Post on 01-Mar-2023
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PPR 227 Foreign Policy of Contending Powers - Coursework Assignment 1
“American power and influence in the world is in a state of irreversible decline”. Discuss.
Power and influence of the United States is in a state of decline but it is not irreversible and also not
a decline relative to other contending powers. First, there are few constraints on the actions of the
US as a hegemon and these are not gradually tightening. Secondly, despite the US economy and
political function becoming increasingly less potent, it has re-emerged from economic complications
before, and is more than capable of doing so again. Third, other contending powers such as Brazil,
Russia, India, China (BRIC) and the EU, have become noticeably influential militarily, politically
and/or economically so that in some matters US chooses to no longer act independently without
their consent. However, economic problems that the US faces are not unique to the superpower,
and each potential rival has its own internal instabilities that prevent them from challenging the US.
Finally, the US has established its political connections around the world and with an ideological
accord, more so than potential contenders. Even if other economies surpass an arbitrary threshold
it will not force the US to withdraw from its hegemonic position.
In politics, the term power refers to the ability to influence and alter the actions, thought, or
behaviour of other social groups, organisations, cultures or countries. Power is also the ability to
discourage an actor (on the international stage) from taking an action they otherwise would have1.
Social psychologists John R. P. French and Bertram Raven suggested that there are five bases of
power which are as follows: Coercive, Reward, Legitimate, Expert and Referent2. Most are
1 Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy Second Edition, published 2012 Oxford University Press,
Page 427 2 http://changingminds.org/explanations/power/french_and_raven.htm
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complimentary or interdependent. For example, an authority (legitimate power) without the power
to enforce it (coercive power) will be meaningless, as the League of Nations was in the 1930’s.
Since the Pax Americana era and for most of the American (20th) century, the US has attained of all
of these types which it still holds today. The first argument is that the US not only remains the sole
superpower, but also faces comparatively weak systemic constraints on the global exercise of its
power3. ‘There are 192 member states of the United Nations. To have troops stationed in more than
nine of every ten countries on earth is beyond the wildest dreams of any previous imperial power’4.
America’s president faced on many occasions this dilemma of backing up his Nobel Peace Prize
whilst simultaneously confronting international doubt arisen from the Iraq War after Bush. How
does the US remind the world of its inexhaustible power and influence in an era of increasing
peace5? Considering the decreasing frequency and intensity of conflicts globally in the past two
decades6, if Obama is less military active than his predecessors it does not mean that the US is
relatively less militarily active. This is why has Obama been criticized for withholding military action
in other scenarios. For example, the UN should be more condemning of the Syrian regime7 but
Russia and many Americans were not keen on intervening in Assad’s chemical weapon controversy.
Obama, despite being more than capable of acting anyway, decided to avert these strikes to avoid
disapproval of allies. Unfortunately for Obama’s reputation, if he does not fully utilise the military
might of the US contending powers may question, as some have, the authority the US imposes on
the international stage. This view can be misleading and cause analysts to jump to conclusions (as
the declinists have). 3 Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy Second Edition, published 2012 Oxford University Press,
Page 410 4 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/boxed-constraints-us-foreign-policy
5 David Barash and Charles Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies Third Edition, 2014 SAGE publications, page 14
6 David Barash and Charles Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies Third Edition, 2014 SAGE publications, page 16
7http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/17/why_has_the_un_given_assad_a_free_pass_on_mass_m
urder_syria?page=0%2C0
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Since his inauguration in January 2009, Obama has conducted numerous operations in areas of
political conflict: diplomatic discussions about nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea8, drone
attacks in Pakistan9, intervention in Libya on the plea of the Arab League10, the killing of Osama Bin
Laden11, and more. Each of these is a distinct example that there is no leash around America’s neck.
Perception of a country’s power and influence is therefore just as important as the reality of its
power and influence. In short, the constraints on US foreign policy are very limited and so any
restraint would be more caused by domestic economic problems in the US, but nonetheless neither
of these is sufficient to revoke the US’s global dominance.
The second argument is that these economic issues - although causing greater strain on the US than
other countries – are relatively inconsequential and the US has recovered from them before.
Declinists argue that the financial crisis in 2007/2008 was a clear turning point into accelerating
decline. Additionally, the American economy has amassed a national debt of over $17 trillion12, a
Federal deficit of around $600 billion, and trade deficit of $40.6 billion. However, as seen in the
graph shown on the next page, there is a trend of stability and the capability to recover in
unexpected discomforts as shown in 2009. This is a good indicator of the exaggeration of US
economic decline.
8 http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/119861.htm
9 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/world/asia/04drones.html
10 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/17/libya-no-fly-zone-united-nations
11 http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/osama-bin-laden-is-killed-by-us-forces-in-
pakistan/2011/05/01/AFXMZyVF_story.html 12
http://www.zerohedge.com/contributed/2013-10-21/us-national-debt-over-17-trillion-surges-328-billion-single-day
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Image from: Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://docbea.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/trade_124.png
According to the IMF, the US is the sovereign most pivotal for facilitating global economic growth, in
the wake of the slowdown in China and other major emerging economies13.‘For all the economic
strength of Europe (which may be waning) and of China (which is certainly waxing), the United
States is still immensely and unprecedentedly rich, while military might and economic strength are
combined with a matchless cultural dominance’14. Declinist arguments feature a near myopic focus
on aggregate GDP, but for referent power GDP/capita (PPP) is much more important; where PPP of
US = 49,965, EU = 33,527, and China = 9,23315).
13
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/global-economic-growth-fo_b_4166587.html 14
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/boxed-constraints-us-foreign-policy 15
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc
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Since WW2, the US has largely been able to avoid making difficult ‘guns or butter’ decisions precisely
because of its hegemonic role in the international economy16. USD’s role as the international
system’s reserve currency allows the US to live beyond its means in ways that other nations cannot.
As long as the international community believes that the US will repay its debts, and that
uncontrollable inflation will not dilute the dollar’s value, the US can finance its external ambitions
and domestic socio-economic programmes by borrowing money17. Due to established diplomatic
relations, this position will be accountable to more than just flat GDP. In all, the US economy is still
the single largest national economy and its problems are watched closely thus by no means
irreversible.
The third argument is that potential super powers have their own interior problems which amass
the already established US influenced world prevent them from exceeding the superpower. Counter
arguments to the declinist’s predicaments suggest that potential superpowers’ status as an
emerging superpower is more perceived than it is real.
From the most threatening candidates, the EU is on par with the US and most of its ideology with a
long history of cooperation to support it. McCormick argues that the nature of power has changed
since the Cold War-driven definition of superpower was developed; he argues that control of the
‘means of production is more important than control of the means of destruction’. Even if this were
the case, there would be no challenge or incentive to take on its role. As it was during the Cold War,
Europe needs the US much more than vice versa. Owen suggests “to make the USA more responsive
to European preferences, the EU would have to enhance its own military might. However, Europeans
will prefer to avoid the costs of doing so, because their security is not threatened by a powerful USA
16
Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy Second Edition, published 2012 Oxford University Press, page 418 17
Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy Second Edition, published 2012 Oxford University Press, page 416
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which shares European liberal values18”.
Declinist or not, one cannot ignore the spectacular rise of China. However, ‘China is far from being
considered a trustworthy ally to the international community, sitting on the periphery of many
international decision-making processes, for a number of reasons19’:
China has yet to disavow the brutal oppression of President Bashar al-Assad, and, along with
Russia, has held up UN resolutions condemning the regime.
China is also North Korea's last ally, a thoroughly unfortunate distinction.
A massive population implies that GDP per capita would be significantly lower in China, given
that both economies are similar in bulk. (PPP of US 49,965, EU 33,527, and China 9,23320)
China's relationship to human rights is anything but progressive.
Censorship of the press and the Internet, restrictions on freedoms of religion, expression,
association, prohibition of many independent labour unions and organizations, and the
repressive policies against many people in Western China and Tibet spell trouble for the
leaders in Beijing on the international stage21.
“Even though the US is no human rights saint, she currently holds legitimacy with a team of allies
who prize consistency and stability, making a global shift in power highly unlikely22”.
If China continues on this path of questionable governance and cavorting with questionable allies,
no serious block of internationally influential states will support a Chinese hegemony over the
current US one. As a synopsis, China will remain a strong regional and international player, but one
that plays second fiddles to the US
The final argument is that the US is politically and ideologically connected with enough of the world
18
http://www.fes.de/ipg/IPG1_2003/ARTOWEN.HTM 19
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-white/why-us-hegemony-is-here-t_b_4258264.html 20
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc 21
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-white/why-us-hegemony-is-here-t_b_4258264.html 22
Ibid.
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to retain its hegemonic status, and therefore is not in relative decline to other powers. International
legitimacy is derived from and defined by a global coalition of the willing – this is where the US
reigns supreme,23 and their ace in the hole. ‘Until this allegiance to the US breaks down, she will
remain the absolute world superpower24’. The US wields a power of influence, persuasion, and
leadership on the international stage that no other state comes close to. She sets international law,
ignores international law, and is accountable to no one. China, while clearly jockeying for authority
and power, does not yet have legitimacy.
Even if the USD role as International System Reserve Currency is under question, simply because of
the already established preferable association in the international community this will not change,
particularly not to China.
Members of the G8 or even G20 such as the U.K., France, Germany, Japan, etc. will not simply
support China the moment its GDP crosses some arbitrary threshold. “The United States and China
perceived that they needed each other because both were too large to be dominated, too special to
be transformed, and too necessary to each other to be able to afford isolation25.” If anything, in a US
confrontation with China, the vast majority of Asian nations will seek to avoid choosing sides26,
which is still in favour of the US.
A good example is the recent French invasion of Mali, where it was the US who provided the
23
Ibid. 24
Ibid. 25
Henry Kissinger, On China, Published 2011, New York: The Penguin Press, page 487 26
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/12/AR2005061201533.html
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necessary support27, in effect running the operation to combat Islamic militants. It is unlikely the
world will see a scenario where France, a country with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council,
calls first on China over the US. Undoubtedly, China has a regional influence increase substantially in
recent years. A situation in which it is the Chinese and not the US to lead a successful international
coalition of allies is unrealistic.
Kang suggested "There's not a lot of evidence that China is picking a fight with the United States28".
Regardless, the US has and will continue to take assertive measures against Chinese aggression in
fear of the possibility of Hu Jintao’s ‘China’s Peaceful Rise’ becoming side-lined29. This can be
interpreted as increasing frequencies of power struggles where the US takes preventative and
aggressive measures against any signs of expansionism by China. A recent example was when Beijing
announced the right to monitor Senkakus30, a chain of islands off of Japan. “On November 23rd,
China's Ministry of Defense released a map showing part of its Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ), a contested area in the East China Sea31” Fish explains. On November 25th the US flew two B-
52 bombers over Senkaku without informing Beijing. China's publication of the zone is undeniably a
provocation but it is also in line with international norms of airspace and transparency32. The US
Federal Aviation Administration warns of "use of force" in the "case of non-compliance33." In
scenarios like this the US is taking action can imply the US feeling genuinely threatened by Chinese
expansionism. Likewise, it can also be seen that the US chose to demonstrate its dominant position
in most global affairs and shows that it is not afraid to oppose China if need be. Whether or not
China is challenging the US in a way that is subtle, outright, or not at all - this does not change the
27
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/16/so-why-did-france-invade-mali-anyway 28
http://www.cfr.org/china/promise-pitfalls-chinas-peaceful-rise/p10446#p9 29
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61015/zheng-bijian/chinas-peaceful-rise-to-great-power-status 30
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/26/imitation_is_the_securest_form_of_flattery_china_us_national_security 31
Ibid. 32
Ibid. 33
Ibid.
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relative US power and influence in the world.
From history we do learn that sudden sprouts of hegemonic countries are doomed to fall into an
over-confidence stimulated trap of strategic overstretch. Expansion creates enemies who in fear
for their own survival unite against the perpetrator and soon restore the previously existing balance
of power. As was Vienna in 1815, Versailles in 1919, Yalta/Podstam in 1945 and the Soviet downfall
in 1989 restoring the power equilibrium was difficult to maintain. However, with the increasingly
gradual and prolonged rise of the US, a shift in the balance of power dynamic in the 21st and now
globalized century is very different and requires more than economic or military potency. It requires
ideological values (such as democracy and an appreciation of human rights as in the case of the US),
reputable and influential allies which other countries not only agree with but can look up to. From
this it can be deduced that (impending) external drivers of decline are far outweighed by America’s
own internal drivers. For the time being at least, the US is showing and is in no danger of losing its
allies or influence.
Ultimately, despite visible political dysfunction and detriments in the US economy it’s political and
military status is still inexorably that of a world hegemon and this is unlikely to change in the near
future. In a multilateral world where nuclear weapons are more abundant they act as a deterrent
which disincentives any military confrontation between them. This makes the military a less
important factor when asserting power and influence on potential superpowers. This does however
make the military very important when asserting coercive power and influence onto non-
superpower countries or entities. With the US military consisting of 43% of the world’s military
spending34, the US is comfortably the monopoly of military power. The US economy is
approximately a quarter of nominal global GDP, and has the highest Purchasing Power Parity of any
34
http://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending/
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economy. Despite also having the largest debt and indications of decline, the US economy is still
sufficiently strong to retain its hegemonic role in world politics. Goldman Sachs annual report stated
that only by 2050 the BRIC economies can eclipse that of the G635, and each potential contender has
its own restraints that make the US in better position of holding onto the hegemonic role. Brazil is
experiencing a cultural and economic boom making it influential in South America but has a severe
income gap and a significant impoverished population. Russia’s population is shrinking and the
labour market is suffering ‘brain drain’, paving the way towards “global irrelevance36”. India is
relatively corruption free, a growing population and economy37, but “resists its own rise38” with a
muddled foreign policy and strategy for the future. Chinese human rights controversy and closed
nature do not inspire loyalty from other countries, particularly from the western hemisphere. In all,
speculation about the rise of contending powers is not undeserved but has been exaggerated in
many cases.
Candidate name: Alexander Wielgos
Candidate number: 3327 2417
Word count: 2583
35
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our_firm/investor_relations/financial_reports/annual_reports/2003/features/innovativebrics.html 36
http://www.newsweek.com/decline-putins-russia-its-way-global-irrelevance-65847 37
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-01-09/news/29382860_1_third-largest-economy-superpower-india-s-gdp 38
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139098/manjari-chatterjee-miller/indias-feeble-foreign-policy
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University Press
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
David Barash and Charles Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies Third Edition, 2014 SAGE
publications
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2013 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-white/why-us-hegemony-is-here-
t_b_4258264.html
Tania Branigan, China monitored US B52 Bombers’ flight through disputed air-zone, The
Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/27/china-air-defence-zone
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Published 2008 Cambridge University Press
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great-power-status
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http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/boxed-constraints-us-foreign-policy