On the Jaina background of Dvaitavedānta

ROBERTJ. ZYDENBOS

O N T H E J A I N A B A C K G R O U N D

O F D V A I T A V E D , ~ N T A

0. One school of Indian thought which has not yet received due attention from modern scholars, due to the prevailing Western orientation towards illusionistic idealism in Indian philosophical studies, is Dvaitavedfinta, which originated in southwestern India in the thirteenth century. Using a formidable logic as its main weapon against Advaita, it grew into a major religious movement, primarily in southern India and, after AD 1500, also in the northeast of the country. That Dvaita has received little attention from modern scholars, apart from a very small number of important monographs, I is probably due to its relatively late origin and to reasons of a socio-political nature. 2 Of course we must realize that sociological or political reasons for the greater popularity of a particular school of thought are not necessarily indications of philosophical soundness, and the arguments which Dvaita brings forward in its criticism of Advaita illusionism must be taken into consideration in any evaluation of Advaita as a philosophical system.

1.1. Like other forms of Vedfinta, in order to show itself worthy of the name, Dvaita too presents itself as a doctrine which conveys to us the essence of the teachings of the Vedas and the Upanisads. But whereas gaflkara and other Advaitin authors see their doctrine of monistic mdydvdda or illusionism as that essential teaching, Dvaita most emphatically denounces that claim and puts forward its concept of paficabheda or fivefold difference: between the supreme Godhead and the living souls, between the Godhead and lifeless matter, between the souls among themselves, between the souls and matter, and between matter and matter. The material universe in which the souls experience samsdra is real, as is the bondage of samsdra itself. Libera- tion from sams~ra is possible only through bhakti and the grace of God, who in this monotheistic system is thought of as Visnu.

One striking difference between Dvaita and the other main Vedantas

Journal of Indian Philosophy 19:249--27 l, 1991. © 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

250 ROBERT J. ZYDENBOS

is that whereas the foremost proponents of Advaita and Vigistfidvaita, gaflkara and Rfimfinuja, are considered as standing in a tradition, as gifted pupils who have significantly developed teachings which they received from teachers whose names are on record, this is not the case with Dvaita. Dvaitavedfinta begins with Madhva in the thirteenth century; 3 there is no Dvaitin teacher before him, and the only authoritative texts of the school earlier than the writings of Madhva are those which Madhva has classified as saddgama, viz. the Vedas, the Mahdbhdrata, the entire corpus of Pdhcardtrdgamas, the original Rdmdyana 4 and those Purfinas which are in agreement with the aforementioned. 5 To these are also added the Brahmasgttras of

Bfidarfiya9. a, who is Vyhsa, the author of the Vedas, etc., who is an incarnation of the Lord. 6 Thus all these texts can be considered authoritative, according to Dvaita, because they are all derived from the same source, which is the source of all truth and reality. After the Brahmasfitras, the teaching of religious and philosophical truth is taken up again by Madhva, whom tradition considers an incarnation of the god Vfiyu and who had earlier been incarnated as Bhima and Hanumat. 7 Though this identification of Madhva with Vfiyu and the earlier incarnations merits a further investigation on account of its symbolic meaning, it seems not unlikely that in ascribing a divine nature to Madhva the early Dvaitins evinced an uneasy awareness that their creation of a new Vedfintic tradition could be frowned upon within the Brahminical community, and the claim of divinity of the founder could be seen as a sign of how serious they were in pursuing their ideas.

Certain peculiar teachings of the Mhdhvas (the followers of Dvaita, i.e. of the teachings of Madhva), more particularly certain aspects of the mythological account of Madhva's life such as we find it in works like Nhrfiya9. a's Madhvavijaya, have in the past led some researchers to assume that there was a Christian influence in the formation of the doctrine. S. N. Dasgupta opposes this in his History of Indian Philosophy, 8 stating that bhakti can be traced to certain Vedic and Upanisadic verses, that there is no trace of a trinity doctrine in Madhva's thought, and that Madhva urges repeatedly that his doctrines are based on the Vedas, Gitfi and other scriptures. Though from a philosophical point of view Christian influence in Dvaita seems not

ON THE JAINA BACKGROUND OF DVAITAVEDANTA 251

likely, Dasgupta's argumentation against it is hardly convincing. Of course a thinker who wants to be accepted as a Ved~ntin will claim that his ideas are drawn from the Brahminical tradition, or that they represent the 'essence of Vedic thought'. Long before Madhva, ~afikara did the same, and it has been established that ~aflkara's Advaita to a large extent is a Brahminical adaptation of ideas drawn from M~dhyamika Buddhism. Madhva too has noticed this, especially in his Tattvoddyota, which is the first work in which the Advaitin- Buddhist similarity is pointed out supported by arguments. 9 Thus the claim of a philosophical doctrine to vaidikatva or dstikatva is hardly a guarantee against the incorporation of thoughts of non-Hindu origin.

1.2. Dvaita is the youngest important school of Indian realistic thought, and it is markedly different from all the previous Hindu schools. Its being a Ved~mta already makes it sufficiently distinct from the Pfirva. Mim~ms~, and in discussions of numerous matters of epistemology Madhva argues the fallaciousness of that system. Dvaita accepts that the soul is not merely a passive experiencer of phenomena but a real agent, and hence it clearly departs from S~hkhya, although it adopts certain concepts from the latter's evolutionary model of the material universe. In at least two important ways Dvaita differs from the Ny~ya-Vai~esika. Firstly, consciousness is a permanent characteristic of the soul, and hence the soul also remains conscious in the state of moksa. Secondly, truth has svatahprdmdnya, i.e. it is self- evident, whereas in Ny~ya the truthfulness of any item of knowledge demands verification before it can be accepted; in Dvaita, only falsehood is paratah., to be demostrated by other means, while truth is directly experienced as such. l°

One cause of polemics between Dvaita and other schools of thought is the Dvaitin concept of tdratamya or 'hierarchy'. According to Dvaita, souls are inherently different from each other: not only are they numerically many, but they are also qualitatively different. This is seen not only in everyday life: also in moksa differences remain. The amount of bliss experienced in moksa varies according to the soul's inborn capacity for experiencing bliss, and thus moksa does not mean the same for all souls. Moreover, not all souls are destined to attain moksa.


In the Tattvaviveka, one of Madhva's shorter writings, we read that there are two nityamuktas or eternally liberated souls in the universe: the Lord Visnu and his consort, gri or Laksmi, and all other souls are srstiyuj or associated with Visnu's creation. 1~ These other souls are again either mukta or amukta, liberated or not-liberated; and the not- liberated souls are again of three kinds: high, middle and low, or muktiyogydh., nitydvartdh, and tamoyogydh. J 2 In the Tattvasamkhy~na, another short work by Madhva, of which the subject matter largely overlaps with that of the Tattvaviveka, and which opens in an almost identical manner, we come across the same ideas, expressed in slightly different terms: there the mukt~h and amuktdh are called vimukt(th and duh. khasamsthdh., and the latter are muktiyogydh, and ayogy~h., or, returning to the threefold division which we saw earlier, vimuktiyogydh., srstisamsthitdh and tamogdh.. 13 In the Pramdnapaddhati, an important introductory text to Dvaitin epistemology and logic, Jayatirtha subdi- vides them as muktiyogydh, nityasamsdrinah, and tamoyogydh. J 4

Of course Madhva and his commentators quote passages from various scriptures in support of the concept of tdratamya, and their opponents from rival schools of Vedfinta do the same in opposition to the idea. 15 Jayatirtha explains that the knowledge of oneself is truthful in the case of the muktiyogydh., mixed in the nityasam, sdrinah, and false in the case of the tamoyogydh.. 16 From the whole context in which the

concept is presented, viz. an enumeration and description of tattvas or basic principles underlying this universe, we may conclude that tdratamya is considered a basic given fact. Each soul, by nature, belongs to one of the given categories, and this cannot be changed.

What seems highly significant here is that Dvaita was not the first school of thought in India to hold that the final state is not the same for all souls. Jainism expressed such a doctrine from its very beginning, in its own terminology. Here the Tattvdrthas~tra, the foremost jaina doctrinal text, mentions three characteristics of the soul in II, 7: jDabhavydbhavyatvdni ca. According to the Sukhabodha, a Digambara commentary on the Tattvdrthastitra by Bhfiskaranandi, jDatva is consciousness, 17 which in Jainism has always been considered an essential characteristic of the soul. Though there are better known commentaries on the Tattvdrthast~tra, it may be of greater interest to quote Bhfiskaranandi, as he seems to have worked at gravanabe!ago!a


and his terminus ad quem has been placed at AD 1250) 8 This means that he was either an elder contemporary of Madhva or already was no more by the time of Madhva's birth, and that he lived and worked not far from the main area of Madhva's activity. "He [i.e. the soul] who possesses the ability to manifest characteristics of samyagdargana, etc., is a bhavya," Bhfiskaranandi says as an explanation of bhavyatva, and a soul that does not show that ability is an abhavya. 19 Samyagdargana has commonly been translated as 'right faith', which later leads on to sarnyaglTzdna or 'right knowledge' and samyakcaritra or 'right conduct', the three together forming the prerequisites or path towards moksa. In an earlier publication 2° I have expressed my reluctance towards translating dargana by 'faith', because it seems that the semantic field or the term dargana is significantly larger than that which we associate with 'faith'. But what is of importance here is that samyagdargana is a first prerequisite for attaining moks..a, and that according to Bhfiskaranandi the ability to manifest (rvirbhdvagakti) this, or its absence, is what determines whether a soul is a bhavya or an abhavya. In a still somewhat earlier commentary on the Tattvrrthasfara, written in Old Kannada by Bfilacandra, we read in the same context: " . . . the three modifications of nature called fivatva, bhavyatva and abhavyatva are the nature of the soul. ''21 In other words: here too, the characteristics bhavyatva and abhavyatva are seen as given facts, inherent in the souls.

1.3. This parallelism of views in Dvaita and Jainism acquires still greater significance when we consider the historical circumstances in which Dvaita originated. Madhva was born in a village very near the mode m town of Udupi in southwestern Karnataka state, and at that time that region was ruled by a staunch Jaina dynasty which had its capital at Barkur, only a few miles away from Madhva's birthplace. One modern biographer of Madhva states that at the time of Madhva's birth Jainism was very strong in that region, and he adds that the Anantegvara and Candregvara temples in Udupi, which today are major shrines of the Vaisnava sect which Madhva founded, once were Jaina temples dedicated to the Tirthafikaras Anantan~tha and Candranfitha. 22 Also in the later history of Mfidhva Vaisnavism we see examples of Mfidhva-Jaina confrontation: thus the town Subrahmanya,

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also in South Kanara district, was once a Jaina ksetra, z3 but is now dominated by Mfidhvas; the multi-religious place of pilgrimage Dhar- masthala, in the very same region, is still primarily a Jaina ks..etra, but employs M~dhva priests.

Whereas Hindu philosophical texts have given much attention to Buddhist thought and the refutation thereof, Jainism has been com- paratively neglected. The locus in the Brahmast~tras where Jainism is discussed is known as the naikasrninnadhikarana, in the SamayapfMa of the second chapter. 24 In his Brahmasfttrabhdsya, gafikara gave the example for the summary dismissal of Jainism. Two objections are brought forward against Jainism. Objection is made against the Jaina view of the size of the soul, which is thought to be basically coexten- sive with the body which it occupies, whereas for a Ved~ntin the soul is either omnipresent or atomic in size, depending on the particular school of Vedfinta. More importantly, objection is made against the Jaina syddvdda, the doctrine which says that because each real object combines within it a huge variety of aspects and characteristics, conflicting predications can be made about that object. This has been summarized in the famous saptabhaliginaya or 'sevenfold predication', which says that in a certain sense, a thing is, and is not, and also both, and neither, etc. 25 gafikara conveniently overlooked that the syfMvdda does not say that opposing predications may be made about the same object from the same point of view in the selfsame temporal and spatial circumstances, and so his criticism on this point does not reach far beyond a mere sarcastic stating that tertium non datur. This model refutation has been followed by all other Vedfintins ever since.

Madhva does the same in his Anuvydkhydna, his fourth commentary on the Brahmasfaras, and hence in his famous sub-commentary, the Nydyasudhd, Jayatirtha, the most important commentator on Madhva's works, deals with this matter also. What is very striking, however, is the amount of space that Jayatirtha devotes to his discussion of Jainism: in the most recent edition of the text, this passage is approximately 12 pages long. 26 Also, we must notice that in his description of Jaina teachings, he reveals a genuine familiarity with them and presents a more detailed and truthful picture of Jainism than most Vedanta authors do.


1.4. In his discussion of the position of memory in Indian theories of pramdna, B. K. Matilal remarks that memory-experience "was never regarded by any non-Jaina philosopher (a Naiy~yika or a Buddhist) to constitute a piece of knowledge, a pramd, a cognitive awareness which amounts to truth. ''27 The qualification "a Naiy~yika or a Buddhist" is

necessary here, for we see that Madhva and his followers very explicitly do so. 2~ Matilal gives some suggestions as to why the Jainas should differ from others in this respect, and also why a Naiyfiyika such as Udayana should be so strongly opposed to the idea of accept- ing the truthfulness of memory. For a moment he considers the possibility that the Jainas may have used the term pramd in a less strict sense, but he quickly dismisses the idea in favour of an argument which refers to the experience of time in memory, viz. that memory tells us that a thing (for instance) 'is dark', whereas a correct piece of knowledge would have to say that the thing 'was dark'. 29 This is precisely what Jayatirtha contends; 3° the mere fact that we are aware that we remember something amounts to a recognition that what we remember is a cognition of a past state of affairs.

The possibility which Matilal dismissed, on the other hand, seems to be worth closer consideration. Jaina philosophers have traditionally held a view of pramd which differs somewhat from the one which we find in most other schools. S. N. Dasgupta, while contrasting Jaina and Buddhist views, stated that "Pramd i s . . . according to the Jains equivalent t o . . . the outlining of the object, and the immediate instrument of it, or pramrna, is the subjective inner flash of knowledge, leading to such objective . . . determination of objects". 3~ Pramd and pramdna are not completely distinct from each other, as is the case, for example, in Ny~ya. At this juncture we may look at what is said about pramd and pramdn, a and the Pram~prameya of Bh~vasena, a Jaina author who was a contemporary of Madhva. Manuscripts of his works are found in the Jaina matha of Hombuja, which is situated just outside Madhva's native district of South Kanara. 32 In this work we read: "What then is pramdn, a? Pramdna is the determining of the true nature of a thing. And that is twofold: bhdvapramdn, a and karan, apramdn, a. Pramiti is pramdna, and by the qualification 'bhdva', pramfma is correct knowledge. By the qualification 'karana', pramfma is the instrument [for attaining] correct knowledge, by which the truth

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of a thing is concluded or determined, through the excellence by which it discriminates [correct knowledge] from doubt and contra- riety". 33 In other words: pramdna can be either a means for attaining knowledge, or knowledge itself, viz. when this knowledge acts as a means towards further knowledge, such as in the case of memory of recognition. In the case of knowledge acquired through the senses too, Jainism considers prarn6na primarily a function of the soul, to which the physical sense organs appear as a kind of correspondence in the material world: the five bodily sense organs are dravyendriyas or material senses, which correspond to five bhdvendriyas, which are potentialities of the soul . 34 Hence, if there is no absolute distinction between pramd and pramdna, and if the knowledge which is offered by memory is found to be truthful, then there should be no reason why memory would not qualify as a pramdna. Though these ideas are already found in the Tattvdrthas~tra, Bh~vasena's work proves that they were known in southwestern Karnataka in Madhva's time.

In his Pramdnala~anq, Madhva briefly states yathdrtham pramdnam, i.e. "pramdna [is] true to the object," and Jayatirtha elaborates that a pramdna "makes a thing as it is its object". 35 Where Jayatirtha uses the term ydthdrthya, "the quality of being true to the object" as a characterization of pramdna, Bhfivasena uses ydthdtmya, "the quality of being true to the nature [of the object]". 36 Madhva then continues by saying that pramdna is twofold, kevala and anupramdna. 37 Kevala is further defined as yathdrthajhdna, 38 and anupramdna is the means by which it is attained. 39 In this latter context, Jayatirtha adds that yathdrthajh(ma, i.e. kevala, is pramd. In other words, here kevala, which was first defined as one of the two basic kinds of pramdna, finally is considered pramd as well, as has traditionally been the case in Jainism. Dvaitin authors, whether classical or modern, have never noticed or acknowledged this obvious similarity between the two systems. 4°

1.5. Earlier, Jaina thinkers had already made a basic twofold distinction of pramdn, as, as we see e.g. in Tattvdrthas~tra I, 10--12. Knowl- edge is of five kinds, viz. mati, gruta, avadhi, manah.parydya and kevala; the first two, viz. the sensory (including memory) and the scriptural (or reported), were termed parok4.a, and the remaining three


were termed pratyaks..a. 41 With Bhfivasena we find a change from the older division in the Tattvdrthas£ttra: another, fourfold division of pratyaks..a, viz. indriya-, manas-, yogi- and svasamvedandpratyaks.a 42 has taken its place. Thus sensory knowledge has become pratyaks.a, more in agreement with the terminology of other schools of thought, and paroks.a has been redefined as knowledge which is caused by "the application of the self (dtmdvadhdnena); "pratyaks..a, etc.", including memory, recollection, ~tha, apoha, tarka and dgama. 43

In Madhva's Pramdnalaks.ana, we find that kevala has a similar fourfold division as the Jaina pratyaks.a has, though here it is divided into iga-, lak4rni, yogi- and ayogij~dna. These four may all be called jfidna, since it has already been stated that kevala is yathdrthaj~dna. These four kinds of kevala are distinguished from each other by a qualitative gradation in clarity, 44 which we also find among the varieties of pratyaksa of the Tattvdrthas~tra. 45

Of course Jainism, being ultimately an atheistic system, cannot offer any place of special epistemological significance to the supposed knowledge of the two main Vaisnava deities; but apart from the similar occurrence of a fourfold division, we notice that both the Jaina and the Dvaitin classification include a variety of knowledge which they term yogi- (pratyaks..a or jhdna). Yogipratyaks.a is the term which Bhfivasena uses to cover the two varieties of knowledge known by the older terms avadhi- and manah.parydyaj~dna. Through special dhydna or meditative practices (dhydnavidesdd) one acquires yogipratyaks.a, which is a clear apprehension of all things (sakalapad6rthas- past.dvabhdsah.). Avadhijfidna apprehends all material objects and souls in sa.msdra, and again exists in further gradations. Through manah.parydyajfidna one also apprehends still more subtle phenomena, such as the thoughts of others. 46 Kevala finally is omniscience, which is obtained when a soul sheds all its karma and thereby realizes its true nature. Similarly in the Dvaitin view, yogijfidna is an excellence acquired through the influence of yoga 47 which increases gradually until liberation is attained. 48

The use of the word kevala to denote a variety of knowledge both in Jainism and in Dvaita deserves closer attention. Though the term occurs in different places within the classification of pramdna-s in the two systems, they share a common feature. The first two kinds of


jfidma in the Jaina classification, viz. mati and iruta, correspond to the Dvaitin anupramdna-s (which are pratyaksa, anumdna and agama), 49 since in the older Jaina classification anumdna is included in matijhd- na. 5° What distinguishes kevala from anupramdn, a in Dvaita is that kevala is knowledge, a manifestation of the soul, which is independent of any further sddhana or instrument. The definition of anupramdm, a is tatsddhanam anupramdn, am, 51 where tat stands for kevala. The three kinds of knowledge called pratyaks..a in Jainism, of which kevala is one, are characterized by exactly that same independence? 2 Thus we see that what is called kevala in Dvaita corresponds to what is called pratyaks..a in Jaina texts, while the use of the term pratyaks.a by Madhva shows a closer similarity to its use in the other schools of Indian philosophy.

Pratyaks..a is perception and is conceived of as being of seven kinds, 53 viz. perception through the sdksin (the svar•pendriya, a function of the soul, to which we must return later), the manas and the five senses. The passage in the Pramdnalak4.ana where this is mentioned is briefly commented upon by Jayatirtha. But then comes the surprise. After first supporting Madhva's statement that pratyaksa is of seven kinds, he continues: "And this is said not to be universal. For pratyaks..a is of four kinds. It is known under the divisions fsa-, laks..mi-, yogi- and ayogi-pratyaks..a. 54 This is of course exactly the same kind of fourfold division which we have already come across in our discussion of kevala; and in a few lines Jayatirtha gives what looks like a summary of what he has already said earlier in connection with kevala. His statement that pratyaks..a is of four kinds has no foundation in Madhva's text; worse still, it is a flat contradiction. Also, it seems that he has made a logical error. From what Jayatirtha tells us about the four kinds of kevala and the four kinds of pratyaks..a, it appears that there is no distinction whatsoever between kevala and pratyaks..a. But if Madhva, and therefore also Jayatirtha, makes a fundamental distinction between kevala and anupramdna as two basically different types of pramdn, a, and the very same foursome which has previously been given as kevala returns later as a subcategory of anupramdn, a, then this amounts to self-contradiction. Yet Jayatirtha was very firm in this, for we see exactly the same thing happen in his Pramfm. apaddhati, which must be a later work: ~ Commenting on Jayatirtha, R~ghaven-


dratirtha states that "The sevenfoldness is not connected with all souls, ''56 and grinivfisatirtha further elaborates that this is not the case with I~a and Laksmi, since they are spiritual beings who perceive only through the svarftpendriya. 57 But grinivfisatirtha's contention does not hold good for all the remaining souls, yogin as well as ayogin, since they do possess a manas and all the five senses, and so their pratyaks..a is ubhayavidhendriyasannikarsdtmaka, "of the nature of contact with the two kinds of sense organs", as Jayatirtha himself states28 Thus the problem of the seven kinds of pratyaksa which are four kinds remains unsolved.

Considering that we have already noticed how Dvaitin kevala corresponds to Jaina pratyaks..a, it may be not wrong to assume that Jayatirtha was aware of how kindred certain concepts in Jainism and in the teachings of Madhva were, and that he either innocently read further Jaina terminology into Dvaita or actually deliberately attempted to achieve a further synthesis. We have already noted that Jayatirtha was familiar with Jaina thought. In his lengthy section on Jainism in the Nydyasudhd, he opens the discussion with a brief description of some principles of Jainism, but he soon lapses back into the stereo- typed Brahminical condemnation of the system. This is probably due largely to the commentarial tradition in Indian thought, which demands that an older author in the tradition may be commented upon but should not be superseded. The Jaina notion of the size of the soul as changing in accordance with the material body which it occupies is criticized, as earlier Ved~mtin authors have done. Madhva criticizes the Jaina view that mukti consists in the everlasting upward movement of the soul (which the Jainas have never said, and which is a misrepresentation of how the Jainas conceive of the condition of the soul in the few moments immediately following death in the final incarnation). 59 Here Jayatirtha shows an independent spirit and greater fairness towards the Jainas when he describes their view of mukti as moks..ah svdbhdvikdtmasvarfip~virbhdvah., "moksa is the manifestation of the essential nature of the soul . ''6° In passing we should note that also in Dvaita moksa or mukti is considered the realization of the full potentialities of the individual soul within its own limitations, by the grace of God, and Jayatirtha states: bhagavatprasdddd agesdnist.dnivrtti- vi~ist6nandddisvarfipftvirbhdvalaksan6 muktir bhavat#i. 61 Of course


the Jaina logical doctrine of syddv(Ma and anekdntavdda is satirized, as other, earlier Vedhntin authors have done: if the truth of everything is relative, then also the truth of things such as mukti and the entire Jaina doctrine itself become relative, and Jainism cannot claim to hold any real, absolute truth. Jaina authors have of course never said this, nor is this implied in their statements, nor is this a logical consequence of their views. It is merely another traditional misrepresentation.

In that same section of the Ny(~yasudh(~ there are a few remarks which deserve notice in the present discussion. Jayatirtha is aware of the Jaina categorization of souls, but he does not use the Jaina terms. According to him, "Souls are of three kinds. ~Fhey are] bound, have achieved yoga and are liberated". 62 He does not elaborate this any further, nor does Rfighavendratirtha have anything to add to this in his subcommentary Parimala. To my knowledge, this threefold classification does not occur in Jaina texts; the Tattv(lrthasfttra (II, 10) distinguishes only samsdrino muktdg ca, "[souls] in samsdra and fiberated [souls]". In Jayatirtha's threefold classification, the first two kinds of souls (i.e. buddha and yogasiddha) are obviously not liberated, since the muktdh are mentioned as a distinct category. If, on the other hand, the yogasiddhdh should be understood as souls enjoying a state of ffvanmukti, then again the classification is not a correct reflection of the Jaina view, which does not make any categorical distinction between siddha souls, awaiting the final loss of their agh(~tiya karma before they are totally liberated, and other souls in samsdra. However, we have already seen that the Dvaitins themselves have formulated a tripartite classification of souls as tamoyogya, nity6varta and muktiyogya, which, although different, shows a similarity in gradation in view of the ultimate spiritual goal. Whereas the Dvaitin threesome assumes three different degrees of potentiality with regard to attaining mukti, the supposed Jaina threesome, in the form in which Jayatirtha gives it, assumes three different degrees of actuality in the souls' progression towards mukti. In any case, what Jayatirtha tells us about the Jaina view is incorrect, and it seems that a contamination has taken place, in which a Dvaitin tendency to see three categories has also been ascribed to the Jainas.

1.6. Furthermore, we may doubt whether the Dvaitins have much


right to ridicule the Jaina anekdntavdda if we have a closer look at their doctrine of vigesa. Dasgupta mentions a Vi~istfidvaitin work, the Vijayindraprajaya by Parak~layati, which exists in manuscript and appears to be based on the older Tattvamuktakaldpa of Vefikata; in this work, Parakfilayati attacks the Dvaitin doctrine which says that qualities have no existence apart from the substances in which they reside. This concept would make the Vi~istfidvaitin division of categories as dravya and adravya (substance and non-substance) redun- dant, and there follows an analysis and criticism of the Dvaitin view along Vi~istfidvaitin lines. Finally the author says that a substance cannot be identical with many qualities, for if that were so, then it would involve acceptance of the Jaina view of saptabhahgi, the classical expression of syddvada, 63 which is apparently horrendous.

What distinguishes a substance from a quality is termed a vigesa or 'distinctioa' in Dvaita. Jayatirtha develops a set of technical terms based on the Sanskrit verb vi-~is.-, and in further discussions it may be useful for us to use a parallel Latin set of similar derivation, conveying the same meanings. There is no thing without vigesa or distinctio, i.e. all things are distinguendum, to be distinguished, by a certain attribute, e.g. a quality, which is the vigesana or distinctor, and the result is that the distinguendum has become distinguished by the distinctor, in other words: it has become a vigista or distinctum.

. .

In the Gitdt(ltparyanirn. aya, his second commentary on the Bhaga- vadgit~, Madhva devotes considerable space to the concept of vides.a, 64 and the discussion is prompted by a theological question concerning the vigvarfipa of Visnu, viz. whether He is identical with or distinct from it. Certain scriptural passages speak of a single body or form, others speak of many, and again others state that the Lord is not different from the forms. Here Madhva quotes lengthily from the Brahmatarka, a mysterious work which is known to us only through the quotations which we find in Madhva's writings and through a very few stray quotations in the writings of other early Dvaitins, and which was apparently a recent text at the time; 65 however, Madhva attributes the text to Vyasa, 66 and thus it acquires the same authority as the other texts that are considered saddgama. It is through these quotations that the notion of vigesa is first introduced, "une des pi~ces maitresses du syst~me de Madhva", as Siauve calls it. 67


It that passage from the Brahmatarka we read that it is only through vigesa that Hari (Vi.snu) can have one and many forms at the same time. 68 It is vastusvarftpa, the essence of a thing, and is self-supporting. 69 There are logical difficulties involved if one accepts that substances are radically different from their qualities (as happens e.g. in the Ny~ya-Vai~e.sika), but the realistic tendency of Dvaita demands a recognition of differences. Through the acceptance of this concept of videsa one avoids the logical fallacy of infinite regress, 7° so Jayatirtha explains in the Nydyadipikd, his commentary on the Gitdtdtparyanirn. aya. There is no thing without vi~esa, and it is only through vi~esa that a thing can be cognized at all. 7~ There is no fallacy in the acceptance of vigesa, says the Brahmatarka, "because [we] exerience oneness and also experience vi~esa, ''72 in other words: vi~esa is directly given in experience, we know it through our experience of the oneness of the distinctio and the distinguendum. Thus many qualities may reside in a substance. Substance and quality are not different, yet in a way they are, because we experience them as such, and vi~esa is given as the reason for this experience. 73 The text continues with the example of cloth which is not to be experienced separately from the threads and yet is different from the mere threads, and this example of an unconscious object is compared with the soul, which is not different from its qualities of being an actor, enjoyer etc. 74 In the Vdddvafi, one of his independent treatises, Jayatirtha says that there is no contradiction involved in considering one and the same thing subject and object, e.g. in the statement 'I know myself', on account of the strength of the vi~esa. 75 Elsewhere Jayatirtha calls vigesa the paddrthasrkti ('power of the object') which acts as the representative or substitute of difference 76 in a relation of savigesdbheda, "in the sense that it produces the effects of difference where there is no difference," as Siauve puts it. 77

In this arguing in favour of the notion of the one which at the same time is many, of the substance which is one with its qualities and yet different, of differences which exist only in a certain, qualified sense, one hears something that sounds suspectly similar to syddvdda. Jayatirtha writes: "One and the same thing is known in the form in which it is spoken about before and further enquired about (anadyd- kdren, a) [and] unknown in the form in which it is enquired about

ON THE JAINA BACKGROUND OF DVAITAVED,~NTA 263

(prcchyamdndkdrena), and thus there is no impossibility of enquiry on account of the quality of being known and the quality of not being known of each and every thing", TM i.e. there is no contradiction involved in saying that at the same time a thing is known as that thing and not known as modified by knowledge about it which we do not yet possess; and thus he actually adopts the paradoxical style of writing which Jaina authors before him have cultivated for centuries, by implicitily applying the third predication of the saptabhahg~" sydd asti ndsti. The saptabhangi was first formulated by Samantabhadra, whom Matilal places at approximately AD 500. 79

1.7. This important fragment from the Brahmatarka, as quoted by Madhva, and Jayatirtha's commentary on it do not really contain much of a reasoned defence of the notion of savidesdbheda ('non-difference qualified by distinction', as Dvaitin authors refer to it); as said above, vl~esa is given in experience, we perceive it. Perception, pratyaks..a, and knowledge derived from scripture, dgama, together are upafivyapramdn, a, whereas all other pramd.nas are upafivakapramdn, a. These terms are again taken from the Brahmatarka: 8° the two forms of upafivyapramdn, a can be thought of as more fundamental, "sources of truth which give their subsistence to all our other knowledge," in Siauve's wording, 81 or "modes of knowledge which sustain life, which give nourishment to thought, ''82 whereas e.g. "inference is upafivaka- prdmana: it lives by extrinsic data, ''83 namely data which are provided by perception and scripture. Thus inference, being based on perception, may never contradict immediate perceptual knowledge.

This brings us to the crucial question of our means of knowing truth. In Dvaita, this means has been termed the sdksin or 'witness', the ultimate upafivyapramdna. 84 It is an aspect of the soul, and the term has been used as such already in the Upanisads. However, opinions differ on the exact meaning of the term. For Advaitins, this aspect of the soul manifests itself at the moment when one realizes the ultimate Advaitin truth of the unity of all things, and the term has relatively little importance for Advaitin thought as a whole. For the Dvaitins, on the other hand, it is the source of the intuitive knowledge of, among other things, the reality of the phenomenal world, i.e. the reality of difference between things, and the term plays an immensely


important role in Dvaitin epistemology. It is considered one of the important original contributions of Dvaita to Indian thought. 85

The sdksin is one of the seven indriyas or sense organs in Dvaita; it is the svarfipendriya, 'the sense which is the self', in contradistinction to the manas and the five other senses. The meaning of this term quickly becomes clear when we read that the sdksin is jhdnar~pa, 'has the form of knowledge', and is pramdtrsvarfipa, 'is the nature of the experiencer of truth'. 86 Thus it possesses dtmasva~patva, 'the quality of being the nature of the self', and it has as its perceptual objects its own qualities, happiness etc., and also some objects outside itself, such as space and time. 87 The concept of the sdks..in, in Dvaita, is the pillar on which the defence of the notion of svatah.prdmdnya or the self- validity of knowledge rests, 88 and Dvaitin authors bring forward reasons why such a concept is necessary. 89 Thus when, for example, the validity of memory as a means of knowledge is upheld by referring to sdks.iprdmdnya, 9° this effectively means an appeal to svatah.prdmdnya as located in the experiencer, the soul.

In the Jaina view, as represented by Bhfivasena, the qualities of the self, such as happiness, suffering etc. are perceived by the manas and are therefore to be reckoned mdnasapratyaks.a. 91 Yet here too, we must bear in mind that the terminological difference does not represent a conceptual difference, or at least not one that is as great as one might expect, and this is because of the Jaina conception of the nature of the manas, which runs parallel to that of the other sense organs. It is impossible to do justice to all the peculiarities and implications of this conception within the scope of this article. We have noted above how Jaina thinkers saw every sense organ as twofold, bhdvendriya and dravyendriya (see §1.4). As Bhfivasena explains in connection with the manas: "The form of the manas as that of an eight-petalled lotus situated in the heart is the dravyendriya. The bhdvendriya is labdhi and upayoga. Here the partial destruction and neutralization of the karma which obscures knowledge is labdhi. The action of grasping by the soul is upayoga. 92 Upayoga is the term for the two types of knowledge which are distinguished by the terms jhdna and dargana, and it is the characteristic of the soul. 93 This explains how Jaina mdnasapratyaks.a covers both the sdksi- and mdnasapratyaks.a of Dvaita, for the Jaina manas in its subjective aspect is the soul, as is

ON THE JAINA B A C K G R O U N D OF D V A I T A V E D , ~ N T A 265

the Dvaitin sdksin. Hence it should come as no surprise to us that Bh~vasena's defence of memory and recognition as valid sources of knowledge already shows the argumentation which we find also in Jayatirtha's commentary on Madhva. 94 Thus the Dvaitin concept of the sdksin appears to be one aspect of the Jaina theory of the soul, which has been made more explicit through the use of a new term.

2. Both the Jaina as well as the Dvaitin concepts which we have mentioned above still deserve much study with regard to their further implications. In comparison with Jainism, we see in Dvaita a tendency towards further conceptual differentiation and an expansion of terminology; also it seems that the two systems show differences concerning for instance their psychological views of internal perception (the concept of manas, and mdnasapratyak4.a ). Eschatological differences between them will undoubtedly be reflected in their epistemological views as well: the Dvaitin notion of fga- and lak4.mipratyak4.a is one obvious example.

But although much detailed study still remains to be undertaken, three facts, viz. (i) the clear similarities between Jainism and Dvaita, which by constrast they do not share with other systems of Indian thought, (ii) the greater antiquity of the development of these ideas in Jainism in comparison with Dvaita, and (iii) the historical religious and philosophical situation in which Dvaita originated, all show that great Jaina influence in the formation of Dvaita is practically certain. In six topics, viz. (a) tdratamya vis-h-vis bhavydbhavyatva, Co) the notion of memory as a valid source of knowledge, (c) the possibility of pramd being considered a pramdna as well, (d) the twofold categorization of pramdnas, in which Dvaitin kevala corresponds to Jaina prayaksa, (e) the Dvaiti doctrine of savffesdbheda vis-a-vis Jaina anekdntavdda, and (f) the concept of sdksin vis-a-vis the Jaina theory of the soul, we can clearly discern a Jaina background.

Here we must notice that most of these ideas imply each other. The concept of the sdks..in, just as its earlier Jaina parallel, as the source of valid knowledge is the basis of svatah.pramanya, and thus in the Ny~ya-Vai~esika, for example, both are absent. It also lies at the root of the differentiation between two sets of pramdna-s: pratyaksa and paroksa in Jainism, kevala and anupramdna in Dvaita. Savi~esdbheda


and anekdntavdda are defended by reference to this function of the soul, and they justify the view that pramd can also be regarded as a pramd.na. Thus we see that Dvaita has not merely eclectically borrowed some random thoughts from the older system, but that there is an underlying structural similarity between Jainism and Dvaita, due to which a complex of ideas was borrowed. Padmarajiah has claimed that Jainism "represents the most consistent form of realism in Indian metaphysics, ''95 and this structural similarity perhaps supports his view.

It has generally been supposed that there was little exchange of ideas between Jainism and the Brahminical systems of thought, or that at best the mutual interest was rather one-sided. Frauwallner expresses his astonishment that "the literature of the Jainas is extensively occupied with other schools and systems" whereas Brahminical systems hardly mention Jainism and the Buddhists show greater attention only after Akalaflka. 96 Similarly Halbfass has remarked that though Indian doxographies have been produced not only by Jaina authors but also by Advaitins, the Jaina authors showed a desire to classify and codify other systems and show the place of Jaina thought among them rather than to criticize or refute them, whereas the Advaitin works program- matically set out to demonstrate the superiority of Advaita, which is already visible from the hierarchic composition of these works. 97 We have already seen above in connection with the Brahmasfitras that authors of the so-called 'orthodox', 'dstika' or 'vaidika' schools of thought had little good to say about Jainism.

But in the light of all that we have seen above, it is evident that our idea of the place of Jaina thought in the Indian philosophical tradition is in need of a reassessment. Dvaitin thinkers -- at least the earliest ones in the tradition -- were not only familiar with Jalna thought but integrated key elements of Jaina philosophy and relationships between these elements in their own system. Just as Advaita represents the acceptance of significant aspects of Buddhist thought by so-called 'orthodox' thinkers, Dvaita reveals the influence which Jaina thought had on Brahminical contemporaries and the acceptance of this style of realistic thinking as the dominant form of realism in later Indian thought. I believe we may assume that Madhva, due either to philosophical reasons or to his own religious experience, was dissatisfied with the illusionistic idealism that had come to dominate Hindu

ON THE JAINA B A C K G R O U N D OF D V A I T A V E D A N T A 267

thought in his environment and therefore felt the need to re~stablish realism; and with Jaina culture all around him, so to speak, he could draw concepts and a style of philosophizing from that source, to integrate them profitably into his own system.

In this sense, the influence of Jainism has been quite considerable. We already know from the example of the Advaitins that the Brah- minical thinkers were loath to admit their indebtedness to 'heterodox' or 'ndstika' sources, and thus the absence of open appreciation on the part of the Dvaitins for the achievement of the Jainas should not come as a surprise. But it is somewhat curious, if one considers how in the Western philosophical tradition a person such as Thomas Aquinas, who later became the official philosopher of the Roman Catholic church, could openly admit his appreciation for and indebtedness to the heathen Aristoteles. This Hindu intolerance of the non-Hindus, or at least lack of fairness towards them, could be due to considerations of a socio-political nature. Advaita was seen as a Brahminical 'revival' of Hinduism in opposition to Buddhism; Dvaita has traditionally seen itself as a similar 'revival' of Vedic religion in opposition to Advaita, and Dvaitin thinkers have carded on a successful debate with their Advaitin counterparts ever since their school originated; however, we must not forget that Dvaita originated in a Jaina-dominated region, and M~dhva Valsnava hagiography contains numerous references to encounters with Jainas in the area. This is particularly clear in the biography of V~dir~ja (16th c.). Historian K. V. Ramesh remarks that after the fall of Vijayanagara the religious school of Madhva "gained greatly in its following and came to occupy a position of pre-eminence [in South Kanara district] at the expense of ~aivism and, in particular, of Jainlsm. 98 In recent times, B. N. K. Sharma has remarked on some similarities between Dvaita and Jalnism. 99

In spite of their similarities, a sufficiently large number of differences between Jainism and Dvaita remain, and both merit much greater attention from students of Indian thought. Together they represent the living tradition of Indian realism, which has yet to receive proper recognition from modern scholarship.


N O T E S

1 The first work that deserves mention is H. von Glasenapp's Madhvas Philosophie des Visnu-Glaubens (Bonn/Leipzig, 1923), which is still a valuable introduction. The Western scholar who has done most work on Dvaita is the late Ms. S. Siauve, whose La doctrine de Madhva (Pondich6ry: Institut fran~ais d'indologie, 1968) is the best handbook to date for the Western reader. Among contemporary Indian authors writing in a Western language, B. N. K, Sharma deserves special mention for his A History of the Dvaita School of Vedanta and its Literature (2 vols.; Bombay, 1960, and reprinted) and The Philosophy of Madhvdcdrya (Bombay, 1962, and reprinted). 2 It is an unpleasant fact that the academic study of philosophy in India tends to be strongly influenced by the traditional religio-philosophical orientation of the castes of the researchers in question. Members of the Dvaita castes have generally not occupied positions from where they could give much publicity to their opinions. 3 The accepted dating of Madhva's life is 1238--1317. See Sharma, History, I, pp. 101--3, and Siauve, pp. 2--4. 4 Apparently Madhva did not mean the work by Valrm-ki, or perhaps only a part of that work. K. T. Pandurangl mentions that there is a reference in the RSmfiyan.a itself to an older version (K. T. P~.n.durangi (tr.), Vis.nutattvavinirnaya, kannada anuvdda vivarane sahita. Bangalore: Srirfighav6ndrfigrama, 1983 (in Kannada); p. 4). 5 The V~nutattvavinirnaya reads: "R. gddyd bh&atam caiva p6ficargttram ath6khilam / rmilar6mdyanam caiva purdnam, caitaddtmakam /l ye cdnuyf~yinas tves(tm sarve te ca saddgamdh. / . . ." (~r~madvis.nutattvavinirnayah with six commentaries, ed. by ~ri ~ri VidyS.rnS.nyatirtha a.o., Madras: grimanm~dhvarfiddh~mtasam, vardhinisabhfi, 1969; p. 59). In his commentary, Jayatirtha liberally interprets etaddtmakam to mean "what is in conformity with the Rgveda etc.," i.e. "the Manusmrti etc." Presumably this would also include the Upanisads on which Madhva has written commentaries. 6 Cf. R. G. Malagi (ed.), Anubh(~sya of ~r~ Madhvdc~rya with the commentary, Tattvaprak(~gikd, of ~rf Chdlarigesdcdrya. Mysore: Univ. of Mysore Oriental Research Inst., 1985; editor's Sanskrit introduction, p. v. 7 Malagi, p. vi. Siauve, pp. 5--6, mentions that Madhva declared himself an avatdra, but she gives no reference. 8 S. N. Dasgupta, A History oflndian Philosophy vol. IV. Delhi a.o.: M. Banarsidass, 1975 (repr.), pp. 92--3. 9 Sharma, History, I, p. 190. 10 R. S. Panchamukhi (ed.), Pramdnapaddhati by ~rf ~ri Jayafirtha. Dharwad: ~ri Raghavendra Pratishthana, 1982; p. 132, §12. (Hereafter referred to as PP.) 11 p. p. LakswSn~rfiya0.opadhy~y a (ed.), ~rfmaddnandatfrthabhagavatpddaviracitgmi daga prakarandni . . . t.rffyo bhdgah. Madras: grimanm~dhvarhddhSntasamvardhinisabh~, 1971; p. 67. 12 Ibid. p. 68. 13 Ibid. pp. 37--8. 14 pp p. 32, §19. 15 Cf. Dasgupta, pp. 98--100. 16 See n. 14. 17 A. Shantiraja Sastri (ed.), The Tattvdrtha S~tra of ~ri Umdswdmi with the Sukhabodha of ~r~ Bhdskaranandi. Mysore: Univ. of Mysore Oriental Research Inst., 1944; p. 31: fivatvam caitanyam. Hereafter referred to as 'Sukhabodha'.

ON T H E J A I N A B A C K G R O U N D O F D V A I T A V E D , ~ N T A 269

18 Ibid., editor's Sanskrit introduction p. xivii. 19 Ibid. p. 31. 20 Robert J. Zydenbos, Moksa in Jainism, according to Umdsvdti (Wiesbaden: Fr. Steiner, 1983. Beitr~ige zur S/idasien-Forschung, S/idasien-Institut, Universit~it Heidelberg, Bd. 83), p. 16. 21 A. Shanthiraja Sastry (ed.), Tattvaratna Pradfpike ofBdlachandra Deva. Mysore: Univ. of Mysore Oriental Research Inst., 1955; p. 84. Hereafter referred to as 'TRP'. The editor mentions in his Kannada introduction (p. xli) that the author must have lived in the 12th century, and he seems referred to in an inscription in grava0, abe!ago!a. 22 S. K. R~Jnacandrarfiv, P~rnaprajha-pragasti. Mysore: Geetha Book House, 1968; p. 44 (in Kannada). 23 y. Um~n~tha genai "Daksina Kannadada Jaina Sampattu," in Kast~ri, June 1981, pp. 24--8 (in Kannada); p. 28. 24 Adhy~ya 2, p~da 2, sfitra 33--36. 25 The related Jaina doctrines anekdntavdda, nayavdda and syfMvdda are elaborately discussed in S. Mookerjee's The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism (Delhi a.o.: M. Banarsidass, 1978.2nd ed.). B. K. Matilal has dealt with the subject in his The Central Philosophy ofJainism (Anekdnta-vdda) (Ahmedabad: L. D. Inst. of Indology, 1981) and in chapter 4 of his Logic, Language & Reality (Delhi a.o.: M. Banarsidass, 1985). 26 ~rirnat.dkdkrtpddaviracitd ~riman-Nydyasudhd. 3 vols. Mulabagalu: ~rimatprasan- nar~ghavendramatha, 1985--6. The passage in question is found in vol. 2, pp. 1225-- 40. Hereafter quoted as 'Nyfiyasudh~'. 27 Matilal, Logic, p. 262. 28 p. p. Laksmin~r~ya0.opadhyay a (ed.): ~rfmaddnadatirthabhagavatpdddcdryaviracitdni da~a prakarandni . . . prathamo bh(lgah.. Bangalore: grimanm~dhvar~ddh~inta- sam. vardhakasabh~, 1969; pp. 131--4. (Hereafter referred to as 'PL'.) 29 Matilal op. cit. p. 268. 30 Pramdnalaksanatfkd (hereafter: 'PLT'), p. 134. The text is printed along with the PL, in the same edition. See also PP p. 41, §26. 31 Dasgupta, p. 166. 32 V. Johrapurkar (ed.), ~ribh(tvasenaviracita Pramdprameya. Sholapur: Jaina Samskrti Samraksaka Safigha, 1966. The editor places Bh~vasena between AD 1250 and 1367 (editor's Hindi introduction, p. 1). (Hereafter: 'Pram~prameya'.) 33 Pramdprameya pp. 1--2. 34 Pramdprameya p. 2; cf. also TattvdrthastJtra 1I, 17--18 and Sukhabodha p. 34. 35 PLT p. 4. 36 Pramdprameya p. 1; PLT p. 10. Sharma gives 1365--88 as the dates for Jayatitha's life: cf. History, I, p. 322. 37 PL p. 10. 3s PL p. 11. 39 PL p. 16. 40 Cf. e .g .H.N. Raghavendrachar, The Dvaita Philosophy and Its Place in the Vedanta. Mysore: Univ. of Mysore, 1941, p. 153: "The definitions of the previous thinkers suffer from the defect that they all exclude pramd from the field of pramdn, a." 41 Tattvdrthasfttra I, 11--12. 42 Pramdprameya p. 2.


43 Ibid. p. 8. 44 PL pp. 19--27. 45 Sukhabodha p. 12. 46 Pram@rameya pp. 4--6. 47 PLT p. 22. 48 PL p. 23. 49 PL p. 31. 5o Sukhabodha p. 12 with Tattvdrthast~tra I, 13. 51 PL p. 16. 52 Sukhabodha p. 12 with Tattv~rthastitra I, 12: indriy~nindriy~napeks..am pratyak4, am. 53 PL p. 123. 54 PLT p. 123. 55 pp p. 27, §17 and p. 42, §27. In the opening passage of the PP, the author mentions that the PL and other works of Madhva are the proper works to study, and that his PP is an introductory work. This suggests that he had already studied the PL, and presumably he wrote his PLT as a result of that study. 56 R~tghavendratirtha's commentary on PLT, p. 124 (in the same edition). 57 ~rinivfisatirtha's commentary on the PLT, p. 126 (in the same edition). s8 PLT p. 123. 59 Zydenbos, pp. 21, 26--7, 36--7. 60 Nydyasudhd p. 1225. 61 pp p. 165, §13. 62 See n. 60. 63 Dasgupta, p. 97. 64 D. Prahladachar (ed.), ~ridnandatirthabhagavatpdddcdryaviracitah. Git~tdtparyanirnayah.. Bangalore: Pfirnaprajfiavidyfipi.tham, 1987; pp. 207--19. (Hereafter: 'GT'.) 65 Siauve, p. 28. 66 Ibid. p. 26. 67 Ibid. p. 29. 68 GT p. 208. 69 GT p. 209.

7o Ny~yadipikd of Jayatirtha, p. 209. Included in the edition of GT. (Hereafter: 'ND'.) 71 GT p. 210. 72 GT p. 212. 73 ND p. 214. 74 ND p. 216.

75 p. Nagaraja Rao (ed., tr.), Vdd~valf by Jayatirtha. Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1943; p. 124, §441. 76 Ibid. p, 134, §471. 77 Siauve, p. 55. 78 GT pp. 211--2. 79 Matilal, Logic, p. 306. 80 Siauve, p. 41. 81 Ibid. 82 [bid. p. 213. Thus she also explains the significance of the verb root jfv-.

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83 Ibid. 84 Sharma, Philosophy, p. 10. 85 S, S. Raghavachar, Dvaita Vedanta. Madras: Univ. of Madras, 1977; p. 23. Also Sharma, Philosophy, p. 6. 86 PLT p. 123. 87 Ibid. 88 pp III p. 162, §12; ~riniv~tsatirtha's commentary on PL, p. 124. 89 See esp. Sharma, op. cit. p. 108. 90 PLT p. 134. 91 Pramdprameya pp. 3--4. 92 Ibid. p. 3; TRP p. 85 says more explicitly arthagrahanavydpdropayogam. 93 Tattvdrthastitra II, 8; TRP p. 85: jivalaks..anamakkum. 94 Pramdprameya pp. 8--10. 95 y. j. Padmarajiah, A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge (Delhi a.o.: M. Banarsidass, 1986, 2nd ed.), p. 7. 96 E. FrauwaUner, foreword to Padmarajiah, p. vi. 97 W. Halbfass, Indien und Europa (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co., 1981), pp. 301, 405--7. 98 K. V. Ramesh, A History of South Kanara (Dharwad: Karnatak Univ., 1970), p. 307. 99 Sharma, op. cit. pp. 12--3. Sharma already remarks that "certain types of cognition like Manala.pary~ya and Kevala in Jain philosophy correspond in a measure to the Yogipratyaksa and Kevalapram~na of Madhva," and he observes that Madhva's native district was under Jaina rule during his time. The other corre- spondences which he notes are somewhat less clear and will need a more detailed study. The sacrifice of flour-made animals instead of living animals, introduced by Madhva, is probably not due to Jaina influence, since there is a Jaina work in Old Karmada, the Yagodharacarite (of which also Sanskrit and Prakrit versions exist), in which precisely this kind of sacrifice is condemned as a sort of hypocrisy and is considered as evil as the sacrifice of a living animal.

On the Jaina background of Dvaitavedānta

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