CONSOCIATIONAL NEGOTIATED DEMOCRACY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
ON ETHNO-POLITICAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN
MANDERA COUNTY, KENYA
MUTUNGI JOSEPH MATEE
(MA - University of Nairobi; B.Ed. Arts - Moi University)
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POST-GRADUATE STUDIES IN
PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PEACE AND CONFLICT
STUDIES OF THE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PEACE STUDIES,
KISII UNIVERSITY
NOVEMBER 2020
ii
DECLARATION
I declare that this thesis, which I submit for examination in consideration for the award
of Doctor of Philosophy degree in Peace and Conflict Studies, is my original work and
has not been presented for award of any degree in any other university.
Joseph Matee Mutungi ---------------------- ------------------
DAS/60154/14 Signature Date
This thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as the University
Supervisors.
Amb. Prof. David K.A. Kikaya, PhD., HSC. ---------------------- ------------------
Professor of Peace and International Relations Signature Date
United States International University - Africa
Dr. Anthony Ichuloi, PhD. ---------------------- ------------------
Lecturer & Chair of Department Signature Date
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
Kisii University
iii
PLAGIARISM DECLARATION
DECLARATION BY STUDENT i. I declare I have read and understood Kisii University Postgraduate Examination
Rules and Regulations, and other documents concerning academic dishonesty.
ii. I do understand that ignorance of these rules and regulations is not an excuse for a
violation of the said rules.
iii. If I have any questions or doubts, I realize that it is my responsibility to keep
seeking an answer until I understand.
iv. I understand I must do my own work.
v. I also understand that if I commit any act of academic dishonesty like plagiarism,
my thesis/project can be assigned a fail grade (“F”)
vi. I further understand I may be suspended or expelled from the University for
Academic Dishonesty.
Name: MUTUNGI JOSEPH MATEE Signature: ………………………….
Registration No.: DAS/60154/14 Date: ………………………………
DECLARATION BY SUPERVISORS
i. I/we declare that this thesis/project has been submitted to plagiarism detection
service.
ii. The thesis/project contains less than 20% of plagiarized work.
iii. I/we hereby give consent for marking.
----------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------
Signature Date
Amb. Prof. David K.A. Kikaya, PhD., HSC.
Professor of Peace and International Relations
United States International University - Africa
----------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------
Signature Date
Dr. Anthony Ichuloi, PhD.
Lecturer & Chair of Department
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
Kisii University
iv
DECLARATION OF NUMBER OF WORDS
Thesis Title: Consociational Negotiated Democracy and its Implications on Ethno-
Political Conflict Management in Mandera County, Kenya
I confirm that the word length of:
1) The thesis, including footnotes, is …53,773…
2) The bibliography is …2743… and, if applicable
3) The appendices are…1598…
I also declare the electronic version is identical to the final, hard bound copy of the thesis
and corresponds with those on which the examiners based their recommendation for the
award of the degree.
NAME OF CANDIDATE: MUTUNGI JOSEPH MATEE
ADM NO: DAS/60154/14
SCHOOL/FACULTY: SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PEACE STUDIES
Signed: …………………………………… Date: ……………………
(Candidate)
We confirm that the thesis submitted by the above-named candidate complies with the
relevant word length specified in the School of Postgraduate Studies and Commission of
University Education regulations for the PhD Degree.
Signed: ............................................ Date: …………….………….
Amb. Prof. David Kikaya, PhD., HSC.
Professor of Peace and International Relations
United States International University – Africa
Signed: ............................................ Date: ……………………….
Dr. Anthony Ichuloi, PhD.
Lecturer & Chair of Department
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
Kisii University
v
COPYRIGHT
All rights are reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized, in any form or
by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any
information storage or retrieval system without prior written permission of the author or
Kisii University.
© 2020, Mutungi Joseph Matee
vi
DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my mother Rose Kalondu and my late father Anthony Mutungi
for instilling in me at a tender age the virtues of hard work and peaceful resolution of
disputes.
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis would not have materialized without the support of various people and
organizations to whom I am greatly indebted. First and foremost, I thank God for the
privilege of taking up my doctoral studies in Peace and Conflict Studies at Kisii University.
Secondly, I wish to convey my sincere gratitude to my mentors and supervisors, Amb. Prof.
David Kikaya and Dr. Anthony Ichuloi for guiding me during the research work that
culminated in this thesis. I recognize the contribution of my lecturers at Kisii University
who took me through various courses in the run up to this write up. I am grateful to the
Chair of the Department of Political Science and Peace Studies, Dr. Pia Okeche, the Dean
in the School of Arts and Social Sciences, Dr. Margaret Barasa and the Director, School of
Post Graduate Studies Dr. George Nyandoro for the administration effort that went into the
realization of this work since its inception. To my colleagues in the Peace and Conflict
Studies class, thank you for the mutual encouragement even when the going got tough.
Thirdly, I wish to sincerely thank my employer, Africa Nazarene University for the
immense support accorded to me in various ways ranging from tuition fee support, use of
the institutional facilities such as the library and an ambience conducive for research work.
I extend my sincere appreciation to my colleagues at Africa Nazarene University who
contributed to this thesis development in one way or the other, particularly Dr. Emily
Okuto, Dr. Simon Muthomi and Dr. Eric Osoro. I am equally grateful to my friend Alfred
Owino who encouraged me to hang in there even when I was at the verge of despairing.
To my research assistants Mohammed Omar, Adan Ibrahim and Mohammed Hassan, I
could never thank you enough. May the Lord richly bless you all.
Lastly, I am eternally grateful to my dear wife Vivian Mukhavali who took on most of my
responsibilities of bringing up our young family as I burned the midnight oil to complete
my doctoral studies. To my children Anthony Faraja and Rose Kalondu, thank you for
cheering daddy even when the going got tough. Your smiles during those late weekend
evenings made the difference and gave me the impetus to soldier on. To all of you, asanteni
sana.
viii
ABSTRACT
Consociational negotiated democracy is commonly used in plural and multicultural
societies ensure inclusivity and equal representation in the governance process as well as
in sharing of other available resources, thus contributing to peace and stability. In Kenya,
particularly in Mandera county, despite the adoption of the consociational negotiated
democracy model, ethno-political conflicts persist which disrupt peace and stability among
the communities living there. The purpose of this study was to assess the implications of
consociational negotiated democracy to the management of ethno-political conflicts that
tend to undermine peace and stability in Mandera County. The specific objectives guiding
the study were: to analyze the dynamics of consociational negotiated democracy in the
management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County; to examine the structure of
consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in the management of ethno-political
conflicts in Mandera County; to evaluate the effectiveness of consociational negotiated
democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. The study
was informed by Kaufman’s International theory of inter-ethnic war and the pluralist
theory of democracy. A descriptive research design that incorporates both qualitative and
quantitative approaches was employed. The target population was 4765 heads of
households and various cadres of leaders. The sample size was 357 respondents. Data was
collected using interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and questionnaires.
Qualitative data was analyzed using thematic narratives while quantitative data was
analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics obtained from SPSS, version 23.
Regression analysis and ANOVA were used to test the null hypothesis. Pie charts, tables
and bar graphs were used to present the statistical data while qualitative data was presented
in the form of narratives and verbatim quotations. The study found out that religious
teachings, family ties, desire for peaceful electoral processes and the fear of self-
annihilation were key factors in the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy.
Support for Consociational negotiated democracy was also found to have declined when
the 2013 and 2017 election cycles were compared, the reasons for that being exclusion of
some interest groups such as women and youth and major clans like the Degodia and
perception of the process as entrenching political dictatorship. The negotiations were found
to be consultative among the cooperating groups, multi-layered and unanimity the
preferred style of decision making. Consociational negotiated democracy was found not to
have entrenched equity in sharing of power and resources besides worsening intra and
inter-clan political relations. The null hypothesis test gave a p value of .052 against the
study’s adopted alpha level of .05, and hence the study failed to reject the null hypothesis.
The study recommends inclusion of all clans and interest groups in the negotiations besides
ensuring equity in sharing positions of power and resources for Mandera County to realize
a reduction in politically motivated inter-clan conflicts. The study findings may inform
policy makers in the county and the national governments with regard to entrenching
inclusive governance processes as a pathway to managing the recurrent politically
motivated conflicts.
ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION............................................................................................................... ii
PLAGIARISM DECLARATION................................................................................... iii
DECLARATION OF NUMBER OF WORDS.............................................................. iv
COPY RIGHT ................................................................................................................... v
DEDICATION.................................................................................................................. vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................... vii
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ ix
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... xiv
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ..................................................... xvi
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Background of the Study .............................................................................................. 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................ 10
1.3 Justification and significance of the Study ................................................................. 11
1.4 Objectives of the Study ............................................................................................... 13
1.4.1 Specific Objectives ............................................................................................... 13
1.5 Research Questions ..................................................................................................... 13
1.6 Hypothesis................................................................................................................... 13
1.7 Scope of the Study ...................................................................................................... 13
1.8 Limitations of the Study.............................................................................................. 14
1.9 Assumptions of the Study ........................................................................................... 15
1.10 Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................. 16
1.11 Operational Definition of Terms ............................................................................... 19
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................. 21
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 21
2.2 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................... 21
x
2.2.1 International Theory of Inter-Ethnic War ............................................................ 21
2.2.2 The Pluralist Theory of Democracy ..................................................................... 24
2.3 Theoretical Review of Democracy ............................................................................. 26
2.3.1 Consociational Negotiated Democracy ................................................................ 28
2.3.2 Ethno-Political Conflict Management .................................................................. 36
2.4 Empirical Review........................................................................................................ 39
2.4.1 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ....... 39
2.4.2 Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ............................................ 46
2.4.3 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the Management of
Ethno-Political Conflicts ............................................................................................... 55
2.5 Research Gaps ............................................................................................................. 62
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................ 63
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 63
3.2 Research Design.......................................................................................................... 63
3.3 Study Area .................................................................................................................. 65
3.3 Target Population ........................................................................................................ 66
3.4 Sampling Procedures and Techniques ........................................................................ 68
3.4.1 Sampling Procedure ............................................................................................. 68
3.4.2 Study Sample Size ................................................................................................ 70
3.5 Data Collection Instruments ....................................................................................... 71
3.5.1 Developing of Instruments ................................................................................... 71
3.5.1.1 Questionnaire ................................................................................................. 71
3.5.1.2 Interview Schedule ........................................................................................ 72
3.5.1.3 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) ................................................................. 73
3.5.2 Data Collection Instruments Reliability and Validity .......................................... 74
3.5.2.1 Validity of Research Instruments .................................................................. 74
3.5.2.2 Reliability of Research Instruments .............................................................. 75
3.6 Data Analysis and Presentation of Findings ............................................................... 75
3.7 Legal and Ethical Considerations ............................................................................... 78
xi
CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ..................................................................................... 80
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 80
4.2 Response Rate ............................................................................................................. 81
4.3 Bio-data of Respondents ............................................................................................. 82
4.3.1 Age ....................................................................................................................... 82
4.3.2 Level of Education of Respondents ..................................................................... 83
4.3.3 Gender of Respondents ........................................................................................ 85
4.3.4 Marital Status of Respondents.............................................................................. 86
4.3.5 Respondents’ Clan Affiliations ............................................................................ 87
4.3.6 Respondents’ Religious Affiliations .................................................................... 89
4.3.7 Respondents’ Duration of Stay in Mandera County ............................................ 90
4.4 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ............. 91
4.4.1 Desire for a Political Process Free of Violence and Destruction ......................... 91
4.4.2 Fairness in Sharing of Political Positions ............................................................. 93
4.4.3 Fair Distribution of Economic Resources ............................................................ 96
4.4.4 Religious Teachings ............................................................................................. 98
4.4.5 Cross-cutting Family Ties .................................................................................. 100
4.4.6 Insufficient Campaign Finances ......................................................................... 103
4.4.7 Lessons Learnt on the Success of Consociationalism elsewhere ....................... 105
4.4.8 Inclusion of Clan Representatives in the Negotiations ...................................... 107
4.4.9 Consociational Negotiated Democracy as the Only Realistic Pathway to an
Elective Political Office for Small Clans .................................................................... 110
4.4.10 Other Reasons that Influence Adoption of Consociational Negotiated
Democracy .................................................................................................................. 112
4.4.11 Extend of Support for Consociational Negotiated Democracy in Managing
Ethno-Political Conflicts ............................................................................................. 115
4.5 The Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ......................................... 121
4.5.1 Inclusion of All Clans in the Negotiation Team ................................................ 121
4.5.2 Restriction of Negotiation Team to Garre, Murulle and Degodia Clans Only .. 123
4.5.3 Restriction of Negotiation Team to the Garre Clan ........................................... 124
4.5.4 Restriction of Negotiation Team to Two of the Three Major Clans .................. 125
xii
4.5.5 Composition of Negotiating Team in Terms of Gender .................................... 127
4.5.6 Youth Inclusion in Negotiations ........................................................................ 130
4.5.7 Beliefs Shaping Consociational Negotiated Democracy ................................... 131
4.5.8 Terms of Consociational Negotiated Democracy .............................................. 133
4.5.9 Role of Political Leaders in Consociational Negotiated Democracy ................. 137
4.5.10 Generation of Negotiations Agenda ................................................................. 139
4.5.11 Discussion of Agenda Items and Consensus building ..................................... 141
4.5.12 Proposition of Candidates by Clans in the order of Preference ....................... 144
4.5.13 Briefing of Candidates on Negotiation Outcomes ........................................... 146
4.5.14 Proportional Allocation of Positions and Resources among ethnic groups ..... 147
4.5.15 Proposal of Negotiators by Interest Groups other Than Clans ........................ 149
4.5.16 Neutrality of Negotiation Team Leader ........................................................... 150
4.5.17 Documentation of Proceedings ........................................................................ 152
4.5.18 Challenges Encountered During Negotiations ................................................. 153
4.5.19 Institutionalization of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ........................ 165
4.6 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy .......................................... 166
4.6.1 Pre-consociationalism Political Dispute Resolution Methods ........................... 166
4.6.2 Changes after Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy .................. 171
4.6.3 Outcomes of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ........................................ 175
4.6.3.1 Inclusion of All Clans in the County Political Leadership and Governance 176
4.6.3.2 Equitable Distribution of County Employment Opportunities .................... 178
4.6.3.3 Fairness in Implementation of County Government Development Projects 181
4.6.3.4 Successful Resolution of Political Disputes without involving the Courts . 183
4.6.4 Weaknesses of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ..................................... 185
4.6.5 Evidence of Reduction in Ethno-Political Conflicts .......................................... 190
4.6.5.1 Improved Cohesion Among Clans .............................................................. 190
4.6.5.2 Decline in Politically Motivated Inter-clan Violence .................................. 192
4.6.5.3 Voluntary Surrender of Defense/Offence Weapons .................................... 194
4.6.5.4 Settlement of People in Places Previously Considered Hostile ................... 196
4.6.6 Hypothesis Testing ............................................................................................. 198
xiii
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................. 202
5.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 202
5.1 Summary of findings................................................................................................. 202
5.1.1 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ..... 202
5.1.2 The Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ................................... 204
5.1.3 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the Management of
Ethno-Political conflicts in Mandera County. ............................................................. 209
5.2 Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 210
5.3 Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 213
5.4 Suggestions for Further Research ............................................................................. 215
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 217
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 233
APPENDIX I: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 233
APPENDIX II: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE ......................................................... 234
APPENDIX III: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW SCHEDULE .............................................. 241
APPENDIX IV: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS ................................... 243
APPENDIX V: PLAGIARISM REPORT ...................................................................... 244
APPENDIX VI: INTRODUCTION LETTER FROM KISII UNIVERSITY ................ 249
APPENDIX VII: AUTHORIZATION LETTER FROM NACOSTI ............................. 250
APPENDIX VIII: RESEARCH LICENSE .................................................................... 251
APPENDIX IX: AUTHORIZATION LETTER FROM MANDERA COUNTY
COMMISSIONER .......................................................................................................... 252
APPENDIX X: AUTHORIZATION LETTER FROM MANDERA COUNTY
DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION ...................................................................................... 253
APPENDIX XI: KREJCIE AND MORGAN’S TABLE FOR SAMPLE SIZE ............ 254
APPENDIX XII: MAP OF MANDERA COUNTY MAJOR URBAN CENTRES ...... 255
xiv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1: Target population distributed by town ............................................................. 68
Table 3.2: Proportionate sample size distribution across the participating towns ............ 70
Table 4.1: Distribution of respondents by age .................................................................. 82
Table 4.2: Distribution of respondents by level of education ........................................... 84
Table 4.3: Distribution of respondents by gender ............................................................. 85
Table 4.4: Distribution of respondents by marital status .................................................. 86
Table 4.5: Distribution of respondents by clan affiliation ................................................ 87
Table 4.6: Distribution of respondents by religious affiliation ......................................... 89
Table 4.7: Distribution of respondents by duration of stay in Mandera County .............. 90
Table 4.8: Family ties ..................................................................................................... 101
Table 4.9: Successful adoption of consociational negotiated democracy elsewhere...... 105
Table 4.10: Inclusion of all clans in consociational negotiated democracy ................... 121
Table 4.11: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to Garre, Murulle
and Degodia clans only ................................................................................................... 123
Table 4.12: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to one major clan
......................................................................................................................................... 124
Table 4.13: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to two of the three
major clans ...................................................................................................................... 125
Table 4.14: Proportional sharing of positions and resources .......................................... 148
Table 4.15: Propose of negotiators by interest groups .................................................... 149
19Table 4.16: Negotiation process undermined by disgruntled opinion leaders external to
the process ....................................................................................................................... 155
Table 4.17: Infiltration of negotiation processes by parties from outside the county ..... 157
Table 4.18: Clan participation in choosing negotiators and acceptance of outcomes .... 160
Table 4.19: Political dispute resolution methods ............................................................ 167
Table 4.20: Clan affiliation of elected leaders ................................................................ 178
Table 4.21: Distribution of appointive senior county jobs across the clans ................... 180
Table 4.22: Model summary of effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy 198
Table 4.23: ANOVA between reduction in ethno-political conflicts and efficacy of
consociational negotiated democracy ............................................................................. 199
Table 4.24: Coefficients of ethno-political conflicts and effectiveness of consociational
negotiated democracy ..................................................................................................... 200
xv
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework .................................................................................. 18
Figure 4.1: Desire for a political process free of violence and destruction ...................... 92
Figure 4.2: Assurance of fairness in sharing political positions ....................................... 94
Figure 4.3: Fair distribution of economic resources ......................................................... 97
Figure 4.4: Influence of religious teachings ..................................................................... 99
Figure 4.5: Insufficient campaign finances ..................................................................... 103
Figure 4.6: Inclusion of clan representatives in the negotiations.................................... 107
Figure 4.7: An avenue for small clans to hold county political office ............................ 110
Figure 4.8: Support for consociationalism in management of ethno-political conflicts . 116
Figure 4.9: Inclusion of males and females in the negotiation team .............................. 128
Figure 4.10: Inclusion of youth in negotiation teams ..................................................... 130
Figure 4.11: Presentation of candidates for elective posts in order of preference .......... 144
Figure 4.12: Briefings of candidates about negotiation outcomes .................................. 146
Figure 4.13: Neutrality of negotiation process leader ..................................................... 151
Figure 4.14: Documentation of negotiation outcomes .................................................... 152
Figure 4.15: Financial inducement of members of negotiating team ............................. 154
Figure 4.16: Absence of independent experts influences strength of agreements .......... 159
Figure 4.17: Intra-clan rivalries affecting choices of candidates for various offices ...... 162
Figure 4.18: Irregular updates on negotiation progress creating suspicion of foul play. 164
Figure 4.19: Consideration to institutionalize consociational negotiated democracy .... 165
Figure 4.20: Inclusion of all clans in the county political leadership and governance ... 176
Figure 4.21 Equitable distribution of county employment opportunities across clans ... 179
Figure 4.22: Fairness in implementation of county government development projects
across sub-counties ......................................................................................................... 181
Figure 4.23 Successful resolution of political disputes without involving the courts .... 183
Figure 4.24: Growing cohesion among clans ................................................................. 191
Figure 4.25: Decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence .................................. 193
Figure 4.26: Voluntary surrender of defense/offence weapons ...................................... 195
Figure 4.27: Settlement of people in places previously considered hostile .................... 196
xvi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ANOVA : Analysis of Variance
AU : African Union
CoK : Constitution of Kenya
CPDO : County Planning and Development Office
CT : Corner Tribes
DRC : Democratic Republic of Congo
FGD : Focus Group Discussion
GCE : Garre Council of Elders
GoK : Government of Kenya
IEBC : Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
KANU : Kenya Africa National Union
KII : Kei Informant Interviews
KNBS : Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
MCA : Member of County Assembly
MP : Member of Parliament
NACOSTI : National Council of Science Technology and Innovation
NARC : National Rainbow Coalition
NCIC : National Cohesion and Integration Commission
PBO : Public Benefit Organizations
PEV : Post-Election Violence
xvii
RA : Regression Analysis
SPSS : Statistical Package for Social Science
UN : United Nations
UNDG : United Nations Development Group
UNDP : United Nations Development Programme
1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This chapter puts the topic of study in perspective by giving its background, statement of
the problem and a justification for the study. It further highlights the objectives of the study,
the research questions, scope of the study and its limitations, the conceptual framework
and operationalizes the key terms used in the study.
1.1 Background of the Study
The international community continues to grapple with the challenge of conflicts occurring
in different parts of the world. Conflicts vary in terms of their nature, duration, stage, and
underlying causes; they are an endemic phenomenon associated with an inevitable co-
existence in all human societies. Instructively, conflicts are neither good nor bad in
themselves; their progression, suppression or resolution largely depends on how they are
handled. Any intervention should be intended to restore the pre-conflict relationships
between the contending parties and it should be as inclusive as possible because there is no
single actor, public or private, who has the knowledge and skillset required to solve
complex, dynamic and diversified societal problems (Stoker, 2004; Hyden & Court, 2001).
Direct and indirect actors in a conflict must be involved for any envisaged peaceful
outcome to bear legitimacy and support at the implementation stage. Indeed, the study takes
the view that any peace-building effort that excludes the very people for whom the peace
is being built is an exercise in futility. This line of thought is reiterated by Schuman (2006)
who explains that individuals and interest groups in all sectors of society have the right to
meaningful participation in the decisions that affect them.
2
In the context of this study, consociational negotiated democracy (CND) refers to a
political structure where members of a given community or society, engage in discussions
on how to share power between various segments that make up society (Lijphart, 2012;
Armingeon, 2003). This arrangement is important in ensuring representation in decision
making, fair sharing of the community’s resources, amicable resolution of political
differences, and reducing animosity within communities where cultural/identity
differences are significant (Cammett & Malesky, 2012). Consociationalism is thus an all-
inclusive approach to democracy that seeks to incorporate as many actors in the political
matrix as possible through the processes of compromise and accommodation of constituent
segments’ elite to enhance societal stability.
Consociational negotiated democratic transitions have occurred in many regions across the
globe such as Europe, Africa, East and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East that had
experienced varied degrees of politically motivated identity conflicts. The political,
economic and social transformations that have occurred in these regions have resulted in
different outcomes besides exhibiting varied characteristics of the negotiation and
transition processes (Guo & Stradiotto, 2014). Some of the characteristics include shared
political power based on the relative strength of the cooperating groups and a resurgent
economy arising from the resultant stable environment. It is important to note here that in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, many European countries experienced significant political
shifts and/or transitions owing to various geopolitical dynamics at the time, with the most
significant one revolving around the cold war politics and the emerging new world order.
3
The political shifts and transitions to democracy resulted in high levels of democratization
among them transformations from one-party states to multiparty political systems.
In Hungary for instance, there was a major transition from communism to democracy
which was characterized by elements of consociational democracy after many years of
engagement in war (Prohnitchi, 1990). Cox and Furlong (2007), writing on the transition
posit that the roundtable discussions and outcomes of the negotiated political process set
Hungary on a successful path toward democracy, evidenced by among other indicators
successive successful multi‐party elections and establishment of parliamentary system of
governance with clear division of political functions.
In Asia, the political union between Malaysia and Singapore was short-lived as the latter
seceded from the former in 1965 after only two years due to escalating conflicts revolving
around racial and ethnic inclusivity in the political landscape of the federation. The reality
of ethnic and racial diversity largely informed Malaysia’s review of her constitution in
order to accommodate that identity diversity in political representation and this set the
country on the path of stability (Shamsuddin, Liaw & Ridzuan, 2015). Policy instruments
such as the National Economic Policy were also negotiated and adopted in order to
accommodate all groups in the social and economic life of Malaysia in an equitable
manner.
The salience of identity difference, popularly called ethnicity in African politics and
conflicts is well documented (Cheeseman, 2015; Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008). Cheeseman
4
and Ford (2007) for instance argue that ethno-political fragmentations and geographical
concentration of ethnic groups are important factors in explaining Africa’s ethnic-based
politics and its attendant upheavals. In essence, Cheeseman and Ford paint a picture of a
continent whose politics is typified by overreliance on ethnic support bases. This view is
buttressed by the findings of a study conducted by Teshome-Bahiru (2008) in Ethiopia on
the formation of political parties in three successive administrations between 1930 and
2008 in which overwhelming evidence indicated that formation of the political parties were
largely informed by ethnicity.
The political reality in many African countries is that influential politicians from different
ethnic communities cut political deals in terms of power sharing for themselves and present
such deals to their ethnic groups as the benefit the community would obtain by supporting
the deal at hand. It is this cadre of leaders that Lijphart (2012) refers to as an “elite cartel”
whose interests in the sharing of power if not met can undermine the stability of the political
unit. It is noteworthy that the deals struck by the ‘elite cartels’ have nothing to do with
ideologies but pure political survival of influential individuals in the respective
communities. Political contests are thus reduced to a matter of ethnic or even clan
mobilization against competitors.
The argument on the reduction of politics in many African polities to ethnic contests is
supported by African history that documents African societies as having been divided
along ethnic lines and the ethnic groups as further sub-divided into clans (Alesina et al.,
2011; Boone, 2003; Murdock, 1959). From the clan level, regional and national politics
5
emerge as candidates are assured of near fanatical following by their kith and kin. It is out
of that kind of understanding that ethno-political conflicts become inevitable as political
competition becomes a zero-sum game. The consociational model of democracy thus
comes in handy under such political reality to prevent, manage and/or resolve ethno-
political conflicts.
In Africa, consociational negotiated democracy has increasingly continued to gain traction
both at the national and grassroots levels. In South Africa for instance, the transition from
the apartheid regime to democratic rule took the course of consociational negotiated
democracy among the contending parties after many years of a mix of armed struggles and
non-violent strife. According to Horowitz (2001) the end of white-minority rule in South
Africa and the transition to an all-inclusive governance structure was a major political
transition aided, guided and midwifed by among significant other processes and activities,
negotiated democracy. Instructively, the process of negotiations in South Africa was not
only a process of resolving the racial conflict between the whites and the blacks, but also
the conflict between the Africa National Congress (ANC) group and fellow blacks who
had been successfully ‘bought/induced’ by the ruling white minority. The significance of
consociational arrangements in the democratic processes of South Africa is evidenced by
her successful emergence from the shadows of seemingly irreconcilable conflict to create
‘the rainbow nation’.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides another African example where the
concept of consociational negotiated democracy has been experimented in the management
6
of political formation for identity-based conflicts at the national level. Mpyana, (2017)
characterizes the DRC as a country that has been at war with itself. The DRC’s political
conflicts and alignments in the period after independence from colonial rule were
characterized by ethnicity. For instance, the battle for political supremacy in the DRC post-
independence state pitted the majority Katanga against the minority Kasai. The Kasai
people were considered more educated and perhaps wealthy because they benefited
immensely from the colonialists who offered them better education and jobs than the
Katangas (Berkeley, 2002). These ethnic grudges have been manipulated by the political
elite and compounded by other geo-political processes to metamorphose into the long
running violent conflict that besets DRC to date. This study contends that the political
system adopted in any political unit must be responsive to the unique needs of the unit’s
social demographics.
In comparing Kenya to other African countries, Njoroge and Sperling (2017), assert that
politics in Kenya is less about pertinent issues and ideals that touch on the lives of its
citizens but more about ethnicity and tribalism. They advance the argument made by
Cheeseman and Ford (2007) that the political realm of Kenya right from independence was
established and continues to be fed by ethnic-based politics which mostly end up in violent
conflicts. The politics of ethnic identity and its attendant negative effects have become
manifest in almost all electoral cycles since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in
1990, with the 2007 general elections especially in the race for presidency being the
watershed moment.
7
It was after this disputed presidential election of 2007 which turned tragic, claiming 1133
lives (CIPEV, 2008) that negotiated democracy in the form of consociational
representation was formally introduced as supported by the interventions that ensued. It is
noteworthy here that the presidential campaigns preceding the elections had been proffered
as ‘forty one against one’ to imply that 41 ethnic communities were uniting to dislodge one
ethnic community from power because of its perceived dominance. Given the immense
influence on the control and distribution of resources that political actors had under the
repealed constitution that was in operation in 2007/2008, that presidential election were
conceived as a matter of life and death. The aftermath of the post-election violence (PEV)
was the creation of the National Dialogue mechanism led by the African Union (AU) that
negotiated a power sharing deal in the form of a grand coalition government between the
two disputants. This negotiated agreement saw the country regain stability as parties were
accommodated in political decision making and resource sharing (Mwagiru, 2008).
The practice of negotiated democracy in Kenya post the 2008 period extended to the
subnational or county levels following the adoption of the Constitution of Kenya (CoK)
2010 that established the devolved system of governance being practiced in the 47 counties.
The practice of consociationalism at the sub-national level has however incorporated a mix
of previously inactive political actors in the name of elders and active political actors
seeking political office. Consociationalism at the counties has been painted as a traditional
mechanism for nominating political leaders and is mostly practiced among ethnic
communities of different numerical strength who occupy the same electoral unit. The
Kenyan-Somalis for instance conceive it as a way of fostering peaceful co-existence as
8
well as unity among various clans of Somali descent. The mechanism had actually been
practiced by the Kenyan Somali clans for long, albeit subtly. It however gained traction in
the 2013 and 2017 general election cycles.
The pursuit of devolved power and resource has seen political contests at the sub-national
level (counties) heighten. Mandera County, the research site of the study has its politics
organized along clans and sub-clans. Although the county had experienced violent
interclan conflicts prior to devolution, the struggle for space within the county’s political
matrix led to a surge in violent politically motivated inter-clan conflicts. In light of this,
consociational form of negotiated democracy was championed as a viable approach in
managing ethno-political interests and the attendant conflicts in the lead up to the 2013 and
2017 general elections. In the 2017 election cycle in particular, the Garre Council of Elders
(GCE) advised all serving elected leaders against defending their political seats. The
Council argued that inter-clan consultations favoured an approach where leadership had to
rotate between the various clans in the county. This, as Makinda (1991), points out, is a
furtherance of pre-independence politics of the Somali community, when politics was clan-
based and the clan elders at that time formulated ways of ensuring that democracy did not
result to animosity among the clans.
However, such occurrences and practices of consociationalism are neither unique nor
limited to the communities residing in Mandera County. In the build-up to the 2013 general
election in Trans Nzoia County, activists and opinion leaders urged communities in the
county to embrace the concept of consociational negotiated democracy to ensure equity in
9
the sharing of power among the communities in the polity. The county is cosmopolitan and
consociationalism was advanced as the best mechanism to avert conflicts which would
undermine the promise of development and unity as envisaged by the devolved system of
governance. Under the Mabanga Peace Accord, the major communities of the western
Kenya region fairly shared elective County Assembly positions to ensure impartial
representation and also reduce hostilities (Bwayo, 2012).
As with any other forms and processes of democracy, consociational democracy processes
can be punctuated by serious disagreements which might degenerate to violence before the
parties come again together for further and more sober discussions. If well executed,
consociational democracy is likely to flourish in culturally plural societies as the resultant
institutions and arrangements are home-grown, inclusive, legitimate and hence locally
supported. This is a core tenet of fair representative governance institutions and grassroots
peacebuilding as advocated by Lederach (1997). Successful negotiations between actors
translate to inclusive governance, political stability, equity in development and fidelity to
constitutionalism. However, negotiations and transitions characterized by suppression of
competition and refusal to relinquish elective positions are highly likely to lead to political
instability (Guo & Stradiotto, 2014).
In light of the foregoing discussion, this study sought to examine the dynamics that
informed the adoption of consociational democracy, the structure and effectiveness of
consociational negotiated democracy in forestalling and managing ethno-political conflicts
in Mandera County.
10
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Ethno-political conflicts undermine social-political stability between groups in the areas
affected. In Kenya, ethnic wars are being used as a political tool to weaken the peace
processes. For instance, the 2007/2008 Post Election Violence claimed about1133 lives
besides occasioning the displacement of over 600,000 people perceived to belong to
different ethno-political formations (CIPEV, 2008). Out of 310 deaths and over 216, 294
displacements emanating from politically motivated interethnic violence as recorded by
OCHA in 2015, 56% were reported in Mandera and Wajir Counties. The root causes of
ethno-political conflicts in Mandera county have been linked to development grievances,
exclusion from political power and access to resources (Abdi, 2016). The principles of the
consociational model of governance that mirrors the objectives of devolution at Article 174
of the CoK, a system of governance that was designed to address the root causes and drivers
of conflicts in the counties seem not address the problem. This highlights the place of
political leadership and governance deficits in the ethnically diverse and volatile county.
Despite the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy model whose principles of
inclusivity, proportionality and segment autonomy had been argued as the pathway to
addressing the conflict drivers, politically motivated conflicts persist. The National
Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) flags Mandera County as a hotspot for
interethnic violence, especially during the electioneering period as was the case in 2017.
Little is known about the specific dynamics in Mandera County that informed adoption of
the consociational model, the extend of its support among the populace and the structure
of the negotiations embodying the model because as explained by Armingeon (2003), most
11
studies on consociationalism focus on outcomes rather than a characterization of the
processes that occur prior to the observed outcomes. The model’s effectiveness in
managing ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County is also largely unknown. These are
some of the knowledge gaps the study intended to fill.
1.3 Justification and significance of the Study
The politics of the winner takes all creates problems such as unequal sharing of economic
resources, poor political representation of some social groups etc. and this in most cases
leads to inter group tensions and conflicts in plural settings (Koter, 2013; Ajulu, 2002).
Inequalities in access to political power and resources provide strong incentives for the rise
of politically motivated ethnic violence. The consociational model of democracy has been
advanced as the most suitable to transform the social-political conflict enablers in plural
settings because of its inclusion and proportionality principles that directly address issues
around access to power and resources equitably.
Despite the expansive literature on the consociational democracy and ethno-political
conflicts, very few studies have delved into the effectiveness of consociationalism in
managing ethno-political conflicts at the sub-national level in Kenya and Mandera County
in particular. The existing literature on consociationalism focuses more on the outcomes of
power and resource sharing at the national level with no scholarly attention to the
subnational level, and especially the model’s contribution to conflict management.
The study considered Mandera County a fitting environment for the inquiry because of its
diverse and conflicting clan/sub-clans identified with the same Somali community. The
12
specific complexities around the negotiations generating the agreements in Mandera
County’s body politic are scanty, further justifying the need for this study. The extend of
civil participation in the county’s political and governance process as anticipated in the
consociational model of democracy is unknown, including the underlying enablers or
hindrances. The study, therefore, seeks to contribute to an in-depth understanding of the
workings and potentials of consociational negotiated democracy at the subnational level,
in a county beset by recurrent ethno-political conflicts and a setting of heterogeneity within
homogeneity.
Thus, the study findings may assist the political leadership in Mandera County review
existing laws and policies on governance and development by integrating the emergent
recommendations. This may help create an enabling and sustainable socio-political and
economic framework in which the various groups living there can realize the promise of
devolution as contemplated in Article 174 of the Constitution of Kenya and hence
progressively eliminate the causes of conflicts in the county.
The findings may further interest scholars of consociational democracy and ethnic conflict
management, keen on understanding the nexus between the two variables. The importance
of appreciating the context within which a model is used and the complex issues
surrounding relationships of groups in a polity is also illuminated. In essence, the findings
and especially the suggested areas for further study form a basis for future scholarship.
13
1.4 Objectives of the Study
The general objective of this study was to examine the implications of consociational
negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.
1.4.1 Specific Objectives
i) To analyze the dynamics influencing the adoption of consociational negotiated
democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County
ii) To examine the structure of consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in the
management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County
iii) To evaluate the effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy in the
management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.
1.5 Research Questions
i) What dynamics influenced the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in the
management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County?
ii) What characteristics underpin the structure of consociational negotiated democracy as
practiced in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County?
iii) Is the practice of consociational negotiated democracy effective in the management of
ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County?
1.6 Hypothesis
H0 (iii): Consociational negotiated democracy has not led to reduction of ethno-political
conflicts in Mandera County.
1.7 Scope of the Study
Geographically, the study was restricted to Mandera County, Kenya. This is one of the
administrative areas established by the Constitution of Kenya in the First Schedule, whose
14
population is nearly perfectly homogenous, perhaps due to its proximity to communities of
Somali origin in the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia and Somalia. In terms of content,
the scope of the study was limited to consociational negotiated democracy and ethno-
political conflict management. Consociational negotiated democracy in this study refers to
a negotiation-based variant of democracy aimed at sharing elective and appointive
positions among other resources accruing from the electoral process. The type of
negotiations in focus were those based on power sharing as well as other resources that
come with acquisition of power. Specifically, the study focused on the influence of
consociational negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts pitting
the three dominant clans in Mandera County namely Garre, Murulle and the Degodia. The
study sampled respondents from among the leaders and the general population in an
attempt to obtain data on the research questions.
The study was further limited to the period between 2012 and 2018 during which the 2013
and the 2017 general elections occurred and when the practice of consociational negotiated
democracy became manifest. Moreover it was during this period that violent politically
motivated inter-clan conflicts were witnessed in Mandera County.
1.8 Limitations of the Study
Evidence indicates that most residents (70%) of Mandera County have no formal education
(KNBS, 2017) and therefore using English language in the data collection instruments and
during data collection was anticipated to affect the quality of information collected. To
overcome this drawback, the study enlisted the services of a professional translator to
decode research questions into the local Somali language and the filled questionnaire into
15
English for those respondents that had a limited English capacity. The researcher also made
use of research assistants drawn from the study population who had a good command of
English and the Somali languages who were trained and assisted to understand the
questions so that they can in turn assist the respondents during data collection. The study
contends that these measures enhanced the quality of data and information collected as well
as the return rate.
The study also suffered from unintended bias wherein a majority of the targeted group, that
is heads of households turned out to be males, owing to the patriarchal nature of the larger
Somali community within which the study was situated. This limitation is what has
informed the suggestion for further study on carrying out a study that has an equal
representation of both males and females to confirm whether the findings would hold.
1.9 Assumptions of the Study
First, the study assumed that there were underlying dynamics existing in Mandera county
that made the consociational model of democracy attractive to the majority of the
population and which prompted residents to support it at the onset of the devolved system
of governance in 2013. The study also assumed that the dynamics were linked to access to
power and economic resources as core conflict drivers in the county and that the
respondents were in a position to comment on the nexus between the consociational model
and the management of interclan conflicts.
Secondly, the study assumed that power sharing that is at the core of the consociational
model was based on some form of negotiations between the elite members of the Garre,
16
Degodia and Murulle clans and that these negotiations addressed the finer details on how
power was to be shared, the duration of those holding power to be in office among other
issues. That the essence of the negotiations was to reduce ethno-political tensions that
escalate to violent conflicts occasioning loss of lives and destruction of property.
Finally, the study further assumed that the respondents answered the questions in an honest
and candid manner and that none of them falsified the responses they provided. Another
presumption was that the inclusion criteria of the sample population was the most
appropriate one and it assured that the respondents had the necessary experience and
knowledge of the subjects under study.
1.10 Conceptual Framework
The proposed study seeks to examine the practice of consociational negotiated democracy
and its attendant dynamics in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera
County. To achieve this objective, the study proposes to borrow important concepts derived
from the theories explored above. The research questions indicate to a possible relationship
between the practice of consociational negotiated democracy which the study presented as
the independent variable and the management of ethnic based political conflicts, the
dependent variable as shown in Figure 1.1.
From figure 1.1, it can be seen that dynamics such as marginalization, family ties across
clans and the need for equity in the sharing of resource influence and motivate segments in
divided societies to consider a consociational approach in management of ethno-political
conflicts. The diagram suggests that outcomes such as representation in the economic and
17
political sphere enhance acceptance of consociational negotiated democracy as an avenue
to managing ethno-political conflicts. The figure also suggests that political leaders, well
established principles on the structure of negotiations and documentation of agreements
arising from negotiations play a role in the management of ethno-political conflicts. The
indicators of effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy in managing ethno-
political conflicts as per the conceptual framework include perceptions of inclusion or
exclusion among significant segments of the population, presence of resolved disputes and
the existence of a stable and peaceful environment where all groups are thriving. The study
posits that the independent variables influence the dependent variable. From Figure 1.1,
consociational negotiated democracy is the independent variable while the management of
ethno-political conflicts is the dependent variable. All these aspects which are linked to
consociational negotiated democracy are moderated by variables such as constitutional
demands, statutory provisions, policies and cultural practices in influencing the
management of ethno-political conflicts.
When ethno-political conflicts emerge, they do not have to be violent because alternative
approaches to managing them such as negotiations can be pursued to obtain win-win
solutions. What needs to be established are the factors that will pull people towards or away
from negotiations. The composition of the negotiation team as well as the assurance of
attending to the needs of all parties precipitating the conflicts will lead to effective
management of ethno-political conflicts and hence a more stable and peaceful society.
18
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework
Dynamics influencing adoption of
consociational negotiated democracy
Marginalization concerns
Equity in distribution of socio-economic
and political resources
Familial ties at the clan level
Structure of Consociational Negotiated
Democracy
Principles and terms
Role of political leaders
Agenda and consensus building
Documentation of agreements
Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated
Democracy
Inclusion of all clans in county political
leadership and governance
Fairness in county government
employment opportunities
Equity in distribution of development
projects across sub-counties
Successfully resolved political disputes
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
Legal framework i.e. Article 174 (d)
(e) (g) of the CoK
Cultural decision-making dictates
Clan demographics
Reduction in Ethno-Political Conflicts
Cohesion among different clans in
the county
Decline in politically motivated
inter-clan violence
Voluntary surrendering of
defence/offence weapons
Settlement of people in places
previously considered hostile
Intervening Variables
19
1.11 Operational Definition of Terms
Active Political Leaders: these are political leaders who are either holding an elective post
or vied but lost in the 2013 and or 2017 election cycles for the positions at the constituency
and county levels.
Clan: A unit of differentiation within an ethnic group that is composed of members that
have close family ties or lineage.
Consociation: an association of communities divided along ethnic, racial, sectorial or even
religious lines, coming together with an objective of amicably resolving their differences
to promote peaceful and progressive coexistence between/among them.
Democracy: a populist process of engaging all eligible people within a political unit either
directly or indirectly in making decisions that affect them.
Elder: A senior citizen within a community who is respected and his/her counsel is sought
in the management of issues of concern to the community. He/she has a privileged position
and is an opinion leader in the community owing to their familiarity with the community’s
dynamics, interests and history.
Ethnicity: A concept that characterizes the fact of one belonging to a particular group of
people that share certain common traditions.
Ethno-political conflicts: disagreements rooted in political matters that are informed by
the ethnic extraction of the contesting parties.
Head of household: An adult, male or female, who is in charge of a family. He or she
provides for the family and makes key decisions; they can authoritatively speak for their
respective household.
20
Management: means handling issues in a manner that obtains the best outcomes for all
involved actors. In this study, this concept has been used to mean a reduction in ethno-
political conflicts arising from consociational negotiated democracy processes.
Member of Parliament: This is an elected representative who represents an electoral unit,
either in the National Assembly and the Senate.
Negotiated democracy: a process of decision making that involves a few eminent persons
acting on behalf of the larger community deliberating on and recommending candidates to
the electorate for election in the actual elections as well as coming up with agreements on
the sharing of resources equitably in the polity.
Negotiations: structured discussions and/or deliberation between two parties over an issue
of mutual interest to them. The aim is to reach at an agreement acceptable to both of them.
Resources: these are valued things that are either of social, economic, political or
economic nature.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out to analyse and synthesize literature on the nexus between
consociational negotiated democracy and the management of politically motivated inter-
ethnic conflicts. The first part of the section focussed on the theories grounding the study
followed by an exposition of some of the extant debates in the area of consociational
negotiated democracy as it relates to political conflicts management so as to contextualize
the study. These debates were explored within the context of the key variables that form
the crux of the study. The second part of the review of literature focussed on empirical
studies aligned with the specific objectives that anchored the study.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Conflict between ethnic groups, caused by different factors, remain a reality and a problem
facing most communities and societies across the world. Landis (2017) notes that a number
of theories have been developed over the years to help in explaining and predicting the
phenomenon and to outline ways to reduce conflicts. This study used a triangulation
approach in developing a theoretical framework that adequately addressed the study
objectives. One of these anchor theories is Stuart Kaufman’s International Theory of Inter-
Ethnic War.
2.2.1 International Theory of Inter-Ethnic War
The international theory of inter-ethnic war was developed by Kaufman (1996), building
on the salience of ethnicity in conflicts, particularly in divided societies as advanced by
scholars such as Horowitz (1985). Kaufman argues in this theory that the political class
22
and political elites manipulate the existing fears and enmities, real or perceived, among
people to their advantage in order to advance their political interests and achieve their
desired political goals and objectives. These personal goals and objectives are camouflaged
as the communal goals and members of ethnic groups are mobilized to understand, adopt
and stand in solidarity with the emergent ‘ethnic community position’ because their
survival depends on having ‘their own person’ in that particular political office the
influential politician is seeking (Cheeseman, 2015).
In the process, ethnic passions are fanned to potential or actual violence if one or more
ethnic group perceives that their existence and interests are threatened by the other. The
emotional rallying call that ‘our group is in danger without our son or daughter in power’
creeps in and grows stronger with time if not kept in check. Ethnic appeals coupled with
political opportunism may eventually evoke vertical escalation of conflict culminating in
the use of violence as a way of handling that conflict. Kaufman (1996) argues that the
dynamics of mass hostility, xenophobic political mobilization and a security dilemma
further drive political contestation to the realm of ‘we must be in power by all means’. It
is important to point out here that the security dilemma that Kaufman alludes to is the
product of an ingrained understanding that only one ‘group’ in such settings can hold power
and consequently direct the sharing of resources, an eventuality that can undermine the
existential chances of the excluded groups.
However, the challenge with the international theory of inter-ethnic war is its general
presumption that individuals within groups are passive political actors who cannot decipher
23
and deconstruct private endeavours advanced as communal. It argues as though elite
political actors have the support of their respective constituents under lock and key and
whatever they present to ‘their people’ is taken hook, line and sinker without internal
opposition. Moreover, the theory presents ethnicity as though it is always a bad thing yet
the concept in itself is neither good nor bad. It fails to account for the fact that ethnic groups
do cooperate in various societal matters for a peaceful co-existence – including cross
cultural marriages. The theory also fails to account for the consequences of the security
dilemma, especially when groups balance threats against each other. This study advances
that in situations of security dilemma, negotiations tend to be a viable exit route.
In spite of the above explanatory shortfalls, this study considers Kaufman’s theory relevant
in explaining the political conflicts experienced among clans and sub-clans residing in
Mandera County. Clan-based conflicts in Mandera County are characterized by the three
dynamics identified in the theory namely mass hostility, chauvinist political mobilization
and a security dilemma. The political class and their key supporters in the county have the
tendency of exploiting members of their clans and sub-clans and fanning violence among
the different groups in order to achieve their respective private goals camouflaged as the
clan’s social, economic and political interests.
Whereas this theory makes a profound effort in explaining the ethnic dynamics that may
generate certain outcomes, it does not anchor the idea of democratization considered
central in the study. It is for this reason that the study opted for a second theory, namely
the pluralist theory of democracy. The choice of this theory was to complement Kaufman’s
24
theory of inter-ethnic war and explicitly address the subject of democracy, linking it more
directly to the phenomenon of ethnicity.
2.2.2 The Pluralist Theory of Democracy
This theory has grown from the Marxist and elitist schools of thought. The proponents of
this theory build on the concept of liberal democracy pioneered by John Locke and other
early thinkers. The concept of pluralism within the political realm aids in the examination
of the multiplicity of actors and their interests in the acquisition and exercise of power as
well as decision making. In a typical political setup the state is responsible for governance
and decision making. However, non-state actors use their resources to influence decision
making by those vested with such responsibility under the law.
The pluralist theory of democracy was developed in the 1950s and early 1960s and its
proponents include Robert Dahl and Smith who posited that people with common interests
form organized groups to promote their causes and influence the political agenda. It is
important to emphasize here that the groups that individuals join are those that deal with
the issues that they care about. The theory further argues that no single group, industry, or
government agency is politically dominant over the others and hence bargaining and
compromising between different groups representing different interests is often the norm
rather than the exception. Further, the theory asserts that due to non-dominance of any
group over others, a healthy competition exists in the development of the policy agenda
and in the selection of the policy makers (Burtenshaw, 1968). Though competition may
come across as destructive, it is moderated by deliberations to create consensus and build
understanding in the interest of justice and equity. Longley and Kiberd (2001) in their
25
contribution to the theory espouse pluralism as being underpinned by the need for inclusion
of all parties that make up the whole. They persuasively argue that pluralism can be likened
to a system comprising of component parts, each performing a complementary role to the
other for the harmonious performance of the whole.
However, despite these strong persuasive arguments advanced by the pluralism
proponents, this theory suffers from the contestable argument that no group in society can
dominate the political landscape without giving delimitations. On the contrary, it is
possible to find an out rightly dominant ethnic group at the sub-national political units
which can control who gets to ascend to power especially if the group acts as a single unit
in political decision making, including elections. Gerrymandering in the drawing of
political boundaries has been reported in plural societies (Hayes & McKee, 2012). In
addition, the instrumentalist use of ethnicity can also lead to the creation of majorities in
particular polities where micro issues exist yet whatever is pursued is at the macro level.
Moreover, the theory’s assertion on the need for deliberations to moderate competition
undermines a key cog of democratic practice – competition of ideologies and consequently
the numbers which make up the concept of majority. The justification for consensus and
inclusivity, though plausible weakens when the tenets of democracy are critically analyzed.
Finally, the assumption by the proponents that commonality of interests and the need to
promote them motivate individuals and small groups to come together is unconvincing.
Sometimes groups can be forced by circumstances to bandwagon with others by reasons
other than commonality of interests.
26
The above shortcomings notwithstanding, the pluralism theory was particularly relevant in
this study in explaining the move towards consociational negotiated democracy. As
brought out in the characterization of the concept of negotiated democracy, one of the key
objectives of negotiated democracy is to create a level playing field to warrant equality and
equity in the sharing of social, economic and political resources among members of
different groups while ensuring that no group has more than its fair share. This study
advances the view that consociational negotiated democracy provides a platform for unity
of the different ethnic groups to bargain and compromise so that divergent views are
represented in the eventual political space and public policy.
Thus, the study argues that the international theory of inter-ethnic war was helpful in
addressing objectives one and three while the pluralist theory was used to enucleate
objectives one and two. On the whole, the theories helped to put the study questions into
perspective by anchoring the concepts of ethno-political conflicts, and consociational
negotiated democracy and its attendant political processes within a framework of an
ethnically conscious society.
2.3 Theoretical Review of Democracy
The field of political science within which the concept of consociational negotiated
democracy and the practice of ethnic-based politics are situated is very rich in terms of
robust debates informed by the dynamics of the human society over time. The roots of
democracy are traced to the city state of Athens in ancient Greece in which originally, only
privileged male members of the society played a direct role in the governance of their state
27
(Ober, 2003). This implies that women, slaves and foreigners had no role to play as far as
democracy and governance were concerned in this otherwise patriarchal society.
Democracy is essentially pragmatic in the sense that it allows room for change, acceptance
or even discarding of things or approaches that no longer work. Thus, democracy is
conceived by man for man and should at all time work for man. Scholars of comparative
politics such as Huntington, Dahl, Sartori, Lijphart among others in their various writings
concur that there are two broad categories of democracy: direct and indirect democracy. In
direct democracy, citizens participate in the actual decision making process while in
indirect democracy, citizens elect representatives to whom they delegate their sovereign
power to make decisions on their behalf. Over time, variants of democracy have been
established within these two broad categorizations to meet the peculiar and context specific
needs of people across the globe (Lijphart, 2012). The choice of democracy adopted
depends on an array of dynamics such as demographic composition and trends within a
polity, the attendant level of political consciousness and resource availability.
At the heart of democracy lies the idea of elections. In other words, the sovereign will of
any democratic political unit lies with the people and they exercise it through elections.
Typically, elections present a case for the establishment of a social contract as advanced
by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacque Rousseau; a contract which is limited by
time and against which the electorate evaluate the performance of their representatives
before deciding to renew it or terminate it. Aristotle (1948[322 BC]) further argued that
the sovereign will of the people can never be overlooked in a truly democratic society.
28
Central to Aristotle’s conception of democracy is the expression of the people’s will by
way of voting. The veracity of this argument is grounded on the reality that competition
breaths life to the concept of democracy.
Competitive politics are characterized by conflicts without which democracy loses its
raison d’etre (Vasilev, 2015). The concept of conflict that Vasilev alludes to in his
argument is not necessarily underpinned by violence but rather an expression of
disagreements between the contending parties. The very nature of competitive politics in a
typical laissez faire democracy is such that winners and losers are generated at the end of
the process and hence conflicts will always be there at any point or throughout the electoral
process.
However, even though voting is crucial in a democracy, its utility and practicality in
making decisions on every other issue in the modern world is doubtful – the expenses
involved, be they in terms of time, labour or finances are enormous. This study concurs
with Lijphart (2012) that the focus of democracy is people’s participation in their own
governance. The research however adds that the freedom of choice should be exercised in
a manner consistent with the realities in society and the intent to meet the needs of the
societal membership.
2.3.1 Consociational Negotiated Democracy
Freedom of choice within democratic systems sometimes tends to create disagreements
which if not properly attended to may spiral to violence. As noted earlier, democracies are
fraught with conflicts. These conflicts revolve around real or perceived injustice in
29
representation, resource sharing among others. The question however is whether there can
be the kind of resources where everyone gets what they desire. The study takes the view
that it is impossible because resources are finite and human nature inclines most people
towards individualism and primitive accumulation. Thus, conflicts become inevitable as
men seek a share of the pie. The existence of conflict begets the need for actors to engage
each other in an exercise of justifying and explaining their respective actions and this spurs
the possibility of a negotiation (Mwagiru, 2008).
Negotiations are a pacific approach to the management, resolution or transformation of
conflicts. The deliberations that ensue in negotiations are geared towards validating and
legitimizing the needs or interests of the contending parties in a conflict. The legitimacy of
an agreement obtained by way of negotiations is heavily dependent on the consent of the
parties bound by it. Vasilev (2015) posits that negotiations build consensus which in turn
enhances social learning, the very key component in the management of conflicts. Social
learning was theorized by Bandura (1977) who argued that people learn from each other in
various ways among them observation, which is also known as vicarious learning or
modelling – variously referred to as enactive learning. Social learning is however
influenced by an individual’s personal or environmental factors.
Lafont (2015) argues that for meaningful consensus to be build, all people that are to be
affected by a given decision must be included and meaningfully participate in the process
which generates the decision. The importance of an all-inclusive deliberation process in
decision making is further stressed by Schafer (2017) who persuasively argues that the
30
process of negotiations transforms minds and positions and if people do not participate in
making a particular decision which affects them, they have no reason to accept the
outcome. In essence, Shafer appears to suggest, and rightly so, that non-inclusive processes
renders the decisions thereof illegitimate and hence their implementation difficult. The
conflict thus becomes protracted.
Modern human societies are characterized by complex demographic dynamics. In this
regard, there are political units that have homogenous populations while others have
heterogeneous populations of varying numerical strengths. Demographics are an important
consideration in the political architecture of an electoral unit because the pursuit of power
is about marshalling support from people and allocation of resources. Heterogeneous
populations are quite complex and so is the politics in such spaces. Against this
background, it is important for communities with heterogeneous populations to develop
and or adopt political systems and practices that best suit their unique demographics.
Scholars such as Lijphart, (2012), Bohman (2012) and Mansbridge (1999) argue for a
negotiated democracy that is consultative and all-inclusive in complex social settings. A
contextual analysis of the complexity the trio contemplated points towards the presence of
diverse communities and interest groups in a polity, each with its own needs and interests
as well as legitimate claims to the pursuit of power. Lijphart (2012) recommends a
consociational negotiated model of democracy to accommodate the diversity of actors,
arguing that such an arrangement avert the emergence of spoilers who can destabilize the
community through conflicts.
31
Consociational negotiated democracy has been a fertile field of inquiry and debate for
modern political theorists. This type of democracy has been advanced by its proponents as
suitable in divided societies – those societies that are characterized by a multiplicity of
identities, each keen on advancing its interests within a setting of competitive politics.
According to Horowitz (1993), a typical majoritarian system is not a viable solution in
political zones whose societies are highly fragmented into ethnic-identities “because it
permits domination of some groups in perpetuity” and this creates a fertile ground for
conflicts to thrive. His argument appears to endorse a consultative and all-inclusive
approach without overtly stating so, as a measure towards mitigating and resolving political
conflicts that are inevitable in political processes.
Fishkin (2009) in making a case for negotiated democracy in plural societies holds the view
that it “explicitly affirms political equality”, presumably among actors, their demographic
strength notwithstanding. This study however is of the view that political equality as
advanced by Fishkin without contextualizing it could be misleading because the reality
remains that politics is a game of numbers and proportionality rather than equality is the
norm. The research further argues that to the extent that the negotiations yield a workable
solution that meets the needs of all actors and interest groups in a proportionate manner,
then the outcome will be legitimate in the eyes of those affected.
Consensus-based democracy according to Lijphart (2012) is ‘kinder and gentler’ compared
to the more direct competitive and majoritarian democracy that does not take into account
internal dynamics in heterogeneous societies. Majoritarian approaches are adversarial in
32
practice and they tend to exclude sections of the population in a society and this has the
potential to pose governance difficulties even when the mandate to govern was given by
the majority of the groups in the polity in question. Lijphart suggests in this postulation
that deliberations in plural societies should yield consensus, a position corroborated by
Mansbridge (1999) who further notes that the deliberations should clarify the conflict
necessitating the deliberations in the first place. Mansbridge’s proposition presents
negotiations as platforms of getting to the root of conflicts so as to address them in the most
effective way that leaves the society stronger.
This study notes that without addressing the root causes of a conflict, the actors in a conflict
situation will only be handling the symptoms that may recur shortly after a solution is
found. It is however noteworthy that deliberations may not always yield consensus
especially when the multiplicity of interests advanced by parties are incongruent and there
is unwillingness to compromise and collaborate in finding a solution that is acceptable by
all.
According to Yankelovich (1999 [cited in He, 2013]), dialogue which happens in the form
of negotiations presents the best alternative in the transformation of conflict into
cooperation. Dialogue seeks to legitimize each of the parties’ needs and interests as a
starting point to finding a progressive and sustainable solution to the dispute at hand. The
centrality of dialogue in the drive towards successful political processes is further
emphasized by O’Flynn (2006) who stresses the norms of reciprocity and publicity.
According to O’Flynn, reciprocity appeals to reason that all parties can identify with, thus
33
paving the way for mutual respect while publicity centres on open and transparent
negotiation processes that focus on needs rather than positions. The concept of reciprocity
builds on the argument of the importance of legitimization of needs. Essentially, parties
involved in negotiations should identify with the needs of each other and regard them as
important and worth being met.
The location of deliberations aimed at solving the differences underlying a conflict is also
important. Whereas O’Flynn is in favour of elite and local levels of deliberations, Fishkin
(2009) roots for the grassroot as the ideal place for deliberations. O’Flynn’s proposal for
the two levels of deliberations is informed by the understanding that the elite members of
society have the capacity and influence over their grassroot supporters and can easily sway
them as long as their private interests are camouflaged and presented as those of the
community. Fishkin on his part holds the view that deliberations at the grassroots help build
tolerance and trust among the masses while eliminating stereotypes and minimizing
polarization. The idea of a grassroot driven processes is further advocated for by Lederach
(1997) who contends that a successful dialogue in handling micro issues has the potential
of escalating the same to the macro level especially when the problem is symptomatic of
the larger societal structures. Thus, civil participation in decision making regarding matters
that affect the masses is important in the drive towards a sustainable outcome.
In making a case for consociational democracy, Lijphart (1968; 2012) maintains its utility
in polities where no social-cultural group has the numbers to make a commanding majority
that can out rightly win and appropriate political power in the political unit they are
34
domiciled. He argues that any of the constituent groups despite not making a majority can
destabilize the political system if they are excluded. The motivation for cooperation from
the elites in each constituent social-segment arises from rational incentives such as the
assurance of representation in decision making and the attendant benefits of resource
distribution and or accumulation. The assumption Lijphart appears to make here is that
elites have the political will to cooperate and that they drag along with them their respective
constituents. In essence, he roots for a grand coalition outfit, grounded on the principles of
proportionality in political representation, segmental autonomy on matters exclusive to a
segment and veto power over collective decisions that may be injurious to the interests of
a cooperating segment’s interests.
The argument made for coalition governments is that such outfits bring together various
segments into the government, who are represented in a proportional manner and thus
important actors are not excluded and there is no motivation for them to destabilize the
system. The leaders forming the coalition are assumed to be reasonable moderates, with a
predisposition to compromise and committed to unity and stability of the system. Horowitz
(2002) however differs with this preference for moderates, arguing that coalitions should
incorporate people with extreme views so that they can contribute to transforming the
coalitions. It would appear here that Lijphart is pro stability maintained by the status quo
while Horowitz sees transformation as suitable rather than status quo. Though he does not
give his reasons for the transformation, this study is persuaded by his transformation
orientation, noting that transformation acknowledges the organic nature of society and the
need for systems to evolve with it. The research further argues that the moderates in the
35
spirit of reciprocity can influence the extremists to changing their behaviour, and thus
overall, suggests a mix of moderates and those with extreme views.
A critical analysis of consociational model’s proportionality principle does however not
rule out oppression of the minority groups even when included in the power frame.
Dominant members have the power to take decisions that affects everybody irrespective of
the minorities’ opposition to such decisions. In essence, the winner-takes-all that Lijphart
argues his model seeks to cure is not necessarily addressed. Even though he argues that the
cooperating groups create multiple balances of power within the coalition that can cure
dominance as alluded to earlier, there is no evidence to that effect. This study argues that
the possibility of coalitions and or factions within a coalition cannot be ignored and even
so the size of the largest segment remains a key determinant.
Moreover, leadership may fail to exercise compromise which is an important aspect of
consociationalism. Realpolitik is categorical that politicians seek to outbid each other
rather than cooperate. The prominent role given to leadership by Lijphart further renders
the model elitist rather than a people driven process. This is problematic because followers
are not necessarily a passive lot ready to take instructions from their influential political
masters.
Finally, consociationalism which is based on power sharing is not sufficiently democratic
and this renders its practical value doubtful. The focus on leadership of segments implies
the absence of compelling incentives for moderate behaviour (Elissi, 2004). Society
36
sometimes has a critical mass of moderates which if unattended to can create splinter
groups and this has the effect of further destabilizing it, an exact opposite of what
consociationalism promises to deliver. Segmental autonomy can also be used by moderates
to drive a secessionist agenda rather than a uniting one, thus exacerbating the conflicts the
model seeks to find a solution to. Thus, one is persuaded to agree with Dixon (2011) that
consociationalism is essentially elitist, primordial, segregationist and essentialist. Further,
the argument by consociational theorists that ethnic identities will lose their salience
following the formation of a grand coalition government is inconclusive and perhaps
misleading as it offers no insights on how reconciliation will be facilitated, the worth of
institutionalizing identity or the structures that ameliorate interethnic tensions.
2.3.2 Ethno-Political Conflict Management
According to Larfella (1988), society is in a continuous process of evolution and conflict
is one of the drivers of that process. Given that conflict is typically a product of
categorization, that fact of differentiation is enough to break or stabilize society depending
on how the conflict is dealt with. Conflict thus offers new perspectives to issues and
necessitates creative solutions that advance society, leaving it stable in the short term to
the medium term. There are many typologies of conflict that can be broadly categorized
into social, economic, political or a combination of either two of these. This study restricted
itself to ethno-political conflicts. The study uses the phrase ‘ethno-political conflicts’ to
mean those conflicts that are of political nature and are anchored on social identity
differences. Instructively, everyone has an identity for the simple reason that they are part
of a community (Ake, 1993).
37
In many African countries, ethnic identity is best presented as a construct – something that
can be created, meaning that it can equally be killed once its purpose is achieved. The
Abaluhyia and Kalenjin identity groups in Kenya for instance have subgroups within them
whose cultures and languages though similar on face value, are quite different yet for
political relevance, these groups prefer coming together to enhance their voice and stakes
(Blundell, 1994). This is the instrumental use of ethnicity – that is, ethnicity being used as
an instrument to achieve or pursue a given end. Based on this understanding, this study
argues that the concept of an ethnic group is very malleable and it’s fed and given salience
by the group(s) interests. Aseka (2007) makes a compelling argument that an identity is
created by a people through the socio-cultural, economic and political processes that they
are part of. Thus, it would be logical to argue that ethnic communities provide a strong
base upon which its constituent members build social capital in the form of social networks.
Ethnic identity remains one of the key distinguishing features of political competition in
plural societies across the world and more so in Africa. Cheeseman (2015) and Kanyinga
(2014) are for instance in agreement that political processes in Kenya are characterized by
ethnic mobilization and violence. Instructively, violence in political processes has been
cascaded from the national level to the sub-national level of political contestation. This has
led to the adoption of different approaches to the practice of democracy, responsive to the
unique needs of ethnically plural societies and as a pathway to averting or managing
conflicts emerging from political processes. One of these approaches is consociational
negotiated democracy which has been explored in section 2.3.1.
38
The concept of conflict management has been described in great details by various scholars
among them Thakore (2013), Fisher (2010), Harris and Reilly (1998) and Burton (1987).
These scholars have variously described conflict management as a process aiming at
conflict prevention or the reduction of its intensity. Harris and Reilly (1998:18) describe
conflict management as the “positive and constructive handling of difference and
divergence.” They emphasize that conflict management sets the stage for the eventual
resolution and transformation of the structures that provide an enabling environment for
conflict to thrive.
Identity-based conflicts which are waged on the basis of social factors tend to be intractable
mainly due to the social and group attachments that disputants may have over whatever is
at the heart of a dispute. The pursuit of political power that is grounded on ethnic identity
is brutal because oftentimes the competition tends to be fashioned as an existential issue in
such plural settings. Many countries of the world have experienced politically motivated
identity conflicts (henceforth ethno-political conflicts) that have devastated them and some
of which had to develop creative systems of sharing power in order to contain the conflicts
and attain stability.
In most divided societies, ethnic groups tend to owe their allegiance to the group rather
than the state. Binningsbo (2006) argues that cooperation between ethnic groups in a polity
is low due to trust issues. Moreover, some elements of identity such as religion are fixed
and thus not subject to compromise. Thus, identity based conflicts must be analysed
contextually because there can never be a solution that is applicable to all societies as Dixon
39
(2018) notes. In managing such types of conflicts, the choice of a management approach
needs to be informed by the understanding that the particular style affects the structure of
the conflict and the goal of containing the destructive component of the conflict must
triumph.
From the foregoing discussion, scholars that root for collaborative negotiated processes,
including democratic processes argue that deliberations create opportunities for social
transformation. The dialogue process helps frame political conflicts as between collectives
rather than individuals and this facilitates the agenda for equity. The solutions generated
from negotiated processes are not only legitimate but they also enjoy the support that makes
their implementation easier. However, like every other political process, consociational
negotiated democracy is not necessarily supported by every member of the polity; actors
within and without the political sphere are actively contesting outcomes. Thus, continuous
review and adjustments to accommodate emergent concerns is the norm rather than the
exception.
2.4 Empirical Review
This section is devoted wholly to examining, analyzing and synthesizing empirical
literature on the independent and dependent variables under study. The highlight of this
section is the gaps in the existing literature which this study sought to fill and by so doing
contribute to knowledge in the areas of research.
2.4.1 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
Observations and research findings by scholars and policy makers alike indicate that the
politics of identity is influenced and shaped a by a number of drivers, some of which are
40
generic while others are unique and exclusive to different political contexts. Generally,
these factors can be categorized into three broad bases namely social factors, political
factors and economic factors.
In a study conducted by Ngoy-Kangoy (2007) which focused on the 1960 and 2006
legislative and presidential elections in Democratic Republic Congo (DRC), it was
established that formation of political parties and alliances in the country were to
considerable degrees defined by linguistic, economic and regional factors. The study
further determined that voting patterns of the major ethnic groups in the DRC namely Ba-
Likolo (people from the upper side), Bato ya se (people from the lower side), and the
Bateke-Bahumbu, went beyond mere ethnic identities and were influenced by the other
factors such as land ownership, as was with the case of the Bateke-Bahumbu, who were
the first holders of land certificates over most of the Leopoldville area.
The case of DRC further reveals the reasoning behind the social identity theory whose
fulcrum is the ‘othering’ mentality i.e. as long as they do not speak our language and share
in our culture they can turn against us. Internal cohesion and unity of purpose among
speakers of same language and practitioners of same culture is thus a solid ground for
forming groups to pursue and protect common interests. Thus, ethnic identities are not
mere facts of categorizations but rather strong pedestals around which the interests of a
group are built and articulated. When members of the group buy into an ‘us-versus-them
dichotomy’, violence becomes a justifiable pathway in the pursuit of the group’s interests.
The study further demonstrated that DRC continues to rely on ethnic identities as the key
41
mobilizing element and the main reasoning is to enhance a group’s bargaining power in
the sharing of resources. The shortcoming with Ngoy Kangoy’s study, however, is that
ethnicity is considered at the group level and internal dynamics and differences among
subgroups forming the larger group do not find any expression in his work. This is a glaring
omission that ethnic based studies should seek to fill, without assuming subgroups are in
harmonious relations under the umbrella of the bigger instrumental identity.
Socio-political movements also form the basis upon which racism and the ethnic identity
become salient rallying call in the fight against any perceived discrimination or unfairness.
For instance, during the struggle against racism and black discrimination in the US and in
the fight for democracy in India, both occasions notably led by among others Martin Luther
King Jnr., and Mohandas Gandhi respectively, social and civil rights movements played
critical roles during struggles for political liberations and fight against social, political and
economic injustices. It must however be acknowledged and appreciated that the civil and
social movements such as those led Martin Luther King Jnr., Gandhi, Wangari Maathai,
and Desmond Tutu do not simply form by the mere fact that a section of population feel
oppressed.
The formation of socio-political movements, according to Van Dyke and Amos (2017) are
motivated and driven by certain shared beliefs and interests among the populace who
support them. A review of Van Dyke and Amos’ study on drivers of social movement
coalition formation, longevity, and success identifies social ties, ideology, culture, identity,
and resources as among the critical factors that influenced formation of social and
42
politically motivated movements. Social ties included considerations of a common descent,
physical appearance among others. Van Dyke and Amos further noted in their study that
family ties also saw groups coalescing in seeking a political change on their plight. The
study argues that identity can be by circumstance, choice or coercion and it is essentially
socially constructed as argued by White (2010).
In South Africa, a study by Seo (2008) showed that a number of internal and external
factors played significant roles in negotiations for democracy and eventual deterioration of
the white minority rule, which marked the beginning of the end of apartheid and the
discrimination of the blacks. Analysis of the dynamics of the transition to democracy in
South Africa from the white minority to the majority native blacks determined that the
main categories of domains that guided the process were structural factors such as culture,
economic development, class structures, increased education, and the international
environment and behavioural variables such as major political actors, elite factions and
organisations from civil society. The presence of elite factions created problems in the
negotiations yet they could not be ignored without compromising the success of
implementation of ensuing agreements. This view serves to buttress Lijphart’s (2012)
argument that the elite have a key role to play in negotiations due to the immense influence
they wield among their constituents.
In a study conducted in Ghana on the nexus between elections and conflict management,
Ayezaluno (2011) argues that elections in Ghana’s majoritarian system are a zero-sum
game in which elites use all means at their disposal to win. Although in the last decade
43
Ghana has been presented as the poster child of democracy in Africa, the country has and
continues to battle inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic political conflicts (Tonah, 2007). As is the
case with many African countries, Ghana’s political processes are grounded in identity
differences, irrespective of whether the identity is primordial or instrumental. Identity
differences in Ghana take different forms such as Northerners versus Southerners, Ewes
versus the Akan, among others. Given the destabilizing effect of exclusion, politicians have
been forced by these ethnicity dynamics among others to form alliances and coalitions for
winning power and sharing the spoils that come with political power. Ayezaluno stresses
the fact that toxic patron-client networks are very much in place in the case of Ghana as
elsewhere, noting the dearth of rational voters. The study does not however explore the
effectiveness of the power sharing arrangements in the study area as it relates to conflict
management between the contesting groups, an issue that forms a key cog of the current
study.
Building on the findings of another study conducted by Nukunya (2003) which focused on
the salience of kinship in political processes, Ayezaluno argues that such social units are
the basis for social life. Though the study convincingly argues that some primordial groups
prioritize their sub-national citizenship or loyalty over the national one, it does not link the
effect of this phenomenon on peace and stability in those areas.
Kadima and Owuor (2014) in their study of Kenya’s decade of experiments with political
party alliances and coalitions focused on the numerous political alliances that have been
formed in Kenya since the post-colonial era and the motivations thereof. Indeed, Kenya’s
44
political history is punctuated with a number of political alliances which were formed to
drive different agenda. In Kenya’s recent political history, some of the notable coalitions
include National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) that memorably defeated and dethroned
KANU after almost 40 years in power and the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
(CORD) among others. The study by Kadima and Owuor found that sharing of national
resources has been one of the main motivations behind the formation of political alliances
and coalitions in the country. Further, these researchers observe that formation of such
coalitions and alliances both at the national and local levels are also driven by the need to
enhance ethnic cohesion and integration among different ethnic communities that make up
the Kenyan fabric. The study, however, does not address the subject of whether the power
sharing has been inclusive and effective in attaining the intended goals. These are some of
the gaps this study sought to address.
Negotiations are designed with the aim of benefiting conflicting parties but sometimes, due
to challenges, which are inevitable in any process, reaching conclusion may prove little.
As Musson (2013) rightly adduces, in any given diverse society, regardless of the issues
under discussion or consideration, there will naturally be a strong divergence of views and
opinions necessitated by divergent vested interests of the actors. Movement in one direction
is highly likely to be countered by an equally strong movement in a reverse direction.
Subsequently, in order to have effective negotiation, parties to the negotiation process must
begin by identifying key challenges that are likely to derail the process. History has time
and again proven that implementation and the practice of democracy is full of challenges,
problems and detractors. In reference to Johan Galtung's ABC triangle of peace model,
45
Stalenoi (2014) advances that the context in which negotiation processes are taking place
is one of the main sources of challenges. Context may be characterized by the environment
setting, the prevailing ideas, and political temperature among other factors (Arslan, 2016).
Culture and poverty are contextual factors that present major challenges to democratic
processes and systems such as the formation of interethnic political alliances. Facets of
culture include language, religion, values, beliefs, morals, law, and aesthetics (Yadav &
Shankar, 2016). Results of a study carried out in three Sahel countries namely Mali, Niger
and Senegal, countries whose populace are largely Muslim, indicated that cultural
differences, specifically religion, among the actor populations is a barrier that significantly
derail negotiation processes during formation of ethno-political alliances. The assumption
among such scholars like Huntington, is the notion that Islam is a religion that is ‘not
hospitable to democracy’, is as a result of fundamental incompatibility between core tenets
of Islam and the principles of democracy. Other scholars, often from the Muslim world,
however hold the view that some tenets of and texts within Islam might be interpreted as
compatible with democracy (Villalón, 2010). These contrasting views therefore necessitate
questions and concerns on ways in which religious structures and institutions as well as
religious ideas and symbols, as facets of culture, affect how the democratic question is
framed, discussed and shaped in any given context.
In addition to cultural factors such as religion, Villalón (2010) posits that striking material
deprivation presents a challenge to negotiation processes aimed at formation of interethnic
political alliances. This can be considered from the perspective of scramble for the very
46
limited available material resources. Highly inadequate levels of resources make it difficult
for the parties to the negotiation process to easily reach a consensus on how the little
available resource is to be shared equitably. More often than not, disagreements will arise
which eventually have the potential to stall the entire process or even roll back the gains
and steps that have been made in the negotiation process. Other barriers according to the
same author that were established during the study in the three Sahel countries include
heavy dependence on postcolonial economic legacies, and ethnic and linguistic pluralism.
2.4.2 Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
To understand the structure of consociational negotiated democracy and democratic
regimes, there is need to comprehend the social and political bases of such regimes and the
fundamental structure of relations within which they operate. Of concern then is how
consociational negotiated democracy is framed, pursued, and modified to fit in the multi-
ethnic societies and the prevailing political contexts. From the discussions stage to the
partnership phase, the process of democratization involves both democratic installation and
consolidation. Depending on different factors at play, the process of negotiating democracy
between or among various actors in the polity in question, in some parts of Africa and
indeed across the world can be long, intensive and tedious or relatively short and quick
(Kadima & Owuor, 2014). However, more often than not, the process is likely to be long
because of the various contentious issues that need to be discussed and negotiated upon
while not losing the focus of the ultimate goal.
The path followed through the process has significant influence on the outcomes of the
negotiated democracy. Policy needs and concerns should be the first items on the agenda
47
and must be prioritized from the very onset of the structure and process of negotiating
democracy. To enhance the effectiveness of the structure, process and outcomes of
intergroup negotiations and conflict resolution efforts, Russell, Ong, Ty and Anderson
(2006), explain that it is critical that actors develop and agree on ground rules, which
basically define the structure, which the negotiation processes will be anchored on. Ideally,
ground rules should be among the first items that the parties to a negotiation process should
establish before the actual negotiation process commences. Setting grounds rules at the
earliest stages of the negotiation process is essential in expediting and facilitating the
negotiation process. The ground rules should be drawn and agreed upon to ensure that they
never become a hindrance or cause for delay to the process of negotiating democracy.
The findings of a study conducted by Barja, Villarroel and Zavaleta (2013) on Bolivia
highlighted the significance of well-grounded policies and ground rules at the initial stages
of negotiations leading up to a democratic process. Noting that the political scene in Bolivia
prior to the transition towards democracy was characterized by political and economic
instability and turmoil, the researchers focused on the discussions around Bolivia’s
institutional design with an aim of establishing how the policies and institutional designs
affected the development and process of democracy and the consequences these designs
and policies had on the country’s democracy. The findings of the study showed that
Bolivia, a plural and fragmented society, democratically suffered from its previous, poorly
crafted institutional design that had not been the product of thorough discussions. The study
does not however address the subject of negotiation structure at the subnational level,
including who participates and the manner of making decisions.
48
In a related study that explored the negotiations leading to the coalition government
following the 2007 disputed presidential elections in Kenya, Mwagiru (2008) points out
the significant role played by the establishment of ground rules. The focus of such rules,
the study avers, was to spell out how the negotiations would proceed including
communication to the public. The actual or perceived relative bargaining position of each
actor in the negotiation process is an essential feature of the process. The motivation by an
actor in the consolidation of a consociational model lies in the strength of interests being
assured and the available options in attaining those interests.
Apart from ground rules, the place of the elite members of the society is of utmost
importance in negotiations due to the power of control and influence they wield over the
segments they identify with (Horowitz, 2014). Consequently, an actor’s relative position
during negotiations will also influence if one or more actors will be dominant over others,
or there will be balance in order to enhance ownership of the negotiated agreements. If one
or more of the actors’ position is perceivably or actually weak, then the actor is likely to
be easily persuaded, provided their interests are attended to. Such an occurrence will then
hasten the process of negotiation while at the same time leading to a lot of compromise in
order to accommodate such actors without making them feel as though they are trivial or
secondary actors in the negotiations. Weak actors or minorities can play a vital role in the
creation of a balance of power, one of the conditions within a consociational model which
helps in stabilization of the polity (Lijphart, 1968). This is essential in forestalling re-entry
problems during the implementation phase of the negotiated agreements. Casper and
Taylor (1996) maintain that democracies resulting from intense inclusive negotiation
49
processes have a higher likelihood of succeeding and having strong consolidation while
those resulting from coercive processes are likely to be weak and will eventually fail.
A study conducted by Adetula, Murithi and Buchanan-Clarke (2018) on the failure of peace
negotiations and agreements in Africa found that good faith in negotiations is extremely
important in the pursuit of agreements that will receive wide acceptance and compliance
during implementation. They attributed non-compliance in the case of South Sudan
following the 2015 agreement to coercion in terms of sanctions threatened by the UN. The
study further noted that the multiplicity of actors, each controlling a section of an armed
force and claiming the support of a given ethnic group has seen a continuous
metamorphosis of the conflict, as all parties seek to pursue their interests within the state’s
political matrix. The study in emphasizing the significance of well-structured negotiations
argues that: “…the foundations of peace and the potential for socio-economic and political
transformation depend on vital decisions made at the negotiating table, as well as the
dynamics of the peace talks, including their traditionally gendered nature.” The study
concludes that plural societies such as South Sudan must seriously consider the question
of goodwill among negotiators in peace negotiations, noting the influence they have in
power play.
Norris, (2008), advances that community or societal elites are the mainstay to any
democratic process and the consociational democracy is no exception. The economic elites,
the political elites, and the academic elites all come into this fold to drive their interests
mostly fashioned as communal interests. Their involvement and commitment to the entire
50
negotiation process right from the onset must be ensured given the critical role they play
in shaping the society and their contributions to the societal activities. In the consociational
negotiated democracy process, Knight (1941) contends, their commitment is essential in
maintaining the systems and the negotiation course. Further, because of the almost
indispensable positions they hold in their societies, the elites have significant influence and
role to play in halting and even reversing any disintegrative leanings of the parties to the
negotiation process. Getting the elites from the different professional and career
backgrounds to share in and have converging views of the issues under discussion is
equally essential in the negotiation process (Norris, 2008).
Thus, engineering consociational democracy involves designing all-inclusive and peaceful
institutional frameworks in the divided societies, where interests are explained and
prioritization taken into account. Subsequently, successful structures that identify and
acknowledge the underlying reasons for animosity as well as their real root-causes are very
essential in effectively addressing and resolving community conflicts. Every position taken
by a member or members of a negotiating team normally has an underlying interest. As
Zuahir (2002) attests with reference to the case of Northern Ireland, effective structures are
capable of fostering peace and cementing cohesion in divided societies. Elites, key players
and documented agreements are three key aspects that constitute institutional frameworks
or structures of consociational democracies necessary for effective combat of politics of
ethnic exclusion by majoritarian models in plural and polarised societies (Carvalho, 2016).
These three facets form the basis for structural review of consociational democracy in this
study.
51
O'Flynn and Russell (2005), note that power-sharing, which is the hallmark of
consociational democracy, must be institutionalized to enable viable implementation of
agreements. Failure to address diversity in power sharing among the constituent groups in
deeply divided societies would be detrimental to stability, acceptance and performance of
democracies. In essence O’Flynn and Russell underscore the argument by scholars as noted
earlier on the significance of political leaders of different groups as key players in the
process of negotiated democracy. The consensus among the scholars is that political leaders
have considerable influence on the nature of democratic politics, for instance how political
parties choose their candidates, how the different ethnic groups or religious groups choose
their candidates and who eventually gets the opportunity to represent the members of their
communities (Zuahir, 2002).
Additionally, in consociational negotiated democracy, political leaders play critical role
with regard to election disputes and how they are resolved in case they arise. Sileikaite and
Spirova (2016), drawing from their study of political negotiations and consociationalism
in Lebanon advise that proportional representation of all groups is an essential provision in
consociational negotiated democracy and power-sharing arrangements. They caution that
disproportionate representation in the institutional negotiation structures enhances
likelihood of driving sectarian strife in the negotiation process. In their study, Sileikaite
and Spirova note that when the Ta’if Agreement was signed and the constitution was
modified, it aimed to maintain equal political representation between Christian and Muslim
religious groups which subsequently granted Shi’a population a greater participation in the
country’s political system, a privilege the group initially did not enjoy. Their study avers
52
that the effect of minority inclusion in the political matrix and consequently decision
making and access to resources has enhanced stability in Lebanon.
The structure of negotiated democracy should also rope in external players who are not
direct beneficiaries of the negotiated democracy. Horowitz (2014) argues that external
players are necessary and important for the existence of consociational negotiated
democracy regimes. These players play invaluable roles in supporting the negotiation
processes and the implementation of resultant outcomes of the negotiations in fragmented
systems caused by racial, religious, ethnic or sectorial cleavages. They act as guarantors of
the agreements arrived at following the negotiations. A concurring view is held by Kerr
(2009), who asserts that successful and effective consociationalism depends on external
players who are considered exogenous forces. Such forces could include officials of
electoral commissions, individuals and groups from legal institutions such as the judiciary
and even civil society organizations who positively coerce the negotiating groups to find
amicable and fair solution to the matters under discussion (Pildes, 2008). Citing an example
of the Belfast Agreement which was negotiated by the US and which helped obtain a
political truce between the warring factions in Northern Ireland, McGarry and O’Leary
(2006), advance that external players can facilitate consociationalism by mediating or
compassionately using incentives to the protagonists to the negotiated democracy to attain
mutual agreement and to abide by the power-sharing institutional agreements and
arrangements.
53
While comparing the structure of democracy at the national and council (comparable to
wards) in Britain, Musson (2013), asserts that democratic processes at council wards are
more intense compared to the national level because at the lower levels (councils), the
electorate is more homogenous in terms of ethnic and racial composition. Subsequently, as
one moves from the lower levels towards the national level, this homogeneity decreases
while heterogeneity increases thus enhancing the complexity of social, economic and
political issues that are under political contention. At the higher more heterogeneous level,
the likelihood that the electorate will have adequate personal knowledge of the candidates
involved decreases. Additionally, there is a diminishing probability that individual
electorate will have shared interests with those in other parts of the country. Musson’s
observation is comparable and vastly similar to what happens in most counties in Kenya
such as Mandera County where at the clan levels (comparable to Musson’s council or ward
level) electors largely share political views and have personal knowledge of the contesting
candidates. However, when the span widens to county level, the number of clans increase
and so does the number of candidates seeking political seats. Interests and views of the
individual clans become diverse and sharply contrast and powerful lobbying by political
elites from the respective ethnic clans sets in, with each clan’s political leader pulling
toward their (clan’s) side. This eventually leads to flaring tempers and even interclan
political violence if the political activities of the contesting groups are not dealt with in a
sober and more accommodative manner.
According to Elster (1995), a contradistinction between the openness of negotiated
procedures to the democratic public on one hand and their problem-solving capacity as
54
well as substantive quality on the other hand, is a major challenge that faces democratic
processes. Elster argues that limiting the negotiation process aimed at a democratic exercise
to a few elite representatives, as is the practice in consociationalism, and excluding the
wider public expedites the negotiation process towards finding amicable and objective
solutions. On the flip side, engaging the wider public and trying to get everyone’s opinion
has the potential of derailing the process and making it more subjective hence
compromising on the outcomes of the negotiation process.
In countering Elster’s assertions, Czada (2017) contends that the scholar’s standpoint
sharply contradicts the general view and notion that for democratic processes to be
effective, they should involve as many participants as possible – the idea particularly for a
consociational model being accommodating all segments to obtain peace and stability in
the polity. The view of the latter notion which this study agrees with is that failing to engage
the larger public, who are certainly major stakeholders, amounts to some sort of ‘short-
circuiting’ the democratic process and attract a lot of suspicion from the general public
who will feel short-changed irrespective of the outcomes of any negotiation process that
does not adequately involve them. The challenge, therefore, according to Elster is that, the
more segments or groups engage in the negotiation processes, the longer the process takes.
But more important is that engaging many people means that everyone will bring in their
view and try to push through their selfish interest. At the end of the day, it becomes difficult
to arrive to a consensus and a conclusion that meet everyone’s expectations. The study
however is short in exploring how consensus is arrived at or preferred, issues that form the
gaps of this study.
55
2.4.3 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the Management of
Ethno-Political Conflicts
As noted in chapter one, different versions and sub-versions of democracy have evolved
over the decades across the world, among them representative democracy, presidential
democracy, participatory democracy, Islamic democracy, and social democracy (Schmidt,
2013). It is noteworthy that each of these versions has had different levels of success.
Effectiveness of democracy in general and its variants as noted above has attracted the
interest of some scholars and researchers in the realm of political science. In a comparative
study carried out by Magalhães (2014) featuring over 100 surveys from across the world
using different models, it was determined that government effectiveness in service delivery
was low under some model specifications in non-democracies. In democracies however,
government effectiveness tended to be generally higher owing to the existence of peaceful
methods of managing disputes whenever they arose within the polity. The study further
noted that inclusion of various actors within the government structure helped in stabilizing
the operational environment, thus contributing to government effectiveness. The findings
of this study on the subject of performance of democracies is lend credence by Ringen
(2017) who argues that the general notion that autocracies deliver while democracies dither
was wrong and misplaced. In his view, democratic governments are not only fair but also
more effective in delivering on their mandate as compared to other forms of governance
because of their wide inclusion of stakeholders and the existence of accountability
mechanisms.
56
In a research study conducted by Walden University (n.d) to determine the effectiveness
of representative democracy in the United Kingdom, it was established that despite a few
shortcomings, representative democracy does operate effectively. The UK presents an
interesting case where several political entities have autonomy on matters specific to them,
but they still fall under the union. The study noted that representative democracy allows
for a wide array of segment representation and hence inclusion. The effect of such
inclusivity has been political stability which further leads to growth in other areas such as
the economy. Moreover, the researchers noted, the people who put leaders in office can get
their views and ideas heard by using avenues such as pressure groups and local leaders. As
Mansbridge (2018), observes, and rightly so, facets that make democratic negotiations
successful or otherwise have been given scant attention by political science scholars and
researchers alike. Subsequently, there is need to go the extra mile to research and find out
more about how and what make political negotiations work and under what circumstances.
In another study conducted by Zuhair (2008) in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka on their
experience with power sharing, the key plank of consociational democracy, she found that
Northern Ireland was progressing well in the post Belfast Agreement of 1998 which gave
her some level of autonomy and representation of various significant cleavages in the
executive and national assembly. The study stresses that the level of success in Northern
Ireland is attributable to proper negotiations that produced the Belfast agreement which
provided for the representation of significant cleavages in a proportional manner. These
findings seem to contradict those of an earlier study conducted by McGarry and O’Leary
(2004) who had found that consociationalism was a weak approach to the management of
57
the conflict in Northern Ireland because the agreement generating it had not factored in
external actors, the trans-state nature of the dispute and its overemphasis on a grand
coalition government. A critical review of the McGarry and O’Leary study demonstrates
that the key areas they focused on namely the place of external actors and the trans-state
nature of the dispute were not part of what a consociational formation should be about.
This study takes the view that the authors attempt at introducing issues outside of what they
were studying, that is consociationalism hence their conclusions may be inaccurate.
In a study conducted on the efficacy of consociational democracy in Lebanon by Salamey
(2009), it was established that the model was failing over time. Even though there was fair
sharing of key positions among the significant segments making up Lebanon,
disagreements continued to undermine the efficacy of the state in terms of executing its
responsibility through the government of the day. The religious elite failed to integrate the
secular groups within the system and this has been witnessed in the form of tensions and
low key conflicts in Lebanon in the period leading up to 2008 when Qatar managed to
broker a short term agreement among the segments. Regional dynamics were pointed as
contributing to the instability in Lebanon, a situation that had been thought to have been
cured by the consociational model as argued by Lijphart (2012). The study established that
the sectarian political elite had captured the state, making it impossible for the government
to deliver public goods. The study noted that the political elite had established an oligopoly
grounded in patron client networks that have proved difficult to eliminate. It argued that
the veto power vested in sects has undermined making of public decisions and this serves
to further weaken and erode interethnic harmony and integration. In essence, the study
58
holds the view that Lebanon is a failed or a failing case of the application of negotiated
democracy, specifically consociationalism.
In Ghana, the concept of negotiating democracy has been practiced in the upper Eastern
region of the country. In this region, an ethno-political conflict pitting the Kusasis and
Mamprusis has been going on for a while. The main bone of contention in this conflict has
been a claim to traditional power, popularly known as the chieftaincy. It is important to
note that the chieftaincy was the main system of governance in precolonial Ghana and in
modern times, the holder has a lot of sway on the political affairs of the region, hence the
intractable nature of the conflict. In a study conducted by Noagah (2013), it was established
that negotiation processes aimed at resolving the conflict were always infiltrated by
politicians who wanted to use the conflict to further their political goals. The study
established that they whip emotions among their ethnic constituents for them to capture
power in the name of the community and at the same time scuttle every effort of fairly
negotiating a long term solution. Thus, most of the negotiations ended up unfruitful and
reports of progress just a scheme to avert violence in the short term. The study does
however not suggest or explore exactly what role if any political players play or would
wish to play in the negotiation process, as a pre-requisite to support it.
In another research conducted in South Africa by Maharaj (2008), the study established
that the negotiations leading to independence and subsequent governance of the rainbow
nation had all the hallmarks of consociationalism. Precisely, the study noted that the
inclusion of significant cleavages within the black and white groups helped create a tolerant
59
society that nurtured South Africa to the level of being the second largest economy in
Africa after Nigeria. During the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, the country enjoyed
a lot of economic growth owing to political stability, thanks to the ability of the leaders to
weave together representative governments accommodating all segments. The
decentralized form of governance was aimed at giving each of the cleavages some degree
of autonomy in making and implementing decisions that mattered to them. The study
however falls short on examining how effective the consociational model has been in
anchoring the decentralized form of governance and especially so in addressing the drivers
of conflict that decentralization sought to cure. This omission is part of the gap that this
study sought to fill.
In Kenya, the application of a negotiated approach in the management of political disputes
has been recorded over time (Kajirwa, 2008; Owuoche & Jonyo, 2004). Due to the
ethnicization of national politics, key political parties have been established with
predefined ethnic constituencies to shore up numbers in order to win power. From the
onset, the sharing of key positions among elites representing significant ethnic segments in
the event power is obtained. The Serena Accord which paved the way for the establishment
of the coalition government provided for consultations between the leaders of the parties
and appointments reflecting the regional balance of the country.in a study conducted by
Kadima and Owuor (2014), it was established that coalitions arising out of pre-election
negotiations tend to foster cohesion especially if they are inclusive. They cited the National
Rainbow Coalition (NARC) that dislodged Kenya African National Union (KANU) from
power in 2002. Coalitions between communities that have previously bitterly contested
60
power have also led to relative peace during the lifespan of the coalition. The study
highlighted the case of the Jubilee Alliance which was crafted in 2012 and which saw
improved relations between the Kalenjin and the Agikuyu communities that had previously
contested. From the findings of this study, it is clear that coalitions tend to foster the
concept of power sharing among the partners and by so doing enhance the chance stable
environment within which a government can execute its mandate. The only challenge arises
when significant sections are excluded from governance and sharing of the benefits that
accrue from being in a coalition setting. The study however does not address the effect of
excluding other significant segments from the political power matrix, an issue of interest
to this study.
The tendency towards efficiency and effectiveness by democracies can be attributed to
obligation to deliver to their citizens, on whose behalf they hold power. Additionally,
democracies tend to be more effective because the persons entrusted with offices and
instruments of power rule by consent and goodwill of the citizens hence making it easy for
them to get their policies accepted (Körösényi, 2005). Further, effectiveness of
democracies is drawn from their ability to include key actors within the governance
framework and by so doing minimize the opportunities for confrontations. The Global
Governance Index has consistently scored democracies ahead of autocracies in terms of
peace and stability and subsequently growth in various facets of development such as the
economy. Scandinavian countries, North America and Western Europe are among
democracies that have been rated highly in terms of political stability and good governance.
61
East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have also scored well in terms
of government effectiveness.
A comparative glance of the studies cited in the preceding paragraphs indicate that
democracy remains the most effective institutional means so far of creating legitimate
coercion. However, in the contemporary world, democracy, contrary to what it has been
known for many decades, seems to be facing crises of different magnitudes. Subsequently,
there is need in understanding the crucial role of negotiation in generating legitimate
coercion. Thus, negotiated democracy is significant and can be effective in building and
entrenching democracies. The effectiveness and success of negotiated democracy however
hinges on two forms. The first form is existence of zone of possible agreement on the
various issues within the negotiation. With respect to this first form, negotiating parties
discover the possibilities and make decisions and agreements based on them. The second
form is presence of differential trade-offs as a result of availability of different outcomes
that the negotiating parties value and prioritize differently. There are however different
factors and human errors that affect effectiveness and success of negotiated democracy.
These include fixed-pie bias which refer to preconscious assumption of zero-sum conflict
even when more issues can be brought into a negotiation to produce outcomes that are
better for all and self-serving bias, the preconscious cognitive bias that makes all human
beings prefer ideas and outcomes that benefit them in contrast to those that benefit others
(Mansbridge, 2018).
62
2.5 Research Gaps
The concept and idea of consociational negotiated democracy is one that has recently
attracted interest and attention of Kenyans, especially with increasing ethnic diversity,
intensifying competition for political power which is presumed to influence the sharing of
the limited resources. Drawing from theoretical and empirical literature, the consociational
model of democracy can be a very essential mechanism for managing ethnic animosities,
by attending to the enablers of conflict such as exclusion grievances and lack of equity in
power and resource sharing. However, adequate studies have not been conducted on the
specific dynamics informing adoption of the model and its potential in ethno-political
conflict management, particularly at the subnational levels in plural societies.
There is a lack of adequate empirical literature on consociational negotiated democracy at
the clan level, a very vital building block of the African ethnic group concept. Additionally,
the structure of consociational negotiated democracy as well as its efficacy in the
management of ethno-political conflicts remain grey areas or altogether scholarly
unattended, especially at the sub-national political units in democracies. In Kenya, no
scientific research study has been conducted on the implications of consociational
negotiated democracy on ethno-political conflict management in demographically
homogenous, yet heterogeneous sub-national political units. It is these concerns that inform
and feed the objectives that anchor this study in order to fill the knowledge gaps.
63
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the research methodology of the study. The chapter particularizes the
specific procedures that were followed in undertaking the study. The research design,
study population, sampling methods and procedures, data collection procedures and
instruments, data analysis and reporting are described in this chapter. The procedure was
intended to generate adequate data that enabled an in-depth analysis of the variables under
study and hence a meaningful contribution to knowledge. Finally, the chapter examines
ethical issues considered in this study for purposes of its authenticity and credibility in the
field of research.
3.2 Research Design
A descriptive research design that incorporates both qualitative and quantitative
approaches to research was employed in this study. The study adopted a descriptive
research design because of its capability to provide a picture of consociational negotiated
democracy as happens in its natural setting (Burns & Grove, 2003). Moreover, a descriptive
design enabled the researcher to examine consociational negotiated democracy as currently
practiced in Mandera County, thus setting the stage for an informed and evidence-based
presentation of the situation based on data collected and analysed.
In this design, quantitative methods were used to collect, analyse and represent
relationships between variables through inferential statistical analysis, with the primary
tool for quantitative data generation being a questionnaire. The quantitative methods were
64
critical in highlighting the strength of relationship within and between variables under
study especially when measuring the effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy
in ethno-political conflict management besides forming a basis for the failure to reject the
hypothesis. Qualitative methods on the other hand were used to obtain deep insights and
explaining multifaceted phenomena that otherwise cannot be quantified especially with
regard to the structure of consociational negotiated democracy. The qualitative data was
collected through in-depth interviews with key informants and Focus Group Discussions
(FGDs) with representatives of various groups comprising the sample. The mix allowed
the researcher to integrate these strengths of quantitative and qualitative approaches in
order to draw data-based conclusions that led to the formulation of a holistic interpretive
framework for generating possible solutions or new understandings of the problem
(Creswell, 2008). The decision to use mixed methods in the descriptive research design
was further informed by the interconnection between variables.
In the research design, the study utilized an embedded strategy where both qualitative and
quantitative data were collected concurrently, with more emphasis on qualitative
approaches. The embedded strategy ensured that the quantitative data generated played a
complementary role to the qualitative data given the high illiteracy rates among some of
the key respondents (KNBS, 2017). The study undertook the mixing of quantitative and
qualitative processes during the collection, analysis and interpretation of the data. A
concurrent embedding approach helped cushion the inherent weaknesses in qualitative and
quantitative approaches when either is used to the other’s exclusion, besides helping
validate findings.
65
3.3 Study Area
Mandera County, the study area adopted for this study, is located in the extreme North
Eastern region of Kenya and she covers a landmass of approximately 25,798 square
kilometres. The county borders the federal republics of Ethiopia to the North and Somalia
to the East. On the Kenyan frontiers, the county borders Wajir County to the South and
Marsabit County to the west. Mandera County is among the Arid and Semi-Arid counties
in Kenya. The poverty levels in the county have been attributed to among other things low
literacy levels, long periods of structural marginalization and its poor climatic conditions.
Due to its border location in addition to the desert like climatic conditions, the county has
tended to be ignored by successive post-independence governments with regard to
development investments (Government of Kenya [GoK], 1965).
According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), the population of Mandera
County stood at approximately 1,025,756 people (KNBS, 2009). The county is largely an
ethnically homogenous polity, with members of the Somali community making up about
99% of the population. The census revealed that over 90 percent of the resident population
of Mandera County practice Islam; it would probably be largely correct to assume based
on these statistics by a GoK agency that most Somalis share a religion irrespective of their
clan allegiance.
The immediate areas bordering Mandera County, locally and internationally are
predominantly inhabited by the Somali community and this adds to contextualize the near
homogenous nature of the county’s population in terms of ethnicity. In the larger Somali
66
society, individual or group identification and subsequently differentiation occurs at the
clan level, geographical spread notwithstanding. This is in contrast to other plural societies
where the ethnic group, oftentimes called the tribe is the unit of identification and
differentiation. It is partly because of this intragroup differentiation that the study was
premised on the clan as the unit of analysis, rather than the broader ethnic group. The 1%
of the non-Somali community is comprised of migrants from other parts of Kenya who are
in Mandera County to pursue economic interests rather than settlement.
Mandera County has been politically volatile due to negative clannism, nepotism, political
monopoly and clan exclusivity, lack of high value natural resources, underdevelopment
and insecurity. Its choice as the research site and most suitable county in which to conduct
the study was based on these profile elements. The study was carried out in three out of the
six sub-counties of Mandera County namely Mandera North, Mandera South and Mandera
East. In each of these sub-counties, the study specifically focussed on the major towns in
each due to their cosmopolitan nature in terms of clan presence. Thus, Mandera Township
in Mandera East sub-county, Rhamu in Mandera North and Elwak in Mandera South were
the focus areas.
3.3 Target Population
This study targeted heads of households drawn from across the three major towns of
Mandera Township, Rhamu and Elwak, political leaders, national government officials
with jurisdiction over the three towns in focus, religious leaders, elders from the Garre,
Murulle and Degodia clans and special interest group leaders such as women and the youth.
Leaders of organizations working in peacebuilding and conflict management in Mandera
67
County also formed part of the targeted population. The study assumed that the three towns
attract residents drawn from all demographics that make up Mandera County’s population.
The decision to target political leaders for in-depth interviews was informed by the fact
that elective positions are the most contested positions which oftentimes led to violence.
Elders drawn from across the three clans who were privy to the workings of consociational
negotiated democracy and the management of disputes in their respective clans were
targeted to ensure their input in the research. National government officials were included
in the target population because of the role they play in coordinating security, including
investigations into violence. Religious leaders and leaders of organizations working on
peacebuilding and conflict management were considered important in obtaining detailed
information because of their regular involvement in peace and conflict processes and also
to ensure a balanced representation of the different interest groups. Heads of households,
whether male or female, were involved as representatives of the general population and to
ensure that the sample was inclusive in terms of the three major clans in the study.
Based on data from KNBS (2009) and the CPDO (2018), a total of 4765 potential
respondents were targeted to participate in the study, their breakdown in terms of
participating towns and other strata comprising key informants being as provided in Table
3.1.
68
Table 3.1: Target Population Distribution by Town
Town Respondent
Category
Target Pop’n
(x)
Proportion
(x/4765)100%
Mandera
Township
Household
heads
2237 47.0
Rhamu Household
heads
1225 25.7
Elwak Household
heads
1303 27.3
Total 4765 100
Source: KNBS, 2009
3.4 Sampling Procedures and Techniques
3.4.1 Sampling Procedure
The sampling frame comprised of heads of households in the three towns of Mandera
Township, Rhamu and Elwak, politicians who participated in the 2013 and 2017 general
elections, elders drawn from the Garre, Murrulle and Degodia clans, national government
officials, religious leaders and other community interest groups as well as representatives
of organizations involved in peacebuilding and conflict management operating in Mandera
county.
The study employed multi-stage sampling that incorporated both probability and non-
probability sampling techniques. The rationale behind this approach was that the study area
is fairly large and in order to ensure that a representative sample whose findings could be
generalized to the population was obtained, the sample had to be as inclusive as was
practically possible. The areas of Mandera Township, Rhamu and Elwak were purposively
sampled. These towns were deemed to have the necessary amenities and as thriving
economic centres were potential respondents could be found. The urban areas were also
69
considered because of their accessibility and the fact that most of the violence begun there
as was the case with Rhamu in 2014.
Stratified sampling technique was then used where each town was considered a stratum
and statistics from Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) used to obtain the
proportionate sample size per town. The objective in this stage of sampling was to ensure
that each of the three participating urban areas got a share of the sample size that was
proportional to the households within it, where each household had an equal chance of
selection (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2004). Thereafter, the actual respondents were drawn
from among the household heads using simple random sampling.
A mix of purposive and snowball sampling procedures was used to choose key informants
from among the political actors, clan elders, religious leaders, women leaders, youth
leaders, national government officials and leaders of organizations involved in
peacebuilding and conflict management programs. Unlike the heads of households, the key
informants were not limited to specific urban areas; that is, they had jurisdiction over the
whole county and given their relative small number (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003), the
researcher sampled them using the two methods, based on their roles in the processes under
study and referrals from other participants who indicated they had information that the
study was looking for (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2004). The quality of information a
potential respondent held or had access to and which was significant to the study
determined their inclusion in the sample. The snowball sampling procedure was especially
used in obtaining key informants whose opposition to the consociational negotiated
70
democracy model is not in the public domain and is only known to their close allies yet the
information they held was critical to the study.
3.4.2 Study Sample Size
The determination of the sample size was informed by Krejcie and Morgan (1970) model
which indicates that for every target population, there is a corresponding sample size from
which data can be obtained and a generalization made on the whole population. The target
population of 4765 corresponded to a sample size of 357 in Krejcie and Morgan table. This
sample size was proportionately distributed across the various strata comprising the target
population as shown in Table 3.2. The study’s desired margin of error was 0.05% and a
confidence level of 95%.
Table 3.2: Proportionate Sample Size distribution across the Participating Towns
Town Respondent
Category
Target
Pop’n (x)
Proportion
(x/4765)100%
Sample size
Mandera
Township
Household heads
2237 47.0 168
Rhamu Household heads
1225 25.7 92
Elwak Household heads 1303 27.3 97
4765 100 357
Source: KNBS, 2009
The key informants were found to have jurisdiction beyond the three urban areas in focus
i.e. Mandera Town, Rhamu and Elwak and therefore the sample per stratum as indicated
in Table 3.2 was based on the number of categories within it i.e. the political leaders stratum
was divided into elected and unelected leaders with each category producing three
informants to make a total of 6, clan leaders into Garre, Murulle and Degodia Clans with
each producing one key informant to make 3 while the PBO stratum was divided into
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national PBO and Community-based PBOs, each producing one informant. The rest of the
key informant strata were allocated one respondent each.
3.5 Data Collection Instruments
3.5.1 Developing of Instruments
The study made use of three main instruments namely questionnaire, Key Informant
Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) to collect data from the field. Each
of these instruments is discussed hereunder.
3.5.1.1 Questionnaire
The researcher designed a questionnaire comprising of closed and open-ended questions to
facilitate data collection. The decision by the researcher to design this kind of questionnaire
was largely informed by a variety of reasons, key among them the objectives of the study,
the level of information richness by the respondents and the motivation among the
respondents to answer the questions (Cooper & Schindler, 2014; Nachmias & Nachmias,
2004).
The closed ended questions were in the form of a five point likert scale from which
respondents were expected to choose the most appropriate response based on their
opinions, experience or observation of the variable under study (Nachmias & Nachmias,
2004). The closed questions were exactly the same for all respondents in order to allow for
comparison of responses and unearth trends emerging from the data collected. These types
of questions were also intended to make it easier for the respondents to answer, thus
increase the completeness and return rate of the questionnaires. Closed questions were also
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deemed suitable for generation of quantitative data for purposes of inferential statistical
analysis.
The open-ended questions were intended to invite the respondent to freely express their
thoughts or experiences with regard to the variables under study (Nachmias & Nachmias,
2004). These types of questions were meant to give detailed explanations of phenomena
under study. To achieve this, the questions were made simple and as straight forward as
possible in order to obtain the requisite information that was sought by the researcher.
The questionnaire targeted respondents drawn from among the non-key informant heads
of households in the towns of Mandera, Rhamu and Elwak owing to the responsibility they
had for the safety of their dependants and an enabling environment for them to fend for
those dependants. The mix of questions was reflective of the research design adopted by
the study. The design of the questionnaire incorporated some contingency questions in
order to obtain respondents who could answer richly on particular questions especially with
regard to the second objective on the structure of consociational negotiated democracy.
3.5.1.2 Interview Schedule
Interviews allow a researcher to discover underlying motives, needs, feelings or desires of
the respondents (Kothari, 2004). The interviews were undertaken with the help of a guide
that ensured a logical flow of ideas and issues as they build on one another. In this study,
the researcher conducted face-to-face interviews with the respondents. The face-to-face
method enabled the researcher observe body language and factor in emotions as the
interviewees responded. This enabled the researcher to obtain more complete information
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from the respondents. This method was extensively used to collect data relating to the
structure of consociational negotiated democracy and its effectiveness in the management
of ethno-political conflicts.
Structured interviews were conducted with respondents drawn from among the active
political leaders, the elders from each of the three clans, youth leaders, women leaders,
national government leaders, and leaders of the two largest organizations involved in
peacebuilding and conflict management programs. These groups of respondents were
assumed to possess rich information and actually generated very insightful responses that
were used explain various aspects of consociational negotiated democracy and ethno-
political conflicts. However, the researcher was flexible enough to use telephone interviews
where a face-to-face interview proved difficult to have and the particular respondent’s
responses were considered important to the study.
3.5.1.3 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were used to offer a variety and depth of perspectives on
ethno-ethnic political conflicts. The nature of questions asked using this method focussed
on the participants’ opinions, attitudes, perceptions or even beliefs on the particular issues
under investigation (Kothari & Gang, 2014). The study used two FGDs; one for males and
the other for women. Each FGD comprised of 10 participants from across the various clans
and other interest groups. The choice of the two categories for the FGDs was informed by
the understanding that in the Somali community, mixing and free expression of either
gender in the presence of the other is almost impossible. The study was thus persuaded that
different FGDs would yield rich results to complement the data obtained through
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questionnaires and the interviews. The researcher relied on notes taken during discussions
as consent to record contributions was not granted (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2004).
FGDs were used because of their ability to yield adequate information on the thoughts and
opinions of participants on the influence of consociational negotiated democracy in the
management of ethno-political conflicts. Specifically, the FGDs sought to establish the
peoples understanding, positions and experiences with consociational negotiated
democracy as used in ethno-political conflict management in Mandera County and the
reasons informing the positions they held on the subject matter. FGDs ability to integrate
observation of non-verbal cues (Kothari & Gang, 2014) made it invaluable, besides helping
in bridging the literacy divide as noted in chapter one of this study.
3.5.2 Data Collection Instruments Reliability and Validity
The data collection instruments were tested prior to their use in the field. The testing was
intended to determine their validity and reliability.
3.5.2.1 Validity of Research Instruments
Validity in research is concerned with how accurate the data obtained in the study
represents the variables of the study that needed to be measured (Mugenda & Mugenda,
2003). According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2004) there are diffrent types of validity
available for a researcher’s consideration based on his study orientation. These include
content, internal, construct and external validity. This study pursued content validity by
consulting the supervisors to ensure questions in the tools covered the study objectives and
construct validity to ensure the data generated was reflective of the variables and
analyzable.
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3.5.2.2 Reliability of Research Instruments
Reliability ensures that there is precision with which data is collected. It responds to
concerns on whether similar results can be obtained when measuring the same variable at
different times using that instrument under the same conditions. A perfectly reliable
test/instrument has a reliability coefficient of 1.00. This perfect level of reliability is
however impossible due to factors such as ambiguity of instructions or distractions on the
part of the respondent (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2004).
In this study, the data collection instruments were subjected to a test-retest to examine the
reliability of the instrument. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2012), if identical
outcomes, not necessarily exactly the same outcomes, are realized after running a number
of tests, then it can be reliably concluded that the data collected is reliable. Using a pilot
sample of 40 as recommended by Mugenda and Mugenda (2012), who were drawn from
Takaba town, the computed result from the pilot test using Cronbach technique to obtain
internal consistency, known as coefficient of stability obtained was 0.76. The study,
drawing from the assertion by Mugenda and Mugenda (2012) thus concluded that the
instrument was reliable and proceeded to use it for data collection.
3.6 Data Analysis and Presentation of Findings
Once the data had been collected from the field, it was edited, coded, and classified based
on the research objectives and research questions. The data was winnowed to “establish
order from chaos and give shape to the mass of data” (Paradis et al., 2016). After the data
had been winnowed, quantitative data obtained from the closed questions was then keyed
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into the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Version 23 to generate the
descriptive and inferential statistics that were used to analyse the data.
The quantitative data analysis involved a critical breakdown and interpretation of
descriptive and inferential statistics to establish the emergent details and relationships
among variables. Descriptive statistics, which were used to show how often a score
occurred, helped define the characteristics and relationships among the variables in the
sample. The description of the variables was done in terms of the attributes that comprise
them. Tables, charts and graphs were used in presenting the analysed data.
Inferential statistics on the other hand were used to assist the researcher determine the
likelihood that the investigator can generalize the findings obtained from the sample to the
whole population. This study points out that the degree of generalizability of the results
from the sample was expressed as probabilities in conformity with the statistical caution
that inferential statistics are influenced by various types of errors such as the sampling
error. The specific inferential statistics that was used was Regression Analysis.
The regression analysis was used to determine how the independent variables under study
influenced the dependent variable and the extent to which the former predicted the latter.
The independent variables variously referred to as the predictor variables were assumed in
this study to influence the variance of the criterion/dependent variable as indicated in the
conceptual framework in chapter two. Five-point Likert items based on the independent
variables ordered “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, “Neutral”, “Disagree”, “Strongly Disagree”
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were measured and checked against “reduction in ethno-political conflicts”. Regression
analysis was preferred for this study because it offered the investigator an opportunity to
determine the contribution of the independent variables on the dependent variable (Mills
& Gray, 2016). The coefficients obtained from the simple linear regression analysis were
reported using Field’s (2009) simple linear regression equation written as:
Y= α +βx1+ ɛ
Where:
Y= the predicted value of the dependent variable,
α = is predicted value of the dependent variable if the independent variable is zero,
β= rate of increase or decrease for each unit of change in x1
x1 = is the independent variable and
ɛ= other factors that may affect the dependent variable that were not observable in this
study.
The hypothesis was tested to evaluate the significance of the results coming from the study
and whether they were in sync with the original expectations. The F-test was used to test
the study’s hypothesis to compare variations in views and opinions between and among
the various categories of respondents. In this study, the investigator was guided by the
understanding that in the event that the p-value was less than the significance level of .05,
the researcher rejected the null hypothesis. Conversely, if the p-value for the test run was
more than the significance level (.05), the researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis.
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Qualitative data analysis on the other hand was based on induction. The process of analysis
involved identifying common patterns (themes) within the responses, coding, synthesizing
and then grouping them together before critically analysing each theme in order to arrive
at findings that are informative with regard to the attributes that make up the variables. The
investigator was on the lookout for phrases that respondents used over and over as well as
responses that seemed to match one another. Ideally, the analysis focussed on accurate
summarization of data. Direct quotations were used to firm up the themes as appropriate
during the analysis. Once the analysis was done, interpretation of the data followed that
sought to demonstrate what was important in the data, why that consideration of
importance was made and the new knowledge generated therefrom. In order to make full
and meaningful sense of the results and fill up the gaps identified in the literature, the
primary findings of the research were compared with empirical studies in the reviewed
literature as well as theoretical underpinnings before making conclusions.
3.7 Legal and Ethical Considerations
Conducting research studies demands that researchers have to observe and adhere to certain
laid down legal and ethical policies and procedures. Throughout the study period, the
researcher observed policies and guidelines set by various institutions including the
university. Any material that is cited has been duly referenced as is the standard practice
with academic works. The researcher obtained the necessary authorizations from the
National Council for Science and Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) as well as the
National Government official in charge of Mandera County. The researcher further sought
informed consent of study participants when collecting data from the field. Further,
participation by respondents was voluntary hence no one was coerced to participate.
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Participants’ identities were concealed and guarded unless there was need to refer to the
specific respondents and his/her consent had been granted. The final document was
subjected to the Turn-it-in software to check on originality.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents and discusses the findings of the study. The study was guided by
three objectives which intended to analyze the dynamics accounting for the adoption of the
consociational negotiated democracy model in Mandera County, the structure of
consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County and a determination
on the effectiveness of the approach in the management of ethno-political conflicts in the
county. The results were also discussed within the context of the extant literature, thus
evaluating the veracity of findings and arguments made in the existing literature while also
espousing new trends and conclusions based on evidence, thus contributing to knowledge.
The study argues that by analyzing the dynamics surrounding the adoption of
consociational negotiated democracy, insights will emerge including the fears and
aspirations that the communities involved have with regard to the model as it impacts on
ethno-political conflict management. A variety of determinants such as age, education
levels, clan, religion, desire for peace, inclusion of all significant segments, availability of
financial resources for campaigns, inter-clan family ties among others were explored under
this objective. The study also addressed itself to structural issues regarding consociational
negotiated democracy and the findings obtaining from this objective have been discussed
in detail because of the need to understand how consociational negotiated democracy is
practiced in Mandera County as a pathway to peaceful conflict management. The focus
was on the organization of the entire process as practiced in the polity of Mandera.
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Finally, the chapter evaluates the extent of success of consociational negotiated democracy
in the management of ethno-political conflicts by examining various outcomes such as
equity in sharing of political positions and reduction in cases of violent politically
motivated inter-clan conflicts. Under this objective, the study also examined the
weaknesses of consociational negotiated democracy in managing ethno-political conflicts,
an aspect that was considered critical in making informed recommendations.
4.2 Response Rate
The data collection process was successful with regard to the various techniques used. The
researcher administered 322 questionnaires out of which 308 were answered by the
respondents and returned back to the researcher. Of the 308 that were received back, 301
were fully answered by the respondents who took part in the study, representing a response
rate of 93%. It is the 301 fully answered questionnaires that were used for analysis.
Drawing from the statistics, the response rate was adequate and satisfactory; it allowed the
researcher to proceed with the analysis of the collected data. This response rate is supported
by Kothari and Gang (2014) who affirm that a response rate of 70% and above is excellent
and sufficient for analysis. It can be deduced from the results that most of the questionnaires
that were distributed during data collection were received back, adequately answered by
the respondents.
Besides the questionnaire, the researcher was able to engage 13 out of the 15 Key
informants as indicated in Table 3.2 in interviews, a process that enabled him collect
critical information relevant to this study. Two of the interviewees could not honour the
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request for interviews despite accepting to participate as they were engaged in official
duties. The FGDs received 100% response rate as all invited respondents turned up, making
the exercise very representative and unbiased.
4.3 Bio-data of Respondents
The first section of the questionnaire required the respondents to indicate their age, highest
level of education, gender, marital status, clan, religion and the duration he or she had lived
in Mandera County. This information was deemed useful in explaining and comparing
trends emerging from the collected data during analysis. The findings from the
respondents’ biodata are presented and discussed under each subtopic.
4.3.1 Age
The results on the age of respondents are as indicated in Table 4.1
Table 4.1: Distribution of respondents by age
Age bracket Frequency Percentage (%)
21-30 years 47 16
31-40 years 98 33
41-50 years 94 31
Over 51 years 62 20
Total 301 100
Source: Field data, 2019
Majority of the respondents (33%) were found to be aged between 31 to 40 years, followed
closely by those aged 41 to 50 years (31%). Respondents aged 51 years and beyond were
(20%) while those aged 21 to 30 years were (16%). The results show that majority of the
heads of households are in the most productive age, 31 to 50 years and were likely to be
active in the political life of the study area and could thus make sense of its political
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activities. The study established that most of the participants had completed their education
and were already engaged in or searching for income generating activities that could allow
them establish and sustain families.
The study was conducted in urban areas which normally tend to be the economic and
political centers of any political unit, with the 21 to 50 years age bracket being the most
active in both activities. This argument is consistent with Jedwab, Christiansen and
Gindelsky (2014) finding on economic factors as key pull factors to urban areas for the
productive age of a population. The study found out that people in their prime age which
coincides with the 21 to 50 years age bracket are agile, politically aware, exhibiting the
exuberance of youth and susceptible to unemployment and can thus be enticed into political
violence in exchange for some little money. Stakeholders must therefore seek ways of
engaging this group actively in political processes and in a positive manner so as to
dissuade them from engaging in ethno-political conflicts. On the other hand, the low
number of respondents aged 51 years and beyond was attributed to the law of diminishing
returns; most people in this age bracket were heading to retirement or had retired from
active production and were transiting to eldership and they tended to withdraw to their rural
homes where life was not as fast paced as in the urban areas.
4.3.2 Level of Education of Respondents
As shown in Table 4.2, majority of the respondents (35%) indicated that they had had
primary level of education while 32% of them had a secondary level of education. 21%
respondents indicated that they had a college education and the remaining 12% indicated
that they had a university education.
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Table 4.2: Distribution of respondents by level of education
Level of Education Frequency Percentage (%)
Primary 107 35
Secondary 95 32
College 62 21
University 37 12
Total 301 100
Source: Field data, 2019
The findings imply that majority of the respondents (65%) had post-primary level of
education and hence suited to the pursuit of economic and political opportunities afforded
by the infrastructure in urban areas. Moreover, most companies, enterprises and
government institutions which require a college level of education as a pre-requisite for
employment were mostly located in the urban areas and this explains the one third of
respondents (33%) with post-secondary education in a county flagged as having a high
illiteracy rate (KNBS, 2017).
The study concurs with Campbell (2006) that education is a useful explanatory factor
influencing a person’s level of civic engagement and decision making. It further explains
that an individual who has attained post primary education is in a position to analyze and
decipher the implications of a certain approach to politics and therefore make an informed
decision as to whether to support that approach or not. Those with a primary or no
education at all can benefit from such an analysis and even be influenced by those that are
more educated either to support or reject the approach. On the strength of this argument
and with reference to the study findings, it follows that most of the study participants were
politically aware and could give informed opinions in support of their decision to either
85
support or oppose consociational negotiated democracy as a pathway to ethno-political
conflict management.
4.3.3 Gender of Respondents
The findings on the distribution of the respondents in terms of gender are as tabulated in
Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Distribution of respondents by gender
Gender Frequency Percentage (%)
Male 243 81
Female 58 19
Total 301 100
Source: Field data, 2019
From the findings presented in Table 4.3, it is evident that the majority of the respondents,
81% were males while the females were 19%. Given that the study targeted heads of
households who traditionally have been assumed to be men in a typical nuclear family; it
is not surprising that men thus formed the majority of the respondents. It is important to
note here that voluntary single parenthood is frowned upon in the larger Somali community
except in cases of natural attrition such as death or in cases of divorce. The fact that the
study was conducted in urban settings where men mostly venture to in search of economic
opportunities as their wives remain in the rural homes to take care of the family further
explains the high number of males.
The study agrees with IFES (2017) that women, children and the elderly are vulnerable to
political violence and further asserts that women would be more likely to support
consociational negotiated democracy because of its promise to promote peace and stability.
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Given the patriarchal nature of African and precisely Somali politics (UNDP, 2017) it
would follow that the vast majority of women are not deeply integrated into elective
politics and decision making. Ideally, therefore, the study had a majority of respondents
who by implication were more active and abreast in matters politics of Mandera County.
Policy makers and support groups need to encourage and support women to be more active
in politics and political decision making as they would be more inclined to support politics
anchored on peaceful resolution of disputes. The study however notes that its focus on
heads of households, whose majority turned out to be men, could have disadvantaged
female participants who were not heads of households but could have provided alternative
views and recommends a further study with 50-50 representation in the sample size in
terms of gender.
4.3.4 Marital Status of Respondents
The findings on the marital status of respondents were as summarized in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Distribution of respondents by marital status
Marital Status Frequency Percentage (%)
Single 13 4
Married
Divorced
Widowed
258
12
18
86
4
6
Total 301 100
Source: Field data, 2019
Majority of the respondents (86%) were married while 6% of them were widowed. A
further 4% indicated that they were single and the remaining 4% declared they were
divorced. The findings imply that the institution of marriage/family is held in high regard
as the basic foundation of family and community life. The study established that some of
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the women were widowed as a result of their husbands being casualties of politically
motivated violence as explained by respondent C in the female FGD:
I lost my husband to negative clannism in the 2014 clashes in Rhamu. Just because
he was vocal in supporting a candidate from his own clan, he was targeted for
killing (Respondent C).
This study suggests that marital status and especially cross-clan marriages has an impact
on the level of political participation as it is a predictor of their activism towards peaceful
methods of dispute resolution i.e. people in family life, especially heads of households are
mindful of the safety and security of their families. Married individuals and those with
families were found to react or respond differently to political activities and processes in
the clans as opposed to those who were not married. The study asserts that to the extent
that inter-clan marriages contribute to improving of relations between clans and therefore
forestalling inter-clan violence, its cause notwithstanding, then that would be a practice
worth promoting.
4.3.5 Respondents’ Clan Affiliations
The findings of the study in respect of clan affiliation of respondents are as indicated in
Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Distribution of respondents by clan affiliation
Clan Frequency Percentage (%)
Garre 118 39
Murulle
Degodia
Corner tribes
Others
77
87
13
6
26
29
4
2
Total 301 100
Source: Field data, 2019
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Majority of the respondents (39%) were found to be members of the Garre clan while those
who identified themselves with the Degodia clan were 29%. The Murulle clan had a
representation of 26%. The corner tribes, which comprised of ethnic Somali not affiliated
to the three mentioned clans totaled 4% and the rest of the non-Somali population labelled
‘others’ were only 2%.
From the findings, it was evident that the Garre, the Degodia and the Murulle were the
major groups, which Lijphart (2012) refers to as significant segments, living in Mandera
County as they account for a combined 94% of the population. Instructively, the findings
suggest that none of the three clans has a numerically outright majority that would render
it politically dominant. It is under such an environment of no dominant majority that the
proponents of consociationalism argue that the chances of success of the approach are
higher since the significant groups will have to cooperate in a coalition form of
government.
The study established that a combination of the Garre and the Murulle to the exclusion of
the Degodia fomented political conflicts that have continued to beset the county. The study
further found out that small groups such as the corner tribes and others, were left out of the
political power play and still did not pose a major instability on their own. This finding
affirms Lijphart’s argument on inclusion of all significant segments to maintain stability in
a political unit, irrespective of whatever yardstick is used to differentiate them; whether
ethnic groups or clans.
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4.3.6 Respondents’ Religious Affiliations
The study findings with regard to the religion respondents identified with were as indicated
in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Distribution of respondents by religious affiliation
Religion Frequency Percentage (%)
Islam 286 95
Christianity
Other
13
2
4
1
Total 301 100
Source: Field data, 2019
Majority of the respondents 95% indicated that they were followers of Islam while those
who identified themselves with Christianity were 4%. A further 1% of the respondents
indicated that they identified with other religions which they did not specify.
The study findings demonstrated that Islam is the most dominant religion in the county.
The implication of this finding was that any decision making process that integrated within
it the teachings of the Islamic faith had the chance of receiving near unanimous support as
suggested by a Murulle elder in the interviews:
Mandera County has most of her residents being practitioners of Islam. The religion
influences most of its followers’ decisions and actions, including peace and politics
(Key Informant IV).
This social regard was informed by the consideration that religion is a key factor in the
establishment of social relations and support systems. The study considered religion as an
important element that can be used to explain social stability or instability and as a
mechanism for conflict management in the area. Moreover, religion plays a key role in the
political establishment in Mandera County for a comprehensive pursuit of peace and
stability as intended by the consociational model (Lijphart, 2012; Lemarchand, 2006).
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Further, the religious dimension or bearing on peace is a fundamental pillar enshrined in
Islamic teaching supposedly embraced by the local population in the peaceful management
of disputes in the area. However, other dynamics and considerations as explored in section
4.4 of this study have proven stronger than religion in the decision to either support or
reject consociational negotiated democracy.
4.3.7 Respondents’ Duration of Stay in Mandera County
The findings on the respondent’s duration of stay in Mandera County were as indicated in
Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Distribution of respondents by duration of stay in Mandera County
Duration of Stay Frequency Percentage (%)
0 to 5 years 7 2
6 to 10 years
Over 10 years
13
281
4
94
Total 301 100
Source: Field data, 2019
Majority of the respondents, 94% indicated that they had lived in Mandera County for over
ten years while 4% had lived there for a period of between six and ten years. Only 2% of
the respondents had lived in Mandera County for less than 5 years. The study argues that
the duration one has lived in an area may determine the depth of information they have to
offer to the researcher with regard to his study questions, based on their experiences and
observation; the more one has lived in the study area, the more they are likely to give
conclusive information. The study, therefore, considered the duration of stay significant
because the phenomenon under study straddle between two elections occurring at intervals
of five years.
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That an overwhelming majority of the respondents had lived in Mandera County for a
period of over ten years meant that they had witnessed the workings of consociational
negotiated democracy during the 2013 and 2017 election cycles and they could therefore
give adequate feedback on various issues under study. The fact that the study also used an
embedded strategy where the quantitative component was intended to support the
qualitative approach meant that the study benefitted from information richness as given by
many respondents who had lived in Mandera County for long. The majority group had also
witnessed the nexus between various social factors such as religion and traditions and how
they influenced politics and conflict management and as a result, they could give a
comparative picture of issues under study authoritatively.
4.4 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
The researcher made use of a questionnaire to obtain data related to the various dynamics
that influence adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in the management of
ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. Precisely, a five point likert-scale was
developed by the researcher with five options per statement that highlight the strength of
the response given. Qualitative data generated from open-ended questions as well as
interviews and FGDs was also integrated in the analysis and discussion as demonstrated in
the sections that follow.
4.4.1 Desire for a Political Process Free of Violence and Destruction
The findings on the desire for a political process devoid of violence and destruction as
indicated in Figure 4.1 indicate that 69% of the respondents strongly agreed that the desire
for a political process free of violence and destruction was a push factor for them to support
consociational negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts. A
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further 18% of the respondents agreed with the question statement while 6% were
indifferent. 5% of the respondents disagreed with the statement while 2% expressed strong
disagreement with it.
Figure 4.1: Desire for a political process free of violence and destruction
Source: Field data, 2019
A response rate of 87% of the informants indicating their desire for a violence and
destruction free political formation suggests that political activities in the county of
Mandera have been best with violence. The findings were also interpreted to mean that the
competitive clan-based organization of politics in the county had been fuelling animosity
among the residents, an outcome that most of the informants would wish to see reversed.
The results are further indicative of personal experiences with the adverse effects of a
violent political process such as the loss of a loved one or even the destruction of property
that was their lifeline and which the respondents would never wish to encounter again.
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Political processes in democracies such as Kenya (and all sub-national political units within
her) are intended to be violence free because violence undermines peace and stability.
However, the dominant majoritarian system in many democracies has been reduced to
zero-sum contests that produce winners and losers, a situation that oftentimes leads to
violent conflicts as electoral outcomes are disputed. Based on the study findings as
presented in Figure 4.1, the study takes the view that from its inception, respondents
seemed to believe that management of ethno-political conflicts through consociational
negotiated democracy could mark the end of animosity which exists between the different
clans.
Moreover, the study concurs with Lehmbruch (2006) that the propensity for violence in
majoritarian systems is particularly high where there is no established culture of accepting
electoral outcomes or the processes are prone to manipulation. It consequently concluded
that the electorate in areas prone to politically motivated violence such as Mandera County
would be more willing to support an approach such as consociational negotiated democracy
that promotes mechanisms that curtail the opportunities for violence and destruction.
4.4.2 Fairness in Sharing of Political Positions
The study sought to establish whether the promise of fair sharing of political positions was
a push factor in the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County.
The findings were as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Assurance of fairness in sharing political positions
Source: Field data, 2019
The study findings indicate that 23% of the respondents in this study strongly agreed that
the promise of fair sharing of political positions in the county was a push factor for them
in their decision to support the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy as a
pathway to political conflicts management. This view was supported by a further 32% of
the informants. This means that slightly more than half of the respondents (55%) thought
that consociational negotiated democracy would deliver fairness in the sharing of political
positions and hence help avert politically motivated conflicts. On the other hand, a
significant proportion of the respondents, 37% of the respondents disagreed that the need
for assurance of fairness in sharing political positions had informed their support for
consociational negotiated democracy while 8% of them were indifferent.
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From the findings, the study found out that majority of the respondents did not think that
the majoritarian system used prior to adoption of consociational negotiated democracy was
fair in the manner in which political positions were shared among the clans in the county.
The study based on these findings argues that majority of the respondents were of the view
that unfairness in the sharing of political positions contributed to the recurrent politically
motivated conflicts in the county of Mandera. It is the researcher’s position based on
evidence drawn from Figure 4.2 that the proponents of consociationalism had convinced a
majority of the respondents that the approach would ensure equity in political power
sharing and hence the fairly strong support for it among the respondents. The study
considered the 37% of the respondents expressing disagreement with the view that the need
for equity in sharing of political positions had persuaded them to support consociationalism
as indicative of other considerations that may not be necessarily political. This perspective
was informed by a response given by a Murulle participant in the males FGD who noted
thus:
Consociationalism is good because each clan can do its business the way it wishes
without worrying about meddling in its affairs by other rival clans. Fairness in
sharing of political positions is impossible because of different clan sizes in terms
of population. For me, a stable business environment is more important than
positions of power (Respondent K).
With regard to the 8% of the respondents who were indifferent, the researcher concluded
that they were not significant enough to affect the overall observation because even if that
percentage was added to the disagreeing group, those in support of consociationalism on
account of its promise of equity in sharing of political positions would still be the majority.
In any political unit where power is contested by several actors, there is a tendency among
groups that have been or perceive themselves to be victims of systemic exclusion to support
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an alternative arrangement that accommodates them. The concept of proportionality as
theorized by the scholars of consociationalism is particularly tempting for small groups
and if implemented faithfully, it can usher in stability. This has been proven in the case of
Malaysia where accommodation of all significant segments set the country on a path to
stability as argued by Henry (2016). Despite this compelling argument, this study was
persuaded that the assurance of political positions though significant for the community
and especially those that may have previously been excluded from political power, could
not in itself mean much to an individual who is apolitical and who would rather a system
that brings stability for him to pursue his interests.
4.4.3 Fair Distribution of Economic Resources
This research question intended to investigate the extent to which fair distribution of
economic resources had informed the support for consociational negotiated democracy in
Mandera County. The findings were as shown in Figure 4.3. the study established that that
59% of the study participants strongly agreed that the promise of fair distribution of
economic resources influenced their support for adoption of consociational negotiated
democracy as a strategy for managing politically instigated interethnic conflicts in Mandera
County. Respondents who simply agreed with this view were 16% while 8% expressed
neutrality. A combined 17% of the respondents disagreed that fair distribution of economic
resources had influenced their support for adoption of consociational negotiated
democracy.
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Figure 4.3: Fair distribution of economic resources
Source: Field data, 2019
The study finding that 75% of the respondents were attracted to consociational negotiated
democracy because of the promise of fair distribution of economic resources were
suggestive that the pre-consociational negotiated democracy period was characterized by
inequalities in the distribution of economic resources accruing to Mandera County. A
Murulle participant in the females FGD explained that:
Some parts of Mandera County especially in the rural areas are very marginalized
and accessing economic is extremely difficult. The few that were available prior to
devolution went to areas with influential vocal leaders who did not understand and
fully respect the principles of consociational negotiated democracy. This little
understanding of negotiated democracy made the populace in the county to
welcome and embark on it (Respondent A).
The study contended that inequalities in the sharing of resources were as a result of people’s
little knowledge of the model, and lack of County political structures and legal frameworks
on how resources should be shared. Negotiations done are made to favour dominantly
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represented clans. This faulty system facilitated influential politicians to take advantage,
thus, contributing to the recurrence of politically motivated conflicts among clans.
Economic resources are the backbone of a society’s existence and any threat to such
resources provides fodder for violence from those that are excluded as well as those that
are in control but unwilling to share. Resource-based conflicts that are manifested in
political processes have been witnessed in many African countries such as the Democratic
Republic of Congo, where ethnic groups wrestle for power as a platform to control the
resources (Burnley, 2012). The study argues that consociational negotiated democracy’s
promise that groups would get an opportunity to be in power and consequently get their
fair share of resources made that political arrangement attractive to the residents especially
in the 2013 electoral cycle. But, unfortunately, the outcomes of that election, the
subsequent appointments by the county government and the sharing of resources did not
reflect proportionality among the significant segments as intended. This inconsistency with
the stipulated principles of consociational democracy contributed to the decline in its
support in the 2017 election cycle as reported by a PBO key informant:
In my view, the failure by the first county government regime to entrench equity in
the sharing of positions power and resources coupled with fall outs within the Garre
clan contributed to the decline in support for negotiated democracy in the 2017
election. This is because, there are no legal structures to support the consociational
distribution of resources (Key Informant III)
4.4.4 Religious Teachings
The findings in respect of the significance of religious teachings in the adoption of
consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County are as shown in figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Influence of religious teachings
Source: Field data, 2019
As can be seen from Figure 4.4, 67% of the respondents expressed strong concurrence that
religious teachings on peaceful dispute resolution influenced adoption of
consociationalism, a view which was shared by a further 17% of them. However, about 9%
of the respondents disagreed that religious teachings had any role in the adoption of
consociational negotiated democracy in the county. The remaining 8% of the respondents
were not certain on whether or not religious teachings were a motivator for the adoption of
consociationalism as a way of resolving the ethnically inspired political conflicts in the
county.
Religious teachings, specifically those of Islam which is the dominant religion (see Table
4.5) in the county significantly influenced adoption of consociational negotiated
democracy as indicated by 84% of respondents. This is attributed to the fact that Islam, just
like Christianity, emphasises values such as equality, fairness and peaceful resolution of
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disputes (Abu-Nimer, 2010). These were some of the pull factors towards consociational
negotiated democracy as demonstrated in sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3. The finding was also
suggestive of the extent to which Islamic religious teachings had been integrated in the
political sphere as well as the dispute resolution mechanisms of the dominant ethnic Somali
community in Mandera County. Moreover, the findings also inferred that the grassroot
network of religious institutions and their leadership were promoting consociational
negotiated democracy as a pathway to inter-clan political accommodation and
consequently peace among the populace while making reference to the religious teachings.
Religious teachings and contextually those of Islam emphasize the importance of peace
within oneself and others. The finding on religious influence in the adoption of the
consociational model was in sync with Abu-Nimer’s (2010) assertion that the Quran forbid
violent behaviour while encouraging peaceful coexistence among all people who it
describes as equal before God. The significance of religion in the adoption of
consociational negotiated democracy as a strategy to managing ethno-political conflicts
and consequently building peace is further emphasized by Kadayifci-Orellana (2010) who
has argued that it is the duty of every Muslim to uphold peace. Thus, the study findings are
in perfect harmony with the existing literature. The non-Muslim respondents in support of
the significance of religion in adoption of consociationalism were assumed to have been
influenced by teachings in their respective religions.
4.4.5 Cross-cutting Family Ties
The findings of the study on the respondents’ views in respect of the influence of family
ties on adoption of consociational negotiated democracy were as shown in Table 4.8.
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(SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree;
F=Frequency; %=Percentage).
Table 4.8: Family ties
SA A N D SD
F % F % F % F % F %
Influence of family ties on
adoption of consociational
negotiated democracy.
142 47 57 19 30 10 45 15 27 9
Source: Field data, 2019
Table 4.8 indicates that 66% of the respondents agreed that cross-cutting family ties
influenced adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in the county as a means to
addressing ethno-political conflicts. Approximately 10% of the respondents expressed
neutrality with regard to the effect of inter-clan family ties on the adoption of
consociational negotiated democracy as a further 24% disagreed.
The findings inferred that family ties characterized by cross-clan marriages had occurred
in Mandera County. The study findings indicated that the inter-clan family ties had been
informed by increased mobility of people as they pursued different interests such as
education or economic opportunities as reported by a women leader:
Nowadays, people are moving from rural areas into urban areas in pursuit of
education, business opportunities or employment. In the process, they interact and
establish relationships culminating in inter-clan marriages. There are lots of
interclan marriages in the urban areas due to group diversity and increased interclan
interactions in those settings compared to the rural areas (Key Informant V).
The study noted that marriage and love were matters that were personal and in the pursuit
of such private undertakings, clan affiliation could have been relegated to a lower level
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compared to personal choice. As such, marriage was found to connect families and
consequently clans. The end result, as the study finding suggest would be the thawing of
inter-clan relations and the possibility of erstwhile rivals working together, if not for
anything else for the sake of protecting their families.
The 24% that disagreed on the influence of cross-cutting family ties on the adoption of
consociational negotiated democracy indicated that one’s spouse was a personal choice and
they could neither be victimized nor embraced at the clan level purely on account of their
marriage. A Murulle key informant noted thus:
Marriage is mainly determined by a man and whatever clan his wife comes from is
immaterial. Women are considered as part of their husbands’ clan and cannot be
possibly targeted on account of their parent’s clan (Key Informant IV).
For the dissenting group of respondents, it would appear that though family is important in
its own right, for them, the clan extraction of the women was immaterial due to the
patriarchal nature of the Somali community. In effect, the finding suggested that a woman’s
clan of birth was lost at the point of marriage and did not necessarily mean improved
relations between their maiden clan and the assumed one from her husband.
The majority finding of 66% suggests that inter-clan marriages are a common cultural
practice that is highly encouraged among the clans as they are believed to foster the unity
of the clans involved (Tadesse, 2010). Such marriages were used as a social measure to
encourage peaceful coexistence among the clans constituting a community. The study
argues that people who consider each other as family on account of marriage, clan
differences notwithstanding are less likely to attack each other in the event of
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disagreements and would rather adopt dialogue. Thus, the study concluded that family ties
encouraged cooperation and sharing, which were also noted to be key markers of
consociationalism, and especially its principle of inclusivity.
4.4.6 Insufficient Campaign Finances
The findings in respect of whether insufficient campaign finances within clans had any role
in the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy were as illustrated in Figure 4.5.
Majority of the respondents (74%) expressed their view that insufficient campaign finances
influenced the decision by clans to adopt consociational negotiated democracy as a
working political model in Mandera County. That 56% of this group of respondents
strongly agreed demonstrates the salience of finances in political processes in the county
of Mandera. Approximately 20% of the study participants disagreed with the statement
while the remaining 6% of the respondents were undecided.
Figure 4.5: Insufficient campaign finances
Source: Field data, 2019
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The findings were interpreted to mean that political campaigns were an expensive affair
that could cut off potential candidates from the political process besides influencing the
outcomes. The findings further suggested that the majoritarian system which existed prior
to the introduction of consociationalism was a preserve of those that could marshal enough
finances to mount the campaigns. Based on the findings, the study further deduced that
small clans that could not pool the resources needed for campaigns had no chance of
ascending to political office in the pre-consociationalism period as they had no capacity to
campaign against their more financially endowed rivals and this served to exacerbate
rivalry among dominant clans and the smaller ones.
Campaign financing is a major issue in democracies because it can influence the direction
an election will go, especially in societies where politics is not organized along ideologies
and this can be a precursor for politically motivated conflicts. The study findings are
affirmed by Posada-Carbo’s (2008) argument that uncontrolled injection of financial
resources can undermine the legitimacy of not just candidates or political parties, but also
the political processes and systems. Introduction of any political system demands
investments in terms of enough financial resources that can be used to educate, inform and
involve the populace in the attempts to popularise it. In Mandera county, consociational
negotiated democracy was introduced theoretically without a practical involvement and
participation of the entire affected communities. This is in disagreement with the sweeping
claims that a consociational negotiated democracy model is not expensive. When the
populace is not involved in the design of the process and it is only left in the domain of
individual influential politicians, then the system would not appropriately represent those
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it is intended to represent thus and neither will it stem violent conflicts. This goes against
the argument that smaller clans operating from the premise of realpolitik would support a
system that favours them to achieve their ends of political participation and representation.
4.4.7 Lessons Learnt on the Success of Consociationalism elsewhere
The study sought to gauge the extent to which the workings of consociational negotiated
democracy elsewhere had influenced its adoption in Mandera County and the findings were
as illustrated in Table 4.9. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree;
SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).
Table 4.9: Successful adoption of consociational negotiated democracy elsewhere
SA A N D SD
F % F % F % F % F %
Benchmarked success of
consociational negotiated
democracy in similar polities
elsewhere.
24 8% 33 11% 18 6% 114 38% 112 37%
Source: Field data, 2019
From Table 4.9, only 8% of the respondents strongly agreed that support for consociational
negotiated democracy in Mandera County was influenced by evidence of its successful
practice elsewhere. About 11% of the study participants agreed that their support for
consociational negotiated democracy was influenced by its success elsewhere while 6%
expressed neutrality. Three quarters of the respondents (75%) disagreed that their support
for consociational negotiated democracy as a pathway in the management of ethno-political
conflicts was influenced by its success elsewhere.
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The findings suggest that the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy to help with
management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County had nothing to do with its
successful use elsewhere; thus leading to the conclusion that it developed from within the
community. The findings were also interpreted to mean that this strategy had not been used
at the subnational level of political participation given the centralization of politics and
resources in the country prior to the promulgation of the CoK 2010. The findings persuaded
the researcher that the success of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms spearheaded
by elders and who were key actors in the consociational negotiated democracy model could
have encouraged the community to support it.
As stated in the problem statement, there are inadequate empirical studies on the practice
of consociational democracy at the sub-national level of political contestation. The extant
literature has tended to focus on the national level of consociational programming, taking
into account heterogeneity of the society at that level. The dynamics in Mandera Coutnty
are different because not only is the political unit a sub-national one but the dominant ethnic
group, that is the Somali is also sub-divided into clans and the clans into sub-clans. This is
the very reason the study refers to the population in Mandera County as homogeneous (the
instrumental use of ethnicity with particular reference to the Somali community identity),
yet heterogeneous (the primordial use of ethnicity as depicted by the wide array of clan and
sub-clan identities). The study argues that traditions and culture, including religion have
shaped the consociational model practiced Mandera County, making it essentially home-
grown. This view is supported by the fact that the practice is spearheaded by elders who
hardly have any formal training to prepare them for benchmarking exercises that could
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inform an argument in support of lessons learnt from elsewhere. The study however notes
that the clans in the neighbouring semi-autonomous Somaliland have had a consociational
approach to their politics (Omaar & Ali, 2018) and this may be the reason 19% of the
respondents were in support of the claim that lessons learnt from its success elsewhere had
influenced their support for consociational negotiated democracy in the management of
ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.
4.4.8 Inclusion of Clan Representatives in the Negotiations
The study findings on the place of inclusion of clans in the negotiations leading up to
adoption of consociational negotiated democracy were as illustrated in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Inclusion of clan representatives in the negotiations
Source: Field data, 2019
The pie chart in Figure 4.6 indicates that 36% of the study participants strongly disagreed
that inclusion of each clan’s representatives in the negotiations led to their support for
consociational negotiated democracy while 27% of the respondents simply disagreed with
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this statement. Only 4% of the respondents expressed neutrality with regard to this
statement while 14% agreed that inclusion of each clan’s representatives influenced their
decision to support. The remaining 20% of the respondents strongly agreed with the
question statement. Thus cumulatively, 63% of the respondents downplayed the
significance of clan representation in the negotiations as a push factor for adoption of
consociational negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in
Mandera County.
The findings were unexpected as the assumption was that inclusion in decision making
would be received positively by all clans as a sign of recognition, a key aspect in the pursuit
of power. The findings were suggestive of the possibility of exclusion of certain clans in
the community’s political architecture or that cooperation of clans in the political sphere
of the wider Somali community is not something that most of the residents were enthused
about; that a culture of survival for the fittest had taken root among the clans. In this regard,
a Degodia key informant noted thus:
My clan was excluded from discussions on possible cooperation with the Garre and
Murulle clans despite requesting to be included. This made us work with the Garre
political rebels (Key Informant XIII).
This finding was important because it helped shed some light on why the support for
consociational democracy declined in 2013 compared to 2017 – in the 2013 election cycle,
the Garre were united but following the fallouts in 2017, the rebels teamed up with Degodia
to oppose negotiated democracy. Moreover, the study was persuaded that the elite in the
community were unwilling or lacked the motivation to bridge the inter-clan cleavages. The
results were also interpreted to mean that a clan’s representation in the negotiations was
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not a high ranking priority to some of the respondents compared to other factors like equity
in resource allocation.
Based on this finding, the study inferred that inclusion was varied and not just about the
physical presence of group representatives in decision making; provided the decisions were
fair in the opinion of the respondents, that would be sufficient as pointed out by a Garre
participant in the males FGD:
For me, the most important thing is fairness especially in sharing the available
opportunities and resources. My clan does not need to be represented in the
negotiations for this to happen (Respondent P).
Such an interpretation adds clarity to the emphasis Lijphart (2012) gives to the idea of
inclusivity as a success factor in consociational negotiated democracy as a pathway to
peaceful coexistence. The major argument stemming from the finding that the study made
was that perception of equity in resource sharing was seen as a synonym to inclusivity by
the respondents. The study thus agrees with Cederman, Wimmera and Min (2010) that
ethnic groups rebel and initiate conflicts when they are excluded from power. It is
noteworthy that over one third of the respondents (34%) were of the contrary view that
inclusion of their representatives motivated their support for consociational democracy. In
this regard, the study concluded that this group believed that their political survival was
only guaranteed by people with whom they shared some primordial characteristics.
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4.4.9 Consociational Negotiated Democracy as the Only Realistic Pathway to an
Elective Political Office for Small Clans
The pie chart in Figure 4.7 shows the findings on the respondents’ views in relation to
consociationalism as the only realistic path for small clans to occupy political office and
hence mitigate ethno-political conflicts.
Figure 4.7: An avenue for small clans to hold county political office
Source: Field data, 2019
From the pie chart, 40% of the respondents strongly agreed that consociationalism was the
only realistic path for small clans to hold any county or national elective political office in
the county, and thus avert ethnically motivated political conflicts. A further 17% agreed
with the statement while 32% of the respondents did not concur with the statement. The
rest, 11% expressed indifference in response to this question.
The study findings suggest that small clans had no chance of ascending to political office
outside the consociational negotiated democracy model. The finding could as well mean
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that the bigger clans have monopolized the county political leadership and it would take a
different approach to politics other than majoritarianism for smaller clans to get a chance
at exercising political power. The study findings may also signify that collusion between
the numerically significant clans can perpetually deny the smaller clans political power.
Such an eventuality would then mean endless struggles and instability as the small clans
seek to show their strength by resorting to violence.
In political processes, the struggle by groups, big or small, to access and maintain political
power is the clearest indication yet that no group wants to perpetually and voluntarily have
its political fate determined by another. Acquisition of political power presupposes access
to all resources, including the instruments or means by which to maintain that power, be
they consensual or non-consensual. The study concurs with Cheeseman (2011) that in the
absence of elite cohesion to initiate cooperation to share power between them – and by
extension the constituencies they represent, perceptions of victimhood increase among
smaller groups and this serves to perpetuate instability as they are inclined to adopt
violence as their modus operandi. Thus consociationalism as a pathway out of ethnic-
based political violence would work for all groups, provided elite decisions and patterns of
cooperation are properly configured.
The 32% that expressed disagreement with the statement was considered significant by the
study because the implication is that there were other means other than consociationalism
for smaller clans to access political power, their inferior numerical strength
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notwithstanding. The study assumed that these other methods could include pre-election
alliances that did not necessarily conform to the pillars of consociationalism.
4.4.10 Other Reasons that Influence Adoption of Consociational Negotiated
Democracy
In this question, the study intended to find out whether there were reasons other than those
suggested in the Likert scale that motivated the communities living in Mandera County to
consider consociational negotiated democracy as a useful strategy in managing ethno-
political conflicts. A thematic analysis of the responses highlights the unity of the larger
Somali community as paramount, their clan differences notwithstanding. That the practice
is advocated for by elders renders it worthy of consideration given the immense respect
that they command from the community as guardians of the common good. A Garre
participant in the females FGD corroborated this perspective thus:
One of the undeniable facts is that we are Somalis first before our membership to
our different clans. A non-Somali and indeed many Somalis cannot pinpoint the
difference between a Garre and a Degodia or Murulle. Thus the unity and
preservation of our culture as Somalis supersedes that of individual clans. Such an
agenda driven by the elders whom we respect as the custodians of our culture and
public good will to a very large extend tend to get support from the community
members (Respondent E).
This view was also corroborated by a PBO key informant who said that:
The institution of elders is highly respected within the Somali community because
since time immemorial, it is them that have been making most of the decisions
involving conflict resolution which have in many times ended inter-clan rivalries,
their aim being unity of the Somali community (Respondent XV).
Analysis of the above finding indicates the importance of cultural institutions such as the
council of elders in decision making and the value of unity and harmony attached to it by
the Somali clans. However, these ties and the desire for unity and harmony, though in sync
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with the consociational argument that cooperation breeds stability (Lijphart, 2012) does
not seem to be the reality in Mandera County given the recurrence of violent conflicts
grounded in politics. This study argues that the high political stakes among the clans
participating coupled with exclusion grievances in the electoral processes breed hostilities
and accentuate clan differences and consequently violence to the detriment of
consociationalism. In essence, the manner in which ethnicity is used in the politics and
governance of Mandera county as established and discussed under section 4.6 of this study
is the problem because it excludes and antagonizes rather than include and integrate all
segments.
The study also established that there exists the fear of self-annihilation among the Somali
clans. This finding was intertwined with the common saying in the community that: ‘the
Somali comes ahead of the Murulle, Degodia or Garre’. This finding was succinctly
elaborated by a Garre key informant in an interview who said thus:
My son (referring to the researcher), we all come from families which together form
a community. The community members by virtue of lineage share certain attributes
that make them identify with each other by default. Imagine members from related
families fighting over things they can discuss and resolve? If the fighting continues
for long, the community will no longer exist. So it is up to the leaders of the
community to help their kin find alternative ways of settling disagreements (Key
Informant VI).
The fear of self-annihilation of homogenous yet heterogeneous populations is not unique
to the Somali community in Mandera County. In spite of the cleavages at the clan and sub-
clans, the Somali identity is the aggregate of all these other identities and it gives them
distinctiveness at the national level. On this basis, one can arguably and quite convincingly
point to the instrumentalization of ethnicity, depending on the purpose and context of its
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usage (Woolcock, 1998). To the extent that the Somali language flows across constituent
clans, the Islamic religion dominant in all clans, it would follow that the constituent clans
will tend to cooperate and support consociational negotiated democracy because after all
the clans are just but members of an extended family called the Somali that must be
protected. It is the contention of this study that the reality of self-annihilation at the higher
level of identification favors a more moderate behaviour among sub-groups rather than a
hardline one when it comes to political negotiations.
The study further established that the adoption of negotiated democracy in the management
of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County was encouraged by the National Cohesion
and Integration Commission (NCIC), in exercise of its mandate to promote alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms that thaw ethnic relations. There were also respondents who
indicated the need to comply with the provisions of Article 174 (d) and (e) which
emphasize the right of communities to manage their own affairs and the protection and
promotion of the rights and interests of minorities and marginalized communities.
Inclusion of all interested parties in the political matrix as contemplated by the supreme
law was thus perceived as only possible through the consociational negotiated democracy
model. On compliance with the law, a national government key informant noted thus:
The communities living in Mandera County are citizens of Kenya, irrespective of
their ethnic or clan identities. Thus, any action undertaken by or in the name of the
community must be in conformity with the provisions of the law, precisely the NCIC
Act 2008 and Article 174 of the Constitution of Kenya (Key Informant XIV).
The role of the NCIC was found to have been particularly instrumental in supporting the
elders from across the clans reach out and find a workable solution that promotes the rights
and interests of all clans in order to enhance peace and stability. It however emerged that
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the negotiations, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter, were not inclusive in terms of clan
representation. The study thus takes the view that exclusion of significant segments (clans)
undermined the roll out of consociational negotiated democracy in the manner
contemplated by the legal framework cited above and it is no wonder that the 2017 electoral
cycle saw stiff opposition to consociational negotiated democracy compared to the 2013
electoral cycle.
From the above responses and discussion, it is evident that the Somali community in
Mandera County has deep respect for the institution of the elders and it believes that
decisions made by the elders are usually in the best interests of the community. The pursuit
of unity and fear of communal self-annihilation were significant factors in favour of
adoption of consociational negotiated democracy. This partly explains why some of the
active political actors agreed with the elders to step down even when such an action meant
that their political careers would come to an end. Moreover, there is an appreciation of the
effort of national institutions such as the NCIC working in concert with cultural institutions
in entrenching consociationalism in the promotion of peaceful ethnic relations.
4.4.11 Extend of Support for Consociational Negotiated Democracy in Managing
Ethno-Political Conflicts
In this question, the researcher sought to establish the extent to which the respondents
supported the practice of consociationalism in the management of ethno-political conflicts
and the findings were as illustrated in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Support for consociationalism in management of ethno-political conflicts
Source: Field data, 2019
Figure 4.8 manifests that a majority of the respondents at 57% did not support
consociational negotiated democracy, while 43% of them supported it, indicating a major
shift in opinion going by the results presented and analyzed under this objective. Based on
this finding, the study sought to establish the reasons why the majority of the respondents
did not support consociational negotiated democracy in the 2017 election cycle compared
to the 2013 cycle and the explanations are discussed below.
A thematic assessment indicated that the respondents who do not support consociational
negotiated democracy argued that the practice undermined true traditional democracy.
Viewed against the biodata of respondents, it was determined that this particular response
was popular with nearly half (48%) of the total Garre clan respondents and more than three
quarters (78%) of the total Murulle and Degodia clan respondents. The analysis further
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revealed that slightly more than half of this group of respondents (52%) had a post primary
level of education and their average age was 39 years. The findings suggest that
consociational negotiated democracy has more backing from the Garre compared to the
Murulle or the Degodia clans. The finding further is indicative of its popularity with the
educated youthful segment of the population who presumably understood the tenets of an
ideal democracy and were convinced that what was happening in Mandera County under
the consociational model was inconsistent with those ideals.
The study further deduced that the youthful educated population did not support
consociationalism because of the failure of its promoters to involve them in decision
making. As argued in section 4.3.2, educational attainment was found to elevate this group
to a position where they can assess and determine whether constituent components of
democracy are in place before supporting or rejecting any of its perceived variations.
Despite the low formal literacy levels (KNBS, 2017), it would appear that the community
in Mandera County is politically literate, at least in respect of their understanding of
democracy. This contention is given more impetus by the finding that it was dominant
among respondents in the active production band who were beneficiaries of formal
education. A respondent had noted in their questionnaire response that consociational
negotiated democracy was “promoting (political) dictatorship” among the masses, a
finding that was corroborated and summed up by a Degodia participant in the males FGD
thus:
Consociational negotiated democracy undermines democracy and instils a culture of
political dictatorship by the elders, who have reduced voting to a crowning exercise
rather than a decision making process. Women and youth are excluded from
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negotiations; sort of treated like children and incapable of making any useful
contribution to our community’s politics (Respondent S).
Another response in support of the above view was given by a Garre key informant during
an interview who observed that:
Most people especially the younger generation feel that negotiated democracy is
marginalizing them in terms of actively participating in the political process. They
feel that their candidates who are popular but not having the financial muscle are
unfairly elbowed out of the race with promises of other opportunities coming to the
community which cannot be guaranteed (Key Informant XI).
The excerpts above point to the level of disaffection and disappointment segments of the
Mandera County population had regarding consociational negotiated democracy. Women
and youth who are significant actors in the political life of the community did not approve
of the practice because of its monopoly by the male elite and the elders in the political
arrangements of their cultural communities. In light of this challenge, these disenfranchised
groups working with anti-consociational negotiated democracy voices in a bid to defend
their political rights, resulted to the use of violence which ultimately undermined the very
stability that consociational negotiated democracy was argued to usher (Lijphart, 2012).
Respondents also cited the fact that politicians were funding the negotiations as reason
enough to reject it. Such an approach in their view made the process flawed ab initio, citing
the maxim that ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’. The finding on the source of funding
as deterring support for consociational negotiated democracy found expression from across
the clans, age and levels of education notwithstanding. A vast majority of the respondents
aged between 21-50 years expressed strong disapproval, noting that whether directly or
through proxies, politicians manipulated the elders to favour their bid during the
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negotiations. However, even though the elders interviewed unanimously agreed that
politicians contributed financially towards meeting the negotiations costs, they maintained
that such funding was voluntary and not obligatory and it did not in any way influence
them.
This study was persuaded by the assertions made by the respondents that the source of
funding tainted the process and rendered it vulnerable to manipulation by the funders or
their proxies. The claims were further supported by Onapajo’s (2015) finding that political
corruption in African politics is deep-rooted and stretches beyond the pecuniary dimension.
The study concurred with Cheeseman (2015) that individual and group investment in
political processes particularly in Africa is never for philanthropic or altruistic purposes.
In the case of Mandera County, the funding by politicians undermines negotiations
irrespective of how well intentioned or altruistic it is because even when one loses fairly,
they could still have a justification and campaign arsenal to attack the negotiators and hence
the process, casting perceptions of bias which are difficult to erode. The subject of
politicians funding the negotiation process became even more significant in the 2017
election cycle compared to the 2013 cycle with respondents pointing out that the stakes
were too high and there was a deeper understanding of devolution and the resources
accruing to the county from it. A PBO key informant explained this situation in an
interview:
The stakes in the 2017 election cycle was higher than in 2013 because within the
first five years of devolution, the public got to understand the devolved system of
governance and the amount of resources accruing to the county from the national
government. People had also observed the manner in which political power and
positions were inequitably shared in the county (Key Informant III).
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Another finding in support of rejection of consociational negotiated democracy was given
as the predisposition by big clans to bully the smaller clans by allocating them smaller non-
influential positions. A Degodia key informant aptly captured this claim as follows:
Politics is about power and numbers and in the case of our county, the Garre who are
the majority will always take the positions of governor, senator and women
representative, unless the Degodia and Murulle unite. Our two clans have no chance
of occupying elective county offices because of small numbers and historical rivalry.
Negotiated democracy can only benefit the Garre (Key Informant XIII).
It would appear based on this finding that the Garre overran the interests of the Degodia
and the Murulle and this explains why members of the two clans did not strongly favour
consociational negotiated democracy as currently practiced in Mandera County. The
incentives for cooperation for the Garre were limited and where need be; they were skewed
towards the numerically smaller Murulle clan. This study argues that were it not for the
provisions of the CoK on the need for inclusivity in appointments and fairness in resource
sharing, the dominant Garre-aligned leadership would ride roughshod on the numerically
inferior Murulle and Degodia clans, unless the two united. The arguments on mutual veto
made by Lijphart (2012) where segments checkmate each other do not suffice in the context
of Mandera County partly because of Garre’s numerical strength.
From the findings presented above, it is evident that the level of support that consociational
negotiated democracy model had in 2013 dropped in 2017 and the main reason for the drop
is because the practice as executed in Mandera County does not accord the general
populace an opportunity to exercise their democratic right, both in elections and
governance. Majority of the people perceive the practice as entrenching political autocracy
and reducing them into passive beings that have no private political preferences. This
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category of respondents appears to be offended by the decision of elders to relegate them
to the position of mere voters whose private choices are subservient to their interests
camouflaged as ‘community interests’. This observation is in sync with Dixon’s (2018)
assertion that consociational democracy is not only elitist but also reinforces alienation
rather than alleviating it.
4.5 The Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
Consociational negotiated democracy is one of the variants of democracy intended to
accommodate the segments in plural societies in the politics of the concerned polity. In
order to understand how consociational negotiated democracy is organized in Mandera
County, a number of closed and open ended questions were developed to help generate
data which is presented and discussed in this section. Some of the questions were
contingent in nature so that particular respondents who have participated in the process
could offer in-depth information.
4.5.1 Inclusion of All Clans in the Negotiation Team
The study sought to establish whether all clans were represented in the negotiating team
and the findings were as presented in Table 4.10. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree;
N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).
Table 4.10: Inclusion of all clans in consociational negotiated democracy
SA A N D SD
F % F % F % F % F %
Consociational negotiated
democracy team comprises all
clans, including corner clans in
Mandera County.
9 3 15 5 21 7 93 31 163 54
Source: Field data, 2019
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The findings show that more than three quarters of the respondents (85%) disagreed that
the negotiation team comprised of all clans, with more than half of this dissenting group of
respondents, 54% strongly disagreeing. Only 8% of the respondents agreed all clans were
represented in the negotiations as a further 7% were neutral.
The findings suggest that some of the clans do not have representatives in the negotiations
team to articulate their interests. They may also mean the negotiations were spearheaded
by one of the clans that did not extent invitations to all clans. The high disagreement rate
could also be indicating that the promoters of consociationalism did not intent that every
clan is represented in the actual negotiations. The findings could also mean that pre-
existing differences among clans are still intact and the elites are not willing to cooperate.
These findings are reiterated by (Lijphart, 2012) who maintains that for consociational
democracy to be effective and successful, the negotiation team must include elites from the
significant segments of the population. However, the finding that not all clans were
represented in the negotiations was a strong indicator that consociationalism as conceived
and practiced in Mandera County deviated from one of its cardinal tenets – inclusivity. It
is this study’s contention that the exclusion radicalized elites from the marginalized clans
and this served to destabilize the polity. It is paradoxical that a process touted as a paradigm
shift in the practice of politics in plural societies such as Mandera County ignores the very
foundations of the practice it purports to be. The findings provide insights into the declining
support for consociational negotiated democracy, especially when the 2013 and 2017
cycles are juxtaposed as established in section 4.4.11.
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4.5.2 Restriction of Negotiation Team to Garre, Murulle and Degodia Clans Only
The findings of the study in respect of the possibility of restriction of negotiation team
membership to the Garre, Murulle and the Degodia were as shown in Table 4.11.
(SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree;
F=Frequency; %=Percentage).
Table 4.11: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to Garre, Murulle and
Degodia clans only
SA A N D SD
F % F % F % F % F %
Restriction of
consociational negotiated
democracy team to Garre,
Murulle and Degodia clans
only.
36 12 114 38 6 2 109 36 36 12
Source: Field data, 2019
The study findings indicate that half of the respondents, 50% agreed that the negotiation
team comprised of representatives from the Garre, Murulle and Degodia clans. An almost
similar number of respondents, 48% disagreed with the statement while only 2% were
neutral. Based on these findings, it can be deduced that the respondents were not very sure
that all the three clans are involved in the negotiation. The nearly equal split in opinion
among respondents with regard to the statement may also be interpreted to mean that there
are divisions within each clan as to whether it’s represented in the negotiation team or not.
As demonstrated in the clan affiliation findings and discussion in section 4.3.5, the
mentioned three clans form the bulk of the population in the county of Mandera. The three
clans have not had a good working relationship thereby giving reasons to perceptions of
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distrust among the implied ethnic groups. The study found no clear evidence that the
negotiation team comprised of the Garre, Murulle and Degodia clans.
4.5.3 Restriction of Negotiation Team to the Garre Clan
The study sought to establish whether the negotiation team comprised of members drawn
from the dominant Garre clan and the findings were as shown in Table 4.12. (SA=Strongly
Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency;
%=Percentage).
Table 4.12: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to one major clan
SA A N D SD
F % F % F % F % F %
Consociational negotiated
democracy team comprises
Garre clan only.
126 42 102 34 18 6 38 12 17 6
Source: Field data, 2019
The results indicate that 42% of the respondents strongly agreed that the negotiation team
is restricted to the Garre clan, a position that was supported by a further 34% of the
respondents. Approximately 18% of the participants expressed disagreement with the
statement while 6% were neutral.
The findings suggest that the Garre clan was the main promoter of consociational
negotiated democracy and as the majority clan, they had a strong desire for peace and
stability in the county of Mandera. The dissenting opinion by 18% of the respondents could
be construed to mean that other clans were involved, although on a very small scale. The
strong position taken by the respondents in support of the statement that the Garre were the
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only clan driving the negotiations can be interpreted as follows: this is the most dominant
clan in the county, implying that whenever a violent conflict erupts, its members suffer the
greatest loss. It would therefore be in the interest of the clan to pursue any approach that
cuts on their losses without necessarily losing their dominance in the political landscape.
The ideas of proportionality as advanced by consociational model of governance could thus
be appealing to the clan as it does not take away their dominance. Moreover, its location
between two Degodia groups (the majority in Wajir County which borders Mandera
County to the South and Southern Ethiopia) with whom the Garre have had a long standing
rivalry, could be understood contextually as an effort at self-preservation in the face of
adversity.
4.5.4 Restriction of Negotiation Team to Two of the Three Major Clans
The study sought to establish whether the negotiation team comprised of members from
either two of the three major clans and the findings were as presented in Table 4.13.
(SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree;
F=Frequency; %=Percentage).
Table 4.13: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to two of the three
major clans
SA A N D SD
F % F % F % F % F %
Consociational negotiated
democracy team comprises
either two of the three big
clans.
165 56 82 27 30 10 24 8 0 0
Source: Field data, 2019
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The study found out that 56% of the respondents strongly agreed that the negotiation team
membership was an alliance of either two of the three major clans living in Mandera
County, a view supported by 27% more of the respondents. However, 8% of the
respondents disagreed with while those who expressed indifference with regard to the
statement in focus were 10%. None of the respondents strongly disagreed with the question
statement.
The study findings affirm that the negotiation team membership represents two clans that
have had a working political cooperation. The findings also pointed to the salience of inter-
clan alliance building for political power contestation in Mandera County. The study
findings are a manifestation of practical politics as executed in Mandera County. Inter-clan
relations in the larger Northern Kenya have never been cordial, and particularly with regard
to electoral activities (Carrier & Kochere, 2014).
From a political contestation perspective, all the clans know that they cannot win any of
the county seats without cooperating with one of the other two. Although the Garre are the
majority, they cannot overpower a coalition of the Murulle and the Degodia. Historically,
the Garre consider the Murulle as less threatening and that they are better off being in an
alliance with them. The Murulle, aware of their numerical inferiority and the territorial
claims to Mandera County made by the Garre have forged a working political relationship
with the Garre for protection from the Degodia and to benefit politically as well, their other
grievances against the Garre clan notwithstanding.
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The finding on coalition of two of the three big clans as comprising the negotiating team
was confirmed by a Garre interviewee who noted thus:
The Garre and Murulle have always had a good working relationship at least
politically because the latter recognize their small numbers and if left on their own,
they would not win anything. So the agreement allows the Murulle take the deputy
governor position and the Lafey Parliamentary Seat in addition to some appointive
positions in the county government. Such a deal and the threat of losing out if the
Garre worked with the Degodia (which is highly unlikely because the Degodia
control Wajir County and are intruders in Mandera County), the Murulle agree (Key
Informant VI).
The elder’s response gives insights into the reasons why the Degodia were strongly
opposed to consociational negotiated democracy. It is important to note that the inter-clan
level of negotiations applies to county level positions such as the governor, deputy
governor, senator and the women representative positions and some parliamentary seats.
4.5.5 Composition of Negotiating Team in Terms of Gender
The study sought to establish whether the gender dimension was an important
consideration in the formation of the negotiating teams in the consociational governance
process. This is because gender is an important construct in conflict management, which
should be taken into account. The findings were as illustrated in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: Inclusion of males and females in the negotiation team
Source: Field data, 2019
The findings demonstrate that an absolute majority of the respondents, that is 98%,
indicated that the negotiation team was not comprised of both men and women while 2%
of the participants were of the view that the team comprised individuals drawn from both
sexes.
The finding denotes that women are not part of the negotiations. This finding explains the
traditional and strict observation of cultural beliefs of the Somali community and
particularly the clans living in Mandera County. This question was brought up in the FGDs
and some of the responses given are presented below:
In the Somali culture, politics and generally community matters are a preserve of
male elders. This has been part of our tradition because unlike women, a man will
always remain to be a member of his clan. Women on the other hand can be married
in other clans and they have to be loyal to their husbands’ clan. They are regarded as
part of the husbands’ family and the children they bear are identified with the
husband’s clan. The Somali culture is patrilineal. Thus, women cannot be part of the
team negotiating the interests of a clan. (Respondent N from the males FGD)
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Another response from the females FGD noted thus:
Women are assumed to be untrustworthy in community decision making simply
because some of us may have been born in one clan but married in another. Some of
these traditions are unfair because they disadvantage us and deny us our voice in
political decision making. Not even women of ages commensurate to that of the male
elders can be included in the negotiations despite some having been married into the
husbands’ clans and lived in family life for over 50 years. We are still treated as
strangers by the very people for whom we bear and raise children. (Respondent G)
The study findings were clear that women are not given an opportunity to participate in
any processes or activities that involve decision making on behalf of their clans.
Based on the above presentations, the responses emanating from the FGDs explicitly
manifest that the male members of the Somali community in Mandera County, clan
notwithstanding, are not ready to cede ground in terms of accommodating women in the
negotiations for an inclusive governance structure that will reduce ethno-political and
interested group conflicts. The arguments in support of women exclusion are merely
cultural and have nothing to do with the ability of women to make meaningful contributions
during negotiations towards a political process that fosters a cohesive coexistence. Women
on the other hand feel oppressed and denied an opportunity to actively participate in
making decisions that affect their lives as envisaged in Article 174 of the CoK.
The younger generation particularly that has had the benefit of an education and own
finances feel that women need to be included in those negotiations because they can act as
bridges between clans given their loyalty on account of birth and marriage. Thus, the
question of gender exclusion in decision making remains a highly contested matter which
must be tackled if consociational negotiated democracy is to embody its true meaning.
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4.5.6 Youth Inclusion in Negotiations
The research pursued to find out the place of the youth in the negotiations as an important
and active demographic in modern political spaces as expressed in the African Youth
Charter (2006). The findings were as illustrated in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10: Inclusion of youth in negotiation teams
Source: Field data, 2019
From Figure 4.10, nearly all the respondents, 98%, indicated that the youth were left out
of the negotiations. Only 2% of the respondents opined that youths are included in the
negotiation team. The study attributed the exclusion of the youth from negotiations to the
stringent cultural dictates of the wider Somali community which view young people as
unfit to make decisions on behalf of their clans. Youth exclusion in political decision
making spheres appears to be a problem in the wider African continent as argued by the
UNDP (2012). The net effect of excluding this significant segment of the population has
been their strong opposition and campaign against consociational negotiated democracy.
The study notes that the youth are very energetic and versatile and tend to be easily
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mobilized by the established political actors against consociational negotiated democracy
to campaign against the candidates endorsed in the negotiations and in some instances
cause chaos. Including them in the process thus gives them a voice and makes them feel
part of the process. It would further foster a sense of ownership and make them responsible
as they learn the leadership dynamics of the society they live in.
4.5.7 Beliefs Shaping Consociational Negotiated Democracy
The research sought to establish whether there were any beliefs, cultural or religious that
shaped the peoples’ desire for consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. In
terms of cultural beliefs, the study established that the community trusted the elders as
having their best interests at heart and this trust contributed to the acceptance of
consociational negotiated democracy in the community. An elderly female respondent who
was the head of her household explained thus:
Our community is closely knit along the clan system because several families make
up a clan. So in case of anything, the clan comes together and shares the matter
amongst members and the issue is sorted. Even for someone like me who is a widow,
I still feel the family warmth and the elders are always at hand to support and take up
any matter that is of concern to me (Respondent 2).
In an interview with a Murulle key informant, the respondent noted that:
Consociational negotiated democracy is a very fair system of rotating the community
leadership among the various clans. This reduces exclusion sentiments that different
clans may have, especially the numerically smaller ones. That way, every member of
our larger Somali community feels accommodated and this encourages peaceful
coexistence among clans (Key Informant IV).
The place of elders in dispute resolution is clear from the foregoing and is further reiterated
by Kariuki (2015), who affirms their contribution in governance for effective and stable
society. This serves to enhance the study finding that belief system and cultural institutions
were important in shaping the course of negotiated democracy in Mandera County. Given
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their positions and the fact that they were also heads of households, there was a strong
position among respondents that an elder cannot preside over something that was
detrimental to the wellbeing of the community. The study further found that the Somali
language acted as a major unifying factor in that irrespective of one’s clan, he or she still
had a responsibility to the larger Somali community, thus any effort aimed at enhancing
the unity was welcome.
From the FGDs, it was found that teachings of the Islamic religion on peaceful settlement
of disputes played a major role in negotiations. A respondent noted that according to the
Islamic teachings, justice and fairness as well as good intention should always guide the
action of every true believer, sentiments which are reiterated in section 4.4.4 of this chapter.
This finding contradicted Nguyen (2010) whose findings indicated that there was no
significant relationship between religion and ethnic conflicts. However, whereas Nguyen
explored religion and ethnic conflicts in terms of causality, this study explored the same in
terms of management. It therefore becomes clear that religious teachings influence the
adoption of consociational negotiated democracy because of its emphasis on fairness. A
religious leader in an interview explained that:
The religion of Islam is about peace and not violence as many non-Muslims seem to
believe because of the distorted explanations of Jihad by extremists. The name of the
religion itself means peace. During negotiations, the elders have breakout sessions
during which they pray for consensus among themselves and Allah’s grace to make
the best decisions in the interest of the community. You notice also that most of the
people in this county are practicing Muslims. So, yes, religion shapes the kind of
consociationalism practiced in Mandera County (Key Informant II).
The findings indicate the place of culture in the formation of consociational negotiated
democracy. In particular, the study highlights the central role of elders and religion in the
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day to day political life of the county and the communities therein. Other aspects of culture
that emerged in the responses and which have a bearing on consociational negotiated
democracy included relationship patterns between various demographics in the Somali
community and the respondents’ interpretations of the behaviour exhibited by elders as
well as political leaders. The study takes the view that culture is a derivative of both
personal and group experiences and perceptions and will invariably affect the way such
individuals or groups receive a particular practice based on those experiences and the
forecast they project for their future.
4.5.8 Terms of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
The research sought to know the terms of consociational negotiated democracy as practiced
in Mandera County. One of the key terms of the process that emerged from the study was
that the agreements emanating from the negotiation process must demonstrate equity in the
sharing of power and particularly elective positions. In support of this perspective, a Garre
interviewee explained that:
The overriding interest during negotiations is to ensure every constituent clan gets a
fair share of elective and appointive positions from those available for sharing (Key
Informant VI).
The sharing of political power among the significant segments of the population was
advanced as helpful in the creation of an enabling environment in which all members could
fully participate in the governance of their county. This finding resonates with Lehmbruch
(2006) assertion that consociationalism functions optimally under conditions of
proportionality.
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The study, however, argues that the proportionality contemplated in the consociational
negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County is only limited to the clans
cooperating in the political governance process. This deviates from the proportionality
principle contemplated by the proponents of consociationalism in the sense that a coalition
of two clans leaves out a significant segment that can turn to work against stability and
coexistence in the county.
The second key finding on the terms of consociational negotiated democracy was
imposition of time lines, precisely five years after which the stakeholders review the
political governance of their polity and particularly the quality of leadership offered by
those given the opportunity to lead through elections. The study established that the
timeline is intentionally fixed to coincide with the general elections as provided for by the
CoK. The review was intended to offer opportunities for rotation of the leadership mantle
among sub clans within the various ethnic populations of the county. The study further
established that the review had its focus on sub-clans. This finding indicates the complexity
of the consociationalism in Mandera i.e. it is more of an intra-clan undertaking but
numerical dynamics implied that the stage for negotiation was moved to the clan level. The
finding on the clan and intra-clan levels of engagement resonates with Lijphart’s (2012)
assertion that consociationalism is favored by overarching group loyalties. In other words,
this finding implies that people have multiple loyalties, precisely rising from the sub-clan
to clan and eventually the community. The finding is further corroborated by the responses
from key informant interviews as follows:
The inclusion of leaders from across the sub-clans is very important because the
leaders have some influence on whether their followers accept or reject the
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negotiation outcomes. There is no doubt the masses will tend to align themselves with
a particular individual or group of elites they think represent their interests and
aspirations particularly those from their own sub-clans or sub-clans they have a
working relationship with. (PBO Key Informant III)
I am a beneficiary of negotiated democracy and I can tell you for sure the system is
the most ideal. Other than the rotation of leadership, the timelines given push a leader
to do their best in serving the people so that they can also be considered in the future
when their current term comes to an end. (Murulle Key Informant VIII)
Another finding of the study in respect of the question on terms of consociational
negotiated democracy was that the system lets individual clans have control on matters that
affect them only, including making choices on specific candidates they wish to present for
election. In essence, the clans have their individual consultations and consensus building
on the candidate to present to the community for consideration for election as the candidate
who best represents the interests of the wider clan and who can secure a win against their
political opponents at the ballot or even for appointment in cases of appointive positions in
the county government. The study considers this arrangement akin to one of the conditions
given by Lijphart (2012) for consociational democracy to work; that segments should have
exclusive control on matters specific to them. The challenge with segmental autonomy is
that it tends to feed into the nationalist agenda and this has the potential for creating
instability. This is besides accentuating group differences even when they are not that
pronounced. This study takes the position that segmental autonomy as advocated by
consociational theorists is not entirely the silver bullet in forestalling the falling out of
groups in a consociational model; it can actually facilitate the disintegration.
The study also established that for one to be considered as a negotiator in the democratic
space, he has to be an elder from his respective clan and he has to be nominated by that
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particular clan. In this regard, the study noted that every clan has a team of elders who offer
guidance to help the clan in taking common positions on matters germane to them. Elite
decision making and interactions shape the outcomes of a regime, an argument augmented
by the findings of a study conducted by Osei (2018) in Ghana. Inter-elite consultations help
minimize re-entry problems after negotiations. The study further established that an elder
must have unequivocal support and command respect and authority of peers who are not
on the negotiation team to forestall factionalism in the community. Within the meaning of
consociationalism, this study found out that there has to be consensus among elites from
cooperating significant segments for negotiation outcomes to materialize.
From the foregoing findings and discussions in respect of the terms of consociational
negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County, the study concludes that the
consociationalism practiced in Mandera County is not in perfect harmony with the tenets
advanced by the consociational school led by Lijphart. The consultations at the sub-clan
level in Mandera County prior to the inter-clan processes do not seem to feature anywhere
in Lijphart’s conceptualization. This could have been informed by the treatment of clans
as ethnic groups within the larger Somali community and sub-clans as ethnic groups within
a clan. Whereas the clans are the building blocks of the Somali ethnic group, the sub-clans
are the building blocks of the clan. It would therefore follow that the concept of ‘Somali
community’ is instrumentally used outside Mandera County when pursuing other interests,
otherwise, within the county, individuals and groups identify themselves with either their
sub-clans or their clans, whichever is convenient at a given point in time, depending on the
circumstances. The study therefore contends that consociational negotiated democracy can
137
happen at multiple levels depending on the meaning of a significant segment adopted by
the analyst and the levels of differentiation and identification within a society.
4.5.9 Role of Political Leaders in Consociational Negotiated Democracy
The study pursued to examine the role of political leaders in the establishment of
consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. The findings of the study in this
regard are as discussed in the following paragraphs.
The study established that one of the main functions of political leaders in the establishment
of consociational negotiated democracy is funding of the process. The study established
that politicians contribute the highest percentage of the negotiation process budget with the
remainder being topped up by community members, especially business men. Mobilization
of supporters to accept and support the decisions reached by the team of negotiators was
also found to be another key role played by political leaders in the organization of
consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. These two roles were repeated
in the FGDs and interviews which noted that:
Political leaders are a very important component in the realization of the success of
consociational negotiated democracy because of the influence they have on their
supporters. If they incite their supporters against the elders and the negotiation
outcomes, implementation becomes very difficult. They also contribute their
resources in funding the negotiations (Key Informant I).
Politicians contribute financial resources to fund the process besides having a strong
influence on their supporters. When they tell the supporters to do something, there is
a high chance many of them will do what they are told by their political leader,
whether good or bad. Their influence in the success of negotiated democracy cannot
be underestimated (Respondent N).
These findings were found to be in agreement with those of Segawa (2015) whose study
established that regimes emerging from ethnic based politics tend to suffer from legitimacy
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deficits for a variety of reasons such as marginalization of minority groups and political
leaders.
The study further established that political leaders also take direct role in the negotiations
by appearing before the panel of negotiators to make a case for their candidature and
suitability for consideration to the political offices they are seeking to hold. Such an
arrangement makes the political leaders part and parcel of the process. However, the study
noted that some political leaders have disagreed with the outcomes even after participating
and competed outside the consociational negotiated democracy framework. A Garre
interviewee who vied for a parliamentary seat against the consociational negotiated
democracy candidate and won pointed out in an interview that:
Consociational negotiated democracy is a good idea but unfortunately, some of the
negotiators are out rightly biased. They consider one’s financial status more
important than their leadership abilities. I disagreed with them when they invited me
for discussions to build consensus on a common candidate, ran my own campaign
even as they campaigned against me and I still won because my supporters believed
in me and felt my competitor was being imposed on them (Key Informant X).
This response supports the argument that political leaders are influential among their
followers and can lead them in supporting or opposing negotiation outcomes, dealing a
blow to the whole process. An FGD participant noted that by politicians directly
participating in the negotiations, whether they agreed or disagreed with the outcome, that
in itself gave the process some legitimacy.
Respondents were unequivocal that political leaders are crucial to the negotiation process
and excluding them would cause them to sabotage the process in different ways such as
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withholding their financial support, marshalling their supporters to undermine the
negotiation outcomes as well as denying the process the political goodwill it requires. The
centrality of political leaders in consociational negotiated democracy as a political vehicle
to power is further lend credence by the practice of patrimonial politics in Africa
(Cheeseman, 2015). Mandera County is no exception to the patronage-based politics that
define Kenya’s and by extension Africa’s political landscape.
4.5.10 Generation of Negotiations Agenda
The researcher sought to establish the manner or process through which the agenda guiding
the negotiations for consociational democratic process is generated. The findings in light
of this research concern were as discussed hereunder.
The study established that one of the ways through which the agenda for negotiations was
obtained was by way of stakeholder consultations. A Murulle interviewee explained the
agenda generation process thus:
Everything that we do is always in the interest of the community. We consult with
them on every matter. Sometimes it is the community members who approach us with
their concerns. We listen to their fears and aspirations. A concerned person or group
raises the issue with an elder in the sub-clan, who then considers it together with other
elders and escalates it to the clan or inter-clan level if it cannot be exhausted at the
lower levels (Key Informant VI).
This claim was reiterated by other key informants from the Murulle clan who maintained
that clan members as key stakeholders share their concerns, interests and views with their
respective elders. At this level, the consultations are limited to the sub-clan level of
discussions. The study established that at this stage, the elders were simultaneously
reaching out to political leaders, religious leaders among other cadres of leadership in the
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community to get their views on the concerns of the community. The elders then present
those interests or concerns to the clan council for fine-tuning and adoption of a common
clan level agenda.
Once the agenda at the clan level has been agreed upon and firmed up, the study established
that the clan elders reach out to their counterparts from other clans, share general areas of
interest for discussion and subsequently plan for a meeting to harmonize the agenda.
During the harmonization meeting, it was established that the elders also agreed on the
optimal number of negotiators to be involved, including how many from each clan. Once
the agenda had been harmonized and the number of negotiators agreed, the elders set a date
for the actual discussions while also reaching out to community members and politicians
to mobilize resources needed to offset the negotiation process costs.
The study however noted that the Degodia interviewees dismissed inter-clan consultations,
arguing that it did not happen because they were not involved in any way, a position that
is corroborated by the study findings as explained in section 4.5.1 y. On the strength of this
argument, the study concluded that the consultations were only between the cooperating
clans – the Garre and the Murulle. Overall, and the dissenting opinion notwithstanding, the
major finding of this study item was found to be congruent with Lederach’s (1997)
assertion that processes emanating from the grassroots have more ownership and hence
better chances of success because of their organic nature; the people can identify with the
outcomes as they participated in the process from conception.
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4.5.11 Discussion of Agenda Items and Consensus building
The researcher sought to evaluate the process through which discussions on the various
agenda items progress. A Garre interviewee explained that:
As community leaders representing different competing interests, we have to agree
on how to go about the negotiations. We make decisions during the first sessions on
who will chair the sessions and hence the official spokesperson. This is followed by
concurrence among members on how to proceed with discussions, including when to
take breaks so that there is order in the meetings. The idea is to ensure civility and
respect for one another, irrespective of conflicting clan positions on matters (Key
Informant VI).
The study established that the initial items in the first meeting were the appointment of a
chairperson who would serve as the team’s spokesperson in its interactions with various
stakeholders and adoption of ground rules as to how the discussions would proceed.
After the ground rules have been set, the study established that the negotiators begin by
categorizing the agenda items in terms of the most contested and complex to the seemingly
easiest. In other words, the negotiation agenda is ranked in order to ensure adequate time
and weight is given for each item. Ranking of the agenda for negotiation is an important
step as it makes the process flow smoothly besides having a psychological effect on the
power of agreement as argued by Elliot and Golub (2015). The actual negotiations begin
with tackling the most complex and contested agenda item. Every negotiator who wishes
to contribute on the agenda item is given an opportunity to make their point. The
chairperson then proceeds to harmonize the emerging points of consensus and difference,
keen on ironing out the differences to pave way for consensus and possibly a unanimous
decision. The study further established that it is during discussions on complex agenda that
emotions are at their peak as each negotiator sticks to their position. Members are given an
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opportunity to consult with their key constituents as well as any advisors they may have. It
is also a moment for members to reflect on each other’s propositions and possibly lobby
each other for their preferred positions. A Murulle interviewee noted that:
During the talks, we take turns to make contributions in a civil and respectful way
even when we don’t agree with each other’s view. We also take breaks to cool off
emotions and consult with our respective constituents on contested issues in order
to ensure broad acceptance of negotiation outcomes. Lobbying is allowed to avoid
as much as possible going for a vote. Votes tend to destroy relations within the
room, hence the avoidance (Key Informant IV).
The drift towards consensus does not mean that the elders cannot take a vote on a contested
matter. The study established that the preference for consensus in decision making among
the negotiators who are basically elders and highly respected people in the community was
intended to minimize re-entry problems. Probed further on the preference for consensus,
the informant explained as follows:
As elders we have a responsibility to guide our people in the direction of peaceful
settlement of disputes and fair sharing of resources. If we disagree among ourselves
on matters that affect us as a community, then how do we bargain for our interests
with non-Somali communities? Lack of consensus among us signifies to our
adversaries the existence of an opportunity for them to divide us further and rule us.
(Key Informant IV)
The argument presented by the elder who was a practicing Muslim is sustained by
Elsamann and Arafa (2012) who stressed “unanimous consensus of the community
(Islamic community) through its competent representatives” as a source of Islamic Sharia
Law. Being a predominantly Muslim community, it is not surprising that religious
teachings and or bases find their way in the Somali community’s affairs, their clan
differences notwithstanding.
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Apart from the use of lobbying as a strategy for reaching consensus among the members
of the negotiating team, the study established that there is the use of emissaries to convince
representatives of clans to reach a common ground. The use of emissaries to obtain
consensus was supported by respondents, irrespective of the method used to obtain data
from them. The study established that the emissaries are normally elders who are not part
of the negotiating team and who understand the pros and cons of issues that are contested.
Their work was to help negotiators understand the issues in contention from different
viewpoints. Use of emissaries is a common practice in negotiations (Sebenius, 2009) aimed
at altering interpersonal dynamics among negotiating parties. The emissary normally is
supposed to enjoy some edge over the person they are sent to persuade and they should
possess qualities similar to the negotiating parties to ensure mutual respect and recognition.
As earlier noted, voting was also found to be another way of building consensus, although
the least preferred approach. A religious leader explained this aspect in an interview thus:
We as Somalis and especially as Muslims strongly believe in the teachings of the
Holy Quran, which encourages consensus in decision making. We dislike the vote in
our decision making because it brings a lot of divisions among the people. The idea
of negotiated democracy borrows heavily from Islam. The voting occurring after
negotiated democracy is anticipated to be a mere fulfilment of the constitution
otherwise the decision taken during the negotiations should remain unchanged (Key
Informant II).
From the above discussion, it is evident that building consensus during the consociational
negotiated democracy process involves lobbying and use of emissaries. The process has a
lot of traction in the larger Somali community because of its close association with the
Islamic faith that is prevalent in Mandera County. Voting as an approach to making a
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collective communal decision is avoided because of the unintended divisions that emerge
thereof.
In the following sections, the study examines responses emerging from a five point Likert
Scale that had been developed to complement the open ended questions that have been
explored in the foregoing paragraphs.
4.5.12 Proposition of Candidates by Clans in the order of Preference
The study sought to find out whether clans are given an option of presenting many
candidates for consideration for a particular position so that should the most preferred fall
short, another can still be picked. The findings are as shown in Figure 4.11.
Figure 4.11: Presentation of candidates for elective posts in order of preference
Source: Field data, 2019
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The findings shows that about one third of the respondents, that is 30%, strongly agreed
that clans present several candidates for consideration for each elective post in the order of
the clan’s preference for each candidate while 16% of the study participants simply agreed
with the question statement. On the other hand, 26% of the respondents disagreed that each
clan presents several candidates for consideration for each elective post in the order of the
clan’s preference per candidate while 20% of the participants strongly disagreed with the
statement. The rest of the respondents, 8% were neutral.
The findings reveal a disagreement in opinion among the respondents with regard to
proposition of candidates by clans in the order of preference, as there were equal
proportions of respondents holding diametrically opposed views. This implies that while
some clans have a favourite or preferred candidate who they present for the elective or
appointive posts, other clans had no such predetermined candidates. The findings could
also imply that the community’s opinion was sought by the elders on their preferred
candidate to help with decision making.
The negotiations on this item occur at the clan level, where several sub-clans present their
candidates before one representing the entire clan is chosen and presented to the negotiating
partner clan to form a team. This finding buttresses a previous argument made by the study
that there are at least two levels of negotiations in the consociational arrangement practiced
in Mandera County. Public participation is a key pillar of democratic processes, even if it
is through representatives such as the elite as is the case with consociationalism.
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4.5.13 Briefing of Candidates on Negotiation Outcomes
The research intended to find out whether candidates being considered for positions from
across the clans were briefed by the negotiators prior to announcement of agreements and
the findings were as illustrated in Figure 4.12.
Figure 4.12: Briefings of candidates about negotiation outcomes
Source: Field data, 2019
Slightly more than half of the population, that is 56%, strongly agree that candidates are
briefed about the negotiations prior to the announcement of agreements to the general
public. About 27% of the survey participants agreed with the statement. The proportion of
respondents who expressed indifference with regard to this statement is 7% while an equal
percentage strongly disagreed that candidates are briefed about the negotiations prior to the
announcement of agreements to the general public. The remaining 4% of the study
participants expressed disagreement.
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Based on these findings, it is evident that a majority of the respondents (83%) are of the
view that the negotiators communicate directly to the affected persons. Communication
with key stakeholders such as politicians is an important component of successful
negotiations as argued by Berkovich (1996). The study established that the intention of the
briefing is to consolidate the support of politicians for consociational negotiated democracy
to avert escalation of tensions into violence. The move was considered essential in
managing the candidates’ expectations and addressing any discontentment at very early
stages.
In spite of this effort meant to stem re-entry problems; some of the candidates were not
convinced or satisfied with the outcomes of the findings. Such candidates openly express
their displeasure and proceed to vie for political seats against candidates who are fronted
by the negotiating team. The study notes that even though there is a strong attempt at
managing communication, fallouts happen and this greatly undermines the success of
consociational negotiated democracy in managing ethno-political conflicts. The outcomes
of the 2017 election cycle were a complete contrast with those of the 2013 cycle owing to
the fall outs witnessed in 2017. The study attributes the fall out to the Garre elders’ decision
to direct all elected candidates at the time not to vie so that they give other sub-clans a
chance.
4.5.14 Proportional Allocation of Positions and Resources among ethnic groups
The research sought to find out whether the sharing of positions and resources
demonstrated equity as advocated by the proponents of consociationalism. The findings
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were as illustrated in Table 4.14. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree;
SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).
Table 4.14: Proportional sharing of positions and resources
SA A N D SD
F % F % F % F % F %
Elective and appointive
opportunities and resources
are allocated based on a
clan’s relative population
strength
24 8 81 27 21 7 63 21 112 37
Source: Field data, 2019
Based on the study findings presented in Table 4.14, 37% of the study participants strongly
disagreed that allocation of positions and opportunities in the county was based on relative
population strength of clans. About 21% of the respondents disagreed with this question
statement while 7% of them expressed indifference. 27% of respondents agreed that
allocation of positions and opportunities was based on relative population strength of clans,
a position which was supported by 8% of the respondents who strongly agreed with the
question statement.
The findings indicate that a majority of the respondents did not perceive the allocation of
positions and resources to mirror the numerical strength of the constituent clans in the
county. This is supported by the results presented in Table 4.21 which clearly indicate an
open bias in the allocation of appointive positions in the county government in favour of
the Garre clan. Whereas the findings of the study related to equity have consistently
demonstrated the fact that the clan is more populous than the rest, the allocations to it far
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outweigh its rightful share. The study argues that it is disproportionate distribution of
positions that contributed to the rejection of consociational negotiated democracy in the
2017 election cycle and beyond as demonstrated in section 4.4.11. The results further
points to the continued inequalities, which factors have continued to fan the tensions in the
political life of the county.
4.5.15 Proposal of Negotiators by Interest Groups other Than Clans
The study sought to establish whether interest groups had a role in the proposition of
negotiators. The findings were presented in Table 4.15. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree;
N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).
Table 4.15: Propose of negotiators by interest groups
SA A N D SD
F % F % F % F % F %
Negotiators are proposed by
interest groups as well as the
clans.
9 3 6 2 13 4 79 26 194 65
Source: Field data, 2019
The study findings show that only 3% of the respondents strongly agreed that interest
groups other than clans propose negotiators to represent their interests during the
negotiations. About 2% of the participants agreed with the statement while 4% of them
expressed indifference. On the other hand, 26% of the survey participants disagreed that
clans’ negotiators are proposed by interest groups and not the clans themselves while 65%
strongly disagreed with the statement.
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The findings strongly suggest that the negotiators are not proposed by any interest group
other than the clans themselves. The findings could also mean that interest groups other
than clans were not given a chance to participate in the process. It would thus be logical to
conclude that the county’s politics is considered a fairly local matter that did not require
the ‘meddling of external parties’ as a Murulle politician noted in an interview:
Negotiations are a purely an internal matter that does not require any external parties
and if that were to happen, it would then mean the elders and the community is ceding
the control of its own affairs to external parties (Key Informant IX).
The interviewee’s response is indicative of the strong view held by the community that its
politics cannot be the subject of third parties. The study notes that even though community
pride is important in its existence, a structured process such as negotiations should involve
interest groups so that the voice of the demographics they represent is heard and attended
to in the decision making process. This approach, the study counsels, would enhance the
support of outcomes as various groups begin to perceive themselves as important and
valued actors in the decision making process (Lederach, 1997).
4.5.16 Neutrality of Negotiation Team Leader
The research sought to establish whether neutrality of the negotiation team leader was
considered important by the respondents and the findings were as shown in Figure 4.13.
The findings indicate that approximately 24% of the respondents strongly agreed that the
position of the chair of the negotiating team is usually handed to a neutral person not
aligned to any clan during the negotiations. Those who agreed with the question statement
were 21%. Almost one half the respondents differed with the statement, with 30% of them
strongly disagreeing with it and the remaining 18% disagreeing. Only 6% of the
respondents were nonaligned.
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Figure 4.13: Neutrality of negotiation process leader
Source: Field data, 2019
The findings suggest that the chair is normally not neutral or the respondents do not expect
him to be neutral. The findings may also mean that neutrality of the negotiation team leader
is not a big issue; it does not mean much to the people. In addition, the findings could also
point to trust issues such that while some of the respondents trusted the persons who chaired
the negotiation processes and considered them nonpartisan, some of the study participants
were of the view that in as much as the individuals or institutions trusted with the position
of chairing the negotiations appeared neutral, they were human after all and had private
interests which can favour some clans and discriminate against others.
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The subject of neutrality of negotiation team members is a debatable one: whether the
neutrality is to the issues under discussion or the conflict parties. Contributing to that
debate, this study argues that neutrality should be to issues rather than an individual’s
affiliation to a group. This argument is premised on the fact that people are social beings
and irrespective of where they come from, they will always be affiliated to a given group,
many times not out of choice or any rational explanation. It is therefore logical to conclude
that the neutrality of the negotiation team leader was considered an important factor
contributing to the acceptance of outcomes of the negotiation process and that could
explain why the respondents were divided down the middle.
4.5.17 Documentation of Proceedings
The research pursued to establish whether the negotiation team recorded the negotiation
proceedings for future reference and the findings are as presented in Figure 4.14.
Figure 4.14: Documentation of negotiation outcomes
Source: Field data, 2019
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More than half of the respondents, that is 64%, agreed that negotiation agreements were
documented as a true record of the proceedings, with 34% of them strongly agreeing. About
14% of the respondents were neutral while 15% disagreed on whether agreements were
documented as a further 7% of the respondents expressed strong disagreement. The study
findings on documentation of negotiations proceedings was consistent with a physical
check in the clan offices in Mandera County where the researcher was shown documents
emanating from negotiations, specifically in the Garre and Murulle council of elders’
offices located in Mandera Town.
The study attributes the dissenting opinions on documentation to the respondents from
segments that were not included in the negotiations as has been ably explored in preceding
sections of this chapter or respondents who simply did not know whether there was any
documentation out of ignorance of the whole process. The study considered documentation
important because written agreements form the basis for reference in the event that any of
the parties claim otherwise. It also constitutes an important reference point during conflict
analysis to develop alternative intervention approaches in the future as the new interveners
can be properly guided on a number of issues pertinent to the conflict. This perspective
tallies with the counsel given to conflict interveners by the UNDG (2016).
4.5.18 Challenges Encountered During Negotiations
The researcher sought to establish the challenges that beset the negotiation process and
developed eight statements against which the respondents would express the extent of
agreement or disagreement. The findings are presented, analyzed and discussed per each
statement below.
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The study sought to find out whether negotiation team members were prone to financial
inducement to favour particular candidates and the findings are as shown in Figure 4.15.
Figure 4.15: Financial inducement of members of negotiating team
Source: Field data, 2019
Based on the findings in Figure 4.15, 35% of the respondents strongly agreed that members
of the negotiating team get financially induced to favour certain candidates, a position
supported by a further 40% of the respondents who simply agreed with the statement.
About 15% of them expressed indifference while a combined 10% of the respondents
disagreed with the statement. This finding implies that the negotiation process and the
negotiators were prone to compromise. The findings also suggest that political
entrepreneurs actively sought the negotiators with a view to influencing them to favour
particular candidates or positions during the negotiations. This finding is consistent with a
previous one were a majority of the respondents expressed misgivings with politicians
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funding the process, arguing that such an approach lend the process to manipulation by
interested parties.
The study interpreted the manipulation contemplated by the respondents as including
financial inducement of negotiators to favour certain candidates. Financial corruption runs
deep in Kenyan politics throughout the various stages of the political processes as argued
by Kanyinga (2014). This finding further sheds light to why most of respondents neither
trust nor support consociational negotiated democracy as an avenue out of ethno-political
conflicts in the county of Mandera. The findings are consistent with Lederach’s (1997)
caution that mistrust in negotiations militate against the success of the process. The mistrust
tends to be high especially where the majority do not get fully engaged in the processes.
Secondly, the study sought to explore the influence of disgruntled opinion leaders left out
of negotiation teams on the process and acceptance of outcomes. The study findings were
as illustrated in Table 4.16. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree;
SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).
Table 4.16: Negotiation process undermined by disgruntled opinion leaders external to the
process
SA A N D SD
F % F % F % F % F %
Disgruntled opinions leaders
external to the negotiation
team undermine the process.
102 34 127 42 24 8 33 11 15 5
Source: Field data, 2019
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Slightly more than one third of the respondents, 35% strongly agreed that disgruntled
opinion leaders undermine the negotiation process. A further 42% of the respondents
agreed with the statement. On the contrary, a combined 16% of the respondents disagreed
with the statement, 11% of them expressing strong disagreement. The rest 8% took a
neutral stance with regard to the statement claim. The findings point to the influence of
opinion leaders in swaying the public view or decision on matters of interest to the society.
The findings may also be suggestive on the need to consider the level of influence an
opinion leader wields before leaving them out of communal processes as their views are
mostly supported by their followers.
Opinion leaders have strong grassroots networks that can be used for good or for worse,
depending on what the leader intends to achieve (Chen, 2014). It is this study’s contention
that decision makers can benefit a great deal out of cooperating with opinion leaders as any
grapevine they may trigger can undermine or promote what is being pursued. However,
caution must be exercised in how and when they are to be engaged to prevent them from
taking over the process and using it to achieve partisan ends.
The study further sought to gauge whether parties external to the county attempted to
infiltrate the negotiations to support particular candidates and the findings are as presented
in Table 4.17. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly
Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).
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Table 4.17: Infiltration of negotiation processes by parties from outside the county
SA A N D SD
F % F % F % F % F %
Parties outside the county
attempt to infiltrate and
influence the negotiation
process.
57 19 154 51 15 5 51 17 24 8
Source: Field data, 2019
The findings indicate that 19% of the respondents strongly agreed parties outside Mandera
County attempted to infiltrate and influence the negotiation process. Slightly more than
half of the respondents, that is 52%, agreed with the question statement while 25% of the
respondents disagreed with it, 8% of those disagreeing doing so strongly. About 5% of the
study respondents were neutral.
The findings suggest that political processes in Mandera County generate a lot of interest
from outside the polity. Extra-polity interests were found to be spearheaded by actors that
considered the politics of Mandera County as key to the national level political arithmetic
and architecture.
Based on the findings presented above, it is evident that the consociational negotiated
democracy processes were not only subject to interference by people and institutions from
Mandera County but also by extra-county parties with political interests in the county
politics. This can be explained by the view that subnational politics in any polity constitute
part of the national tally, especially in the scheming of national power play. This finding is
in sync with that of a study conducted by Kanyinga (2014) which established
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patrimonialism as the pillar of politics in Kenya and it entailed the use of social networks.
The study established from the interviews that political parties operating at the national
level attempted to reach out to the elders to sway them to endorse candidates from their
parties with the promise of better tidings if the political party won the national elections as
their candidate would act as a bridge with the national government. A Murulle participant
in the males FGD decried thus:
Presidential candidates and their agents make attempts to influence the elders
through emissaries to support particular candidates who they think is a pillar to their
national political programming, irrespective of whether he/she is popular at the
grassroots (Respondent K).
The import of such infiltration attempts would mean that if successful, the interests of the
communities would be subservient to those of the infiltrating party, effectively
undermining the whole logic of consociational negotiated democracy and its attendant
peace package as advanced by its proponents.
An investigation on whether the absence of independent expert negotiators with the
requisite skill set impacted on the strength of agreements reached during negotiations
returned the results illustrated in Figure 4.16.
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Figure 4.16: Absence of independent experts influences strength of agreements
Source: Field data, 2019
Majority of the respondents, 67%, strongly agreed that involvement of independent expert
does influence the strength of the agreements reached between negotiating parties with a
further 12% of the study respondents expressing agreement. 3% of the respondents were
indifferent. A total of 18% of the respondents held dissenting views with 5% of them
indicating strong dissent.
This finding affirms the essence of independent experts with the skill set in negotiation
processes. The finding suggest that majority of the respondents are of the strong opinion
that the agreements reached during the negotiations were weak because of failure to tap
expert knowledge. The results also imply that the negotiation team members did not have
the formal training in negotiations, which in effect led to weak agreements that did not
satisfy all parties.
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Expert knowledge and skill set is a crucial component in negotiations as the holders are
able to undertake a thorough analysis of the conflict and direct interventions towards
addressing the root causes of the inter-ethnic violence. The significance of expert advice
in negotiations is highlighted by Mwagiru (2008) who credited the success of the Koffi
Annan-led negotiation team to the efforts and advice of the backroom advisors who helped
with the negotiations, suggesting potential strengths and pitfalls to positions advocated by
parties in the negotiations.
Community involvement in identification of negotiators and the credibility of outcomes
was investigated and the findings were as presented in Table 4.18. Majority of the
respondents 80% felt excluded from the process and consequently were under no obligation
to consider the outcome credible. Instructively, about 10% of the respondents were not of
the view that failure to involve the community in the choice of negotiators undermined the
credibility of the outcome as a further 10% expressed indifference. (SA=Strongly Agree;
A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).
Table 4.18: Clan participation in choosing negotiators and acceptance of outcomes
SA A N D SD
F % F % F % F % F %
Poor/Limited clan participation
in choosing negotiators
undermines acceptance of
outcomes.
144 48 96 32 27 9 13 4 21 7
Source: Field data, 2019
The findings suggest that failure to include the community in identifying negotiators
effectively isolated the masses and thus denied the process the legitimacy it required. The
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findings further imply that the minority did not consider the involvement of the community
as necessary in the appointment of negotiators. It would seem that majority of the
respondents were not convinced that consociational negotiated democracy was the best
approach in handling ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.
The subject of inclusivity of all people affected by the decision to adopt consociational
negotiated democracy has continued to recur across the study findings. Popular
participation is a cardinal tenet of democracy which requires people to participate in the
decision making process directly or through their authorized representatives. Ethno-
political conflicts can only be managed and eventually resolved when the masses perceive
that they are fully involved in finding solutions to them and are convinced that their say is
considered in any intervention attempt.
The study also sought to establish whether intra-clan rivalries affected the choice of
candidates proposed to various offices and the findings are as presented in Figure 4.17.
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Figure 4.17: Intra-clan rivalries affecting choices of candidates for various offices
Source: Field data, 2019
The study findings indicated that 46% of the respondents strongly agreed that intra-clan
rivalries affected the choice of candidates to various offices while 29% of them agreed with
the question statement. About 7% of the respondents were neutral while 15% of them
disagreed that intra-clan rivalries affect the choice of candidates to various offices. The
remaining 3% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement.
These findings mean that candidates form various clans were competing for the same
position. The findings could also imply that there were clans that sought to undermine the
candidature of particular people from other clans. The findings may also be construed to
suggest that pre-existing differences between clans found their way into the consociational
democracy negotiations.
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The study is cognizant of the fact that clans are constituted by sub-clans whose influence
cannot be underestimated particularly in a process that involves politics whose key defining
feature is numbers. The study argues that for the intra-clan rivalries to be contained so that
they do not undermine consociational negotiated democracy and its contribution to ethno-
political conflict management, there is need by clan leadership to consult extensively across
sub-clans and elders to be more open with information so that they are not perceived as
side-lining certain sub clans. Intra-group rivalries are fuelled by perceptions that only a
member of the immediate family or sub-clan can guarantee his people their rightful share.
Mistrusts which undermine negotiations increase as the group grows and particular limited
resources are being pursued.
Finally, the study intended to find out the significance of regular communication on the
progress of negotiations and the findings are as illustrated in Figure 4.18. The study
findings revealed that 22% of the respondents strongly agreed that failure to regularly
update the community on the progress of the negotiations led to suspicions of foul play in
the process. Slightly more than half of the respondents, that is 51%, agreed with the
statement, increasing the total tally of respondents who believed poor communication
strategy had a destabilizing effect on the progress of the negotiations to 73%. About 8% of
the respondents were indifferent while 13% of them disagreed with the statement. Only 7%
of the survey participants strongly disagreed with the statement.
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Figure 4.18: Irregular updates on negotiation progress creating suspicion of foul play
Source: Field data, 2019
The implication of the above finding is that there was strong need to regularly keep the
public informed about the progress and proceedings of negotiations. The findings also
imply that the negotiators were taking long to arrive at agreements which in turn meant
delayed communication of progress to the community.
The significance of communication in negotiation process is crucial to believability of the
process and elimination of perceptions of foul play. It helps reduce or completely eliminate
anxiety among the members of the public or those affected by a particular decision. The
study agrees with Mwagiru (2008) on the need to ensure the communication strategy
adopted is well thought through and executed, otherwise it could as well undermine
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negotiations or create the wrong impression among constituents, thereby heightening
tensions. Communication is considered critical because the negotiators are representatives
of larger constituencies and failure or miscommunication can undermine the process and
its outcomes.
4.5.19 Institutionalization of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
In this question, the study intended to establish what exactly had been done to entrench
consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. The obtaining findings were as
illustrated in Figure 4.19.
Figure 4.19: Consideration to institutionalize consociational negotiated democracy
Source: Field data, 2019
The study findings indicated that 55% of the respondents agreed that institutionalization of
consociational negotiated democracy as a mechanism of ethno-political conflict
management had been given due consideration while 45% responded otherwise.
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Respondents who affirmed institutionalization of consociational negotiated democracy
pointed to the establishment of formal offices with functional secretariats for each of the
three clans as well as the corner tribes and the group that brings together all non-Somali
communities living in Mandera County, popularly labelled as “others”. The respondents
explained that offices were funded by the community and were being used by the elders to
conduct affairs relating to community issues and interests. The secretariat worked under
the direction of an elder who acted as the organizing secretary of the council of elders of
the respective clan. Some respondents further pointed out that there were increased
sensitization and awareness campaigns among the masses on the existence of the
mechanism and its significance in the pursuit of the community’s interests in their relations
with other clans and even the national government.
4.6 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
This objective was intended to establish whether the practice of consociational negotiated
democracy had been effective in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera
County. To make this determination, data was collected using open-ended questions and a
five point likert scale comprising of five items which the study considered key indicators
of effectiveness. The findings of the research are based on the questions.
4.6.1 Pre-consociationalism Political Dispute Resolution Methods
The researcher sought to establish the mechanisms that were used to resolve political
disputes prior to the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy. The study findings
were as indicated in Table 4.19. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree;
SD=Strongly Disagree).
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Table 4.19: Political dispute resolution methods
SA A N D SD
Method F % F % F % F % F %
The courts 93 31 203 67 2 1 3 1 0 0
Elders Mediation 12 4 41 14 0 0 182 60 66 22
Violence 84 28 104 34 2 1 56 19 55 18
Source: Field Data, 2019
The study findings indicate that the dominant method of dispute resolution used prior to
consociationalism was the courts as supported by 98% of the respondents, 31% of whom
strongly agreed. The second most used method of political dispute resolution prior to
adoption of consociational negotiated democracy was the resort to violence as supported
by 62% of the respondents, with 28% strongly agreeing while the least used method was
mediation by the elders as supported by 18% of the respondents. The findings imply that
the area respondents had a lot of faith in the formal justice system and if that doesn’t work,
violence was used as a quick-fix solution. The findings in Table 4.23 were supported by a
Garre participant in the female FGD who noted thus:
Politicians are bound by the law of the land that clearly states that if one is dissatisfied
with electoral outcomes, they can seek redress in court. Thus, most of them either
directly or through their supporters lodge cases in court to pursue electoral justice.
However, the courts take long to adjudicate the cases and this increases tensions
among the disputing parties and their supporters (Respondent F).
Based on the study findings, it was deduced that politicians or their supporters dissatisfied
with the electoral conduct and outcome of a particular position filed cases in court to
contest those results. The popularity of the formal justice system was found to be informed
by the involvement of parties outside the county who were apolitical and with no direct
interest in local politics. This mechanism has also been used for many decades across the
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world in resolving political disputes in democracies, yielding a mixture of outcomes
ranging from upholding of decisions made by electoral bodies to nullification of others.
Punishment in the form of hefty fines imposed by courts was found to be deterrence for
commission of similar crimes in the future. However, the litigation process was found to
take too long, thus contributing factor to increased tension in the affected areas or
perceptions.
Respondents who supported the resort to violence (62%) claimed that politicians incited
their supporters to rise up in arms and fight what they considered to be theft of their victory
or attempts to exclude “their people” from power. This claim was supported by a PBO
interviewee who explained that:
Conflicts tend to be more during electioneering period and those that occur prior to
Election Day are usually intended to tilt the political equation in favor of a particular
candidate (clan). Those happening during and after elections are geared towards
necessitating nullification of the whole exercise or forcing negotiations for inclusion
in power (Key Informant III).
The study, making reference to the 37% that disagreed on the salience of violence as a
dispute resolution method and the claims made by the key informant above concluded that
political violence may have been considered a swift pathway to justice as the destruction
in its wake mostly led to negotiations to have disputing parties accommodated in the county
power matrix. The researcher further established that violence used during the pre-election
day period was intended to drive away perceived supporters of a rival candidate or to
intimidate them so that they did not participate in the actual elections. In some cases,
violence was deployed during the elections to create an environment conducive for rigging
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the election by way of stuffing ballot boxes. These perspectives were shared by a national
government interviewee who explained thus:
This county has had episodic violent bust ups especially during electioneering period.
Our investigations have consistently established that the violent bust ups were
politically motivated as some politicians sought to drive away populations they
deemed to be supporting their competitors or to create room for stuffing ballot boxes
on the election night. The hotspot has been Rhamu were the Garre and Degodia clans
have violently clashed leading to deaths and displacement (Key Informant XIV).
This assertion was reiterated by various contributors during the FGD sessions held in
Mandera Town. The study established from the FGD participants that the Degodia clan is
the slight majority in Mandera North constituency where Rhamu is located but the Garre
registered in droves there so as to defeat the Degodia in the elections of Member of
Parliament. This was achieved in the 2013 general election which was followed by the
2014 Garre-Degodia clashes that left approximately 13 people dead and properties
destroyed following incitement by politicians and the elite (Interpeace, 2017).
A contributor in the male FGD explained that the strategy used by the Garre worked in the
2013 electoral cycle but in the 2017 cycle, the Degodia worked with Garre candidates who
were against consociational negotiated democracy to win the seat which they argued
belonged to them as the majority clan in Mandera North Constituency. The study noted
that Mandera County had three constituencies prior to the enactment of the CoK 2010
namely Mandera West, Mandera Central and Mandera East. The new constitution created
three more by reorganizing the boundaries and renaming them as follows: Mandera West,
Mandera South, Banissa, Lafey, Mandera East and Mandera North, making a total of six.
The manner in which the boundaries were drawn is indicative of gerrymandering. The
competition thus became stiffer in the 2013 and 2017 election cycles as clans could claim
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dominance in particular electoral units and redistribute their voting strength to other
political areas to expand their control as was found to be the case with the Garre in Mandera
North in their attempt to lock out the Degodia from the county politics. It is no surprise that
political violence was high following the 2013 electoral cycle.
The finding on the mediation of political disputes by elders as supported by 18% of the
respondents was found to be practiced in political units inhabited by overwhelming
majority clans where the competition was between candidates from the same sub-clans or
county level positions which required clans to build alliances to win power. The researcher
found out that intervention by elders was aimed at guarding against the loss of a political
position to a rival sub-clan or consolidating numbers in a sub-clan to defeat competitors
from other sub-clans. A Garre interviewee explained that:
In cases of intra clan/sub-clan competition, the weaker candidate is convinced to drop
their bid and support the stronger candidate with the promise of either future political
support or compensation for the resources they had expended in the campaigns (Key
Informant VI).
In some cases, especially with the advent of devolution, some candidates would be
promised appointment to senior county government position or any other opportunities
accruing to the community from the national government.
The rejection of mediation by elders by majority of the respondents (82%) was found to
have been informed by the tendency to keep elders out of politics as was the practice. A
probe into this argument revealed that traditionally, elders seized of cultural issues and
amity of the community as a whole and politics was not one of their domains. A women
leader in an interview explained thus:
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Traditionally, elders dealt with issues concerning disputes within and between clans.
Their role in politics was limited unlike now when devolution has brought resources
closer and competition is enhanced, obliging them to step in and offer direction to the
community (Key Informant V).
The entry of elders into political dispute resolution was established as causing
fragmentations in clans as they were perceived to be partisan, dictatorial and out of touch
with the evolution of politics in the county. This assertion was adopted by the researcher
as a persuasive explanation as to why most of the respondents did not favour involving
elders in political dispute resolution.
4.6.2 Changes after Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
This aspect of the research was intended by the researcher to be comparative in nature; to
establish any changes that the respondents identified which they associated with the onset
of consociational negotiated democracy. A majority of the respondents indicated that elders
were now taking a more active role in resolution of political disputes compared to the
period prior to the introduction of consociationalism during which their jurisdiction
excluded open active participation in politics. The participants in the FGDs argued that the
increased visibility of elders in politics was mainly attributed to devolution which had
brought with it a lot of resources to the county level which clans were jostling to control.
A Murulle participant in the female FGD explained that:
The coming of devolution has seen many resources being brought to Mandera
County. In fact our county is receiving the third highest allocation of finances after
Nairobi and Turkana counties. With such large amounts of money coming in and the
county government collecting more, the struggle for control of the billions is intense
(Respondent A).
This perspective was shared by various political actors and the leadership of the Non-
Governmental Organizations during interviews. As the custodians of the community
interests (Kariuki, 2015), the elders were found to have become more active in the county
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politics in the post-new constitution era. Their major role was established to have been
identification of the candidates who in their wisdom could best deliver the benefits of
devolution in addition to mobilizing the masses to collectively support their decisions
which they argued were made in the best interest of the community. This turn of events has
raised the elders’ political profile and they were now more visible in the county politics
besides being sought by the politicians keen on riding on their influence for political
reasons.
The respondents further identified deteriorated intra and inter-clan political relations in the
wake of consociational negotiated democracy. The worsening of relations at the intra-clan
level was found to have been the result of perceptions that the elders were favoring some
individuals at the expense of others by prioritizing the financial ability of a candidate to
mount a campaign, more than their leadership ability and popularity with the electorate.
The deterioration of relations at the intra-clan level was found to be particularly
pronounced within the dominant Garre clan and this was demonstrated by some politicians
defying the elders’ choice of candidates in the 2017 election cycle to mount their own
campaigns and winning the support of the electorate and consequently the elections. A case
that was repeatedly cited was that of the sitting governor and senator who had been asked
by the elders not to vie in 2017 but they defied the call to support the consociational
negotiated democracy candidates and successfully defended their respective seats to which
they had been elected in 2013. A Garre respondent in the male FGD explained the 2017
scenario in respect of the clan thus:
The elders were forcing unpopular candidates on the voters and since the elections
are by secret ballot, many people chose to keep quiet and support the governor and
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senator because they didn’t want to be seen as openly defying the elders. Some youths
with the support of the ‘rebel’ candidates openly criticized and chided the elders,
something that had never happened before. Tensions at the sub-clan levels were high
during the electioneering period (Respondent O).
At the inter-clan level, the study established that the relations between the Garre and the
Degodia clans had worsened, with the latter maintaining that there was nothing like
consociational negotiated democracy in the strict sense of the concept because the clan was
not involved in the negotiations. A Degodia nterviewee explained the position thus:
The Garre clan leadership is very arrogant. They cite their clans’ numerical strength
and our ‘dominance’ in Wajir County and Southern Ethiopia to deny us
representation in Mandera County. We thus supported the rebel group opposed to
consociational negotiated democracy as a strategy to deny the practice legitimacy
because Garre elders refused to incorporate us in the negotiations (Key Informant
XIII).
Logically, it would follow that had the Garre elders granted the request of the Degodia clan
for inclusion in the negotiations and an agreement reached on the sharing of power among
all the clans, there would have been more support for consociationalism and the
factionalism within the Garre clan that was manifested would have been minimal and
unsuccessful.
It also emerged from the study that the Murulle were not necessarily in an alliance with the
Garre out of choice; their small population compared to the Garre clan and the threat of
attack and expulsion forced them into the alliance. Some respondents described the alliance
as the manifestation of ‘coercive’ politics. This dissatisfaction was aptly captured by a
Murulle in the males FGD thus:
The Garre are taking advantage of us because they only allocate us the position of
deputy governor. If we disagree with them politically, they will attack us and destroy
our property. The Degodia are also not part of any negotiations as they are considered
outsiders. The bad relations between the Garre and the Degodia have been the major
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cause of violence in Mandera County. Consociational negotiated democracy is
worsening inter-clan relations because of exclusion and unfairness in sharing of
power among them (Respondent L).
Based on the above findings, it is evident that intra and inter-clan relations had deteriorated
in the wake of devolution and more so because of the manner in which power was acquired
and shared. The findings are supported by Wolf (2010) who argues that segmentation
creates fragmentations and worsening of relations within societies. The study thus contends
that consociational negotiated democracy had worsened relations within, between and
among clans because of the manner it was executed.
Another finding with regard to changes reported following the adoption of consociational
negotiated democracy was the emergence of an organic approach to political issues in the
clan as they sought to maximize benefits accruing from the political space. Even though
this finding was only highlighted in the FGDs, the study considered it an important
development that required attention. The organic approach as a new development was
demonstrated by consultations occurring at the sub-clan level feeding into the clan level of
engagement and the significance of this had been a wider public participation in the
political process. The benefits of the consultations were reported as increased political
awareness and strategizing particularly among the Degodia and Murulle clans. A PBO
interviewee noted as follows in this regard;
In my view, there is increased awareness within the Degodia and Murulle clans as
well as the corner tribes as they strategize to benefit from the Garre clan political
fallouts. The split of the Murulle in the same manner as the Garre meant the clan
would retain its deputy governor position as well as the Mandera East and Lafey
parliamentary seats. The Degodia allied with the rebellious faction and captured the
Mandera North Parliamentary seat in 2017. It would appear that the two clans
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position themselves to bargain for better power deals from the Garre factions (Key
informant XV).
Based on the above finding, it is clear that small but significant segments within a polity
seek for opportunities that guarantee them maximum benefits by pooling their numbers or
splitting them as appropriate. They strategize in a way that allows them benefit whichever
way the elections go. The study also took note of the central position of the Garre clan in
the county politics as every decision of the other clans was pegged on developments from
that clan.
In summing up the findings with regard to this research question, it would appear that
consociational negotiated democracy has deteriorated intra and inter-clan relations besides
enhancing political awareness and activism among the clans. Consultations among the
smaller clans coupled with strategizing saw the smaller clans, though significant in their
own right, benefit in 2017 more than they did in the 2013 electoral cycle. Even though the
reported changes were not the kind of outcomes that were contemplated by the proponents
of consociationalism, the study argues that the changes nevertheless had influenced the
political landscape of Mandera County in a major way.
4.6.3 Outcomes of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
In this section, the researcher developed five statements to complement the responses from
the open ended questions and the FGDs and key informant interviews with regard to
specific aspects of the study. The researcher considered responses to those statements
together with data emerging from the FGDs and key informant interviews as important in
making a determination on the extent of effectiveness of consociational negotiated
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democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. The
findings of the study are presented and discussed as per each item.
4.6.3.1 Inclusion of All Clans in the County Political Leadership and Governance
This aspect of the research question sought to establish the extent to which consociational
negotiated democracy had led to inclusion of all clans in the county political leadership
and governance. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.20.
Figure 4.20: Inclusion of all clans in the county political leadership and governance
Source: Field Data, 2019
The findings as presented in Figure 4.20 indicate that 36% of the respondents agreed that
consociational negotiated democracy had led to inclusion of all clans in the county political
leadership and governance, a view shared by another 6% of them who strongly agreed in
favour of the study item. More than half of the respondents (56%) disagreed that
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consociational negotiated democracy had led to inclusion of all clans in the county political
leadership and governance, with 27% of them expressing strong disagreement. About 2%
of the respondents were indifferent.
The study findings suggest that a majority of the respondents, 56%, did not consider
consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County as entrenching
inclusivity of all population segments in the political leadership and governance of the
county. The findings imply that respondents from particular clans did not think
consociational negotiated democracy was a fair political system. The study observed that
the sizeable 42% agreeing with the study item could have been drawn from clans that had
benefited in different ways from the election outcomes. The respondents who were neutral
were deemed as negligible in terms of swinging the foregoing observations either way.
This finding that consociational negotiated democracy had not contributed to inclusivity in
sharing of political and appointive positions was corroborated by a survey of the clan
affiliation of elected leaders in the county governance as shown in Table 4.20.
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Table 4.20: Clan affiliation of elected leaders
Governor Deputy
Governor
Senator Women
Rep.
MP MCA Total
Garre 1 0 1 1 3 19 25
Degodia 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
Murulle 0 1 0 0 2 7 10
Corner Tribe 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 1 1 1 6 30 40
Source: Field data, 2019
The findings illustrated in Table 4.20, it is instructive to note that the second largest clan,
the Degodia only managed one position of Member of Parliament and three MCAs while
the slightly numerically inferior Murulle compared to the Degodia managed a deputy
governor position, two members of parliament and seven MCAs. The outcomes reaffirm
the benefits the Murulle obtained from their alliance with the Garre clan. The corner tribes
managed a single position of MCA. The study therefore concurred with the majority
respondents on the basis of the evidence adduced above that consociational negotiated
democracy did not foster inclusivity in the sharing of political positions.
4.6.3.2 Equitable Distribution of County Employment Opportunities
The researcher sought to determine the extent to which consociational negotiated
democracy had led to equitable distribution of employment opportunities among all the
clans and interest groups. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.21.
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Figure 4.21 Equitable distribution of county employment opportunities across clans
Source: Field Data, 2019
From the findings presented in Figure 4.21, 29% of the respondents agreed that
consociational negotiated democracy had led to equitable distribution of employment
opportunities among all the clans and interest groups, a position supported by a further
15% of them who strongly agreed with the study item. Nearly half of the respondents (49%)
disagreed that consociational negotiated democracy had led to equitable distribution of
employment opportunities among all the clans and interest groups, with 22% of them
expressing strong disagreement. A further 7% of the respondents neither agreed nor
disagreed as to whether consociational negotiated democracy had any influence on the
distribution of employment opportunities among the clans and interest groups.
The findings on this item were clear that consociational negotiated democracy did not usher
equity in the sharing of employment opportunities as demonstrated by the dissenting
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response of 49% of the total study respondents. The researcher obtained data from the
county government on the distribution of employment opportunities in four top tier cadres
in the county executive across the clans which were found to be as shown in Table 4.21.
Table 4.21: Distribution of appointive senior county jobs across the clans
Clan Ministers Chief
Officer
Directors Senior
Executives
Total
Garre 5 14 26 15 60
Degodia 2 5 3 1 11
Murulle 2 3 3 3 11
Corner
Tribes
1 1 1 1 4
Others 0 1 1 0 2
Total 10 24 34 20 88
Source: Field data, 2019
The findings in Table 4.21 demonstrate the extent of dominance of the county
executive/appointive positions by the Garre clan. From this finding, the study presumes
that the lower cadres of employment in the county public service were dominated by the
same clan. The study therefore agrees with the majority on the basis of foregoing
incontrovertible evidence that the county appointive positions were not shared fairly or
proportionally based on each clan’s relative strength. The study noted that the sitting
governor was not a beneficiary of consociational negotiated democracy and was therefore
not bound by any pre-election consociational negotiated agreements. This could partly
explain the skewed appointments by his administration in favour of members of his clan,
and perhaps the faction of the clan that supported him. On the basis of the foregoing
evidence, the the researcher concluded that consociational negotiated democracy did not
bring fairness in distribution of county government jobs as would have been expected in a
consociational political arrangement. The study findings are further supported by
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Cheeseman (2015) and Kanyinga (2014) both of whom explain the entrenchment of
cronyism and nepotism in political appointments across Africa.
4.6.3.3 Fairness in Implementation of County Government Development Projects
The research pursued to establish whether consociational negotiated democracy had
resulted in fairness in implementation of county government-funded development projects
across all areas in the county of Mandera. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.22.
Figure 4.22: Fairness in implementation of county government development projects
across sub-counties
Source: Field data, 2019
The study findings in Figure 4.22 indicate that 10% of the respondents agreed that
consociational negotiated democracy had brought fairness in the implementation of
development projects funded by the county government across all the sub-counties, a claim
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supported by a further 26% of them who stated strong opinion in favour of that study item.
A combined 59% of the respondents did not support the claim that consociational
negotiated democracy had brought fairness in the implementation of development projects
funded by the county government across all parts of the county, with 27% of them
expressing strong disagreement. About 5% of the respondents were neutral with regard to
whether consociational negotiated democracy had any influence on fair implementation of
development projects funded by the county government throughout the county.
The study established that there was skewed implementation of development projects
funded by the county government to favour areas that voted for the county political
leadership more than the other areas which voted for the rival group especially in the 2017
election cycle. The tendency to favour areas that supported the political leadership in power
was found to be deliberate; it was a way of retaining that voting bloc in future elections. A
PBO interviewee explained this situation thus:
Politicians do not always engage in development activities in a fair manner. There
are areas that must be favored on account of their loyal support to the ruling class, at
the expense of those areas that merely expressed their political right by supporting a
different candidate (Key informant III).
A Degodia participant in the males FGD elaborated this position more succinctly:
Garre dominated areas have benefitted more from county development projects given
their dominance of the county executive. Even though some Garre dominated areas
did not vote for the administration in power, they still benefit because of being from
the same clan with the governor, which also controls the allocation of county
government-funded projects (Respondent T).
The assertions made by the key informants above are consistent with Cheeseman’s (2015)
exposition of patrimonial politics in Africa; the patron who is the politician has to keep his
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loyal clients - the voters happy by allocating more resources to them while sparing some
to other areas in order to court them for future elections. The study however argues that
given the long periods of marginalization in the county before the advent of devolution,
some areas such as the urban areas may get a bigger share of development projects, not
necessarily because of their support to the administration in power but because of other
factors such as their strategic location in terms of advancing the county interests such as
creating an enabling environment for investments.
4.6.3.4 Successful Resolution of Political Disputes without involving the Courts
The researcher sought to establish whether consociational negotiated democracy had led to
successful resolution of political disputes without involving the courts and the findings
were as presented in Figure 4.24.
Figure 4.23 Successful resolution of political disputes without involving the courts
Source: Field data, 2019
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The study findings as presented in Figure 4.24 indicate that 39% of the respondents agreed
that consociational negotiated democracy had led to successful resolution of political
disputes without involving the courts, with a further 7% expressing strong opinion in
support of the claim. The findings further show that 36% of the respondents did not support
the assertion that consociational negotiated democracy had brought fairness in the
distribution and access to economic resources by all segments comprising the county
population, a view shared by a further 13% of them who expressed strong disagreement.
About 2% of the respondents were indifferent with regard to whether consociational
negotiated democracy had bought about fair distribution and access to economic resources
by the residents of the county.
Based on the study findings, it was evident that the respondents were almost evenly divided
in their opinions (46% for and 49% against) as to whether consociational negotiated
democracy had led to successful resolution of political disputes without involving the
courts; albeit with a tendency towards disagree with the study item. The researcher went
further to ascertain whether there was any increase or decrease in the number of election
related cases filed in court after the 2013 and 2017 cycles and the findings indicated that
in 2013, 12 cases were filed in court while in 2017, the number increased by one to 13. The
neutral group of respondents at 6% was considered significant because if such respondents
were to take either of the two sides, the findings would be tilted to the direction they would
support. The question of resolving political disputes without resorting to the courts has
been used in Africa with some degree of success, with the overriding claim being the need
to understand conflicts within their social setting (Brock–Utne, 2001).
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A Garre interviewee noted that:
Even though there have been disagreements between and within the major clans in
matters politics, the negotiated democracy approach helped resolve some of the
disputes and thus giving stability to the county to allow for service delivery by the
administration in power (Key Informant VII).
The finding suggests that, the consociational approach to the practice of politics was useful
in resolving some of the political disputes. The study noted that even though there were
serious fall outs following the outcomes of the election to office of the governor, the case
filed in court by the losing candidate was withdrawn following negotiations led by the
elders and alternative pathway to power for the losing candidate. The study thus deduced
that consociational negotiated democracy had contributed to management of political
disputes in Mandera County as evidenced by the number of election related cases filed in
court remaining unchanged in 2017 despite the intra and inter-clan political fallouts.
4.6.4 Weaknesses of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
The researcher developed this question to help establish the shortcomings in the
consociational negotiated democracy approach which findings would form the basis for
recommendations on how to improve the approach to make it responsive to the people’s
needs and consequently contribute to the management of ethno-political conflicts in
Mandera County. In this regard, the study established that the practice suffered from
susceptibility to manipulation by vested interests, the exclusion of women and youth,
dependence on political goodwill and autonomy camouflaged in negative clannism. These
findings are discussed below.
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Responses form the open ended question pointed out that consociational negotiated
democracy was susceptible to control and manipulation by politicians and other vested
interests as established in section 4.5.18. The respondents backed this argument by drawing
the attention of the researcher to the fact that the negotiation process was majorly funded
by politicians who had a direct stake in the process and its outcomes. Other than politicians,
some business persons with an interest in the economic opportunities accruing from the
county government fronted certain candidates as proxies in order to attain this interest. A
Murulle participant in the males FGD captured this perspective thus:
There is nothing like negotiated democracy in Mandera County but a capture of the
political process by politicians and business people keen on controlling the resources
in the county. They achieve this by using the elders who are respected in the
community as opinion leaders. As long as politicians and business people fund the
negotiations, the outcome will have all the footprints of their interests (Respondent
M).
This study is persuaded by this argument made by the respondents and further espouses
that politicians and business entities do not entirely support community programs and
activities for purely altruistic reasons. After all, the pursuit of power is about fulfilment of
interests. Cheeseman (2015) alludes to the incontrovertible reality that is corruption in
African politics, noting that this is the bane of the continent’s democratic reform as elected
leaders and political entrepreneurs seek to amass wealth to replace part of what was spent
to ‘buy’ the win and build a war chest for future elections. The negotiators are not free
from the discreet and explicit compromise and manipulation from faceless political
strategists and hitmen.
The study further established that consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County
does not include women and youth in its programming according to the respondents, a
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finding that is supported by the findings of Kanyinga (2014). The respondents argued that
times had changed such that women had become educated and empowered to take an active
role in leadership and governance and so the community’s view of women as incapable of
political leadership had to change. In this regard, a Garre participant in the females FGD
argued as follows:
The elders are still stuck in the past where women had no role in community
leadership. They must realize that we are becoming empowered in different ways to
take up our rightful place in leadership and governance. The world has become more
open and tolerant to women in leadership. Look at Ilhan Omar (a US
Congresswoman) who is an ethnic Somali? As women, we can perfectly balance
between our families and meaningfully participate in the political life of our
community (Respondent E).
The subject of women engagement in political leadership in Kenya is aptly and
persuasively explored by Kamau (2003) who reiterates the need to mainstream women.
This study agrees with her that women are not passive beings with no political interests
and a contribution to make to the attendant political processes in the polities they are part
of. The biggest challenge however remains the patriarchal nature of politics in Kenya and
the Somali community in particular.
The study also established that consociational negotiated democracy spurred negative
clannism in light of perceptions of clan control of particular political units, thus
undermining unity and amity among the people of Mandera County. It would appear that
the concept was not properly understood and executed in the community and clans were
on overdrive to carve out niches of political control to avoid losing out to rivals, thanks to
gerrymandering during the political units boundaries review. Instead of bringing people to
the negotiation table to share available socio-economic and political resources, clannism
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was fomenting toxic relations as each plotted on how to politically and therefore
economically disempower the other.
A review of the literature attributed this behaviour to historical rivalries and lack of trust
among the clans. The views expressed by respondents coalesced to the position that with
an area of control, a clan was safer whether in government or not as other clans would
recognize that control or ownership. Exclusive clan based control of a territory implies that
other clans are cut off or are regarded as immigrants who can always be evicted should
they overstay their welcome. Based on this finding, the study agrees with Elissi (2004) who
alluded that the exclusive territorial control by a segment increases the occurrence of
conflicts between groups, the very thing that consociationalism is intended to manage or
resolve. Binningsbo (2006) arguing against consociationalism and particularly its
proposition for segment control notes that such an approach lowers cooperation due to trust
issues. It would appear that clan territorial control only serves to amplify intergroup
differences and spheres of control.
The respondents further pointed to the practice of clannism in politics as having permeated
the county government public service where distribution of employment opportunities was
skewed in favour of the clan in power. They pointed out that leaders controlling the levers
of government favored people from their own clan, with little regard to the principles of
proportionality as advocated by the proponents of consociational negotiated democracy
such as Lijphart (2012) and the dictates of the CoK. Nepotism in public service reduces
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politics and governance to a zero sum game, producing winners, who enjoy the benefits of
being in power and losers who are condemned to oblivion.
Another important finding that emerged from the study was that the consociational
negotiated democracy approach is dependent on goodwill from among the people directly
involved in it. This response was common among the youthful, educated respondents. A
respondent explained that the approach is not anchored in any known law and any
agreements arising from it are not in any way binding to the target audience. He cited
several cases of politicians who went against the decisions emerging from the negotiations,
pointing out that some won in the elections while others lost. It would appear that the
youthful population, which is estimated at 38% of the Mandera County population by
KNBS in its 2017 demographic projections, do not favour consociational negotiated
democracy mainly because of their exclusion from the process leading to identification of
candidates on account of their age. The study takes note that this particular demographic
segment has some basic or advanced education in addition to a national and global
exposure to political developments in other parts of the world, thanks to technology and
hence their resistance to an elders-driven process. This argument is partly corroborated by
the sentiments of a youthful Garre participant in the males FGD who quipped thus:
Look, we are living in a different time compared to when our fathers were our age.
Things have changed and they still think they can make decisions about us and our
future. Despite educating us, they do not trust us to drive the change we need. We
have no choice but to defy them on matters we believe they are getting wrong. And
this should not be misconstrued to mean we disrespect our parents as some elders
have been saying (Respondent Q).
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The FGD further revealed increasing tension and dissatisfaction among the population in
the polity, clan notwithstanding, that the elders dabbling in politics was frowned upon.
Instructively, all the participants of the male and female FGDs preferred a majoritarian
system of elections.
4.6.5 Evidence of Reduction in Ethno-Political Conflicts
In this section, the researcher developed five statements with regard to reduction in ethno
political conflicts resulting from the use of consociational negotiated democracy to help
with the testing of the hypothesis. The researcher considered responses to those statements
as important in determining the extent of reduction in ethno-political conflicts in Mandera
County resulting from the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy. The findings
were presented and discussed as per each item.
4.6.5.1 Improved Cohesion Among Clans
The study sought to find out whether there was improved cohesion among the clans and
interest groups residing in Mandera County as evidence of reduction in ethno-political
conflicts and the findings were as shown in Figure 4.25.
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Figure 4.24: Growing cohesion among clans
Source: Field data, 2019
The findings as presented in Figure 4.25 indicate that 27% of the respondents agreed that
there was a growing cohesion among the clans and groups residing in Mandera County,
symbolizing reduction in ethno-political conflicts. This view was supported by a further
11% of the respondents who expressed strong concurrence with the study item. Slightly
more than half of the respondents (52%) disagreed that there was a growing cohesion
among the clans and groups residing in Mandera County, with 11% of them expressing
strong disagreement. A significant 10% of the respondents were neutral with regard to the
study item.
Based on the findings, the study established that a majority of the respondents did not think
that there was any growth in social cohesion among the communities living in Mandera
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County. The researcher noted that stereotypes and suspicions were still high among the
clans and bitterness fueled by a range of issues such as exclusion in governance and
inequality in resource sharing as earlier established in sections 4.6.3.1 and 4.6.3.4 of this
study. A Degodia participant in the males FGD lamented that:
The corner tribes and us the Degodia are excluded from the affairs of our county and
treated as outsiders. The Garre are amassing the county resources to benefit
themselves and dominate over other clans (Respondent S).
The study argues that such feelings of bitterness are indicative of the divisions within the
clans and the clearest indicator of elusive cohesion that consociational negotiated
democracy was intended to usher. The process of building cohesion among groups is
homegrown; it comprises of trust, solidarity and collective action among groups (Brown,
2013). The unfairness in sharing of development projects across the different areas as
established in section 4.6.3.3 undermines unity of purpose which in turn militates against
cohesion of groups. The finding in support of growing cohesion among groups in the
county as indicated by 38% of the respondents was ascribed to respondents who identified
with the ruling coalition and who were benefitting from the county largesse. The neutral
respondents (10%) were considered as not significant because they could not swing the
finding with regard to majority of the respondents even if they were to work with those in
favour of the study item’s claim. The study thus concludes that the clans in Mandera
County have not yet experienced cohesion and even though there is no active violence, it
would only take a trigger for violence to become manifest.
4.6.5.2 Decline in Politically Motivated Inter-clan Violence
The researcher sought to investigate whether there was a decline in politically motivated
inter-clan violence in Mandera County. The study findings were as shown in Figure 4.26.
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Figure 4.25: Decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence
Source: Field data, 2019
Based on the study findings as presented in Figure 4.26, 34% of the respondents agreed
that there was a decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence in Mandera County, a
development that meant reduction in ethno-political conflicts. This assessment was
corroborated by a further 17% of the respondents who expressed strong agreement with the
study item. About half of the respondents (51%) disagreed that there was a decline in
politically motivated inter-clan violence in Mandera County, with 16% of them expressing
strong disagreement. About 8% of the respondents were neutral.
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The investigation revealed that a slight majority of the respondents were of the view that
there was a decline in politically motivated violence, a finding that was supported and
elaborated by a national government interviewee thus:
Political violence tends to be pronounced during the electioneering period. If you
look at the history of Mandera County, you will notice that violence is rife during the
electoral year as groups strategize and implement their plans of winning particular
seats. Violence is thus conveniently used to achieve political ends after which
normalcy resumes (Key Informant XIV).
A Garre participant in the females FGD further explained this finding as follows:
Government officials and the NCIC have been working hard to contain political
violence, thus acting as deterrence for war mongers. The period after elections is
always calm in terms of inter-clan violence as the reality is that elections are an event
and when they are over, people move on with their normal routines (Respond D).
The explanations given by the two respondents are consistent that political violence was
high during the electoral period beyond which there was no motivation for it and this is
supported by Oyugi (2000) who contends that political violence was a periodic
phenomenon in Kenya. The study contends that the fact that there was decline in political
violence did not necessary mean that consociational negotiated democracy had contributed
to the decline; rather the electoral cycle acts as a catalyst for it.
4.6.5.3 Voluntary Surrender of Defense/Offence Weapons
The study sought to establish whether civilian residents of Mandera County were
voluntarily surrendering weapons in their possession which they had used to propagate
politically motivated violence and the findings were as shown in Figure 4.27.
The findings as presented in Figure 4.27 show that 17% of the respondents agreed that
illegally held defense/offense weapons were being voluntarily surrendered by the residents,
a view shared by a further 13% of them who strongly agreed with the assertion made by
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the study item. About 69% of the respondents expressed disagreement with the study item,
30% of them strongly disagreeing. The rest of the respondents (2%) were neutral.
Figure 4.26: Voluntary surrender of defense/offence weapons
Source: Field data, 2019
A majority of the respondents (69%) disagreed that there was voluntary surrender of
weapons from among the residents, a position supported by a national government
interviewee who explained that:
Mandera County shares borders with the Federal Republics of Somalia and Ethiopia.
The internal and external threats to the residents are many and they have had to
acquire weapons from the black market to protect themselves given the inadequacy
of security officers in the area. There hasn’t been anyone voluntarily surrendering
their illegally held weapons to the authorities (Key Informant XIV).
These findings point to the burden of self-defense that residents have to contend with, a
situation that has forced them to acquire weapons which at times they use to perpetrate
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political violence against each other during the electoral cycle when ethnic passions
become mobilized. The study finding is supported by the KNFP Survey (2011) which
established that political cycles witness the proliferation and use of small arms and light
weapons to intimidate or drive away perceived hostile populations, a situation exacerbated
by negative ethnicity and the presence of ungoverned spaces especially in the peripheral
areas of the country such as Mandera County.
4.6.5.4 Settlement of People in Places Previously Considered Hostile
This aspect of the research was intended to establish whether settlement patterns had
changed such that people from the different clans were settling in places previously
considered hostile on account of the dominance of a particular clan. The findings of the
inquiry were as illustrated in Figure 4.28.
Figure 4.27: Settlement of people in places previously considered hostile
Source: Field data, 2019
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The research findings indicated in Figure 4.28 show that 17% of the respondents agreed
that residents of Mandera County were freely settling in areas that had previously been
considered hostile due to politically motivated inter-clan rivalries. A further 10% of them
strongly agreed with the claim made by the study item. About 67% of the respondents
expressed disagreement with the study item, 27% of them strongly disagreeing. The rest of
the respondents (6%) were neutral.
The study findings manifest that a majority of the respondents (67%) did not think that
people felt secure enough to freely settle in areas that had previously been considered
hostile during the violent conflicts period. The researcher established that there were some
areas were particular communities were dominant and hence individuals from other
communities did not feel safe enough to settle there and neither were they welcome by the
dominant group in the area. A Murulle key infromant explained the partitioning
phenomenon thus:
It is normal that particular clans dominate particular areas and are very protective of
such dominance especially because of its value in terms of political strength during
voting. For instance, the Garre are dominant in Mandera West, Banissa and Mandera
South sub-counties while the Degodia claim majority population in Mandera North
sub-county. As such, the Degodia do not feel very safe settling in an area where their
rival clan is dominant (Key Informant IV).
This finding is supported by the findings of this research as explained in section 4.4. The
study argues that in multi-cultural societies, there is a tendency by groups that are sensitive
to their primordial identities to demographically dominate an area, including in its political
and economic spheres. The assertion is supported by Boone (2012) who argues that land
and distributive politics characterize the politically motivated violent conflicts that were
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witnessed in the former Rift Valley province of Kenya following the reintroduction of
multiparty politics in Kenya in the early 1990s. Thus the study maintains that the residents
of Mandera County do not feel safe enough to settle in areas they consider hostile due to
domination of such areas by a rival clan. The implication of this finding was that tensions
and mistrust still persist in Mandera County among clans and therefore the possibility of
ethno-political conflicts becoming violent remains high.
4.6.6 Hypothesis Testing
The study was guided by the null hypothesis that:
Consociational negotiated democracy has not been effective in the reduction of ethno-
political conflicts in Mandera County.
To test this hypothesis, the F Test was carried out using simple linear regression analysis.
The findings were as discussed in the following three tables. Consociational negotiated
democracy was the predictor variable while reduction in ethno-political conflicts was the
criterion variable.
Table 4.22: Model summary of effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 .114a .013 .010 4.96980
a. Predictors: (Constant), Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
Source: Field data, 2019
Table 4.22 indicates that the Adjusted R Square which was used to establish the predictive
power of the study model was found to be .010. This implies that 1% of the variance in
reduction in ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County was explained by consociational
negotiated democracy. The remaining 99% of the variance was attributed to factors not
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examined by the study. The study further checked on the significance of effectiveness
between consociational negotiated democracy and reduction in ethno-political conflicts in
Mandera County. A report of the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is presented in Table
4.23.
Table 4.23: ANOVA between reduction in ethno-political conflicts and efficacy of
consociational negotiated democracy
Model Sum of
Squares
df Mean Square F Sig.
1
Regression 94.119 1 94.119 3.812 .052b
Residual 7382.310 299 24.690
Total 7476.429 300
a. Dependent Variable: Reduction in Ethno-political Conflicts
b. Predictors: (Constant), Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
Source: Field data, 2019
From Table 4.23 the ANOVA results demonstrate that the model is not a statistically
significant predictor of effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy in the
reduction of ethno-political conflicts among the different clans in Mandera County i.e. the
model was not statistically significant in the reduction of ethno-political conflicts in
Mandera County (F(1,300)= 3.812; p=.052>.05). This was further supported by the finding
in the model summary in Table 4.22 which indicated that only 1% of the variance in
reduction in ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County was explained by consociational
negotiated democracy.
The study went further to establish the beta values and the significance of these values to
the regression model. The findings were as shown in Table 4.24.
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Table 4.24: Coefficients of ethno-political conflicts and effectiveness of consociational
negotiated democracy
Model Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1
(Constant) 2.217 .181 12.250 .000
Effectiveness of
Consociational
Negotiated
Democracy
-.110 .056 -.160 -1.964 .052
a. Dependent Variable: Reduction in Ethno-political Conflicts
Source: Field data, 2019
Table 4.24 presents the findings on regression coefficient of the study variables. The study
established that the coefficient value for effectiveness of consociational negotiated
democracy was negative (β = -0.110) while the constant had a positive coefficient value (β
= 2.217). Additionally, the study also established that consociational negotiated democracy
had an insignificant value (p – value = 0.052, > 0.05). As a result, the findings revealed
that there was no significant relationship between effectiveness of consociational
negotiated democracy and reduction in ethno-political conflict in Mandera County, Kenya.
Against this finding, the study failed to reject the null hypothesis.
Substitution for the simple linear equation as stated in section 3.6:
Y= 2.217 – 0.110
From the simple linear model of the study; it was established that when all other factors
are held constant, reduction in ethno-political conflict in Mandera County would be 2.217.
However, with the introduction of other factors such as a unit increase in effectiveness of
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consociational negotiated democracy, this will result to a unit decrease in reduction in
ethno-political conflict in Mandera County by -0.110. This revealed that there is little or
no effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy on reduction of ethno-political
conflict in Mandera County, Kenya.
Based on the foregoing evidence which indicates the p value (.052) as greater than the
significance level at .05, the study failed to reject the null hypothesis.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.0 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the summary, conclusions and recommendations based on the
findings of the study. It also provides suggestions on possible areas for further research in
the broad area of consociational negotiated democracy as it relates to ethno-political
conflict management. The study was grounded on three objectives which form the outline
of the summary, conclusion and recommendations will be based.
5.1 Summary of findings
The general objective of the study was to examine the contribution of consociational
negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.
This objective was studied by breaking it down to three specific objectives which were
used to guide the summary of findings as presented in this section.
5.1.1 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
This objective sought to establish the underlying factors that motivated the clans in
Mandera County to adopt consociational negotiated democracy as a pathway to the
management of the ethno-political conflicts that have beset the county.
Based on the study findings, violence and destruction had been witnessed in Mandera
County during the electoral cycles. Majority of the people, as reported by 87% of the
respondents, expressed their desire for a political process devoid of violence and
destruction which had impoverished families besides rendering many widowed or
orphaned. The prospects of peace and stability by the consociational model as advanced by
its theorists saw the model get support at the inception of devolution in 2013. The support
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for consociational negotiated democracy was fueled by the pre-existing system’s
inadequacies based on its zero-sum orientation; the winner controlled everything, with
skewed sharing of resources being the norm rather than the exception. Consociationalism
which is pro-equity was thus adopted on this consideration as reported by 55% of the
respondents. Over one third of the respondents were however cynical that consociational
negotiated democracy would deliver fairness. The consociational model was found to be
favored by the respondents at its inception because of its ability to uphold the teachings of
the dominant Islamic faith on peaceful dispute resolution as reported by 84% of the
respondents as well as favoring the inter-clan family ties. The study established that the
family ties were threatened by inter-clan violence fanned by politics according to 66% of
the respondents.
The consociational approach was found be the only realistic pathway for small clans to
take their place in the county’s political power configuration according to 57% of the
respondents. Politics being a game of numbers, the study noted that realpolitik demanded
that opportunities of wielding power as promised by consociationalism could not be turned
down by the small clans. The design of consociationalism was seen as cost effective
because agreements during negotiations if upheld would imply decreased expenditure in
campaigns. The system was thus attractive and a break from the finance-intensive
majoritarian system as reported by 74% of the respondents.
Other key pull factors in the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy were
explained as including the fear of self-annihilation and the desire for Somali unity given
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the many cultural aspects the clans in Mandera County share. Advice from elders and state
institutions such as the NCIC were found to have also played a role in persuading the
residents of Mandera County that the consociational model was a game changer in
combating politically motivated inter-clan conflicts. Legal provisions particularly those
contained in article 174 of the CoK pertaining to the objectives of devolution and which
neatly mapped to the principles of the consociational model attractive to the constituent
groups.
In terms of extend of support for consociational democracy, the study established that 57
% of the respondent did not support the model in 2017 compared to 2013. The decline in
support for the model was attributed by the respondents to unfulfilled promises of the
approach such as equity in sharing of political and economic resources and exclusion of
significant segments (clans, youth and women) in the county power configuration. Funding
of the process by interested politicians and business persons, oppression of the numerically
small clans by the big ones, imposition of candidates on the electorates and the tendency
to undermine the spirit of liberal democracy were also cited as reasons informing the
decline in support. The decline in support was demonstrated by intra-clan fallouts in light
of support for the model and the election of leaders not supporting the consociational
model.
5.1.2 The Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
The second objective of the study sought to examine the structure of consociational
negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County in the management of ethno-
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political conflicts. This objective was inspired by the need for contextualization of analyses
as different political units have different experiences.
The study findings revealed that an overwhelming majority of the respondents (85%) did
not believe or perceive consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera
County as inclusive of all significant segments (clans and other interest groups). Indeed,
86% of the respondents were emphatic that consociational negotiated democracy was
purely a Garre clan affair while 83% expressed their concern that the process involved the
Garre and Murulle clans only, much to the chagrin of the Degodia clan, the corner tribes
and other non-Somali groups residing in Mandera County. The study established that the
Degodia, which is the second largest clan in the county, was not involved in the
negotiations despite reaching out to the Garre and Murulle clans which were reported as
spearheading the consociational model.
Women and youth who form a key portion of the political equation in any political unit
were found to have not been involved in the negotiations as reported by 98% of the
respondents. Reasons related to religion, culture and the patriarchal nature of the political
organization of the Somali community were cited as responsible for the exclusion of these
two interest groups. This finding amplified the exclusion narrative, casting doubts on
whether what was being practiced in Mandera County could pass the test of the
consociational model.
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The teachings of the Islamic faith on justice and fairness were found to have been
instrumental in decision making during negotiations. Respect and trust in the elders as
reliable guardians of community interests and peace were cited in support of the
composition of the negotiators.
The study further established the key terms of consociational negotiated democracy as
including review of community political interests and leadership every five years with a
view on rotation of leadership among the various groups or extension of term as deemed
appropriate. Although respondents indicated that sharing of positions was based on a clan’s
numerical strength, a verification outcome revealed that there was no equity in the sharing
of positions, whether elective or appointive. Proportionality which is a key pillar of the
consociational model did not seem to count for anything as the Garre clan monopolized
power and consequently the resources that accompany access to power.
Political leaders were found to be important actors in the realization of consociational
negotiated democracy given the power and influence they wielded with regard to their
constituents. They were found to be particularly significant in funding the negotiations,
providing goodwill to the practice, mobilization of supporters to accept decisions even
when such decisions did not favor them and presentation of opinions of their followers to
the negotiators. The respondents were of the view that excluding politicians would
undermine the process as they could easily incite their supporters against the outcomes.
The study further noted that politics was the kernel of the process and excluding politicians
would damage the credibility of the process.
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On the generation and execution of the agenda, the study established that any member of
the community could approach and share their concerns with an elder who upon
considering it weighty would raise it with other elders for further deliberations and
considerations at the sub-clan level. A given agenda would be considered for deliberation
at the clan level if it satisfied the sub-clan elders as substantive enough and having an
impact on the wider community. The study further found that political actors and
government administrators were also contacted to share their views on the significance of
a proposed agenda item and its implications on the community. The study noted that such
a move was aimed at building goodwill from the onset. Once a proposal had been adopted
as an agenda it would be listed alongside others for discussion. The agenda items were
found to be prioritized based on their complexity during the negotiations, so that the
procedure would be handling complex matters towards easier ones.
The findings also demonstrated that dialogue with a view to obtaining unanimous decisions
was the most preferred consensus building approach even though the use of emissaries and
voting were also considered depending on the issues at hand and positions taken by
members. Taking of a vote in which case the majority vote was adopted as the collective
position, was reported as the least preferred approach. Emissaries were dispatched to
reason and persuade negotiators opposed to a particular collegiate decision on matters that
had implications on the larger community. The implication of this was that negotiations at
times were heated and members disagreed before taking breaks to cool tempers and consult
with constituents. It also emerged that candidates were also briefed before the final
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decisions were made public in an effort to obtain their goodwill. However, such goodwill
was very limited in the 2017 election cycle.
It was established that negotiations occurred at two levels; the sub-clans within a clan to
come up with a common candidate for the clan and at the inter-clan level for purposes of
tradeoffs based on the available positions and other factors such as the need to rotate
positions among clans. The concept of intra-clan negotiations before adopting the common
position in readiness for the inter-clan negotiations was equated to Lijphart’s (2012) idea
of segmental autonomy. This finding was particularly significant because it provided
insights on the complexity of plural societies; especially in African settings were the
concept of an ethnic group is very fluid.
The agreements emanating from the negotiations were declared final and binding on the
parties and they were documented as official records of the negotiations and deposited with
the elders’ office of each participating clan for future reference. The offices with functional
secretariats funded by community members of the respective clans were cited as evidence
of institutionalization of consociational negotiated democracy.
Finally, the study established that the negotiations process faced a myriad of challenges
that negotiators had to contend with, among them financial inducement of some negotiators
to favor certain positions or groups, infiltration by interest groups such as political parties,
limited expertise and skill set for negotiation due to illiteracy among negotiators, inter-clan
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rivalries, leaking of raw deliberations heightening tensions among groups and poor
communication strategies adopted by the team.
5.1.3 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the Management of
Ethno-Political conflicts in Mandera County.
Having established the motivating factors to adoption of consociational negotiated
democracy and its structure, the study sought to evaluate the efficacy of the practice in the
management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.
The study established that consociational negotiated democracy had not brought about
inclusion of the various clans and interest groups in the political leadership and governance
of the county as reported by 56% of the respondents. Sharing of opportunities among the
clans was found to be highly skewed in favour of the Garre clan members as demonstrated
in Table 4.21. In terms of fairness in the implementation of development projects funded
by the county government, 59% of the respondents did not consider consociational
negotiated democracy as having positively contributed in this regard. The study further
found out that access to and distribution of economic resources was highly skewed in
favour of the Garre clan members and the cooperating Murulle clan as reported by 55% of
the respondents.
Opinion was divided among the respondents as to whether consociational negotiated
democracy had resulted in the successful resolution of political disputes without involving
the courts. A slight majority of 49% were of the view that there was no success recorded
in dispute resolution compared to 46% who thought thare was success albeit not
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pronounced. In terms of the overall support for consociational negotiated democracy when
the 2013 and 2017 electoral cycles were juxtaposed, the study established that there was
no notable increase in support for consociational negotiated democracy in the 2017 election
cycle but rather a decrease compared to 2013 as reported by 69% of the respondents. This
scenario was attributed to increased awareness among individuals and clans on the political
benefits at play. A majoritarian system was viewed more favorably than consociational
negotiated democracy.
5.2 Conclusions
The findings of this study demonstrated that demographic characteristics such as age, level
of education attainment, gender and clan affiliation had significant influence on an
individual’s decision to support or not support consociational negotiated democracy in the
management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. The study concluded that
negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County did not wholly manifest the
principles of consociationalism as advanced by its proponents, leading to its reduced
support particularly in the 2017 election cycle.
The study determined that increased political awareness in the post 2013 period, elite
capture of the process of negotiations, exclusion and factions within significant segments
of the population of Mandera County as the principal factors that undermined the support
for consociational negotiated democracy in the 2017 electoral cycle when compared to the
2013 electoral cycle. In particular, divisions within the dominant Garre clan coupled with
its unwillingness to involve the other clans, especially the Degodia dealt the biggest blow
to consociational negotiated democracy and with it the promise of managing politically
motivated conflicts in the county. The anti-consociational negotiated democracy group
211
within the Garre clan, who were labelled ‘rebels’ by the promoters of the consociational
model formed an alliance with the Degodia and Murulle clans to restore majoritarianism,
effectively sinking the opportunities and potential that consociationalism held with regard
to the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.
In terms of the structure of consociational negotiated democracy, the study concluded that
the exclusion of the Degodia clan, women and youth as significant segments of the
population from negotiations undermined the prospects for support of outcomes from them
besides not meeting the criteria for inclusiveness. In addition, the finding on fractionation
of agenda items though in tandem with Berkovitch’s (1996) idea of fractionation and
prioritization in agenda setting, the practice deviated from his psychological approach that
easy issues be dealt with ahead of the complex ones to give negotiators the motivation that
they can find solutions to even the seemingly difficult matters. Participants in the
negotiations noted that cracking the complex matter was more important because the easy
ones would easily be handled. This adds impetus to the need to appreciate context in
research before making generalization.
The process of generating the agenda revealed the negotiations were two tiered; at the sub-
clan level and at the clan levels. This brought to focus the fluid nature of the concept of
significant segment which Lijphart (2012) did not consider in his analysis. This study
concluded in this regard that group dynamics, depending on how pronounced they are, can
and do influence political decision making and consequently conflict management.
212
The consensus-based approach to decision making during negotiation was found to mirror
the expectations of political negotiations in plural societies. Against this finding, the study
concluded that preparation and the implementation of outcomes were partially the
drawbacks to the success of consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. On
the significance of political actors, the study concluded that the process required the
goodwill of politicians for it to succeed, but not in the form of financial contributions
towards the negotiations as that heightened perceptions of attempts to influence outcomes.
Findings on exclusion and disproportionate representation of segments to elective and
appointive positions of power led the study to conclude that the approach had not been
effective in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. Manifestation
of ineffectiveness was demonstrated by lack of inclusivity in the political leadership and
governance as well as unfairness in sharing of employment opportunities and development
projects. These worsened relations between groups constituting the population in Mandera
County, leading to open rejection of consociational negotiated democracy by politicians
and their supporters and hence denying it the much needed goodwill. There was also no
significant reduction in the number of election-related cases filed in court, a finding that
informed the study to conclude that the approach was ineffective since it did not attain the
intended outcomes.
In a nutshell, consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera county rather
than alleviating conflict has antagonized the key stakeholders by accentuating their
differences. A regression analysis of the effectiveness of consociational negotiated
213
democracy as a predictor of reduction in ethno-political conflicts returned a p value of
0.052 which was greater than the significance level of 0.05, thus informing the decision to
fail to reject the null hypothesis.
5.3 Recommendations
The study makes the following recommendations based on the findings and conclusions
made on each of the three specific objectives:
With regard to the first objective, the key pull factors which had included assurance of
fairness in sharing of economic resources as well as political and appointive positions in
2013 were not honored, leading to rejection of negotiated democracy in the 2017 election
cycle. The stakeholders, particularly the elders and elected leaders should therefore ensure
inclusion of all significant segments in decision making as well as in governance and
manage intra-clan differences more amicably to avoid fall outs. Remedial measures should
seek to correct the skewed distribution of economic resources, political and appointive
positions by developing a formula that epitomizes justice and fairness. The elders should
work closely with statutory bodies such as the NCIC to establish proportionally constituted
joint negotiation teams comprising of representatives of all significant segments and
interest groups to thaw relations and enhance perceptions of inclusivity. The NCIC would
act as a neutral party whose interest would be to champion inclusion as a pathway to
cohesion and integration of all constituent groups in the county’s political matrix. Other
critical issues that stakeholders can leverage on to enhance acceptance of consociational
negotiated democracy include the presence of family ties across clans and Islamic religious
teachings on peaceful resolution of disputes given that a vast majority of the polity’s
population identify with and practice the Islamic religion. The study believes such
214
considerations would help the community gain a sense of ownership of consociational
negotiated democracy and support it as the most appropriate mechanism for ethno-political
conflict management.
Based on findings in light of objective two, the study recommends that consociational
negotiated democracy must be anchored on an inclusive process that is driven by a team of
elites who have the unwavering support of the segments they claim to represent besides
being guided by agreed upon terms. Corner tribes, women and the youth who constitute a
significant segment in the county should be included in the negotiations first as a right and
secondly, to stem their rejection of negotiation outcomes, which exacerbates rather than
alleviate conflict. This can be achieved by transforming the council from a male only entity
to one that is accommodative of the variety of significant interest groups in the county.
Stakeholders should also establish alternative ways of funding the negotiations other than
relying on politicians and business persons in order to forestall perceptions of undue
influence of outcomes. As critical actors in the process, politicians should instead play the
role of mobilizing their supporters to accept and support negotiations outcomes irrespective
of whether such decisions favour them or not.
The study also recommends development of programs that foster reconciliation, with the
youth and politicians who are key actors in violence taking a leading role in denouncing
political violence in all its manifestations. Stakeholders should also consider inclusion of
independent experts during negotiations to assist with obtaining agreements that are
inclusive and implementable without having to depend on the goodwill of individuals.
215
In order for the consociational model to deliver justice, fairness, cohesion and unity among
the communities making up the population in Mandera County, the study recommends that
the elites driving the process should adopt an organic approach that is consultative and all-
inclusive to replace the exclusive approach that has treated some groups and the general
population as passive actors whose only role is to implement their decisions. This will go
a long way in promoting acceptance of outcomes and stemming fallouts which exacerbate
rather than alleviate group conflicts.
The leadership of the three major clans needs sensitization training to help manage
expectations of their constituents so that they are not caught by surprise in terms of
negotiation outcomes. The Garre clan which is slightly more populous than the others
should be encouraged to accept that all clans and communities living in Mandera County
have equal rights under the law to not only live there but also engage in the county’s
politics; and that there is no provision, legal or moral that stipulates the county as
exclusively its political sphere of influence. Finally, state agencies mandated with
delimitation of boundaries should consider redrawing of boundaries in the county in such
a way that gerrymandering is eliminated.
5.4 Suggestions for Further Research
Given the delimitations that bound this study and findings from the data collected as well
as gaps in the extant literature, the study suggests further research on the following:
This study focused on consociational negotiated democracy in a largely culturally
homogenous setting. Another study focusing on consociational negotiated democracy in
sub-national political units with culturally distinct groups should be carried out to compare
and develop best practice.
216
The often cited cause of rejection of consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera
County was exclusion of significant segments and interest groups. This study suggests an
examination of the modalities and the influence of including all significant segments and
interest groups on the success or failure of consociational negotiated democracy.
Finally, the study suggests that since most of the study participants turned out to be men
on account of being heads of households or elders, a further study with equal representation
of males and females in the sample size be carried out to establish whether the findings
will hold.
217
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233
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
Joseph M. Mutungi
P.O Box 53067-00200
Nairobi.
Tel: 0724526366
Dear Respondent,
RE: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
I am a student at Kisii University pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Peace and
Conflict Studies. I am conducting a research titled “CONSOCIATIONAL
NEGOTIATED DEMOCRACY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON ETHNO-
POLITICAL CONFLICTS MANAGEMENT IN MANDERA COUNTY, KENYA”.
Mandera County has been reported as practicing negotiated democracy since 2013. This is
an area that is fairly new in the Kenyan political landscape and thus the study would want
to establish more about the nature and process of negotiated democracy, the level of
acceptance in the community, its effectiveness and the challenges experienced in rolling it
out. I have identified you to participate in the study and I would be honored by your kind
acceptance of my request. Your honest response to the questions will be greatly
appreciated. Please note that there is no right or wrong answers. The information you will
provide shall be strictly used for academic purposes and shall remain anonymous and
confidential.
Thank you for your participation.
Sincerely,
Joseph Mutungi
234
APPENDIX II: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire is designed to assist in the collection of information regarding the
influence of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the management of ethno-political
conflicts in Mandera County. The information collected will only be used for the purposes
of this study and shall thus be confidential. Please mark the appropriate answer in the
provided boxes or parentheses ( ) with a tick (√) or an (x) and where applicable write the
required response in the spaces provided.
PART A:
Bio-Data
Please tick (√) or mark with an (x) the choice that is applicable to you.
a. Age: 21-30years ( ) 31-40 years ( ) 41-50 years ( ) Over 51 years ( )
b. Highest Education Level: Primary ( ) Secondary ( ) College ( ) University ( )
c. Gender: Male ( ) Female ( )
d. Marital Status: Single ( ) Married ( ) Divorced ( ) Widowed ( )
e. Clan: Garre ( ) Murrule ( ) Degodia ( ) Corner Tribe ( ) Other ( )
f. Religion: Muslim ( ) Christian ( ) other – please specify ………………..
g. How long have you lived in Mandera County?
0 to 5 years ( ) 6 to 10 years ( ) More than 10 years ( )
PART B:
Dynamics influencing adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in the
management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County
a. To what extent do you agree with the following statements relating to factors
influencing the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy as a means to
managing ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County? (Please tick only one option
for each statement; 1 – Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Disagree and 5
– Strongly Disagree)
235
b. Please state any other reason not listed in the table above that you think influence
or has the potential to influence the adoption of consociational negotiated
democracy as a means to the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera
County.
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
c. Do you support the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in the
management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County? Yes ( ) No ( )
d. If your answer to (c) above is no, please explain your reasons.
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
PART C:
The structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
a. How representative in terms of clans is the negotiating team? (Please tick only one
option for each statement; 1 – Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Disagree
and 5 – Strongly Disagree)
1 2 3 4 5
1 The desire for a political process free of violence and destruction
2 Assurance of fairness in the sharing of political positions
3 The promise of fairness in distribution of economic resources
4 Religious teachings on peaceful dispute resolution
5 Presence of family ties across clans
6 Lack of a sufficient campaign finances required to put up a
typical free-for-all democratic political competition
7 Lessons learned from observing the practice work in similar
situations elsewhere
8 Inclusion of each clan’s representatives in the negotiations
leading to sharing of political positions and other resources
9 It is the only realistic path for small clans to hold any county or
national elective political office
236
b. Does the negotiating team comprise of people drawn from across the male and
female sexes? Yes ( ) No ( )
Please explain your answer to (b) above.
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
c. Are the youth involved in the negotiations? Yes ( ) No ( )
Please explain your answer
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
d. What beliefs (cultural or religious) bring about the kind of consociational
negotiated democracy practiced in Mandera County?
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
e. What are the terms of consociational negotiated democracy practiced in Mandera
County?
....................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................
1 2 3 4 5
1 Comprises of all the clans residing in Mandera, including corner
tribes
2 Comprises of the Garre, Murulle and Degodia clans only
3 Comprises of the Garre only
4 Comprises of coalition of either two of the three big clans
237
f. What role do political leaders play in the establishment of consociational negotiated
democracy in Mandera County?
....................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................
g. In your opinion, do you think that political leaders are necessary in the realization
of consociation democracy in Mandera? Please explain your answer.
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
h. How is the agenda for the negotiations generated?
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
i. How does the negotiating team conduct their discussions of the various items on
the agenda? Please explain.
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
j. How is consensus arrived at among the negotiators?
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
k. To what extent do you agree with the following statements on the structure of
negotiations? (Please tick only one option in each question; 1 – Strongly Agree, 2
– Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Disagree and 5 – Strongly Disagree).
238
1 2 3 4 5
1 Each clan presents several candidates for consideration for each
elective post in the order of the clan preference for each candidate
2 Candidates are briefed about the negotiations prior to the
announcement of agreements to the general public
3 Elective and appointive opportunities and resources are allocated
based on the relative population strength of each clan
4 Interest groups other than clans propose negotiators to represent
their interests during the negotiations
5 The chair of the negotiating team is usually a neutral person not
aligned to any clan during the negotiations
6 Negotiation sessions and outcomes are documented as a true record
of proceedings
l. To what extent do you agree with the following statements with regard to the
challenges encountered during the negotiation processes? (Please tick only one
option in each question; 1 – Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Disagree
and 5 – Strongly Disagree)
1 2 3 4 5
1 Some members of the negotiating team are financially induced to
favor certain candidates
2 Disgruntled opinion leaders not in the negotiating team work to
undermine the negotiation process
3 Parties outside the county rooting for particular candidates attempt
to infiltrate the negotiations to sway it their way
4 Lack of independent experts with the knowledge and skill set in
negotiations leads to weak agreements
5 Lack of community participation in the choice of negotiators
undermines the credibility of the outcome
6 Failure to regularly update the community on the progress of the
negotiations leads to suspicions of foul play in the final decisions
7 Some clan representatives make unrealistic demands which slow
down negotiations as compromise and consensus is sought
8 Intra clan rivalries affect the choice of candidates for various offices
m. Has the leadership in Mandera County considered institutionalization of the
practice of consociational negotiated democracy as a mechanism of managing and
resolving ethno-political conflicts in the community? Yes ( ) No ( )
Please explain.
239
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
PART D: Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the management
of Ethno-Political Conflicts in Mandera County
a. What types of political dispute resolution mechanisms were there before
consociational negotiated democracy was introduced?
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
b. What has changed in the management of inter-clan political disputes after adoption
of consociational negotiated democracy?
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
c. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (Please tick only one
option against each statement; 1 - Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 -
Disagree and 5 – Strongly Disagree)
As a result of Consociational Negotiated Democracy, there is: 1 2 3 4 5
1 Inclusion of all clans in the county political leadership and
governance
2 Equitable distribution of county government employment
opportunities
3 Fairness in implementation of county government development
projects across the sub-counties
4 Successful resolution of political disputes without involving the
courts
d. Please state what you would consider to be the weaknesses of consociational
negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera
County.
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
240
PART E: Reduction in Ethno-Political Conflicts
a. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (Please tick only one
option against each statement; 1 - Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 -
Disagree and 5 – Strongly Disagree)
Reduction in ethno-political conflicts is evidenced by: 1 2 3 4 5
1 Growing cohesion among different clans in the county
2 Decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence
3 Voluntary surrender of defense/offence weapons
4 Settlement of people in places previously considered hostile
Thank you for your time
241
APPENDIX III: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
Thank you so much for honoring my request for an interview on the practice of
consociational negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in
Mandera County. As I indicated to you when I was seeking this opportunity to interview
you, I am a student at Kisii University pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Peace
and Conflict Studies. The main purpose for the interview is to obtain information from you
that will help answer my study questions. The information shared with me shall be treated
with utmost confidentiality and strictly used for academic purposes. Your identity shall be
concealed during reporting of the study findings.
Interview guide
Contextual dynamics influencing acceptance of Consociational Negotiated
Democracy in Mandera County
i. What pull factors (fears, interests, culture, resources sharing etc.) do you think
endeared Consociational Negotiated Democrcay to the people residing in Mandera
County?
ii. Would you say that the practice of Consociational Negotiated Democracy is widely
accepted and supported by all the clans in Mandera County?
Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy
i. How inclusive is the practice of consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera
County in terms of clans and special interest groups?
ii. How is the actual negotiation process organized? (Agenda setting, consensus
building on issues etc.)
iii. What particular roles if any do politicians play in the establishment and realization
of the negotiations?
iv. Are the agreements arrived at documented? Why? Who is/are the custodian(s) of
the agreements if any?
v. Has the practice of consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County been
institutionalized?
vi. What are the challenges faced by the team of negotiators during the actual
negotiations?
242
Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the management of Ethno-
Political conflicts
i. Do you think consociational negotiated democracy has helped in mainstreaming all
clans and interest groups in Mandera in the governance of the county?
ii. Kindly share with me any case(s) of highly contested political seats that previously
generated violence during elections but have since 2013 experienced peace thanks
to negotiated democracy?
iii. In your assessment, would you say that there is equity in the sharing of the various
resources among the clans and interest groups in Mandera County after the adoption
of consociationalism?
iv. In what ways has consociational negotiated democracy contributed to peaceful
coexistence among clans in Mandera County after the 2013 and 2017 general
elections?
v. What suggestions do you think can help enhance the practice of consociational
negotiated democracy for it to yield more successful and sustainable outcomes?
Thank you very much for your time.
243
APPENDIX IV: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
Thank you so much for honoring my request for a discussion on the practice of
consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. As I indicated when I was
seeking this opportunity for discussions with you, I am a student at Kisii University
pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Peace and Conflict Studies. The main purpose
for the discussions is to obtain information from you regarding the processes around
consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera that will help answer my
study questions. The information shared with me shall be treated with utmost
confidentiality and strictly used for academic purposes. Your identity shall be concealed
during reporting of the study findings.
Discussion Guiding Questions
i. What pull factors endeared consociational negotiated democracy to the people of
Mandera County to adopt it as the best strategy for managing political conflicts?
ii. How inclusive is the team that leads the negotiations to resolve political conflicts in
Mandera County in terms of clans and special interest groups?
iii. How significant are politicians in the whole process of consociational negotiated
democracy?
iv. Are the negotiation outcomes documented?
v. Has negotiated democracy been institutionalized as a strategy for resolving political
conflicts in Mandera County?
vi. What factors influence the acceptance and adoption of consociational negotiated
democracy in the management of political conflicts in Mandera County?
vii. What indicators demonstrate the effectiveness of consociational negotiated
democracy in the management of political conflicts in Mandera County?
viii. What challenges undermine the practice of consociational negotiated democracy in
the management of political conflicts in Mandera County?
ix. What suggestions do you propose to overcome the challenges facing consociational
negotiated democracy in the management of political conflicts in Mandera County?
254
APPENDIX XI: KREJCIE AND MORGAN’S TABLE FOR SAMPLE SIZE
Population
Size
Confidence = 95% Confidence = 99%
Margin of Error Margin of Error
5.0% 3.5% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 3.5% 2.5% 1.0%
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
20 19 20 20 20 19 20 20 20
30 28 29 29 30 29 29 30 30
50 44 47 48 50 47 48 49 50
75 63 69 72 74 67 71 73 75
100 80 89 94 99 87 93 96 99
150 108 126 137 148 122 135 142 149
200 132 160 177 196 154 174 186 198
250 152 190 215 244 182 211 229 246
300 169 217 251 291 207 246 270 295
400 196 265 318 384 250 309 348 391
500 217 306 377 475 285 365 421 485
600 234 340 432 565 315 416 490 579
700 248 370 481 653 341 462 554 672
800 260 396 526 739 363 503 615 763
1000 278 440 606 906 399 575 727 943
1200 291 474 674 1067 427 636 827 1119
1500 306 515 759 1297 460 712 959 1376
2000 322 563 869 1655 498 808 1141 1785
2500 333 597 952 1984 524 879 1288 2173
3500 346 641 1068 2565 558 977 1510 2890
5000 357 678 1176 3288 586 1066 1734 3842
7500 365 710 1275 4211 610 1147 1960 5165
10000 370 727 1332 4899 622 1193 2098 6239
25000 378 760 1448 6939 646 1285; 2399 9972
50000 381 772 1491 8056 655 1318 2520 12455
75000 382 776 1506 8514 658 1330 2563 13583
100000 383 778 1513 8762 659 1336 2585 14227
250000 384 782 1527 9248 662 1347 2626 15555
500000 384 783 1532 9423 663 1350 2640 16055
1000000 384 783 1534 9512 663 1352 2647 16317
2500000 384 784 1536 9567 663 1353 2651 16478
10000000 384 784 1536 9594 663 1354 2653 16560
100000000 384 784 1537 9603 663 1354 2654 16584
300000000 384 784 1537 9603 663 1354 2654 16586
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