; nationality; age and gender.

They are reported in tables.

�$%��=��8�� %�(�%��# ,%��$!��),��)�

Highest Degree Completed Number Percentage Doctoral degree 32 48.48

Master’s degree 20 30.30

Baccalaureate degree 11 16.66

No response 3 4.54

Total 66 100

Source: Field work from Questionnaire Responses, (2007)

�$%��=�"��8��0��# ,%��'��'��)��),��)��

Highest Degree Completed Number Percentage Before 1960 (Nigerian Independence) 0 0

1960-1970 0 0

1970-1989 25 37.87

After 1990 41 62.12

Total 66 100


�

71

�

�

�$%��=�5��8��. ��'��)��6 �)��$!��),��)� Where Highest Degree

was Earned Number Percentage Nigerian University 22 33.33

Non Nigerian University 44 66.66

No response 0 0

Total 66 100


�$%��=�*��8� ��)'�'��%��),��)� Designation Number Percentage Top Management Staff 39 69.09

Middle management staff 19 28.78

Junior staff 8 12.12

Total 66 100


�

�$%��=�+�8�-�� ('�� '��)��('�6 ��

��-��G ��'��4 '��%��,��4 ��# �� %��

�� ('�� 4 ��

+8�*�!��)��"��"��=�� ""� � 55�55�

�+8"*!��)�� "� ��5� � ��=� � � "5� � 5*�=*�

"+85��!��)� "� ��"� � �� *� � "��"��

5�8�$�(�� "� ��"� � ��5� � � ;� � ��@��

��%�� =� �":� � ��":�� @@� � ��

�


72

�$%��=�@�8� � ��'��%'�!��),��)�

Nationality Number Percentage

Nigerian 61 92.42

Non Indigene of Imo 4 6.06

No response 1 1.51

Total 66 100

Source: Field work from Questionnaire Responses, (2007) �

�$%��=�;� � 8� � ��),��)�

Age Number Percentage

19-30 21 31.8

31-41 23 34,8

42-52 11 16.7

52 and above 11 16.7

Total 66 100


�

�$%��=�=��8�� 1 ��),��)�

Gender Number Percentage

Male 43 65.2

Female 23 34.8

No response 0 0

Total 66 100


The demographic characteristics of subjects are reported for descriptive purposes.

73

Data about demographic characteristics were not used in any of the data analyses.

Sixty-six out of the seventy subjects returned their survey instruments, that is, a

94.28% return rate. The reason for less than one hundred percent response was due to

uncompromising attitude of some staff, in order not to divulge what they consider as

secret document or information. Some were afraid that information given out might not

be treated with confidentiality while lack of interest from some respondents due to

ignorance of research work was another reason.

This sixty-six included the twenty (20) people interviewed. Out of this number,

thirty rated the extent to which the implementation of the Federal Government housing

policy was attained in Imo State. Thirty-six subjects rated the extent to which the

implementation of the Federal Government housing policy was the preferred housing

goals for Imo State. Data used for treatment and analysis in this study were provided

by the returned sixty-six usable survey instruments and responses from interviewees.

The process of data collection and analysis produced some findings which

confirmed that the problems that militated against the successful implementation of

Housing Policies in Nigeria were all present in the Second Republic Housing

Programme implementation in Imo State. The findings were obtained after looking into

the research questions which reviewed whether the Constitutional procedures of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria as it concerned the policy formulations and implemnentation

were complied with; why and how the low-cost housing policy was promulgated; the

extent of effectiveness of the housing programme implementation in Imo State; and the

role played by the political parties, the interest groups, the mass media and the people

towards the housing policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria with particular

reference to Imo State.

74

Five research questions were investigated in the study. The survey instruments

used for data collection included thirty-five items for the formal discussion/interview and

fifty items which were constructed to represent the goals and aspirations of the Federal

Government Housing Policy Implementation in Imo State (1979-2008). The first

research question was about the link between formulation and Implementation. The

second research question was about the promulgation of the low-cost housing policy

during Nigeria’s Second Republic. The third research question was about whether the

goals of earlier housing policies in Nigeria were being attained or were preferred and

the degree to which these goals was attained or was preferred before the promulgation

of the low cost housing policy and its implementation. The fourth research question was

whether the Second Republic housing policy implementation improved the housing

situation in Imo State, that is, whether the desired goals were being attained or were

preferred.

The fifth research question was to ex-ray the degree of power by those who were

expected to contribute in the formulation and implementation of this housing policy - the

Law makers, the Executive, Judiciary and Pressure/Interest groups, whether their roles

were attained or were preferred for the implementation of the Federal Government

Housing Programme with particular reference to Imo State.

The first four research questions investigated in this study were:

1. What is the link between formulation and Implementation?

2. What led to the promulgation of the low-cost housing policy during Nigeria’s Second Republic?

3. Did the Second Republic housing policy implementation improve the housing situation in Imo State?

4. What factors militated against housing policy implementation in Imo State?

75

Data pertaining to these four research questions were obtained by the responses

of subjects in Groups 1 and 2 to the fifty items on the survey instrument which were

based on goals of housing policies in Nigeria. The fifty items included in Form 1 were

rated by subjects in Group 1 and the fifty items included in Form 2 were rated by

subjects in Group 2. The mean scores were calculated as shown in the table below

using item (1) as an example:

Table 9 Item 1 - Housing policy is an instrument for effecting societal and national development

Wts Number Fx

(Values) of Res- (Summation pondents of score)

7 1 7 6 1 6 5 1 5 4 2 8 3 5 15 2 10 20 1 10 10 Total 30 71 Mean = 71 = 2.36 30 In the above table, the number of respondents is thirty while the summation of scores is seventy-one. The mean was calculated by dividing the summation by the total number of respondents. To get the percentage, the mean score was divided by the number of weights (values) times hundred, that is, 2.36 X 100 = 33.71%. 7

The means of items (2) to (50) in the survey instruments are obtained in the

same pattern as shown above, using data as appropriate. The responses and their

means and percentages were computed, indicating the extent to which the goals of the

Second Republic Housing Policy were attained in Imo State by Group 1. Group 2

indicated the extent to which the goals of the Second Republic Housing Policy were

preferred in Imo State (see pages 76-83).

76

AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HOUSING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN IMO STATE, NIGERIA:1979-2007

Table 10 - Summary of responses to the survey instruments (Form 1) indicating the extent to

which the goals of the Federal Government Housing Policy were attained in Imo State.

S/N0.

QQUUEESSTTIIOONN//SSTTAATTEEMMEENNTT

EE 77

VVII 66

AAAAII 55

AAII 44

BBAAII 33

LLII 22

NNII 11

MMEE-- AANN

%%

1. Housing policy is an instrument for effecting societal and national development

1 1 1 2 5 10 10 2.36 33.7

2. The Constitutional procedures were important for housing policy formulation and implementation.

10 10 20 6 2 2 2 1.67 23.8

3. The goals of the Federal Government Housing Policy were relevant to the needs of the masses.

0 0 0 2 5 13 10 1.97 28.1

4. Evaluation of the success of the Second Republic Housing programme was based on the level of individuals’ living standard.

9 10 3 2 2 2 2 1.17 16.8

5 The sentimental attachment to land in Nigeria was not considered in the Land Use decree and this negatively affected the Federal Government Housing programme.

5 5 5 2 5 4 4 1.67 23.8

6. The goals of the Federal Government Housing Policy were to ensure even geographical distribution of better housing facilities.

0 0 1 2 10 10 7 2.33 33.3

7. The goals of the Federal Government Housing Policy were the pursuit of building construction and research.

0 0 0 0 5 5 20 1.50 21.4

8. The Federal Government Housing policy served as an effective instrument for cementing national unity.

0 1 1 10 16 10 2.90 41.4

9.

Obstacles posed by government officials and non-utilisation of talents adversely affected the Federal Government Housing programme.

0 0 1 1 8 10 10 2.10 30.0

10. Lack of finance militated against the Federal Government Housing programme.

00 00 00 22 44 1100 1144 11..8800 2255..77

11. The Federal Government Housing policy provided opportunities for the compulsory knowledge of architectural designs in view of the ignorance among Nigerians over each other’s housing culture.

0 0 0 2 10 10 8 2.20 31.4

12 The Federal Government Housing policy was geared towards providing competent builders.

1 1 1 1 11 5 5 2.33 33.3

13. The Federal Government Housing policy did not relax restriction practices such as high interest rate, low exchange rate of the Naira to other currencies.

1 1 1 2 5 5 15 2.20 31.4

1144 The housing policy adopted more liberal loan policy to enable low-income workers and rural dwellers own houses anywhere in the country.

1 2 2 2 10 10 3 2.20 31.4

77

S/N0.


EE 77

VVII 66

AAAAII 55

AAII 44

BBAAII 33

LLII 22

NNII 11

MMEEAANN

%%

15. Lack of planning in the various Federal Goivernment housing programmes militated against their successful implementation and housing delivery in Imo State.

0 0 0 0 0 0 30 1 14..2

16. The Housing policy permitted the Federal Government to have greater say on the affairs of Nigeria’s housing sector – when, where and how new housing programmes were to be established and implemented.

0

0

1

2

2

10

15

1.80

21

17. The Federal Government Housing policies maintained the traditional plan of settlement freedom.

1 1 1 1 10 16 0 2.80 40

18. The Federal Government Housing policies changed the practice of people paying high rents to landlords.

0 1 1 1 10 16 1 2.60 34.1

19. The goals of the Federal Government Housing policies introduced a new practice of owner/occupier instead of rental basis.

0 1 2 2 5 10 10 2.30 37.1

20. The goals of the Federal Government Housing policies provided that the national standard of performance be maintained through the Federal Housing authority Offices in the country.

0 1 2 2 5 5 15 2.13 30.48

21. Population explosion and rapid urbanization led to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programme.

15 5 5 2 1 1 1 5.80 82.9

22. Over-crowding, illegal construction of shanties and their attendant problems such as vandalism contributed to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programmes.

10 10 2 6 2 0 0 5.67 81

23. Were the Federal Government Housing programmes planned and designed to improve the housing situation for the low-income earners?

0 0 0 2 10 10 16 2.20 31.4

24. Was the impact of the Federal Government Housing programmes felt in Imo State as there were cheap and affordable housing units for the low income earners?

0 1 2 1 6 10 10 2.27 32.4

25. Did the domination of the award of contracts, the execution of the projects and the sharing of the housing units by the executive, legislators and political stalwarts adversely affect the Federal Government housing policies?

0 1 1 3 5 10 10 2.27 32.4

26. Did the political/administrative conflict between the Federal Government and the State Governments negatively affect the achievement of the goals of the housing programmes?

0 0 2 2 2 10 14 1.93 27.6

27. The non-contributory role of the Legislators and Pressure groups in the formulation of the Housing policy adversely affected the programmes.

0 2 2 2 4 10 10 2.40 34.3

28. Lack of sound leadership and incompetent personnel hindered the implementation of the housing programmes.

0 0 0 0 5 10 15 1.67 23.9

29. Inadequate provision of financial resources to financial institutions militated against the Second Republic housing programmes.

0 0 0 0 5 10 15 1.67 23.9

78

S/N0.


EE 77

VVII 66

AAAAII 55

AAII 44

BBAAII 33

LLII 22

NNII 11

MMEEAANN

%

30. Poor work attitude hampered the achievement of the Federal Government housing programmes.

0

1

0

2

5

10

12

2.37

33.9

31.

Lack of up-to-date and reliable database on housing hindered the housing programmes.

0

0

0

0

10

10

10

2.00

28.6

32.

Lack of research and support for local building materials negatively affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

0

1

2

1

1

14

2

3.03

43.3

33. Flagrant mismanagement of Nigeria’s economy adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

0 0 0 0 5 15 10 1.83 26.1

34. Lack of indigenous political, financial and administrative culture negatively affected the housing programmes.

0 0 1 1 3 10 15 1.76 25.1

35. Was adequate infrastructure – roads, electricity, water, drainage system etc. provided in the housing estates?

1 0 0 1 3 12 13 1.90 27.1

36. Were the Federal Government housing units spacious enough for additional rooms?

0 0 1 1 5 10 13 1.90 27.1

37. Was the concept of core housing units explained to and understood by the allotees of the Federal Government housing units?

1 2 2 2 10 10 3 3.00 42.9

38. Non adoption of Due Process mechanism in the award of contracts and execution of projects adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

0 0 2 2 6 10 10 2.20 31.4

39. There were Federal Government Republic housing programmes.

0 0 0 1 4 10 15 1.70 24.3

40. Increased debt profile and doubtful viability hampered the implementation of the Federal Government c housing programmes.

0 0 0 2 1 6 21 1.46 20.9

41. Poor location - swamps, valleys and marshy land hindered the implementation of the Federal Government housing programmes.

0 0 0 0 5 10 15 1.67 23.9

42. Corruption associated with compensation for land acquisition adversely affected the Federal Government programmes.

0 0 0 0 5 5 20 1.50 21.5

43. Inflationary trend (high cost of building materials) adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

0 1 1 2 8 10 10 2.13 30.4

44. Weak enforcement of contract negatively affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

0 0 0 1 3 8 18 1.57 22.4

45. Favouritism due to ‘familistic syndrome in the selection of contractors adversely affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State

0 0 1 2 5 10 12 2.00 28.6

46. Lack of maintenance culture hampered the housing programmes.

0 0 1 4 5 10 10 2.20 31.4

47. There were abandoned housing projects during the implementation of the Federal Government housing programmes in Imo State.

0 0 0 1 4 10 15 1.70 24.3

79

S/N0.


EE 77

VVII 66

AAAAII 55

AAII 44

BBAAII 33

LLII 22

NNII 11

MMEEAANN

%%

4488..

Absence of sustainable structure adversely affected the housing programmes.

0

0

1

1

6

10

12

1.97

28.1

49. Inflated contract sums negatively affected the Federal Government housing programmes implementation in Imo State.

0

0

0

0

0

1

29

1.03

14.7

50.

Sophistry and guile culture was the bane of Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

0

0

0

0

1

4

25

1.20

17,1

Total 1.95 27.9

*Symbol Meaning Value E Essential = 7 VI Very Important = 6 AAI Above Average Importance = 5 AI Average importance = 4 BAI Below Average Importance = 3 LI Little Importance = 2 NI No importance = 1

Source: Quantitative Analyses of Responses to the Research Questions by the writer, Ekeanyanwu, (2007)

80

AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HOUSING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN IMO STATE, NIGERIA:1979-2007

Table 11 - Summary of responses to the survey instruments (Form 2) indicating the extent to which the goals of the Federal Government Housing Policy were preferred in Imo State.

S/N0. QQUUEESSTTIIOONN//SSTTAATTEEMMEENNTT

EE 77

VVII 66

AAAAII 55

AAII 44

BBAAII 33

LLII 22

NNII 11

MMEEAANN

%%

1. Housing policy should be an instrument for effecting societal and national development.

10 11 8 5 2 0 0 5.61 80.1

2. The Constitutional procedures should be important for housing policy formulation and implementation.

11 10 8 5 2 0 0 5.64 80.6

3. The goals of the Federal Government Housing Policy should have been relevant to the needs of the masses.

10 11 8 5 2 0 0 5.61 80.1

4. Evaluation of the success of the Federal Government Housing programme should have been based on the level of individuals’ living standard.

10 10 8 2 6 1 1 5.53 79.0

5 The sentimental attachment to land in Nigeria should have been considered in the Land Use decree and this negatively affected the Federal Government Housing programmes.

15 10 8 3 0 0 0 6.02 86.0

6. The goal of the Federal Government Housing Policy should have been to ensure even geographical distribution of better housing facilities.

14 10 8 2 2 0 0 5.89 84.1

7. The goal of the Federal Government Housing Policy should be the pursuit of building construction and research.

20 15 1 0 0 10 0 6.52 93.2

8. The Federal Government Housing policy should have served as an effective instrument for cementing national unity.

10 10 8 6 2 0 0 5.56 79.4

9.

Obstacles posed by government officials and non-utilisation of talents should adversely affected the Federal Government Housing programmes.

13 11 8 2 2 0 0 5.86 83.7

10. Lack of finance should be a militated against the Federal Government Housing programmes.

13 11 8 2 2 0 0 5.86 83.7

11. The Federal Government Housing policy should have provided opportunities for the compulsory knowledge of architectural designs in view of the ignorance among Nigerians over each other’s housing culture.

16 10 8 2 0 0 0 6.11 87.39

12 The Federal Government Housing policy should have been geared towards providing competent builders.

21 10 5 0 0 0 0 6.44 92.0

13. The Federal Government Housing policy should have been to relax restriction practices such as high interest rate, low exchange rate of the Naira to other currencies.

16 6 7 5 1 1 0 5.77 82.4

1144 The housing policy should have adopted more liberal loan policy to enable low-income workers and rural dwellers own houses anywhere in the country.

15 10 5 3 2 1 0 5.83 83.3

81

S/N0.


EE 77

VVII 66

AAAAII 55

AAII 44

BBAAII 33

LLII 22

NNII 11

MMEEAANN

%%

1155..

Lack of planning in the various Federal Goivernment housing programmes must have militated against their successful implementation and housing delivery in Imo State.

10 15 4 4 2 1 0 5.67 81.0

16. The Federal Government Housing policy should have permitted the Federal Government to have greater say on the affairs of Nigeria’s housing sector – when, where and how new housing programmes were to be established and implemented.

14 9 7 5 1 0 0 6.86 79.7

17. The Federal Government Housing policy was supposed to maintain the traditional plan of settlement freedom.

2 2 2 2 3 8 16 2.33 42.3

18. The Federal Government Housing policy should have been to change the practice of people paying high rents to landlords.

10 15 5 4 2 0 0 5.75 82.1

19. The goal of the Federal Government Housing policy should have permitted a new practice of owner/occupier instead of rental basis.

15 10 5 4 2 0 0 5.88 84.0

20. The goal of the Federal Government Housing policy should have provided that the national standard of performance be maintained through the Federal Housing authority Offices in the country.

10 15 8 2 1 0 0 5.86 83.7

21. Population explosion and rapid urbanization must have led to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programmes.

15 10 8 2 1 0 0 6.00 85.7

22. Over-crowding, illegal construction of shanties and their attendant problems such as vandalism must have contributed to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programmes.

10 10 8 5 3 3 3 5.78 82.6

23. The Federal Government Housing should have been implemented to improve the housing situation for the low-income earners.

15 10 8 2 1 0 0 6.00 85.7

24. The impact of the Federal Government Housing programme should have been felt in Imo State as there were cheap and affordable housing units for the low income earners.

0 0 1 1 8 10 16 1.97 28.1

25. The domination of the award of contracts, the execution of the projects and the sharing of the housing units by the executive, legislators and political stalwarts should have adversely affect the Federal Government housing policy.

15 10 8 2 1 0 0 6.00 85.7

26. The political/administrative conflict between the Federal Government and State Governmens must have affected the achievement of the goals of the housing programmes.

15 10 8 2 1 0 0 6.00 85.7

27. The non-contributory role of the Legislators and Interest/Pressure groups in the formulation of the Housing policy should have adversely affected the programmes.

10 10 8 5 2 1 0 5.50 78.4

28. Lack of sound leadership and incompetent personnel must have hindered the implementation of the housing programmes.

18 10 8 0 0 0 0 6.28 89.5

82

S/N0.


EE 77

VVII 66

AAAAII 55

AAII 44

BBAAII 33

LLII 22

NNII 11

MMEEAANN

%%

29. Inadequate provision of financial resources to financial institutions must have militated against the Federal Government housing programmes.

11 8 5 2 5 3 2 5.44 77.7

30. Poor work attitude must have hampered the achievement of the objectives of the Federal Government housing programmes.

16 10 10 0 0 00 12 6.17 88.2

31. Lack of up-to-date and reliable database on housing hindered the housing programmes.

9 10 9 5 3 0 0 5.47 78.1

32 and support for local building materials negatively affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

15 10 8 2 1 0 0 6.00 65,7

33. Flagrant mismanagement of Nigeria’s economy must have been adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

18 8 5 1 2 1 1 6.31 90.08

34. Lack of indigenous political, financial and administrative culture must have affected the housing programmes.

15 10 8 2 1 0 0 6.00 85.7

35. Adequate infrastructure – roads, electricity, water, drainage system etc should have been.provided in the housing estates.

15 10 8 2 1 0 0 6.00 85.7

36. The Federal Government housing units should have been spacious enough for additional rooms.

16 15 2 2 1 0 0 6.19 88.4

37. The concept of core housing units should have been explained to and understood by the allotees of the Federal Government housing units.

2 2 2 2 2 10 16 2.39 34.1

38. Non adoption of Due Process mechanism in the award of contracts and execution of projects should have adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

16 10 5 5 0 0 0 6.02 86.0

39. Over-valued contract sums and weak enforcement of contract must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

15 10 8 3 2 1 0 6.25 89.3

40. Increased debt profile and doubtful viability must have hampered the implementation of the Federal Government housing programmes.

10 10 8 2 2 2 2 5.28 75.4


15 10 8 3 0 0 0 6.03 86.1

42. Corruption associated with compensation for land acquisition must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

16 10 5 5 0 0 0 6.03 86.1

43. Inflationary trend (high cost of building materials) must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

12 10 8 5 1 0 0 5.75 82.1

44.

Weak enforcement of contract should have negatively affected the Second Republic housing programme.

14

10

8

4

0

0

0

5.89

84.1

83

S/N0


EE 77

VVII 66

AAAAII 55

AAII 44

BBAAII 33

LLII 22

NNII 11

MMEEAANN

%%

45. Favouritism due to ‘familistic syndrome in the selection of contractors should have adversely affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State

13 10 8 5 0 0 0 5.86 83.7

46 Lack of maintenance culture must have hampered the housing programme.

16 15 2 3 0 0 0 6.22 88.9

47 Abandoned housing projects must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

16 10 5 5 0 0 0 6.02 86.0

4488 Absence of sustainable structure must have adversely affected the housing programme.

10 10 8 2 2 2 2 5.28 75.4

49. All the problems that hindered the Housing Policy Implementation in Imo State are still present in housing delivery.

12 8 4 6 2 2 2 5.22 74.6

50. Sophistry and guile culture should be the bane of the Federal Government Housing policy implementation in Imo State.

18 10 8 0 0 0 0 6.28 89.7

Total 5.36 76.6

*Symbol Meaning Value E Essential = 7 VI Very Important = 6 AAI Above Average Importance = 5 AI Average importance = 4 BAI Below Average Importance = 3 LI Little Importance = 2 NI No importance = 1 Source: Quantitative Analyses of Responses to the Research Questions

by the Researcher, Ekeanyanwu, 2007.

84

The composite mean is the mean rating of all the fifty survey questions taken

together. It is a measure of the typical rating of all the respondents of the level of

attainment of the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State,

Nigeria:1979-2007. Seen against the values (weights) assigned to each of the seven

categories of responses, the composite mean score for Form 1 (level of attainment) is

equivalent to ‘Little Importance’.

4.2 Comparative Analysis of Attained and Preferred Composite Means

The comparative means for the two survey instruments - Forms 1 and 2 are

shown in the table below:

Table 12. - Comparative Analysis of Attained and Preferred Composite Means

S/No

Survey Items

Mean Score Attained

Mean score Prefer-red

Level of Impor- tance Attained

Level of Importance Preferred

1. Housing policy should be an instrument for effecting societal and national development as reward to party supporters.

2.36 5.61 LI VI


1.67 5.64 LI VI

3. The goals of the Federal Government Housing Policies were relevant to the needs of the masses.

1.97 5.61 LI VI

4. Evaluation of the success of the Federal Government Housing programmes was based on the level of individuals’ living standard.

1.17 5.53 NI VI

5 The sentimental attachment to land in Nigeria was not considered in the Land Use decree and this negatively affected the Federal Government Housing programmes.

1.67 6.02 LI VI

6. The goal of the Federal Government Housing Policies was to ensure even geographical distribution of better housing facilities.

2.33 5.89 LI VI

7. The goal of the Federal Government Housing Policies was the pursuit of building construction and research.

1.50 6.52 LI E

8. The Federal Government Housing policies served as an effective instrument for cementing national unity.

2.90 5.56 BAI VI

9. Obstacles posed by government officials and non-utilisation of talents adversely affected the Federal Government Housing programmes.

2.10 5.86 LI VI

85

S/No Survey Items Mean Score Attained




10. Lack of finance militated against the Federal Government Housing programmes.

1.80 5.86 LI VI

11. The Federal Government Housing policies provided opportunities for the compulsory knowledge of architectural designs in view of the ignorance among Nigerians over each other’s housing culture.

2.20 6.11 LI VI

12 The Federal Government Housing policies were geared towards providing competent builders.

2.33 6.44 LI VI

13. The Federal Government Housing policies did not relax restriction practices such as high interest rate, low exchange rate of the Naira to other currencies.

5.83 5.77 VI VI

1144 The housing policies adopted more liberal loan policy to enable low-income workers and rural dwellers own houses anywhere in the country.

2.20 5.83 LI VI

1155..

Lack of planning impeded on the Federal Government housing programmes.

2.20 5.67 LI VI

16. The Federal Government Housing policies permitted the Federal Government to have greater say on the affairs of Nigeria’s housing sector – when, where and how new housing programmes were to be established and implemented.

1.60 5.58 LI VI

17. The Federal Government Housing policies maintained the traditional plan of settlement freedom.

2.80 2.33 BAI LI

18. The Federal Government Housing policies changed the practice of people paying high rents to landlords.

2.60 5.75 BAI VI

19. The goal of the Federal Government Housing policies introduced a new practice of owner/occupier instead of rental basis.

2.30 5.88 LI VI

20. The goals of the Federal Government Housing policies provided that the national standard of performance be maintained through the Federal Housing authority Offices in the country.

2.10 5.86 LI VI

21 Population explosion and rapid urbanization led to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programme.

5.80 6.0 VI VI

22. Over-crowding, illegal construction of shanties and their attendant problems such as vandalism contributed to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programme.

5.60 5.78 VI VI

23. Were the Federal Government Housing programmes planned and designed to improve the housing situation for the low-income earners?

2,20 6.0 LI VI

24. Were the impact of the Federal Government Housing programmes felt in Imo State as there were cheap and affordable housing units for the low income earners?

2.20 1.97 LI LI

25. Did the domination of the award of contracts, the execution of the projects and the sharing of the housing units by the executive, legislators and political stalwarts adversely affect the Federal Government housing policy?

2.21 6.03 LI LI

86





26. Did the administrative conflict between Federal and the State Governments negatively affect the achievement of the goals of the housing programmes?

1.93

6.03

LI

VI

27. The non-contributory role of the Legislators and Interest/Pressure groups in the formulation of the Housing policies adversely affected the programmes.

2.40 5.5 LI VI

28. Lack of sound leadership and incompetent personnel hindered the implementation of the housing programmes.

1.67 6.28 LI VI

29. Inadequate provision of financial resources to financial institutions militated against the Federal Government housing programmes.

1.67 5.44 LI AI

30.

Poor work attitude hampered the achievement of the objectives of the Federal Government housing programmes.

2.37 6.17 LI VI

31 Lack of up-to-date and reliable database on housing hindered the housing programme.

2.0 5,47 LI VI

32 Lack of research and support for local building materials negatively affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

1.83 6.0 LI VI

33. Flagrant mismanagement of Nigeria’s economy adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

3.03 4.81 BAI AAI

34. Lack of indigenous political, financial and administrative culture negatively affected the housing programmes.

1.76 6.0 LI VI

35. Was adequate infrastructure – roads, electricity, water, drainage system etc. provided in the housing estates?

1.90 6.00 LI VI

36. Were the Federal Government housing units spacious enough for additional rooms?

1.90 6.19 LI VI

37. Was the concept of core housing units explained to and understood by the allotees of the Federal Government housing units?

3.0 2.39 BAI BAI

38. Non adoption of Due Process mechanism in the award of contracts and execution of projects adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

2.20 6.02 LI VI

39. There were over-valued procurement during the Federal Government housing programmes.

1.70 6.25 LI VI

40.

Increased debt profile and doubtful viability hampered the implementation of the Federal Government housing programmes.

1.46 5.28 LI VI

87






1.67 6.03 LI VI

42. Corruption associated with compensation for land acquisition adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

1.50 6.03 LI VI

43. Inflationary trend (high cost of building materials) adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

1.13 5.75 NI VI

44. Weak enforcement of contract negatively affected the Federal Government housing programmes.

1.57 5.89 LI VI

45. Favouritism due to ‘familistic syndrome in the selection of contractors adversely affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State

1.00 5.86 NI VI

46 Lack of maintenance culture hampered the housing programme in Imo State.

1.20 6.22 NI VI

47 There were abandoned housing projects during the Federal Government housing programmes.

1.70 6.02 LI VI

4488 Absence of sustainable structure adversely affected the housing programme.

1.07 5.28 NI VI

49. Inflated procurement sums negatively affected the Federal Government housing programmes implementation in Imo State.

1.03 5.22 NI AAI

50.

Sophistry and guile culture was the bane of Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State

1.20

6.28

NI

VI

Composite Mean Percentage

1.17

16.70

5.67

81.0

NI

NI

VI

E

Source: Comparative Analyses of the Composite Means for Forms 1 and 2, designed by the researcher, Ekeanyanwu, (2007)

This is the interpretation of the composite mean on the basis of the scale values

(weights) assigned to the seven response categories.

88

From the treatment of the data, the following findings were identified for the first

four research questions of this study:

1. No item out of the fifty items was perceived by subjectss in Group 1 to be goals

which were attained in Imo State at levels of importance characterised as “Essential”.

Three items were perceived by subjects to be attained at levels which would cause

these goals to be classified as “Very Important”, no item was perceived as “Above

Average Importance”, no item was perceived as “Average Importance”, six items were

perceived as “Below Average Importance”, thirty-five items were perceived as “Little

Importance” while five items out of the fifty items were perceived by respondents as

“Not Important” for the attainment of the housing policy implementation goals.

2. The items which were perceived as being attained are listed in descending order of

the degree to which they were perceived by sujects in Group 1; the mean score for each

item is shown in parentheses:

Very Important

The Second Republic Housing policy did not relax restriction practices such as high interest rate, low exchange rate of the Naira to other currencies (5.83). Population explosion and rapid urbanization led to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programme (5.80). Over-crowding, illegal construction of shanties and their attendant problems such as vandalism contributed to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programme( 5.67)

Below Average Importance

Flagrant mismanagement of Nigeria’s economy adversely affected the Second Republic housing programme (3.03). The goal of the Second Republic Housing Policy was the pursuit of building construction and research (3.00). The concept of core housing units explained to and understood by the allotees of the Second Republic housing units (3.00). The Second Republic Housing policy served as an effective instrument for cementing national unity (2.90).

89

The Second Republic Housing policy maintained the traditional plan of settlement freedom (2.80) The Second Republic Housing policy changed the practice of people paying high rents to landlords (2.60). Little Importance

The non-contributory role of the Legislators and Interest/Pressure groups in the formulation of the Housing policy adversely affected the programme (2.40). Poor work attitude hampered the achievement of the objectives of the Second Republic housing programme (2.37). Housing policies should be instrument for effecting societal and national development (2.36). The Federal Government housing policies were geared towards providing competent builders (2.33) The goals of the Federal Government housing policies introduced a new practice of owner/occupier instead of rental basis (2.30). The housing policies adopted more liberal loan policy to enable low-income workers and rural dwellers own houses anywhere in the country (2.22). Lack of planning impeded on the Federal Government housing programmes (2.22)

The domination of the award of contracts, the execution of the projects and the sharing of the housing units by the executive, legislators and political stalwarts adversely affect the Federal Government housing policies (2.21).

The Federal Government housing programmes were planned and designed to improve the housing situation for the low-income earners (2.20)

The impact of the Federal Government housing programmes was felt in Imo State as there were cheap and affordable housing units for the low income earners (2.20). Non adoption of Due Process mechanism in the in the award of contracts and execution of projects adversely affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State (2.20). Lack of maintenance culture hampered the housing programmes (2.20) The Federal Government housing policies provided opportunities for the compulsory knowledge of architectural designs in view of the ignorance among Nigerians over each other’s housing culture (2.20)

90

Inflated contract sums negatively affected the Federal Government housing programme implementation in Imo State (2.17).

The goals of the Federal Government housing policies provided that the national standard of performance be maintained through the Federal Housing authority Offices in the country (2.13). Inflationary trend (high cost of building materials) adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes (2.13) Obstacles posed by government officials and non-utilisation of talents adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes (2.10). Favouritism due to ‘familistic syndrome in the selection of contractors adversely affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State (2.00).

Lack of up-to-date and reliable database on housing hindered the housing programmes (2.00).

Absence of sustainable structure adversely affected the housing programmes (1.97).

The goals of the Federal Government housing policies were relevant to the needs of the masses (1.97).

The administrative conflict between the Federal Government and State Governments negatively affected the achievement of the goals of the housing programmes (1.93). Adequate infrastructure – roads, electricity, water, drainage system etc. were provided in the housing estates (1.90). The Federal Government housing units were spacious enough for additional rooms (1.90). Lack of research and support for local building materials negatively affected the Federal Government housing programmes (1.83). Lack of finance militated against the Federal Government housing programmes (1.80)

Lack of indigenous political and financial culture negatively affected the housing programmes (1.76).

There were over-valued contract sums during the Federal Government housing programmes (1.70). The Constitutional procedures were important for housing policy formulation and implementation (1.67)

The sentimental attachment to land in Nigeria was not considered in the Land Use decree and this negatively affected the Federal Government Housing programmes (1.67)

91

Lack of sound leadership and incompetent personnel hindered the implementation of the housing programmes (1.67). Inadequate provision of financial resources to financial institutions militated against the Federal Government housing programmes (1.67). Poor location - swamps, valleys and marshy land hindered the implementation of the Federal Government housing programmes (1.67).

The Federal Government Housing policies permitted the Federal Government to have greater say on the affairs of Nigeria’s housing sector – when, where and how new housing programmes were to be established and implemented (1.60). Weak enforcement of contract negatively affected the Federal Government housing programmes (1.57). Weak enforcement of contract negatively affected the Federal Government housing programmes(1.57).

Corruption associated with compensation for land acquisition adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes (1.50). Not Important

Increased debt profile and doubtful viability hampered the implementation of the Federal Government housing programmes (1.46).

Sophistry and guile culture was the bane of Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State (1.26). There were abandoned housing projects during the implementation of the Federal Government housing programmes (1.17).

Evaluation of the success of the Federal Government Housing programmes was based on the level of individuals’ living standard (1.17).

Evaluation of the success of the Federal Government Housing programmes was based on the level of individuals’ living standard (1.17)

92

3. Form 2 - Preferred Goals

The fifty items or goals of the Federal Government housing policy implementation

in Imo State (1979-2008) were perceived by subjects in Group 2 to be preferred goals.

One goal which was rated as not being attained by subjects in Group 1 was perceived

as “Essential”. Forty goals which were rated as not being attained by subjects in Group

1 were perceived as “Very Important”, six goals were perceived as “Above Average

Importance”, no item was perceived as “Average Importance”, no goal was perceived as

“Below Average Importance”, three items were perceived as “Little Importance” while no

goal was perceived as “Not Important”.

Goals which were perceived by subjects in Group 2 as preferred goals for the

Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State (1979-2008) are listed

below in descending order of the degree to which they were perceived to be preferred

goals. The mean score for each item is shown in parentheses:

Essential

The goals of the Federal Government Housing polcies should have been the pursuit of building construction and research (6.52).

Very Important The Federal Government Housing polcies should have been geared towards providing competent builders (6.44). Sophistry and guile culture should be the bane of Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State (6.28). Lack of sound leadership and incompetent personnel must have hindered the implementation of the housing programmes (6.28). Over-valued contract sums during the Federal Government Housing programmes must have adversely affected the implementation (6.25). Lack of maintenance culture must have hampered the housing programmes (6.22).

93

Poor work attitude must have hampered the achievement of the objectives of the Federal Government housing programms (6.17). The domination of the award of contracts, the execution of the projects and the sharing of the housing units by the executive, legislators and political stalwarts must have adversely affected the Federal Government Housing polcies (6.03). Poor location - swamps, valleys and marshy land must have hindered the implementation of the Federal Government housing programmes (6.03). Corruption associated with compensation for land acquisition must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing programme (6.03). The sentimental attachment to land in Nigeria was should have been considered in the Land Use decree and this negatively affected the Federal Government housing programmes (6.02). Non adoption of Due Process mechanism in the award of contracts and execution of projects must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes (6.02). Abandoned housing projects during the Federal Government housing programmes must have militated against the implementation of the housing policies (6.02). Corruption associated with compensation for land acquisition must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes (6.03).

Poor location - swamps, valleys and marshy land should have hindered the implementation of the Federal Government housing programmes (6.03). Population explosion and rapid urbanization must have led to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programme (6.00). The Federal Government Housing programmes should have been planned and designed to improve the housing situation for the low-income earners (6.00). Flagrant mismanagement of Nigeria’s economy must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes (6.00).

Lack of indigenous political, financial and administrative culture must have negatively affected the housing programmes (6.00). Adequate infrastructure – roads, electricity, water, drainage system etc. should have been provided in the housing estates (6.00)

The goals of the Federal Government Housing polcies should be to ensure even geographical distribution of better housing facilities (5.89).

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Weak enforcement of contract negatively must have affected the Federal Government Housing programmes (5.89). The goals of the Federal Government Housing polcies should have introduced a new practice of owner/occupier instead of rental basis (5.88). The goals of the Federal Government Housing polcies should have provided that the national standard of performance be maintained through the Federal Housing authority Offices in the country (5.86). Obstacles posed by government officials and non-utilisation of talents must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes (5.86). Favouritism due to ‘familistic syndrome in the selection of contractors must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State (5.86). Lack of finance should have militated against the Federal Government housing programmes (5.86). The Federal Government Housing polcies should have relaxed restriction practices such as high interest rate, low exchange rate of the Naira to other currencies (5.83). The housing policies should have adopted more liberal loan policy to enable low-income workers and rural dwellers own houses anywhere in the country (5.83). Population explosion and rapid urbanization should have led to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programmes (5.80). Over-crowding, illegal construction of shanties and their attendant problems such as vandalism must have contributed to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programmes (5.78). The Federal Government Housing polcies should have changed the practice of people paying high rents to landlords (5.75). Inflationary trend (high cost of building materials) must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing programmes (5.75). Lack of planning must have impeded on the Federal Government housing programmes

(5.67).

The Constitutional procedures should have been important for housing policy formulation and implementation (5.64). Housing policies should be instruments for effecting societal and national development (5.61). The goals of the Federal Government Housing polcies should be relevant to the needs of the masses (5.61).

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Evaluation of the success of the Federal Government Housing programmes should have been based on the level of individuals’ living standard (5.53). The non-contributory role of the Legislators and Interest/Pressure groups in the formulation of the Housing policies must have adversely affected the programme (5.50).

Above Average Importance

Inadequate provision of financial resources to financial institutions should have militated against the Federal Government housing programms (5.44). Lack of up-to-date and reliable database on housing must have hindered the housing programmes (5.47). Increased debt profile and doubtful viability must have hampered the implementation of the Federal Government housing programmes (5.28). Absence of sustainable structure should have adversely affected the housing programme implementation in Imo State (5.28). Inflated procurement sums should have negatively affected the Federal Government housing programme implementation in Imo State (5.22). Little Importance

The Federal Government Housing polcies should have maintained the traditional plan of settlement freedom (2.33). The impact of the Federal Government housing programme should have been felt in Imo State as there were cheap and affordable housing units for the low income earners (1.94) The concept of core housing units should have been explained to and understood by the allotees of the Federal Government housing units (2.39).

From their comparative means, it can be seen that the Federal Government

housing policy implementation in Imo State (1979-2008) was worse than expected or

preferred by the people of Imo State. There was a wide gap between the people’s

aspiration/preferences and implementation/execution of the Federal Government

housing policy in Imo State (1979-2008).

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The fifth research question investigated in this study was: “What were the contributions of the Legislature, the Executive, the Interest groups, the Mass Media and the people towards the Federal Government Housing policy implementation?

Data pertaining to this research question are shown in the table below:

Table 13 - Mean Scores for perceived Sources of power by

Group 1 (Form 1) on “Some Say” in the Federal Government Housing Policy Implementation in Imo State (1979-2008)

ndividual/Group AS MS SS LS MEAN %

4 3 2 1

The Legislature 30 16 20 - 3.15 78.8

The Executive Arm of Government 40 10 6 - 3.06 76.5

The Judiciary 20 30 10 6 3.18 79.5

Interest Groups 10 5 30 20 2.05 51,3

Other People - 10 50 6 2.06 51.5

*Symbol Meaning Scale Point

A Absolute = 4 MS Much Say = 3

SS Some Say = 2 LS Little Say = 1 Source: Quantitative Analyses of Responses to Research Question 5 by the writer,

Ekeanyanwu (2007).

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Table 14 - Mean Scores on Preferred Sources of power by Group 2 (Form 2) on “Some Say” in the Federal Government Housing Policy Implementation in Imo State (1979-2008)

INDIVIDUAL/GROUP AS MS SS LS MEAN %

The Legislature 10 10 10 6 2.67 66.7

The Executive Arm of Government - 10 20 6 2.11 52.8

The Judiciary 5 10 10 11 1.28 32.0

Interest Groups 10 10 10 6 2.67 66.8

Communities/StateHousing Corporation 16 10 10 - 3.17 79.8

*Symbol Meaning Scale Point A Absolute = 4 MS Much Say = 3

SS Some Say = 2 LS Little Say = 1

Source: Quantitative Analyses of Responses to Research Question 4 by the writer, Ekeanyanwu (2008)

Findings pertinent to this research question were:

�� The Federal government and the Legislature were the two groups with shared

“Absolute” powers over the housing policy implementation in Imo State. ��

2. Agencies of the Federal Government, the Governor, and the Communities/Imo

State Housing Corporation should have “Much Say” over the housing policy

implementation.

3. The Interest groups including the Mass Media not perceived as having “Absolute

Say” or “Much Say” about housing policy implementation were preferred by

respondents to the survey instruments to have “Some Say about housing policy

implementation in Imo State.

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4. The perceived levels of attained and preferred “Say” about the selection of

housing goals and policies were congruent with one another, that is, there were

no noticeable or meaningful discrepancies between attained and preferred level

of power relative to selection of housing goals and policies. The Executive was

perceived as having more power than would be preferred, and the Legislators

and the Judiciary were perceived as having less power than would be preferred;

these differences, however, were not significant.

4.3 FINDINGS 4.3.1. Summary of Findings from the Research Questions

Based on the foregoing, it was discovered that the Implementation of the Federal

Government Housing Policy Implementation in Imo State, Nigeria: 1979-2007 had deep

rooted constraints, which include, among others:

Inherent weakness in the Policy. Due process was not followed as the policy making institutions made no contributions towards the formulation and implementation of the housing policy, according to the Constitutional provisions for policy making. There was therefore lack of sound procedure in the formulation and implementation of the housing programme.

Administrative conflict between the Federal and the Imo State Government. The

State Government, who also wanted to handle the project but was not allowed to do so, therefore, refused to take the programme/projects seriously in order to undermine the efforts of the Federal Government.

There was an exponential growth of housing users due to the uncontrolled

population increase and urban migration which gave rise to uncontrolled housing demands. This in turn resulted to illegal construction of shanties and the resultant effect was vandalism.

Endemic corrupt practice and weak enforcement of contracts because of sophistry

and guile culture of the people. These vices slowed down national social development in the area of housing policy.

There was lack of sound leadership and incompetent personnel as the top

management and subordinate staff lacked managerial capacity, integrity,

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competence and vision to supervise the housing programme. Monitoring, especially in the rural local governments was not done.

Government laws and policies, imposed heavy and multiple taxes on the importation

of building materials. Technical advancement, high interest rates, low exchange rates of the Naira to other currencies, high unemployment resulted to crime, foreign policy and inflation adversely affected the housing programme.

Lack of proper and adequate supervision of the housing Programme which resulted

to the housing units being constructed haphazardly to the detriment of the nation, the State and the ‘beneficiaries’ of the low-income earners.

The design of the house was faulty as it failed to consider the various cultural

and climatic factors adversely militated again the implementation of the Federal Government housing policy in Imo State (1979-1983).

9. The poor location of sites in remote areas with little or no accessibility due to

politicization by most State Governments resulted in waste of funds; also there was non payment of compensation for land acquired from the rural or original owners.

10. There was appointment of contractors on political party patronage instead of experience in construction and non availability of cheap building materials to contractors.

11. A cement armada which reared its ugly head in port congestion. This caused scarcity of cement and other building materials and consequent diversion of some resources for building houses.

12. The Pressure Groups including the masses did not contribute to the effective implementation of the housing policy of the Second Republic. The Mass Media as the public watchdog did ot also play its role during the Second Republic. It is the duty of the Press as the public watchdog to sniff out any acts or indiscretions of the public officers who abuse their offices. It is the mass media that goes into the closet and brings out the skeletons.

13. The low-income earners could not afford the housing units due to unavailability of fund and the Mortgage conditions were very high and rough for the low income workers.

14. Non-acceptability of the core housing programme by the low income earners due to wrong impression given to it by Government.

15. Denial of Right during Allocation of the Housing Units.

16. Poor Relationship between Formulation and Implementation of housing policy. 17. The terrible impact of sophistry and guile culture was the bane of the Federal

Government Housing policy implementation in Imo State.

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*�* ��

*�*��In-depth Descriptive Analysis of Research Questions �

Inherent weakness in the Policy � The Legislative Council did not perform any

law making function but merely served as an advisory body to the Colonial Governor.

When Nigeria became independent through series of constitutional conferences

in 1954, 1957, and 1958, it adopted the Westminster parliamentary system of

government. It had two Legislative houses – the House of Representatives – “three

hundred and twelve�members elected nation-wide to serve for five years and a Senate

of 44 members” (Dawson and Robinson, 1963). It was a colonial creation, designed to

play ratifying role, instead of policy making. Thus, the Nigerian Legislature from its

embryonic stage was subordinate to the needs and logic of the Legislature of the

metropolis and as a result was prevented from developing as an autonomous institution

with the attributes of legislatures in modern democratic State.

The colonial Legislature was therefore neither a supreme nor a sovereign body,

and its function was not even deliberative but merely ratifying. It existed to give formal

approval to executive directives issued by the Governor. In addition to the above, the

legislature was neither formally nor objectively representative of the people for whom it

was supposed to be making laws. Since there was no worthwhile system of election,

the Nigerian people had no say in the selection of the legislative Council. The

legislature became not the centre of all government activities, the ultimate policy maker,

protector of the people’s interest, instrument of national integration and inducer of socio-

economic development, but body factionalized into three major political parties which

represented the three dominant ethnic groups. The Nigerian Legislature had never been

anything but a rubber stamp, whichmade impossible the acquisition of the attributes,

norms and rules of liberal democracy as is the case in USA or India. The government

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was inclined to ride roughshod over the house, secure in the belief that it would always

get its way with the House and the electorate too.

Essentially, the general performance of the Legislature during the Second

Republic was disappointedly poor. Part of the reason for this poor performance was

due to the intra and inter party conflict that dominated the legislative process during the

period. Part of this conflict arose because no one party had absolute majority in the

parliament, so, there was need to devise an accord between the ruling party and the

Nigerian Peoples Party. The performance of the parties during the 1979 Legislative

election is shown in the table below:

Table 15 - Summary of Position of Political Parties in the Nigerian Legislature during the Second Republic

Political Party Senate House

National Party of Nigeria 36 167

Unity Party of Nigeria 28 110

Nigerian Peoples Party 16 77

Great Nigerian Peoples Party 8 47

Peoples Redemption Party 7 44

Total 95 445

Source: Federal Ministry of Information (1982), The National Assembly, p. 9.

The intra and inter-party conflict manifested in the controversy which attended

the nomination of Chief R. Akinjide as a minister in Shagaris Cabinet”. After this intra-

inter party conflict, the Legislature busied itself with fixing its salaries and personal

emoluments. In fact for almost one year of the resumption, the Legislature concerned

itself with issues of accommodation, comfort and salaries for its members. For

example, on the very day the Nigerian Legislature assumed duty, the members passed

a motion requesting for N1 million salary advance pending the determination of their

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salary, special free transport facilities, immunity from odd-even number motor traffic law

of Lagos, and alternative accommodation at Victoria Island, instead of the Badagry

Express high rise apartments reserved for the law maker. When the demand was not for

free and posh accommodation, it was for fat salaries. They were there carrying out the

wishes of the executive. In fact, the housing policy was initiated by the Executive Arm

of the government. The policy was never debated by the legislative arm of the

government but the President used his executive powers to direct how he wanted the

housing projects handled in each State. A major problem that faced the Housing

programme of the Second Republic was lack of policy co-ordination under the NPN-

NPP accord. Ministers appointed from these two political parties had different priorities

in their programmes. The execution of the housing policy was therefore, characterized

by uncoordinated strategies.

On the whole, the legislators performed below expectation, essentially because

the political parties carried the bitterness and acrimony which attended the controversial

presidential election to the National Assembly. The result of this unhealthy situation

was administrative inefficiency.

Administrative Conflict: The housing programme of the Second Republic was

characterized with administrative conflict between the National Party of Nigeria (NPN)

Federal Government and the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) State Government in Imo

State. The State Government, who also wanted to handle the project for popularity

reasons but was not allowed to do so, refused to take the programme/project seriously.

With their sophistry and guile nature, they undermined the efforts of the Federal

Government through acquisition of poor land and non payment at times of

compensation for land acquired. The poor location of sites in remote areas, with little or

no accessibility, due to politicization by most state governments resulted in waste of

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funds. In general terms, “a conflict of interest exists where a public official is placed in

a position where for some advantage to be gained for himself, he finds it difficult or

impossible to devote himself with complete energy and loyalty to the public interest”

(Nigro, 1973). This was the case during Nigeria’s Second Republic housing policy.

Exponential Growth, Poor Sanitation and Vandalism: The situation became worse

with the ever increasing migration of low or no-income earners from the surrounding

neighbourhoods into the towns. This resulted, among other things, in the increase of

the number of petty businesses, which competed for accommodation with households in

the same buildings and,��aggravated the problem of dwelling units. As was

clearly evident, the above lumping of various economic activities with residential

accommodation in the high density areas of the towns, not only generated health

problems including that of unabated noise, but also the resultant congestions further

increased the incidence of social and psychological conflict for the individual and the

nation.

In comparison, the low and to a lesser extent, the lesser medium density areas

where fewer urban dwellers lived were not afflicted with these problems. The physical

and mental health as well as the social well-being of the inhabitants of the low and

some medium density areas “were therefore by virtue of their relatively cleaner, more

refined and quieter living environment, generally more conducive to a better quality of

life than those of their fellow citizens residing in the high density areas” (Wood, 1967).

As a corollary to the above, the pattern of household occupation by type of

accommodation was considered. In this regard, the case of Imo State was abundantly

conspicuous, especially, because “as many as 87% of all the households surveyed in

the high and medium density of the State lived in single rooms” (Wood, 1967). A World

Bank study described the housing conditions in Calcutta, India where it found that more

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than two-thirds of families lived in single rooms as “drastic and poor in the extreme”

(WB, 1972:17). It was therefore clear that the case of Imo State in this regard was not

only more drastic but had set a new record of extremity. The table below confirms this

statement:

Table 16 - Household Occupation by Type of Accommodation

in Imo State, 1980 Total Number Number in % of No in % of Number in % of of Households Single Rooms Total Bungalow Total Flats Total 1,889 1,644 87.03 91 4.82 154 8.15 Source: Nwosu, E. (1981), Uneven Opportunities in Urban Housing: The Case of Imo State of Nigeria, Enugu, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, p.39. In the study of Owerri Urban, Imo State capital, 60 per cent of the inhabitants were

found to live in single room tenement as shown in the table below:

Table 17 - Housing Type Distribution in Owerri Urban (1979-1983) Housing Type Number Per cent of Total

Bungalow 72 25.90 Flats 42 15.11 Single Room Tenement 164 59.99

Total 278 100

Source: Nwosu, E. (1981), Uneven Opportunities in Urban Housing,

The Case of Imo State of Nigeria, Enugu, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, p.39. In this study, nearly the entire 60% expressed their desire to change the present

housing due to the following reasons: inadequacy of the present accommodation (47)”

while an additional 17% mentioned lack of essential facilities as shown in the table next

page:

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Table 18 - Distribution of Reasons for Wishing to Change Present Housing in Owerri Urban (1981)

Reason Number Per cent of Total

Present housing inadequate 75 46.88

Family size becoming large 23 14.38

Lack of essential facilities 27 16.88

Long distance to place of work 7 4.38

Change in status and income 5 3.13

Other reasons 23 14.38

Total 160 100.00

Source: Nwosu, E. (1981), Uneven Opportunities in Urban Housing:

The Case of Imo State of Nigeria, Enugu, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, p. 40. The two reasons which might be interpreted to mean more or less the same thing is not

the important thing, rather both inadequacy of housing and lack essential facilities in

Owerri, (for instance, as indicated in the Table below, the proportion of urban

households in Imo State with water supply):

Table 19 - Distribution of Households by Water Supply in Imo State Urban Centres (In Percentage)

State Treated Untreated Well Well Bore- Stream Ponds Others Pipe Pipe Water Water hole Borne Borne (Piped) (Not Water Water piped)

Imo 36.00 4.00 1.35 3.25 3.10 15.00 9.50 2.25

Sources: Nwosu, E. (1981), Uneven Opportunities in Urban Housing:

The Case of Imo State of Nigeria, Enugu, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, p. 40. This accounted for as much as 64 per cent of the reason for wishing to change their

accommodation was a popular and clear verdict of rejection of the existing pattern and

quality of housing in Imo State. Again, according to the above Table, only 3.13 per cent

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gave “change in status and income” as reason for wishing to change their

accommodation.

The rejection was not as a result of their preference for the small over-crowded,

poorly ventilated and poorly equipped buildings situated in abundantly filthy and stinking

surroundings in which they spent their lives. The reason was that as a consequence of

their very low incomes, they avoided the higher incidence of rents that increasingly

became concomitant with a change to a better living accommodation. Logically,

although this rejection could be said to be symptomatic to a deep sense of frustration,

helplessness and even anger, it nonetheless represented a more fundamental and

realistic appraisal of their stagnant low economic status vis-a-vis the relatively affluent

few, who as a result of their positively changing income levels could desire and effect a

change of accommodation.

In the area of sanitation in Imo State prior to the promulgation of the low-cost

housing policy during Nigeria’s Second Republic, it was clear that the greatest single

problem of congested living in the acutely over-crowded high density areas of the State

was the danger to the health of residents. In these areas more than in the low and

medium density areas, unemployed youths residing with relatives, domestic servants

and even children often slept on house passage ways, in open kitchens and even in

workshops.

In these high density areas, there was usually a large cluster of old houses and

the most dangerous of all the health and sanitation problems in these places was the

waste disposal system. The bath and restrooms were usually detached from but very

close to the main buildings and these facilities were shared by the entire households in

the building. The most disgraceful and dehumanizing aspect of the living conditions of

the inhabitants of these over-crowded areas was the disposal of human excrement

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continued to be dominantly through the bucket latrine system by which the pail is placed

beneath a small elevated concrete wall, and emptied nightly by the “night soil men”.

Flies naturally found their way to such open-lying human waste and perched at will on

everything available, including food items.

It was no wonder then that with such unsanitary and heavily polluted

environment, with several people residing in a dwelling unit, and with all residents using

the same inadequate kitchen, bath and latrine facilities, not only were the most

elementary principles of personal hygiene and privacy lacking, but also the incidence of

epidemics such as cholera remained a bug-bear to the inhabitants of the State. The

problem of poor toilet facilities was not administratively planned. Records show that

seven out of every ten Nigeria urban dwellers made use of pit latrines during the period

under review, while less than one-fifth had access to water closet as at 1981. By 1983,

the proportion of those with access to water closet had reduced to less than one-tenth

as shown in the table below:

Table 20 - Type of Toilet in the Urban Centres (1979-1983)

Type Percentage in 1979-1981 Percentage in 1982-1983

Pit 65 58

Pail 4 2

Water Closet 6 4

Toilet or Water 5 4

Bush 18 20

Total 98 88

Source: Federal Office of Statistics, (1981), Appraisal of the National Housing Policy, in Housing Today, A Journal of the Association of Housing Corporations of Nigeria (AHCN), Vol. 2 No. 1, p.17.

The housing policy failed to meet public expectations for cheap and affordable

housing units. This situation in Imo State, briefly described, was the case in all the

States of the federation. What led to the promulgation of the low-cost housing policy

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during Nigeria’s Second Republic was therefore the desire to provide affordable houses

to low-income earners in various parts of the country. It is in furtherance of this goal,

that the Minister of Housing and Environment promised the nation that the Federal

government planned to build 200,000 housing units annually with the support of the

State government and private sector. The specific objectives for the promulgation of the

low-cost housing units were to ensure increased production of affordable

owner/occupier houses in the urban areas; adequate provision of financial resources to

institutions charged with the responsibility of house financing and building construction

industry as well as to support local initiative and activities in home production.

Poor Location and Condition of the Land: The remoteness of the land was against

the culture of the people in the South East who build houses and live together in

clusters of kindred. Even when individuals purchase land for building purposes, they do

not purchase in far removed and distant locations to ensure security of their lives and

property. The poor condition of the land which was marshy, slumps, evil forest, land

dedicated to gods and even land under dispute created problems of abandoned projects

(see Appendices 7A to 7C with the researcher in set).

Corruption Associated With Compensation for Land Acquired: The nature and

level of corruption in Imo State was a reflection of what obtained in the larger Nigerian

society. The State’s socio-economic and political environment just like that of Nigeria

was bedeviled with corruption, abuse of position and privileges. In line with sophistry

and guile, the local politicians colluded with their counterparts in the State Government

to pay huge compensations on such lands. There was corruption associated with

compensation for land acquisition. Most times, the compensation paid by the State

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Government did not actually reach the land owners; the owners of the land at times got

little money.

Unethical Values: The seemingly un-ending crises that emanate from these have

seriously eroded the ethical and moral fabrics of the society. The cummulative effects

of all these are manifested in the current grave sense of physical, social, economic and

political insecurity. The end result was a fierce human struggle for survival, which has

virtually negated our ethical values and norm and enthroned a near-amoral culture of

unbridled indiscipline that seemed to thrive on idleness, slovenliness and low

productivity. Gross administrative inefficiency is a product of low moral and inadequate

motivation which in turn resulted in the manifestation of adaptive behaviours by the

masses. There was lack of devotion to duty and absence of commitment to the

objectives of the Second Republic housing programme.

Again, the resultant effect of this terrible housing situation was extensive

vandalism of building materials and equipment. This wanton destruction vandals

inflicted in the housing projects created untold drain on scarce financial resources of the

country during the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State

(1979-1983). Vandalism appears to be the product of a complex society such as ours.

The craze for material things and the desperate desire to get rich quick in a bid to win

the material rat race pushed people to commit all sorts of offences including vandalism.

Let us consider what these activities of vandals constituted, each time they were

inflicted on the nation. They could and had indeed always denied – indeed deprived

that comfort shelter would have given the citizens - the ordinary everyday needs,

protection from homelessness, communal living, the harassment from landlords,

relaxation and family get-together.

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Denial of Right during Allocation of the Housing Units: In allocation of the housing

units, the Presidential Liaison Officer (PLO) on behalf of the President allocated the

housing units to party loyalists and stalwarts and not to the low income groups. The

PLO himself was appointed by the President as political patronage. He was not a

professional and administratively competent to handle complex issue of allocation of

houses to the intended target owners and occupants. Administratively, it was a case of

square peg in a round hole as there was a mismatch between the PLO and competence

of the task assigned to him. Again, there was lack of maintenance of the estate due to

lack of maintenance culture.

Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for

development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding

inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid. Mismanagement,

cheating and corruption are cankerworm, which destroyed the Second Republic

Housing policy in Nigeria, with particular reference to Imo State. The high level of

corruption of the Second Republic and the failure of the measures adopted to curb this

malaise, which has now assumed the gargantuan proportions informed the

establishment of institutions in later years to fight this problem.

One argument that was raised for the failure of the fight against corruption in the

Second Republic was that, there were no institutional provision and agencies charged

with the responsibility of fighting corruption. The establishment of such institutions as

Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Independent Corrupt Practices and Other

Related Offences Commission, and Due Process Office, etc. in the Presidency was of

utmost importance. Part of the institutionalization process of these anti-corruption

agencies is the passage of acts by the National Assembly, which were later accented to

by the President to become laws.

111

With the level of corruption in the Second Republic, it was not surprising that the

economy went into serious crises. Three years after the government came on board,

President Shehu Shagari’s government in October 1979 inherited about US $5.5 billion

in foreign reserves from the Military. By July, 1980 this rose to US $8.2 billion. By the

time the President was overthrown in December, 1983, Nigeria owed foreign creditors

over US $ 28-30 billion.

Looking at the Federal Government housing programme during this period, the

total estimated financial requirement was put at N2.45 billion. Despite the huge

investment on housing delivery during Nigeria’s Second Republic, the provision of

housing units to the teeming populace in low-income group was very minimal in the

nineteen States of the Federation, especially in Imo State. It was a dismal

performance. The Second Republic Housing policy was therefore not designed and

planned to improve the housing situation in Nigeria, with particular reference to Imo

State.

Lack of Sound Leadership and Competent Personnel: Acting without legal authority

was rampant among public officials in Nigeria. Such administrative acts were frequent

and wide-spread. In the process of administration, top officials created and changed

existing laws. Some inadvertently failed to observe in their administrative acts and

utterances the required due process as provided by law. In such situations, the zealous

or unwitting or careless official thought that he was acting within the law. Violation of

Procedural Due Process was a common feature of Nigeria’s Second Republic. In

general terms, procedural due process means that all public officials at all levels of

government must be fair in their dealings with private citizens and groups. The

executive during this period under review did not recognize the fact that they were

public property and that they existed to serve the public and not themselves. They

112

treated citizens and groups as beggars of public services and in consequence treated

them unfairly. They made things difficult for the citizens they served.

The housing policy was initiated by the Executive arm of the government during

the Second Republic. The policy was never debated by the legislative arm of the

government but the President used his executive powers to direct how he wanted the

housing projects handled in each State” (FMHE,1981:13). It is a known fact that

bureaucracy is a source of power. Damming or denying this power “accomplishes little

towards the major task of increasing the probability that policy would be informed and

responsible” (Long, 1954:18). In support of this view, citing the example of British Civil

Servants, “the most important functions of the British Civil Servants is not to carry out

decisions already taken by Ministers, but to advise them on what decisions they should

take” (Dale, 1975:33). Most Western observers are of the view that political functions

tend to be appropriated “in considerable measures, by the bureaucrats in the States.

But this view contradicts Harris’ findings in a study he conducted in 1966 on the role of

the higher public servants in Nigeria between 1964-1965, which showed that the actual

role behaviour of the higher public servants as perceived by themselves and members

of the elite group conformed with the basic elements of their prescribed role of advising

Ministers on policy matters and supervising the execution of existing policies.

Rather, all that was done was that the housing policy of the Second Republic

received input from the top bureaucrats by way of administrative structure and issuing

out circulars, directing the Federal Mortgage Bank and Federal Housing Authority.

Faulty Housing Design: The design of the houses failed to consider the various

cultural and climatic factors. The housing policy was designed to cover the then entire

nineteen States of the federation. The low-income housing unit comprised one

bedroom, one living room, one store, one kitchen, one bath and one toilet and a terrace

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space. In the case of two bedroom housing unit, it comprised two bedrooms, one living

room, one store, one kitchen, one bath and one toilet and a terrace. These in the

respondents’ opinion were rock bottom minimum requirement.

People in the low income group whom the policy tended to profess to give these

so-called low cost houses to, were invariably prone to having the largest number of

children and wives and consequently needed to be given larger space accommodation

to live decently. Therefore to house them conveniently they needed additional room, a

minimum of three bedrooms was considered adequate. This created a big contradiction

of how to make a bigger area of accommodation low costing.

Inefficiency in Policy Implementation: Taking a sample of the housing allocation in

some States, which would be shown later in tables, it was clear that the housing

programme was progressive and mass-oriented. Thus the programme was seen as a

lofty one with populist conception. To assist in the implementation of the programme,

by the end of 1980, branches of the Federal Mortgage Banks were established in all the

nineteen States, (see Appendix V) to give soft loans which would be repaid between

seven and twenty years.

At the end of 1983, it was reported that out of a total of one hundred and twenty

thousand (120,000) housing units expected to have been constructed, only thirty-two

thousand, two hundred and twenty-seven (32,227) structures were erected. Yet, a total

amount of N1.266 billion was committed to their construction during this period - 1980-

1983. A performance table of some of the States is shown next page:

114

Table 21 - Housing Policy Performance of some States during Shagari’s Administration State % of success No. of houses built Imo 0.06% 781

Sokoto 12.5% 1,000

Bauchi 22.0% 1,760

Oyo 18.0% 1.440

Federal Government 8,000

out of 46,000 17.391% 8,000

Gongola built 382 out of 8,000 4.775%. 382

Source: Olu, A. (1980), Housing in Nigeria, p.40.

In the planning of the housing programme, various infrastructure formed part of

the housing estate but during implementation, to people’s dismay, the roads, were not

tarred (see Appendix 6A), police posts, telecommunication boots, security, refuge and

sewage disposal were not provided. Most of the houses were not connected with

electricity and water when the occupants initially moved in. The poor state of the

infrastructures was one major serious aspect of the housing problem. Those who relied

on well, stream or pond constituted 30.7% and 32.1% respectively as shown in the table

next page:

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Table 22 - Regular Sources of Water to Urban Households Sources Percentage

Pipe borne water 26.7

Borehole 10.41

Well (piped or unpiped) 30.7

Stream/Pond 32.1

Total 100

Sources: Ajanlekoko, S (1988), Appraisal of the National Housing

Policy, in Housing Today, A Journal of the Association of Housing Corporations of Nigeria (AHCN), Vol. 2 No. 1, p.17.

In Imo State, the housing programme of the Second Republic was a failure. It

was a white-elephant project and a conduit pipe for siphoning the national cake,

especially in the rural areas where the programme became a laughing stock. The

Second Republic Housing Programme of Alhaji Shehu Shagari was not successfully

implemented though the housing policy was people-oriented. A total of seven hundred

and eighty-one housing units out of a total of eihgt thousand housing units slated for the

State were much later constructed in Owerri Municipal and other rural areas as shown

in the table next page:

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Table 23 - Performance Rate of Federal Government Housing Policy Implementation in Imo Statem (1979-1983)

Local Government/Location Number of Housing Units Constructed

Owerri Site 1 (Egbu) 171

Owerri Site 2 (Umuguma) 223

Ezinihitte 23

Mbaitoli/Ikeduru (Iho) 21

Ngor Okpala 20

Etiti Site 1 (near Abadaba Lake in Obowo) 28

Etiti Site 2 (Isinweke) 20

Okigwe 69

Mbano Site 1 (Umuelemai) 30

Mbano Site 2 (Osuama) 20

Orlu 31

Nkwerre 26

Oru (Mgbidi) 15

Ohaji/Egbema/Oguta 22

Total 781

Source: Field Work by the Researcher, Ekeanyanwu, (2007).

Again, the table reveals that out of the two million houses to be constructed in the State

within the period under review, only seven hundred and eighty-one housing units were

constructed and this number gives a simple percent of 0.06% completion of the

intended 100%.

Contractual Default/Incompetent Personnel: The concept of mass housing in the

circumstances of Nigeria necessarily implies the involvement of people in construction

work, who may not qualify to execute them. The contractors who were not builders

themselves employed the services of unskilled and incompetent builders without

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theoretical background to explain what they were doing. These incompetent personnel

were even deficient in simple measurement in length and width. When corrected, they

usually retorted “it doesn’t matter, that how we do it”. Their work was not based on

accuracy and precision but on hunch. This was equally true of the Federal Government

housing policy implementation in Imo State, Nigeria:1979-2007.

The findings revealed that most of the housing units in the local governments

were given to incompetent contractors because of pressure from the interest groups in

this State. During the period (1979-1983), the civilian government allowed political

considerations to override those of housing policy and programmes. A typical example

was the appointment of contractors on political party patronage instead of experience to

execute the housing programmes in all the States of the Federation.

Experience instead of political consideration should weigh heavily in contract

patronage, to avoid an advent of emergency contractors without technical know-how. In

the negotiation, between the contractors as middle men (which was a problem in itself)

and government and/or between the contractors and the builders, foxy pattern of cheat

and grab syndrome was evident. The contractors in their proposals and quotations

during the Second Republic housing programme in Imo State listed standard

measurements, use of highly skilled and knowledgeable personnel, reasonable time

frame, etc. but in actual execution of the contract used unskilled, incompetent and

cheap labour who trained on the job, sub-standard materials and never kept to the time

frame and price quoted. Each of them would always ask for revaluation.

The contractors most of the time did not pay the workers who, of course,

abandoned the projects. Thus, the contractors contributed in abandoned project

syndrome with its attendant wasteful effects among which was vandalism of building

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materials. Majority of the builders lacked commitment. The very few committed ones

were regarded as fools and were always mocked at.

Lack of Proper and Adequate Supervision of the Housing Programme: The guile

practice of cheat and grab manifested intensively during supervision of the housing

projects. The government officials who should act as eye and ear of government often

compromised their responsibilities and offices to the detriment of the programme and

the entire nation. They collected huge amounts as bribes and certified sub-standard

jobs.

The duplication of responsibilities between Ministries of Works and Housing on

the one hand and State Agency for housing delivery on the other hand implied

administrative inefficiency. This resulted in the haphazard construction of the housing

units. The Federal Housing Authority in the State, which handled the supervision of the

housing programme had no operational autonomy. Government through the controlling

Ministry exercised excessive control to the point of interfering with the day-to-day

execution of the housing programme. This militating factor dangerously affected the

implementation of the housing programme in Imo State.

Non-avaibility of building materials: There was also non availability of cheap building

materials to contractors as at this period in question, there was cement armada which

reared its ugly head in port congestion and the scarcity of private landlords through rent

control edicts and consequent diversion of some resources for building houses. In the

purchase of building materials, the guile pattern of behaviour was exhibited in

purchases of building materials. The contractors colluded with the dealers of the

building materials to quote bloated prices.

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Core Housing: However, core housing which is adaptable to future expansion by the

user has been built by the federal and state governments or their agencies. For

example, the one-bedroom housing units built by the federal government were meant to

be core housing. But the potential users did not accept them because they were not

educated to know that their contribution was necessary to fully develop the houses.

Their reaction was understandable because the government gave users the impression

that they would be provided with completed housing units.

Non-Affordability of the Housing Units Due to Inaccessibility of Fund: The major

input in housing development is Finance. This is a sine qua non to any meaningful

efforts in housing development”. Affordable housing in recent past had seemingly

become impossible for an average Nigerian. While the real income of the people

continued to drop, the cost of developing housing and purchase of same continued to

be on the rise. The effect of this non-affordability of housing was overcrowding and

unsanitary squatter settlements especially in our urban centers. The obvious hindrance

to affordable housing was inaccessibility to the required finance. In the past, the

governments were directly involved in mass housing provision, providing all required

capital and infrastructural facilities.

Pressure Groups: The 1979 Presidential System also encouraged the emergence and

operations of Pressure Groups. The 1979 Constitution conspicuously gave a legal

backing for the operations of these groups. For example, Section 37 of the Constitution

specifically guaranteed the freedom of association. Also, Section 15 (3d) provided thus:

For the purpose of promoting national integrity, it shall be the duty of the State to

promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic,

religious or other sectional barriers. Under the same Chapter II on Fundamental

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Objectives, the founding fathers articulated the fact that all Nigerians have a common

stake in the survival and prospects of the nation.

The realization of this also encouraged a stiff competition between various

industries, groups and interests seeking to maximize their benefits and share in the

‘national cake’ during the Nigeria’s Second Republic. It was obvious too, that a situation

such as this intrinsically encouraged individuals to join together into such groups that

would best realize their individual desires. Obviously, it was this provision, among

others, which sustained the generally aggressive posture of labour organizations and

their consequent incessant strike actions during the Second Republic to achieve their

aims. This occurred where dialogue and series of arbitration failed to yield fruit. The

table below is a comprehensive record of incessant strike actions by various labour

organizations which were members of Pressure Groups, from 1979 to 1983:

Table 24 - Strikes, Workers Involved and Man-Days Lost 1979-1983

Year Number of Disputes Workers Involved Man-Day Lost

1979 755 204,742 7,038,855

1980 265 221,088 2,350,998

1981 234 323,700 2,218,223

1982 253 2,874,721 9,652,400

1983 253 2,874,721 9,652,400

Source: Emekwe (1989), Class and Class Struggle in Nigeria:

The NLC and the Government As Evidenced by Strike Actions, UNN, p 18.

The Mass Media always have a role to play in policy implementation all over the

world. Nwankwo, (2003:19) stated that, “it is the duty of the press as the public

watchdog to sniff out any acts or indiscretions of the public officers who abuse their

offices. It is the mass media that go into the closet and brings out the skeletons. In not

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doing so, means that the mass media became part of the problem. They were,

therefore, merely toothless bull dog in the area of the nation’s housing policy and

implementation during this period.

Despite the vital role of the Pressure Groups in Nigeria, during the Second

Republic, it is amazing that the Pressure groups did not make any input in the

formulation and implementation of the housing policy neither did they exercise any

statutory or regulatory control over the Executive, the Legislature or other Building

Agencies during Nigeria’s Second Republic, rather, they had a lot of input in shaping it

by pressing for contracts to be awarded to individuals or groups that could not perform.

Poor Link between Formulation and Implementation

Formulation of policy is not an end in itself. More importantly is to make effective

the course of action decided upon. Policy is not therefore concerned with its formulation

for its own sake; it is concerned with performance. Nothing is as useless therefore as

the right formulation that is quietly sabotaged by the people who have to make it

effective. The origin of this sabotage and disdain for patroitism is not difficult to identify.

It is the sophistry and guile culture at work. In that Second Republic housing

developmet programme, one witnessed series of scams garnished as housing

development policies but which were merely intended to construct houses for those who

formulated and implemented them.

In Imo State, sound policies have been formulated but they have been marred

by poor implementation. Policy must be operationalised or translated into specific

strategies, procedure, rules and actions that may enhance the realisation of set

objectives. As stated in the UNICEF, (1999:66), “any project or programme has a

higher chance of success if it is based on the expressed needs of the community and

the community is a key actor in its implementation, monitoring and evaluation”.

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Sophistry and Guile Culture: The fundamental problem of our housing policies as

well as other policies in Nigeria is the flaw in our culture. Our scanty value system has

changed for the worse. We are ranked among the fifty most corrupt nations of the world

and with 419; money is worshipped no matter how it is acquired. Even though the so

called sound cultural and Christian values are widely orchestrated in our culture, it has

no depth. This bankrupt cultural orientation is what was transferred to all economic,

social, political, administrative and contractual activities and programmes during

Nigeria’s Second Republic.

Even in the formulation and execution of both public and private policies, they

were skewed to benefit a few corrupt and selfish individuals. The same politicians who

formulated the housing policy, fraudulently implemented it, were the same people who

awarded the contracts themselves, executed the contracts, advertised the sale and

purchased the houses themselves, leaving out the intended beneficiary – the low-

income earners.

The failure of the housing policy in Nigeria, with particular reference to the

Second Republic Housing Programme in Imo State, was significantly caused by this

weak and toxic culture that cheated, stole and destroyed the system. The cheat and

grab mentality resulted in unfaithfulness in service and the attendant effect was an

economy where majority of the people suffered in the midst of plenty without adequate

shelter or improved standard of living.

Summary

Based on the above data presented, interpreted and analysed, based on the

findings and indepth discussions on the research questions, it was discovered that

beyond any reasonable doubt, the Federal Government housing policy implementation

in Imo State, Nigeria:1979-2007 was not only very poor but a failure.

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+�� / ��4 �-�� 3�3�� 1 �3� ��

�� 4 �� / �33�� 0�

Efficiency is an administrative value in which a set objective is realized within the

time frame with minimum inputs; a state in which maximum outputs are realized with

minimum inputs. Efficiency is both individually and organizational based. It is,

therefore, the greatest value of a nation in general and a State in particular.

Dispassionate application of the Rule of Law is a cardinal principle for the

achievement of administrative efficiency for policy formulation and implementation in

any nation. No one is above the law as enshrined in our Constitution. This concept is

very important because it presupposes the equality of all in order to achieve effective

national policies for a successful socio-economic development. Invariably, therefore,

both the Executive and the Legislature must act within the law. The modern form of

Government, particularly the American presidential model, which we copied provides for

separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. The

Legislature passes a bill and when it is signed into law by the President, the legislators

move around to monitor its implementation. This is what is called the oversight

functions of the legislature while the Judiciary on its own part, interpretes the law and

brings perpetrators of evil in any form to book.

5.1 Implications of Findings for Administrative Efficiency

The implication of findings in this study is gross violation of Administrative

efficiency as the housing policy was afflicted by various abuses of administrative powers

and malpractices. What was experienced during the Second Republic housing policy

were violation of standard procedure and due process, acting without legal authority,

bribery and corruption, dishonesty, unethical behaviour, unfair treatment of workers,

gross inefficiency, denial of rights and failure to exercise administrative initiatives.

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The implications of findings for administrative efficiency in this study are presented

under the following sub-themes:

1. Legislation of the Housing Policy and contribution by all arms of government.

2. Efficiency in the Implementation of the Housing Programme by ensuring

sound leadership and competency-based workers.

3. Sound Planning. 4. Monitoring and Evaluation of housing programmes.

5. Privatization of the building and construction industry. 6. Structure for sustainability of the Housing Programme.

7. Ethical Value to fight Sophistry and Guile culture.

8. Competent and committed Legislature.

9. Financial, political and administrative will.

10. Adherence to Due Process 11. Checkmating Government Powers

12. Cordial Relationship among workers

13. Continuity.

14. Lessons learnt from the Second Republic Housing policy Implementation in Imo State.

Legislation of the Housing Policy and contribution by the all arms of government

Section 4 of the Constitution specifically empowered the Legislature to “make

laws for the peace, order and good government of the federation or any part thereof”

(FMI, 1974). The Nigerian Legislature from its embryonic stage was subordinate to the

needs and logic of the Executive of the State and as a result was prevented from

developing as an autonomous institution with the attributes of legislatures in modern

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democratic State. Its function was not even deliberative but merely ratifying. It

existed to give formal approval to executive directives issued by the

President/Governor. The legislature was neither formally nor objectively representative

of the people for whom it was supposed to be making laws.

Since there was no worthwhile system of election, the Nigerian people had no

say in the selection of the Legislative Council. Essentially, the general performance of

the Legislature during the Second Republic was disappointedly poor. Part of the reason

for this poor performance was due to the intra and inter party conflict that dominated the

legislative process during the period under review. After this intra-inter party conflict,

the Legislature busied itself with fixing its salaries and personal emoluments. In fact for

almost one year of the resumption, the Legislature concerned itself with issues of

accommodation, comfort and salaries for its members. For example, on the very day

the Nigerian Legislature assumed duty, the members passed a motion requesting for

N1 million salary advance pending the determination of their salary, special free

transport facilities, immunity from odd-even number motor traffic law of Lagos, and

alternative accommodation at Victoria Island, instead of the Badagry Express high rise

apartments reserved for the law maker. When the demand was not for free and posh

accommodation, it was for fat salaries. They were there carrying out the wishes of the

executive.

In fact, the housing policy was initiated by the Executive Arm of the government.

The policy was never debated by the legislative arm of the government but the

President used his executive powers to direct how he wanted the housing projects

handled in each State. A major problem that faced the Housing programme of the

Second Republic was lack of policy co-ordination under the NPN-NPP accord.

Ministers appointed from these two political parties had different priorities in their

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programmes. The execution of the housing policy was therefore, characterized by

uncoordinated strategies.

On the whole, the legislators performed below expectation, essentially because

the political parties carried the bitterness and acrimony of the election to the National

Assembly. The Legislature was a rubber stamp of the Executive (lacking a will of their

own), a body factionalised into three major political parties which represented the three

dominant ethnic groups. The result of this unhealthy situation was administrative

inefficiency.

For administrative efficiency, the Legislature should be the centre of all

government activities, the ultimate policy maker, protector of the people’s interest,

instrument of national integration and inducer of socio-economic development and not a

rubber stamp of the Executive.

Efficiency in the Implementation of the Housing Programme by Ensuring Sound Leadership and Competency-based Workers

Programme execution needs inspirational leadership as it involves a lot of

people. The majority of people in the agencies or organisations are involved in

execution. Engaging the implementers around the housing programme and motivating

them to work and deliver requires great leadership. A leader has to bring the strategy to

life for his people, and create the environment to bring out the best from everyone.

Poor leadership was one of the banes of economic development, especially in the

area of housing programme in Nigeria. Chief executives and subordinates should not

be short term in orientation nor lack the managerial capacity, integrity, competence and

vision to successfully execute the housing programmes/projects. The leaders should

not be what St. Augustine described as “massa damnata” (a mass of iniquity), utterly

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fleshy and worldly. This materialistic group should never be trusted with leadership as

they could not lead.

Finally, individual goals should be with national goals. A leader has got to see

that the Individual aspirations of his people can be met through the achievement of the

national goals. In this way, quick wins would have been identified, successes

celebrated and the team re-energized as it feels valued and refueled. �The researcher

strongly believed that poor leadership was one of the negative reasons for poor

execution of the Second Republic housing programme, with particular reference to Imo

State. People are the most important assets of an organization. Companies that focus

on people deliver better results. After all it is people that get the job done. Putting

people first is the duty of good leadership.

Governments often take the populace for granted only to be shocked with the

reaction of the populace. The failure of government to provide services and create jobs

while a handful of the leaders display arrogantly their wealth, which are not earned

legitimately provoke violent reaction and brings down the government. History is replete

with such development.

The housing policy implementation should not be characterized with administrative

conflict between the Federal and the State Governments. The State Government

should cooperate with the Federal Government in handling housing projects and keep

aside any selfich motives for popularity. The State Government without the application

of sophistry and guile would not undermine the efforts of the Federal Government

through acquisition of poor land and non payment at times of compensation for land

acquired. The Federal Housing Authority in the State, which handles the supervision of

the housing programmes should be allowed operational autonomy while Government

provides enabling conditions for housing policy implementation.

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The strategic end game should be articulated into a compelling vision. The

housing vision lacked a strong emotional appeal that could drive passion across the

Housing Authorities or agencies that handled the housing programme. There was

therefore lack of alignment to the housing policy. This was one of the most common

reasons that plans/strategies were poorly executed. Some groups in the housing

programme were not aligned to the housing plan. A good example was where the

supply function was not aligned to the implementation strategy and this reduced his line

efficiency on standardization of consumers’ choice required for the work. It was the role

of the leader to drive total alignment before execution or implementation of the housing

policy. This was unlike the level of alignment in the U.S. space mission, which inspired

a cleaner to see his role as “helping to put a man on the moon”. That is an example of

ultimate alignment.

The annual ritual of additive planning and budgeting continued unabated. Capital

projects were included in the budget without proper appraisal and current budgeting

was a simple matter of scaling up the previous year’s numbers. Little attention was paid

to proper training of personnel and the modernization of planning equipment and

facilities. This practice continued upon return to civil governance and the phenomenon

was replicated throughout the entire public service.

There was also lack of communication which is critical to engaging the agencies

with the housing plan. Any effort required to engage the people to the housing

programme would have been worth it many times over. The team that handled the

housing construction was neither built nor inspired. At the end of the day, it was people

that executed the housing programme. So having the right people and spirit within the

team was critical. A good leadership has the right people-insight to select the right

people for the job. As important as having the right people was having the correct team

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spirit to get the best out of each player. Team spirit where each member owned the

team goals, supporting one another was the key to a successful housing programme.

This was lacking during this Second Republic housing programme.

The challenges of the Second Republic housing programme stemmed from

these external and internal influences. The resultant effect of these socio-economic

changes in our environment will lead to the need for a thorough leadership management

system that would evolve strategies to cope with the volatile socio-economic problems.

Leaders are expected to exhibit a high sense of integrity, honesty and diligence as well

as obedience to the rule of law in the performance of their duties.

Poor employment procedure resulted to incompetent workers, which caused

under- performance in the housing sector. This could often be traced to the quality and

type of people employed as there was pressure from high quarters to sacrifice merit on

the alter of mediocrity in areas of recruitment. As there was no minimum standard, any

person that connected to a party stalwart, Chief Executive or management staff got into

the team, irrespective of performance at recruitment interview. Cases abound all over

the world of recruitment errors, or misfits that the leadership of the Housing Authorities

and Agencies lacked the courage to deal with.

5.1.3 Sound Planning For administrative efficiency, the planning and design of housing programme,

should take into consideration the following factors:

• Prior assessment of needs for the rural dwellers to ascertain the extent of their need for housing.

• A clear democratic consensus among the executive, the

National Assembly and interest groups (the public).

• Community active participation to ensure that the programme/ projects would be sustained and protected.

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• Use of institutionalized structures to give the people a sense of belonging in what concerned them.

• Counterpart funding to make them have a stake in the

programme in order to ensure commitment.

• Capacity building – training and retraining of manpower to avoid incompetence and assurance of�coordination and monitoring.�

Steps to the development of a work Plan which was lacking in the Federal

Government housing programme include the preparation of a comprehensive fact base;

listing of problems and opportunities; Stating the specific objectives; developing the

strategies and establishing the Budget. The absence of a comprehensive national

policy framework for the operation and maintenance of Second Republic housing

programme did not auger well for administrative efficiency. Some of the steps that

should be taken include:

- Identification of major causes of poor operation and maintenance of rural

development infrastructures.

- Enacting laws on the institution and practices required for effective

operations and maintenance.

- Identification and classifications of various stakeholders for different

aspects of rural development maintenance.

- Enhanced national capacity development in the operation and

maintenance of housing units especially in the areas of water, electricity,

roads, health and educational facilities.

The above policy objectives were imperative if the housing programme was meant for

the low income earners and if the rural dwellers were to benefit from the investments

made in the provision of housing units and infrastructures dotted in the various local

government areas of the country.

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Options for sound planning can be broadly classified into three categories:

1. to build: construction of complete housing units.

2. to support: partial housing or core housing financial loan.

3. to facilitate: settlement upgrading, incentives for regulation of and

construction by private/public sectors”.

The first option requires the greatest capital investment and produces the fewest

completed houses because the government is overburdened with all roles – general

contractor, manager, and initiator. The other disadvantage of this option is that the

potential user is totally not involved in the housing process. The future users may reject

the ready-made houses if they do not meet their aspiration of decent housing. In

Nigeria, where there is the craze for awarding contracts, most public organizations

unfortunately choose this option. Some people were still building their houses during

that period of economic recession, whereas, public corporations responsible for housing

delivery were on the verge of collapse. The only hope of minimizing housing shortages

appears to lie in the user participation of housing delivery, that is, support to build

houses. There were many people who had money to build houses but could not find a

piece of urban land to do so. Other users might require support in form of finance or

technical direction. That was why housing delivery activities got grounded.

Finally, the national housing project which had a general framework should

consider the local peculiarities such as culture and source of income or resource base

each Local Government Area is known for; the building of human and social capital and

support for local processes which are the key elements of the housing programme were

not properly focused during this project development. The result was poor

maintenance culture, sheer neglect and irresponsibility on the part of the operators. It

is therefore vital for government agencies to provide the necessary training to adapt

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government employees to the requirements of a successful work career. These

appeared to account for the decay witnessed in the Federal Government housing policy

and implementation in Imo State, which implication was administrative inefficiency.

5.1.4 Monitoring and Evaluation of Housing Programmes

The meaning and functions of monitoring and evaluation, their roles in ensuring

sustainable national development propgrammes were not explored for the benefit of the

Federal Government housing policy and implementation in the nation in general and

Imo State in particular. �Administrative reports, such as progress reports or physical and

financial inputs and outputs, supplemented by investigative studies or in-depth analyses

of persistent problem areas, provide the information base for monitoring. Monitoring

and evaluation are tools for analyzing data and producing information for decision-

making.��

Participatory monitoring and evaluation will help to generate project specific

information on progress, processes and performance. It will also help to analyze and

aggregate data generated at various levels to track progress, process quality and

project sustainability. Above all participatory appraisal and evaluation will help to

document and disseminate feedback and lessons learnt to relevant users and

stakeholders. Participatory national development monitoring and evaluation would not

only examine physical achievement in terms of programmes and projects, it will also

seek to compare targets with achievements, look at the budgeted financial figure

against actual expenditure and take another look at the status of whatever index that is

being measured before and after the implementation. For instance using housing to

address national development programmes, the monitoring and evaluation team would

have sought to know the hecterage and terrain of land before and after the introduction

of the programme, the price range of the particular housing products before and after

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the introduction of the programme, the economic/financial status of the populace as well

as security of lives and property.

A monitoring and evaluation team for an urban and/or rural water project to

service the housing estates, would have sought to find out what number of the populace

per water point; measure the reduction of ailment such as guinea worm, typhoid,

diarrhea against previous status etc. Again, such a team would take interest in cost of

the projects as well as their operations and maintenance. An evaluation of a portable

water programme will take a close look at the economic well being of the populace

before and after the introduction of the programme; employment generation and

capacity building by way of people being engaged in the skill acquisition for repair of

water equipment and supply of parts.

The guiding principle of monitoring and evaluation is a learning process. It is a

process of national development, particularly in the local government areas. It is still

largely an unexplored area and much is yet to be learnt about its dynamics by both the

decision makers, planners and executors. The two-fold task of terminal and ex-post

evaluation is to access the achievement of overall results of the project in terms of

efficiency, output, effects and impact; and to learn lessons for future planning that is, the

design or formulation, appraisal, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of

development activities such as the Second Republic housing programme.

The monitoring and evaluation offices could be external or internal to the rural

communities. But participatory rural monitoring and evaluation appears to be the most

effective. This is where the rural development beneficiaries are themselves the

monitoring and evaluation team. There are several advantages of having participatory

monitoring and evaluation. First, the beneficiaries know when rural development

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programmes and projects are functional, successful and or failed. They also know how

much such programmes or projects impacted on their lives.

The National Housing Fund decree also required that workers earning above

N3,000.00 per annum were to contribute 2.5% of their basic monthly earnings to the

funds. This contribution, once made, qualified the contributor for a loan from the fund to

build his own house. The terms low-cost housing might mean different things to different

people. For instance, in a developed country, USA housing can be considered

affordable for a low or moderate-income earner if that household can acquire the use of

that housing unit (owned or rented) for an amount up to 30% of its household income

(Miles et al, 2000:22)s. Mortgage lenders also used this standard as one important

criterion in qualifying buyers of market rate housing for mortgage loans. In developing

countries, only up to 20% of the population who in actual fact constitute the higher

income earners would be able to afford such housing units.

The low-income group in developing countries is generally unable to access the

housing market through the mortgage institutions. Housing requirement for this group

are both urban and rural based. Low cost housing for the low-income group is generally

developed by the informal sector of the economy through unstructured procurement

systems.

On the other hand, prices of the upper medium/high income houses were fixed

high enough to cover all development costs and provided a margin. It was conceived

that the surpluses or gains to be earned from high-income housing would be used to

offset the deficits anticipated from low-income housing. Besides, it was expected that

an arrangement for bulk-purchase and supply of building materials for the programme

would generate savings that would not only off-set losses, but bring in gains. For these

reasons, it was publicly proclaimed (by the former Hon. Minister of Works and Housing)

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that the prices would not change within the two years of the programme up to 1981.

This was a good plan. But for the programme to continue and be self-sustaining there

needed to be a continuing balance struck between the surpluses earned from high-

income housing and the deficits under the low-income housing. Unfortunately, that

balance was not matched as the pressure to establish the political relevance of the

programme led to its being launched nation-wide.

The demand position in almost all the States of the Federation occasioned the

development of low-cost units all over without the counterpart high-income housing. In

the alternative, a contributor who retired from service or attained the age old 60 and

incapable of continuing with the contribution could have his refund made within three

months, with 4% interest. Insurance companies as well, were required to invest a

minimum of 20% of their non-life funds and 40% of their life funds in real property

development.

Obviously, the achievement of the housing programme could not be appraised

out of the context of the regulatory environment. Their contractors were often not given

free hands to build the housing units, as they were made to dance to the whims and

caprices of the powers that be. The controlling Ministry exercised excessive control to

the point of interfering in the day-to-day operations of the housing projects. Government

laws and policies (which impose heavy and multiple taxes on the building materials),

high interest rates, low exchange rates of the Naira to other currencies, crime, and

foreign policy were environmental factors outside the control of the housing policy

implementation in Nigeria, with particular reference to Imo State.

NEEDS, (2003:84) identified poor implementation to non-monitoring and

evaluation in the past. In spite of the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation

process, the results still remain poor as policy objectives are not realized.

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For Housing policy to be effective, productive and profitable in Nigeria, it should

have enjoyed better monitoring, especially in the rural local governments, free from

political interference, directed and controlled by competent builders. This would have

gone a long way to providing an understanding of and improved housing situation of the

masses.

�

5.1.5 Prioritization and Privatization of the Building Industry

Obviously, the implications for administrative efficiency of the Federal Government

housing policy and implementation in Imo State could not again be appraised out of the

context of the regulatory environment. Their Chief Executives or managers should be

given free hands to execute the housing programmes/projects.

The implication of lack of prioritisation during this period caused the federal

government to have more things to do than it had the resources and time to do it. In

order to execute effectively, leadership must prioritise and make sure that this was

communicated down the line. Doing a few things well is often better than doing many

things poorly. Leadership has to have the courage to call out the priorities for focus.

Carrying the nineteen States of the federation at the same time resulted into poor

execution of the housing programme. Programme�execution requires resources and

often meets obstacles on the way. The leader has a role to see that execution is well

resourced in terms of people and money. Some of the housing construction failed

because the required resources were not provided e.g. marketing budget, people,

technology etc.

The programme execution ran into obstacles due to programme politicization.

Leadership must remove obstacles in the way of execution. Again, goals were not fully

integrated. Functional conflicts often provide major obstacles in the way of execution

excellence. A good way to do this is through high-level sponsorship where important

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projects have very senior leaders as sponsors who support the execution team.�

Execution does not happen in a vacuum. The work environment and ways of working

are critical enablers to great execution.

5.1.6 Structure for the Sustainability of housing Programmes

The housing policy/programme lacked structure and authority relationships which

should have evolved from the strategic plan. The structure was not there to enable a

smooth execution of the strategy. Development in the States and local governments

must come along with ownership and participation by the entire stake holders. Myriads

of social amenities such as housing etc., could never result in real rural development

without the active participation of the users from inception, through planning and

implementation. There must be a needs assessment analysis before projects are

located in a local government. If after conducting a needs assessment and these

projects do not rank high on the scale of needs of such a local government, it will

amount to a wasted effort citing such a project. To determine the level of involvement of

the local government in the selection, and implementation of their needs, there must be

institutionalized structures.

In every State or Local Government (rural communities), there are very often

already existing institutions and structures that only require strengthening for

effectiveness. In Imo State, such institutions are numerous ranging from traditional

institutions like age grade, “Ward Aladinmas”, “Awuruawus” to modern structures like

Town Development Unions, Community Development Committees etc. These

institutions and structures vary from one geographical zone to the other. Development

Programmes can only be successfully executed or implemented and sustained by the

people when their institutional structures are recognized. Ownership, the hallmark of

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sustainable development can only be realized when enshrined on the institutionalized

structures.

All developmental programmes must be people-oriented and consequently the

people must be located within an existing framework or machinery, be it traditional or

modern. The user local government must own the project or programme before it can

be successful. That is why the Second Republic housing programme, like the

Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI), Structural Adjustment

Programme (SAP), Green Revolution etc collapsed upon the exit of their initiators.

The Local Government, State and Federal agencies established for housing

development, where they exist should only regulate, strengthen capacity and facilitate

the already existing institutions at the local governments. Creation of institutions or

structures and fostering them on local governments for development will surely not

achieve sustainable development but taking regular census of the institutions,

registering them and improving their capacities through regional education will assist

tremendously in sustaining rural development efforts of various tiers of government.

Another key structural issue in the Second Republic housing programme was the

level of centralization versus decentralization. The lack of a strategy driven by high

levels of standardization and relatedness of products and markets could not drive a high

level of centralization with the key functions and resources at Federal and State levels.

A strategy based on high levels of differentiation and specialization is often best

delivered through decentralized construction units. The implication of finding here is that

the policy makers of the Second Republic housing policy failed to know that a structure

was critical to fit with the plan for sustainability of the programme.

It was, therefore, a false statement for the nation to claim to have housing

development programme for the States and the Local Government Areas, when they

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were neither part of the conception, design, implementation, operation and

maintenance, or played a role in its monitoring and evaluation. The Federal

Government merely dumped projects on States and the various local governments.

5.1.7 Re-introduction of Ethical Values to fight Sophistry and Guile Culture

Corruption is a disease, a debilitating, paralyzing disease that slowly destroys a

society. When corruption was allowed to fester, social, moral and economic annihilation

crept on the Second Republic Housing Policy. The Federal Government housing policy

implementation in Imo State not only offered hospitality to corruption, it also offered it

permanent abode, or so it appeared.

Culture from anthropological perspective, is defined as the sum total of ways of

living built up by a group of human beings and transmitted from one generation to

another. The effect of sophistry and guile was much as our people practiced it in every

thing, everywhere and every time. It became a way of life. The name of Nigerians

“honours this corruption and chastisement doth therefore hide its head” (as Brutus in the

Shakespearian Drama, Julius Caesar, told Cassius, supplanting Cassius with

Nigerians).

The sophistry and guile culture which means also crude brutality and the ability to

control others, misled others, orchestrated falsehood for the purpose of negating truth.

It created adverse conditions that frustrated hard work, commitments and desirable

goals. It obfuscated the issue, confused the people for whom a sound plan and

programme should benefit and served as a contrivance for deception of stakeholders, it

misinformed and distorted sound information, cheated, duped, obtained by tricks, etc.

and perpetuated corruption. In both the public and private spheres of the housing

programme, corruption reared its ugly head in the following forms – misappropriation or

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outright theft of funds, over-invoicing, extortion, under-handed deals, acceptance of sub-

standard good, payment of salaries and benefits to ghost workers, nepotism,

favouritism, grand fraud and sharp practice in financial institutions, payment of bribes to

public officers by multi-national companies for government contracts and for exemption

from regulations, collusion with members of the public to underpay government the

required amount on levies, tariffs and taxes, or outright evasion of the payment of such

bills, etc. The above administrative inefficiency would be looked at, especially in the

following areas:

For administrative efficiency to be achieved, Government should seriously put up

a fight against vandalism. The abandoned projects constituted or provided illegal

abode for miscreants and criminals who stole the building materials and construction

equipment. meant for the major work - housing projects - thus depleting the materials.

These miscreants and criminals who vandalized the building materials, constructed

shanties and of course, illegally connected to electricity lines and this resulted to over-

loading of electric lines and fire outbreaks. The occupants of these shanties were never

recognized and counted during population census. They did not pay taxes and so

denied government of revenue generation. There was total lack of administrative

efficiency in this regard.

The wanton destruction vandals inflicted in the housing projects aside the untold

drain on scarce financial resources of the nation during this period was better imagined.

On the 13th of June 2000, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act

was passed into law by the National Assembly. The passage of bill signified more than

anything else, the political will to take the fight to the door of this beast. The Act set up

the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC)

which was inaugurated on September 29, 2000 by President Olusegun Obasanjo. The

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Act in Sections 8-26 created a wide range of offences and punishments, the scope of

which is comprehensive as it cuts across the public and private sectors of the economy,

binding all Nigerians. The offences as shown in the Table below include the following:

Table 25 - Offences and Punishments

OFFENCE PUNISHMENT IN JAIL TERM

* Acceptance of gratification by an official either directly or through an agent

7 Years

* Corrupt offers to public officers 7 Years

* Corrupt demand by persons 7 Years

* Fraudulent acquisition of property. 7 Years

* Fraudulent receipt of property. 7 Years

* Where the fraudulent receipt is related to postal matter, chattel, money or valuable security.

7 Years

* Deliberate frustration of investigation by the Commission.

7 Years

* Making false statement or returns 7 Years

* Gratification by and through agents 5 Years

* Officer and acceptance of gratification to and by a public officer as an inducement or reward.

5 Years

* Offence o using office or position to gratify or confer undue advantage on oneself, relation or associate.

5 Years

* Bribery in relation to auction transactions. 3 Years

* Bribery for giving assistance, etc in regard to contracts.

7 Years

* Failure to report bribery transactions. 2 Years

* Dealing with, using, holding receiving or concealing gratification.

5 Years

* The transfer or the spending of money for a particular project or service on another project.

1 Year or N50,000.00 fine

* Award of contract without budget provision, approval and cash backing.

3 Years and N1000,00 fine.

Sources: Akanbi, M. M. A. (2002), Anti-Corruption Project and Sustainable socio-Economic Development in Nigeria, Abuja: December, 12, p.9

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5.1.8 Competent Legislature

For the legislature to serve as a powerful instrument of control for administrative

efficiency, the legislators should be intelligent, knowledgeable, committed to the cause

of the people they represent, hard working, disciplined and patriotic. This was not the

case during Nigeria’s Second Republic. Nigerians did not care to know or access the

intelligence quotient of their legislators. It was a case of money-bag politicians.

Because of this incompetence, there was weak control over the Executive and the

implementers of the housing programme by the Legislature and the Judiciary, neither

was there any control by the pressure groups through the Public Complaints

Commission or the Code of Conduct Bureau.

As there was no law enacted by the National Assembly to establish the housing

policy, the policy was not sustainable and so it fizzled out with the administration that

formulated the policy. It was not institutionalized and therefore lacked continuity. The

break in democracy caused by the military intervention also created non-sustainability of

the housing policy implementation because the succeeding military regime pursued its

own housing policy different from that formulated by the civilian administration.

The structural framework was therefore not made strong enough to carry the

burden of executing housing policy such as inadequate funding, lack of sound

leadership and competent personnel. Our leaders in policy formulation may live on hills

or mountains if they choose, that is, away from the people, but they should come down

from their selfish motives to deliberate on issues in order to alleviate the housing

problems of the people who elected them into office. They should abide with the rule of

law which made them servants rather than masters of the people. This should enable

them efficiently achieve the desired housing targets.

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5.1.9 Financial, Political and Administrative Will

A very strong financial, political and administrative will should be evolved to

tackle these problems and build a state that thrives on the highest standard of

discipline, morals and ethical values. There was lack of sound mortgage institutions for

financing cheap and affordable houses, especially for the low and medium income

earners. The programme did not receive a take–off grant expected from the Federal

Government. It therefore depended on the slim financial resources generated from the

20%/33%/3% deposits of home seekers. This could not carry the project far as political

consideration led to the programme being launched in so many states at about the

same time, when the project should have been staggered and prioritized.

Declining liquidity in the economy hampered the obtaining of depositors to

commit more funds to the programme. This was caused by the collapse of world oil

prices and the sharp decline in petroleum output, the later resulting from lowering of

Nigeria’s OPEC quota in the early 1980s; the rising and ill-directed government

spending during the 1970s; the neglect of the agricultural sector; the inward-looking

industrial policies left Nigeria vulnerable to profound changes in the external

environment in the following decade. Thus, the dramatic fall in oil export revenues

entailed a sharp deterioration in the country’s public finances and balance of payments.

This led to recession and economic deterioration as manifested by fiscal crisis, foreign

exchange shortage, balance of payments and debt crisis, high rate of unemployment,

negative economic growth, to mention a few

The sharp worsening of economic conditions prompted the Shagari Government

to introduce the Economic Stabilization Act of April, 1982. The Stabilization Act

comprised a packet of stringent policies and measures of demand management aimed

at rationalizing overall expenditure pattern, in order to restore fiscal balance on the

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domestic front and equilibrium in the external sector. The Stabilization measures were

to a large extent implemented through the administrative controls of import, exchange

restrictions on current international transactions etc.

Fiscal accountability and transparency also should not be allowed to suffer.

Obligation to follow established and laid down accounting, reporting, monitoring and

evaluating rules and procedures must be felt. Financial management and cash release

rules were routinely violated during the period of study. For instance, the time-honoured

treasury approach to cash management that required ministerial heads to focus on the

budget and item votes was jettisoned for the ad hoc imprest system that allocated a

bulk sum to the ministerial head without reference to the budget. Among the policies

that suffered was that of the housing sector.

Lack of political will means the lack of sufficient determination and/or the

unwillingness of the political leaders to develop the country. Effective policy process or

Political Will suggests that policy formulation is a logical process. Though the

resources are limited, the demands on the limited resources are numerous and

unlimited. Policy makers should be rational in their approach to policies to enable them

achieve them with minimum cost. The inability to enforce the employers Housing

Liability etc., Decree of 1979; the inability to control high rate of inflation which made

long term banking deposits (usually available for housing finance) unobtainable; the

absence of a housing maintenance and upgrading machinery; the inefficient

government machinery re-indirect intervention in housing construction and the relatively

high cost of production of housing units; the fact that subsidies went to those in the

upper and middle socio-economic groups rather than the low-income earners for whom

they were intended implied administrative inefficiency.

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Quoting Shakespeare again, “The fault dear Brutus is not in our stars but in

ourselves that we are underlings”. The citizens were seen to be lily-livered and

spineless. Professor Wole Soyinka amplified this theme in his prison note – The Man

Died – the man dies in all who keep silent in the face of tyranny”, in this case, the man

dies in all who keep silent in the face of political fraud or lack of political will.

The problems of administration remain that, the Nigerian Executive and

Legislator saw their elections to office as a great opportunity to exploit the resources of

the nation for their personal aggrandisement. They established companies for the

specific purpose of securing Mobilisation Fees for jobs that were not done at all. Again,

the Legislators must be requested to resist being lobbied for the passage of executive

bills, (a feature of the executive presidential system of government) as an opportunity to

be bribed by the Executive.

Administration (planning, organising, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting

and budgeting), which can be described as the use of systematic procedures, relevant

principles, generalization of theories in performing administrative processes and

function in formal organisations should not be lacking. Positive administration is a vital

ingredient for socio-economic development. It operates on the basis of meritocracy,

formalistic impersonality and rigid application of rules. It is against the bending or

breaking of rules to suit personal interest. Such an administration would possess a high

rate of performance with the least waste of resources. Over all, it has well defined

objectives that give it purpose and direction. In particular, a positive administrative will

or culture compels bureaucrats to resist the temptation of introducing structural

impediments to the policies, programmes and projects of government. The merit of

positive administration in socio-economic development/reliance is that it reduces

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operational cost and increases efficiency, thereby assisting in the realization of socio-

economic development such as the Nigeria’s Second Republic housing policy.

Traditionally, housing construction could be financed in Nigeria in three ways –

personal savings, mortgages and contractor finance. If one was left to finance home

ownership by personal savings, most Nigerians could not own homes in a lifetime. For

mortgage, the volume of these instruments available was quite small, and very difficult

to obtain. The instruments were also thought to be outside the reach of most Nigerians.

Only people in the big cities and states’ capitals, and people in the upper-middle class

could meet the requirements of most banks and insurance companies.

The criterion with this scheme however, was the fact that it did not profess to

service the interest of the teeming masses that the government was concerned with.

Rather, it helped to perpetuate the dominance over property ownership of the few ‘high-

ups’ who were privileged to secure plots in these various low density areas all over the

country, as a result of their positions in the society. The shortage of liquid cash in

Nigeria brought to light the hard fact that the traditional method of providing complete

physical housing units by the public sector could not be sustained. Most public housing

corporations in the country were at a standstill because they could not afford to pay

contractors for work done.

5.1.10 Adherence to Due Process

There was high incidence of political/personal consideration in contract awards

without recourse to Due Process from the cradle to grass, that is, from the initiation of

the programme to the formulation of the policy, in the award of contracts, the execution

of the projects and the sharing of the housing units. Due Process is the application of

the principles of transparency, competency, competition and equal opportunity to all in

the conduct and award of contracts. Under the Due Process policy, all contracts

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must be advertised. There must be process of pre-qualification, followed by invitation to

tender, technical and financial bid process, and opening of tender publicly, bid

evaluation process before the winner of the contract could be determined. The major

objective is to create opportunity for innovation, local enterprise, creativity and genuine

interest to make money through hard work and service delivery. During the period of

study, every politician in Nigeria virtually became a contractor. Procurement is a special

area that requires professionalism, competency and integrity. Due Process (do it the

right way) entails setting out the procedures/guidelines that must be adhered to in all

procurement activities. These include:

a. Ensuring that procurements are duly advertised in at least two national daily newspapers requesting for tenders.

b. The procuring organizations must be corporate bodies duly registered in

Nigeria.

c. Tenders must be submitted in the prescribed manner within the stipulated time.

d. Tenders must not be opened except on the appointed date and in the glare of

the interested parties.

e. Criteria for selecting the eventual winner would have been determined and followed accordingly when the tenders are opened. This may include technical competence, ability to perform within time frame, amount quoted, managerial competence of the company, evidence of similar projects executed in the past, etc.

f. Tenders committee must ensure proper documentation by the procuring

organizations.

g. Funds for the procurement would have been duly budgeted for during the year (cash backing).

h. Checklist of compliance with the procedures should be drawn up and strictly

adhered.

i. Pricing and monitoring unit should be created to verify quotations from tenders.

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Lack of Due Process in staff recruitment led to incompetent personnel who

supervised the housing programme. The informal and ad hoc approach to public

administration also permeated staff recruitment and promotion processes and

procedures. Merit was displaced as the most important criterion for hiring as entry

into the service came to depend more on “whom you know’ than “what you can do”.

The major consequence of this was the displacement of efficiency and effectiveness

and the enthronement of incompetence and indiscipline. The absence of Due

Process during the Second Republic housing programe with reference to Imo State,

therefore, had a negative implication on administrative efficiency.

5.1.11 Checkmating the Executive through the Role of the Judiciary, the Pressure Groups or Public Opinion

Acting without legal authority was rampant among public officials in Nigeria.

Such administrative acts were frequent and wide-spread. In the process of

administration, top officials created and changed existing laws. Some inadvertently

failed to observe in their administrative acts and utterances the required due process as

provided by law. In such situations, the zealous, unwitting or careless official thought

that he was acting within the law. Violation of Procedural Due Process was a common

feature of Nigeria’s Second Republic.

Procedural due process means that all public officials at all levels of government

must be fair in their dealings with private citizens and groups. The executive during this

period under review did not recognize the fact that they were public property and that

they existed to serve the public and not themselves. They treated citizens and groups

as beggars of public services and in consequence treated them unfairly. They made

things difficult for the citizens they served.

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There should be control over the Executive and the Legislature by the Judiciary.

As an accepted constitutional practice in a democratic rule that whenever a public

official acts contrary to the provisions of the constitution, the official is taken to court

through the Judiciary, the Public Complaints Commission etc., where the

constitutionality of his action is determined. This would ensure administrative efficiency

in Federal Government Housing policy and its implementation.

There should be a body of public opinion that is both consistent and dynamic,

which could then become the element that keeps officials faithful and accountable to the

people. In England, the study of pressure groups was taken up in the mid 1950s.

Pressure groups are “any society, even one employing the simple and most primitive

techniques, groups of various specialized sorts, a non-partisan organisation formed to

exert influence upon the legislature, the executive, or the governmental agency through

public opinion for the modification, enactment or the rejection of certain legislation, or

discontinuance of a policy” (Mackenzie, 1955:24, Truman, D.B. 1951:43). They should

play fundamental roles in housing policy making and implementation in Imo State.

The Mass Media always has a role to play in policy implementation all over the

world. Recognised all over the world as major pillars in the institutional fight against

any form of corruption, Nwankwo, (2003:19) stated that, “it is the duty of the press as

the public watchdog to sniff out any acts or indiscretions of the public officers who

abuse their offices. It is the mass media that go into the closet and bring out the

skeletons. They serve as the eyes and ears of the citizens. They were in a position to

spot and deal with misconducts, which if not immediately checked or nipped in the bud

by expositing them, could develop into major problems and result in substantial losses

to Government, while enriching a few. They should not be toothless bull dog in the

area of the nation’s housing policy and implementation.

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5.1.12 Cordial Relationship as Against Crash and Crush Syndrome Among Workers There is however a form of unhealthy relationship in the system that the

researcher would describe as the “crash and crush mentality/syndrome. This is an

expression, which means a planned destruction of a subordinate officer’s career by a

superior officer to eventually get him/her thrown out of the system.

This wicked act is often perpetuated against bright young officers to frustrate

them. This experience kills the zeal, initiative and the drive of such officers and in turn,

adversely affects productivity, as these bright ones are not encouraged; rather they are

frustrated in or out of office. This syndrome has been generated from daily but sad

experience of man’s inhumanity against fellow men. This is confirmed by the fact that

every officer who has spent a minimum of five years in the Imo State Public Service

often tells the uninteresting story of agony, mental injury, frustration inflicted upon the

worker by one superior officer or the other in the course of his/her Service years.

The sad thing about this situation is that rather than make a fundamental break

with this unhealthy experience, the same officers perpetuate it and unleash more torture

and agony on their subordinates who are supposed to execute the Housing policy. The

negative effect of this situation is that rather than concentrate on proper implementation

of the policies formulated, the workers engage more on mud-slinging, gossips,

backbiting, petition writing, rumour mongering, “god fatherism” (who gives protection

against molestation in the Service) in order to find a channel for safety from undue

punishment arising from the Crash and Crush syndrome.

4.1.13 Continuity

Government is supposed to be a going concern whereby government

programmes and policies initiated by a previous administration should be pursued by a

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successive government. Unfortunately, this was not the case with the Second Republic

housing programme after the Shagari Administration was overthrown by the Military.

Most of the housing units under construction in the Federal, State and Local

Governments were left to rot and the programme became white elephant projects. This

was because there is a general conception among Nigerians that public property is

nobody’s property.

This belief, has over the years depended and expanded in their psychological

framework and has accounted for widespread collapse and decay in almost all

government owned housing projects. The inconsistencies in government policies only

worsened the state of these housing projects, resulting in their poor maintenance

culture. Where else in the whole world could this happen if not in Nigeria, the giant of

Africa with dwarf wisdom. Appendices XIIA to E show the various housing units

abandoned up to this moment of writing in Aboh/Ezinihitte, Ahiara/Ekwerazu, Obowo,

Mbaitoli/Ikeduru, Okigwe Local Governments of Imo State.

4.1.14 Lessons learnt from the Second Republic Housing policy Implementation in Imo State

The Second Republic, 1979-1983 had come and gone but the tempo of housing

has assumed a top priority in the programme of successive governments till today. With

spiraling population of the country, the issue of housing will continue to take an

important place in government activities/programmes in the future. This study has aptly

identified housing as one of the problems in our country and all the political parties have

also identfied housing as one of the problems they would like to tackle when voted into

power in the future.

Making housing a top priority of government is important but more important is

the successful implementation of the programme. The Federal Goivernment would

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always promise the nation to building a certain number of housing units annually with

the support of State Governments and the private sector but at the end of each tenure

of government, the lofty promises are never realised because of certain endemic

difficulties and challenges.

This study has assiduously identified these intractable and crippling weakness

that constituted the bane of government housing programme. The research is therefore

not only a compendium of information on housing in Nigeria but also an invaluable

diagnosis of problems, weaknesses and difficulties besetting successful implementation

of housing programmes in Nigeria, particularly in Imo State.

A casual study of housing policy implementation in Imo State would reveal that

the constraints identified in this study are still prevalent today. Until these weaknesses

are genuinely and consistently removed or minimised, our housing programmes targets

today and in the future will remain a mirage. This study therefore provides the following:

- a sound basis for smoother, efficient and successful implementation of housing programmes in Imo State in the future;

� a dependable guide and standard in the construction, supervision, monitoring and certification of housing in Imo State;

� a critical appraisal of the implementation of housing construction in terms of

contractors, materials and character of professionals to be engaged; � assistance to create and engender the right attitude and frame of mind and a

conducive environment for the rapid realisation of housing targets and an increase in home ownershipo in the future.

� The research result may also contribute in the evolution of a comprehensive

implementation progranne on housing. � Participants in the design and implementation of future government housing

programmes may be better focused and more properly directed without choice of strategies of co-ordination and construction to realise the programme.

The problem of housing shortages cannot be solved or minimized by the

governments’ main policy of direct construction of complete housing units. Nigeria

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cannot afford the huge financial investment involved nor does she have technical

manpower and technological capability. Housing is not a problem, which can be solved.

It is a complex, dynamic and ongoing developmental issue involving improvement rather

than solution. Its improvement is defined in developmental terms and not simply in

terms of the number of dwelling units. The nature and shape of the housing problem is

constantly changing as developmental factors and influences change.

Consequently, the measures advanced here are not put forward as a universal

remedy for all housing ills, they are merely some measures which seem appropriate and

beneficial at this point in time since the problem is dynamic, the approach adopted to

the problem must also be dynamic and the measures applied must respond to changing

circumstances. What is required therefore is an ongoing monitoring process which

assesses measures, identifies changes in circumstances, and tests responses. This is

the only answer to the shelter challenge and the appropriate follow-up to the housing

policy of the Second Republic in Nigeria, with particular reference to Imo State.

Without proper environmental management programme, the housing programme or

policy could not provide a clean, beautiful, safe and healthy environment to the housing

estates,

Both the federal and state governments’ well-orchestrated housing policies have

always concentrated on direct construction of so-called “low cost” housing units for low

and middle-income groups. Houses constructed by the government cannot be “low

cost” when profit margins for contractors and housing agencies are added. It is also a

known fact that through self-help, a user can build a better house with the same amount

that the public sector spends per house unit. The current stand still in most public

housing corporations is mainly due to the non-available long-term housing delivery

154

strategies in a policy form. A good policy should be flexible according to prevailing

conditions.

The study concluded that there was need for assessment before the Second

Republic housing programme was embarked upon. This would have avoided the

programme and projects being occupied by specific groups who tended to exclude other

participants. Above all, study of institutions and structures was more relevant in order to

avoid development agencies being made part of the struggles between interest groups.

An example of the vital nature of the above assertion is the European Union, which

recommends that its agency as its absence would jeopardize impact and sustainability

of investments.

Slogans do not build houses for citizens of any country nor inconsistent personal

programmes or whoever is the boss for the time being at the Federal Ministry of Works

and Housing. The federal government should mobilize the private sector participation in

provision of housing, so that the sector can perform better than it is doing presently.

The environment and policies of the government as they are and enumerated are not

conducive for private-led initiative in housing delivery in Nigeria. If the cog-wheels are

removed today, the sky will be the limit for the private sector.

This programme did not profess to serve the interest of the teaming masses that

the government was concerned with rather, it helped to perpetuate the dominance over

property ownership of the few ‘high-ups’ who were privileged to secure the housing

units all over the country as a result of their position in the society.

Decision making in Government should be transparent and predictable while

accountability should be the watchword. The Second Republic housing policy was

formulated by the Presidency. It did not reflect the needs, wants, wishes and interest of

the various stake holders. In a democracy such a policy that touches all classes of

155

people ought to have been made public for discussion over a period of time. Such a

broad based discussion among various stake holders and classes of people in the

society would achieve sound housing policy. For sound policies to be achieved,

“democratic values require the public (including the opponent) to make inputs. Before

any development project is embarked upon, it should ascertain or obtain the approval of

the people’s representatives – the Assembly whether State or Federal” (Evo, 2008).

The various stake holders should be consulted before the formulation and

implementation so as not to impose a policy on the people. Again, considering the

elitist nature of and posture of the Presidency, it was obvious that the Office alone could

not set up an effective housing policy for the masses. If they had thrown it open for the

masses to discuss, it would have been a better housing programme. The negative

implication was the hasty manner the scheme was conceived and pronounced and the

lack of effective co-ordination in the various States.

It is pertinent for Government and her officials to see the housing programme

and projects as a whole, that is, in their macro rather than their micro formations.

Administrative efficiency could only be achieved where individuals, various agencies

and organisations involved in the implementation of a policy or programme do not

violate administrative responsibilities but adhere to the rule of law.

A nation naturally endowed with many enviable human and material resources,

could not afford to languish in the limbo of waste, social anarchy and non-productive,

hence successive governments have in various ways tried to steer the nation back to

the path of sanity, founded on moral rectitude and socio-economic development,

especially in the area of provision of housing units to the people.

The provision of housing is an integral part of the urban development, in

consideration of the fact that urban development cannot be achieved without adequate

156

housing provision for the people who make up the urban population. The provision of

adequate and affordable shelter for our people has continued to pose problems for

successive administrations in Imo State. The seriousness of the problem has led to a

Federal Housing Policy being designed to encourage private sector participation in

property development through affordable mortgage facilities.

� The lessons learnt from the study of the Second Republic housing policy

implementation in Imo State are relevant in today’s housing development programmes

because the constraints identified are still present and constitute barriers to success.

�

�# # ��!�

In this chapter, the implications of findings for administrative efficiency have been

discussed. In Chapter VI, the findings of the study are summarized, the

recommendations proferred and the conclusions drawn from the findings are presented.

157

@�� / � � � 4 4 � �02�� 4 4 � � � ��

� � � �� -� ��

� � � � �6.1 SUMMARY

Sequel to the series of housing policy implementation measures as introduced by

governments over the past years, it has become relevant, at least for academic and

administrative purposes to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of these housing

policies on the recipients. Results of such as assessment often serve as guides and

reason for improvements when necessary.

Among the various Federal Government housing policies in NIgeria, the Second

Republic housing policy (1979-1983) though a failure, was the only one that gave high

priority rating to housing. It adopted an elaborate national housing programme based

on the concept of affordability and owner-occupier with the low-income earners as its

target group. This study is aimed at examining the degree or extent to which the

Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State (1979-2008) was

attained or was preferred. Consequently, the use of oral interview and questionnaire

technique as the main research instruments provided useful platform for this study.

Data were collected by the administration of a fifty item survey instrument which

was administered to seventy (70) senior management, middle management as well as

junior workers of the various housing construction and housing financing establishments

in Imo State. These subjects were divided into two groups of twenty-five each who

rated the extent to which the goals of the Second Republic Housing Policy were

attained in Imo State and the preferred goals which the Policy was expected to achieve.

Data used for treatment and analysis in this study were provided by responses from the

returned sixty-six usable survey instruments.

158

The findings revealed utter disregard of ethical norms and values which resulted

into various indisciplined acts and reckless implementation of the Federal Government

Second Republic Housing policy in Imo State. It further revealed that this Housing

Policy implementation in Imo State, lacked the ability to execute consistently, and so, its

strategic plans continued to be a pipe dream.

Implementation is perhaps the most important competitive advantage for national

housing policy. With sophistry and guile culture, it is not surprising that efforts made so

far by governments to solve the problems facing the housing sector in Nigeria, with

particular reference to Imo State have proved grossly ineffective. The problem of

housing is an ongoing developmental issue involving improvement rather than solution.

Its improvement is defined in developmental terms and not simply in terms of the

number of dwelling units. What is required therefore is an ongoing monitoring process

which assesses, measures, identifies changes in circumstances, and tests responses.

Above all, any project or programme has a higher chance of success if it is based

on the expressed needs of the community and the community is a key actor in its

implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This can only be achieved when sophistry

and guile are reduced to the barest minimum in our system.

@�"� �� 4 4 � � � ��

The mission statement of Fannie Mae in Ibrahim (2002:26) opines, “our mission

is to tear down barriers, lower costs and increase the opportunities for home ownership

and affordable rental housing for all Americans. Because having a safe place to call

home strengthens families, communities and the American nation as a whole”. This

may also be true for any developing country like Nigeria, particulary Imo State.

159

Consequently, the measures advanced in this study are not put forward as a

universal remedy for all housing ills. They are merely some measures which seem

appropriate and beneficial at this point in time since the problem is dynamic, the

approach adopted to the problem must also be dynamic and the measures applied must

respond to changing circumstances. Considering the fact that the Federal Government

Housing policy and its implementation in Imo State, Nigeria:1979-2007 did not meet the

housing target, and bearing in mind the indispensability of housing, the researcher

proffers the following general measures for proper housing policy implementation - the

formulation of a housing policy with clear guidelines that would identify the housing

delivery options; how to make housing meet supply demand; determine the target

groups that are to benefit from every type of housing; use of housing as economic

development strategy for the state and how to mobilize housing finance. Combating

corruption should focus on the reform of existing systems. It requires an economic

approach, coupled with great political sensitivity and a mass attitudinal change.

To achieve the above measures, the following specific recommendations are

suggested:

1. Adoption of a realistic housing delivery strategy that the generality of the

populace can benefit from. In order to increase the quantity of housing to reach

the populace, the Federal and State Governments should evolve some

strategies. These strategies include some partial solutions such as site and

services, core housing, as well as supports and financial loans. In other words,

user participation should be encouraged, and government should set up co-

operative shops in all the Local Government Headquarters for the sale of

building materials.

160

2. The Federal Government should direct that the Housing Corporations in the

States be given self autonomy, with a view to making the Housing Corporations

self-reliant. They should also be allowed to charge economic rents as the

participation of the Federal and State Ministries of Works and Housing might not

help the economic situation in the country.

3. Government should be shorn of all square pegs in round holes and Nigerians

must avoid acts that tend to turn Government into a circus. For our housing

policy not to be imperiled, Government must not be like charity or worse still an

employment agency that finds jobs for the unemployed, merely because of party

affiliation.

4. For housing policy to succeed in Nigeria, it must settle the issue of who has

Legislative power over the subject of land and the issue of the ownership of

land. In other words, there should be a flexible workable land market before the

Private Sector can effectively and efficiently deliver, and those who buy in this

market must have no doubt whatsoever as to the security of tenure of their

holdings. This brings in security of tenure - a very important requirement of any

land tenure system without which the private sector can hardly play any

meaningful role in any national housing delivery policy.

5. The Imo State Planning and Economic Development Commission should

conduct a study of population movement in order to determine housing needs in

terms of urban growth to enable the State government effect implementation of

any housing programme the federal government may conceive in the interest of

the masses.

161

6. Federal Mortgage Bank should be revived and it should strive to reach the masses

through easy home ownership scheme. Their present system of lending is too

lengthy, tedious and time wasting. In addition, the bank should extend its

services to the rural areas where about 80% of Nigerians reside, while the

machinery for loan repayment from borrowers should be properly monitored for

the benefit of new customers.

7. Government should give incentives to banks and insurance companies for the

contributions they are mandated to make to the National Housing Funds.

Mandating the contribution may not be practicable if there is no economic return

on it, instead the support of these institutions should be sought by providing

incentives like tax holiday and foreign exchange allocation increase since their

contributions form the heartbeat of the National Housing Fund.

8. Rehabilitation of housing stock to ensure that the life of existing stock of housing is

prolonged. Emphasis should be laid on good town planning and workable

environmental sanitation. Slums should be discouraged while health and useful

housing programme should be incorporated.

9. Government should stop paying lip service to housing by avoiding conflicting policy statements, for example, Housing for all by year 2020 in one voice, another

voice is asking for Value Added Tax (VAT) on housing: and 15%-30% on

Government’s consent to housing transaction.

10. Value Added Tax (VAT) should either be waived or reduced because more often

than not, it has served as a disincentive to individuals wishing to acquire

properties since they have to make an extra payment of 5% of the total cost of the

162

properties acquired. VAT for those who take mortgages does not make sense. It

should not be applicable to construction at all. It should be limited to luxuries.

11. The establishment of more technical schools and colleges to take care of the

manpower needs such as town planners, surveyors, bricklayers carpenters, electricians, painters, etc. in this gigantic housing programme. This equally

follows that the male child education which has drastically been reduced should

be looked into by the Federal, State and Local Governments.

12. Establishment of a Due Process office and training of the staff of the due process

and Procurement system as well as creating a compliance mechanism and

complaint and feedback channel.

13. The prioritization of the housing sector through adequate financial funding,

monitoring for standards as well as effective and efficient implementation of

housing policies. Indeed, it is the belief in the relevance of these virtues that

forms the bedrock of the recommendations in this work.

14. There should be matching of formulation and implementation of policy as the

chances that our housing policy objectives will succeed are far greater when

formulation matches its implementation. Policy formulation changes over time,

so must its implementation methods.

15. To ensure that there is cost cutting, government should always consider whether

the implementing agencies follow sound purchasing/acquisition practices;

acquiring the appropriate type, quality and quantity of resources at an

appropriate cost; properly protecting and maintaining its resources; adopting

efficient operating procedures; using the optimum amount of resources (staff,

equipment and facilities in producing or delivering the appropriate quantity and

quality of houses, infrastructure, etc. in a timely and efficient manner.

163

16. Adequate measures should be built into the contract process to ensure that the

State and Local governments, Communities or individuals do not succumb to

pressure under any condition, to embarki n any project or programme in haste.

This would save the nation from poor project conception, planning,

documentation, costing, abandoned projects, nugatory payments as well as

financial and political embarrassment.

17. The National Population Commission should work in collaboration with the housing

development partners to support future housing programme while supervisory

control should be designed to ensure that the functions of the

artisans/subordinates are subjected to an independent review by immediate

superiors. The supervisors of the housing programmes should be high calibre

professionals and eminent personalities with competencies such as:

* ability to work in teams�in different socio-cultural settings;

* good organizational and analytical skills;

* ability to work under tight deadlines;

* skills in the use of Microsoft Word and Excel application software to record�findings and/or complaints received from any source during the assessment of work in the housing estates.

The supervisors will have to sign a Code of Conduct designed to protect them

from allegations of improper influence��

18. There should be a change in the people’s perception of government from that of

subjects to partners. Government will use its achievements in the delivery of

several poverty alleviation projects and the maintenance and sustenance of

peace, law and order to canvass for reciprocal participation of the people by

paying their taxes in order to enable the government continue to accomplish

164

more housing programmes that will enhance the quality of life of its citizens.

The quality of tax assessment will be enhanced through training and capacity

building.

19. Revenue Courts should be established in the State. A mobile court for sanitary

offences and vandalism should also be established. The resultant effect of the

mobile courts would be increased internally generated revenue, which is about

33% effort to assist in the construction of houses for the citizens.

20. Financial empowerment is very necessary. Every worker deserves his pay. A

hungry man is an angry man and can go any length to address his anger. Better

remuneration, motivation and prompt payment of salaries are big factors for

public and private workers. In civilized countries, welfare and social security

benefits system are necessary measures by government to reduce crime,

discontentment amongst the masses, protect the well to do and eliminate

corruption as much as possible. Rewards for honesty, transparency and

accountability in organisations will encourage and drive people to shun

corruption.

21. Adequate monitoring and severe sanctions should be put in place at all levels.

From our definition of corruption, profligacy is its synonym. Government should

therefore discourage displaying of wealth by instituting a body that will report

unnecessary flouting of wealth to the appropriate bodies without necessarily

waiting for people to report the culprit. Corruption is a natural tendency, but

people tend to be less corrupt in some countries where the consequences of

being caught are too far reaching.

165

22. Enhanced national capacity development in the operation and maintenance of

rural infrastructures especially water, electricity, roads, health and educational

facilities.

23. In order to stage consistent war against sophistry and guile culture, people

should be adequately sensitized and informed of its evils, demerits and

consequences as no vice can be corrected, without a clear understanding of the

problem. To this end, it may be necessary to re-introduce genuine Ethical Re-

Orientation in our professional practice, private and public life; General Studies

curriculum, starting from the nursery to primary to secondary and then to tertiary

institutions should be introduced.

24. In summary, we need a rebirth for this millennium: “humble enough not to try to

solve all our problems for us but strong enough to give us the tools to solve our

problems for ourselves; a government that is smaller, lives within its means and

does more with less” (Clinton, 1999).

The recommendations listed above would be helpful in combating the numerous

factors that militated against the achievement of Housing Policy in Nigeria, with

particular reference to Housing Programme Implementation in Imo State. They would

go a long way to consolidating government efforts towards the attainment of successful

housing programmes in Nigeria, in line with the United Nation Conference on Human

Settlements (UNCHS) otherwise called Habitat 11 which seek to improve the quality of

life of the Nigerian citizens in the area of housing.

166

6.3 CONCLUSION

The study carried out a survey of An Analysis of Federal Government Housing

Policy Implementation in Imo State (1979-2008). Purposeful respondents from

Government and private building and construction industry were used. Their reponses

were critically used in the analysis of data.

According to the outcome of the study, the researcher was able to identify the

intrinsic variables bearing on the implementation of Second Republic housing policy in

Imo State. Prominent among these factors were inherent weakness in the Policy,

administrative conflict between the NPN Federal Government and the NPP State

Government in Imo State, an exponential growth of housing users due to the

uncontrolled population increase and urban migration, endemic corrupt practice and

weak enforcement of contracts, lack of sound leadership and incompetent personnel,

Government laws and policies, imposed heavy and multiple taxes on the importation of

building materials, poor location of sites, faulty design of the housing units. For all the

years of its development, our housing policy has remained a “nascent policy rather like

a man suffering from arrested development and who, therefore, exhibited the

mannerisms of a child. Put differently, the inordinate ambition of the leaders and the

sophistry and guile culture with their attendant negetive and terrible influence on our

people combined to stultify the housing policy implementation in Imo State.

Inspite of all the promises made by the Federal Government since 1999 to 2008,

the implementation of the Housing programmes is yet to commence in Imo State. The

study also revealed that even though past governments had been involved in the

housing sector, the effective implementation of their housing policy and programmes

167

are yet to be attained. The Federal Government Housing Policy implemention in Imo

State (1979-2008) was, therefore, not only poor but a failure.

@�* �� 3� � �3� �� 0�

This work was carried out on housing construction organisations of seven

Government establishments, six Local Government Areas and one private organization

only. Findings are therefore applicable to them rather than to all the people of Imo

State, especially in the rural areas. In order to have a balanced view of the topic, may I

suggest that further work be carried out on the place of Community Participation in

achieving the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State. This

will enhance efficiency of practitioners and assist scholars wishing to carry out further

research in any of the fields of policy making and implementation.�

168

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178

� . ��

Ade, S. T., (1984), “Nigeria’s Budget, Myth or Real”, Daily Times, Lagos, Wednesday, November 28.

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November, 25.

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Oluoma, T. (1988), “The Reality of Provision of Housing Units”, The Punch, Lagos, Friday, January, 20.

Omoile, (1994),” Urban Planning in Nigeria”, BUSINESSDAY, Lagos, Monday March. Njoku, E. T. (1999), “Emergence of Housing Contractors”, The Punch, Lagos,

February, 13. Njoku. E. T. (2004), “Nigerian Electoral Processes”, The Punch, Lagos, February, 27.

179

APPENDIX 1

MAP OF NIGERIA DURING THE SECOND REPUBLIC

181

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APPENDIX V

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An Analysis of the Federal Government Housing Policy Implementation in Imo State, Nigeria: 1979-2007

Instruction: �� % ��& ��''��((��))��

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1. The Constitutional procedures were important for housing policy formulation

and implementation.

2. The goals of the Federal Government Second Republic Housing Policy were relevant to the needs of the masses.

3. The sentimental attachment to land in Nigeria was not considered in the

Land Use decree and this negatively affected the Federal Government Second Republic Housing Policy implementation in Imo State.

4. Obstacles posed by government officials and non-utilisation of talents

adversely affected the Federal Government Second Republic Housing Policy implementation in Imo State.

5. Lack of finance militated against the Federal Government Housing Policy


6. The Federal Government Second Republic Housing policy did not relax restriction practices such as high interest rate, low exchange rate of the Naira to other currencies.

7. The Housing policy adopted more liberal loan policy to enable low-income workers and rural dwellers own houses anywhere in the country.

8. Lack of planning impeded on the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

9. The Federal Government Housing policies changed the practice of people paying high rents to landlords in Imo State.

10. The goals of the Federal Government Housing policies introduced a new practice of owner/occupier instead of rental basis.

11. The goals of the Second Republic Housing policy provided the national standard of performance be maintained through the Federal Housing Authority offices in the country.

193

12. Population explosion and rapid urbanization led to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programme.

13. Over-crowding, illegal construction of shanties and their attendant

problems such as vandalism contributed to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programme.

14. Was the Second Republic Housing programme planned and designed to

improve the housing situation for the low-income earners?

15. Were there abandoned housing projects after the Federal Government housing programme in Imo State?

16. Did the domination of the award of contracts, the execution of the projects and the sharing of the housing units by the executive, legislators and other political stalwarts adversely affect the Second Republic housing policy?

17. Did the administrative conflict between the Federal and State

Governments negatively affect the achievement of the goals of the housing policies?

18. The non-contributory role of the Legislators and Interest/Pressure groups in

The formulation of the Federal Government Housing policy adversely affected its implementation

19. Lack of sound leadership and incompetent personnel hindered the implementation of the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

20. Inadequate provision of financial resources to financial institutions militated against the Federal Government Second Republic housing Policy implementation in Imo State.

21. Poor work attitude hampered the achievement of the objectives of the

Second Republic housing programme.

22. Lack of up-to-date and reliable database on housing hindered the housing programme.

23. Lack of research and support for local building materials negatively affected the Second Republic housing programme.

24. Inflated or over-valued contract sums negatively affected the implementation of the Second Republic housing programme.

25. Flagrant mismanagement of Nigeria’s economy and corruption adversely affected the Second Republic housing programme.

26. Was adequate infrastructure – roads, electricity, water, drainage

system, etc. provided in the housing estates in Imo State?

194

27. Were the Federal Government Second Republic housing units spacious enough for additional rooms? 28. Was the concept of core housing units explained to and understood by the allotees of the Second Republic housing units?

29. Non adoption of Due Process mechanism in the award of contracts and

execution of projects adversely affected the Federal Government Housing policy implementation in Imo State.

30. Increased debt profile and doubtful viability hampered the implementation of the Federal Government housing policy in Imo State. 31. Poor location - swamps, valleys and marshy land hindered the implementation of the Federal Government Housing policies in Imo State.

32. Corruption associated with compensation for land acquisition adversely

affected the Second Republic housing programme.

33. Inflationary trend (high cost of building materials) adversely affected the Second Republic housing programme.

34. Absence of sustainable structure adversely affected the housing programme.

35. Sophistry and guile culture was the bane of the Second Republic Housing programme in Imo State.

Source: Interview Guide designed by the researcher, Ekeanyanwu (2007)

195

APPENDIX IX

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 1. Arch. I. K. Mathias

(Chief Resident Architect) Federal Ministry of Environment, Housing and Urban Development, Owerri. 2. Mr. L. Onomeregwa

(Town Planning Officer) Federal Ministry of Environment, Housing and Urban Development,

Owerri.

3. Mr. D. A. Nkem (Quantity Surveyor) Federal Housing Authority Owerri

4. Mr. Sam Dike (Director of Estate)

Federal Housing Authority Owerri.

5. Mr. F. Nkwocha (Credit Officer)

Federal Mortgage Bank, Owerri.

6. Mr. D Ofoegbu

(Manager) Federal Mortgage Bank,

Owerri. .

7. Mr. M. Iwuji General Manager Imo State Housing Corporation Owerri.

8. Mr. M. Oshodi

(Chief Estate Officer) Imo State Housing Corporation Owerri.

9. Mr. T. Oguzie

(Asst. Executive Officer) Ministry of Works, Housing and Transport

Owerri.

196

10. Mr. E. O Obigwe

(Quantity Surveyor) Ministry of Works, Housing and Transport Owerri.

Mr. M. Opara (Structural Engineer) Imo State Building InvestmentCompany Ltd., Owerri.

12. Mr. C. Njoku

(Electrical Engineer) Imo State Building Investment Company Ltd., Owerri .

13. Mrs F. Maduike (Director, Lands)

Ministry of Lands, Survey and Urban Development Owerri. 14. Mr. S. Anyaehie

(Chief Stores Officer) Ministry of Lands, Survey and Urban Development Owerri. .

15. Mrs. V. Anyanwu (Civil Engineer))

Ministry of Public Utilities and Rural Development Owerri.

16. Mr. U. Okoronta (Estate Manager) Ministry of Public Utilities and Rural Development

Owerri.

17. Chief J. O. Enyogasi (Building Contractor) Okigwe Construction Company Owerri.

18. Mr. V. Onyekwere (Civil Engineer) Okigwe Construction Company Owerri.

197

19. Mr. E. D Nwoke (Building Engineer) Ahiazu Local Government Area Afor Oru.

20. Mrs. C. Okebalama

(Works Superintendent) Obowo Local Government Area. Otoko.

Source: Purposive Sampling List of Interviewees by the researcher, Ekeanyanwu (2007)

198

APPENDIX XA

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FORM I Purpose: One of the great issues in Nigeria’s housing sector has to do with the

proper policy and goals in the housing sector. The purpose of this questionnaire is to

rate the extent to which the housing goals and policies were attained in Nigeria, with

particular reference to Imo State.

Instruction: Please, read each statement on this questionnaire and indicate your

opinion of how important the statement is, using the following scale:

7 - Essential

6 - Very Important

5 - Above Average Importance

4 - Average Importance

3 - Below Average Importance

2 - Little Importance

1 - No Importance

OR how much “say”, differing roles or role groups had in the formulation or implementation of housing policies and goals, using a four point scale as follows:

4 = Absolute

3 = Much say

2 = Some say

1 = Little say

199

1. Housing policy is an instrument for affecting societal and national development.


3. The goals of the Federal Government Housing policies were relevant to the needs of the masses.

4. Evaluation of the success of the Second Republic Housing programme was based on the continuous assessment of the individuals’ living standard.

5. The sentimental attachment to land in Nigeria was not considered by the Land Use decree and this negatively affected the Second Republic Housing programme.

6. The goals of the Federal Government Housing policies were to ensure even geographical distribution of better housing facilities.

7. The goals of the Federal Government Housing policies were the pursuit of building construction and research.

8. The Second Republic Housing policy served as an effective instrument for cementing national unity.

9. Obstacles posed by government officials and non-utilisation of talents

adversely affected the Federal Government Housing policy implementation in Imo State.

10. Lack of finance militated against the Federal Government Housing

programme implementation in Imo State.

11. The Federal Government Housing policies provided opportunities for the compulsory knowledge of architectural designs in view of the ignorance among Nigerians over each other’s housing culture.

12. The Second Republic Housing policy was geared towards providing competent builders.

13. The Federal Government Housing policies did not relax restriction practices

such as high interest rate, low exchange rate of the Naira to other currencies and this hindered the implementation in Imo State.

14. The Federal Government Housing policies adopted more liberal loan policy to enable low-income workers and rural dwellers own housing anywhere in the country.

15. Lack of planning impeded on the Second Federal Government Housing policy


16. The Federal Government Housing policies permitted the Federal Government to have greater say on the affairs of Nigeria’s housing sector – when, where and how new housing programmes were to be established and implemented.

200

7 - Essential

6 - Very Important





1 - No Importance

17. The goals of the Federal Government Housing policies were to maintain the traditional plan of settlement freedom.

18. The Federal Government Housing policies were to change the practice of

people paying high rents o landlords. 19. The goals of the Housing policies permitted a new practice of owner/occupier

instead of rental basis. 20. The goals of the Federal Government Housing policies provided national

standard of performance through the Federal Housing Authority Offices in the country.

21. Population explosion and rapid urbanization led to the promulgation of the

low-cost housing programme during the second republic in Nigeria.

22. Over-crowding, illegal construction of shanties and their attendant problems such as vandalism contributed to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programme.

23. Were the Federal Government Housing policies implemented to improve the

housing situation of the low-income earners in Imo State?

24. Was the impact of the Second Republic Housing programme felt in Imo State as there were cheap and affordable housing units for the low income earners?

25. Did the domination of the award of contracts, the execution of the projects and

the sharing of the housing units by the executive, legislators and other political stalwarts adversely affect this Federal Government housing policy in Imo State?

26. Did the administrative conflict between the Federal and State Governments

negatively affect the achievement of the goals of this housing policy in Imo State?

27. The non-contributory role of the Legislators and Interest/Pressure group in the

formulation of this Housing policy adversely affected the implementation of the policy in Imo State.

201

7 - Essential

6 - Very Important





1 - No Importance

28. Lack of sound leadership and incompetent personnel hindered the implementation of these housing policies in Imo State.

29. Inadequate provision of financial resources to financial institutions

militated against the implementation of the Federal Government housing policies in Imo State.

30. Poor work attitude hampered the achievement of the objectives of the Federal Government housing policies in Imo State.

31. Lack of up-to-date and reliable database on housing hindered the implementation of these housing policies in Imo State.

32. Lack of research and support for local building materials negatively affected the implementation of the Federal Government housing policies in Imo State.

33. Lack of indigenous political, financial ad administrative culture negatively affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

34. Flagrant mismanagement of Nigeria’s economy and corruption adversely

affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State. 35. Was adequate infrastructure – roads, electricity, water, drainage system, etc.

provided in the various housing estates in Imo State?

36. Were the Second Republic housing units spacious enough for additional rooms?

37. Was the concept of core housing units explained to and understood by the allotees of this Federal Government housing units?

38. Non adoption of Due Process mechanism in the award of contracts and execution of projects adversely affected the implementation of the Federal Government housing policies.

39. There were over-valued contract sums and weak enforcement of contract of the Federal Government housing programme.

40. Increased debt profile and doubtful viability hampered the implementation of the Federal Government housing policy in Imo State.

41. Poor location - swamps, valleys and marshy land hindered the implementation of the Federal Government housing policies in Imo State.

202

7 - Essential

6 - Very Important





1 - No Importance 42. Corruption associated with compensation for land acquisition adversely affected

the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

43. Inflationary trend (high cost of building materials) adversely affected the implementation of the Federal Government housing policy in Imo State.

44. Favouritsm due to ‘familistic syndrome’ in the selection of contractors adversely

affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State. 45. There were abandoned housing projects during this Second Republic housing

programme in Imo State. 46. Inflated contract sums negatively affected the Federal Government housing policy

implementation in Imo State. 47. Inadequate capacity building (training and retraining) created a lag in technological

development and negatively affected the achievement of the goals of the Federal Government housing policies.

48. Obsolete equipment hindered negatively affected the achievement of the goal of

the housing programmes. 49. Absence of sustainable structure and maintenance culture adversely

affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

50. Sophistry and guile culture were the bane of the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

Source: Questionnaire designed by the writer, Ekeanyanwu (2007)

203

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FORM 2 Purpose: One of the great issues in Nigeria’s housing sector has to do with the proper

policy and goals in the housing sector. The purpose of this questionnaire is to rate the

degree to which the goals of the Federal Government housing policy implementation

were preferred in Imo State.

Instruction: Please, read each statement/question on this questionnaire and indicate

your opinion of how important the statement is, using the following scale:

7 - Essential

6 - Very Important





1 - No Importance

OR how much “say”, differing roles or role groups had in the formulation or

implementation of housing policies and goals, using a four point scale as follows:

4 = Absolute

3 = Much say

2 = Some say

1 = Little say

204

1. Housing policy should be an instrument for affecting societal and national development.

2. The Constitutional procedures should be important for housing policy formulation and implementation.

3. The goals of the Federal Government housing Policies should have been relevant to the needs of the masses.

4. Evaluation of the success of the Federal Government housing programme should have been based on the continuous assessment of the individuals’ living standard.

5. The sentimental attachment to land in Nigeria should have been considered by the Land Use decree and this negatively affected the Second Republic Housing

programme.

6. The goals of the the Federal Government housing policies should have been to ensure even geographical distribution of better housing facilities.

7. The goal of the Second Republic Housing Policy should be the pursuit of building construction and research.

8. The Second Republic Housing policy should have served as an effective instrument for cementing national unity.

9. Obstacles posed by government officials and non-utilization of talents should

adversely affect the Federal Government Housing policy implementation in Imo State.

10. Lack of finance should be a militating factor against the Federal

Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

11. The Federal Government housing policies should have provided opportunities for the compulsory knowledge of architectural designs in view of the ignorance among Nigerians over each other’s housing culture.

12. The Second Republic Housing policy should have been geared towards providing competent builders.

13. The Second Republic Housing policy should have been to relax restriction practices such as high interest rate, low exchange rate of the Naira to other currencies and this hindered the implementation in Imo State.

14. The Second Republic Housing policy should have adopted more liberal loan policy to enable low-income workers and rural dwellers own housing anywhere in the country. 15. Lack of planning must have impeded the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

205

7 - Essential

6 - Very Important





1 - No Importance

16. The Second Republic Housing policy should have permitted the Federal

Government to have greater say on the affairs of Nigeria’s housing sector – when, where and how new housing programmes were to be established and implemented.

17. This Federal Government Housing policy was supposed to maintain the

traditional plan of settlement freedom.

18. The goals of the Federal Government Housing policies should have been to change the practice of people paying high rents o landlords.

19. The goals of Federal Government Housing policies should have been to

change the practice of people paying high rents should have permitted a new practice of owner/occupier instead of rental basis.

20. The goals of the Federal Government Housing policies should have been to

change the practice of people paying high rents should have provided national standard of performance through the Federal Housing Authority Offices in the country.

21. Population explosion and rapid urbanization must have led to the promulgation of

the low-cost housing programme during the second republic in Nigeria.

22. Over-crowding, illegal construction of shanties and their attendant problems such as vandalism must have contributed to the promulgation of the low-cost housing programme.

23. This Federal Government Housing policy should have been implemented to improve the housing situation of the low-income earners in Imo State?

24. The impact of the Second Republic Housing programme should have been felt in

Imo State as there were cheap and affordable housing units for the low income earners.

25. The domination of the award of contracts, the execution of the projects and the

sharing of the housing units by the executive, legislators and other political stalwarts should have adversely affected on this Federal Government housing policy in Imo State.

206

7 - Essential

6 - Very Important





1 - No Importance

26. The administrative conflict between the Federal and State Governments negatively must have affected the achievement of the goals of the housing policies in Imo State.

27. The non-contributory role of the Legislators and Interest/Pressure groups in the formulation of this Housing policy should have adversely affected the implementation of the policy in Imo State.

28. Lack of sound leadership and incompetent personnel must have hindered the implementation of this housing policy in Imo State.

29. Inadequate provision of financial resources to financial institutions should have militated against the implementation of this housing policy in Imo State. 30. Poor work attitude should have hampered the achievement of the objectives of

this Second Republic housing policy in Imo State.

31. Lack of up-to-date and reliable database on housing should have hindered the implementation of this housing policy.

32. Lack of research and support for local building materials should have negatively affected the implementation of this Federal Government housing policy in Imo State.

33. Lack of indigenous political, financial ad administrative culture negatively should have affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

34. Flagrant mismanagement of Nigeria’s economy and corruption must have been adversely affected the housing policy implementation in Imo State.

35. Adequate infrastructure – roads, electricity, water, drainage system, etc. should have been provided in the housing estates in Imo State.

36. The Second Republic housing units should have been spacious enough for additional rooms.

37. The concept of core housing units should have been explained to and

understood by the allotees of this Federal Government housing units.

207

7 - Essential

6 - Very Important





1 - No Importance

38. Non adoption of Due Process mechanism in the award of contracts and

execution of projects should have adversely affected the implementation of the Federal Government housing policies in Imo State.

39. Over-valued contract sums and weak enforcement of contract must have

adversely affected the implementation of the Federal Government housing policies in Imo State.

40. Increased debt profile and doubtful viability must have hampered the implementation of the Federal Government housing policy in Imo State.

41. Poor location - swamps, valleys and marshy land must have hindered the

implementation of the Federal Government housing policies in Imo State.

42. Corruption associated with compensation for land acquisition must have adversely affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

43. Inflationary trend (high cost of building materials) must have adversely affected the implementation of the Federal Government housing policy in Imo State.

44. Favouritsm due to ‘familistic syndrome’ in the selection of contractors should

have militated against the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

45. Absence of sustainable structure and maintenance culture must have adversely

affected the housing policy implementation in Imo State.

46. Abandoned housing projects must have negatively affected the implementation of the Federal Government Housing policies Imo State.

47. Inflated procurement of goods and services should have militated against this Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

48. Inadequate capacity building (training and retraining) which creates a lag in

technological development should have hindered the achievement of the goals of the Federal Government housing policies in Imo State.

208

7 - Essential

6 - Very Important





1 - No Importance

49. Obsolete equipment hindered must have negatively affected the Federal Government housing policy implementation in Imo State.

50. Sophistry and guile culture should be the bane of the Federal Government

housing policy implementation in Imo State.

Source: Questionnaire designed by the researcher, Ekeanyanwu (2007)

IN TRO D U CTIO N 1.1 Background of the Study

Documents

Transcript of IN TRO D U CTIO N 1.1 Background of the Study