The Changing Roleof the PhalanxInfantry between490 and 323 B.C.Department of Classics and
Ancient HistoryDurham University
Andreas Kagiavas Torp
2014
Abstract
In this dissertation I will argue that the role of the
phalanx infantry changed from having an attacking role at
the battle of Marathon, into having a defensive role at
the battle of Hydaspes. The increased use of other units,
such as cavalry and missile troops, forced the phalanx
infantry to change its role and this change was further
enhanced by the development in equipment. I will also
argue that the role of the phalanx infantry within the
army changed, from practically being the army at Marathon,
into being a part of the army under Alexander the Great. I
also claim that the Greco-Macedonian army was improved due
to this change, largely because it became a more
purposeful army, using its units where they were to best
use.
2
Table of ContentsAbstract.......................................................1Introduction...................................................3
Chapter 1 – From Marathon to the Peloponnesian War.............7Chapter 2 – From the Peloponnesian War to Philip II of Macedon15
Chapter 3 – Philip II and Alexander the Great.................24Conclusion....................................................32
Appendix......................................................35Bibliography..................................................38
3
Introduction
The Greeks have since the time described in Homer’s Iliad
had a strong infantry which was usually the most important
unit of every Greek army. Over the course of time though,
the infantry changed and instead of using swords as the
primary weapon at the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C., it
started using thrusting spears. That was not the only
change however from the Homeric style of fighting, because
4
the infantry at Marathon also fought in something that
much closer resembled the well-known hoplite phalanx, but
this is something I will come back to later. This would
mark the beginning of a much larger change in the infantry
as an army unit. In less than 170 years the phalanx
infantry went from being the unit which Greco-Macedonian
armies was centred around, into being a unit that was
needed as a part of the army. The importance of this unit
changed as well, going from being the single most
important unit of the army, into being one of several
important units. The role of the phalanx infantry changed
dramatically from the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. to
the death of Alexander the Great1 in 323 B.C. which is what
I will argue in this paper. However, before I can go into
any detailed analysis of passages and discussion on this
topic, I need to make clear what I mean with the terms
‘phalanx infantry’ and the ‘role’ of the phalanx infantry.
1 Henceforth referred to only as Alexander.
5
A standard Greek army2, and later the Macedonian army,
would usually consist of several different army units,
such as heavy infantry, light infantry, skirmishers and
cavalry. However, the main portion of a Greco-Macedonian
army would in most instances be the hoplite infantry and
later foot soldiers armed with the sarissa (both of course
usually referred to as heavy infantry). Because this unit
changes in terms of how it fought and what it was equipped
with, I believe that it is more useful to talk about this
unit as ‘phalanx infantry’ rather than ‘hoplite infantry’
and then later ‘Macedonian phalanx’, because both units
fought in a phalanx formation. Therefore, I do not discuss
in this essay the changing role of the hoplite infantry or
the Macedonian phalanx, but rather the heavy infantry
unit, or as I will call it in this paper, the phalanx
infantry.
As to the ‘role’ of the phalanx infantry I do not mean
what its purpose was in terms of politics or indeed any
2 I am aware that the term ‘Greek army’ would perhaps be too broad and generalizing too much because of the many Greek city states that all had their own armies (which was usually raised when needed), but for the sake of the argument which is not intended to discuss one, two or several of these armies in depth, but rather the phalanx infantry as aunit I believe that it is a sound term to use.
6
socio-political role, but rather what its role was on the
battlefield. As I will show in the coming chapters, the
phalanx infantry’s role changed in terms of how it was
used on the battlefield and what its purpose was. To see
this clearly I will be discussing examples from several
famous battles ranging from Marathon in 490 B.C. to the
battle of the Hydaspes River in 326 B.C. What I will show
is that the role which the phalanx infantry had around 490
B.C. was an attacking role, but that the tendency
throughout the period in which I am looking at is that the
phalanx infantry would take a more and more defensive
role. The ‘role’ which I will be discussing in this essay
is the role of the phalanx infantry, as an army unit on
the battlefield.
Having defined these slightly vague terms and hopefully
made them clearer, I will now shortly explain the choice
of time period. The battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. is
arguably the starting point of Greek military domination
in not only the Aegean Sea, but also parts of the eastern
Mediterranean. In 478 B.C. Athens formed an alliance with
the Ionians (but not limited to Ionic Greeks) which acted
7
as a counterpart to the Spartans who kept waging war
against the Persians. Eventually though, Athens too
resumed war against the Persians and the longing for more
territory to control ultimately led to the Peloponnesian
War in 431 B.C3. Whilst fighting each other through a
series of alliances, the Greek city states kept their
domination over the Aegean and more so, until Philip II of
Macedon started to conquer territories himself,
threatening the Greek domination. Having annexed most of
the Greek mainland (except Sparta) after the battle of
Chaeronea in 338 B.C., King Philip II now turned his eye
towards the east and the Persians. However, his plans were
cut short with his assassination, which led to the reign
of his son, Alexander. With the expansion of the
Macedonian kingdom by Alexander into the distant parts of
the East, bringing Hellenic culture all the way to India,
one might say that Hellenic culture and military power was
never as powerful as at that point. That is why I choose
to end my discussion with the death of Alexander, because
after him his kingdom was divided and Hellenic culture and
military power was arguably never the same after him. 3 P. Rhodes, 2006, first paragraph
8
Hellenic military power was arguably at its greatest
between 490 B.C. and 323 B.C. and much of that greatness
is owed to the phalanx infantry which was throughout the
back-bone of the Hellenic army, be it in a Greek or
Macedonian army. However, in the coming chapters I will
follow the development of the phalanx infantry and see
that the role of this unit changed dramatically. It went
from being the most important part of the army, into being
a part of the army that was still important, but which
needed much support. The unit that often supported the
infantry, the cavalry unit, will as we shall see take over
the role as the attacking unit, whilst the two units will
continue to support each other. In this paper I will
therefore show that the role of the phalanx infantry
changed from an attacking role into a defensive role and
that this was due to two main aspects. Firstly, other
units, especially the cavalry unit, would prove much
quicker and thus be more effective as an attacking unit,
as we shall see good examples of in chapter 3. The second
aspect which would alter the role of the phalanx infantry
was that it proved to be vulnerable on its own and needed
9
much support from other units, as we shall see in chapter
2. These two aspects are arguably why the role of the
phalanx infantry changed from an attacking one to a
defensive one.
10
Before I can go into any analysis of battles and the
phalanx infantry’s role in those battles, I would like to
take a moment to discuss what the phalanx infantry of this
time would have been equipped with. This issue will become
important later in the paper when discussing the
Macedonian army and also in terms of understanding the
role of the phalanx infantry at the battles that I will
look at closer in this chapter. The arms and armour which
the hoplite infantry was equipped with around the battle
of Marathon has been much debated4. What we can be fairly
certain about however is that the hoplite panoply at the
time of Marathon usually consisted of a thrusting spear,
shield (the hoplon5), helmet, breastplate and grieves6.
Later on at the time of Philip II and Alexander we will
see that the panoply again would be decreased in number of
items and also lightened, as V. D. Hanson argues was a
trend starting as early 6th or 7th century B.C.7 Because
there was no ‘general issue’ equipment at this time each
4 See J. K. Anderson, 1991; A. M. Snodgrass, 1965; A. M. Snodgrass, 1967; V. D. Hanson, 1991; H. van Wees, 2004 for main views in this debate.5 From which the hoplite took its name according to F. E. Adcock, 1957;A. M. Snodgrass, 1967. For opposing view on this topic see J. F. Lazenby and D. Whitehead, 19966 V. D. Hanson, 2000, p. 56-577 V. D. Hanson, 2000, p. 57
12
man had to equip himself, it was therefore a variety in
arms and armour8. We also know from Herodotus that “the
Persians used neither spear nor shield and were easy to
beat”9, implying that the Greeks did use spear and shield
and thus had an advantage. We cannot however be absolutely
certain of how the hoplite infantry were equipped at the
battle of Marathon, but assume that they were equipped
with a spear, a shield, helmet, grieves and a breastplate.
The reason why the hoplite panoply is of importance is
that it very much determines its function and role on the
battlefield. Because of the weight of the panoply and the
fact that the hoplites need to stay close in order for the
phalanx to be functional, the unit was very immobile. That
is not to say that they could not run though, as we know
from Herodotus, the Athenians charged into the Persian at
a run10. What becomes clear is that it was the phalanx
infantry’s role to attack the enemy, which Herodotus says
would happen at speed. As we shall see in later chapters,
with the more extensive use of quicker units, the phalanx
infantry unit would no longer be the attacking unit, for 8 V. D. Hanson, 2000, p. 589 Herodotus, Histories 5.9710 Herodotus, Histories 6.112
13
that it was too slow. However, as soon as the hoplite
infantry had made their charge, it would be difficult to
move any other way than forwards. In this chapter, we will
see what happened at Marathon, Thermopylae and Platea and
see what the role of the phalanx infantry was at those
battles.
In 490 B.C. a united Greek army of 9000 Athenians and 1000
Plataeans fought and defeated a Persian army of unknown
size11 in perhaps one of the most famous battles in world
history. The Persian army was at least twice as big as the
Greek army and it was also more flexible and well
balanced, bearing in mind that it was in fact supported by
both missile troops and cavalry. As we know from
Herodotus12, the Greek force had no support from either
cavalry or archers, meaning that the Greek force fought
with only infantry. Outnumbered and unbalanced, the Greeks
lined up their infantry, weakening the centre, so that
11 Herodotus does not give an exact number of neither the Greek or Persian army, but according to Plutarch, Moralia 305 b and Pausanias, Description of Greece 10.20.2 we can accept the number of Greek soldiers. The size of the Persian army is much more difficult to establish because of the variety in our ancient sources, ranging from 200 000 to600 000. Modern scholars however agree on a number between 25 000 and 100 000 infantry and perhaps a 1000 cavalry, see P. Green, 1996; T. Holland, 2005 12 Herodotus, Histories 6.112
14
they could cover the whole Persian front13. As the battle
went on, two things became clear. Firstly, the Greek wings
fought of the Persian cavalry with ease, which enabled
them to encircle the Persian infantry who almost broke
through the Athenians’ centre14. Secondly, the primary
advantage the Persians had with a more balanced army was
wasted due to the strong Greek infantry. V. D. Hanson
argues that it was the superiority of the Greek arms and
armour that defeated the Persians at Marathon15. He also
argues that the relative strength of the armies were not
so important16, which is something I agree on, bearing in
mind that it was a fairly narrow battlefield, as we can
see on figure 117.
The battle of Marathon then shows two important aspects of
the early phalanx infantry. Firstly, when there are no
vulnerable flanks to worry about and the battlefield is
plain, the phalanx infantry is good on its own. The Greeks
fought off a much larger and much more well-balanced army,
13 Herodotus, Histories 6.11114 Herodotus, Histories 6.113-11415 V. D. Hanson, 2000, p. 5616 V. D. Hanson, 2000, p. 2317 See P. Krentz, 2010, p. 111-117 for further analysis of the geography of Marathon.
15
arguably much due to the topography of the area and also
because of its superiority in arms and armour. Persian
missile troops seem also to have been ineffective against
the Greek hoplites, as J. K. Anderson argues18, much due to
the strength of the hoplon. However, as we shall see in
chapter 2 when discussing an Athenian campaign in Aetolia
in 426 B.C., hoplite infantry was indeed vulnerable to
missiles, even though that was under different
circumstances. Secondly, this battle also shows the
vulnerability of the phalanx infantry on plain ground, had
the battlefield been wider. Herodotus told us that the
line had to be stretched out in order to cover the entire
Persian line. Had the Greek generals not done this, the
Persian cavalry would certainly have been able to go
around the phalanx infantry and threaten its flanks. This
is something that will become more evident in later
battles where the battlefields are much more specious,
which I will be showing in later chapters.
The choice of battlefield is however important to discuss
in terms of the phalanx infantry’s role. The Greeks would
18 J. K. Anderson, 1991, p. 21
16
probably have known about the weaknesses of the phalanx
infantry, thus it was important for them to choose an
appropriate battlefield to fight the battle. This then
would mean that the role of the phalanx infantry was very
much determined by the terrain, and when the terrain was
unfavourable for the phalanx infantry it also hindered the
unit to perform its role. At Marathon, the Greeks did in
fact choose where the battle was to be fought, as becomes
clear because Herodotus tells us that the Athenians waited
10 days before attacking the Persians19. Ten days would
have been more than enough time to change the location of
both the Greek and Persian camp, it is therefore clear
that the Greeks were happy with the battlefield. The
phalanx infantry then could fulfil its role without
hinders from a poorly chosen battlefield. However, in
later battles, the generals could not always choose the
best battlefield for its phalanx infantry, so it was clear
that it would need support from other units, but this is
something I will come back to in greater detail in later
chapters.
19 Herodotus, Histories 6.109-111
17
For the battle of Thermopylae in 480 B.C. the role of the
phalanx infantry was quite clear, which was to hold of the
Persian army for as long as possible20. It had yet again
the attacking role, much because it was the only unit in
the army, but also a defensive role as we shall now see.
Herodotus tells us that the pass was a merely 50 feet
wide21, which means that the use of phalanx infantry would
be excellent in terms of holding an attacker at a
distance. Also, it meant that cavalry was useless, but it
also meant that missile troops would have a good
opportunity to fire at the standing phalanx infantry.
Herodotus further informs us that according to his
estimate, the Persians forces would add up to about 5 283
220 men22. This number is as usual for ancient authors
exaggerated to the extremes and it is of course impossible
to know for sure how many men there were in the Persian
force, but modern estimates suggest somewhere between 70
000 and 1 000 000 men23. At any rate, again the Persian
forces highly outnumbered the Greek forces which Herodotus
20 Herodotus, Histories 7.175; Diodorus Siculus, Library 11.4.121 Herodotus, Histories 7.17622 Herodotus, Histories 7.18623 T. Holland, 2005, p. 394 for the suggestion of 70 000 – 300 000. SeeJ. Lazenby, 1993, p. 90-96 for other suggestions.
18
tells us numbered approximately 5200 soldiers in total24,
but which according to Diodorus only totalled to 4300
soldiers25 (1000 Lacedaemonians, 300 Spartiates and 3000
other Greeks). Even though the ancient sources differ,
they do not differ much and both seem like plausible
numbers.
The fighting went on for three days, with the Greek
phalanx infantry standing their ground without any support
from cavalry or missile troops, but as is commonly known,
they were at the end betrayed and lost the battle. The
role of the phalanx infantry then was clear at the battle
of Thermopylae; it was to be the army. No other units were
there to support the phalanx infantry, but then again,
because of the topography and the narrow passage the Greek
forces were placed in, it probably did not need any
support either26. However, we will see in the next chapters
that the phalanx infantry would be more and more a unit
within the army, working together with other units,
creating balance and flexibility. At Marathon and
24 Herodotus, Histories 7.202-20325 Diodorus Siculus, Library 11.4.2, 11.4.526 Because the Greek phalanx infantry had no flanks, they needed no support from cavalry or missile troops.
19
Thermopylae however the phalanx infantry truly was the
army, both offensively and defensively.
At the battle of Platea we will see that, even though
supported by auxiliary units, it was the phalanx infantry
that had the most important part on the battlefield. In
479 B.C., only a year or so after the battle of
Thermopylae, the Greeks and the Persians met again, for
what would be one of the last and decisive battles of the
Persian War. The Greeks came again with a united force,
which according to Herodotus counted 110 000 men strong,
from which 69 500 were auxiliaries27. Herodotus mentions no
cavalry, so we must assume that the Greek forces were not
supported at this battle either. However, there is some
dispute about the number of Greeks Herodotus accounts for
and modern scholars tend to agree on a number much closer
to 70 000 – 80 000, with half of those being hoplites and
the other half auxiliaries, which would then number one
auxiliary per hoplite28. Even though the Greeks assembled a
high number of auxiliaries to this battle, both J. Lazenby
and T. Holland considers their contribution close to
27 Herodotus, Histories 9.3028 J. Lazenby, 1993, p. 227-228; T. Holland, 2005, p. 400 (note 48)
20
nothing and that the outcome would have been the same
without them29. At this battle the Greeks fought a smaller
Persian army, which Herodotus numbers around 300 000 men
strong, with an unknown number of cavalry, since Herodotus
puts them in a separate unit30. Again the numbers are
debated and modern scholarship has mostly agreed on the
number being closer to 70 000 – 120 000 men, with 10 000
cavalry31.
The battle went on for many days in 3 different phases,
where in one phase the Persian cavalry harassed the
Greeks, but not by attacking the Greek phalanx infantry,
but rather the Greek supplies coming from the
Peloponnese32. The reason why the battle went on for so
long and no big scale attack was started before it did was
two sided; firstly, because the Greeks did not want to
give up their good position, which would leave them
vulnerable for attacks against the flanks. Secondly, it
went on for so long because the Persian did not want to
attack a well-defended position. J. Lazenby sees this as
29 J. Lazenby, 1993, p. 227-228; T. Holland, 2005, p. 400 (note 48)30 Herodotus, Histories 9.3231 J. Lazenby, 1993, p. 227-228; T. Holland, 2005, p. 40032 Herodotus, Histories 9.39-40
21
odd, because both sides had appeared as wanting to fight33.
I would argue that this shows the respect the Persians had
for the Greek phalanx infantry and that the phalanx
infantry played its role very well, as a strong unit it
held a good, defensive area which the opposition sooner or
later had to attack. The Persians too held a strong,
defensive position which they too did not want to give up.
At the end however, the two sides met and Herodotus tells
us that less than 3000 Persians survived34. The battle of
Platea shows the importance of the phalanx infantry as a
unit in the Greek army and it also clearly shows the role
the phalanx infantry had at that time. This was to hold of
the opposing army until the timing was right and then
strike. In later chapters we will see that the phalanx
infantry played much the same role, but where other units
would prove just as, or even more, important as the
phalanx infantry.
There is also another aspect which the phalanx infantry of
all three of these battles had in common and that is the
style in which they fought. This is important to the role
33 J. Lazenby, 1993, p. 22834 Herodotus, Histories 9.70
22
of the phalanx infantry because it basically determines
how it functions on the battlefields and also defines its
limitations and capabilities. There has been much
discussion over the past years on how the hoplite infantry
fought and how ancient sources describe it. R. Luginbill
argues that it was othismos, or shoving, which helped the
phalanx infantry of the classical period the successful
military machine it was35. In our ancient sources we can
find evidence for this at both Marathon and Thermopylae36.
However, in Herodotus account of Platea, othismos is only
used in the final stage of the battle37. H. van Wees makes
a counter argument to this theory, stating that the
ancient sources, which we have, makes it clear that the
front ranks would have had room to move about, without
being crushed from the ‘pushing’ by the ranks further back
in the unit38. It is unclear then how the phalanx infantry
fought at the battles of Marathon, Thermopylae and Platea,
but what is clear is that the role of the phalanx infantry
at this time was very much determined by its own abilities
35 R. Luginbill, 1994, p. 6136 Herodotus, Histories 6.111-113, 7.22537 Herodotus, Histories 9.6238 H. van Wees, 2004, p. 189
23
and limitations. For the role of the phalanx infantry in
the early 5th century this tactic meant that it had to be a
moving unit in order to ‘push’ its enemy to death, if
indeed othismos was a part of how the phalanx infantry
fought at this time. However, I will show in chapter 3
that this role had changed completely.
Unfortunately, the period between 479 B.C. and 431 B.C. is
poorly attested by existing ancient sources, so this time
period will not be discussed in any detail in this chapter
or later in this paper. However, between 490 B.C. and 479
B.C., the role of the phalanx infantry was pretty much the
same throughout, which was to hold the enemy to a fixed
position on the battlefield, preferably in an area where
the phalanx could not be outflanked and slowly kill the
enemy’s units. As we have seen in this chapter, this was
true for all three major battles in this time period, but
as we shall now see in chapter 2, the role of the phalanx
infantry would slightly change. Other units will rise in
importance and the phalanx infantry will be challenged in
terms of being the leading unit of the army. We will also
see that the phalanx infantry will be forced out of its
24
comfort zone, thus enabling other units to get an
advantage over the phalanx infantry on the battlefield,
which will in turn reveal the phalanx infantry’s biggest
weaknesses.
Chapter 2 – From the Peloponnesian War to Philip II of Macedon
During the so called Second Peloponnesian War (431 – 404
B.C.) and the period after that leading up to the rule of
Philip II of Macedon beginning in 359 B.C. there was
definitely not a shortage of battles. There were too many
in fact to go into deep analysis of all of them, so I will
focus my analysis to some of the major battles in this
period and supplement with information from minor battles
where I find it necessary. What I will show in this
chapter is how the role of the phalanx infantry changed
from what I have described in chapter 1 and how the
25
phalanx infantry’s importance within the army changed
compared to other units. These aspects will lead to the
final change which will be discussed in chapter 3.
The siege of Platea (429-427 B.C.) went on for such a long
time and was not really a battle fought on a battlefield
with two sides facing each other; I will therefore begin
my examination with a battle near Delion in 424 B.C. Here
a Boeotian army fought an Athenian army, which according
to Thucydides were fairly equal in size in terms of
hoplites39. At the end, the Athenians turned and fled40, but
the outcome is not what I will be focusing on, but rather
how the battle was fought, which units were significant
and most importantly, the role of the phalanx infantry in
each of the two armies. The first thing to notice is how
the units have changed in terms of numbers from what we
saw in chapter 1. Thucydides tells us that the Boeotians,
mustered 7000 hoplites, 10 000 light-armed troops, 1000
cavalry and 500 peltasts (missile units)41, and that the
Athenians mustered the same number of hoplites, but no
39 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.93-9440 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.9641 See J. Best, 1969 for further discussion on the peltasts, especiallyThracian peltasts.
26
light-armed troops or cavalry42. The Athenians then came
with a force very much like what we have seen in chapter
1, basing its army purely on phalanx infantry. The
Boeotians however had a much more balanced force, with
cavalry and light-armed troops on the wings, as would
become usual in later periods. According to Thucydides
this would turn out to be fatal for the Athenians, for
when the Boeotian cavalry came around a hill on the
battlefield, threatening the Athenian wing43. With the
Thebans winning against the Athenians on the right wing
and the Boeotian cavalry threatening the left wing, the
Athenians fled.
J. Lazenby argues that this is a good example of one of
the principal roles classical cavalry could have44, which
is also something I will emphasis further in this chapter
and especially in chapter 3. In this battle we saw that it
was the cavalry which made a big difference and
practically decided the battle in the end. The role the
42 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.93-94. Thucydides does mention that the Athenians greatly outnumbered the Boeotians, but that most of the Athenians had come unarmed. He also mentions that the Athenians left 300 cavalry at Delion, but these would again be no match for the 1000 strong Boeotian cavalry anyway. 43 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.9644 J. Lazenby, 2004, p. 90
27
phalanx infantry played which we looked at in chapter 1
was easily beaten by the appearance of cavalry units in
fairly open terrain. The open terrain enabled the cavalry
to threaten the phalanx infantry from the flanks, because
the phalanx infantry was unprotected. Therefore the
phalanx infantry could no longer fight an opposing army
all by itself on open terrain at least and it needed
support. This unit was also vulnerable to missile troops,
as we shall see in the next paragraph. In turn that means
that a well-balanced army of infantry, cavalry and missile
troops would on an open battlefield have a big advantage
over an army based on purely phalanx infantry. This meant
that the role of the phalanx infantry within the army had
to be changed and that it had to be supported by other
units as well.
In the year before, at the battle of Sphakteria in 425
B.C. it was the Spartans who suffered a loss, much due to
insufficient support from light-armed troops and cavalry.
This was perhaps the moment that led to the first ever
raising of cavalry and archers by Sparta45, which according
45 J. Lazenby, 2004, p. 84
28
to Thucydides, was due to their understanding of facing a
new type of warfare46. However, the battle I am referring
to and which I will discuss in some detail now, is the
Athenian attack on Sphakteria. Here the Spartan hoplite
infantry was crushed by a mix of Athenian hoplites, fixed
at one position and unwilling to move (much like the old
fashion role of the phalanx infantry discussed in chapter
1), and Athenian archers and peltasts. Thucydides tells us
that the Athenians mustered 800 archers and 800 peltasts
for this battle, which all were divided into contingents
of 200, so that the Spartans could never attack all the
missile troops at ones47. The Athenian phalanx infantry was
stationed at a fixed point, as already mentioned, which
was the role of the phalanx infantry at this battle. What
is clear is that the Athenian phalanx infantry assumed a
fairly different role at this battle than what I described
in chapter 1, even though they did pretty much the same
thing. The major difference is of course the support of
the missile troops, which this time proved to be the
46 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.5547 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.32
29
difference between an Athenian victory and a Spartan
victory.
Both at Delion and at Sphakteria either the one or the
other army had only hoplites armed and ready at the
battlefield. I will now look closer at a battle in which
both armies were supported by auxiliary troops and by
cavalry, which will truly show that the role of the
phalanx infantry has indeed changed from Marathon and to
this point in time. The battle I am examining next is the
battle of Mantinea in 418 B.C. where a Spartan army with
its allies met an Argive army accompanied by some Athenian
troops and Mantineans. Thucydides tells us that the
Spartans and its allies lined up their troops as usual and
with cavalry covering both wings48, which would give the
army as a whole more flexibility and manoeuvrability
compared to just a line of phalanx infantry. Thucydides
does not give an exact number for neither side at this
battle49, but from an earlier passage we know that the
Athenians brought with them at least 300 cavalry50, which
48 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.6749 See J. Lazenby, 2004, p. 121-122 for a fuller discussion on the strength of the two armies.50 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.61
30
Thucydides also makes a point of when describing the end
of the battle where the Athenians would have suffered
greater losses had it not been for the good work done by
their cavalry51. We must assume that because Thucydides
does not mention any other cavalry units in the
Argive/Athenian force, that there in fact was no cavalry
covering their right flank52. The Argive/Athenian forces
were probably slightly smaller than the Spartan force,
without knowing exactly how large the Spartan force was53.
As the battle went on, the Argive line broke at two
places54 and even though they managed to rout the Spartan
left wing, it ended in catastrophe for the Argives and its
allies.
What is interesting though, is exactly how Thucydides
emphasises that the Athenians would have suffered more
extensive losses, had it not been for the cavalry and the
protection that unit gave to the flank of the phalanx
infantry. Thucydides noted earlier that the Spartan line
outflanked the Argive/Athenian line by quite a bit, which
51 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.7352 J. Lazenby, 2004, p. 12153 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 554 See J. Lazenby, 2004, p. 124 for figures on the Spartan manoeuvres and the break of lines.
31
without the cavalry surely would have resulted in greater
losses. The Spartan cavalry is unfortunately not mentioned
after the opening sequence of the battle, which I can only
assume is due to it not being in use in this battle. For
the role of the phalanx infantry then this battle is two-
sided. On the Argive/Athenian side the role was much the
same as earlier, only that it needed cavalry support in
order not to be outflanked completely and at the end not
totally annihilated. On the Spartan side, the role of the
phalanx infantry was fairly unchanged from what we saw in
chapter 1, which I assume was due to the infantry on the
Spartan side being better and more professional than on
the Argive/Athenian side. I make this assumption based on
two things; firstly, Thucydides mentions the Spartan army
marching in a rhythmical step when advancing55, which can
be seen as a sign of increased professional training.
Secondly, because Thucydides accuses two officers in the
Spartan left wing of being unprofessional after not
obeying the Spartan king’s order56, thus assuming that the
Spartans fighting on the Spartan right wing would have
55 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.7056 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.71-72
32
been professional and it was also these units that fought
off the entire Argive/Athenian army at the end.
We have already seen how the phalanx infantry at this
point in history began to need support from cavalry and
other supporting units, in order to perform their role on
the battlefield. In the next battle I will examine, we
shall see the Syracusan cavalry not supporting the
Syracusan infantry in winning, but rather in not losing
more men than they already had. This had the same effect
as the Athenian cavalry had at the battle of Mantinea only
three years earlier. The battle in which I will look at is
a battle between a Syracusan army and an Athenian/Argive
army on Sicily in 415 B.C. Thucydides tells us that the
two lines of hoplite infantry faced each other, with
missile infantry on both sides, which would be firing
their missiles before the main battle begun57. Eventually
the hoplite infantry would clash, which at the end led to
a break in the Syracusan line, however, the Athenians did
not dear to pursue the fleeing Syracusans because they
were afraid of the numerous Syracusan cavalry58. The first 57 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 6.67-6958 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 6.70. Thucydides also mentions the threat the Syracusan cavalry was to the Athenians in earlier passages
33
thing to notice is that because both sides were supported
by missile troops, neither side could really put any
pressure in the enemy’s phalanx infantry, as at the battle
of Sphakteria, due to the fact that both sides’ missile
troops would just fight each other. The second thing to
notice is that for some reason the Syracusans did not use
their cavalry in the main battle, allowing the
Athenian/Argive army to basically do whatever they wanted.
On the other hand, this again allowed the Syracusans to
save themselves in the retreat and we can only speculate
whether or not this was the idea in the first place. At
any rate, because both sides were in fact supported by
auxiliary troops, the role of the phalanx infantry was
pretty much the same as it was in earlier battles in this
period.
To this point we have not seen any concluding evidence
that the role of the phalanx infantry changed from the
battle of Marathon to the end of the 5th century B.C., even
though some tendencies have been shown. The traditional
role of the phalanx infantry which was to attack or defend
(6.66-67), clearly emphasising the vulnerability the hoplite phalanx had to cavalry units.
34
a fixed position on the battlefield has however been
challenged by the use of missile troops and cavalry,
forcing the phalanx infantry to alter their role. It is
important at all times to bear in mind that the phalanx
infantry was still the main body of the army and the
infantry was also usually the main body of the opposing
army, so that it was still the phalanx infantry who would
stand for most of the killing. However, as we have seen so
far, the tendency has been that the phalanx infantry could
not have performed this role as well as it has without the
support of other units, which is also what we will see in
chapter 3. The battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. is another
step towards what I will show in chapter 3, where the
phalanx infantry truly are in need of support from other
units in order to perform their role.
As I have now moved away from the Peloponnesian War I have
also moved one step closer to the concluding changes that
we will see to the role of the phalanx infantry. At
Leuctra in 371 B.C. a Theban army fought a Spartan army,
both supported by cavalry, but interestingly enough,
Xenophon tells us that even before the battle had even
35
begun, the cavalry from each side started fighting each
other5960. The Theban cavalry, which according to Xenophon
was in better shape and training, beat the Spartan
cavalry. Interestingly though, the Spartans, and
assumingly also the Thebans, deployed their cavalry in
front of the hoplite phalanx instead of stationing them at
each flank61. This is something that V. Hanson argues is
evidence for poor deployment from the Spartans, allowing
the Thebans to skilfully react to this poor choice of
deployment62. What happened to the cavalry units after the
initial fighting we can only speculate, but at least it
shows willingness from the Thebans to use specialized
cavalry units in battle, opposed to the Spartan untrained
and poorly skilled cavalry, and this is something that in
chapter 3 will become very important.
However, moving back to the infantry units, the Spartans
were lined up as usual in an eight – twelve man rank deep
line, but the Thebans had a fifty man deep line on their
59 Xenophon, A History of My Times 6.4.1360 See figure 2 for a suggestion of how the different moves planned out.61 Xenophon, A History of My Times 6.4.10-1262 V. Hanson, 1988, p. 196
36
left wing, threatening the Spartan king63. V. Hanson argues
that this tactical move was not novel and also did not
give any tactical advantages64. In terms of that the
tactical manoeuvre was not original I agree with V.
Hanson, but I believe that the sources we have indicate
that the fifty shields deep rank definitely gave the
Thebans a tactical advantage. This tactical manoeuvre was
also arguably a defensive one, which would allow the
Thebans to stand their ground with breaking the lines for
a longer time than the Spartan phalanx. As Xenophon tells
us, at the beginning the Spartan line held its ground and
was even having the better of the Thebans, but in the end
the Theban masses was just too much to handle for the
eight to twelve man deep ranks of the Spartan infantry65.
The evidence clearly point to a tactical advantage for the
Thebans in this case, which due to its masses were able to
break the Spartan left wing.
Even though it is not mentioned specifically by Xenophon,
this was the first time the Theban Sacred Band66 would
63 Xenophon, A History of My Time 6.4.1264 V. Hanson, 1988, p. 19965 Xenophon, A History of My Times 6.4.13-1466 A special infantry unit, armed as hoplites. What made this unit special was that it was made up of 150 pairs of homosexual men, each
37
prove decisive in a battle67 and as G. Shrimpton argues,
gain credit for68, which leads me to an aspect which
arguably was first properly introduced at this battle,
namely the use of special forces. Of course, we have
already heard of chosen Argives in Thucydides and the
Knights of Sparta69, but the Theban Sacred Band would be
the first to have a real influence on history. Ironically
enough, they would be annihilated by the very man who
would become an expert on using special forces in his
army, namely Alexander. The role of the phalanx infantry
was pretty much the same at this battle as it was during
the Peloponnesian War, but the inclusion of the Theban
Sacred Band would create extra strength to wherever they
were, much due to their extreme skills and bravery. It
also showed a willingness to use the phalanx infantry in a
more defensive role and even alter regular formations in
order to do so. The role of the phalanx infantry then was
to be more an ordinary infantry unit, which is not at all
pair fighting for each other. 67 Plutarch, Pelopidas 23.468 G. Shrimpton, 1971, p. 31469 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.72-73
38
the same as it was at Marathon where it was the unit of the
army.
We have seen in this chapter that the role of the phalanx
infantry changed somewhat from how it used to be at the
battle of Marathon, Thermopylae and Platea. V. Hanson
correctly argues that it was not a revolutionary change
that happened at Leuctra in 371 B.C. in terms of how the
phalanx infantry fought, but rather a slow
transformation70, which I too have shown in this and the
previous chapter. The phalanx infantry unit went from
usually being the only unit in the army, to being a part
of the army, often relying on supporting units in order to
perform its intended role. The fighting style also
changed; from what was probably a ‘pushing’ and ‘shoving’
fight, into being more a fight of arms, which will be
especially evident in the next chapter. Of course, the
main body of the army was still the phalanx infantry and
it was still this unit that stood for most of the killing,
but it would not have been able to do so without the
support of other units, such as missile troops and
70 V. Hanson, 1988, p. 207
39
cavalry. At the end of this chapter we saw the
introduction of the Theban Sacred Band and the impact
special forces can have on the battlefield. As we move to
the third and final chapter of this paper we shall see
that this very unit will be totally annihilated by no
other than Alexander and that even with a cavalry unit.
The role of the phalanx infantry would see dramatic
changes under Philip II and Alexander, which is what I
will now discuss.
Chapter 3 – Philip II and Alexander the Great
40
In chapter 2 we looked at some minor changes to the role
of the phalanx infantry, basically only tendencies of what
was to come, however it was still changes from the role it
had at the battle of Marathon. We saw that the phalanx
infantry were more and more relying on the support of
other units, either in order to attack or in order to
defend themselves. We have also seen that the phalanx
infantry was being challenged for the role as being the
offensive unit, by other units such as the cavalry showing
their capabilities for this role. This is something we
will so more often in this chapter. At the end of chapter
2 we looked at the introduction of one of the most eminent
special forces in antiquity, namely the Theban Sacred
Band. I therefore see it appropriate to begin this chapter
with an analysis of the battle that would be the end of
this magnificent infantry unit. However, before I can move
on to any detailed analysis I again feel it necessary to
discuss some of the equipment changes that Philip II of
Macedon made. I will look particularly at the introduction
of the sarissa and the decreased shield size, which is
41
basically why the phalanx infantry in this period can no
longer be called hoplites.
The hoplite infantry described in chapter 1 and 2 used
what is known as a dory or thrusting spear, as its main
weapon of choice. The dory was a 3 metre long spear,
weighing approximately 1 to 2 kg71. The sarissa however,
which Philip II at least introduced to the cavalry units
at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C., possibly later for
the infantry72, was according to M. Markle between 4.5 and
5.5 metres long73. Because the sarissa was much harder to
handle, soldiers had to use both hands in order to be able
to control it, therefore the shield could no longer be of
the same size as it had been before and was now reduced to
a 60 centimetre shield74. It also meant that the phalanx
infantry unit would become even more inflexible and less
manoeuvrable, thus require even more support from other
units75, which is something I will come back to in further
detail later in this chapter. The decrease in
manoeuvrability and flexibility also emphasises the role
71 M. Markle, 1977, p. 33172 See M. Markle, 1978 for further analysis on this topic.73 M. Markle, 1977, p. 32374 M. Markle, 1977, p. 33175 M. Markle, 1977, p. 329, 331
42
in which the phalanx infantry would now take, namely the
more defensive role. As it could no longer move at a full
run, as at Marathon, the infantry had clearly no longer
the attacking role in the army. M. Markle also argues that
except from the change in spear and shield, the Macedonian
infantry continued to use the rest of the hoplite
panoply76. Nevertheless, as we can see from figure 3, the
sarissa gave the phalanx infantry an advantage in terms of
the distance it could hold the enemy off at, compared to
the earlier hoplite phalanx. The increased immobility of
the phalanx infantry together with the advantage it gained
in terms of holding the enemy at a distance is what we
will see in this chapter really changed the role of the
phalanx infantry in this period.
As mentioned above, M. Markle argues that there is no
proof for any use of sarissa before the battle of Chaeronea
in 338 B.C77., which is the battle I shall begin my
examination with, since it is much due to the sarissa that 76 M. Markle, 1978, p. 48377 The battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C. could have been discussed in much greater length, as it is a very interesting battle with many new and changing elements, but for the sake of my argument I will only discuss this battle in terms of the changing role of the phalanx infantry. This also allows me to spend more time discussing the battleof Gaugamela (331 B.C.) and Hydaspes (326 B.C.) where the change of the role of the phalanx infantry really becomes evident.
43
the role of the phalanx infantry change so much in this
period. However, the phalanx infantry had at this time
probably not been equipped with sarissae yet7879, thus it
would be only the cavalry units that had this weapon. Even
so, I will still be looking closely at the role of the
phalanx infantry at this battle which we shall see had
already changed quite a bit from the battle of Leuctra in
371 B.C. For descriptions of this battle we must rely on
Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus and Polyaenus, which are
arguably all a part of the vulgate tradition. We are told
that the Macedonian army consisted of 30 000 infantry and
2000 cavalry80, but the relative strength of the
Theban/Athenian army was unknown. Nonetheless, Plutarch
tells us that the famous Theban Sacred Band was present,
but was utterly crushed by Alexander and the Macedonian
left wing.81 We are also told that the sham retreat, which
Philip II had ordered to lure the enemy into a trap, was
possible because the Macedonian infantry could hide behind
their shields82. This further proves that the sarissa was not
78 M. Markle, 1978, p. 48879 See P. Rahe, 1981 for a contradictory view.80 Diodorus, Library 16.85.581 Plutarch, Life of Alexander 9.2; Diodorus, Library 16.86.382 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.2
44
yet a part of the phalanx infantry’s equipment because of
the immobility the use of the sarissa gave the phalanx
infantry.
What is interesting with this battle though is that the
infantry was no longer used to hold a fixed position on
the battlefield, but rather play the role as bait, which
would allow the Macedonian cavalry to break the lines of
the united Greek forces. This further proves that the
sarissa was not yet in use, because M. Markle argues that
this manoeuvre would not have been possible with the sarissa
as the Macedonian weapon of choice83. However, the role as
bait would soon change back to holding a fixed position,
as we will see in the next battles which I will analyse.
The role of the phalanx infantry changed though, because
in the battle of Chaeronea it was no longer the unit that
decided the battle, as we have seen it to be in so many
earlier battles. Instead, the cavalry would prove to be
the battle winning unit, first breaking the enemy’s line
on the Macedonian left, then again on the Macedonian
right. P. Rahe however argues against this, saying that it
83 M. Markle, 1978, p. 488
45
was highly unlikely that the Macedonian cavalry played any
decisive role in this battle84. Having looked at the
ancient sources that we have, no matter how scanty they
might be, I would argue that it was in fact the cavalry
that proved decisive at Chaeronea. After all, there is not
much else to base our understanding of this battle other
than the ancient sources we have access to. What this
battle in fact shows is how cavalry units was going to be
used under Alexander the Great, which was as an active
unit, more often than not attacking the enemy’s infantry.
As I will show in the next two battles, the role of the
infantry will be to hold the enemy’s infantry at a point
which would be favourable for the Macedonian cavalry, so
that the cavalry unit could in fact be the battle winning
unit.
Before I start discussing the battle of Gaugamela in 331
B.C., I must emphasise that this battle was what is known
as a ‘dust-battle’, which is why we cannot know for sure
exactly what happened. The descriptions which I base my
argument on is thus mostly based on the preliminary
84 P. Rahe, 1981, p. 87
46
tactics done before the battle and also what we know from
eye-witness accounts, which may have been used as a source
in one or more of these descriptions. At the battle of
Gaugamela, Arrian tells us that the Persians mustered an
army of 1 000 000 infantry, 40 000 cavalry, 200 scythed-
chariots and some elephants85, whereas Curtius is probably
more reasonable and accounts for 200 000 infantry and 45
000 cavalry86. Modern scholarship however have estimated
the Persian forces to be less than 200 000 infantry and
some 34 000 cavalry87. Alexander’s force was inferior to
the Persians in terms of numbers88 and Arrian suggest the
total strength was 40 000 infantry and 7000 cavalry89.
Curtius notes that Alexander had deployed a large number
of cavalry on each wing90, so that the Persians could not
encircle the Macedonian infantry91. What Curtius is
actually saying here is that the infantry needed support
85 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 3.886 Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 4.12.1287 W. Heckel, notes to book 4, note 80, p. 279 in Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander88 Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 4.13.3089 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 3.1390 There must be said that there was of course several different cavalry units present in Alexander’s army, see N. Hammond, 1998; P. Brunt, 1963 for further discussion on this topic. For the sake of my argument I will generalize a fair bit and talk about cavalry as a unitwithin the army, rather than each specific unit. 91 Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 4.13.29
47
by the cavalry, which it of course had at this time. When
comparing this battle to the battle of Marathon, we can
see that the phalanx infantry no longer functioned on its
own, thus its role also changed.
When the battle begun, both Alexander and Darius tilted
their lines, as seen on figure 4, and Darius attacked the
Macedonian infantry with his chariot units. At first this
attack created havoc, but the infantry soon dealt with the
chariots92, arguably much because of the sarissa, which
allowed the infantry to stand at a distance from the
charging chariots. Then, as Alexander and his chosen
cavalry unit rode towards the right on the battlefield,
trying to find a gap in the Persian line (in order to kill
Darius), the two main bodies of infantry clashed together.
Alexander had also stationed his hypaspists unit93 on the
right side of his phalanx infantry, possibly to cover for
the threat by the Persian cavalry94, which Alexander would
leave only with a smaller cavalry unit as soon as he
charged for the break in the Persian line. The Macedonian
92 Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 4.15.1-493 A infantry unit which was not armed with a sarissa and was much more mobile than the Foot Companions, according to M. Markle, 1977, p. 32994 M. Markle, 1977, p. 329
48
left wing, which was led by Parmenion, was in great
trouble and Curtius tells us that they were saved partly
because the Persians lost fate after Darius fled, but
partly also because the Thessalian cavalry came to their
rescue95. Again we can see that the traditional role of the
phalanx infantry, which we saw in chapter 1, was changing.
The role of the phalanx infantry at the battle of
Gaugamela seemed to be only to keep the Persians occupied
long enough, so that Alexander and his specialist cavalry
unit would have enough time to either kill or rout Darius.
However, as argued by A. Devine, the phalanx infantry and
the cavalry never deprived itself of close support from
each other96, which further emphasises the notion of being
parts of a well-balanced army. Another note I believe
emphasises the changing role of the phalanx infantry was
that the general, here Alexander, was mounted and leading
the attack, whereas in earlier battles it was the infantry
that led the attack. We shall see later that Alexander
even thought that he could win battles with only cavalry,
which would leave the infantry with no role at all.
95 Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 4.16.4-596 A. Devine, 1975, p. 384
49
The last battle I will analyse in depth is the battle of
Hydaspes in 326 B.C. I will not pay much attention to the
crossing of the river, but focus more on the actual
battle. Up to this point I have been looking at battles
where the phalanx infantry have usually far outnumbered
the cavalry. At the battle of Hydaspes however fought
between Alexander and an Indian king named Porus, Arrian
tells us that the Macedonian infantry present counted only
6000 strong and that the cavalry numbered ca. 500097. There
were also archers and javelin-men marching towards the
enemy, which were positioned on each wing of the infantry,
whereas the cavalry, with Alexander of course, were
advancing rapidly98. Arrian further suggest that Alexander
had an idea of attacking Porus’ force only with the
cavalry99. Even though this seems incredible, it suggests
that Alexander now had changed the roles within the army
completely. At Marathon, Thermopylae, Platea and most of
the battles fought during the Peloponnesian War, it was
the infantry which was the attacking unit and that was its
role. What Alexander suggested with this notion was that
97 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 5.1498 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 5.1499 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 5.14
50
it was the cavalry which had the attacking role within his
army. This would make the phalanx infantry the supporting
unit for the cavalry, which will become even more evident
as we analyse this battle further.
Porus’ army numbered, according to Arrian, 30 000
infantry, 4000 cavalry, 300 chariots and 200 elephants100,
but various other sources gives different numbers101,
however in this case the numbers are actually not that
important. We have already seen that Alexander thought he
could defeat Porus’ army with only his cavalry. This was
however not what happened. We shall now see that without
what were in chapter 1 and 2 the supporting units, the
Macedonians would have actually lost the battle. Firstly,
according to Diodorus, the Macedonian cavalry took out the
entire unit of chariots that Porus had deployed102. Then, as
the elephants started to attack the Macedonians, the
phalanx infantry held of the Indian infantry, whilst the
Macedonian missile troops eventually were able to kill the
elephants103. The role of the phalanx infantry was to
100 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 5.15101 See Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 8.13.6, Diodorus Siculus, Library 17.87.2 and Plutarch, Life of Alexander 62.1.102 Diodorus Siculus, Library 17.87.1103 Diodorus Siculus, Library 17.87.2-3
51
support the other troops, by dealing with the Indian
infantry. Arrian notes that Alexander’s mounted troops
(cavalry units) were too much for the Indians104, again just
emphasising that it was now the cavalry which was the
leading unit of the army. However, the cavalry could not
have had the impact they had without the phalanx infantry
being present as well, but what is clear is that the role
of the phalanx infantry changed. Also, as J. Hamilton
argues, one must assume that Arrian was in fact wrong in
his disposition of the Indian cavalry in order for
Alexander to be able to take that unit out all at once105.
Whether we trust our ancient sources or not, it is anyway
clear that the Macedonian cavalry was the attacking force
at this battle.
The role of the phalanx infantry had clearly changed in
164 years, from the battle of Marathon to the battle of
Hydaspes. At Marathon, the role of the phalanx infantry
was to attack the enemy by holding a strong position on
the battlefield, whereas at the battle of Hydaspes the
role of the phalanx infantry was to hold off the enemy
104 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 5.17105 J. Hamilton, 1956, p. 31
52
infantry long enough for the Macedonian cavalry to attack
and rout the enemy army. As argued by C. Armstrong, the
attack by Alexander on the Indian army was truly an
ancient example of blitzkrieg106, which would not be possible
with the phalanx infantry in the role of the attacking
unit. We saw the tendencies of this in chapter 2, where
generals explored the various ways in which they could use
their cavalry unit and their infantry unit differently.
The role of the phalanx infantry started as being the unit
of the army and in 326 B.C. it was a unit in the army,
assisting other units in as a well-oiled killing machine.
The role of the phalanx infantry also changed in this last
period I looked at from being an attacking unit in earlier
battles, into being a defensive unit, supporting the
attacking unit which was now the cavalry.
106 C. Armstrong, 1943, p. 63
53
Conclusion
Greek warfare was arguably at its most powerful during the
campaigns of Alexander (336 – 323 B.C.) and the battle of
Marathon (490 B.C.) was the first of many battles that
laid the foundation for the success of the Macedonian
army. In chapter 1, we saw how the Greeks were able to
hold off a much larger Persian army and even win the
battle at Marathon, much due to its superior arms and
armour. This battle also showed the phalanx infantry as
being an attacking unit, charging into the enemy’s front
lines, which as we have seen would become a rare feature
in Alexander’s army. At Thermopylae 10 years later we saw
much of the same, except that the role of the phalanx
infantry was now to hold a defensive position whilst still
being an attacking unit. It was in fact the only unit
present, which was also true for the battle of Marathon.
This was also a battle the Greeks lost, but not without a
courageous fight. I have also shown how the Greeks fought
the Persians at Platea, where the phalanx infantry was
54
holding a good, defensive position and only started to
fight the Persians when the time was right. Again the
phalanx infantry had an attacking role, but it was
attacking only from a defensive position where it was
secure. In chapter 1 we have seen that the role of the
phalanx infantry was to be the attacking unit of the army,
and on two occasions it was in fact the only unit in the
army. In the time period which I discussed in chapter 2
and 3 this would all change.
In chapter 2 we saw that the phalanx infantry unit became
more and more challenged by the use of other, more
flexible and manoeuvrable units. At the battle of Delion
we saw a Boeotian army lined up in much the same way as
Alexander’s army would almost 100 years later, with
cavalry and light-armed troops on the wings. The threat
which the Boeotian cavalry presented was in fact enough
for the Athenian hoplites to flee. The year before, at the
battle of Sphakteria, Thucydides told us how a unit of
Spartan hoplites were crushed by a mix of Athenian
hoplites and Athenian missile troops. The Athenian hoplite
took up a strong position on the battlefield and held it,
55
which is how the phalanx infantry would function later on,
and the missile troops would harass the Spartan hoplites
every time they would try to attack. One could perhaps go
as far as to say that this was one of the first attempts
at something that looks like blitzkrieg. We have also seen
that at the battle of Mantinea and at a battle on Sicily,
the cavalry played a more important role to the outcome of
the battle and that the phalanx infantry’s role was a more
defensive one. In the last battle I analysed in chapter 2,
the battle of Leuctra, I argued that the phalanx infantry
was now more willing to take up a defensive position,
which was proved by the Theban willingness to alter their
tactics and have a fifty man deep rank against the Spartan
eight man deep rank. In chapter 2 I showed the tendencies
of what was to come in terms of the change in the role of
the phalanx infantry. Other units such as cavalry and
missile troops were challenging the phalanx infantry’s
role and thus it would need to change in order to still be
an effective unit on the battlefield.
The last chapter of this paper described the changes to
the phalanx infantry which arguably begun with Philip II
56
and was further developed by Alexander the Great. I argued
that the phalanx infantry would certainly get an advantage
compared to the traditional hoplite in terms of reach and
ability to hold an enemy at a distance when it was
equipped with the sarissa. I also argued that the phalanx
infantry would now become even less flexible and
manoeuvrable, which would lead to this unit having a much
more defensive role under Alexander. We saw how the
cavalry had taken the role of being the attacking unit at
the battle of Chaeronea, which it would maintain
throughout the campaign of Alexander. The phalanx infantry
had probably not been equipped with the sarissa yet, thus it
could still work as bait, opening the Athenian and Theban
lines. At the battle of Gaugamela this idea was further
enhanced when it became clear that it was the cavalry
which Alexander used as the attacking unit. The phalanx
infantry’s role at this battle was to hold off the enemy’s
infantry, while the cavalry was attacking (in this
instance Darius). This is something we also saw at the
battle of Hydaspes where the infantry was supposed to hold
off the Indian infantry, while the missile troops attacked
57
the elephants and the cavalry took out the Indian cavalry.
The role of the phalanx infantry had been changed into a
much more defensive role and the cavalry had taken the
phalanx infantry’s former role as the attacking unit.
In this dissertation I argue that the role of the phalanx
infantry changed from being an attacking one at the battle
of Marathon, into being a defensive one at the battle of
Hydaspes. I also argue that the phalanx infantry needed
support from other units in order to perform its role,
much due to it being a poorly flexible and manoeuvrable
unit. However, I do not say that the excellence of the
phalanx infantry changed, quite the contrary. What I claim
is that the changing role of the phalanx infantry in fact
improved the Greco-Macedonian army, turning it into a more
balanced and purposeful army.
58
61
Figure 3: A soldiers equipped with a sarissa on the left vs. a hoplite soldier on the right.
Figure 4: Battle of Gaugamela.
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