The Changing Roleof the PhalanxInfantry between490 and 323 B.C.Department of Classics and

Ancient HistoryDurham University

Andreas Kagiavas Torp

2014

1

Abstract

In this dissertation I will argue that the role of the

phalanx infantry changed from having an attacking role at

the battle of Marathon, into having a defensive role at

the battle of Hydaspes. The increased use of other units,

such as cavalry and missile troops, forced the phalanx

infantry to change its role and this change was further

enhanced by the development in equipment. I will also

argue that the role of the phalanx infantry within the

army changed, from practically being the army at Marathon,

into being a part of the army under Alexander the Great. I

also claim that the Greco-Macedonian army was improved due

to this change, largely because it became a more

purposeful army, using its units where they were to best

use.

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Table of ContentsAbstract.......................................................1Introduction...................................................3

Chapter 1 – From Marathon to the Peloponnesian War.............7Chapter 2 – From the Peloponnesian War to Philip II of Macedon15

Chapter 3 – Philip II and Alexander the Great.................24Conclusion....................................................32

Appendix......................................................35Bibliography..................................................38

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Introduction

The Greeks have since the time described in Homer’s Iliad

had a strong infantry which was usually the most important

unit of every Greek army. Over the course of time though,

the infantry changed and instead of using swords as the

primary weapon at the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C., it

started using thrusting spears. That was not the only

change however from the Homeric style of fighting, because

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the infantry at Marathon also fought in something that

much closer resembled the well-known hoplite phalanx, but

this is something I will come back to later. This would

mark the beginning of a much larger change in the infantry

as an army unit. In less than 170 years the phalanx

infantry went from being the unit which Greco-Macedonian

armies was centred around, into being a unit that was

needed as a part of the army. The importance of this unit

changed as well, going from being the single most

important unit of the army, into being one of several

important units. The role of the phalanx infantry changed

dramatically from the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. to

the death of Alexander the Great1 in 323 B.C. which is what

I will argue in this paper. However, before I can go into

any detailed analysis of passages and discussion on this

topic, I need to make clear what I mean with the terms

‘phalanx infantry’ and the ‘role’ of the phalanx infantry.

1 Henceforth referred to only as Alexander.

5

A standard Greek army2, and later the Macedonian army,

would usually consist of several different army units,

such as heavy infantry, light infantry, skirmishers and

cavalry. However, the main portion of a Greco-Macedonian

army would in most instances be the hoplite infantry and

later foot soldiers armed with the sarissa (both of course

usually referred to as heavy infantry). Because this unit

changes in terms of how it fought and what it was equipped

with, I believe that it is more useful to talk about this

unit as ‘phalanx infantry’ rather than ‘hoplite infantry’

and then later ‘Macedonian phalanx’, because both units

fought in a phalanx formation. Therefore, I do not discuss

in this essay the changing role of the hoplite infantry or

the Macedonian phalanx, but rather the heavy infantry

unit, or as I will call it in this paper, the phalanx

infantry.

As to the ‘role’ of the phalanx infantry I do not mean

what its purpose was in terms of politics or indeed any

2 I am aware that the term ‘Greek army’ would perhaps be too broad and generalizing too much because of the many Greek city states that all had their own armies (which was usually raised when needed), but for the sake of the argument which is not intended to discuss one, two or several of these armies in depth, but rather the phalanx infantry as aunit I believe that it is a sound term to use.

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socio-political role, but rather what its role was on the

battlefield. As I will show in the coming chapters, the

phalanx infantry’s role changed in terms of how it was

used on the battlefield and what its purpose was. To see

this clearly I will be discussing examples from several

famous battles ranging from Marathon in 490 B.C. to the

battle of the Hydaspes River in 326 B.C. What I will show

is that the role which the phalanx infantry had around 490

B.C. was an attacking role, but that the tendency

throughout the period in which I am looking at is that the

phalanx infantry would take a more and more defensive

role. The ‘role’ which I will be discussing in this essay

is the role of the phalanx infantry, as an army unit on

the battlefield.

Having defined these slightly vague terms and hopefully

made them clearer, I will now shortly explain the choice

of time period. The battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. is

arguably the starting point of Greek military domination

in not only the Aegean Sea, but also parts of the eastern

Mediterranean. In 478 B.C. Athens formed an alliance with

the Ionians (but not limited to Ionic Greeks) which acted

7

as a counterpart to the Spartans who kept waging war

against the Persians. Eventually though, Athens too

resumed war against the Persians and the longing for more

territory to control ultimately led to the Peloponnesian

War in 431 B.C3. Whilst fighting each other through a

series of alliances, the Greek city states kept their

domination over the Aegean and more so, until Philip II of

Macedon started to conquer territories himself,

threatening the Greek domination. Having annexed most of

the Greek mainland (except Sparta) after the battle of

Chaeronea in 338 B.C., King Philip II now turned his eye

towards the east and the Persians. However, his plans were

cut short with his assassination, which led to the reign

of his son, Alexander. With the expansion of the

Macedonian kingdom by Alexander into the distant parts of

the East, bringing Hellenic culture all the way to India,

one might say that Hellenic culture and military power was

never as powerful as at that point. That is why I choose

to end my discussion with the death of Alexander, because

after him his kingdom was divided and Hellenic culture and

military power was arguably never the same after him. 3 P. Rhodes, 2006, first paragraph

8

Hellenic military power was arguably at its greatest

between 490 B.C. and 323 B.C. and much of that greatness

is owed to the phalanx infantry which was throughout the

back-bone of the Hellenic army, be it in a Greek or

Macedonian army. However, in the coming chapters I will

follow the development of the phalanx infantry and see

that the role of this unit changed dramatically. It went

from being the most important part of the army, into being

a part of the army that was still important, but which

needed much support. The unit that often supported the

infantry, the cavalry unit, will as we shall see take over

the role as the attacking unit, whilst the two units will

continue to support each other. In this paper I will

therefore show that the role of the phalanx infantry

changed from an attacking role into a defensive role and

that this was due to two main aspects. Firstly, other

units, especially the cavalry unit, would prove much

quicker and thus be more effective as an attacking unit,

as we shall see good examples of in chapter 3. The second

aspect which would alter the role of the phalanx infantry

was that it proved to be vulnerable on its own and needed

9

much support from other units, as we shall see in chapter

2. These two aspects are arguably why the role of the

phalanx infantry changed from an attacking one to a

defensive one.

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Chapter 1 – From Marathon to the Peloponnesian War

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Before I can go into any analysis of battles and the

phalanx infantry’s role in those battles, I would like to

take a moment to discuss what the phalanx infantry of this

time would have been equipped with. This issue will become

important later in the paper when discussing the

Macedonian army and also in terms of understanding the

role of the phalanx infantry at the battles that I will

look at closer in this chapter. The arms and armour which

the hoplite infantry was equipped with around the battle

of Marathon has been much debated4. What we can be fairly

certain about however is that the hoplite panoply at the

time of Marathon usually consisted of a thrusting spear,

shield (the hoplon5), helmet, breastplate and grieves6.

Later on at the time of Philip II and Alexander we will

see that the panoply again would be decreased in number of

items and also lightened, as V. D. Hanson argues was a

trend starting as early 6th or 7th century B.C.7 Because

there was no ‘general issue’ equipment at this time each

4 See J. K. Anderson, 1991; A. M. Snodgrass, 1965; A. M. Snodgrass, 1967; V. D. Hanson, 1991; H. van Wees, 2004 for main views in this debate.5 From which the hoplite took its name according to F. E. Adcock, 1957;A. M. Snodgrass, 1967. For opposing view on this topic see J. F. Lazenby and D. Whitehead, 19966 V. D. Hanson, 2000, p. 56-577 V. D. Hanson, 2000, p. 57

12

man had to equip himself, it was therefore a variety in

arms and armour8. We also know from Herodotus that “the

Persians used neither spear nor shield and were easy to

beat”9, implying that the Greeks did use spear and shield

and thus had an advantage. We cannot however be absolutely

certain of how the hoplite infantry were equipped at the

battle of Marathon, but assume that they were equipped

with a spear, a shield, helmet, grieves and a breastplate.

The reason why the hoplite panoply is of importance is

that it very much determines its function and role on the

battlefield. Because of the weight of the panoply and the

fact that the hoplites need to stay close in order for the

phalanx to be functional, the unit was very immobile. That

is not to say that they could not run though, as we know

from Herodotus, the Athenians charged into the Persian at

a run10. What becomes clear is that it was the phalanx

infantry’s role to attack the enemy, which Herodotus says

would happen at speed. As we shall see in later chapters,

with the more extensive use of quicker units, the phalanx

infantry unit would no longer be the attacking unit, for 8 V. D. Hanson, 2000, p. 589 Herodotus, Histories 5.9710 Herodotus, Histories 6.112

13

that it was too slow. However, as soon as the hoplite

infantry had made their charge, it would be difficult to

move any other way than forwards. In this chapter, we will

see what happened at Marathon, Thermopylae and Platea and

see what the role of the phalanx infantry was at those

battles.

In 490 B.C. a united Greek army of 9000 Athenians and 1000

Plataeans fought and defeated a Persian army of unknown

size11 in perhaps one of the most famous battles in world

history. The Persian army was at least twice as big as the

Greek army and it was also more flexible and well

balanced, bearing in mind that it was in fact supported by

both missile troops and cavalry. As we know from

Herodotus12, the Greek force had no support from either

cavalry or archers, meaning that the Greek force fought

with only infantry. Outnumbered and unbalanced, the Greeks

lined up their infantry, weakening the centre, so that

11 Herodotus does not give an exact number of neither the Greek or Persian army, but according to Plutarch, Moralia 305 b and Pausanias, Description of Greece 10.20.2 we can accept the number of Greek soldiers. The size of the Persian army is much more difficult to establish because of the variety in our ancient sources, ranging from 200 000 to600 000. Modern scholars however agree on a number between 25 000 and 100 000 infantry and perhaps a 1000 cavalry, see P. Green, 1996; T. Holland, 2005 12 Herodotus, Histories 6.112

14

they could cover the whole Persian front13. As the battle

went on, two things became clear. Firstly, the Greek wings

fought of the Persian cavalry with ease, which enabled

them to encircle the Persian infantry who almost broke

through the Athenians’ centre14. Secondly, the primary

advantage the Persians had with a more balanced army was

wasted due to the strong Greek infantry. V. D. Hanson

argues that it was the superiority of the Greek arms and

armour that defeated the Persians at Marathon15. He also

argues that the relative strength of the armies were not

so important16, which is something I agree on, bearing in

mind that it was a fairly narrow battlefield, as we can

see on figure 117.

The battle of Marathon then shows two important aspects of

the early phalanx infantry. Firstly, when there are no

vulnerable flanks to worry about and the battlefield is

plain, the phalanx infantry is good on its own. The Greeks

fought off a much larger and much more well-balanced army,

13 Herodotus, Histories 6.11114 Herodotus, Histories 6.113-11415 V. D. Hanson, 2000, p. 5616 V. D. Hanson, 2000, p. 2317 See P. Krentz, 2010, p. 111-117 for further analysis of the geography of Marathon.

15

arguably much due to the topography of the area and also

because of its superiority in arms and armour. Persian

missile troops seem also to have been ineffective against

the Greek hoplites, as J. K. Anderson argues18, much due to

the strength of the hoplon. However, as we shall see in

chapter 2 when discussing an Athenian campaign in Aetolia

in 426 B.C., hoplite infantry was indeed vulnerable to

missiles, even though that was under different

circumstances. Secondly, this battle also shows the

vulnerability of the phalanx infantry on plain ground, had

the battlefield been wider. Herodotus told us that the

line had to be stretched out in order to cover the entire

Persian line. Had the Greek generals not done this, the

Persian cavalry would certainly have been able to go

around the phalanx infantry and threaten its flanks. This

is something that will become more evident in later

battles where the battlefields are much more specious,

which I will be showing in later chapters.

The choice of battlefield is however important to discuss

in terms of the phalanx infantry’s role. The Greeks would

18 J. K. Anderson, 1991, p. 21

16

probably have known about the weaknesses of the phalanx

infantry, thus it was important for them to choose an

appropriate battlefield to fight the battle. This then

would mean that the role of the phalanx infantry was very

much determined by the terrain, and when the terrain was

unfavourable for the phalanx infantry it also hindered the

unit to perform its role. At Marathon, the Greeks did in

fact choose where the battle was to be fought, as becomes

clear because Herodotus tells us that the Athenians waited

10 days before attacking the Persians19. Ten days would

have been more than enough time to change the location of

both the Greek and Persian camp, it is therefore clear

that the Greeks were happy with the battlefield. The

phalanx infantry then could fulfil its role without

hinders from a poorly chosen battlefield. However, in

later battles, the generals could not always choose the

best battlefield for its phalanx infantry, so it was clear

that it would need support from other units, but this is

something I will come back to in greater detail in later

chapters.

19 Herodotus, Histories 6.109-111

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For the battle of Thermopylae in 480 B.C. the role of the

phalanx infantry was quite clear, which was to hold of the

Persian army for as long as possible20. It had yet again

the attacking role, much because it was the only unit in

the army, but also a defensive role as we shall now see.

Herodotus tells us that the pass was a merely 50 feet

wide21, which means that the use of phalanx infantry would

be excellent in terms of holding an attacker at a

distance. Also, it meant that cavalry was useless, but it

also meant that missile troops would have a good

opportunity to fire at the standing phalanx infantry.

Herodotus further informs us that according to his

estimate, the Persians forces would add up to about 5 283

220 men22. This number is as usual for ancient authors

exaggerated to the extremes and it is of course impossible

to know for sure how many men there were in the Persian

force, but modern estimates suggest somewhere between 70

000 and 1 000 000 men23. At any rate, again the Persian

forces highly outnumbered the Greek forces which Herodotus

20 Herodotus, Histories 7.175; Diodorus Siculus, Library 11.4.121 Herodotus, Histories 7.17622 Herodotus, Histories 7.18623 T. Holland, 2005, p. 394 for the suggestion of 70 000 – 300 000. SeeJ. Lazenby, 1993, p. 90-96 for other suggestions.

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tells us numbered approximately 5200 soldiers in total24,

but which according to Diodorus only totalled to 4300

soldiers25 (1000 Lacedaemonians, 300 Spartiates and 3000

other Greeks). Even though the ancient sources differ,

they do not differ much and both seem like plausible

numbers.

The fighting went on for three days, with the Greek

phalanx infantry standing their ground without any support

from cavalry or missile troops, but as is commonly known,

they were at the end betrayed and lost the battle. The

role of the phalanx infantry then was clear at the battle

of Thermopylae; it was to be the army. No other units were

there to support the phalanx infantry, but then again,

because of the topography and the narrow passage the Greek

forces were placed in, it probably did not need any

support either26. However, we will see in the next chapters

that the phalanx infantry would be more and more a unit

within the army, working together with other units,

creating balance and flexibility. At Marathon and

24 Herodotus, Histories 7.202-20325 Diodorus Siculus, Library 11.4.2, 11.4.526 Because the Greek phalanx infantry had no flanks, they needed no support from cavalry or missile troops.

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Thermopylae however the phalanx infantry truly was the

army, both offensively and defensively.

At the battle of Platea we will see that, even though

supported by auxiliary units, it was the phalanx infantry

that had the most important part on the battlefield. In

479 B.C., only a year or so after the battle of

Thermopylae, the Greeks and the Persians met again, for

what would be one of the last and decisive battles of the

Persian War. The Greeks came again with a united force,

which according to Herodotus counted 110 000 men strong,

from which 69 500 were auxiliaries27. Herodotus mentions no

cavalry, so we must assume that the Greek forces were not

supported at this battle either. However, there is some

dispute about the number of Greeks Herodotus accounts for

and modern scholars tend to agree on a number much closer

to 70 000 – 80 000, with half of those being hoplites and

the other half auxiliaries, which would then number one

auxiliary per hoplite28. Even though the Greeks assembled a

high number of auxiliaries to this battle, both J. Lazenby

and T. Holland considers their contribution close to

27 Herodotus, Histories 9.3028 J. Lazenby, 1993, p. 227-228; T. Holland, 2005, p. 400 (note 48)

20

nothing and that the outcome would have been the same

without them29. At this battle the Greeks fought a smaller

Persian army, which Herodotus numbers around 300 000 men

strong, with an unknown number of cavalry, since Herodotus

puts them in a separate unit30. Again the numbers are

debated and modern scholarship has mostly agreed on the

number being closer to 70 000 – 120 000 men, with 10 000

cavalry31.

The battle went on for many days in 3 different phases,

where in one phase the Persian cavalry harassed the

Greeks, but not by attacking the Greek phalanx infantry,

but rather the Greek supplies coming from the

Peloponnese32. The reason why the battle went on for so

long and no big scale attack was started before it did was

two sided; firstly, because the Greeks did not want to

give up their good position, which would leave them

vulnerable for attacks against the flanks. Secondly, it

went on for so long because the Persian did not want to

attack a well-defended position. J. Lazenby sees this as

29 J. Lazenby, 1993, p. 227-228; T. Holland, 2005, p. 400 (note 48)30 Herodotus, Histories 9.3231 J. Lazenby, 1993, p. 227-228; T. Holland, 2005, p. 40032 Herodotus, Histories 9.39-40

21

odd, because both sides had appeared as wanting to fight33.

I would argue that this shows the respect the Persians had

for the Greek phalanx infantry and that the phalanx

infantry played its role very well, as a strong unit it

held a good, defensive area which the opposition sooner or

later had to attack. The Persians too held a strong,

defensive position which they too did not want to give up.

At the end however, the two sides met and Herodotus tells

us that less than 3000 Persians survived34. The battle of

Platea shows the importance of the phalanx infantry as a

unit in the Greek army and it also clearly shows the role

the phalanx infantry had at that time. This was to hold of

the opposing army until the timing was right and then

strike. In later chapters we will see that the phalanx

infantry played much the same role, but where other units

would prove just as, or even more, important as the

phalanx infantry.

There is also another aspect which the phalanx infantry of

all three of these battles had in common and that is the

style in which they fought. This is important to the role

33 J. Lazenby, 1993, p. 22834 Herodotus, Histories 9.70

22

of the phalanx infantry because it basically determines

how it functions on the battlefields and also defines its

limitations and capabilities. There has been much

discussion over the past years on how the hoplite infantry

fought and how ancient sources describe it. R. Luginbill

argues that it was othismos, or shoving, which helped the

phalanx infantry of the classical period the successful

military machine it was35. In our ancient sources we can

find evidence for this at both Marathon and Thermopylae36.

However, in Herodotus account of Platea, othismos is only

used in the final stage of the battle37. H. van Wees makes

a counter argument to this theory, stating that the

ancient sources, which we have, makes it clear that the

front ranks would have had room to move about, without

being crushed from the ‘pushing’ by the ranks further back

in the unit38. It is unclear then how the phalanx infantry

fought at the battles of Marathon, Thermopylae and Platea,

but what is clear is that the role of the phalanx infantry

at this time was very much determined by its own abilities

35 R. Luginbill, 1994, p. 6136 Herodotus, Histories 6.111-113, 7.22537 Herodotus, Histories 9.6238 H. van Wees, 2004, p. 189

23

and limitations. For the role of the phalanx infantry in

the early 5th century this tactic meant that it had to be a

moving unit in order to ‘push’ its enemy to death, if

indeed othismos was a part of how the phalanx infantry

fought at this time. However, I will show in chapter 3

that this role had changed completely.

Unfortunately, the period between 479 B.C. and 431 B.C. is

poorly attested by existing ancient sources, so this time

period will not be discussed in any detail in this chapter

or later in this paper. However, between 490 B.C. and 479

B.C., the role of the phalanx infantry was pretty much the

same throughout, which was to hold the enemy to a fixed

position on the battlefield, preferably in an area where

the phalanx could not be outflanked and slowly kill the

enemy’s units. As we have seen in this chapter, this was

true for all three major battles in this time period, but

as we shall now see in chapter 2, the role of the phalanx

infantry would slightly change. Other units will rise in

importance and the phalanx infantry will be challenged in

terms of being the leading unit of the army. We will also

see that the phalanx infantry will be forced out of its

24

comfort zone, thus enabling other units to get an

advantage over the phalanx infantry on the battlefield,

which will in turn reveal the phalanx infantry’s biggest

weaknesses.

Chapter 2 – From the Peloponnesian War to Philip II of Macedon

During the so called Second Peloponnesian War (431 – 404

B.C.) and the period after that leading up to the rule of

Philip II of Macedon beginning in 359 B.C. there was

definitely not a shortage of battles. There were too many

in fact to go into deep analysis of all of them, so I will

focus my analysis to some of the major battles in this

period and supplement with information from minor battles

where I find it necessary. What I will show in this

chapter is how the role of the phalanx infantry changed

from what I have described in chapter 1 and how the

25

phalanx infantry’s importance within the army changed

compared to other units. These aspects will lead to the

final change which will be discussed in chapter 3.

The siege of Platea (429-427 B.C.) went on for such a long

time and was not really a battle fought on a battlefield

with two sides facing each other; I will therefore begin

my examination with a battle near Delion in 424 B.C. Here

a Boeotian army fought an Athenian army, which according

to Thucydides were fairly equal in size in terms of

hoplites39. At the end, the Athenians turned and fled40, but

the outcome is not what I will be focusing on, but rather

how the battle was fought, which units were significant

and most importantly, the role of the phalanx infantry in

each of the two armies. The first thing to notice is how

the units have changed in terms of numbers from what we

saw in chapter 1. Thucydides tells us that the Boeotians,

mustered 7000 hoplites, 10 000 light-armed troops, 1000

cavalry and 500 peltasts (missile units)41, and that the

Athenians mustered the same number of hoplites, but no

39 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.93-9440 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.9641 See J. Best, 1969 for further discussion on the peltasts, especiallyThracian peltasts.

26

light-armed troops or cavalry42. The Athenians then came

with a force very much like what we have seen in chapter

1, basing its army purely on phalanx infantry. The

Boeotians however had a much more balanced force, with

cavalry and light-armed troops on the wings, as would

become usual in later periods. According to Thucydides

this would turn out to be fatal for the Athenians, for

when the Boeotian cavalry came around a hill on the

battlefield, threatening the Athenian wing43. With the

Thebans winning against the Athenians on the right wing

and the Boeotian cavalry threatening the left wing, the

Athenians fled.

J. Lazenby argues that this is a good example of one of

the principal roles classical cavalry could have44, which

is also something I will emphasis further in this chapter

and especially in chapter 3. In this battle we saw that it

was the cavalry which made a big difference and

practically decided the battle in the end. The role the

42 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.93-94. Thucydides does mention that the Athenians greatly outnumbered the Boeotians, but that most of the Athenians had come unarmed. He also mentions that the Athenians left 300 cavalry at Delion, but these would again be no match for the 1000 strong Boeotian cavalry anyway. 43 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.9644 J. Lazenby, 2004, p. 90

27

phalanx infantry played which we looked at in chapter 1

was easily beaten by the appearance of cavalry units in

fairly open terrain. The open terrain enabled the cavalry

to threaten the phalanx infantry from the flanks, because

the phalanx infantry was unprotected. Therefore the

phalanx infantry could no longer fight an opposing army

all by itself on open terrain at least and it needed

support. This unit was also vulnerable to missile troops,

as we shall see in the next paragraph. In turn that means

that a well-balanced army of infantry, cavalry and missile

troops would on an open battlefield have a big advantage

over an army based on purely phalanx infantry. This meant

that the role of the phalanx infantry within the army had

to be changed and that it had to be supported by other

units as well.

In the year before, at the battle of Sphakteria in 425

B.C. it was the Spartans who suffered a loss, much due to

insufficient support from light-armed troops and cavalry.

This was perhaps the moment that led to the first ever

raising of cavalry and archers by Sparta45, which according

45 J. Lazenby, 2004, p. 84

28

to Thucydides, was due to their understanding of facing a

new type of warfare46. However, the battle I am referring

to and which I will discuss in some detail now, is the

Athenian attack on Sphakteria. Here the Spartan hoplite

infantry was crushed by a mix of Athenian hoplites, fixed

at one position and unwilling to move (much like the old

fashion role of the phalanx infantry discussed in chapter

1), and Athenian archers and peltasts. Thucydides tells us

that the Athenians mustered 800 archers and 800 peltasts

for this battle, which all were divided into contingents

of 200, so that the Spartans could never attack all the

missile troops at ones47. The Athenian phalanx infantry was

stationed at a fixed point, as already mentioned, which

was the role of the phalanx infantry at this battle. What

is clear is that the Athenian phalanx infantry assumed a

fairly different role at this battle than what I described

in chapter 1, even though they did pretty much the same

thing. The major difference is of course the support of

the missile troops, which this time proved to be the

46 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.5547 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 4.32

29

difference between an Athenian victory and a Spartan

victory.

Both at Delion and at Sphakteria either the one or the

other army had only hoplites armed and ready at the

battlefield. I will now look closer at a battle in which

both armies were supported by auxiliary troops and by

cavalry, which will truly show that the role of the

phalanx infantry has indeed changed from Marathon and to

this point in time. The battle I am examining next is the

battle of Mantinea in 418 B.C. where a Spartan army with

its allies met an Argive army accompanied by some Athenian

troops and Mantineans. Thucydides tells us that the

Spartans and its allies lined up their troops as usual and

with cavalry covering both wings48, which would give the

army as a whole more flexibility and manoeuvrability

compared to just a line of phalanx infantry. Thucydides

does not give an exact number for neither side at this

battle49, but from an earlier passage we know that the

Athenians brought with them at least 300 cavalry50, which

48 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.6749 See J. Lazenby, 2004, p. 121-122 for a fuller discussion on the strength of the two armies.50 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.61

30

Thucydides also makes a point of when describing the end

of the battle where the Athenians would have suffered

greater losses had it not been for the good work done by

their cavalry51. We must assume that because Thucydides

does not mention any other cavalry units in the

Argive/Athenian force, that there in fact was no cavalry

covering their right flank52. The Argive/Athenian forces

were probably slightly smaller than the Spartan force,

without knowing exactly how large the Spartan force was53.

As the battle went on, the Argive line broke at two

places54 and even though they managed to rout the Spartan

left wing, it ended in catastrophe for the Argives and its

allies.

What is interesting though, is exactly how Thucydides

emphasises that the Athenians would have suffered more

extensive losses, had it not been for the cavalry and the

protection that unit gave to the flank of the phalanx

infantry. Thucydides noted earlier that the Spartan line

outflanked the Argive/Athenian line by quite a bit, which

51 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.7352 J. Lazenby, 2004, p. 12153 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 554 See J. Lazenby, 2004, p. 124 for figures on the Spartan manoeuvres and the break of lines.

31

without the cavalry surely would have resulted in greater

losses. The Spartan cavalry is unfortunately not mentioned

after the opening sequence of the battle, which I can only

assume is due to it not being in use in this battle. For

the role of the phalanx infantry then this battle is two-

sided. On the Argive/Athenian side the role was much the

same as earlier, only that it needed cavalry support in

order not to be outflanked completely and at the end not

totally annihilated. On the Spartan side, the role of the

phalanx infantry was fairly unchanged from what we saw in

chapter 1, which I assume was due to the infantry on the

Spartan side being better and more professional than on

the Argive/Athenian side. I make this assumption based on

two things; firstly, Thucydides mentions the Spartan army

marching in a rhythmical step when advancing55, which can

be seen as a sign of increased professional training.

Secondly, because Thucydides accuses two officers in the

Spartan left wing of being unprofessional after not

obeying the Spartan king’s order56, thus assuming that the

Spartans fighting on the Spartan right wing would have

55 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.7056 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.71-72

32

been professional and it was also these units that fought

off the entire Argive/Athenian army at the end.

We have already seen how the phalanx infantry at this

point in history began to need support from cavalry and

other supporting units, in order to perform their role on

the battlefield. In the next battle I will examine, we

shall see the Syracusan cavalry not supporting the

Syracusan infantry in winning, but rather in not losing

more men than they already had. This had the same effect

as the Athenian cavalry had at the battle of Mantinea only

three years earlier. The battle in which I will look at is

a battle between a Syracusan army and an Athenian/Argive

army on Sicily in 415 B.C. Thucydides tells us that the

two lines of hoplite infantry faced each other, with

missile infantry on both sides, which would be firing

their missiles before the main battle begun57. Eventually

the hoplite infantry would clash, which at the end led to

a break in the Syracusan line, however, the Athenians did

not dear to pursue the fleeing Syracusans because they

were afraid of the numerous Syracusan cavalry58. The first 57 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 6.67-6958 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 6.70. Thucydides also mentions the threat the Syracusan cavalry was to the Athenians in earlier passages

33

thing to notice is that because both sides were supported

by missile troops, neither side could really put any

pressure in the enemy’s phalanx infantry, as at the battle

of Sphakteria, due to the fact that both sides’ missile

troops would just fight each other. The second thing to

notice is that for some reason the Syracusans did not use

their cavalry in the main battle, allowing the

Athenian/Argive army to basically do whatever they wanted.

On the other hand, this again allowed the Syracusans to

save themselves in the retreat and we can only speculate

whether or not this was the idea in the first place. At

any rate, because both sides were in fact supported by

auxiliary troops, the role of the phalanx infantry was

pretty much the same as it was in earlier battles in this

period.

To this point we have not seen any concluding evidence

that the role of the phalanx infantry changed from the

battle of Marathon to the end of the 5th century B.C., even

though some tendencies have been shown. The traditional

role of the phalanx infantry which was to attack or defend

(6.66-67), clearly emphasising the vulnerability the hoplite phalanx had to cavalry units.

34

a fixed position on the battlefield has however been

challenged by the use of missile troops and cavalry,

forcing the phalanx infantry to alter their role. It is

important at all times to bear in mind that the phalanx

infantry was still the main body of the army and the

infantry was also usually the main body of the opposing

army, so that it was still the phalanx infantry who would

stand for most of the killing. However, as we have seen so

far, the tendency has been that the phalanx infantry could

not have performed this role as well as it has without the

support of other units, which is also what we will see in

chapter 3. The battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. is another

step towards what I will show in chapter 3, where the

phalanx infantry truly are in need of support from other

units in order to perform their role.

As I have now moved away from the Peloponnesian War I have

also moved one step closer to the concluding changes that

we will see to the role of the phalanx infantry. At

Leuctra in 371 B.C. a Theban army fought a Spartan army,

both supported by cavalry, but interestingly enough,

Xenophon tells us that even before the battle had even

35

begun, the cavalry from each side started fighting each

other5960. The Theban cavalry, which according to Xenophon

was in better shape and training, beat the Spartan

cavalry. Interestingly though, the Spartans, and

assumingly also the Thebans, deployed their cavalry in

front of the hoplite phalanx instead of stationing them at

each flank61. This is something that V. Hanson argues is

evidence for poor deployment from the Spartans, allowing

the Thebans to skilfully react to this poor choice of

deployment62. What happened to the cavalry units after the

initial fighting we can only speculate, but at least it

shows willingness from the Thebans to use specialized

cavalry units in battle, opposed to the Spartan untrained

and poorly skilled cavalry, and this is something that in

chapter 3 will become very important.

However, moving back to the infantry units, the Spartans

were lined up as usual in an eight – twelve man rank deep

line, but the Thebans had a fifty man deep line on their

59 Xenophon, A History of My Times 6.4.1360 See figure 2 for a suggestion of how the different moves planned out.61 Xenophon, A History of My Times 6.4.10-1262 V. Hanson, 1988, p. 196

36

left wing, threatening the Spartan king63. V. Hanson argues

that this tactical move was not novel and also did not

give any tactical advantages64. In terms of that the

tactical manoeuvre was not original I agree with V.

Hanson, but I believe that the sources we have indicate

that the fifty shields deep rank definitely gave the

Thebans a tactical advantage. This tactical manoeuvre was

also arguably a defensive one, which would allow the

Thebans to stand their ground with breaking the lines for

a longer time than the Spartan phalanx. As Xenophon tells

us, at the beginning the Spartan line held its ground and

was even having the better of the Thebans, but in the end

the Theban masses was just too much to handle for the

eight to twelve man deep ranks of the Spartan infantry65.

The evidence clearly point to a tactical advantage for the

Thebans in this case, which due to its masses were able to

break the Spartan left wing.

Even though it is not mentioned specifically by Xenophon,

this was the first time the Theban Sacred Band66 would

63 Xenophon, A History of My Time 6.4.1264 V. Hanson, 1988, p. 19965 Xenophon, A History of My Times 6.4.13-1466 A special infantry unit, armed as hoplites. What made this unit special was that it was made up of 150 pairs of homosexual men, each

37

prove decisive in a battle67 and as G. Shrimpton argues,

gain credit for68, which leads me to an aspect which

arguably was first properly introduced at this battle,

namely the use of special forces. Of course, we have

already heard of chosen Argives in Thucydides and the

Knights of Sparta69, but the Theban Sacred Band would be

the first to have a real influence on history. Ironically

enough, they would be annihilated by the very man who

would become an expert on using special forces in his

army, namely Alexander. The role of the phalanx infantry

was pretty much the same at this battle as it was during

the Peloponnesian War, but the inclusion of the Theban

Sacred Band would create extra strength to wherever they

were, much due to their extreme skills and bravery. It

also showed a willingness to use the phalanx infantry in a

more defensive role and even alter regular formations in

order to do so. The role of the phalanx infantry then was

to be more an ordinary infantry unit, which is not at all

pair fighting for each other. 67 Plutarch, Pelopidas 23.468 G. Shrimpton, 1971, p. 31469 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.72-73

38

the same as it was at Marathon where it was the unit of the

army.

We have seen in this chapter that the role of the phalanx

infantry changed somewhat from how it used to be at the

battle of Marathon, Thermopylae and Platea. V. Hanson

correctly argues that it was not a revolutionary change

that happened at Leuctra in 371 B.C. in terms of how the

phalanx infantry fought, but rather a slow

transformation70, which I too have shown in this and the

previous chapter. The phalanx infantry unit went from

usually being the only unit in the army, to being a part

of the army, often relying on supporting units in order to

perform its intended role. The fighting style also

changed; from what was probably a ‘pushing’ and ‘shoving’

fight, into being more a fight of arms, which will be

especially evident in the next chapter. Of course, the

main body of the army was still the phalanx infantry and

it was still this unit that stood for most of the killing,

but it would not have been able to do so without the

support of other units, such as missile troops and

70 V. Hanson, 1988, p. 207

39

cavalry. At the end of this chapter we saw the

introduction of the Theban Sacred Band and the impact

special forces can have on the battlefield. As we move to

the third and final chapter of this paper we shall see

that this very unit will be totally annihilated by no

other than Alexander and that even with a cavalry unit.

The role of the phalanx infantry would see dramatic

changes under Philip II and Alexander, which is what I

will now discuss.

Chapter 3 – Philip II and Alexander the Great

40

In chapter 2 we looked at some minor changes to the role

of the phalanx infantry, basically only tendencies of what

was to come, however it was still changes from the role it

had at the battle of Marathon. We saw that the phalanx

infantry were more and more relying on the support of

other units, either in order to attack or in order to

defend themselves. We have also seen that the phalanx

infantry was being challenged for the role as being the

offensive unit, by other units such as the cavalry showing

their capabilities for this role. This is something we

will so more often in this chapter. At the end of chapter

2 we looked at the introduction of one of the most eminent

special forces in antiquity, namely the Theban Sacred

Band. I therefore see it appropriate to begin this chapter

with an analysis of the battle that would be the end of

this magnificent infantry unit. However, before I can move

on to any detailed analysis I again feel it necessary to

discuss some of the equipment changes that Philip II of

Macedon made. I will look particularly at the introduction

of the sarissa and the decreased shield size, which is

41

basically why the phalanx infantry in this period can no

longer be called hoplites.

The hoplite infantry described in chapter 1 and 2 used

what is known as a dory or thrusting spear, as its main

weapon of choice. The dory was a 3 metre long spear,

weighing approximately 1 to 2 kg71. The sarissa however,

which Philip II at least introduced to the cavalry units

at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C., possibly later for

the infantry72, was according to M. Markle between 4.5 and

5.5 metres long73. Because the sarissa was much harder to

handle, soldiers had to use both hands in order to be able

to control it, therefore the shield could no longer be of

the same size as it had been before and was now reduced to

a 60 centimetre shield74. It also meant that the phalanx

infantry unit would become even more inflexible and less

manoeuvrable, thus require even more support from other

units75, which is something I will come back to in further

detail later in this chapter. The decrease in

manoeuvrability and flexibility also emphasises the role

71 M. Markle, 1977, p. 33172 See M. Markle, 1978 for further analysis on this topic.73 M. Markle, 1977, p. 32374 M. Markle, 1977, p. 33175 M. Markle, 1977, p. 329, 331

42

in which the phalanx infantry would now take, namely the

more defensive role. As it could no longer move at a full

run, as at Marathon, the infantry had clearly no longer

the attacking role in the army. M. Markle also argues that

except from the change in spear and shield, the Macedonian

infantry continued to use the rest of the hoplite

panoply76. Nevertheless, as we can see from figure 3, the

sarissa gave the phalanx infantry an advantage in terms of

the distance it could hold the enemy off at, compared to

the earlier hoplite phalanx. The increased immobility of

the phalanx infantry together with the advantage it gained

in terms of holding the enemy at a distance is what we

will see in this chapter really changed the role of the

phalanx infantry in this period.

As mentioned above, M. Markle argues that there is no

proof for any use of sarissa before the battle of Chaeronea

in 338 B.C77., which is the battle I shall begin my

examination with, since it is much due to the sarissa that 76 M. Markle, 1978, p. 48377 The battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C. could have been discussed in much greater length, as it is a very interesting battle with many new and changing elements, but for the sake of my argument I will only discuss this battle in terms of the changing role of the phalanx infantry. This also allows me to spend more time discussing the battleof Gaugamela (331 B.C.) and Hydaspes (326 B.C.) where the change of the role of the phalanx infantry really becomes evident.

43

the role of the phalanx infantry change so much in this

period. However, the phalanx infantry had at this time

probably not been equipped with sarissae yet7879, thus it

would be only the cavalry units that had this weapon. Even

so, I will still be looking closely at the role of the

phalanx infantry at this battle which we shall see had

already changed quite a bit from the battle of Leuctra in

371 B.C. For descriptions of this battle we must rely on

Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus and Polyaenus, which are

arguably all a part of the vulgate tradition. We are told

that the Macedonian army consisted of 30 000 infantry and

2000 cavalry80, but the relative strength of the

Theban/Athenian army was unknown. Nonetheless, Plutarch

tells us that the famous Theban Sacred Band was present,

but was utterly crushed by Alexander and the Macedonian

left wing.81 We are also told that the sham retreat, which

Philip II had ordered to lure the enemy into a trap, was

possible because the Macedonian infantry could hide behind

their shields82. This further proves that the sarissa was not

78 M. Markle, 1978, p. 48879 See P. Rahe, 1981 for a contradictory view.80 Diodorus, Library 16.85.581 Plutarch, Life of Alexander 9.2; Diodorus, Library 16.86.382 Polyaenus, Stratagems 4.2.2

44

yet a part of the phalanx infantry’s equipment because of

the immobility the use of the sarissa gave the phalanx

infantry.

What is interesting with this battle though is that the

infantry was no longer used to hold a fixed position on

the battlefield, but rather play the role as bait, which

would allow the Macedonian cavalry to break the lines of

the united Greek forces. This further proves that the

sarissa was not yet in use, because M. Markle argues that

this manoeuvre would not have been possible with the sarissa

as the Macedonian weapon of choice83. However, the role as

bait would soon change back to holding a fixed position,

as we will see in the next battles which I will analyse.

The role of the phalanx infantry changed though, because

in the battle of Chaeronea it was no longer the unit that

decided the battle, as we have seen it to be in so many

earlier battles. Instead, the cavalry would prove to be

the battle winning unit, first breaking the enemy’s line

on the Macedonian left, then again on the Macedonian

right. P. Rahe however argues against this, saying that it

83 M. Markle, 1978, p. 488

45

was highly unlikely that the Macedonian cavalry played any

decisive role in this battle84. Having looked at the

ancient sources that we have, no matter how scanty they

might be, I would argue that it was in fact the cavalry

that proved decisive at Chaeronea. After all, there is not

much else to base our understanding of this battle other

than the ancient sources we have access to. What this

battle in fact shows is how cavalry units was going to be

used under Alexander the Great, which was as an active

unit, more often than not attacking the enemy’s infantry.

As I will show in the next two battles, the role of the

infantry will be to hold the enemy’s infantry at a point

which would be favourable for the Macedonian cavalry, so

that the cavalry unit could in fact be the battle winning

unit.

Before I start discussing the battle of Gaugamela in 331

B.C., I must emphasise that this battle was what is known

as a ‘dust-battle’, which is why we cannot know for sure

exactly what happened. The descriptions which I base my

argument on is thus mostly based on the preliminary

84 P. Rahe, 1981, p. 87

46

tactics done before the battle and also what we know from

eye-witness accounts, which may have been used as a source

in one or more of these descriptions. At the battle of

Gaugamela, Arrian tells us that the Persians mustered an

army of 1 000 000 infantry, 40 000 cavalry, 200 scythed-

chariots and some elephants85, whereas Curtius is probably

more reasonable and accounts for 200 000 infantry and 45

000 cavalry86. Modern scholarship however have estimated

the Persian forces to be less than 200 000 infantry and

some 34 000 cavalry87. Alexander’s force was inferior to

the Persians in terms of numbers88 and Arrian suggest the

total strength was 40 000 infantry and 7000 cavalry89.

Curtius notes that Alexander had deployed a large number

of cavalry on each wing90, so that the Persians could not

encircle the Macedonian infantry91. What Curtius is

actually saying here is that the infantry needed support

85 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 3.886 Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 4.12.1287 W. Heckel, notes to book 4, note 80, p. 279 in Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander88 Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 4.13.3089 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 3.1390 There must be said that there was of course several different cavalry units present in Alexander’s army, see N. Hammond, 1998; P. Brunt, 1963 for further discussion on this topic. For the sake of my argument I will generalize a fair bit and talk about cavalry as a unitwithin the army, rather than each specific unit. 91 Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 4.13.29

47

by the cavalry, which it of course had at this time. When

comparing this battle to the battle of Marathon, we can

see that the phalanx infantry no longer functioned on its

own, thus its role also changed.

When the battle begun, both Alexander and Darius tilted

their lines, as seen on figure 4, and Darius attacked the

Macedonian infantry with his chariot units. At first this

attack created havoc, but the infantry soon dealt with the

chariots92, arguably much because of the sarissa, which

allowed the infantry to stand at a distance from the

charging chariots. Then, as Alexander and his chosen

cavalry unit rode towards the right on the battlefield,

trying to find a gap in the Persian line (in order to kill

Darius), the two main bodies of infantry clashed together.

Alexander had also stationed his hypaspists unit93 on the

right side of his phalanx infantry, possibly to cover for

the threat by the Persian cavalry94, which Alexander would

leave only with a smaller cavalry unit as soon as he

charged for the break in the Persian line. The Macedonian

92 Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 4.15.1-493 A infantry unit which was not armed with a sarissa and was much more mobile than the Foot Companions, according to M. Markle, 1977, p. 32994 M. Markle, 1977, p. 329

48

left wing, which was led by Parmenion, was in great

trouble and Curtius tells us that they were saved partly

because the Persians lost fate after Darius fled, but

partly also because the Thessalian cavalry came to their

rescue95. Again we can see that the traditional role of the

phalanx infantry, which we saw in chapter 1, was changing.

The role of the phalanx infantry at the battle of

Gaugamela seemed to be only to keep the Persians occupied

long enough, so that Alexander and his specialist cavalry

unit would have enough time to either kill or rout Darius.

However, as argued by A. Devine, the phalanx infantry and

the cavalry never deprived itself of close support from

each other96, which further emphasises the notion of being

parts of a well-balanced army. Another note I believe

emphasises the changing role of the phalanx infantry was

that the general, here Alexander, was mounted and leading

the attack, whereas in earlier battles it was the infantry

that led the attack. We shall see later that Alexander

even thought that he could win battles with only cavalry,

which would leave the infantry with no role at all.

95 Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 4.16.4-596 A. Devine, 1975, p. 384

49

The last battle I will analyse in depth is the battle of

Hydaspes in 326 B.C. I will not pay much attention to the

crossing of the river, but focus more on the actual

battle. Up to this point I have been looking at battles

where the phalanx infantry have usually far outnumbered

the cavalry. At the battle of Hydaspes however fought

between Alexander and an Indian king named Porus, Arrian

tells us that the Macedonian infantry present counted only

6000 strong and that the cavalry numbered ca. 500097. There

were also archers and javelin-men marching towards the

enemy, which were positioned on each wing of the infantry,

whereas the cavalry, with Alexander of course, were

advancing rapidly98. Arrian further suggest that Alexander

had an idea of attacking Porus’ force only with the

cavalry99. Even though this seems incredible, it suggests

that Alexander now had changed the roles within the army

completely. At Marathon, Thermopylae, Platea and most of

the battles fought during the Peloponnesian War, it was

the infantry which was the attacking unit and that was its

role. What Alexander suggested with this notion was that

97 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 5.1498 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 5.1499 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 5.14

50

it was the cavalry which had the attacking role within his

army. This would make the phalanx infantry the supporting

unit for the cavalry, which will become even more evident

as we analyse this battle further.

Porus’ army numbered, according to Arrian, 30 000

infantry, 4000 cavalry, 300 chariots and 200 elephants100,

but various other sources gives different numbers101,

however in this case the numbers are actually not that

important. We have already seen that Alexander thought he

could defeat Porus’ army with only his cavalry. This was

however not what happened. We shall now see that without

what were in chapter 1 and 2 the supporting units, the

Macedonians would have actually lost the battle. Firstly,

according to Diodorus, the Macedonian cavalry took out the

entire unit of chariots that Porus had deployed102. Then, as

the elephants started to attack the Macedonians, the

phalanx infantry held of the Indian infantry, whilst the

Macedonian missile troops eventually were able to kill the

elephants103. The role of the phalanx infantry was to

100 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 5.15101 See Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander 8.13.6, Diodorus Siculus, Library 17.87.2 and Plutarch, Life of Alexander 62.1.102 Diodorus Siculus, Library 17.87.1103 Diodorus Siculus, Library 17.87.2-3

51

support the other troops, by dealing with the Indian

infantry. Arrian notes that Alexander’s mounted troops

(cavalry units) were too much for the Indians104, again just

emphasising that it was now the cavalry which was the

leading unit of the army. However, the cavalry could not

have had the impact they had without the phalanx infantry

being present as well, but what is clear is that the role

of the phalanx infantry changed. Also, as J. Hamilton

argues, one must assume that Arrian was in fact wrong in

his disposition of the Indian cavalry in order for

Alexander to be able to take that unit out all at once105.

Whether we trust our ancient sources or not, it is anyway

clear that the Macedonian cavalry was the attacking force

at this battle.

The role of the phalanx infantry had clearly changed in

164 years, from the battle of Marathon to the battle of

Hydaspes. At Marathon, the role of the phalanx infantry

was to attack the enemy by holding a strong position on

the battlefield, whereas at the battle of Hydaspes the

role of the phalanx infantry was to hold off the enemy

104 Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander 5.17105 J. Hamilton, 1956, p. 31

52

infantry long enough for the Macedonian cavalry to attack

and rout the enemy army. As argued by C. Armstrong, the

attack by Alexander on the Indian army was truly an

ancient example of blitzkrieg106, which would not be possible

with the phalanx infantry in the role of the attacking

unit. We saw the tendencies of this in chapter 2, where

generals explored the various ways in which they could use

their cavalry unit and their infantry unit differently.

The role of the phalanx infantry started as being the unit

of the army and in 326 B.C. it was a unit in the army,

assisting other units in as a well-oiled killing machine.

The role of the phalanx infantry also changed in this last

period I looked at from being an attacking unit in earlier

battles, into being a defensive unit, supporting the

attacking unit which was now the cavalry.

106 C. Armstrong, 1943, p. 63

53

Conclusion

Greek warfare was arguably at its most powerful during the

campaigns of Alexander (336 – 323 B.C.) and the battle of

Marathon (490 B.C.) was the first of many battles that

laid the foundation for the success of the Macedonian

army. In chapter 1, we saw how the Greeks were able to

hold off a much larger Persian army and even win the

battle at Marathon, much due to its superior arms and

armour. This battle also showed the phalanx infantry as

being an attacking unit, charging into the enemy’s front

lines, which as we have seen would become a rare feature

in Alexander’s army. At Thermopylae 10 years later we saw

much of the same, except that the role of the phalanx

infantry was now to hold a defensive position whilst still

being an attacking unit. It was in fact the only unit

present, which was also true for the battle of Marathon.

This was also a battle the Greeks lost, but not without a

courageous fight. I have also shown how the Greeks fought

the Persians at Platea, where the phalanx infantry was

54

holding a good, defensive position and only started to

fight the Persians when the time was right. Again the

phalanx infantry had an attacking role, but it was

attacking only from a defensive position where it was

secure. In chapter 1 we have seen that the role of the

phalanx infantry was to be the attacking unit of the army,

and on two occasions it was in fact the only unit in the

army. In the time period which I discussed in chapter 2

and 3 this would all change.

In chapter 2 we saw that the phalanx infantry unit became

more and more challenged by the use of other, more

flexible and manoeuvrable units. At the battle of Delion

we saw a Boeotian army lined up in much the same way as

Alexander’s army would almost 100 years later, with

cavalry and light-armed troops on the wings. The threat

which the Boeotian cavalry presented was in fact enough

for the Athenian hoplites to flee. The year before, at the

battle of Sphakteria, Thucydides told us how a unit of

Spartan hoplites were crushed by a mix of Athenian

hoplites and Athenian missile troops. The Athenian hoplite

took up a strong position on the battlefield and held it,

55

which is how the phalanx infantry would function later on,

and the missile troops would harass the Spartan hoplites

every time they would try to attack. One could perhaps go

as far as to say that this was one of the first attempts

at something that looks like blitzkrieg. We have also seen

that at the battle of Mantinea and at a battle on Sicily,

the cavalry played a more important role to the outcome of

the battle and that the phalanx infantry’s role was a more

defensive one. In the last battle I analysed in chapter 2,

the battle of Leuctra, I argued that the phalanx infantry

was now more willing to take up a defensive position,

which was proved by the Theban willingness to alter their

tactics and have a fifty man deep rank against the Spartan

eight man deep rank. In chapter 2 I showed the tendencies

of what was to come in terms of the change in the role of

the phalanx infantry. Other units such as cavalry and

missile troops were challenging the phalanx infantry’s

role and thus it would need to change in order to still be

an effective unit on the battlefield.

The last chapter of this paper described the changes to

the phalanx infantry which arguably begun with Philip II

56

and was further developed by Alexander the Great. I argued

that the phalanx infantry would certainly get an advantage

compared to the traditional hoplite in terms of reach and

ability to hold an enemy at a distance when it was

equipped with the sarissa. I also argued that the phalanx

infantry would now become even less flexible and

manoeuvrable, which would lead to this unit having a much

more defensive role under Alexander. We saw how the

cavalry had taken the role of being the attacking unit at

the battle of Chaeronea, which it would maintain

throughout the campaign of Alexander. The phalanx infantry

had probably not been equipped with the sarissa yet, thus it

could still work as bait, opening the Athenian and Theban

lines. At the battle of Gaugamela this idea was further

enhanced when it became clear that it was the cavalry

which Alexander used as the attacking unit. The phalanx

infantry’s role at this battle was to hold off the enemy’s

infantry, while the cavalry was attacking (in this

instance Darius). This is something we also saw at the

battle of Hydaspes where the infantry was supposed to hold

off the Indian infantry, while the missile troops attacked

57

the elephants and the cavalry took out the Indian cavalry.

The role of the phalanx infantry had been changed into a

much more defensive role and the cavalry had taken the

phalanx infantry’s former role as the attacking unit.

In this dissertation I argue that the role of the phalanx

infantry changed from being an attacking one at the battle

of Marathon, into being a defensive one at the battle of

Hydaspes. I also argue that the phalanx infantry needed

support from other units in order to perform its role,

much due to it being a poorly flexible and manoeuvrable

unit. However, I do not say that the excellence of the

phalanx infantry changed, quite the contrary. What I claim

is that the changing role of the phalanx infantry in fact

improved the Greco-Macedonian army, turning it into a more

balanced and purposeful army.

58

Appendix

59

Figure 1: Battle of Marathon.

60

Figure 2: Battle of Leuctra.

61

Figure 3: A soldiers equipped with a sarissa on the left vs. a hoplite soldier on the right.

Figure 4: Battle of Gaugamela.

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