CONSOCIATIONAL NEGOTIATED DEMOCRACY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

ON ETHNO-POLITICAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN

MANDERA COUNTY, KENYA

MUTUNGI JOSEPH MATEE

(MA - University of Nairobi; B.Ed. Arts - Moi University)

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POST-GRADUATE STUDIES IN

PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF

THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PEACE AND CONFLICT

STUDIES OF THE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PEACE STUDIES,

KISII UNIVERSITY

NOVEMBER 2020

ii

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis, which I submit for examination in consideration for the award

of Doctor of Philosophy degree in Peace and Conflict Studies, is my original work and

has not been presented for award of any degree in any other university.

Joseph Matee Mutungi ---------------------- ------------------

DAS/60154/14 Signature Date

This thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as the University

Supervisors.

Amb. Prof. David K.A. Kikaya, PhD., HSC. ---------------------- ------------------

Professor of Peace and International Relations Signature Date

United States International University - Africa

Dr. Anthony Ichuloi, PhD. ---------------------- ------------------

Lecturer & Chair of Department Signature Date

Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

Kisii University

iii

PLAGIARISM DECLARATION

DECLARATION BY STUDENT i. I declare I have read and understood Kisii University Postgraduate Examination

Rules and Regulations, and other documents concerning academic dishonesty.

ii. I do understand that ignorance of these rules and regulations is not an excuse for a

violation of the said rules.

iii. If I have any questions or doubts, I realize that it is my responsibility to keep

seeking an answer until I understand.

iv. I understand I must do my own work.

v. I also understand that if I commit any act of academic dishonesty like plagiarism,

my thesis/project can be assigned a fail grade (“F”)

vi. I further understand I may be suspended or expelled from the University for

Academic Dishonesty.

Name: MUTUNGI JOSEPH MATEE Signature: ………………………….

Registration No.: DAS/60154/14 Date: ………………………………

DECLARATION BY SUPERVISORS

i. I/we declare that this thesis/project has been submitted to plagiarism detection

service.

ii. The thesis/project contains less than 20% of plagiarized work.

iii. I/we hereby give consent for marking.

----------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------

Signature Date

Amb. Prof. David K.A. Kikaya, PhD., HSC.

Professor of Peace and International Relations

United States International University - Africa

----------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------

Signature Date

Dr. Anthony Ichuloi, PhD.

Lecturer & Chair of Department

Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

Kisii University

iv

DECLARATION OF NUMBER OF WORDS

Thesis Title: Consociational Negotiated Democracy and its Implications on Ethno-

Political Conflict Management in Mandera County, Kenya

I confirm that the word length of:

1) The thesis, including footnotes, is …53,773…

2) The bibliography is …2743… and, if applicable

3) The appendices are…1598…

I also declare the electronic version is identical to the final, hard bound copy of the thesis

and corresponds with those on which the examiners based their recommendation for the

award of the degree.

NAME OF CANDIDATE: MUTUNGI JOSEPH MATEE

ADM NO: DAS/60154/14

SCHOOL/FACULTY: SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PEACE STUDIES

Signed: …………………………………… Date: ……………………

(Candidate)

We confirm that the thesis submitted by the above-named candidate complies with the

relevant word length specified in the School of Postgraduate Studies and Commission of

University Education regulations for the PhD Degree.

Signed: ............................................ Date: …………….………….

Amb. Prof. David Kikaya, PhD., HSC.

Professor of Peace and International Relations

United States International University – Africa

Signed: ............................................ Date: ……………………….

Dr. Anthony Ichuloi, PhD.

Lecturer & Chair of Department

Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

Kisii University

v

COPYRIGHT

All rights are reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized, in any form or

by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any

information storage or retrieval system without prior written permission of the author or

Kisii University.

© 2020, Mutungi Joseph Matee

vi

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my mother Rose Kalondu and my late father Anthony Mutungi

for instilling in me at a tender age the virtues of hard work and peaceful resolution of

disputes.

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have materialized without the support of various people and

organizations to whom I am greatly indebted. First and foremost, I thank God for the

privilege of taking up my doctoral studies in Peace and Conflict Studies at Kisii University.

Secondly, I wish to convey my sincere gratitude to my mentors and supervisors, Amb. Prof.

David Kikaya and Dr. Anthony Ichuloi for guiding me during the research work that

culminated in this thesis. I recognize the contribution of my lecturers at Kisii University

who took me through various courses in the run up to this write up. I am grateful to the

Chair of the Department of Political Science and Peace Studies, Dr. Pia Okeche, the Dean

in the School of Arts and Social Sciences, Dr. Margaret Barasa and the Director, School of

Post Graduate Studies Dr. George Nyandoro for the administration effort that went into the

realization of this work since its inception. To my colleagues in the Peace and Conflict

Studies class, thank you for the mutual encouragement even when the going got tough.

Thirdly, I wish to sincerely thank my employer, Africa Nazarene University for the

immense support accorded to me in various ways ranging from tuition fee support, use of

the institutional facilities such as the library and an ambience conducive for research work.

I extend my sincere appreciation to my colleagues at Africa Nazarene University who

contributed to this thesis development in one way or the other, particularly Dr. Emily

Okuto, Dr. Simon Muthomi and Dr. Eric Osoro. I am equally grateful to my friend Alfred

Owino who encouraged me to hang in there even when I was at the verge of despairing.

To my research assistants Mohammed Omar, Adan Ibrahim and Mohammed Hassan, I

could never thank you enough. May the Lord richly bless you all.

Lastly, I am eternally grateful to my dear wife Vivian Mukhavali who took on most of my

responsibilities of bringing up our young family as I burned the midnight oil to complete

my doctoral studies. To my children Anthony Faraja and Rose Kalondu, thank you for

cheering daddy even when the going got tough. Your smiles during those late weekend

evenings made the difference and gave me the impetus to soldier on. To all of you, asanteni

sana.

viii

ABSTRACT

Consociational negotiated democracy is commonly used in plural and multicultural

societies ensure inclusivity and equal representation in the governance process as well as

in sharing of other available resources, thus contributing to peace and stability. In Kenya,

particularly in Mandera county, despite the adoption of the consociational negotiated

democracy model, ethno-political conflicts persist which disrupt peace and stability among

the communities living there. The purpose of this study was to assess the implications of

consociational negotiated democracy to the management of ethno-political conflicts that

tend to undermine peace and stability in Mandera County. The specific objectives guiding

the study were: to analyze the dynamics of consociational negotiated democracy in the

management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County; to examine the structure of

consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in the management of ethno-political

conflicts in Mandera County; to evaluate the effectiveness of consociational negotiated

democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. The study

was informed by Kaufman’s International theory of inter-ethnic war and the pluralist

theory of democracy. A descriptive research design that incorporates both qualitative and

quantitative approaches was employed. The target population was 4765 heads of

households and various cadres of leaders. The sample size was 357 respondents. Data was

collected using interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and questionnaires.

Qualitative data was analyzed using thematic narratives while quantitative data was

analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics obtained from SPSS, version 23.

Regression analysis and ANOVA were used to test the null hypothesis. Pie charts, tables

and bar graphs were used to present the statistical data while qualitative data was presented

in the form of narratives and verbatim quotations. The study found out that religious

teachings, family ties, desire for peaceful electoral processes and the fear of self-

annihilation were key factors in the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy.

Support for Consociational negotiated democracy was also found to have declined when

the 2013 and 2017 election cycles were compared, the reasons for that being exclusion of

some interest groups such as women and youth and major clans like the Degodia and

perception of the process as entrenching political dictatorship. The negotiations were found

to be consultative among the cooperating groups, multi-layered and unanimity the

preferred style of decision making. Consociational negotiated democracy was found not to

have entrenched equity in sharing of power and resources besides worsening intra and

inter-clan political relations. The null hypothesis test gave a p value of .052 against the

study’s adopted alpha level of .05, and hence the study failed to reject the null hypothesis.

The study recommends inclusion of all clans and interest groups in the negotiations besides

ensuring equity in sharing positions of power and resources for Mandera County to realize

a reduction in politically motivated inter-clan conflicts. The study findings may inform

policy makers in the county and the national governments with regard to entrenching

inclusive governance processes as a pathway to managing the recurrent politically

motivated conflicts.

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION............................................................................................................... ii

PLAGIARISM DECLARATION................................................................................... iii

DECLARATION OF NUMBER OF WORDS.............................................................. iv

COPY RIGHT ................................................................................................................... v

DEDICATION.................................................................................................................. vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................... vii

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ ix

LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... xiv

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ..................................................... xvi

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Background of the Study .............................................................................................. 1

1.2 Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................ 10

1.3 Justification and significance of the Study ................................................................. 11

1.4 Objectives of the Study ............................................................................................... 13

1.4.1 Specific Objectives ............................................................................................... 13

1.5 Research Questions ..................................................................................................... 13

1.6 Hypothesis................................................................................................................... 13

1.7 Scope of the Study ...................................................................................................... 13

1.8 Limitations of the Study.............................................................................................. 14

1.9 Assumptions of the Study ........................................................................................... 15

1.10 Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................. 16

1.11 Operational Definition of Terms ............................................................................... 19

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................. 21

2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 21

2.2 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................... 21

x

2.2.1 International Theory of Inter-Ethnic War ............................................................ 21

2.2.2 The Pluralist Theory of Democracy ..................................................................... 24

2.3 Theoretical Review of Democracy ............................................................................. 26

2.3.1 Consociational Negotiated Democracy ................................................................ 28

2.3.2 Ethno-Political Conflict Management .................................................................. 36

2.4 Empirical Review........................................................................................................ 39

2.4.1 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ....... 39

2.4.2 Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ............................................ 46

2.4.3 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the Management of

Ethno-Political Conflicts ............................................................................................... 55

2.5 Research Gaps ............................................................................................................. 62

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................ 63

3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 63

3.2 Research Design.......................................................................................................... 63

3.3 Study Area .................................................................................................................. 65

3.3 Target Population ........................................................................................................ 66

3.4 Sampling Procedures and Techniques ........................................................................ 68

3.4.1 Sampling Procedure ............................................................................................. 68

3.4.2 Study Sample Size ................................................................................................ 70

3.5 Data Collection Instruments ....................................................................................... 71

3.5.1 Developing of Instruments ................................................................................... 71

3.5.1.1 Questionnaire ................................................................................................. 71

3.5.1.2 Interview Schedule ........................................................................................ 72

3.5.1.3 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) ................................................................. 73

3.5.2 Data Collection Instruments Reliability and Validity .......................................... 74

3.5.2.1 Validity of Research Instruments .................................................................. 74

3.5.2.2 Reliability of Research Instruments .............................................................. 75

3.6 Data Analysis and Presentation of Findings ............................................................... 75

3.7 Legal and Ethical Considerations ............................................................................... 78

xi

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ..................................................................................... 80

4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 80

4.2 Response Rate ............................................................................................................. 81

4.3 Bio-data of Respondents ............................................................................................. 82

4.3.1 Age ....................................................................................................................... 82

4.3.2 Level of Education of Respondents ..................................................................... 83

4.3.3 Gender of Respondents ........................................................................................ 85

4.3.4 Marital Status of Respondents.............................................................................. 86

4.3.5 Respondents’ Clan Affiliations ............................................................................ 87

4.3.6 Respondents’ Religious Affiliations .................................................................... 89

4.3.7 Respondents’ Duration of Stay in Mandera County ............................................ 90

4.4 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ............. 91

4.4.1 Desire for a Political Process Free of Violence and Destruction ......................... 91

4.4.2 Fairness in Sharing of Political Positions ............................................................. 93

4.4.3 Fair Distribution of Economic Resources ............................................................ 96

4.4.4 Religious Teachings ............................................................................................. 98

4.4.5 Cross-cutting Family Ties .................................................................................. 100

4.4.6 Insufficient Campaign Finances ......................................................................... 103

4.4.7 Lessons Learnt on the Success of Consociationalism elsewhere ....................... 105

4.4.8 Inclusion of Clan Representatives in the Negotiations ...................................... 107

4.4.9 Consociational Negotiated Democracy as the Only Realistic Pathway to an

Elective Political Office for Small Clans .................................................................... 110

4.4.10 Other Reasons that Influence Adoption of Consociational Negotiated

Democracy .................................................................................................................. 112

4.4.11 Extend of Support for Consociational Negotiated Democracy in Managing

Ethno-Political Conflicts ............................................................................................. 115

4.5 The Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ......................................... 121

4.5.1 Inclusion of All Clans in the Negotiation Team ................................................ 121

4.5.2 Restriction of Negotiation Team to Garre, Murulle and Degodia Clans Only .. 123

4.5.3 Restriction of Negotiation Team to the Garre Clan ........................................... 124

4.5.4 Restriction of Negotiation Team to Two of the Three Major Clans .................. 125

xii

4.5.5 Composition of Negotiating Team in Terms of Gender .................................... 127

4.5.6 Youth Inclusion in Negotiations ........................................................................ 130

4.5.7 Beliefs Shaping Consociational Negotiated Democracy ................................... 131

4.5.8 Terms of Consociational Negotiated Democracy .............................................. 133

4.5.9 Role of Political Leaders in Consociational Negotiated Democracy ................. 137

4.5.10 Generation of Negotiations Agenda ................................................................. 139

4.5.11 Discussion of Agenda Items and Consensus building ..................................... 141

4.5.12 Proposition of Candidates by Clans in the order of Preference ....................... 144

4.5.13 Briefing of Candidates on Negotiation Outcomes ........................................... 146

4.5.14 Proportional Allocation of Positions and Resources among ethnic groups ..... 147

4.5.15 Proposal of Negotiators by Interest Groups other Than Clans ........................ 149

4.5.16 Neutrality of Negotiation Team Leader ........................................................... 150

4.5.17 Documentation of Proceedings ........................................................................ 152

4.5.18 Challenges Encountered During Negotiations ................................................. 153

4.5.19 Institutionalization of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ........................ 165

4.6 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy .......................................... 166

4.6.1 Pre-consociationalism Political Dispute Resolution Methods ........................... 166

4.6.2 Changes after Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy .................. 171

4.6.3 Outcomes of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ........................................ 175

4.6.3.1 Inclusion of All Clans in the County Political Leadership and Governance 176

4.6.3.2 Equitable Distribution of County Employment Opportunities .................... 178

4.6.3.3 Fairness in Implementation of County Government Development Projects 181

4.6.3.4 Successful Resolution of Political Disputes without involving the Courts . 183

4.6.4 Weaknesses of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ..................................... 185

4.6.5 Evidence of Reduction in Ethno-Political Conflicts .......................................... 190

4.6.5.1 Improved Cohesion Among Clans .............................................................. 190

4.6.5.2 Decline in Politically Motivated Inter-clan Violence .................................. 192

4.6.5.3 Voluntary Surrender of Defense/Offence Weapons .................................... 194

4.6.5.4 Settlement of People in Places Previously Considered Hostile ................... 196

4.6.6 Hypothesis Testing ............................................................................................. 198

xiii

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................. 202

5.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 202

5.1 Summary of findings................................................................................................. 202

5.1.1 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ..... 202

5.1.2 The Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy ................................... 204

5.1.3 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the Management of

Ethno-Political conflicts in Mandera County. ............................................................. 209

5.2 Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 210

5.3 Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 213

5.4 Suggestions for Further Research ............................................................................. 215

REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 217

APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 233

APPENDIX I: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 233

APPENDIX II: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE ......................................................... 234

APPENDIX III: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW SCHEDULE .............................................. 241

APPENDIX IV: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS ................................... 243

APPENDIX V: PLAGIARISM REPORT ...................................................................... 244

APPENDIX VI: INTRODUCTION LETTER FROM KISII UNIVERSITY ................ 249

APPENDIX VII: AUTHORIZATION LETTER FROM NACOSTI ............................. 250

APPENDIX VIII: RESEARCH LICENSE .................................................................... 251

APPENDIX IX: AUTHORIZATION LETTER FROM MANDERA COUNTY

COMMISSIONER .......................................................................................................... 252

APPENDIX X: AUTHORIZATION LETTER FROM MANDERA COUNTY

DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION ...................................................................................... 253

APPENDIX XI: KREJCIE AND MORGAN’S TABLE FOR SAMPLE SIZE ............ 254

APPENDIX XII: MAP OF MANDERA COUNTY MAJOR URBAN CENTRES ...... 255

xiv

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Target population distributed by town ............................................................. 68

Table 3.2: Proportionate sample size distribution across the participating towns ............ 70

Table 4.1: Distribution of respondents by age .................................................................. 82

Table 4.2: Distribution of respondents by level of education ........................................... 84

Table 4.3: Distribution of respondents by gender ............................................................. 85

Table 4.4: Distribution of respondents by marital status .................................................. 86

Table 4.5: Distribution of respondents by clan affiliation ................................................ 87

Table 4.6: Distribution of respondents by religious affiliation ......................................... 89

Table 4.7: Distribution of respondents by duration of stay in Mandera County .............. 90

Table 4.8: Family ties ..................................................................................................... 101

Table 4.9: Successful adoption of consociational negotiated democracy elsewhere...... 105

Table 4.10: Inclusion of all clans in consociational negotiated democracy ................... 121

Table 4.11: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to Garre, Murulle

and Degodia clans only ................................................................................................... 123

Table 4.12: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to one major clan

......................................................................................................................................... 124

Table 4.13: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to two of the three

major clans ...................................................................................................................... 125

Table 4.14: Proportional sharing of positions and resources .......................................... 148

Table 4.15: Propose of negotiators by interest groups .................................................... 149

19Table 4.16: Negotiation process undermined by disgruntled opinion leaders external to

the process ....................................................................................................................... 155

Table 4.17: Infiltration of negotiation processes by parties from outside the county ..... 157

Table 4.18: Clan participation in choosing negotiators and acceptance of outcomes .... 160

Table 4.19: Political dispute resolution methods ............................................................ 167

Table 4.20: Clan affiliation of elected leaders ................................................................ 178

Table 4.21: Distribution of appointive senior county jobs across the clans ................... 180

Table 4.22: Model summary of effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy 198

Table 4.23: ANOVA between reduction in ethno-political conflicts and efficacy of

consociational negotiated democracy ............................................................................. 199

Table 4.24: Coefficients of ethno-political conflicts and effectiveness of consociational

negotiated democracy ..................................................................................................... 200

xv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework .................................................................................. 18

Figure 4.1: Desire for a political process free of violence and destruction ...................... 92

Figure 4.2: Assurance of fairness in sharing political positions ....................................... 94

Figure 4.3: Fair distribution of economic resources ......................................................... 97

Figure 4.4: Influence of religious teachings ..................................................................... 99

Figure 4.5: Insufficient campaign finances ..................................................................... 103

Figure 4.6: Inclusion of clan representatives in the negotiations.................................... 107

Figure 4.7: An avenue for small clans to hold county political office ............................ 110

Figure 4.8: Support for consociationalism in management of ethno-political conflicts . 116

Figure 4.9: Inclusion of males and females in the negotiation team .............................. 128

Figure 4.10: Inclusion of youth in negotiation teams ..................................................... 130

Figure 4.11: Presentation of candidates for elective posts in order of preference .......... 144

Figure 4.12: Briefings of candidates about negotiation outcomes .................................. 146

Figure 4.13: Neutrality of negotiation process leader ..................................................... 151

Figure 4.14: Documentation of negotiation outcomes .................................................... 152

Figure 4.15: Financial inducement of members of negotiating team ............................. 154

Figure 4.16: Absence of independent experts influences strength of agreements .......... 159

Figure 4.17: Intra-clan rivalries affecting choices of candidates for various offices ...... 162

Figure 4.18: Irregular updates on negotiation progress creating suspicion of foul play. 164

Figure 4.19: Consideration to institutionalize consociational negotiated democracy .... 165

Figure 4.20: Inclusion of all clans in the county political leadership and governance ... 176

Figure 4.21 Equitable distribution of county employment opportunities across clans ... 179

Figure 4.22: Fairness in implementation of county government development projects

across sub-counties ......................................................................................................... 181

Figure 4.23 Successful resolution of political disputes without involving the courts .... 183

Figure 4.24: Growing cohesion among clans ................................................................. 191

Figure 4.25: Decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence .................................. 193

Figure 4.26: Voluntary surrender of defense/offence weapons ...................................... 195

Figure 4.27: Settlement of people in places previously considered hostile .................... 196

xvi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANOVA : Analysis of Variance

AU : African Union

CoK : Constitution of Kenya

CPDO : County Planning and Development Office

CT : Corner Tribes

DRC : Democratic Republic of Congo

FGD : Focus Group Discussion

GCE : Garre Council of Elders

GoK : Government of Kenya

IEBC : Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

KANU : Kenya Africa National Union

KII : Kei Informant Interviews

KNBS : Kenya National Bureau of Statistics

MCA : Member of County Assembly

MP : Member of Parliament

NACOSTI : National Council of Science Technology and Innovation

NARC : National Rainbow Coalition

NCIC : National Cohesion and Integration Commission

PBO : Public Benefit Organizations

PEV : Post-Election Violence

xvii

RA : Regression Analysis

SPSS : Statistical Package for Social Science

UN : United Nations

UNDG : United Nations Development Group

UNDP : United Nations Development Programme

1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter puts the topic of study in perspective by giving its background, statement of

the problem and a justification for the study. It further highlights the objectives of the study,

the research questions, scope of the study and its limitations, the conceptual framework

and operationalizes the key terms used in the study.

1.1 Background of the Study

The international community continues to grapple with the challenge of conflicts occurring

in different parts of the world. Conflicts vary in terms of their nature, duration, stage, and

underlying causes; they are an endemic phenomenon associated with an inevitable co-

existence in all human societies. Instructively, conflicts are neither good nor bad in

themselves; their progression, suppression or resolution largely depends on how they are

handled. Any intervention should be intended to restore the pre-conflict relationships

between the contending parties and it should be as inclusive as possible because there is no

single actor, public or private, who has the knowledge and skillset required to solve

complex, dynamic and diversified societal problems (Stoker, 2004; Hyden & Court, 2001).

Direct and indirect actors in a conflict must be involved for any envisaged peaceful

outcome to bear legitimacy and support at the implementation stage. Indeed, the study takes

the view that any peace-building effort that excludes the very people for whom the peace

is being built is an exercise in futility. This line of thought is reiterated by Schuman (2006)

who explains that individuals and interest groups in all sectors of society have the right to

meaningful participation in the decisions that affect them.

2

In the context of this study, consociational negotiated democracy (CND) refers to a

political structure where members of a given community or society, engage in discussions

on how to share power between various segments that make up society (Lijphart, 2012;

Armingeon, 2003). This arrangement is important in ensuring representation in decision

making, fair sharing of the community’s resources, amicable resolution of political

differences, and reducing animosity within communities where cultural/identity

differences are significant (Cammett & Malesky, 2012). Consociationalism is thus an all-

inclusive approach to democracy that seeks to incorporate as many actors in the political

matrix as possible through the processes of compromise and accommodation of constituent

segments’ elite to enhance societal stability.

Consociational negotiated democratic transitions have occurred in many regions across the

globe such as Europe, Africa, East and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East that had

experienced varied degrees of politically motivated identity conflicts. The political,

economic and social transformations that have occurred in these regions have resulted in

different outcomes besides exhibiting varied characteristics of the negotiation and

transition processes (Guo & Stradiotto, 2014). Some of the characteristics include shared

political power based on the relative strength of the cooperating groups and a resurgent

economy arising from the resultant stable environment. It is important to note here that in

the late 1980s and early 1990s, many European countries experienced significant political

shifts and/or transitions owing to various geopolitical dynamics at the time, with the most

significant one revolving around the cold war politics and the emerging new world order.

3

The political shifts and transitions to democracy resulted in high levels of democratization

among them transformations from one-party states to multiparty political systems.

In Hungary for instance, there was a major transition from communism to democracy

which was characterized by elements of consociational democracy after many years of

engagement in war (Prohnitchi, 1990). Cox and Furlong (2007), writing on the transition

posit that the roundtable discussions and outcomes of the negotiated political process set

Hungary on a successful path toward democracy, evidenced by among other indicators

successive successful multi‐party elections and establishment of parliamentary system of

governance with clear division of political functions.

In Asia, the political union between Malaysia and Singapore was short-lived as the latter

seceded from the former in 1965 after only two years due to escalating conflicts revolving

around racial and ethnic inclusivity in the political landscape of the federation. The reality

of ethnic and racial diversity largely informed Malaysia’s review of her constitution in

order to accommodate that identity diversity in political representation and this set the

country on the path of stability (Shamsuddin, Liaw & Ridzuan, 2015). Policy instruments

such as the National Economic Policy were also negotiated and adopted in order to

accommodate all groups in the social and economic life of Malaysia in an equitable

manner.

The salience of identity difference, popularly called ethnicity in African politics and

conflicts is well documented (Cheeseman, 2015; Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008). Cheeseman

4

and Ford (2007) for instance argue that ethno-political fragmentations and geographical

concentration of ethnic groups are important factors in explaining Africa’s ethnic-based

politics and its attendant upheavals. In essence, Cheeseman and Ford paint a picture of a

continent whose politics is typified by overreliance on ethnic support bases. This view is

buttressed by the findings of a study conducted by Teshome-Bahiru (2008) in Ethiopia on

the formation of political parties in three successive administrations between 1930 and

2008 in which overwhelming evidence indicated that formation of the political parties were

largely informed by ethnicity.

The political reality in many African countries is that influential politicians from different

ethnic communities cut political deals in terms of power sharing for themselves and present

such deals to their ethnic groups as the benefit the community would obtain by supporting

the deal at hand. It is this cadre of leaders that Lijphart (2012) refers to as an “elite cartel”

whose interests in the sharing of power if not met can undermine the stability of the political

unit. It is noteworthy that the deals struck by the ‘elite cartels’ have nothing to do with

ideologies but pure political survival of influential individuals in the respective

communities. Political contests are thus reduced to a matter of ethnic or even clan

mobilization against competitors.

The argument on the reduction of politics in many African polities to ethnic contests is

supported by African history that documents African societies as having been divided

along ethnic lines and the ethnic groups as further sub-divided into clans (Alesina et al.,

2011; Boone, 2003; Murdock, 1959). From the clan level, regional and national politics

5

emerge as candidates are assured of near fanatical following by their kith and kin. It is out

of that kind of understanding that ethno-political conflicts become inevitable as political

competition becomes a zero-sum game. The consociational model of democracy thus

comes in handy under such political reality to prevent, manage and/or resolve ethno-

political conflicts.

In Africa, consociational negotiated democracy has increasingly continued to gain traction

both at the national and grassroots levels. In South Africa for instance, the transition from

the apartheid regime to democratic rule took the course of consociational negotiated

democracy among the contending parties after many years of a mix of armed struggles and

non-violent strife. According to Horowitz (2001) the end of white-minority rule in South

Africa and the transition to an all-inclusive governance structure was a major political

transition aided, guided and midwifed by among significant other processes and activities,

negotiated democracy. Instructively, the process of negotiations in South Africa was not

only a process of resolving the racial conflict between the whites and the blacks, but also

the conflict between the Africa National Congress (ANC) group and fellow blacks who

had been successfully ‘bought/induced’ by the ruling white minority. The significance of

consociational arrangements in the democratic processes of South Africa is evidenced by

her successful emergence from the shadows of seemingly irreconcilable conflict to create

‘the rainbow nation’.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides another African example where the

concept of consociational negotiated democracy has been experimented in the management

6

of political formation for identity-based conflicts at the national level. Mpyana, (2017)

characterizes the DRC as a country that has been at war with itself. The DRC’s political

conflicts and alignments in the period after independence from colonial rule were

characterized by ethnicity. For instance, the battle for political supremacy in the DRC post-

independence state pitted the majority Katanga against the minority Kasai. The Kasai

people were considered more educated and perhaps wealthy because they benefited

immensely from the colonialists who offered them better education and jobs than the

Katangas (Berkeley, 2002). These ethnic grudges have been manipulated by the political

elite and compounded by other geo-political processes to metamorphose into the long

running violent conflict that besets DRC to date. This study contends that the political

system adopted in any political unit must be responsive to the unique needs of the unit’s

social demographics.

In comparing Kenya to other African countries, Njoroge and Sperling (2017), assert that

politics in Kenya is less about pertinent issues and ideals that touch on the lives of its

citizens but more about ethnicity and tribalism. They advance the argument made by

Cheeseman and Ford (2007) that the political realm of Kenya right from independence was

established and continues to be fed by ethnic-based politics which mostly end up in violent

conflicts. The politics of ethnic identity and its attendant negative effects have become

manifest in almost all electoral cycles since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in

1990, with the 2007 general elections especially in the race for presidency being the

watershed moment.

7

It was after this disputed presidential election of 2007 which turned tragic, claiming 1133

lives (CIPEV, 2008) that negotiated democracy in the form of consociational

representation was formally introduced as supported by the interventions that ensued. It is

noteworthy here that the presidential campaigns preceding the elections had been proffered

as ‘forty one against one’ to imply that 41 ethnic communities were uniting to dislodge one

ethnic community from power because of its perceived dominance. Given the immense

influence on the control and distribution of resources that political actors had under the

repealed constitution that was in operation in 2007/2008, that presidential election were

conceived as a matter of life and death. The aftermath of the post-election violence (PEV)

was the creation of the National Dialogue mechanism led by the African Union (AU) that

negotiated a power sharing deal in the form of a grand coalition government between the

two disputants. This negotiated agreement saw the country regain stability as parties were

accommodated in political decision making and resource sharing (Mwagiru, 2008).

The practice of negotiated democracy in Kenya post the 2008 period extended to the

subnational or county levels following the adoption of the Constitution of Kenya (CoK)

2010 that established the devolved system of governance being practiced in the 47 counties.

The practice of consociationalism at the sub-national level has however incorporated a mix

of previously inactive political actors in the name of elders and active political actors

seeking political office. Consociationalism at the counties has been painted as a traditional

mechanism for nominating political leaders and is mostly practiced among ethnic

communities of different numerical strength who occupy the same electoral unit. The

Kenyan-Somalis for instance conceive it as a way of fostering peaceful co-existence as

8

well as unity among various clans of Somali descent. The mechanism had actually been

practiced by the Kenyan Somali clans for long, albeit subtly. It however gained traction in

the 2013 and 2017 general election cycles.

The pursuit of devolved power and resource has seen political contests at the sub-national

level (counties) heighten. Mandera County, the research site of the study has its politics

organized along clans and sub-clans. Although the county had experienced violent

interclan conflicts prior to devolution, the struggle for space within the county’s political

matrix led to a surge in violent politically motivated inter-clan conflicts. In light of this,

consociational form of negotiated democracy was championed as a viable approach in

managing ethno-political interests and the attendant conflicts in the lead up to the 2013 and

2017 general elections. In the 2017 election cycle in particular, the Garre Council of Elders

(GCE) advised all serving elected leaders against defending their political seats. The

Council argued that inter-clan consultations favoured an approach where leadership had to

rotate between the various clans in the county. This, as Makinda (1991), points out, is a

furtherance of pre-independence politics of the Somali community, when politics was clan-

based and the clan elders at that time formulated ways of ensuring that democracy did not

result to animosity among the clans.

However, such occurrences and practices of consociationalism are neither unique nor

limited to the communities residing in Mandera County. In the build-up to the 2013 general

election in Trans Nzoia County, activists and opinion leaders urged communities in the

county to embrace the concept of consociational negotiated democracy to ensure equity in

9

the sharing of power among the communities in the polity. The county is cosmopolitan and

consociationalism was advanced as the best mechanism to avert conflicts which would

undermine the promise of development and unity as envisaged by the devolved system of

governance. Under the Mabanga Peace Accord, the major communities of the western

Kenya region fairly shared elective County Assembly positions to ensure impartial

representation and also reduce hostilities (Bwayo, 2012).

As with any other forms and processes of democracy, consociational democracy processes

can be punctuated by serious disagreements which might degenerate to violence before the

parties come again together for further and more sober discussions. If well executed,

consociational democracy is likely to flourish in culturally plural societies as the resultant

institutions and arrangements are home-grown, inclusive, legitimate and hence locally

supported. This is a core tenet of fair representative governance institutions and grassroots

peacebuilding as advocated by Lederach (1997). Successful negotiations between actors

translate to inclusive governance, political stability, equity in development and fidelity to

constitutionalism. However, negotiations and transitions characterized by suppression of

competition and refusal to relinquish elective positions are highly likely to lead to political

instability (Guo & Stradiotto, 2014).

In light of the foregoing discussion, this study sought to examine the dynamics that

informed the adoption of consociational democracy, the structure and effectiveness of

consociational negotiated democracy in forestalling and managing ethno-political conflicts

in Mandera County.

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1.2 Statement of the Problem

Ethno-political conflicts undermine social-political stability between groups in the areas

affected. In Kenya, ethnic wars are being used as a political tool to weaken the peace

processes. For instance, the 2007/2008 Post Election Violence claimed about1133 lives

besides occasioning the displacement of over 600,000 people perceived to belong to

different ethno-political formations (CIPEV, 2008). Out of 310 deaths and over 216, 294

displacements emanating from politically motivated interethnic violence as recorded by

OCHA in 2015, 56% were reported in Mandera and Wajir Counties. The root causes of

ethno-political conflicts in Mandera county have been linked to development grievances,

exclusion from political power and access to resources (Abdi, 2016). The principles of the

consociational model of governance that mirrors the objectives of devolution at Article 174

of the CoK, a system of governance that was designed to address the root causes and drivers

of conflicts in the counties seem not address the problem. This highlights the place of

political leadership and governance deficits in the ethnically diverse and volatile county.

Despite the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy model whose principles of

inclusivity, proportionality and segment autonomy had been argued as the pathway to

addressing the conflict drivers, politically motivated conflicts persist. The National

Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) flags Mandera County as a hotspot for

interethnic violence, especially during the electioneering period as was the case in 2017.

Little is known about the specific dynamics in Mandera County that informed adoption of

the consociational model, the extend of its support among the populace and the structure

of the negotiations embodying the model because as explained by Armingeon (2003), most

11

studies on consociationalism focus on outcomes rather than a characterization of the

processes that occur prior to the observed outcomes. The model’s effectiveness in

managing ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County is also largely unknown. These are

some of the knowledge gaps the study intended to fill.

1.3 Justification and significance of the Study

The politics of the winner takes all creates problems such as unequal sharing of economic

resources, poor political representation of some social groups etc. and this in most cases

leads to inter group tensions and conflicts in plural settings (Koter, 2013; Ajulu, 2002).

Inequalities in access to political power and resources provide strong incentives for the rise

of politically motivated ethnic violence. The consociational model of democracy has been

advanced as the most suitable to transform the social-political conflict enablers in plural

settings because of its inclusion and proportionality principles that directly address issues

around access to power and resources equitably.

Despite the expansive literature on the consociational democracy and ethno-political

conflicts, very few studies have delved into the effectiveness of consociationalism in

managing ethno-political conflicts at the sub-national level in Kenya and Mandera County

in particular. The existing literature on consociationalism focuses more on the outcomes of

power and resource sharing at the national level with no scholarly attention to the

subnational level, and especially the model’s contribution to conflict management.

The study considered Mandera County a fitting environment for the inquiry because of its

diverse and conflicting clan/sub-clans identified with the same Somali community. The

12

specific complexities around the negotiations generating the agreements in Mandera

County’s body politic are scanty, further justifying the need for this study. The extend of

civil participation in the county’s political and governance process as anticipated in the

consociational model of democracy is unknown, including the underlying enablers or

hindrances. The study, therefore, seeks to contribute to an in-depth understanding of the

workings and potentials of consociational negotiated democracy at the subnational level,

in a county beset by recurrent ethno-political conflicts and a setting of heterogeneity within

homogeneity.

Thus, the study findings may assist the political leadership in Mandera County review

existing laws and policies on governance and development by integrating the emergent

recommendations. This may help create an enabling and sustainable socio-political and

economic framework in which the various groups living there can realize the promise of

devolution as contemplated in Article 174 of the Constitution of Kenya and hence

progressively eliminate the causes of conflicts in the county.

The findings may further interest scholars of consociational democracy and ethnic conflict

management, keen on understanding the nexus between the two variables. The importance

of appreciating the context within which a model is used and the complex issues

surrounding relationships of groups in a polity is also illuminated. In essence, the findings

and especially the suggested areas for further study form a basis for future scholarship.

13

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study was to examine the implications of consociational

negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.

1.4.1 Specific Objectives

i) To analyze the dynamics influencing the adoption of consociational negotiated

democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County

ii) To examine the structure of consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in the

management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County

iii) To evaluate the effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy in the

management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.

1.5 Research Questions

i) What dynamics influenced the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in the

management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County?

ii) What characteristics underpin the structure of consociational negotiated democracy as

practiced in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County?

iii) Is the practice of consociational negotiated democracy effective in the management of

ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County?

1.6 Hypothesis

H0 (iii): Consociational negotiated democracy has not led to reduction of ethno-political

conflicts in Mandera County.

1.7 Scope of the Study

Geographically, the study was restricted to Mandera County, Kenya. This is one of the

administrative areas established by the Constitution of Kenya in the First Schedule, whose

14

population is nearly perfectly homogenous, perhaps due to its proximity to communities of

Somali origin in the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia and Somalia. In terms of content,

the scope of the study was limited to consociational negotiated democracy and ethno-

political conflict management. Consociational negotiated democracy in this study refers to

a negotiation-based variant of democracy aimed at sharing elective and appointive

positions among other resources accruing from the electoral process. The type of

negotiations in focus were those based on power sharing as well as other resources that

come with acquisition of power. Specifically, the study focused on the influence of

consociational negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts pitting

the three dominant clans in Mandera County namely Garre, Murulle and the Degodia. The

study sampled respondents from among the leaders and the general population in an

attempt to obtain data on the research questions.

The study was further limited to the period between 2012 and 2018 during which the 2013

and the 2017 general elections occurred and when the practice of consociational negotiated

democracy became manifest. Moreover it was during this period that violent politically

motivated inter-clan conflicts were witnessed in Mandera County.

1.8 Limitations of the Study

Evidence indicates that most residents (70%) of Mandera County have no formal education

(KNBS, 2017) and therefore using English language in the data collection instruments and

during data collection was anticipated to affect the quality of information collected. To

overcome this drawback, the study enlisted the services of a professional translator to

decode research questions into the local Somali language and the filled questionnaire into

15

English for those respondents that had a limited English capacity. The researcher also made

use of research assistants drawn from the study population who had a good command of

English and the Somali languages who were trained and assisted to understand the

questions so that they can in turn assist the respondents during data collection. The study

contends that these measures enhanced the quality of data and information collected as well

as the return rate.

The study also suffered from unintended bias wherein a majority of the targeted group, that

is heads of households turned out to be males, owing to the patriarchal nature of the larger

Somali community within which the study was situated. This limitation is what has

informed the suggestion for further study on carrying out a study that has an equal

representation of both males and females to confirm whether the findings would hold.

1.9 Assumptions of the Study

First, the study assumed that there were underlying dynamics existing in Mandera county

that made the consociational model of democracy attractive to the majority of the

population and which prompted residents to support it at the onset of the devolved system

of governance in 2013. The study also assumed that the dynamics were linked to access to

power and economic resources as core conflict drivers in the county and that the

respondents were in a position to comment on the nexus between the consociational model

and the management of interclan conflicts.

Secondly, the study assumed that power sharing that is at the core of the consociational

model was based on some form of negotiations between the elite members of the Garre,

16

Degodia and Murulle clans and that these negotiations addressed the finer details on how

power was to be shared, the duration of those holding power to be in office among other

issues. That the essence of the negotiations was to reduce ethno-political tensions that

escalate to violent conflicts occasioning loss of lives and destruction of property.

Finally, the study further assumed that the respondents answered the questions in an honest

and candid manner and that none of them falsified the responses they provided. Another

presumption was that the inclusion criteria of the sample population was the most

appropriate one and it assured that the respondents had the necessary experience and

knowledge of the subjects under study.

1.10 Conceptual Framework

The proposed study seeks to examine the practice of consociational negotiated democracy

and its attendant dynamics in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera

County. To achieve this objective, the study proposes to borrow important concepts derived

from the theories explored above. The research questions indicate to a possible relationship

between the practice of consociational negotiated democracy which the study presented as

the independent variable and the management of ethnic based political conflicts, the

dependent variable as shown in Figure 1.1.

From figure 1.1, it can be seen that dynamics such as marginalization, family ties across

clans and the need for equity in the sharing of resource influence and motivate segments in

divided societies to consider a consociational approach in management of ethno-political

conflicts. The diagram suggests that outcomes such as representation in the economic and

17

political sphere enhance acceptance of consociational negotiated democracy as an avenue

to managing ethno-political conflicts. The figure also suggests that political leaders, well

established principles on the structure of negotiations and documentation of agreements

arising from negotiations play a role in the management of ethno-political conflicts. The

indicators of effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy in managing ethno-

political conflicts as per the conceptual framework include perceptions of inclusion or

exclusion among significant segments of the population, presence of resolved disputes and

the existence of a stable and peaceful environment where all groups are thriving. The study

posits that the independent variables influence the dependent variable. From Figure 1.1,

consociational negotiated democracy is the independent variable while the management of

ethno-political conflicts is the dependent variable. All these aspects which are linked to

consociational negotiated democracy are moderated by variables such as constitutional

demands, statutory provisions, policies and cultural practices in influencing the

management of ethno-political conflicts.

When ethno-political conflicts emerge, they do not have to be violent because alternative

approaches to managing them such as negotiations can be pursued to obtain win-win

solutions. What needs to be established are the factors that will pull people towards or away

from negotiations. The composition of the negotiation team as well as the assurance of

attending to the needs of all parties precipitating the conflicts will lead to effective

management of ethno-political conflicts and hence a more stable and peaceful society.

18

Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework

Dynamics influencing adoption of

consociational negotiated democracy

Marginalization concerns

Equity in distribution of socio-economic

and political resources

Familial ties at the clan level

Structure of Consociational Negotiated

Democracy

Principles and terms

Role of political leaders

Agenda and consensus building

Documentation of agreements

Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated

Democracy

Inclusion of all clans in county political

leadership and governance

Fairness in county government

employment opportunities

Equity in distribution of development

projects across sub-counties

Successfully resolved political disputes

Independent Variables Dependent Variable

Legal framework i.e. Article 174 (d)

(e) (g) of the CoK

Cultural decision-making dictates

Clan demographics

Reduction in Ethno-Political Conflicts

Cohesion among different clans in

the county

Decline in politically motivated

inter-clan violence

Voluntary surrendering of

defence/offence weapons

Settlement of people in places

previously considered hostile

Intervening Variables

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1.11 Operational Definition of Terms

Active Political Leaders: these are political leaders who are either holding an elective post

or vied but lost in the 2013 and or 2017 election cycles for the positions at the constituency

and county levels.

Clan: A unit of differentiation within an ethnic group that is composed of members that

have close family ties or lineage.

Consociation: an association of communities divided along ethnic, racial, sectorial or even

religious lines, coming together with an objective of amicably resolving their differences

to promote peaceful and progressive coexistence between/among them.

Democracy: a populist process of engaging all eligible people within a political unit either

directly or indirectly in making decisions that affect them.

Elder: A senior citizen within a community who is respected and his/her counsel is sought

in the management of issues of concern to the community. He/she has a privileged position

and is an opinion leader in the community owing to their familiarity with the community’s

dynamics, interests and history.

Ethnicity: A concept that characterizes the fact of one belonging to a particular group of

people that share certain common traditions.

Ethno-political conflicts: disagreements rooted in political matters that are informed by

the ethnic extraction of the contesting parties.

Head of household: An adult, male or female, who is in charge of a family. He or she

provides for the family and makes key decisions; they can authoritatively speak for their

respective household.

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Management: means handling issues in a manner that obtains the best outcomes for all

involved actors. In this study, this concept has been used to mean a reduction in ethno-

political conflicts arising from consociational negotiated democracy processes.

Member of Parliament: This is an elected representative who represents an electoral unit,

either in the National Assembly and the Senate.

Negotiated democracy: a process of decision making that involves a few eminent persons

acting on behalf of the larger community deliberating on and recommending candidates to

the electorate for election in the actual elections as well as coming up with agreements on

the sharing of resources equitably in the polity.

Negotiations: structured discussions and/or deliberation between two parties over an issue

of mutual interest to them. The aim is to reach at an agreement acceptable to both of them.

Resources: these are valued things that are either of social, economic, political or

economic nature.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to analyse and synthesize literature on the nexus between

consociational negotiated democracy and the management of politically motivated inter-

ethnic conflicts. The first part of the section focussed on the theories grounding the study

followed by an exposition of some of the extant debates in the area of consociational

negotiated democracy as it relates to political conflicts management so as to contextualize

the study. These debates were explored within the context of the key variables that form

the crux of the study. The second part of the review of literature focussed on empirical

studies aligned with the specific objectives that anchored the study.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Conflict between ethnic groups, caused by different factors, remain a reality and a problem

facing most communities and societies across the world. Landis (2017) notes that a number

of theories have been developed over the years to help in explaining and predicting the

phenomenon and to outline ways to reduce conflicts. This study used a triangulation

approach in developing a theoretical framework that adequately addressed the study

objectives. One of these anchor theories is Stuart Kaufman’s International Theory of Inter-

Ethnic War.

2.2.1 International Theory of Inter-Ethnic War

The international theory of inter-ethnic war was developed by Kaufman (1996), building

on the salience of ethnicity in conflicts, particularly in divided societies as advanced by

scholars such as Horowitz (1985). Kaufman argues in this theory that the political class

22

and political elites manipulate the existing fears and enmities, real or perceived, among

people to their advantage in order to advance their political interests and achieve their

desired political goals and objectives. These personal goals and objectives are camouflaged

as the communal goals and members of ethnic groups are mobilized to understand, adopt

and stand in solidarity with the emergent ‘ethnic community position’ because their

survival depends on having ‘their own person’ in that particular political office the

influential politician is seeking (Cheeseman, 2015).

In the process, ethnic passions are fanned to potential or actual violence if one or more

ethnic group perceives that their existence and interests are threatened by the other. The

emotional rallying call that ‘our group is in danger without our son or daughter in power’

creeps in and grows stronger with time if not kept in check. Ethnic appeals coupled with

political opportunism may eventually evoke vertical escalation of conflict culminating in

the use of violence as a way of handling that conflict. Kaufman (1996) argues that the

dynamics of mass hostility, xenophobic political mobilization and a security dilemma

further drive political contestation to the realm of ‘we must be in power by all means’. It

is important to point out here that the security dilemma that Kaufman alludes to is the

product of an ingrained understanding that only one ‘group’ in such settings can hold power

and consequently direct the sharing of resources, an eventuality that can undermine the

existential chances of the excluded groups.

However, the challenge with the international theory of inter-ethnic war is its general

presumption that individuals within groups are passive political actors who cannot decipher

23

and deconstruct private endeavours advanced as communal. It argues as though elite

political actors have the support of their respective constituents under lock and key and

whatever they present to ‘their people’ is taken hook, line and sinker without internal

opposition. Moreover, the theory presents ethnicity as though it is always a bad thing yet

the concept in itself is neither good nor bad. It fails to account for the fact that ethnic groups

do cooperate in various societal matters for a peaceful co-existence – including cross

cultural marriages. The theory also fails to account for the consequences of the security

dilemma, especially when groups balance threats against each other. This study advances

that in situations of security dilemma, negotiations tend to be a viable exit route.

In spite of the above explanatory shortfalls, this study considers Kaufman’s theory relevant

in explaining the political conflicts experienced among clans and sub-clans residing in

Mandera County. Clan-based conflicts in Mandera County are characterized by the three

dynamics identified in the theory namely mass hostility, chauvinist political mobilization

and a security dilemma. The political class and their key supporters in the county have the

tendency of exploiting members of their clans and sub-clans and fanning violence among

the different groups in order to achieve their respective private goals camouflaged as the

clan’s social, economic and political interests.

Whereas this theory makes a profound effort in explaining the ethnic dynamics that may

generate certain outcomes, it does not anchor the idea of democratization considered

central in the study. It is for this reason that the study opted for a second theory, namely

the pluralist theory of democracy. The choice of this theory was to complement Kaufman’s

24

theory of inter-ethnic war and explicitly address the subject of democracy, linking it more

directly to the phenomenon of ethnicity.

2.2.2 The Pluralist Theory of Democracy

This theory has grown from the Marxist and elitist schools of thought. The proponents of

this theory build on the concept of liberal democracy pioneered by John Locke and other

early thinkers. The concept of pluralism within the political realm aids in the examination

of the multiplicity of actors and their interests in the acquisition and exercise of power as

well as decision making. In a typical political setup the state is responsible for governance

and decision making. However, non-state actors use their resources to influence decision

making by those vested with such responsibility under the law.

The pluralist theory of democracy was developed in the 1950s and early 1960s and its

proponents include Robert Dahl and Smith who posited that people with common interests

form organized groups to promote their causes and influence the political agenda. It is

important to emphasize here that the groups that individuals join are those that deal with

the issues that they care about. The theory further argues that no single group, industry, or

government agency is politically dominant over the others and hence bargaining and

compromising between different groups representing different interests is often the norm

rather than the exception. Further, the theory asserts that due to non-dominance of any

group over others, a healthy competition exists in the development of the policy agenda

and in the selection of the policy makers (Burtenshaw, 1968). Though competition may

come across as destructive, it is moderated by deliberations to create consensus and build

understanding in the interest of justice and equity. Longley and Kiberd (2001) in their

25

contribution to the theory espouse pluralism as being underpinned by the need for inclusion

of all parties that make up the whole. They persuasively argue that pluralism can be likened

to a system comprising of component parts, each performing a complementary role to the

other for the harmonious performance of the whole.

However, despite these strong persuasive arguments advanced by the pluralism

proponents, this theory suffers from the contestable argument that no group in society can

dominate the political landscape without giving delimitations. On the contrary, it is

possible to find an out rightly dominant ethnic group at the sub-national political units

which can control who gets to ascend to power especially if the group acts as a single unit

in political decision making, including elections. Gerrymandering in the drawing of

political boundaries has been reported in plural societies (Hayes & McKee, 2012). In

addition, the instrumentalist use of ethnicity can also lead to the creation of majorities in

particular polities where micro issues exist yet whatever is pursued is at the macro level.

Moreover, the theory’s assertion on the need for deliberations to moderate competition

undermines a key cog of democratic practice – competition of ideologies and consequently

the numbers which make up the concept of majority. The justification for consensus and

inclusivity, though plausible weakens when the tenets of democracy are critically analyzed.

Finally, the assumption by the proponents that commonality of interests and the need to

promote them motivate individuals and small groups to come together is unconvincing.

Sometimes groups can be forced by circumstances to bandwagon with others by reasons

other than commonality of interests.

26

The above shortcomings notwithstanding, the pluralism theory was particularly relevant in

this study in explaining the move towards consociational negotiated democracy. As

brought out in the characterization of the concept of negotiated democracy, one of the key

objectives of negotiated democracy is to create a level playing field to warrant equality and

equity in the sharing of social, economic and political resources among members of

different groups while ensuring that no group has more than its fair share. This study

advances the view that consociational negotiated democracy provides a platform for unity

of the different ethnic groups to bargain and compromise so that divergent views are

represented in the eventual political space and public policy.

Thus, the study argues that the international theory of inter-ethnic war was helpful in

addressing objectives one and three while the pluralist theory was used to enucleate

objectives one and two. On the whole, the theories helped to put the study questions into

perspective by anchoring the concepts of ethno-political conflicts, and consociational

negotiated democracy and its attendant political processes within a framework of an

ethnically conscious society.

2.3 Theoretical Review of Democracy

The field of political science within which the concept of consociational negotiated

democracy and the practice of ethnic-based politics are situated is very rich in terms of

robust debates informed by the dynamics of the human society over time. The roots of

democracy are traced to the city state of Athens in ancient Greece in which originally, only

privileged male members of the society played a direct role in the governance of their state

27

(Ober, 2003). This implies that women, slaves and foreigners had no role to play as far as

democracy and governance were concerned in this otherwise patriarchal society.

Democracy is essentially pragmatic in the sense that it allows room for change, acceptance

or even discarding of things or approaches that no longer work. Thus, democracy is

conceived by man for man and should at all time work for man. Scholars of comparative

politics such as Huntington, Dahl, Sartori, Lijphart among others in their various writings

concur that there are two broad categories of democracy: direct and indirect democracy. In

direct democracy, citizens participate in the actual decision making process while in

indirect democracy, citizens elect representatives to whom they delegate their sovereign

power to make decisions on their behalf. Over time, variants of democracy have been

established within these two broad categorizations to meet the peculiar and context specific

needs of people across the globe (Lijphart, 2012). The choice of democracy adopted

depends on an array of dynamics such as demographic composition and trends within a

polity, the attendant level of political consciousness and resource availability.

At the heart of democracy lies the idea of elections. In other words, the sovereign will of

any democratic political unit lies with the people and they exercise it through elections.

Typically, elections present a case for the establishment of a social contract as advanced

by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacque Rousseau; a contract which is limited by

time and against which the electorate evaluate the performance of their representatives

before deciding to renew it or terminate it. Aristotle (1948[322 BC]) further argued that

the sovereign will of the people can never be overlooked in a truly democratic society.

28

Central to Aristotle’s conception of democracy is the expression of the people’s will by

way of voting. The veracity of this argument is grounded on the reality that competition

breaths life to the concept of democracy.

Competitive politics are characterized by conflicts without which democracy loses its

raison d’etre (Vasilev, 2015). The concept of conflict that Vasilev alludes to in his

argument is not necessarily underpinned by violence but rather an expression of

disagreements between the contending parties. The very nature of competitive politics in a

typical laissez faire democracy is such that winners and losers are generated at the end of

the process and hence conflicts will always be there at any point or throughout the electoral

process.

However, even though voting is crucial in a democracy, its utility and practicality in

making decisions on every other issue in the modern world is doubtful – the expenses

involved, be they in terms of time, labour or finances are enormous. This study concurs

with Lijphart (2012) that the focus of democracy is people’s participation in their own

governance. The research however adds that the freedom of choice should be exercised in

a manner consistent with the realities in society and the intent to meet the needs of the

societal membership.

2.3.1 Consociational Negotiated Democracy

Freedom of choice within democratic systems sometimes tends to create disagreements

which if not properly attended to may spiral to violence. As noted earlier, democracies are

fraught with conflicts. These conflicts revolve around real or perceived injustice in

29

representation, resource sharing among others. The question however is whether there can

be the kind of resources where everyone gets what they desire. The study takes the view

that it is impossible because resources are finite and human nature inclines most people

towards individualism and primitive accumulation. Thus, conflicts become inevitable as

men seek a share of the pie. The existence of conflict begets the need for actors to engage

each other in an exercise of justifying and explaining their respective actions and this spurs

the possibility of a negotiation (Mwagiru, 2008).

Negotiations are a pacific approach to the management, resolution or transformation of

conflicts. The deliberations that ensue in negotiations are geared towards validating and

legitimizing the needs or interests of the contending parties in a conflict. The legitimacy of

an agreement obtained by way of negotiations is heavily dependent on the consent of the

parties bound by it. Vasilev (2015) posits that negotiations build consensus which in turn

enhances social learning, the very key component in the management of conflicts. Social

learning was theorized by Bandura (1977) who argued that people learn from each other in

various ways among them observation, which is also known as vicarious learning or

modelling – variously referred to as enactive learning. Social learning is however

influenced by an individual’s personal or environmental factors.

Lafont (2015) argues that for meaningful consensus to be build, all people that are to be

affected by a given decision must be included and meaningfully participate in the process

which generates the decision. The importance of an all-inclusive deliberation process in

decision making is further stressed by Schafer (2017) who persuasively argues that the

30

process of negotiations transforms minds and positions and if people do not participate in

making a particular decision which affects them, they have no reason to accept the

outcome. In essence, Shafer appears to suggest, and rightly so, that non-inclusive processes

renders the decisions thereof illegitimate and hence their implementation difficult. The

conflict thus becomes protracted.

Modern human societies are characterized by complex demographic dynamics. In this

regard, there are political units that have homogenous populations while others have

heterogeneous populations of varying numerical strengths. Demographics are an important

consideration in the political architecture of an electoral unit because the pursuit of power

is about marshalling support from people and allocation of resources. Heterogeneous

populations are quite complex and so is the politics in such spaces. Against this

background, it is important for communities with heterogeneous populations to develop

and or adopt political systems and practices that best suit their unique demographics.

Scholars such as Lijphart, (2012), Bohman (2012) and Mansbridge (1999) argue for a

negotiated democracy that is consultative and all-inclusive in complex social settings. A

contextual analysis of the complexity the trio contemplated points towards the presence of

diverse communities and interest groups in a polity, each with its own needs and interests

as well as legitimate claims to the pursuit of power. Lijphart (2012) recommends a

consociational negotiated model of democracy to accommodate the diversity of actors,

arguing that such an arrangement avert the emergence of spoilers who can destabilize the

community through conflicts.

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Consociational negotiated democracy has been a fertile field of inquiry and debate for

modern political theorists. This type of democracy has been advanced by its proponents as

suitable in divided societies – those societies that are characterized by a multiplicity of

identities, each keen on advancing its interests within a setting of competitive politics.

According to Horowitz (1993), a typical majoritarian system is not a viable solution in

political zones whose societies are highly fragmented into ethnic-identities “because it

permits domination of some groups in perpetuity” and this creates a fertile ground for

conflicts to thrive. His argument appears to endorse a consultative and all-inclusive

approach without overtly stating so, as a measure towards mitigating and resolving political

conflicts that are inevitable in political processes.

Fishkin (2009) in making a case for negotiated democracy in plural societies holds the view

that it “explicitly affirms political equality”, presumably among actors, their demographic

strength notwithstanding. This study however is of the view that political equality as

advanced by Fishkin without contextualizing it could be misleading because the reality

remains that politics is a game of numbers and proportionality rather than equality is the

norm. The research further argues that to the extent that the negotiations yield a workable

solution that meets the needs of all actors and interest groups in a proportionate manner,

then the outcome will be legitimate in the eyes of those affected.

Consensus-based democracy according to Lijphart (2012) is ‘kinder and gentler’ compared

to the more direct competitive and majoritarian democracy that does not take into account

internal dynamics in heterogeneous societies. Majoritarian approaches are adversarial in

32

practice and they tend to exclude sections of the population in a society and this has the

potential to pose governance difficulties even when the mandate to govern was given by

the majority of the groups in the polity in question. Lijphart suggests in this postulation

that deliberations in plural societies should yield consensus, a position corroborated by

Mansbridge (1999) who further notes that the deliberations should clarify the conflict

necessitating the deliberations in the first place. Mansbridge’s proposition presents

negotiations as platforms of getting to the root of conflicts so as to address them in the most

effective way that leaves the society stronger.

This study notes that without addressing the root causes of a conflict, the actors in a conflict

situation will only be handling the symptoms that may recur shortly after a solution is

found. It is however noteworthy that deliberations may not always yield consensus

especially when the multiplicity of interests advanced by parties are incongruent and there

is unwillingness to compromise and collaborate in finding a solution that is acceptable by

all.

According to Yankelovich (1999 [cited in He, 2013]), dialogue which happens in the form

of negotiations presents the best alternative in the transformation of conflict into

cooperation. Dialogue seeks to legitimize each of the parties’ needs and interests as a

starting point to finding a progressive and sustainable solution to the dispute at hand. The

centrality of dialogue in the drive towards successful political processes is further

emphasized by O’Flynn (2006) who stresses the norms of reciprocity and publicity.

According to O’Flynn, reciprocity appeals to reason that all parties can identify with, thus

33

paving the way for mutual respect while publicity centres on open and transparent

negotiation processes that focus on needs rather than positions. The concept of reciprocity

builds on the argument of the importance of legitimization of needs. Essentially, parties

involved in negotiations should identify with the needs of each other and regard them as

important and worth being met.

The location of deliberations aimed at solving the differences underlying a conflict is also

important. Whereas O’Flynn is in favour of elite and local levels of deliberations, Fishkin

(2009) roots for the grassroot as the ideal place for deliberations. O’Flynn’s proposal for

the two levels of deliberations is informed by the understanding that the elite members of

society have the capacity and influence over their grassroot supporters and can easily sway

them as long as their private interests are camouflaged and presented as those of the

community. Fishkin on his part holds the view that deliberations at the grassroots help build

tolerance and trust among the masses while eliminating stereotypes and minimizing

polarization. The idea of a grassroot driven processes is further advocated for by Lederach

(1997) who contends that a successful dialogue in handling micro issues has the potential

of escalating the same to the macro level especially when the problem is symptomatic of

the larger societal structures. Thus, civil participation in decision making regarding matters

that affect the masses is important in the drive towards a sustainable outcome.

In making a case for consociational democracy, Lijphart (1968; 2012) maintains its utility

in polities where no social-cultural group has the numbers to make a commanding majority

that can out rightly win and appropriate political power in the political unit they are

34

domiciled. He argues that any of the constituent groups despite not making a majority can

destabilize the political system if they are excluded. The motivation for cooperation from

the elites in each constituent social-segment arises from rational incentives such as the

assurance of representation in decision making and the attendant benefits of resource

distribution and or accumulation. The assumption Lijphart appears to make here is that

elites have the political will to cooperate and that they drag along with them their respective

constituents. In essence, he roots for a grand coalition outfit, grounded on the principles of

proportionality in political representation, segmental autonomy on matters exclusive to a

segment and veto power over collective decisions that may be injurious to the interests of

a cooperating segment’s interests.

The argument made for coalition governments is that such outfits bring together various

segments into the government, who are represented in a proportional manner and thus

important actors are not excluded and there is no motivation for them to destabilize the

system. The leaders forming the coalition are assumed to be reasonable moderates, with a

predisposition to compromise and committed to unity and stability of the system. Horowitz

(2002) however differs with this preference for moderates, arguing that coalitions should

incorporate people with extreme views so that they can contribute to transforming the

coalitions. It would appear here that Lijphart is pro stability maintained by the status quo

while Horowitz sees transformation as suitable rather than status quo. Though he does not

give his reasons for the transformation, this study is persuaded by his transformation

orientation, noting that transformation acknowledges the organic nature of society and the

need for systems to evolve with it. The research further argues that the moderates in the

35

spirit of reciprocity can influence the extremists to changing their behaviour, and thus

overall, suggests a mix of moderates and those with extreme views.

A critical analysis of consociational model’s proportionality principle does however not

rule out oppression of the minority groups even when included in the power frame.

Dominant members have the power to take decisions that affects everybody irrespective of

the minorities’ opposition to such decisions. In essence, the winner-takes-all that Lijphart

argues his model seeks to cure is not necessarily addressed. Even though he argues that the

cooperating groups create multiple balances of power within the coalition that can cure

dominance as alluded to earlier, there is no evidence to that effect. This study argues that

the possibility of coalitions and or factions within a coalition cannot be ignored and even

so the size of the largest segment remains a key determinant.

Moreover, leadership may fail to exercise compromise which is an important aspect of

consociationalism. Realpolitik is categorical that politicians seek to outbid each other

rather than cooperate. The prominent role given to leadership by Lijphart further renders

the model elitist rather than a people driven process. This is problematic because followers

are not necessarily a passive lot ready to take instructions from their influential political

masters.

Finally, consociationalism which is based on power sharing is not sufficiently democratic

and this renders its practical value doubtful. The focus on leadership of segments implies

the absence of compelling incentives for moderate behaviour (Elissi, 2004). Society

36

sometimes has a critical mass of moderates which if unattended to can create splinter

groups and this has the effect of further destabilizing it, an exact opposite of what

consociationalism promises to deliver. Segmental autonomy can also be used by moderates

to drive a secessionist agenda rather than a uniting one, thus exacerbating the conflicts the

model seeks to find a solution to. Thus, one is persuaded to agree with Dixon (2011) that

consociationalism is essentially elitist, primordial, segregationist and essentialist. Further,

the argument by consociational theorists that ethnic identities will lose their salience

following the formation of a grand coalition government is inconclusive and perhaps

misleading as it offers no insights on how reconciliation will be facilitated, the worth of

institutionalizing identity or the structures that ameliorate interethnic tensions.

2.3.2 Ethno-Political Conflict Management

According to Larfella (1988), society is in a continuous process of evolution and conflict

is one of the drivers of that process. Given that conflict is typically a product of

categorization, that fact of differentiation is enough to break or stabilize society depending

on how the conflict is dealt with. Conflict thus offers new perspectives to issues and

necessitates creative solutions that advance society, leaving it stable in the short term to

the medium term. There are many typologies of conflict that can be broadly categorized

into social, economic, political or a combination of either two of these. This study restricted

itself to ethno-political conflicts. The study uses the phrase ‘ethno-political conflicts’ to

mean those conflicts that are of political nature and are anchored on social identity

differences. Instructively, everyone has an identity for the simple reason that they are part

of a community (Ake, 1993).

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In many African countries, ethnic identity is best presented as a construct – something that

can be created, meaning that it can equally be killed once its purpose is achieved. The

Abaluhyia and Kalenjin identity groups in Kenya for instance have subgroups within them

whose cultures and languages though similar on face value, are quite different yet for

political relevance, these groups prefer coming together to enhance their voice and stakes

(Blundell, 1994). This is the instrumental use of ethnicity – that is, ethnicity being used as

an instrument to achieve or pursue a given end. Based on this understanding, this study

argues that the concept of an ethnic group is very malleable and it’s fed and given salience

by the group(s) interests. Aseka (2007) makes a compelling argument that an identity is

created by a people through the socio-cultural, economic and political processes that they

are part of. Thus, it would be logical to argue that ethnic communities provide a strong

base upon which its constituent members build social capital in the form of social networks.

Ethnic identity remains one of the key distinguishing features of political competition in

plural societies across the world and more so in Africa. Cheeseman (2015) and Kanyinga

(2014) are for instance in agreement that political processes in Kenya are characterized by

ethnic mobilization and violence. Instructively, violence in political processes has been

cascaded from the national level to the sub-national level of political contestation. This has

led to the adoption of different approaches to the practice of democracy, responsive to the

unique needs of ethnically plural societies and as a pathway to averting or managing

conflicts emerging from political processes. One of these approaches is consociational

negotiated democracy which has been explored in section 2.3.1.

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The concept of conflict management has been described in great details by various scholars

among them Thakore (2013), Fisher (2010), Harris and Reilly (1998) and Burton (1987).

These scholars have variously described conflict management as a process aiming at

conflict prevention or the reduction of its intensity. Harris and Reilly (1998:18) describe

conflict management as the “positive and constructive handling of difference and

divergence.” They emphasize that conflict management sets the stage for the eventual

resolution and transformation of the structures that provide an enabling environment for

conflict to thrive.

Identity-based conflicts which are waged on the basis of social factors tend to be intractable

mainly due to the social and group attachments that disputants may have over whatever is

at the heart of a dispute. The pursuit of political power that is grounded on ethnic identity

is brutal because oftentimes the competition tends to be fashioned as an existential issue in

such plural settings. Many countries of the world have experienced politically motivated

identity conflicts (henceforth ethno-political conflicts) that have devastated them and some

of which had to develop creative systems of sharing power in order to contain the conflicts

and attain stability.

In most divided societies, ethnic groups tend to owe their allegiance to the group rather

than the state. Binningsbo (2006) argues that cooperation between ethnic groups in a polity

is low due to trust issues. Moreover, some elements of identity such as religion are fixed

and thus not subject to compromise. Thus, identity based conflicts must be analysed

contextually because there can never be a solution that is applicable to all societies as Dixon

39

(2018) notes. In managing such types of conflicts, the choice of a management approach

needs to be informed by the understanding that the particular style affects the structure of

the conflict and the goal of containing the destructive component of the conflict must

triumph.

From the foregoing discussion, scholars that root for collaborative negotiated processes,

including democratic processes argue that deliberations create opportunities for social

transformation. The dialogue process helps frame political conflicts as between collectives

rather than individuals and this facilitates the agenda for equity. The solutions generated

from negotiated processes are not only legitimate but they also enjoy the support that makes

their implementation easier. However, like every other political process, consociational

negotiated democracy is not necessarily supported by every member of the polity; actors

within and without the political sphere are actively contesting outcomes. Thus, continuous

review and adjustments to accommodate emergent concerns is the norm rather than the

exception.

2.4 Empirical Review

This section is devoted wholly to examining, analyzing and synthesizing empirical

literature on the independent and dependent variables under study. The highlight of this

section is the gaps in the existing literature which this study sought to fill and by so doing

contribute to knowledge in the areas of research.

2.4.1 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

Observations and research findings by scholars and policy makers alike indicate that the

politics of identity is influenced and shaped a by a number of drivers, some of which are

40

generic while others are unique and exclusive to different political contexts. Generally,

these factors can be categorized into three broad bases namely social factors, political

factors and economic factors.

In a study conducted by Ngoy-Kangoy (2007) which focused on the 1960 and 2006

legislative and presidential elections in Democratic Republic Congo (DRC), it was

established that formation of political parties and alliances in the country were to

considerable degrees defined by linguistic, economic and regional factors. The study

further determined that voting patterns of the major ethnic groups in the DRC namely Ba-

Likolo (people from the upper side), Bato ya se (people from the lower side), and the

Bateke-Bahumbu, went beyond mere ethnic identities and were influenced by the other

factors such as land ownership, as was with the case of the Bateke-Bahumbu, who were

the first holders of land certificates over most of the Leopoldville area.

The case of DRC further reveals the reasoning behind the social identity theory whose

fulcrum is the ‘othering’ mentality i.e. as long as they do not speak our language and share

in our culture they can turn against us. Internal cohesion and unity of purpose among

speakers of same language and practitioners of same culture is thus a solid ground for

forming groups to pursue and protect common interests. Thus, ethnic identities are not

mere facts of categorizations but rather strong pedestals around which the interests of a

group are built and articulated. When members of the group buy into an ‘us-versus-them

dichotomy’, violence becomes a justifiable pathway in the pursuit of the group’s interests.

The study further demonstrated that DRC continues to rely on ethnic identities as the key

41

mobilizing element and the main reasoning is to enhance a group’s bargaining power in

the sharing of resources. The shortcoming with Ngoy Kangoy’s study, however, is that

ethnicity is considered at the group level and internal dynamics and differences among

subgroups forming the larger group do not find any expression in his work. This is a glaring

omission that ethnic based studies should seek to fill, without assuming subgroups are in

harmonious relations under the umbrella of the bigger instrumental identity.

Socio-political movements also form the basis upon which racism and the ethnic identity

become salient rallying call in the fight against any perceived discrimination or unfairness.

For instance, during the struggle against racism and black discrimination in the US and in

the fight for democracy in India, both occasions notably led by among others Martin Luther

King Jnr., and Mohandas Gandhi respectively, social and civil rights movements played

critical roles during struggles for political liberations and fight against social, political and

economic injustices. It must however be acknowledged and appreciated that the civil and

social movements such as those led Martin Luther King Jnr., Gandhi, Wangari Maathai,

and Desmond Tutu do not simply form by the mere fact that a section of population feel

oppressed.

The formation of socio-political movements, according to Van Dyke and Amos (2017) are

motivated and driven by certain shared beliefs and interests among the populace who

support them. A review of Van Dyke and Amos’ study on drivers of social movement

coalition formation, longevity, and success identifies social ties, ideology, culture, identity,

and resources as among the critical factors that influenced formation of social and

42

politically motivated movements. Social ties included considerations of a common descent,

physical appearance among others. Van Dyke and Amos further noted in their study that

family ties also saw groups coalescing in seeking a political change on their plight. The

study argues that identity can be by circumstance, choice or coercion and it is essentially

socially constructed as argued by White (2010).

In South Africa, a study by Seo (2008) showed that a number of internal and external

factors played significant roles in negotiations for democracy and eventual deterioration of

the white minority rule, which marked the beginning of the end of apartheid and the

discrimination of the blacks. Analysis of the dynamics of the transition to democracy in

South Africa from the white minority to the majority native blacks determined that the

main categories of domains that guided the process were structural factors such as culture,

economic development, class structures, increased education, and the international

environment and behavioural variables such as major political actors, elite factions and

organisations from civil society. The presence of elite factions created problems in the

negotiations yet they could not be ignored without compromising the success of

implementation of ensuing agreements. This view serves to buttress Lijphart’s (2012)

argument that the elite have a key role to play in negotiations due to the immense influence

they wield among their constituents.

In a study conducted in Ghana on the nexus between elections and conflict management,

Ayezaluno (2011) argues that elections in Ghana’s majoritarian system are a zero-sum

game in which elites use all means at their disposal to win. Although in the last decade

43

Ghana has been presented as the poster child of democracy in Africa, the country has and

continues to battle inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic political conflicts (Tonah, 2007). As is the

case with many African countries, Ghana’s political processes are grounded in identity

differences, irrespective of whether the identity is primordial or instrumental. Identity

differences in Ghana take different forms such as Northerners versus Southerners, Ewes

versus the Akan, among others. Given the destabilizing effect of exclusion, politicians have

been forced by these ethnicity dynamics among others to form alliances and coalitions for

winning power and sharing the spoils that come with political power. Ayezaluno stresses

the fact that toxic patron-client networks are very much in place in the case of Ghana as

elsewhere, noting the dearth of rational voters. The study does not however explore the

effectiveness of the power sharing arrangements in the study area as it relates to conflict

management between the contesting groups, an issue that forms a key cog of the current

study.

Building on the findings of another study conducted by Nukunya (2003) which focused on

the salience of kinship in political processes, Ayezaluno argues that such social units are

the basis for social life. Though the study convincingly argues that some primordial groups

prioritize their sub-national citizenship or loyalty over the national one, it does not link the

effect of this phenomenon on peace and stability in those areas.

Kadima and Owuor (2014) in their study of Kenya’s decade of experiments with political

party alliances and coalitions focused on the numerous political alliances that have been

formed in Kenya since the post-colonial era and the motivations thereof. Indeed, Kenya’s

44

political history is punctuated with a number of political alliances which were formed to

drive different agenda. In Kenya’s recent political history, some of the notable coalitions

include National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) that memorably defeated and dethroned

KANU after almost 40 years in power and the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy

(CORD) among others. The study by Kadima and Owuor found that sharing of national

resources has been one of the main motivations behind the formation of political alliances

and coalitions in the country. Further, these researchers observe that formation of such

coalitions and alliances both at the national and local levels are also driven by the need to

enhance ethnic cohesion and integration among different ethnic communities that make up

the Kenyan fabric. The study, however, does not address the subject of whether the power

sharing has been inclusive and effective in attaining the intended goals. These are some of

the gaps this study sought to address.

Negotiations are designed with the aim of benefiting conflicting parties but sometimes, due

to challenges, which are inevitable in any process, reaching conclusion may prove little.

As Musson (2013) rightly adduces, in any given diverse society, regardless of the issues

under discussion or consideration, there will naturally be a strong divergence of views and

opinions necessitated by divergent vested interests of the actors. Movement in one direction

is highly likely to be countered by an equally strong movement in a reverse direction.

Subsequently, in order to have effective negotiation, parties to the negotiation process must

begin by identifying key challenges that are likely to derail the process. History has time

and again proven that implementation and the practice of democracy is full of challenges,

problems and detractors. In reference to Johan Galtung's ABC triangle of peace model,

45

Stalenoi (2014) advances that the context in which negotiation processes are taking place

is one of the main sources of challenges. Context may be characterized by the environment

setting, the prevailing ideas, and political temperature among other factors (Arslan, 2016).

Culture and poverty are contextual factors that present major challenges to democratic

processes and systems such as the formation of interethnic political alliances. Facets of

culture include language, religion, values, beliefs, morals, law, and aesthetics (Yadav &

Shankar, 2016). Results of a study carried out in three Sahel countries namely Mali, Niger

and Senegal, countries whose populace are largely Muslim, indicated that cultural

differences, specifically religion, among the actor populations is a barrier that significantly

derail negotiation processes during formation of ethno-political alliances. The assumption

among such scholars like Huntington, is the notion that Islam is a religion that is ‘not

hospitable to democracy’, is as a result of fundamental incompatibility between core tenets

of Islam and the principles of democracy. Other scholars, often from the Muslim world,

however hold the view that some tenets of and texts within Islam might be interpreted as

compatible with democracy (Villalón, 2010). These contrasting views therefore necessitate

questions and concerns on ways in which religious structures and institutions as well as

religious ideas and symbols, as facets of culture, affect how the democratic question is

framed, discussed and shaped in any given context.

In addition to cultural factors such as religion, Villalón (2010) posits that striking material

deprivation presents a challenge to negotiation processes aimed at formation of interethnic

political alliances. This can be considered from the perspective of scramble for the very

46

limited available material resources. Highly inadequate levels of resources make it difficult

for the parties to the negotiation process to easily reach a consensus on how the little

available resource is to be shared equitably. More often than not, disagreements will arise

which eventually have the potential to stall the entire process or even roll back the gains

and steps that have been made in the negotiation process. Other barriers according to the

same author that were established during the study in the three Sahel countries include

heavy dependence on postcolonial economic legacies, and ethnic and linguistic pluralism.

2.4.2 Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

To understand the structure of consociational negotiated democracy and democratic

regimes, there is need to comprehend the social and political bases of such regimes and the

fundamental structure of relations within which they operate. Of concern then is how

consociational negotiated democracy is framed, pursued, and modified to fit in the multi-

ethnic societies and the prevailing political contexts. From the discussions stage to the

partnership phase, the process of democratization involves both democratic installation and

consolidation. Depending on different factors at play, the process of negotiating democracy

between or among various actors in the polity in question, in some parts of Africa and

indeed across the world can be long, intensive and tedious or relatively short and quick

(Kadima & Owuor, 2014). However, more often than not, the process is likely to be long

because of the various contentious issues that need to be discussed and negotiated upon

while not losing the focus of the ultimate goal.

The path followed through the process has significant influence on the outcomes of the

negotiated democracy. Policy needs and concerns should be the first items on the agenda

47

and must be prioritized from the very onset of the structure and process of negotiating

democracy. To enhance the effectiveness of the structure, process and outcomes of

intergroup negotiations and conflict resolution efforts, Russell, Ong, Ty and Anderson

(2006), explain that it is critical that actors develop and agree on ground rules, which

basically define the structure, which the negotiation processes will be anchored on. Ideally,

ground rules should be among the first items that the parties to a negotiation process should

establish before the actual negotiation process commences. Setting grounds rules at the

earliest stages of the negotiation process is essential in expediting and facilitating the

negotiation process. The ground rules should be drawn and agreed upon to ensure that they

never become a hindrance or cause for delay to the process of negotiating democracy.

The findings of a study conducted by Barja, Villarroel and Zavaleta (2013) on Bolivia

highlighted the significance of well-grounded policies and ground rules at the initial stages

of negotiations leading up to a democratic process. Noting that the political scene in Bolivia

prior to the transition towards democracy was characterized by political and economic

instability and turmoil, the researchers focused on the discussions around Bolivia’s

institutional design with an aim of establishing how the policies and institutional designs

affected the development and process of democracy and the consequences these designs

and policies had on the country’s democracy. The findings of the study showed that

Bolivia, a plural and fragmented society, democratically suffered from its previous, poorly

crafted institutional design that had not been the product of thorough discussions. The study

does not however address the subject of negotiation structure at the subnational level,

including who participates and the manner of making decisions.

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In a related study that explored the negotiations leading to the coalition government

following the 2007 disputed presidential elections in Kenya, Mwagiru (2008) points out

the significant role played by the establishment of ground rules. The focus of such rules,

the study avers, was to spell out how the negotiations would proceed including

communication to the public. The actual or perceived relative bargaining position of each

actor in the negotiation process is an essential feature of the process. The motivation by an

actor in the consolidation of a consociational model lies in the strength of interests being

assured and the available options in attaining those interests.

Apart from ground rules, the place of the elite members of the society is of utmost

importance in negotiations due to the power of control and influence they wield over the

segments they identify with (Horowitz, 2014). Consequently, an actor’s relative position

during negotiations will also influence if one or more actors will be dominant over others,

or there will be balance in order to enhance ownership of the negotiated agreements. If one

or more of the actors’ position is perceivably or actually weak, then the actor is likely to

be easily persuaded, provided their interests are attended to. Such an occurrence will then

hasten the process of negotiation while at the same time leading to a lot of compromise in

order to accommodate such actors without making them feel as though they are trivial or

secondary actors in the negotiations. Weak actors or minorities can play a vital role in the

creation of a balance of power, one of the conditions within a consociational model which

helps in stabilization of the polity (Lijphart, 1968). This is essential in forestalling re-entry

problems during the implementation phase of the negotiated agreements. Casper and

Taylor (1996) maintain that democracies resulting from intense inclusive negotiation

49

processes have a higher likelihood of succeeding and having strong consolidation while

those resulting from coercive processes are likely to be weak and will eventually fail.

A study conducted by Adetula, Murithi and Buchanan-Clarke (2018) on the failure of peace

negotiations and agreements in Africa found that good faith in negotiations is extremely

important in the pursuit of agreements that will receive wide acceptance and compliance

during implementation. They attributed non-compliance in the case of South Sudan

following the 2015 agreement to coercion in terms of sanctions threatened by the UN. The

study further noted that the multiplicity of actors, each controlling a section of an armed

force and claiming the support of a given ethnic group has seen a continuous

metamorphosis of the conflict, as all parties seek to pursue their interests within the state’s

political matrix. The study in emphasizing the significance of well-structured negotiations

argues that: “…the foundations of peace and the potential for socio-economic and political

transformation depend on vital decisions made at the negotiating table, as well as the

dynamics of the peace talks, including their traditionally gendered nature.” The study

concludes that plural societies such as South Sudan must seriously consider the question

of goodwill among negotiators in peace negotiations, noting the influence they have in

power play.

Norris, (2008), advances that community or societal elites are the mainstay to any

democratic process and the consociational democracy is no exception. The economic elites,

the political elites, and the academic elites all come into this fold to drive their interests

mostly fashioned as communal interests. Their involvement and commitment to the entire

50

negotiation process right from the onset must be ensured given the critical role they play

in shaping the society and their contributions to the societal activities. In the consociational

negotiated democracy process, Knight (1941) contends, their commitment is essential in

maintaining the systems and the negotiation course. Further, because of the almost

indispensable positions they hold in their societies, the elites have significant influence and

role to play in halting and even reversing any disintegrative leanings of the parties to the

negotiation process. Getting the elites from the different professional and career

backgrounds to share in and have converging views of the issues under discussion is

equally essential in the negotiation process (Norris, 2008).

Thus, engineering consociational democracy involves designing all-inclusive and peaceful

institutional frameworks in the divided societies, where interests are explained and

prioritization taken into account. Subsequently, successful structures that identify and

acknowledge the underlying reasons for animosity as well as their real root-causes are very

essential in effectively addressing and resolving community conflicts. Every position taken

by a member or members of a negotiating team normally has an underlying interest. As

Zuahir (2002) attests with reference to the case of Northern Ireland, effective structures are

capable of fostering peace and cementing cohesion in divided societies. Elites, key players

and documented agreements are three key aspects that constitute institutional frameworks

or structures of consociational democracies necessary for effective combat of politics of

ethnic exclusion by majoritarian models in plural and polarised societies (Carvalho, 2016).

These three facets form the basis for structural review of consociational democracy in this

study.

51

O'Flynn and Russell (2005), note that power-sharing, which is the hallmark of

consociational democracy, must be institutionalized to enable viable implementation of

agreements. Failure to address diversity in power sharing among the constituent groups in

deeply divided societies would be detrimental to stability, acceptance and performance of

democracies. In essence O’Flynn and Russell underscore the argument by scholars as noted

earlier on the significance of political leaders of different groups as key players in the

process of negotiated democracy. The consensus among the scholars is that political leaders

have considerable influence on the nature of democratic politics, for instance how political

parties choose their candidates, how the different ethnic groups or religious groups choose

their candidates and who eventually gets the opportunity to represent the members of their

communities (Zuahir, 2002).

Additionally, in consociational negotiated democracy, political leaders play critical role

with regard to election disputes and how they are resolved in case they arise. Sileikaite and

Spirova (2016), drawing from their study of political negotiations and consociationalism

in Lebanon advise that proportional representation of all groups is an essential provision in

consociational negotiated democracy and power-sharing arrangements. They caution that

disproportionate representation in the institutional negotiation structures enhances

likelihood of driving sectarian strife in the negotiation process. In their study, Sileikaite

and Spirova note that when the Ta’if Agreement was signed and the constitution was

modified, it aimed to maintain equal political representation between Christian and Muslim

religious groups which subsequently granted Shi’a population a greater participation in the

country’s political system, a privilege the group initially did not enjoy. Their study avers

52

that the effect of minority inclusion in the political matrix and consequently decision

making and access to resources has enhanced stability in Lebanon.

The structure of negotiated democracy should also rope in external players who are not

direct beneficiaries of the negotiated democracy. Horowitz (2014) argues that external

players are necessary and important for the existence of consociational negotiated

democracy regimes. These players play invaluable roles in supporting the negotiation

processes and the implementation of resultant outcomes of the negotiations in fragmented

systems caused by racial, religious, ethnic or sectorial cleavages. They act as guarantors of

the agreements arrived at following the negotiations. A concurring view is held by Kerr

(2009), who asserts that successful and effective consociationalism depends on external

players who are considered exogenous forces. Such forces could include officials of

electoral commissions, individuals and groups from legal institutions such as the judiciary

and even civil society organizations who positively coerce the negotiating groups to find

amicable and fair solution to the matters under discussion (Pildes, 2008). Citing an example

of the Belfast Agreement which was negotiated by the US and which helped obtain a

political truce between the warring factions in Northern Ireland, McGarry and O’Leary

(2006), advance that external players can facilitate consociationalism by mediating or

compassionately using incentives to the protagonists to the negotiated democracy to attain

mutual agreement and to abide by the power-sharing institutional agreements and

arrangements.

53

While comparing the structure of democracy at the national and council (comparable to

wards) in Britain, Musson (2013), asserts that democratic processes at council wards are

more intense compared to the national level because at the lower levels (councils), the

electorate is more homogenous in terms of ethnic and racial composition. Subsequently, as

one moves from the lower levels towards the national level, this homogeneity decreases

while heterogeneity increases thus enhancing the complexity of social, economic and

political issues that are under political contention. At the higher more heterogeneous level,

the likelihood that the electorate will have adequate personal knowledge of the candidates

involved decreases. Additionally, there is a diminishing probability that individual

electorate will have shared interests with those in other parts of the country. Musson’s

observation is comparable and vastly similar to what happens in most counties in Kenya

such as Mandera County where at the clan levels (comparable to Musson’s council or ward

level) electors largely share political views and have personal knowledge of the contesting

candidates. However, when the span widens to county level, the number of clans increase

and so does the number of candidates seeking political seats. Interests and views of the

individual clans become diverse and sharply contrast and powerful lobbying by political

elites from the respective ethnic clans sets in, with each clan’s political leader pulling

toward their (clan’s) side. This eventually leads to flaring tempers and even interclan

political violence if the political activities of the contesting groups are not dealt with in a

sober and more accommodative manner.

According to Elster (1995), a contradistinction between the openness of negotiated

procedures to the democratic public on one hand and their problem-solving capacity as

54

well as substantive quality on the other hand, is a major challenge that faces democratic

processes. Elster argues that limiting the negotiation process aimed at a democratic exercise

to a few elite representatives, as is the practice in consociationalism, and excluding the

wider public expedites the negotiation process towards finding amicable and objective

solutions. On the flip side, engaging the wider public and trying to get everyone’s opinion

has the potential of derailing the process and making it more subjective hence

compromising on the outcomes of the negotiation process.

In countering Elster’s assertions, Czada (2017) contends that the scholar’s standpoint

sharply contradicts the general view and notion that for democratic processes to be

effective, they should involve as many participants as possible – the idea particularly for a

consociational model being accommodating all segments to obtain peace and stability in

the polity. The view of the latter notion which this study agrees with is that failing to engage

the larger public, who are certainly major stakeholders, amounts to some sort of ‘short-

circuiting’ the democratic process and attract a lot of suspicion from the general public

who will feel short-changed irrespective of the outcomes of any negotiation process that

does not adequately involve them. The challenge, therefore, according to Elster is that, the

more segments or groups engage in the negotiation processes, the longer the process takes.

But more important is that engaging many people means that everyone will bring in their

view and try to push through their selfish interest. At the end of the day, it becomes difficult

to arrive to a consensus and a conclusion that meet everyone’s expectations. The study

however is short in exploring how consensus is arrived at or preferred, issues that form the

gaps of this study.

55

2.4.3 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the Management of

Ethno-Political Conflicts

As noted in chapter one, different versions and sub-versions of democracy have evolved

over the decades across the world, among them representative democracy, presidential

democracy, participatory democracy, Islamic democracy, and social democracy (Schmidt,

2013). It is noteworthy that each of these versions has had different levels of success.

Effectiveness of democracy in general and its variants as noted above has attracted the

interest of some scholars and researchers in the realm of political science. In a comparative

study carried out by Magalhães (2014) featuring over 100 surveys from across the world

using different models, it was determined that government effectiveness in service delivery

was low under some model specifications in non-democracies. In democracies however,

government effectiveness tended to be generally higher owing to the existence of peaceful

methods of managing disputes whenever they arose within the polity. The study further

noted that inclusion of various actors within the government structure helped in stabilizing

the operational environment, thus contributing to government effectiveness. The findings

of this study on the subject of performance of democracies is lend credence by Ringen

(2017) who argues that the general notion that autocracies deliver while democracies dither

was wrong and misplaced. In his view, democratic governments are not only fair but also

more effective in delivering on their mandate as compared to other forms of governance

because of their wide inclusion of stakeholders and the existence of accountability

mechanisms.

56

In a research study conducted by Walden University (n.d) to determine the effectiveness

of representative democracy in the United Kingdom, it was established that despite a few

shortcomings, representative democracy does operate effectively. The UK presents an

interesting case where several political entities have autonomy on matters specific to them,

but they still fall under the union. The study noted that representative democracy allows

for a wide array of segment representation and hence inclusion. The effect of such

inclusivity has been political stability which further leads to growth in other areas such as

the economy. Moreover, the researchers noted, the people who put leaders in office can get

their views and ideas heard by using avenues such as pressure groups and local leaders. As

Mansbridge (2018), observes, and rightly so, facets that make democratic negotiations

successful or otherwise have been given scant attention by political science scholars and

researchers alike. Subsequently, there is need to go the extra mile to research and find out

more about how and what make political negotiations work and under what circumstances.

In another study conducted by Zuhair (2008) in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka on their

experience with power sharing, the key plank of consociational democracy, she found that

Northern Ireland was progressing well in the post Belfast Agreement of 1998 which gave

her some level of autonomy and representation of various significant cleavages in the

executive and national assembly. The study stresses that the level of success in Northern

Ireland is attributable to proper negotiations that produced the Belfast agreement which

provided for the representation of significant cleavages in a proportional manner. These

findings seem to contradict those of an earlier study conducted by McGarry and O’Leary

(2004) who had found that consociationalism was a weak approach to the management of

57

the conflict in Northern Ireland because the agreement generating it had not factored in

external actors, the trans-state nature of the dispute and its overemphasis on a grand

coalition government. A critical review of the McGarry and O’Leary study demonstrates

that the key areas they focused on namely the place of external actors and the trans-state

nature of the dispute were not part of what a consociational formation should be about.

This study takes the view that the authors attempt at introducing issues outside of what they

were studying, that is consociationalism hence their conclusions may be inaccurate.

In a study conducted on the efficacy of consociational democracy in Lebanon by Salamey

(2009), it was established that the model was failing over time. Even though there was fair

sharing of key positions among the significant segments making up Lebanon,

disagreements continued to undermine the efficacy of the state in terms of executing its

responsibility through the government of the day. The religious elite failed to integrate the

secular groups within the system and this has been witnessed in the form of tensions and

low key conflicts in Lebanon in the period leading up to 2008 when Qatar managed to

broker a short term agreement among the segments. Regional dynamics were pointed as

contributing to the instability in Lebanon, a situation that had been thought to have been

cured by the consociational model as argued by Lijphart (2012). The study established that

the sectarian political elite had captured the state, making it impossible for the government

to deliver public goods. The study noted that the political elite had established an oligopoly

grounded in patron client networks that have proved difficult to eliminate. It argued that

the veto power vested in sects has undermined making of public decisions and this serves

to further weaken and erode interethnic harmony and integration. In essence, the study

58

holds the view that Lebanon is a failed or a failing case of the application of negotiated

democracy, specifically consociationalism.

In Ghana, the concept of negotiating democracy has been practiced in the upper Eastern

region of the country. In this region, an ethno-political conflict pitting the Kusasis and

Mamprusis has been going on for a while. The main bone of contention in this conflict has

been a claim to traditional power, popularly known as the chieftaincy. It is important to

note that the chieftaincy was the main system of governance in precolonial Ghana and in

modern times, the holder has a lot of sway on the political affairs of the region, hence the

intractable nature of the conflict. In a study conducted by Noagah (2013), it was established

that negotiation processes aimed at resolving the conflict were always infiltrated by

politicians who wanted to use the conflict to further their political goals. The study

established that they whip emotions among their ethnic constituents for them to capture

power in the name of the community and at the same time scuttle every effort of fairly

negotiating a long term solution. Thus, most of the negotiations ended up unfruitful and

reports of progress just a scheme to avert violence in the short term. The study does

however not suggest or explore exactly what role if any political players play or would

wish to play in the negotiation process, as a pre-requisite to support it.

In another research conducted in South Africa by Maharaj (2008), the study established

that the negotiations leading to independence and subsequent governance of the rainbow

nation had all the hallmarks of consociationalism. Precisely, the study noted that the

inclusion of significant cleavages within the black and white groups helped create a tolerant

59

society that nurtured South Africa to the level of being the second largest economy in

Africa after Nigeria. During the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, the country enjoyed

a lot of economic growth owing to political stability, thanks to the ability of the leaders to

weave together representative governments accommodating all segments. The

decentralized form of governance was aimed at giving each of the cleavages some degree

of autonomy in making and implementing decisions that mattered to them. The study

however falls short on examining how effective the consociational model has been in

anchoring the decentralized form of governance and especially so in addressing the drivers

of conflict that decentralization sought to cure. This omission is part of the gap that this

study sought to fill.

In Kenya, the application of a negotiated approach in the management of political disputes

has been recorded over time (Kajirwa, 2008; Owuoche & Jonyo, 2004). Due to the

ethnicization of national politics, key political parties have been established with

predefined ethnic constituencies to shore up numbers in order to win power. From the

onset, the sharing of key positions among elites representing significant ethnic segments in

the event power is obtained. The Serena Accord which paved the way for the establishment

of the coalition government provided for consultations between the leaders of the parties

and appointments reflecting the regional balance of the country.in a study conducted by

Kadima and Owuor (2014), it was established that coalitions arising out of pre-election

negotiations tend to foster cohesion especially if they are inclusive. They cited the National

Rainbow Coalition (NARC) that dislodged Kenya African National Union (KANU) from

power in 2002. Coalitions between communities that have previously bitterly contested

60

power have also led to relative peace during the lifespan of the coalition. The study

highlighted the case of the Jubilee Alliance which was crafted in 2012 and which saw

improved relations between the Kalenjin and the Agikuyu communities that had previously

contested. From the findings of this study, it is clear that coalitions tend to foster the

concept of power sharing among the partners and by so doing enhance the chance stable

environment within which a government can execute its mandate. The only challenge arises

when significant sections are excluded from governance and sharing of the benefits that

accrue from being in a coalition setting. The study however does not address the effect of

excluding other significant segments from the political power matrix, an issue of interest

to this study.

The tendency towards efficiency and effectiveness by democracies can be attributed to

obligation to deliver to their citizens, on whose behalf they hold power. Additionally,

democracies tend to be more effective because the persons entrusted with offices and

instruments of power rule by consent and goodwill of the citizens hence making it easy for

them to get their policies accepted (Körösényi, 2005). Further, effectiveness of

democracies is drawn from their ability to include key actors within the governance

framework and by so doing minimize the opportunities for confrontations. The Global

Governance Index has consistently scored democracies ahead of autocracies in terms of

peace and stability and subsequently growth in various facets of development such as the

economy. Scandinavian countries, North America and Western Europe are among

democracies that have been rated highly in terms of political stability and good governance.

61

East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have also scored well in terms

of government effectiveness.

A comparative glance of the studies cited in the preceding paragraphs indicate that

democracy remains the most effective institutional means so far of creating legitimate

coercion. However, in the contemporary world, democracy, contrary to what it has been

known for many decades, seems to be facing crises of different magnitudes. Subsequently,

there is need in understanding the crucial role of negotiation in generating legitimate

coercion. Thus, negotiated democracy is significant and can be effective in building and

entrenching democracies. The effectiveness and success of negotiated democracy however

hinges on two forms. The first form is existence of zone of possible agreement on the

various issues within the negotiation. With respect to this first form, negotiating parties

discover the possibilities and make decisions and agreements based on them. The second

form is presence of differential trade-offs as a result of availability of different outcomes

that the negotiating parties value and prioritize differently. There are however different

factors and human errors that affect effectiveness and success of negotiated democracy.

These include fixed-pie bias which refer to preconscious assumption of zero-sum conflict

even when more issues can be brought into a negotiation to produce outcomes that are

better for all and self-serving bias, the preconscious cognitive bias that makes all human

beings prefer ideas and outcomes that benefit them in contrast to those that benefit others

(Mansbridge, 2018).

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2.5 Research Gaps

The concept and idea of consociational negotiated democracy is one that has recently

attracted interest and attention of Kenyans, especially with increasing ethnic diversity,

intensifying competition for political power which is presumed to influence the sharing of

the limited resources. Drawing from theoretical and empirical literature, the consociational

model of democracy can be a very essential mechanism for managing ethnic animosities,

by attending to the enablers of conflict such as exclusion grievances and lack of equity in

power and resource sharing. However, adequate studies have not been conducted on the

specific dynamics informing adoption of the model and its potential in ethno-political

conflict management, particularly at the subnational levels in plural societies.

There is a lack of adequate empirical literature on consociational negotiated democracy at

the clan level, a very vital building block of the African ethnic group concept. Additionally,

the structure of consociational negotiated democracy as well as its efficacy in the

management of ethno-political conflicts remain grey areas or altogether scholarly

unattended, especially at the sub-national political units in democracies. In Kenya, no

scientific research study has been conducted on the implications of consociational

negotiated democracy on ethno-political conflict management in demographically

homogenous, yet heterogeneous sub-national political units. It is these concerns that inform

and feed the objectives that anchor this study in order to fill the knowledge gaps.

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CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the research methodology of the study. The chapter particularizes the

specific procedures that were followed in undertaking the study. The research design,

study population, sampling methods and procedures, data collection procedures and

instruments, data analysis and reporting are described in this chapter. The procedure was

intended to generate adequate data that enabled an in-depth analysis of the variables under

study and hence a meaningful contribution to knowledge. Finally, the chapter examines

ethical issues considered in this study for purposes of its authenticity and credibility in the

field of research.

3.2 Research Design

A descriptive research design that incorporates both qualitative and quantitative

approaches to research was employed in this study. The study adopted a descriptive

research design because of its capability to provide a picture of consociational negotiated

democracy as happens in its natural setting (Burns & Grove, 2003). Moreover, a descriptive

design enabled the researcher to examine consociational negotiated democracy as currently

practiced in Mandera County, thus setting the stage for an informed and evidence-based

presentation of the situation based on data collected and analysed.

In this design, quantitative methods were used to collect, analyse and represent

relationships between variables through inferential statistical analysis, with the primary

tool for quantitative data generation being a questionnaire. The quantitative methods were

64

critical in highlighting the strength of relationship within and between variables under

study especially when measuring the effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy

in ethno-political conflict management besides forming a basis for the failure to reject the

hypothesis. Qualitative methods on the other hand were used to obtain deep insights and

explaining multifaceted phenomena that otherwise cannot be quantified especially with

regard to the structure of consociational negotiated democracy. The qualitative data was

collected through in-depth interviews with key informants and Focus Group Discussions

(FGDs) with representatives of various groups comprising the sample. The mix allowed

the researcher to integrate these strengths of quantitative and qualitative approaches in

order to draw data-based conclusions that led to the formulation of a holistic interpretive

framework for generating possible solutions or new understandings of the problem

(Creswell, 2008). The decision to use mixed methods in the descriptive research design

was further informed by the interconnection between variables.

In the research design, the study utilized an embedded strategy where both qualitative and

quantitative data were collected concurrently, with more emphasis on qualitative

approaches. The embedded strategy ensured that the quantitative data generated played a

complementary role to the qualitative data given the high illiteracy rates among some of

the key respondents (KNBS, 2017). The study undertook the mixing of quantitative and

qualitative processes during the collection, analysis and interpretation of the data. A

concurrent embedding approach helped cushion the inherent weaknesses in qualitative and

quantitative approaches when either is used to the other’s exclusion, besides helping

validate findings.

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3.3 Study Area

Mandera County, the study area adopted for this study, is located in the extreme North

Eastern region of Kenya and she covers a landmass of approximately 25,798 square

kilometres. The county borders the federal republics of Ethiopia to the North and Somalia

to the East. On the Kenyan frontiers, the county borders Wajir County to the South and

Marsabit County to the west. Mandera County is among the Arid and Semi-Arid counties

in Kenya. The poverty levels in the county have been attributed to among other things low

literacy levels, long periods of structural marginalization and its poor climatic conditions.

Due to its border location in addition to the desert like climatic conditions, the county has

tended to be ignored by successive post-independence governments with regard to

development investments (Government of Kenya [GoK], 1965).

According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), the population of Mandera

County stood at approximately 1,025,756 people (KNBS, 2009). The county is largely an

ethnically homogenous polity, with members of the Somali community making up about

99% of the population. The census revealed that over 90 percent of the resident population

of Mandera County practice Islam; it would probably be largely correct to assume based

on these statistics by a GoK agency that most Somalis share a religion irrespective of their

clan allegiance.

The immediate areas bordering Mandera County, locally and internationally are

predominantly inhabited by the Somali community and this adds to contextualize the near

homogenous nature of the county’s population in terms of ethnicity. In the larger Somali

66

society, individual or group identification and subsequently differentiation occurs at the

clan level, geographical spread notwithstanding. This is in contrast to other plural societies

where the ethnic group, oftentimes called the tribe is the unit of identification and

differentiation. It is partly because of this intragroup differentiation that the study was

premised on the clan as the unit of analysis, rather than the broader ethnic group. The 1%

of the non-Somali community is comprised of migrants from other parts of Kenya who are

in Mandera County to pursue economic interests rather than settlement.

Mandera County has been politically volatile due to negative clannism, nepotism, political

monopoly and clan exclusivity, lack of high value natural resources, underdevelopment

and insecurity. Its choice as the research site and most suitable county in which to conduct

the study was based on these profile elements. The study was carried out in three out of the

six sub-counties of Mandera County namely Mandera North, Mandera South and Mandera

East. In each of these sub-counties, the study specifically focussed on the major towns in

each due to their cosmopolitan nature in terms of clan presence. Thus, Mandera Township

in Mandera East sub-county, Rhamu in Mandera North and Elwak in Mandera South were

the focus areas.

3.3 Target Population

This study targeted heads of households drawn from across the three major towns of

Mandera Township, Rhamu and Elwak, political leaders, national government officials

with jurisdiction over the three towns in focus, religious leaders, elders from the Garre,

Murulle and Degodia clans and special interest group leaders such as women and the youth.

Leaders of organizations working in peacebuilding and conflict management in Mandera

67

County also formed part of the targeted population. The study assumed that the three towns

attract residents drawn from all demographics that make up Mandera County’s population.

The decision to target political leaders for in-depth interviews was informed by the fact

that elective positions are the most contested positions which oftentimes led to violence.

Elders drawn from across the three clans who were privy to the workings of consociational

negotiated democracy and the management of disputes in their respective clans were

targeted to ensure their input in the research. National government officials were included

in the target population because of the role they play in coordinating security, including

investigations into violence. Religious leaders and leaders of organizations working on

peacebuilding and conflict management were considered important in obtaining detailed

information because of their regular involvement in peace and conflict processes and also

to ensure a balanced representation of the different interest groups. Heads of households,

whether male or female, were involved as representatives of the general population and to

ensure that the sample was inclusive in terms of the three major clans in the study.

Based on data from KNBS (2009) and the CPDO (2018), a total of 4765 potential

respondents were targeted to participate in the study, their breakdown in terms of

participating towns and other strata comprising key informants being as provided in Table

3.1.

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Table 3.1: Target Population Distribution by Town

Town Respondent

Category

Target Pop’n

(x)

Proportion

(x/4765)100%

Mandera

Township

Household

heads

2237 47.0

Rhamu Household

heads

1225 25.7

Elwak Household

heads

1303 27.3

Total 4765 100

Source: KNBS, 2009

3.4 Sampling Procedures and Techniques

3.4.1 Sampling Procedure

The sampling frame comprised of heads of households in the three towns of Mandera

Township, Rhamu and Elwak, politicians who participated in the 2013 and 2017 general

elections, elders drawn from the Garre, Murrulle and Degodia clans, national government

officials, religious leaders and other community interest groups as well as representatives

of organizations involved in peacebuilding and conflict management operating in Mandera

county.

The study employed multi-stage sampling that incorporated both probability and non-

probability sampling techniques. The rationale behind this approach was that the study area

is fairly large and in order to ensure that a representative sample whose findings could be

generalized to the population was obtained, the sample had to be as inclusive as was

practically possible. The areas of Mandera Township, Rhamu and Elwak were purposively

sampled. These towns were deemed to have the necessary amenities and as thriving

economic centres were potential respondents could be found. The urban areas were also

69

considered because of their accessibility and the fact that most of the violence begun there

as was the case with Rhamu in 2014.

Stratified sampling technique was then used where each town was considered a stratum

and statistics from Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) used to obtain the

proportionate sample size per town. The objective in this stage of sampling was to ensure

that each of the three participating urban areas got a share of the sample size that was

proportional to the households within it, where each household had an equal chance of

selection (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2004). Thereafter, the actual respondents were drawn

from among the household heads using simple random sampling.

A mix of purposive and snowball sampling procedures was used to choose key informants

from among the political actors, clan elders, religious leaders, women leaders, youth

leaders, national government officials and leaders of organizations involved in

peacebuilding and conflict management programs. Unlike the heads of households, the key

informants were not limited to specific urban areas; that is, they had jurisdiction over the

whole county and given their relative small number (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003), the

researcher sampled them using the two methods, based on their roles in the processes under

study and referrals from other participants who indicated they had information that the

study was looking for (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2004). The quality of information a

potential respondent held or had access to and which was significant to the study

determined their inclusion in the sample. The snowball sampling procedure was especially

used in obtaining key informants whose opposition to the consociational negotiated

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democracy model is not in the public domain and is only known to their close allies yet the

information they held was critical to the study.

3.4.2 Study Sample Size

The determination of the sample size was informed by Krejcie and Morgan (1970) model

which indicates that for every target population, there is a corresponding sample size from

which data can be obtained and a generalization made on the whole population. The target

population of 4765 corresponded to a sample size of 357 in Krejcie and Morgan table. This

sample size was proportionately distributed across the various strata comprising the target

population as shown in Table 3.2. The study’s desired margin of error was 0.05% and a

confidence level of 95%.

Table 3.2: Proportionate Sample Size distribution across the Participating Towns

Town Respondent

Category

Target

Pop’n (x)

Proportion

(x/4765)100%

Sample size

Mandera

Township

Household heads

2237 47.0 168

Rhamu Household heads

1225 25.7 92

Elwak Household heads 1303 27.3 97

4765 100 357

Source: KNBS, 2009

The key informants were found to have jurisdiction beyond the three urban areas in focus

i.e. Mandera Town, Rhamu and Elwak and therefore the sample per stratum as indicated

in Table 3.2 was based on the number of categories within it i.e. the political leaders stratum

was divided into elected and unelected leaders with each category producing three

informants to make a total of 6, clan leaders into Garre, Murulle and Degodia Clans with

each producing one key informant to make 3 while the PBO stratum was divided into

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national PBO and Community-based PBOs, each producing one informant. The rest of the

key informant strata were allocated one respondent each.

3.5 Data Collection Instruments

3.5.1 Developing of Instruments

The study made use of three main instruments namely questionnaire, Key Informant

Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) to collect data from the field. Each

of these instruments is discussed hereunder.

3.5.1.1 Questionnaire

The researcher designed a questionnaire comprising of closed and open-ended questions to

facilitate data collection. The decision by the researcher to design this kind of questionnaire

was largely informed by a variety of reasons, key among them the objectives of the study,

the level of information richness by the respondents and the motivation among the

respondents to answer the questions (Cooper & Schindler, 2014; Nachmias & Nachmias,

2004).

The closed ended questions were in the form of a five point likert scale from which

respondents were expected to choose the most appropriate response based on their

opinions, experience or observation of the variable under study (Nachmias & Nachmias,

2004). The closed questions were exactly the same for all respondents in order to allow for

comparison of responses and unearth trends emerging from the data collected. These types

of questions were also intended to make it easier for the respondents to answer, thus

increase the completeness and return rate of the questionnaires. Closed questions were also

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deemed suitable for generation of quantitative data for purposes of inferential statistical

analysis.

The open-ended questions were intended to invite the respondent to freely express their

thoughts or experiences with regard to the variables under study (Nachmias & Nachmias,

2004). These types of questions were meant to give detailed explanations of phenomena

under study. To achieve this, the questions were made simple and as straight forward as

possible in order to obtain the requisite information that was sought by the researcher.

The questionnaire targeted respondents drawn from among the non-key informant heads

of households in the towns of Mandera, Rhamu and Elwak owing to the responsibility they

had for the safety of their dependants and an enabling environment for them to fend for

those dependants. The mix of questions was reflective of the research design adopted by

the study. The design of the questionnaire incorporated some contingency questions in

order to obtain respondents who could answer richly on particular questions especially with

regard to the second objective on the structure of consociational negotiated democracy.

3.5.1.2 Interview Schedule

Interviews allow a researcher to discover underlying motives, needs, feelings or desires of

the respondents (Kothari, 2004). The interviews were undertaken with the help of a guide

that ensured a logical flow of ideas and issues as they build on one another. In this study,

the researcher conducted face-to-face interviews with the respondents. The face-to-face

method enabled the researcher observe body language and factor in emotions as the

interviewees responded. This enabled the researcher to obtain more complete information

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from the respondents. This method was extensively used to collect data relating to the

structure of consociational negotiated democracy and its effectiveness in the management

of ethno-political conflicts.

Structured interviews were conducted with respondents drawn from among the active

political leaders, the elders from each of the three clans, youth leaders, women leaders,

national government leaders, and leaders of the two largest organizations involved in

peacebuilding and conflict management programs. These groups of respondents were

assumed to possess rich information and actually generated very insightful responses that

were used explain various aspects of consociational negotiated democracy and ethno-

political conflicts. However, the researcher was flexible enough to use telephone interviews

where a face-to-face interview proved difficult to have and the particular respondent’s

responses were considered important to the study.

3.5.1.3 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were used to offer a variety and depth of perspectives on

ethno-ethnic political conflicts. The nature of questions asked using this method focussed

on the participants’ opinions, attitudes, perceptions or even beliefs on the particular issues

under investigation (Kothari & Gang, 2014). The study used two FGDs; one for males and

the other for women. Each FGD comprised of 10 participants from across the various clans

and other interest groups. The choice of the two categories for the FGDs was informed by

the understanding that in the Somali community, mixing and free expression of either

gender in the presence of the other is almost impossible. The study was thus persuaded that

different FGDs would yield rich results to complement the data obtained through

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questionnaires and the interviews. The researcher relied on notes taken during discussions

as consent to record contributions was not granted (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2004).

FGDs were used because of their ability to yield adequate information on the thoughts and

opinions of participants on the influence of consociational negotiated democracy in the

management of ethno-political conflicts. Specifically, the FGDs sought to establish the

peoples understanding, positions and experiences with consociational negotiated

democracy as used in ethno-political conflict management in Mandera County and the

reasons informing the positions they held on the subject matter. FGDs ability to integrate

observation of non-verbal cues (Kothari & Gang, 2014) made it invaluable, besides helping

in bridging the literacy divide as noted in chapter one of this study.

3.5.2 Data Collection Instruments Reliability and Validity

The data collection instruments were tested prior to their use in the field. The testing was

intended to determine their validity and reliability.

3.5.2.1 Validity of Research Instruments

Validity in research is concerned with how accurate the data obtained in the study

represents the variables of the study that needed to be measured (Mugenda & Mugenda,

2003). According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2004) there are diffrent types of validity

available for a researcher’s consideration based on his study orientation. These include

content, internal, construct and external validity. This study pursued content validity by

consulting the supervisors to ensure questions in the tools covered the study objectives and

construct validity to ensure the data generated was reflective of the variables and

analyzable.

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3.5.2.2 Reliability of Research Instruments

Reliability ensures that there is precision with which data is collected. It responds to

concerns on whether similar results can be obtained when measuring the same variable at

different times using that instrument under the same conditions. A perfectly reliable

test/instrument has a reliability coefficient of 1.00. This perfect level of reliability is

however impossible due to factors such as ambiguity of instructions or distractions on the

part of the respondent (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2004).

In this study, the data collection instruments were subjected to a test-retest to examine the

reliability of the instrument. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2012), if identical

outcomes, not necessarily exactly the same outcomes, are realized after running a number

of tests, then it can be reliably concluded that the data collected is reliable. Using a pilot

sample of 40 as recommended by Mugenda and Mugenda (2012), who were drawn from

Takaba town, the computed result from the pilot test using Cronbach technique to obtain

internal consistency, known as coefficient of stability obtained was 0.76. The study,

drawing from the assertion by Mugenda and Mugenda (2012) thus concluded that the

instrument was reliable and proceeded to use it for data collection.

3.6 Data Analysis and Presentation of Findings

Once the data had been collected from the field, it was edited, coded, and classified based

on the research objectives and research questions. The data was winnowed to “establish

order from chaos and give shape to the mass of data” (Paradis et al., 2016). After the data

had been winnowed, quantitative data obtained from the closed questions was then keyed

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into the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Version 23 to generate the

descriptive and inferential statistics that were used to analyse the data.

The quantitative data analysis involved a critical breakdown and interpretation of

descriptive and inferential statistics to establish the emergent details and relationships

among variables. Descriptive statistics, which were used to show how often a score

occurred, helped define the characteristics and relationships among the variables in the

sample. The description of the variables was done in terms of the attributes that comprise

them. Tables, charts and graphs were used in presenting the analysed data.

Inferential statistics on the other hand were used to assist the researcher determine the

likelihood that the investigator can generalize the findings obtained from the sample to the

whole population. This study points out that the degree of generalizability of the results

from the sample was expressed as probabilities in conformity with the statistical caution

that inferential statistics are influenced by various types of errors such as the sampling

error. The specific inferential statistics that was used was Regression Analysis.

The regression analysis was used to determine how the independent variables under study

influenced the dependent variable and the extent to which the former predicted the latter.

The independent variables variously referred to as the predictor variables were assumed in

this study to influence the variance of the criterion/dependent variable as indicated in the

conceptual framework in chapter two. Five-point Likert items based on the independent

variables ordered “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, “Neutral”, “Disagree”, “Strongly Disagree”

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were measured and checked against “reduction in ethno-political conflicts”. Regression

analysis was preferred for this study because it offered the investigator an opportunity to

determine the contribution of the independent variables on the dependent variable (Mills

& Gray, 2016). The coefficients obtained from the simple linear regression analysis were

reported using Field’s (2009) simple linear regression equation written as:

Y= α +βx1+ ɛ

Where:

Y= the predicted value of the dependent variable,

α = is predicted value of the dependent variable if the independent variable is zero,

β= rate of increase or decrease for each unit of change in x1

x1 = is the independent variable and

ɛ= other factors that may affect the dependent variable that were not observable in this

study.

The hypothesis was tested to evaluate the significance of the results coming from the study

and whether they were in sync with the original expectations. The F-test was used to test

the study’s hypothesis to compare variations in views and opinions between and among

the various categories of respondents. In this study, the investigator was guided by the

understanding that in the event that the p-value was less than the significance level of .05,

the researcher rejected the null hypothesis. Conversely, if the p-value for the test run was

more than the significance level (.05), the researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis.

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Qualitative data analysis on the other hand was based on induction. The process of analysis

involved identifying common patterns (themes) within the responses, coding, synthesizing

and then grouping them together before critically analysing each theme in order to arrive

at findings that are informative with regard to the attributes that make up the variables. The

investigator was on the lookout for phrases that respondents used over and over as well as

responses that seemed to match one another. Ideally, the analysis focussed on accurate

summarization of data. Direct quotations were used to firm up the themes as appropriate

during the analysis. Once the analysis was done, interpretation of the data followed that

sought to demonstrate what was important in the data, why that consideration of

importance was made and the new knowledge generated therefrom. In order to make full

and meaningful sense of the results and fill up the gaps identified in the literature, the

primary findings of the research were compared with empirical studies in the reviewed

literature as well as theoretical underpinnings before making conclusions.

3.7 Legal and Ethical Considerations

Conducting research studies demands that researchers have to observe and adhere to certain

laid down legal and ethical policies and procedures. Throughout the study period, the

researcher observed policies and guidelines set by various institutions including the

university. Any material that is cited has been duly referenced as is the standard practice

with academic works. The researcher obtained the necessary authorizations from the

National Council for Science and Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) as well as the

National Government official in charge of Mandera County. The researcher further sought

informed consent of study participants when collecting data from the field. Further,

participation by respondents was voluntary hence no one was coerced to participate.

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Participants’ identities were concealed and guarded unless there was need to refer to the

specific respondents and his/her consent had been granted. The final document was

subjected to the Turn-it-in software to check on originality.

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CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the findings of the study. The study was guided by

three objectives which intended to analyze the dynamics accounting for the adoption of the

consociational negotiated democracy model in Mandera County, the structure of

consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County and a determination

on the effectiveness of the approach in the management of ethno-political conflicts in the

county. The results were also discussed within the context of the extant literature, thus

evaluating the veracity of findings and arguments made in the existing literature while also

espousing new trends and conclusions based on evidence, thus contributing to knowledge.

The study argues that by analyzing the dynamics surrounding the adoption of

consociational negotiated democracy, insights will emerge including the fears and

aspirations that the communities involved have with regard to the model as it impacts on

ethno-political conflict management. A variety of determinants such as age, education

levels, clan, religion, desire for peace, inclusion of all significant segments, availability of

financial resources for campaigns, inter-clan family ties among others were explored under

this objective. The study also addressed itself to structural issues regarding consociational

negotiated democracy and the findings obtaining from this objective have been discussed

in detail because of the need to understand how consociational negotiated democracy is

practiced in Mandera County as a pathway to peaceful conflict management. The focus

was on the organization of the entire process as practiced in the polity of Mandera.

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Finally, the chapter evaluates the extent of success of consociational negotiated democracy

in the management of ethno-political conflicts by examining various outcomes such as

equity in sharing of political positions and reduction in cases of violent politically

motivated inter-clan conflicts. Under this objective, the study also examined the

weaknesses of consociational negotiated democracy in managing ethno-political conflicts,

an aspect that was considered critical in making informed recommendations.

4.2 Response Rate

The data collection process was successful with regard to the various techniques used. The

researcher administered 322 questionnaires out of which 308 were answered by the

respondents and returned back to the researcher. Of the 308 that were received back, 301

were fully answered by the respondents who took part in the study, representing a response

rate of 93%. It is the 301 fully answered questionnaires that were used for analysis.

Drawing from the statistics, the response rate was adequate and satisfactory; it allowed the

researcher to proceed with the analysis of the collected data. This response rate is supported

by Kothari and Gang (2014) who affirm that a response rate of 70% and above is excellent

and sufficient for analysis. It can be deduced from the results that most of the questionnaires

that were distributed during data collection were received back, adequately answered by

the respondents.

Besides the questionnaire, the researcher was able to engage 13 out of the 15 Key

informants as indicated in Table 3.2 in interviews, a process that enabled him collect

critical information relevant to this study. Two of the interviewees could not honour the

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request for interviews despite accepting to participate as they were engaged in official

duties. The FGDs received 100% response rate as all invited respondents turned up, making

the exercise very representative and unbiased.

4.3 Bio-data of Respondents

The first section of the questionnaire required the respondents to indicate their age, highest

level of education, gender, marital status, clan, religion and the duration he or she had lived

in Mandera County. This information was deemed useful in explaining and comparing

trends emerging from the collected data during analysis. The findings from the

respondents’ biodata are presented and discussed under each subtopic.

4.3.1 Age

The results on the age of respondents are as indicated in Table 4.1

Table 4.1: Distribution of respondents by age

Age bracket Frequency Percentage (%)

21-30 years 47 16

31-40 years 98 33

41-50 years 94 31

Over 51 years 62 20

Total 301 100

Source: Field data, 2019

Majority of the respondents (33%) were found to be aged between 31 to 40 years, followed

closely by those aged 41 to 50 years (31%). Respondents aged 51 years and beyond were

(20%) while those aged 21 to 30 years were (16%). The results show that majority of the

heads of households are in the most productive age, 31 to 50 years and were likely to be

active in the political life of the study area and could thus make sense of its political

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activities. The study established that most of the participants had completed their education

and were already engaged in or searching for income generating activities that could allow

them establish and sustain families.

The study was conducted in urban areas which normally tend to be the economic and

political centers of any political unit, with the 21 to 50 years age bracket being the most

active in both activities. This argument is consistent with Jedwab, Christiansen and

Gindelsky (2014) finding on economic factors as key pull factors to urban areas for the

productive age of a population. The study found out that people in their prime age which

coincides with the 21 to 50 years age bracket are agile, politically aware, exhibiting the

exuberance of youth and susceptible to unemployment and can thus be enticed into political

violence in exchange for some little money. Stakeholders must therefore seek ways of

engaging this group actively in political processes and in a positive manner so as to

dissuade them from engaging in ethno-political conflicts. On the other hand, the low

number of respondents aged 51 years and beyond was attributed to the law of diminishing

returns; most people in this age bracket were heading to retirement or had retired from

active production and were transiting to eldership and they tended to withdraw to their rural

homes where life was not as fast paced as in the urban areas.

4.3.2 Level of Education of Respondents

As shown in Table 4.2, majority of the respondents (35%) indicated that they had had

primary level of education while 32% of them had a secondary level of education. 21%

respondents indicated that they had a college education and the remaining 12% indicated

that they had a university education.

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Table 4.2: Distribution of respondents by level of education

Level of Education Frequency Percentage (%)

Primary 107 35

Secondary 95 32

College 62 21

University 37 12

Total 301 100

Source: Field data, 2019

The findings imply that majority of the respondents (65%) had post-primary level of

education and hence suited to the pursuit of economic and political opportunities afforded

by the infrastructure in urban areas. Moreover, most companies, enterprises and

government institutions which require a college level of education as a pre-requisite for

employment were mostly located in the urban areas and this explains the one third of

respondents (33%) with post-secondary education in a county flagged as having a high

illiteracy rate (KNBS, 2017).

The study concurs with Campbell (2006) that education is a useful explanatory factor

influencing a person’s level of civic engagement and decision making. It further explains

that an individual who has attained post primary education is in a position to analyze and

decipher the implications of a certain approach to politics and therefore make an informed

decision as to whether to support that approach or not. Those with a primary or no

education at all can benefit from such an analysis and even be influenced by those that are

more educated either to support or reject the approach. On the strength of this argument

and with reference to the study findings, it follows that most of the study participants were

politically aware and could give informed opinions in support of their decision to either

85

support or oppose consociational negotiated democracy as a pathway to ethno-political

conflict management.

4.3.3 Gender of Respondents

The findings on the distribution of the respondents in terms of gender are as tabulated in

Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Distribution of respondents by gender

Gender Frequency Percentage (%)

Male 243 81

Female 58 19

Total 301 100

Source: Field data, 2019

From the findings presented in Table 4.3, it is evident that the majority of the respondents,

81% were males while the females were 19%. Given that the study targeted heads of

households who traditionally have been assumed to be men in a typical nuclear family; it

is not surprising that men thus formed the majority of the respondents. It is important to

note here that voluntary single parenthood is frowned upon in the larger Somali community

except in cases of natural attrition such as death or in cases of divorce. The fact that the

study was conducted in urban settings where men mostly venture to in search of economic

opportunities as their wives remain in the rural homes to take care of the family further

explains the high number of males.

The study agrees with IFES (2017) that women, children and the elderly are vulnerable to

political violence and further asserts that women would be more likely to support

consociational negotiated democracy because of its promise to promote peace and stability.

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Given the patriarchal nature of African and precisely Somali politics (UNDP, 2017) it

would follow that the vast majority of women are not deeply integrated into elective

politics and decision making. Ideally, therefore, the study had a majority of respondents

who by implication were more active and abreast in matters politics of Mandera County.

Policy makers and support groups need to encourage and support women to be more active

in politics and political decision making as they would be more inclined to support politics

anchored on peaceful resolution of disputes. The study however notes that its focus on

heads of households, whose majority turned out to be men, could have disadvantaged

female participants who were not heads of households but could have provided alternative

views and recommends a further study with 50-50 representation in the sample size in

terms of gender.

4.3.4 Marital Status of Respondents

The findings on the marital status of respondents were as summarized in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: Distribution of respondents by marital status

Marital Status Frequency Percentage (%)

Single 13 4

Married

Divorced

Widowed

258

12

18

86

4

6

Total 301 100

Source: Field data, 2019

Majority of the respondents (86%) were married while 6% of them were widowed. A

further 4% indicated that they were single and the remaining 4% declared they were

divorced. The findings imply that the institution of marriage/family is held in high regard

as the basic foundation of family and community life. The study established that some of

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the women were widowed as a result of their husbands being casualties of politically

motivated violence as explained by respondent C in the female FGD:

I lost my husband to negative clannism in the 2014 clashes in Rhamu. Just because

he was vocal in supporting a candidate from his own clan, he was targeted for

killing (Respondent C).

This study suggests that marital status and especially cross-clan marriages has an impact

on the level of political participation as it is a predictor of their activism towards peaceful

methods of dispute resolution i.e. people in family life, especially heads of households are

mindful of the safety and security of their families. Married individuals and those with

families were found to react or respond differently to political activities and processes in

the clans as opposed to those who were not married. The study asserts that to the extent

that inter-clan marriages contribute to improving of relations between clans and therefore

forestalling inter-clan violence, its cause notwithstanding, then that would be a practice

worth promoting.

4.3.5 Respondents’ Clan Affiliations

The findings of the study in respect of clan affiliation of respondents are as indicated in

Table 4.5.

Table 4.5: Distribution of respondents by clan affiliation

Clan Frequency Percentage (%)

Garre 118 39

Murulle

Degodia

Corner tribes

Others

77

87

13

6

26

29

4

2

Total 301 100

Source: Field data, 2019

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Majority of the respondents (39%) were found to be members of the Garre clan while those

who identified themselves with the Degodia clan were 29%. The Murulle clan had a

representation of 26%. The corner tribes, which comprised of ethnic Somali not affiliated

to the three mentioned clans totaled 4% and the rest of the non-Somali population labelled

‘others’ were only 2%.

From the findings, it was evident that the Garre, the Degodia and the Murulle were the

major groups, which Lijphart (2012) refers to as significant segments, living in Mandera

County as they account for a combined 94% of the population. Instructively, the findings

suggest that none of the three clans has a numerically outright majority that would render

it politically dominant. It is under such an environment of no dominant majority that the

proponents of consociationalism argue that the chances of success of the approach are

higher since the significant groups will have to cooperate in a coalition form of

government.

The study established that a combination of the Garre and the Murulle to the exclusion of

the Degodia fomented political conflicts that have continued to beset the county. The study

further found out that small groups such as the corner tribes and others, were left out of the

political power play and still did not pose a major instability on their own. This finding

affirms Lijphart’s argument on inclusion of all significant segments to maintain stability in

a political unit, irrespective of whatever yardstick is used to differentiate them; whether

ethnic groups or clans.

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4.3.6 Respondents’ Religious Affiliations

The study findings with regard to the religion respondents identified with were as indicated

in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6: Distribution of respondents by religious affiliation

Religion Frequency Percentage (%)

Islam 286 95

Christianity

Other

13

2

4

1

Total 301 100

Source: Field data, 2019

Majority of the respondents 95% indicated that they were followers of Islam while those

who identified themselves with Christianity were 4%. A further 1% of the respondents

indicated that they identified with other religions which they did not specify.

The study findings demonstrated that Islam is the most dominant religion in the county.

The implication of this finding was that any decision making process that integrated within

it the teachings of the Islamic faith had the chance of receiving near unanimous support as

suggested by a Murulle elder in the interviews:

Mandera County has most of her residents being practitioners of Islam. The religion

influences most of its followers’ decisions and actions, including peace and politics

(Key Informant IV).

This social regard was informed by the consideration that religion is a key factor in the

establishment of social relations and support systems. The study considered religion as an

important element that can be used to explain social stability or instability and as a

mechanism for conflict management in the area. Moreover, religion plays a key role in the

political establishment in Mandera County for a comprehensive pursuit of peace and

stability as intended by the consociational model (Lijphart, 2012; Lemarchand, 2006).

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Further, the religious dimension or bearing on peace is a fundamental pillar enshrined in

Islamic teaching supposedly embraced by the local population in the peaceful management

of disputes in the area. However, other dynamics and considerations as explored in section

4.4 of this study have proven stronger than religion in the decision to either support or

reject consociational negotiated democracy.

4.3.7 Respondents’ Duration of Stay in Mandera County

The findings on the respondent’s duration of stay in Mandera County were as indicated in

Table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Distribution of respondents by duration of stay in Mandera County

Duration of Stay Frequency Percentage (%)

0 to 5 years 7 2

6 to 10 years

Over 10 years

13

281

4

94

Total 301 100

Source: Field data, 2019

Majority of the respondents, 94% indicated that they had lived in Mandera County for over

ten years while 4% had lived there for a period of between six and ten years. Only 2% of

the respondents had lived in Mandera County for less than 5 years. The study argues that

the duration one has lived in an area may determine the depth of information they have to

offer to the researcher with regard to his study questions, based on their experiences and

observation; the more one has lived in the study area, the more they are likely to give

conclusive information. The study, therefore, considered the duration of stay significant

because the phenomenon under study straddle between two elections occurring at intervals

of five years.

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That an overwhelming majority of the respondents had lived in Mandera County for a

period of over ten years meant that they had witnessed the workings of consociational

negotiated democracy during the 2013 and 2017 election cycles and they could therefore

give adequate feedback on various issues under study. The fact that the study also used an

embedded strategy where the quantitative component was intended to support the

qualitative approach meant that the study benefitted from information richness as given by

many respondents who had lived in Mandera County for long. The majority group had also

witnessed the nexus between various social factors such as religion and traditions and how

they influenced politics and conflict management and as a result, they could give a

comparative picture of issues under study authoritatively.

4.4 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

The researcher made use of a questionnaire to obtain data related to the various dynamics

that influence adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in the management of

ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. Precisely, a five point likert-scale was

developed by the researcher with five options per statement that highlight the strength of

the response given. Qualitative data generated from open-ended questions as well as

interviews and FGDs was also integrated in the analysis and discussion as demonstrated in

the sections that follow.

4.4.1 Desire for a Political Process Free of Violence and Destruction

The findings on the desire for a political process devoid of violence and destruction as

indicated in Figure 4.1 indicate that 69% of the respondents strongly agreed that the desire

for a political process free of violence and destruction was a push factor for them to support

consociational negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts. A

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further 18% of the respondents agreed with the question statement while 6% were

indifferent. 5% of the respondents disagreed with the statement while 2% expressed strong

disagreement with it.

Figure 4.1: Desire for a political process free of violence and destruction

Source: Field data, 2019

A response rate of 87% of the informants indicating their desire for a violence and

destruction free political formation suggests that political activities in the county of

Mandera have been best with violence. The findings were also interpreted to mean that the

competitive clan-based organization of politics in the county had been fuelling animosity

among the residents, an outcome that most of the informants would wish to see reversed.

The results are further indicative of personal experiences with the adverse effects of a

violent political process such as the loss of a loved one or even the destruction of property

that was their lifeline and which the respondents would never wish to encounter again.

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Political processes in democracies such as Kenya (and all sub-national political units within

her) are intended to be violence free because violence undermines peace and stability.

However, the dominant majoritarian system in many democracies has been reduced to

zero-sum contests that produce winners and losers, a situation that oftentimes leads to

violent conflicts as electoral outcomes are disputed. Based on the study findings as

presented in Figure 4.1, the study takes the view that from its inception, respondents

seemed to believe that management of ethno-political conflicts through consociational

negotiated democracy could mark the end of animosity which exists between the different

clans.

Moreover, the study concurs with Lehmbruch (2006) that the propensity for violence in

majoritarian systems is particularly high where there is no established culture of accepting

electoral outcomes or the processes are prone to manipulation. It consequently concluded

that the electorate in areas prone to politically motivated violence such as Mandera County

would be more willing to support an approach such as consociational negotiated democracy

that promotes mechanisms that curtail the opportunities for violence and destruction.

4.4.2 Fairness in Sharing of Political Positions

The study sought to establish whether the promise of fair sharing of political positions was

a push factor in the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County.

The findings were as illustrated in Figure 4.2.

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Figure 4.2: Assurance of fairness in sharing political positions

Source: Field data, 2019

The study findings indicate that 23% of the respondents in this study strongly agreed that

the promise of fair sharing of political positions in the county was a push factor for them

in their decision to support the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy as a

pathway to political conflicts management. This view was supported by a further 32% of

the informants. This means that slightly more than half of the respondents (55%) thought

that consociational negotiated democracy would deliver fairness in the sharing of political

positions and hence help avert politically motivated conflicts. On the other hand, a

significant proportion of the respondents, 37% of the respondents disagreed that the need

for assurance of fairness in sharing political positions had informed their support for

consociational negotiated democracy while 8% of them were indifferent.

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From the findings, the study found out that majority of the respondents did not think that

the majoritarian system used prior to adoption of consociational negotiated democracy was

fair in the manner in which political positions were shared among the clans in the county.

The study based on these findings argues that majority of the respondents were of the view

that unfairness in the sharing of political positions contributed to the recurrent politically

motivated conflicts in the county of Mandera. It is the researcher’s position based on

evidence drawn from Figure 4.2 that the proponents of consociationalism had convinced a

majority of the respondents that the approach would ensure equity in political power

sharing and hence the fairly strong support for it among the respondents. The study

considered the 37% of the respondents expressing disagreement with the view that the need

for equity in sharing of political positions had persuaded them to support consociationalism

as indicative of other considerations that may not be necessarily political. This perspective

was informed by a response given by a Murulle participant in the males FGD who noted

thus:

Consociationalism is good because each clan can do its business the way it wishes

without worrying about meddling in its affairs by other rival clans. Fairness in

sharing of political positions is impossible because of different clan sizes in terms

of population. For me, a stable business environment is more important than

positions of power (Respondent K).

With regard to the 8% of the respondents who were indifferent, the researcher concluded

that they were not significant enough to affect the overall observation because even if that

percentage was added to the disagreeing group, those in support of consociationalism on

account of its promise of equity in sharing of political positions would still be the majority.

In any political unit where power is contested by several actors, there is a tendency among

groups that have been or perceive themselves to be victims of systemic exclusion to support

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an alternative arrangement that accommodates them. The concept of proportionality as

theorized by the scholars of consociationalism is particularly tempting for small groups

and if implemented faithfully, it can usher in stability. This has been proven in the case of

Malaysia where accommodation of all significant segments set the country on a path to

stability as argued by Henry (2016). Despite this compelling argument, this study was

persuaded that the assurance of political positions though significant for the community

and especially those that may have previously been excluded from political power, could

not in itself mean much to an individual who is apolitical and who would rather a system

that brings stability for him to pursue his interests.

4.4.3 Fair Distribution of Economic Resources

This research question intended to investigate the extent to which fair distribution of

economic resources had informed the support for consociational negotiated democracy in

Mandera County. The findings were as shown in Figure 4.3. the study established that that

59% of the study participants strongly agreed that the promise of fair distribution of

economic resources influenced their support for adoption of consociational negotiated

democracy as a strategy for managing politically instigated interethnic conflicts in Mandera

County. Respondents who simply agreed with this view were 16% while 8% expressed

neutrality. A combined 17% of the respondents disagreed that fair distribution of economic

resources had influenced their support for adoption of consociational negotiated

democracy.

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Figure 4.3: Fair distribution of economic resources

Source: Field data, 2019

The study finding that 75% of the respondents were attracted to consociational negotiated

democracy because of the promise of fair distribution of economic resources were

suggestive that the pre-consociational negotiated democracy period was characterized by

inequalities in the distribution of economic resources accruing to Mandera County. A

Murulle participant in the females FGD explained that:

Some parts of Mandera County especially in the rural areas are very marginalized

and accessing economic is extremely difficult. The few that were available prior to

devolution went to areas with influential vocal leaders who did not understand and

fully respect the principles of consociational negotiated democracy. This little

understanding of negotiated democracy made the populace in the county to

welcome and embark on it (Respondent A).

The study contended that inequalities in the sharing of resources were as a result of people’s

little knowledge of the model, and lack of County political structures and legal frameworks

on how resources should be shared. Negotiations done are made to favour dominantly

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represented clans. This faulty system facilitated influential politicians to take advantage,

thus, contributing to the recurrence of politically motivated conflicts among clans.

Economic resources are the backbone of a society’s existence and any threat to such

resources provides fodder for violence from those that are excluded as well as those that

are in control but unwilling to share. Resource-based conflicts that are manifested in

political processes have been witnessed in many African countries such as the Democratic

Republic of Congo, where ethnic groups wrestle for power as a platform to control the

resources (Burnley, 2012). The study argues that consociational negotiated democracy’s

promise that groups would get an opportunity to be in power and consequently get their

fair share of resources made that political arrangement attractive to the residents especially

in the 2013 electoral cycle. But, unfortunately, the outcomes of that election, the

subsequent appointments by the county government and the sharing of resources did not

reflect proportionality among the significant segments as intended. This inconsistency with

the stipulated principles of consociational democracy contributed to the decline in its

support in the 2017 election cycle as reported by a PBO key informant:

In my view, the failure by the first county government regime to entrench equity in

the sharing of positions power and resources coupled with fall outs within the Garre

clan contributed to the decline in support for negotiated democracy in the 2017

election. This is because, there are no legal structures to support the consociational

distribution of resources (Key Informant III)

4.4.4 Religious Teachings

The findings in respect of the significance of religious teachings in the adoption of

consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County are as shown in figure 4.4.

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Figure 4.4: Influence of religious teachings

Source: Field data, 2019

As can be seen from Figure 4.4, 67% of the respondents expressed strong concurrence that

religious teachings on peaceful dispute resolution influenced adoption of

consociationalism, a view which was shared by a further 17% of them. However, about 9%

of the respondents disagreed that religious teachings had any role in the adoption of

consociational negotiated democracy in the county. The remaining 8% of the respondents

were not certain on whether or not religious teachings were a motivator for the adoption of

consociationalism as a way of resolving the ethnically inspired political conflicts in the

county.

Religious teachings, specifically those of Islam which is the dominant religion (see Table

4.5) in the county significantly influenced adoption of consociational negotiated

democracy as indicated by 84% of respondents. This is attributed to the fact that Islam, just

like Christianity, emphasises values such as equality, fairness and peaceful resolution of

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disputes (Abu-Nimer, 2010). These were some of the pull factors towards consociational

negotiated democracy as demonstrated in sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3. The finding was also

suggestive of the extent to which Islamic religious teachings had been integrated in the

political sphere as well as the dispute resolution mechanisms of the dominant ethnic Somali

community in Mandera County. Moreover, the findings also inferred that the grassroot

network of religious institutions and their leadership were promoting consociational

negotiated democracy as a pathway to inter-clan political accommodation and

consequently peace among the populace while making reference to the religious teachings.

Religious teachings and contextually those of Islam emphasize the importance of peace

within oneself and others. The finding on religious influence in the adoption of the

consociational model was in sync with Abu-Nimer’s (2010) assertion that the Quran forbid

violent behaviour while encouraging peaceful coexistence among all people who it

describes as equal before God. The significance of religion in the adoption of

consociational negotiated democracy as a strategy to managing ethno-political conflicts

and consequently building peace is further emphasized by Kadayifci-Orellana (2010) who

has argued that it is the duty of every Muslim to uphold peace. Thus, the study findings are

in perfect harmony with the existing literature. The non-Muslim respondents in support of

the significance of religion in adoption of consociationalism were assumed to have been

influenced by teachings in their respective religions.

4.4.5 Cross-cutting Family Ties

The findings of the study on the respondents’ views in respect of the influence of family

ties on adoption of consociational negotiated democracy were as shown in Table 4.8.

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(SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree;

F=Frequency; %=Percentage).

Table 4.8: Family ties

SA A N D SD

F % F % F % F % F %

Influence of family ties on

adoption of consociational

negotiated democracy.

142 47 57 19 30 10 45 15 27 9

Source: Field data, 2019

Table 4.8 indicates that 66% of the respondents agreed that cross-cutting family ties

influenced adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in the county as a means to

addressing ethno-political conflicts. Approximately 10% of the respondents expressed

neutrality with regard to the effect of inter-clan family ties on the adoption of

consociational negotiated democracy as a further 24% disagreed.

The findings inferred that family ties characterized by cross-clan marriages had occurred

in Mandera County. The study findings indicated that the inter-clan family ties had been

informed by increased mobility of people as they pursued different interests such as

education or economic opportunities as reported by a women leader:

Nowadays, people are moving from rural areas into urban areas in pursuit of

education, business opportunities or employment. In the process, they interact and

establish relationships culminating in inter-clan marriages. There are lots of

interclan marriages in the urban areas due to group diversity and increased interclan

interactions in those settings compared to the rural areas (Key Informant V).

The study noted that marriage and love were matters that were personal and in the pursuit

of such private undertakings, clan affiliation could have been relegated to a lower level

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compared to personal choice. As such, marriage was found to connect families and

consequently clans. The end result, as the study finding suggest would be the thawing of

inter-clan relations and the possibility of erstwhile rivals working together, if not for

anything else for the sake of protecting their families.

The 24% that disagreed on the influence of cross-cutting family ties on the adoption of

consociational negotiated democracy indicated that one’s spouse was a personal choice and

they could neither be victimized nor embraced at the clan level purely on account of their

marriage. A Murulle key informant noted thus:

Marriage is mainly determined by a man and whatever clan his wife comes from is

immaterial. Women are considered as part of their husbands’ clan and cannot be

possibly targeted on account of their parent’s clan (Key Informant IV).

For the dissenting group of respondents, it would appear that though family is important in

its own right, for them, the clan extraction of the women was immaterial due to the

patriarchal nature of the Somali community. In effect, the finding suggested that a woman’s

clan of birth was lost at the point of marriage and did not necessarily mean improved

relations between their maiden clan and the assumed one from her husband.

The majority finding of 66% suggests that inter-clan marriages are a common cultural

practice that is highly encouraged among the clans as they are believed to foster the unity

of the clans involved (Tadesse, 2010). Such marriages were used as a social measure to

encourage peaceful coexistence among the clans constituting a community. The study

argues that people who consider each other as family on account of marriage, clan

differences notwithstanding are less likely to attack each other in the event of

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disagreements and would rather adopt dialogue. Thus, the study concluded that family ties

encouraged cooperation and sharing, which were also noted to be key markers of

consociationalism, and especially its principle of inclusivity.

4.4.6 Insufficient Campaign Finances

The findings in respect of whether insufficient campaign finances within clans had any role

in the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy were as illustrated in Figure 4.5.

Majority of the respondents (74%) expressed their view that insufficient campaign finances

influenced the decision by clans to adopt consociational negotiated democracy as a

working political model in Mandera County. That 56% of this group of respondents

strongly agreed demonstrates the salience of finances in political processes in the county

of Mandera. Approximately 20% of the study participants disagreed with the statement

while the remaining 6% of the respondents were undecided.

Figure 4.5: Insufficient campaign finances

Source: Field data, 2019

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The findings were interpreted to mean that political campaigns were an expensive affair

that could cut off potential candidates from the political process besides influencing the

outcomes. The findings further suggested that the majoritarian system which existed prior

to the introduction of consociationalism was a preserve of those that could marshal enough

finances to mount the campaigns. Based on the findings, the study further deduced that

small clans that could not pool the resources needed for campaigns had no chance of

ascending to political office in the pre-consociationalism period as they had no capacity to

campaign against their more financially endowed rivals and this served to exacerbate

rivalry among dominant clans and the smaller ones.

Campaign financing is a major issue in democracies because it can influence the direction

an election will go, especially in societies where politics is not organized along ideologies

and this can be a precursor for politically motivated conflicts. The study findings are

affirmed by Posada-Carbo’s (2008) argument that uncontrolled injection of financial

resources can undermine the legitimacy of not just candidates or political parties, but also

the political processes and systems. Introduction of any political system demands

investments in terms of enough financial resources that can be used to educate, inform and

involve the populace in the attempts to popularise it. In Mandera county, consociational

negotiated democracy was introduced theoretically without a practical involvement and

participation of the entire affected communities. This is in disagreement with the sweeping

claims that a consociational negotiated democracy model is not expensive. When the

populace is not involved in the design of the process and it is only left in the domain of

individual influential politicians, then the system would not appropriately represent those

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it is intended to represent thus and neither will it stem violent conflicts. This goes against

the argument that smaller clans operating from the premise of realpolitik would support a

system that favours them to achieve their ends of political participation and representation.

4.4.7 Lessons Learnt on the Success of Consociationalism elsewhere

The study sought to gauge the extent to which the workings of consociational negotiated

democracy elsewhere had influenced its adoption in Mandera County and the findings were

as illustrated in Table 4.9. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree;

SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).

Table 4.9: Successful adoption of consociational negotiated democracy elsewhere

SA A N D SD

F % F % F % F % F %

Benchmarked success of

consociational negotiated

democracy in similar polities

elsewhere.

24 8% 33 11% 18 6% 114 38% 112 37%

Source: Field data, 2019

From Table 4.9, only 8% of the respondents strongly agreed that support for consociational

negotiated democracy in Mandera County was influenced by evidence of its successful

practice elsewhere. About 11% of the study participants agreed that their support for

consociational negotiated democracy was influenced by its success elsewhere while 6%

expressed neutrality. Three quarters of the respondents (75%) disagreed that their support

for consociational negotiated democracy as a pathway in the management of ethno-political

conflicts was influenced by its success elsewhere.

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The findings suggest that the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy to help with

management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County had nothing to do with its

successful use elsewhere; thus leading to the conclusion that it developed from within the

community. The findings were also interpreted to mean that this strategy had not been used

at the subnational level of political participation given the centralization of politics and

resources in the country prior to the promulgation of the CoK 2010. The findings persuaded

the researcher that the success of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms spearheaded

by elders and who were key actors in the consociational negotiated democracy model could

have encouraged the community to support it.

As stated in the problem statement, there are inadequate empirical studies on the practice

of consociational democracy at the sub-national level of political contestation. The extant

literature has tended to focus on the national level of consociational programming, taking

into account heterogeneity of the society at that level. The dynamics in Mandera Coutnty

are different because not only is the political unit a sub-national one but the dominant ethnic

group, that is the Somali is also sub-divided into clans and the clans into sub-clans. This is

the very reason the study refers to the population in Mandera County as homogeneous (the

instrumental use of ethnicity with particular reference to the Somali community identity),

yet heterogeneous (the primordial use of ethnicity as depicted by the wide array of clan and

sub-clan identities). The study argues that traditions and culture, including religion have

shaped the consociational model practiced Mandera County, making it essentially home-

grown. This view is supported by the fact that the practice is spearheaded by elders who

hardly have any formal training to prepare them for benchmarking exercises that could

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inform an argument in support of lessons learnt from elsewhere. The study however notes

that the clans in the neighbouring semi-autonomous Somaliland have had a consociational

approach to their politics (Omaar & Ali, 2018) and this may be the reason 19% of the

respondents were in support of the claim that lessons learnt from its success elsewhere had

influenced their support for consociational negotiated democracy in the management of

ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.

4.4.8 Inclusion of Clan Representatives in the Negotiations

The study findings on the place of inclusion of clans in the negotiations leading up to

adoption of consociational negotiated democracy were as illustrated in Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6: Inclusion of clan representatives in the negotiations

Source: Field data, 2019

The pie chart in Figure 4.6 indicates that 36% of the study participants strongly disagreed

that inclusion of each clan’s representatives in the negotiations led to their support for

consociational negotiated democracy while 27% of the respondents simply disagreed with

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this statement. Only 4% of the respondents expressed neutrality with regard to this

statement while 14% agreed that inclusion of each clan’s representatives influenced their

decision to support. The remaining 20% of the respondents strongly agreed with the

question statement. Thus cumulatively, 63% of the respondents downplayed the

significance of clan representation in the negotiations as a push factor for adoption of

consociational negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in

Mandera County.

The findings were unexpected as the assumption was that inclusion in decision making

would be received positively by all clans as a sign of recognition, a key aspect in the pursuit

of power. The findings were suggestive of the possibility of exclusion of certain clans in

the community’s political architecture or that cooperation of clans in the political sphere

of the wider Somali community is not something that most of the residents were enthused

about; that a culture of survival for the fittest had taken root among the clans. In this regard,

a Degodia key informant noted thus:

My clan was excluded from discussions on possible cooperation with the Garre and

Murulle clans despite requesting to be included. This made us work with the Garre

political rebels (Key Informant XIII).

This finding was important because it helped shed some light on why the support for

consociational democracy declined in 2013 compared to 2017 – in the 2013 election cycle,

the Garre were united but following the fallouts in 2017, the rebels teamed up with Degodia

to oppose negotiated democracy. Moreover, the study was persuaded that the elite in the

community were unwilling or lacked the motivation to bridge the inter-clan cleavages. The

results were also interpreted to mean that a clan’s representation in the negotiations was

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not a high ranking priority to some of the respondents compared to other factors like equity

in resource allocation.

Based on this finding, the study inferred that inclusion was varied and not just about the

physical presence of group representatives in decision making; provided the decisions were

fair in the opinion of the respondents, that would be sufficient as pointed out by a Garre

participant in the males FGD:

For me, the most important thing is fairness especially in sharing the available

opportunities and resources. My clan does not need to be represented in the

negotiations for this to happen (Respondent P).

Such an interpretation adds clarity to the emphasis Lijphart (2012) gives to the idea of

inclusivity as a success factor in consociational negotiated democracy as a pathway to

peaceful coexistence. The major argument stemming from the finding that the study made

was that perception of equity in resource sharing was seen as a synonym to inclusivity by

the respondents. The study thus agrees with Cederman, Wimmera and Min (2010) that

ethnic groups rebel and initiate conflicts when they are excluded from power. It is

noteworthy that over one third of the respondents (34%) were of the contrary view that

inclusion of their representatives motivated their support for consociational democracy. In

this regard, the study concluded that this group believed that their political survival was

only guaranteed by people with whom they shared some primordial characteristics.

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4.4.9 Consociational Negotiated Democracy as the Only Realistic Pathway to an

Elective Political Office for Small Clans

The pie chart in Figure 4.7 shows the findings on the respondents’ views in relation to

consociationalism as the only realistic path for small clans to occupy political office and

hence mitigate ethno-political conflicts.

Figure 4.7: An avenue for small clans to hold county political office

Source: Field data, 2019

From the pie chart, 40% of the respondents strongly agreed that consociationalism was the

only realistic path for small clans to hold any county or national elective political office in

the county, and thus avert ethnically motivated political conflicts. A further 17% agreed

with the statement while 32% of the respondents did not concur with the statement. The

rest, 11% expressed indifference in response to this question.

The study findings suggest that small clans had no chance of ascending to political office

outside the consociational negotiated democracy model. The finding could as well mean

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that the bigger clans have monopolized the county political leadership and it would take a

different approach to politics other than majoritarianism for smaller clans to get a chance

at exercising political power. The study findings may also signify that collusion between

the numerically significant clans can perpetually deny the smaller clans political power.

Such an eventuality would then mean endless struggles and instability as the small clans

seek to show their strength by resorting to violence.

In political processes, the struggle by groups, big or small, to access and maintain political

power is the clearest indication yet that no group wants to perpetually and voluntarily have

its political fate determined by another. Acquisition of political power presupposes access

to all resources, including the instruments or means by which to maintain that power, be

they consensual or non-consensual. The study concurs with Cheeseman (2011) that in the

absence of elite cohesion to initiate cooperation to share power between them – and by

extension the constituencies they represent, perceptions of victimhood increase among

smaller groups and this serves to perpetuate instability as they are inclined to adopt

violence as their modus operandi. Thus consociationalism as a pathway out of ethnic-

based political violence would work for all groups, provided elite decisions and patterns of

cooperation are properly configured.

The 32% that expressed disagreement with the statement was considered significant by the

study because the implication is that there were other means other than consociationalism

for smaller clans to access political power, their inferior numerical strength

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notwithstanding. The study assumed that these other methods could include pre-election

alliances that did not necessarily conform to the pillars of consociationalism.

4.4.10 Other Reasons that Influence Adoption of Consociational Negotiated

Democracy

In this question, the study intended to find out whether there were reasons other than those

suggested in the Likert scale that motivated the communities living in Mandera County to

consider consociational negotiated democracy as a useful strategy in managing ethno-

political conflicts. A thematic analysis of the responses highlights the unity of the larger

Somali community as paramount, their clan differences notwithstanding. That the practice

is advocated for by elders renders it worthy of consideration given the immense respect

that they command from the community as guardians of the common good. A Garre

participant in the females FGD corroborated this perspective thus:

One of the undeniable facts is that we are Somalis first before our membership to

our different clans. A non-Somali and indeed many Somalis cannot pinpoint the

difference between a Garre and a Degodia or Murulle. Thus the unity and

preservation of our culture as Somalis supersedes that of individual clans. Such an

agenda driven by the elders whom we respect as the custodians of our culture and

public good will to a very large extend tend to get support from the community

members (Respondent E).

This view was also corroborated by a PBO key informant who said that:

The institution of elders is highly respected within the Somali community because

since time immemorial, it is them that have been making most of the decisions

involving conflict resolution which have in many times ended inter-clan rivalries,

their aim being unity of the Somali community (Respondent XV).

Analysis of the above finding indicates the importance of cultural institutions such as the

council of elders in decision making and the value of unity and harmony attached to it by

the Somali clans. However, these ties and the desire for unity and harmony, though in sync

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with the consociational argument that cooperation breeds stability (Lijphart, 2012) does

not seem to be the reality in Mandera County given the recurrence of violent conflicts

grounded in politics. This study argues that the high political stakes among the clans

participating coupled with exclusion grievances in the electoral processes breed hostilities

and accentuate clan differences and consequently violence to the detriment of

consociationalism. In essence, the manner in which ethnicity is used in the politics and

governance of Mandera county as established and discussed under section 4.6 of this study

is the problem because it excludes and antagonizes rather than include and integrate all

segments.

The study also established that there exists the fear of self-annihilation among the Somali

clans. This finding was intertwined with the common saying in the community that: ‘the

Somali comes ahead of the Murulle, Degodia or Garre’. This finding was succinctly

elaborated by a Garre key informant in an interview who said thus:

My son (referring to the researcher), we all come from families which together form

a community. The community members by virtue of lineage share certain attributes

that make them identify with each other by default. Imagine members from related

families fighting over things they can discuss and resolve? If the fighting continues

for long, the community will no longer exist. So it is up to the leaders of the

community to help their kin find alternative ways of settling disagreements (Key

Informant VI).

The fear of self-annihilation of homogenous yet heterogeneous populations is not unique

to the Somali community in Mandera County. In spite of the cleavages at the clan and sub-

clans, the Somali identity is the aggregate of all these other identities and it gives them

distinctiveness at the national level. On this basis, one can arguably and quite convincingly

point to the instrumentalization of ethnicity, depending on the purpose and context of its

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usage (Woolcock, 1998). To the extent that the Somali language flows across constituent

clans, the Islamic religion dominant in all clans, it would follow that the constituent clans

will tend to cooperate and support consociational negotiated democracy because after all

the clans are just but members of an extended family called the Somali that must be

protected. It is the contention of this study that the reality of self-annihilation at the higher

level of identification favors a more moderate behaviour among sub-groups rather than a

hardline one when it comes to political negotiations.

The study further established that the adoption of negotiated democracy in the management

of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County was encouraged by the National Cohesion

and Integration Commission (NCIC), in exercise of its mandate to promote alternative

dispute resolution mechanisms that thaw ethnic relations. There were also respondents who

indicated the need to comply with the provisions of Article 174 (d) and (e) which

emphasize the right of communities to manage their own affairs and the protection and

promotion of the rights and interests of minorities and marginalized communities.

Inclusion of all interested parties in the political matrix as contemplated by the supreme

law was thus perceived as only possible through the consociational negotiated democracy

model. On compliance with the law, a national government key informant noted thus:

The communities living in Mandera County are citizens of Kenya, irrespective of

their ethnic or clan identities. Thus, any action undertaken by or in the name of the

community must be in conformity with the provisions of the law, precisely the NCIC

Act 2008 and Article 174 of the Constitution of Kenya (Key Informant XIV).

The role of the NCIC was found to have been particularly instrumental in supporting the

elders from across the clans reach out and find a workable solution that promotes the rights

and interests of all clans in order to enhance peace and stability. It however emerged that

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the negotiations, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter, were not inclusive in terms of clan

representation. The study thus takes the view that exclusion of significant segments (clans)

undermined the roll out of consociational negotiated democracy in the manner

contemplated by the legal framework cited above and it is no wonder that the 2017 electoral

cycle saw stiff opposition to consociational negotiated democracy compared to the 2013

electoral cycle.

From the above responses and discussion, it is evident that the Somali community in

Mandera County has deep respect for the institution of the elders and it believes that

decisions made by the elders are usually in the best interests of the community. The pursuit

of unity and fear of communal self-annihilation were significant factors in favour of

adoption of consociational negotiated democracy. This partly explains why some of the

active political actors agreed with the elders to step down even when such an action meant

that their political careers would come to an end. Moreover, there is an appreciation of the

effort of national institutions such as the NCIC working in concert with cultural institutions

in entrenching consociationalism in the promotion of peaceful ethnic relations.

4.4.11 Extend of Support for Consociational Negotiated Democracy in Managing

Ethno-Political Conflicts

In this question, the researcher sought to establish the extent to which the respondents

supported the practice of consociationalism in the management of ethno-political conflicts

and the findings were as illustrated in Figure 4.8.

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Figure 4.8: Support for consociationalism in management of ethno-political conflicts

Source: Field data, 2019

Figure 4.8 manifests that a majority of the respondents at 57% did not support

consociational negotiated democracy, while 43% of them supported it, indicating a major

shift in opinion going by the results presented and analyzed under this objective. Based on

this finding, the study sought to establish the reasons why the majority of the respondents

did not support consociational negotiated democracy in the 2017 election cycle compared

to the 2013 cycle and the explanations are discussed below.

A thematic assessment indicated that the respondents who do not support consociational

negotiated democracy argued that the practice undermined true traditional democracy.

Viewed against the biodata of respondents, it was determined that this particular response

was popular with nearly half (48%) of the total Garre clan respondents and more than three

quarters (78%) of the total Murulle and Degodia clan respondents. The analysis further

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revealed that slightly more than half of this group of respondents (52%) had a post primary

level of education and their average age was 39 years. The findings suggest that

consociational negotiated democracy has more backing from the Garre compared to the

Murulle or the Degodia clans. The finding further is indicative of its popularity with the

educated youthful segment of the population who presumably understood the tenets of an

ideal democracy and were convinced that what was happening in Mandera County under

the consociational model was inconsistent with those ideals.

The study further deduced that the youthful educated population did not support

consociationalism because of the failure of its promoters to involve them in decision

making. As argued in section 4.3.2, educational attainment was found to elevate this group

to a position where they can assess and determine whether constituent components of

democracy are in place before supporting or rejecting any of its perceived variations.

Despite the low formal literacy levels (KNBS, 2017), it would appear that the community

in Mandera County is politically literate, at least in respect of their understanding of

democracy. This contention is given more impetus by the finding that it was dominant

among respondents in the active production band who were beneficiaries of formal

education. A respondent had noted in their questionnaire response that consociational

negotiated democracy was “promoting (political) dictatorship” among the masses, a

finding that was corroborated and summed up by a Degodia participant in the males FGD

thus:

Consociational negotiated democracy undermines democracy and instils a culture of

political dictatorship by the elders, who have reduced voting to a crowning exercise

rather than a decision making process. Women and youth are excluded from

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negotiations; sort of treated like children and incapable of making any useful

contribution to our community’s politics (Respondent S).

Another response in support of the above view was given by a Garre key informant during

an interview who observed that:

Most people especially the younger generation feel that negotiated democracy is

marginalizing them in terms of actively participating in the political process. They

feel that their candidates who are popular but not having the financial muscle are

unfairly elbowed out of the race with promises of other opportunities coming to the

community which cannot be guaranteed (Key Informant XI).

The excerpts above point to the level of disaffection and disappointment segments of the

Mandera County population had regarding consociational negotiated democracy. Women

and youth who are significant actors in the political life of the community did not approve

of the practice because of its monopoly by the male elite and the elders in the political

arrangements of their cultural communities. In light of this challenge, these disenfranchised

groups working with anti-consociational negotiated democracy voices in a bid to defend

their political rights, resulted to the use of violence which ultimately undermined the very

stability that consociational negotiated democracy was argued to usher (Lijphart, 2012).

Respondents also cited the fact that politicians were funding the negotiations as reason

enough to reject it. Such an approach in their view made the process flawed ab initio, citing

the maxim that ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’. The finding on the source of funding

as deterring support for consociational negotiated democracy found expression from across

the clans, age and levels of education notwithstanding. A vast majority of the respondents

aged between 21-50 years expressed strong disapproval, noting that whether directly or

through proxies, politicians manipulated the elders to favour their bid during the

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negotiations. However, even though the elders interviewed unanimously agreed that

politicians contributed financially towards meeting the negotiations costs, they maintained

that such funding was voluntary and not obligatory and it did not in any way influence

them.

This study was persuaded by the assertions made by the respondents that the source of

funding tainted the process and rendered it vulnerable to manipulation by the funders or

their proxies. The claims were further supported by Onapajo’s (2015) finding that political

corruption in African politics is deep-rooted and stretches beyond the pecuniary dimension.

The study concurred with Cheeseman (2015) that individual and group investment in

political processes particularly in Africa is never for philanthropic or altruistic purposes.

In the case of Mandera County, the funding by politicians undermines negotiations

irrespective of how well intentioned or altruistic it is because even when one loses fairly,

they could still have a justification and campaign arsenal to attack the negotiators and hence

the process, casting perceptions of bias which are difficult to erode. The subject of

politicians funding the negotiation process became even more significant in the 2017

election cycle compared to the 2013 cycle with respondents pointing out that the stakes

were too high and there was a deeper understanding of devolution and the resources

accruing to the county from it. A PBO key informant explained this situation in an

interview:

The stakes in the 2017 election cycle was higher than in 2013 because within the

first five years of devolution, the public got to understand the devolved system of

governance and the amount of resources accruing to the county from the national

government. People had also observed the manner in which political power and

positions were inequitably shared in the county (Key Informant III).

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Another finding in support of rejection of consociational negotiated democracy was given

as the predisposition by big clans to bully the smaller clans by allocating them smaller non-

influential positions. A Degodia key informant aptly captured this claim as follows:

Politics is about power and numbers and in the case of our county, the Garre who are

the majority will always take the positions of governor, senator and women

representative, unless the Degodia and Murulle unite. Our two clans have no chance

of occupying elective county offices because of small numbers and historical rivalry.

Negotiated democracy can only benefit the Garre (Key Informant XIII).

It would appear based on this finding that the Garre overran the interests of the Degodia

and the Murulle and this explains why members of the two clans did not strongly favour

consociational negotiated democracy as currently practiced in Mandera County. The

incentives for cooperation for the Garre were limited and where need be; they were skewed

towards the numerically smaller Murulle clan. This study argues that were it not for the

provisions of the CoK on the need for inclusivity in appointments and fairness in resource

sharing, the dominant Garre-aligned leadership would ride roughshod on the numerically

inferior Murulle and Degodia clans, unless the two united. The arguments on mutual veto

made by Lijphart (2012) where segments checkmate each other do not suffice in the context

of Mandera County partly because of Garre’s numerical strength.

From the findings presented above, it is evident that the level of support that consociational

negotiated democracy model had in 2013 dropped in 2017 and the main reason for the drop

is because the practice as executed in Mandera County does not accord the general

populace an opportunity to exercise their democratic right, both in elections and

governance. Majority of the people perceive the practice as entrenching political autocracy

and reducing them into passive beings that have no private political preferences. This

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category of respondents appears to be offended by the decision of elders to relegate them

to the position of mere voters whose private choices are subservient to their interests

camouflaged as ‘community interests’. This observation is in sync with Dixon’s (2018)

assertion that consociational democracy is not only elitist but also reinforces alienation

rather than alleviating it.

4.5 The Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

Consociational negotiated democracy is one of the variants of democracy intended to

accommodate the segments in plural societies in the politics of the concerned polity. In

order to understand how consociational negotiated democracy is organized in Mandera

County, a number of closed and open ended questions were developed to help generate

data which is presented and discussed in this section. Some of the questions were

contingent in nature so that particular respondents who have participated in the process

could offer in-depth information.

4.5.1 Inclusion of All Clans in the Negotiation Team

The study sought to establish whether all clans were represented in the negotiating team

and the findings were as presented in Table 4.10. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree;

N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).

Table 4.10: Inclusion of all clans in consociational negotiated democracy

SA A N D SD

F % F % F % F % F %

Consociational negotiated

democracy team comprises all

clans, including corner clans in

Mandera County.

9 3 15 5 21 7 93 31 163 54

Source: Field data, 2019

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The findings show that more than three quarters of the respondents (85%) disagreed that

the negotiation team comprised of all clans, with more than half of this dissenting group of

respondents, 54% strongly disagreeing. Only 8% of the respondents agreed all clans were

represented in the negotiations as a further 7% were neutral.

The findings suggest that some of the clans do not have representatives in the negotiations

team to articulate their interests. They may also mean the negotiations were spearheaded

by one of the clans that did not extent invitations to all clans. The high disagreement rate

could also be indicating that the promoters of consociationalism did not intent that every

clan is represented in the actual negotiations. The findings could also mean that pre-

existing differences among clans are still intact and the elites are not willing to cooperate.

These findings are reiterated by (Lijphart, 2012) who maintains that for consociational

democracy to be effective and successful, the negotiation team must include elites from the

significant segments of the population. However, the finding that not all clans were

represented in the negotiations was a strong indicator that consociationalism as conceived

and practiced in Mandera County deviated from one of its cardinal tenets – inclusivity. It

is this study’s contention that the exclusion radicalized elites from the marginalized clans

and this served to destabilize the polity. It is paradoxical that a process touted as a paradigm

shift in the practice of politics in plural societies such as Mandera County ignores the very

foundations of the practice it purports to be. The findings provide insights into the declining

support for consociational negotiated democracy, especially when the 2013 and 2017

cycles are juxtaposed as established in section 4.4.11.

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4.5.2 Restriction of Negotiation Team to Garre, Murulle and Degodia Clans Only

The findings of the study in respect of the possibility of restriction of negotiation team

membership to the Garre, Murulle and the Degodia were as shown in Table 4.11.

(SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree;

F=Frequency; %=Percentage).

Table 4.11: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to Garre, Murulle and

Degodia clans only

SA A N D SD

F % F % F % F % F %

Restriction of

consociational negotiated

democracy team to Garre,

Murulle and Degodia clans

only.

36 12 114 38 6 2 109 36 36 12

Source: Field data, 2019

The study findings indicate that half of the respondents, 50% agreed that the negotiation

team comprised of representatives from the Garre, Murulle and Degodia clans. An almost

similar number of respondents, 48% disagreed with the statement while only 2% were

neutral. Based on these findings, it can be deduced that the respondents were not very sure

that all the three clans are involved in the negotiation. The nearly equal split in opinion

among respondents with regard to the statement may also be interpreted to mean that there

are divisions within each clan as to whether it’s represented in the negotiation team or not.

As demonstrated in the clan affiliation findings and discussion in section 4.3.5, the

mentioned three clans form the bulk of the population in the county of Mandera. The three

clans have not had a good working relationship thereby giving reasons to perceptions of

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distrust among the implied ethnic groups. The study found no clear evidence that the

negotiation team comprised of the Garre, Murulle and Degodia clans.

4.5.3 Restriction of Negotiation Team to the Garre Clan

The study sought to establish whether the negotiation team comprised of members drawn

from the dominant Garre clan and the findings were as shown in Table 4.12. (SA=Strongly

Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency;

%=Percentage).

Table 4.12: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to one major clan

SA A N D SD

F % F % F % F % F %

Consociational negotiated

democracy team comprises

Garre clan only.

126 42 102 34 18 6 38 12 17 6

Source: Field data, 2019

The results indicate that 42% of the respondents strongly agreed that the negotiation team

is restricted to the Garre clan, a position that was supported by a further 34% of the

respondents. Approximately 18% of the participants expressed disagreement with the

statement while 6% were neutral.

The findings suggest that the Garre clan was the main promoter of consociational

negotiated democracy and as the majority clan, they had a strong desire for peace and

stability in the county of Mandera. The dissenting opinion by 18% of the respondents could

be construed to mean that other clans were involved, although on a very small scale. The

strong position taken by the respondents in support of the statement that the Garre were the

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only clan driving the negotiations can be interpreted as follows: this is the most dominant

clan in the county, implying that whenever a violent conflict erupts, its members suffer the

greatest loss. It would therefore be in the interest of the clan to pursue any approach that

cuts on their losses without necessarily losing their dominance in the political landscape.

The ideas of proportionality as advanced by consociational model of governance could thus

be appealing to the clan as it does not take away their dominance. Moreover, its location

between two Degodia groups (the majority in Wajir County which borders Mandera

County to the South and Southern Ethiopia) with whom the Garre have had a long standing

rivalry, could be understood contextually as an effort at self-preservation in the face of

adversity.

4.5.4 Restriction of Negotiation Team to Two of the Three Major Clans

The study sought to establish whether the negotiation team comprised of members from

either two of the three major clans and the findings were as presented in Table 4.13.

(SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree;

F=Frequency; %=Percentage).

Table 4.13: Restriction of consociational negotiated democracy team to two of the three

major clans

SA A N D SD

F % F % F % F % F %

Consociational negotiated

democracy team comprises

either two of the three big

clans.

165 56 82 27 30 10 24 8 0 0

Source: Field data, 2019

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The study found out that 56% of the respondents strongly agreed that the negotiation team

membership was an alliance of either two of the three major clans living in Mandera

County, a view supported by 27% more of the respondents. However, 8% of the

respondents disagreed with while those who expressed indifference with regard to the

statement in focus were 10%. None of the respondents strongly disagreed with the question

statement.

The study findings affirm that the negotiation team membership represents two clans that

have had a working political cooperation. The findings also pointed to the salience of inter-

clan alliance building for political power contestation in Mandera County. The study

findings are a manifestation of practical politics as executed in Mandera County. Inter-clan

relations in the larger Northern Kenya have never been cordial, and particularly with regard

to electoral activities (Carrier & Kochere, 2014).

From a political contestation perspective, all the clans know that they cannot win any of

the county seats without cooperating with one of the other two. Although the Garre are the

majority, they cannot overpower a coalition of the Murulle and the Degodia. Historically,

the Garre consider the Murulle as less threatening and that they are better off being in an

alliance with them. The Murulle, aware of their numerical inferiority and the territorial

claims to Mandera County made by the Garre have forged a working political relationship

with the Garre for protection from the Degodia and to benefit politically as well, their other

grievances against the Garre clan notwithstanding.

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The finding on coalition of two of the three big clans as comprising the negotiating team

was confirmed by a Garre interviewee who noted thus:

The Garre and Murulle have always had a good working relationship at least

politically because the latter recognize their small numbers and if left on their own,

they would not win anything. So the agreement allows the Murulle take the deputy

governor position and the Lafey Parliamentary Seat in addition to some appointive

positions in the county government. Such a deal and the threat of losing out if the

Garre worked with the Degodia (which is highly unlikely because the Degodia

control Wajir County and are intruders in Mandera County), the Murulle agree (Key

Informant VI).

The elder’s response gives insights into the reasons why the Degodia were strongly

opposed to consociational negotiated democracy. It is important to note that the inter-clan

level of negotiations applies to county level positions such as the governor, deputy

governor, senator and the women representative positions and some parliamentary seats.

4.5.5 Composition of Negotiating Team in Terms of Gender

The study sought to establish whether the gender dimension was an important

consideration in the formation of the negotiating teams in the consociational governance

process. This is because gender is an important construct in conflict management, which

should be taken into account. The findings were as illustrated in Figure 4.9.

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Figure 4.9: Inclusion of males and females in the negotiation team

Source: Field data, 2019

The findings demonstrate that an absolute majority of the respondents, that is 98%,

indicated that the negotiation team was not comprised of both men and women while 2%

of the participants were of the view that the team comprised individuals drawn from both

sexes.

The finding denotes that women are not part of the negotiations. This finding explains the

traditional and strict observation of cultural beliefs of the Somali community and

particularly the clans living in Mandera County. This question was brought up in the FGDs

and some of the responses given are presented below:

In the Somali culture, politics and generally community matters are a preserve of

male elders. This has been part of our tradition because unlike women, a man will

always remain to be a member of his clan. Women on the other hand can be married

in other clans and they have to be loyal to their husbands’ clan. They are regarded as

part of the husbands’ family and the children they bear are identified with the

husband’s clan. The Somali culture is patrilineal. Thus, women cannot be part of the

team negotiating the interests of a clan. (Respondent N from the males FGD)

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Another response from the females FGD noted thus:

Women are assumed to be untrustworthy in community decision making simply

because some of us may have been born in one clan but married in another. Some of

these traditions are unfair because they disadvantage us and deny us our voice in

political decision making. Not even women of ages commensurate to that of the male

elders can be included in the negotiations despite some having been married into the

husbands’ clans and lived in family life for over 50 years. We are still treated as

strangers by the very people for whom we bear and raise children. (Respondent G)

The study findings were clear that women are not given an opportunity to participate in

any processes or activities that involve decision making on behalf of their clans.

Based on the above presentations, the responses emanating from the FGDs explicitly

manifest that the male members of the Somali community in Mandera County, clan

notwithstanding, are not ready to cede ground in terms of accommodating women in the

negotiations for an inclusive governance structure that will reduce ethno-political and

interested group conflicts. The arguments in support of women exclusion are merely

cultural and have nothing to do with the ability of women to make meaningful contributions

during negotiations towards a political process that fosters a cohesive coexistence. Women

on the other hand feel oppressed and denied an opportunity to actively participate in

making decisions that affect their lives as envisaged in Article 174 of the CoK.

The younger generation particularly that has had the benefit of an education and own

finances feel that women need to be included in those negotiations because they can act as

bridges between clans given their loyalty on account of birth and marriage. Thus, the

question of gender exclusion in decision making remains a highly contested matter which

must be tackled if consociational negotiated democracy is to embody its true meaning.

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4.5.6 Youth Inclusion in Negotiations

The research pursued to find out the place of the youth in the negotiations as an important

and active demographic in modern political spaces as expressed in the African Youth

Charter (2006). The findings were as illustrated in Figure 4.10.

Figure 4.10: Inclusion of youth in negotiation teams

Source: Field data, 2019

From Figure 4.10, nearly all the respondents, 98%, indicated that the youth were left out

of the negotiations. Only 2% of the respondents opined that youths are included in the

negotiation team. The study attributed the exclusion of the youth from negotiations to the

stringent cultural dictates of the wider Somali community which view young people as

unfit to make decisions on behalf of their clans. Youth exclusion in political decision

making spheres appears to be a problem in the wider African continent as argued by the

UNDP (2012). The net effect of excluding this significant segment of the population has

been their strong opposition and campaign against consociational negotiated democracy.

The study notes that the youth are very energetic and versatile and tend to be easily

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mobilized by the established political actors against consociational negotiated democracy

to campaign against the candidates endorsed in the negotiations and in some instances

cause chaos. Including them in the process thus gives them a voice and makes them feel

part of the process. It would further foster a sense of ownership and make them responsible

as they learn the leadership dynamics of the society they live in.

4.5.7 Beliefs Shaping Consociational Negotiated Democracy

The research sought to establish whether there were any beliefs, cultural or religious that

shaped the peoples’ desire for consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. In

terms of cultural beliefs, the study established that the community trusted the elders as

having their best interests at heart and this trust contributed to the acceptance of

consociational negotiated democracy in the community. An elderly female respondent who

was the head of her household explained thus:

Our community is closely knit along the clan system because several families make

up a clan. So in case of anything, the clan comes together and shares the matter

amongst members and the issue is sorted. Even for someone like me who is a widow,

I still feel the family warmth and the elders are always at hand to support and take up

any matter that is of concern to me (Respondent 2).

In an interview with a Murulle key informant, the respondent noted that:

Consociational negotiated democracy is a very fair system of rotating the community

leadership among the various clans. This reduces exclusion sentiments that different

clans may have, especially the numerically smaller ones. That way, every member of

our larger Somali community feels accommodated and this encourages peaceful

coexistence among clans (Key Informant IV).

The place of elders in dispute resolution is clear from the foregoing and is further reiterated

by Kariuki (2015), who affirms their contribution in governance for effective and stable

society. This serves to enhance the study finding that belief system and cultural institutions

were important in shaping the course of negotiated democracy in Mandera County. Given

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their positions and the fact that they were also heads of households, there was a strong

position among respondents that an elder cannot preside over something that was

detrimental to the wellbeing of the community. The study further found that the Somali

language acted as a major unifying factor in that irrespective of one’s clan, he or she still

had a responsibility to the larger Somali community, thus any effort aimed at enhancing

the unity was welcome.

From the FGDs, it was found that teachings of the Islamic religion on peaceful settlement

of disputes played a major role in negotiations. A respondent noted that according to the

Islamic teachings, justice and fairness as well as good intention should always guide the

action of every true believer, sentiments which are reiterated in section 4.4.4 of this chapter.

This finding contradicted Nguyen (2010) whose findings indicated that there was no

significant relationship between religion and ethnic conflicts. However, whereas Nguyen

explored religion and ethnic conflicts in terms of causality, this study explored the same in

terms of management. It therefore becomes clear that religious teachings influence the

adoption of consociational negotiated democracy because of its emphasis on fairness. A

religious leader in an interview explained that:

The religion of Islam is about peace and not violence as many non-Muslims seem to

believe because of the distorted explanations of Jihad by extremists. The name of the

religion itself means peace. During negotiations, the elders have breakout sessions

during which they pray for consensus among themselves and Allah’s grace to make

the best decisions in the interest of the community. You notice also that most of the

people in this county are practicing Muslims. So, yes, religion shapes the kind of

consociationalism practiced in Mandera County (Key Informant II).

The findings indicate the place of culture in the formation of consociational negotiated

democracy. In particular, the study highlights the central role of elders and religion in the

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day to day political life of the county and the communities therein. Other aspects of culture

that emerged in the responses and which have a bearing on consociational negotiated

democracy included relationship patterns between various demographics in the Somali

community and the respondents’ interpretations of the behaviour exhibited by elders as

well as political leaders. The study takes the view that culture is a derivative of both

personal and group experiences and perceptions and will invariably affect the way such

individuals or groups receive a particular practice based on those experiences and the

forecast they project for their future.

4.5.8 Terms of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

The research sought to know the terms of consociational negotiated democracy as practiced

in Mandera County. One of the key terms of the process that emerged from the study was

that the agreements emanating from the negotiation process must demonstrate equity in the

sharing of power and particularly elective positions. In support of this perspective, a Garre

interviewee explained that:

The overriding interest during negotiations is to ensure every constituent clan gets a

fair share of elective and appointive positions from those available for sharing (Key

Informant VI).

The sharing of political power among the significant segments of the population was

advanced as helpful in the creation of an enabling environment in which all members could

fully participate in the governance of their county. This finding resonates with Lehmbruch

(2006) assertion that consociationalism functions optimally under conditions of

proportionality.

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The study, however, argues that the proportionality contemplated in the consociational

negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County is only limited to the clans

cooperating in the political governance process. This deviates from the proportionality

principle contemplated by the proponents of consociationalism in the sense that a coalition

of two clans leaves out a significant segment that can turn to work against stability and

coexistence in the county.

The second key finding on the terms of consociational negotiated democracy was

imposition of time lines, precisely five years after which the stakeholders review the

political governance of their polity and particularly the quality of leadership offered by

those given the opportunity to lead through elections. The study established that the

timeline is intentionally fixed to coincide with the general elections as provided for by the

CoK. The review was intended to offer opportunities for rotation of the leadership mantle

among sub clans within the various ethnic populations of the county. The study further

established that the review had its focus on sub-clans. This finding indicates the complexity

of the consociationalism in Mandera i.e. it is more of an intra-clan undertaking but

numerical dynamics implied that the stage for negotiation was moved to the clan level. The

finding on the clan and intra-clan levels of engagement resonates with Lijphart’s (2012)

assertion that consociationalism is favored by overarching group loyalties. In other words,

this finding implies that people have multiple loyalties, precisely rising from the sub-clan

to clan and eventually the community. The finding is further corroborated by the responses

from key informant interviews as follows:

The inclusion of leaders from across the sub-clans is very important because the

leaders have some influence on whether their followers accept or reject the

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negotiation outcomes. There is no doubt the masses will tend to align themselves with

a particular individual or group of elites they think represent their interests and

aspirations particularly those from their own sub-clans or sub-clans they have a

working relationship with. (PBO Key Informant III)

I am a beneficiary of negotiated democracy and I can tell you for sure the system is

the most ideal. Other than the rotation of leadership, the timelines given push a leader

to do their best in serving the people so that they can also be considered in the future

when their current term comes to an end. (Murulle Key Informant VIII)

Another finding of the study in respect of the question on terms of consociational

negotiated democracy was that the system lets individual clans have control on matters that

affect them only, including making choices on specific candidates they wish to present for

election. In essence, the clans have their individual consultations and consensus building

on the candidate to present to the community for consideration for election as the candidate

who best represents the interests of the wider clan and who can secure a win against their

political opponents at the ballot or even for appointment in cases of appointive positions in

the county government. The study considers this arrangement akin to one of the conditions

given by Lijphart (2012) for consociational democracy to work; that segments should have

exclusive control on matters specific to them. The challenge with segmental autonomy is

that it tends to feed into the nationalist agenda and this has the potential for creating

instability. This is besides accentuating group differences even when they are not that

pronounced. This study takes the position that segmental autonomy as advocated by

consociational theorists is not entirely the silver bullet in forestalling the falling out of

groups in a consociational model; it can actually facilitate the disintegration.

The study also established that for one to be considered as a negotiator in the democratic

space, he has to be an elder from his respective clan and he has to be nominated by that

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particular clan. In this regard, the study noted that every clan has a team of elders who offer

guidance to help the clan in taking common positions on matters germane to them. Elite

decision making and interactions shape the outcomes of a regime, an argument augmented

by the findings of a study conducted by Osei (2018) in Ghana. Inter-elite consultations help

minimize re-entry problems after negotiations. The study further established that an elder

must have unequivocal support and command respect and authority of peers who are not

on the negotiation team to forestall factionalism in the community. Within the meaning of

consociationalism, this study found out that there has to be consensus among elites from

cooperating significant segments for negotiation outcomes to materialize.

From the foregoing findings and discussions in respect of the terms of consociational

negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County, the study concludes that the

consociationalism practiced in Mandera County is not in perfect harmony with the tenets

advanced by the consociational school led by Lijphart. The consultations at the sub-clan

level in Mandera County prior to the inter-clan processes do not seem to feature anywhere

in Lijphart’s conceptualization. This could have been informed by the treatment of clans

as ethnic groups within the larger Somali community and sub-clans as ethnic groups within

a clan. Whereas the clans are the building blocks of the Somali ethnic group, the sub-clans

are the building blocks of the clan. It would therefore follow that the concept of ‘Somali

community’ is instrumentally used outside Mandera County when pursuing other interests,

otherwise, within the county, individuals and groups identify themselves with either their

sub-clans or their clans, whichever is convenient at a given point in time, depending on the

circumstances. The study therefore contends that consociational negotiated democracy can

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happen at multiple levels depending on the meaning of a significant segment adopted by

the analyst and the levels of differentiation and identification within a society.

4.5.9 Role of Political Leaders in Consociational Negotiated Democracy

The study pursued to examine the role of political leaders in the establishment of

consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. The findings of the study in this

regard are as discussed in the following paragraphs.

The study established that one of the main functions of political leaders in the establishment

of consociational negotiated democracy is funding of the process. The study established

that politicians contribute the highest percentage of the negotiation process budget with the

remainder being topped up by community members, especially business men. Mobilization

of supporters to accept and support the decisions reached by the team of negotiators was

also found to be another key role played by political leaders in the organization of

consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. These two roles were repeated

in the FGDs and interviews which noted that:

Political leaders are a very important component in the realization of the success of

consociational negotiated democracy because of the influence they have on their

supporters. If they incite their supporters against the elders and the negotiation

outcomes, implementation becomes very difficult. They also contribute their

resources in funding the negotiations (Key Informant I).

Politicians contribute financial resources to fund the process besides having a strong

influence on their supporters. When they tell the supporters to do something, there is

a high chance many of them will do what they are told by their political leader,

whether good or bad. Their influence in the success of negotiated democracy cannot

be underestimated (Respondent N).

These findings were found to be in agreement with those of Segawa (2015) whose study

established that regimes emerging from ethnic based politics tend to suffer from legitimacy

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deficits for a variety of reasons such as marginalization of minority groups and political

leaders.

The study further established that political leaders also take direct role in the negotiations

by appearing before the panel of negotiators to make a case for their candidature and

suitability for consideration to the political offices they are seeking to hold. Such an

arrangement makes the political leaders part and parcel of the process. However, the study

noted that some political leaders have disagreed with the outcomes even after participating

and competed outside the consociational negotiated democracy framework. A Garre

interviewee who vied for a parliamentary seat against the consociational negotiated

democracy candidate and won pointed out in an interview that:

Consociational negotiated democracy is a good idea but unfortunately, some of the

negotiators are out rightly biased. They consider one’s financial status more

important than their leadership abilities. I disagreed with them when they invited me

for discussions to build consensus on a common candidate, ran my own campaign

even as they campaigned against me and I still won because my supporters believed

in me and felt my competitor was being imposed on them (Key Informant X).

This response supports the argument that political leaders are influential among their

followers and can lead them in supporting or opposing negotiation outcomes, dealing a

blow to the whole process. An FGD participant noted that by politicians directly

participating in the negotiations, whether they agreed or disagreed with the outcome, that

in itself gave the process some legitimacy.

Respondents were unequivocal that political leaders are crucial to the negotiation process

and excluding them would cause them to sabotage the process in different ways such as

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withholding their financial support, marshalling their supporters to undermine the

negotiation outcomes as well as denying the process the political goodwill it requires. The

centrality of political leaders in consociational negotiated democracy as a political vehicle

to power is further lend credence by the practice of patrimonial politics in Africa

(Cheeseman, 2015). Mandera County is no exception to the patronage-based politics that

define Kenya’s and by extension Africa’s political landscape.

4.5.10 Generation of Negotiations Agenda

The researcher sought to establish the manner or process through which the agenda guiding

the negotiations for consociational democratic process is generated. The findings in light

of this research concern were as discussed hereunder.

The study established that one of the ways through which the agenda for negotiations was

obtained was by way of stakeholder consultations. A Murulle interviewee explained the

agenda generation process thus:

Everything that we do is always in the interest of the community. We consult with

them on every matter. Sometimes it is the community members who approach us with

their concerns. We listen to their fears and aspirations. A concerned person or group

raises the issue with an elder in the sub-clan, who then considers it together with other

elders and escalates it to the clan or inter-clan level if it cannot be exhausted at the

lower levels (Key Informant VI).

This claim was reiterated by other key informants from the Murulle clan who maintained

that clan members as key stakeholders share their concerns, interests and views with their

respective elders. At this level, the consultations are limited to the sub-clan level of

discussions. The study established that at this stage, the elders were simultaneously

reaching out to political leaders, religious leaders among other cadres of leadership in the

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community to get their views on the concerns of the community. The elders then present

those interests or concerns to the clan council for fine-tuning and adoption of a common

clan level agenda.

Once the agenda at the clan level has been agreed upon and firmed up, the study established

that the clan elders reach out to their counterparts from other clans, share general areas of

interest for discussion and subsequently plan for a meeting to harmonize the agenda.

During the harmonization meeting, it was established that the elders also agreed on the

optimal number of negotiators to be involved, including how many from each clan. Once

the agenda had been harmonized and the number of negotiators agreed, the elders set a date

for the actual discussions while also reaching out to community members and politicians

to mobilize resources needed to offset the negotiation process costs.

The study however noted that the Degodia interviewees dismissed inter-clan consultations,

arguing that it did not happen because they were not involved in any way, a position that

is corroborated by the study findings as explained in section 4.5.1 y. On the strength of this

argument, the study concluded that the consultations were only between the cooperating

clans – the Garre and the Murulle. Overall, and the dissenting opinion notwithstanding, the

major finding of this study item was found to be congruent with Lederach’s (1997)

assertion that processes emanating from the grassroots have more ownership and hence

better chances of success because of their organic nature; the people can identify with the

outcomes as they participated in the process from conception.

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4.5.11 Discussion of Agenda Items and Consensus building

The researcher sought to evaluate the process through which discussions on the various

agenda items progress. A Garre interviewee explained that:

As community leaders representing different competing interests, we have to agree

on how to go about the negotiations. We make decisions during the first sessions on

who will chair the sessions and hence the official spokesperson. This is followed by

concurrence among members on how to proceed with discussions, including when to

take breaks so that there is order in the meetings. The idea is to ensure civility and

respect for one another, irrespective of conflicting clan positions on matters (Key

Informant VI).

The study established that the initial items in the first meeting were the appointment of a

chairperson who would serve as the team’s spokesperson in its interactions with various

stakeholders and adoption of ground rules as to how the discussions would proceed.

After the ground rules have been set, the study established that the negotiators begin by

categorizing the agenda items in terms of the most contested and complex to the seemingly

easiest. In other words, the negotiation agenda is ranked in order to ensure adequate time

and weight is given for each item. Ranking of the agenda for negotiation is an important

step as it makes the process flow smoothly besides having a psychological effect on the

power of agreement as argued by Elliot and Golub (2015). The actual negotiations begin

with tackling the most complex and contested agenda item. Every negotiator who wishes

to contribute on the agenda item is given an opportunity to make their point. The

chairperson then proceeds to harmonize the emerging points of consensus and difference,

keen on ironing out the differences to pave way for consensus and possibly a unanimous

decision. The study further established that it is during discussions on complex agenda that

emotions are at their peak as each negotiator sticks to their position. Members are given an

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opportunity to consult with their key constituents as well as any advisors they may have. It

is also a moment for members to reflect on each other’s propositions and possibly lobby

each other for their preferred positions. A Murulle interviewee noted that:

During the talks, we take turns to make contributions in a civil and respectful way

even when we don’t agree with each other’s view. We also take breaks to cool off

emotions and consult with our respective constituents on contested issues in order

to ensure broad acceptance of negotiation outcomes. Lobbying is allowed to avoid

as much as possible going for a vote. Votes tend to destroy relations within the

room, hence the avoidance (Key Informant IV).

The drift towards consensus does not mean that the elders cannot take a vote on a contested

matter. The study established that the preference for consensus in decision making among

the negotiators who are basically elders and highly respected people in the community was

intended to minimize re-entry problems. Probed further on the preference for consensus,

the informant explained as follows:

As elders we have a responsibility to guide our people in the direction of peaceful

settlement of disputes and fair sharing of resources. If we disagree among ourselves

on matters that affect us as a community, then how do we bargain for our interests

with non-Somali communities? Lack of consensus among us signifies to our

adversaries the existence of an opportunity for them to divide us further and rule us.

(Key Informant IV)

The argument presented by the elder who was a practicing Muslim is sustained by

Elsamann and Arafa (2012) who stressed “unanimous consensus of the community

(Islamic community) through its competent representatives” as a source of Islamic Sharia

Law. Being a predominantly Muslim community, it is not surprising that religious

teachings and or bases find their way in the Somali community’s affairs, their clan

differences notwithstanding.

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Apart from the use of lobbying as a strategy for reaching consensus among the members

of the negotiating team, the study established that there is the use of emissaries to convince

representatives of clans to reach a common ground. The use of emissaries to obtain

consensus was supported by respondents, irrespective of the method used to obtain data

from them. The study established that the emissaries are normally elders who are not part

of the negotiating team and who understand the pros and cons of issues that are contested.

Their work was to help negotiators understand the issues in contention from different

viewpoints. Use of emissaries is a common practice in negotiations (Sebenius, 2009) aimed

at altering interpersonal dynamics among negotiating parties. The emissary normally is

supposed to enjoy some edge over the person they are sent to persuade and they should

possess qualities similar to the negotiating parties to ensure mutual respect and recognition.

As earlier noted, voting was also found to be another way of building consensus, although

the least preferred approach. A religious leader explained this aspect in an interview thus:

We as Somalis and especially as Muslims strongly believe in the teachings of the

Holy Quran, which encourages consensus in decision making. We dislike the vote in

our decision making because it brings a lot of divisions among the people. The idea

of negotiated democracy borrows heavily from Islam. The voting occurring after

negotiated democracy is anticipated to be a mere fulfilment of the constitution

otherwise the decision taken during the negotiations should remain unchanged (Key

Informant II).

From the above discussion, it is evident that building consensus during the consociational

negotiated democracy process involves lobbying and use of emissaries. The process has a

lot of traction in the larger Somali community because of its close association with the

Islamic faith that is prevalent in Mandera County. Voting as an approach to making a

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collective communal decision is avoided because of the unintended divisions that emerge

thereof.

In the following sections, the study examines responses emerging from a five point Likert

Scale that had been developed to complement the open ended questions that have been

explored in the foregoing paragraphs.

4.5.12 Proposition of Candidates by Clans in the order of Preference

The study sought to find out whether clans are given an option of presenting many

candidates for consideration for a particular position so that should the most preferred fall

short, another can still be picked. The findings are as shown in Figure 4.11.

Figure 4.11: Presentation of candidates for elective posts in order of preference

Source: Field data, 2019

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The findings shows that about one third of the respondents, that is 30%, strongly agreed

that clans present several candidates for consideration for each elective post in the order of

the clan’s preference for each candidate while 16% of the study participants simply agreed

with the question statement. On the other hand, 26% of the respondents disagreed that each

clan presents several candidates for consideration for each elective post in the order of the

clan’s preference per candidate while 20% of the participants strongly disagreed with the

statement. The rest of the respondents, 8% were neutral.

The findings reveal a disagreement in opinion among the respondents with regard to

proposition of candidates by clans in the order of preference, as there were equal

proportions of respondents holding diametrically opposed views. This implies that while

some clans have a favourite or preferred candidate who they present for the elective or

appointive posts, other clans had no such predetermined candidates. The findings could

also imply that the community’s opinion was sought by the elders on their preferred

candidate to help with decision making.

The negotiations on this item occur at the clan level, where several sub-clans present their

candidates before one representing the entire clan is chosen and presented to the negotiating

partner clan to form a team. This finding buttresses a previous argument made by the study

that there are at least two levels of negotiations in the consociational arrangement practiced

in Mandera County. Public participation is a key pillar of democratic processes, even if it

is through representatives such as the elite as is the case with consociationalism.

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4.5.13 Briefing of Candidates on Negotiation Outcomes

The research intended to find out whether candidates being considered for positions from

across the clans were briefed by the negotiators prior to announcement of agreements and

the findings were as illustrated in Figure 4.12.

Figure 4.12: Briefings of candidates about negotiation outcomes

Source: Field data, 2019

Slightly more than half of the population, that is 56%, strongly agree that candidates are

briefed about the negotiations prior to the announcement of agreements to the general

public. About 27% of the survey participants agreed with the statement. The proportion of

respondents who expressed indifference with regard to this statement is 7% while an equal

percentage strongly disagreed that candidates are briefed about the negotiations prior to the

announcement of agreements to the general public. The remaining 4% of the study

participants expressed disagreement.

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Based on these findings, it is evident that a majority of the respondents (83%) are of the

view that the negotiators communicate directly to the affected persons. Communication

with key stakeholders such as politicians is an important component of successful

negotiations as argued by Berkovich (1996). The study established that the intention of the

briefing is to consolidate the support of politicians for consociational negotiated democracy

to avert escalation of tensions into violence. The move was considered essential in

managing the candidates’ expectations and addressing any discontentment at very early

stages.

In spite of this effort meant to stem re-entry problems; some of the candidates were not

convinced or satisfied with the outcomes of the findings. Such candidates openly express

their displeasure and proceed to vie for political seats against candidates who are fronted

by the negotiating team. The study notes that even though there is a strong attempt at

managing communication, fallouts happen and this greatly undermines the success of

consociational negotiated democracy in managing ethno-political conflicts. The outcomes

of the 2017 election cycle were a complete contrast with those of the 2013 cycle owing to

the fall outs witnessed in 2017. The study attributes the fall out to the Garre elders’ decision

to direct all elected candidates at the time not to vie so that they give other sub-clans a

chance.

4.5.14 Proportional Allocation of Positions and Resources among ethnic groups

The research sought to find out whether the sharing of positions and resources

demonstrated equity as advocated by the proponents of consociationalism. The findings

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were as illustrated in Table 4.14. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree;

SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).

Table 4.14: Proportional sharing of positions and resources

SA A N D SD

F % F % F % F % F %

Elective and appointive

opportunities and resources

are allocated based on a

clan’s relative population

strength

24 8 81 27 21 7 63 21 112 37

Source: Field data, 2019

Based on the study findings presented in Table 4.14, 37% of the study participants strongly

disagreed that allocation of positions and opportunities in the county was based on relative

population strength of clans. About 21% of the respondents disagreed with this question

statement while 7% of them expressed indifference. 27% of respondents agreed that

allocation of positions and opportunities was based on relative population strength of clans,

a position which was supported by 8% of the respondents who strongly agreed with the

question statement.

The findings indicate that a majority of the respondents did not perceive the allocation of

positions and resources to mirror the numerical strength of the constituent clans in the

county. This is supported by the results presented in Table 4.21 which clearly indicate an

open bias in the allocation of appointive positions in the county government in favour of

the Garre clan. Whereas the findings of the study related to equity have consistently

demonstrated the fact that the clan is more populous than the rest, the allocations to it far

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outweigh its rightful share. The study argues that it is disproportionate distribution of

positions that contributed to the rejection of consociational negotiated democracy in the

2017 election cycle and beyond as demonstrated in section 4.4.11. The results further

points to the continued inequalities, which factors have continued to fan the tensions in the

political life of the county.

4.5.15 Proposal of Negotiators by Interest Groups other Than Clans

The study sought to establish whether interest groups had a role in the proposition of

negotiators. The findings were presented in Table 4.15. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree;

N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).

Table 4.15: Propose of negotiators by interest groups

SA A N D SD

F % F % F % F % F %

Negotiators are proposed by

interest groups as well as the

clans.

9 3 6 2 13 4 79 26 194 65

Source: Field data, 2019

The study findings show that only 3% of the respondents strongly agreed that interest

groups other than clans propose negotiators to represent their interests during the

negotiations. About 2% of the participants agreed with the statement while 4% of them

expressed indifference. On the other hand, 26% of the survey participants disagreed that

clans’ negotiators are proposed by interest groups and not the clans themselves while 65%

strongly disagreed with the statement.

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The findings strongly suggest that the negotiators are not proposed by any interest group

other than the clans themselves. The findings could also mean that interest groups other

than clans were not given a chance to participate in the process. It would thus be logical to

conclude that the county’s politics is considered a fairly local matter that did not require

the ‘meddling of external parties’ as a Murulle politician noted in an interview:

Negotiations are a purely an internal matter that does not require any external parties

and if that were to happen, it would then mean the elders and the community is ceding

the control of its own affairs to external parties (Key Informant IX).

The interviewee’s response is indicative of the strong view held by the community that its

politics cannot be the subject of third parties. The study notes that even though community

pride is important in its existence, a structured process such as negotiations should involve

interest groups so that the voice of the demographics they represent is heard and attended

to in the decision making process. This approach, the study counsels, would enhance the

support of outcomes as various groups begin to perceive themselves as important and

valued actors in the decision making process (Lederach, 1997).

4.5.16 Neutrality of Negotiation Team Leader

The research sought to establish whether neutrality of the negotiation team leader was

considered important by the respondents and the findings were as shown in Figure 4.13.

The findings indicate that approximately 24% of the respondents strongly agreed that the

position of the chair of the negotiating team is usually handed to a neutral person not

aligned to any clan during the negotiations. Those who agreed with the question statement

were 21%. Almost one half the respondents differed with the statement, with 30% of them

strongly disagreeing with it and the remaining 18% disagreeing. Only 6% of the

respondents were nonaligned.

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Figure 4.13: Neutrality of negotiation process leader

Source: Field data, 2019

The findings suggest that the chair is normally not neutral or the respondents do not expect

him to be neutral. The findings may also mean that neutrality of the negotiation team leader

is not a big issue; it does not mean much to the people. In addition, the findings could also

point to trust issues such that while some of the respondents trusted the persons who chaired

the negotiation processes and considered them nonpartisan, some of the study participants

were of the view that in as much as the individuals or institutions trusted with the position

of chairing the negotiations appeared neutral, they were human after all and had private

interests which can favour some clans and discriminate against others.

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The subject of neutrality of negotiation team members is a debatable one: whether the

neutrality is to the issues under discussion or the conflict parties. Contributing to that

debate, this study argues that neutrality should be to issues rather than an individual’s

affiliation to a group. This argument is premised on the fact that people are social beings

and irrespective of where they come from, they will always be affiliated to a given group,

many times not out of choice or any rational explanation. It is therefore logical to conclude

that the neutrality of the negotiation team leader was considered an important factor

contributing to the acceptance of outcomes of the negotiation process and that could

explain why the respondents were divided down the middle.

4.5.17 Documentation of Proceedings

The research pursued to establish whether the negotiation team recorded the negotiation

proceedings for future reference and the findings are as presented in Figure 4.14.

Figure 4.14: Documentation of negotiation outcomes

Source: Field data, 2019

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More than half of the respondents, that is 64%, agreed that negotiation agreements were

documented as a true record of the proceedings, with 34% of them strongly agreeing. About

14% of the respondents were neutral while 15% disagreed on whether agreements were

documented as a further 7% of the respondents expressed strong disagreement. The study

findings on documentation of negotiations proceedings was consistent with a physical

check in the clan offices in Mandera County where the researcher was shown documents

emanating from negotiations, specifically in the Garre and Murulle council of elders’

offices located in Mandera Town.

The study attributes the dissenting opinions on documentation to the respondents from

segments that were not included in the negotiations as has been ably explored in preceding

sections of this chapter or respondents who simply did not know whether there was any

documentation out of ignorance of the whole process. The study considered documentation

important because written agreements form the basis for reference in the event that any of

the parties claim otherwise. It also constitutes an important reference point during conflict

analysis to develop alternative intervention approaches in the future as the new interveners

can be properly guided on a number of issues pertinent to the conflict. This perspective

tallies with the counsel given to conflict interveners by the UNDG (2016).

4.5.18 Challenges Encountered During Negotiations

The researcher sought to establish the challenges that beset the negotiation process and

developed eight statements against which the respondents would express the extent of

agreement or disagreement. The findings are presented, analyzed and discussed per each

statement below.

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The study sought to find out whether negotiation team members were prone to financial

inducement to favour particular candidates and the findings are as shown in Figure 4.15.

Figure 4.15: Financial inducement of members of negotiating team

Source: Field data, 2019

Based on the findings in Figure 4.15, 35% of the respondents strongly agreed that members

of the negotiating team get financially induced to favour certain candidates, a position

supported by a further 40% of the respondents who simply agreed with the statement.

About 15% of them expressed indifference while a combined 10% of the respondents

disagreed with the statement. This finding implies that the negotiation process and the

negotiators were prone to compromise. The findings also suggest that political

entrepreneurs actively sought the negotiators with a view to influencing them to favour

particular candidates or positions during the negotiations. This finding is consistent with a

previous one were a majority of the respondents expressed misgivings with politicians

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funding the process, arguing that such an approach lend the process to manipulation by

interested parties.

The study interpreted the manipulation contemplated by the respondents as including

financial inducement of negotiators to favour certain candidates. Financial corruption runs

deep in Kenyan politics throughout the various stages of the political processes as argued

by Kanyinga (2014). This finding further sheds light to why most of respondents neither

trust nor support consociational negotiated democracy as an avenue out of ethno-political

conflicts in the county of Mandera. The findings are consistent with Lederach’s (1997)

caution that mistrust in negotiations militate against the success of the process. The mistrust

tends to be high especially where the majority do not get fully engaged in the processes.

Secondly, the study sought to explore the influence of disgruntled opinion leaders left out

of negotiation teams on the process and acceptance of outcomes. The study findings were

as illustrated in Table 4.16. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree;

SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).

Table 4.16: Negotiation process undermined by disgruntled opinion leaders external to the

process

SA A N D SD

F % F % F % F % F %

Disgruntled opinions leaders

external to the negotiation

team undermine the process.

102 34 127 42 24 8 33 11 15 5

Source: Field data, 2019

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Slightly more than one third of the respondents, 35% strongly agreed that disgruntled

opinion leaders undermine the negotiation process. A further 42% of the respondents

agreed with the statement. On the contrary, a combined 16% of the respondents disagreed

with the statement, 11% of them expressing strong disagreement. The rest 8% took a

neutral stance with regard to the statement claim. The findings point to the influence of

opinion leaders in swaying the public view or decision on matters of interest to the society.

The findings may also be suggestive on the need to consider the level of influence an

opinion leader wields before leaving them out of communal processes as their views are

mostly supported by their followers.

Opinion leaders have strong grassroots networks that can be used for good or for worse,

depending on what the leader intends to achieve (Chen, 2014). It is this study’s contention

that decision makers can benefit a great deal out of cooperating with opinion leaders as any

grapevine they may trigger can undermine or promote what is being pursued. However,

caution must be exercised in how and when they are to be engaged to prevent them from

taking over the process and using it to achieve partisan ends.

The study further sought to gauge whether parties external to the county attempted to

infiltrate the negotiations to support particular candidates and the findings are as presented

in Table 4.17. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly

Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).

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Table 4.17: Infiltration of negotiation processes by parties from outside the county

SA A N D SD

F % F % F % F % F %

Parties outside the county

attempt to infiltrate and

influence the negotiation

process.

57 19 154 51 15 5 51 17 24 8

Source: Field data, 2019

The findings indicate that 19% of the respondents strongly agreed parties outside Mandera

County attempted to infiltrate and influence the negotiation process. Slightly more than

half of the respondents, that is 52%, agreed with the question statement while 25% of the

respondents disagreed with it, 8% of those disagreeing doing so strongly. About 5% of the

study respondents were neutral.

The findings suggest that political processes in Mandera County generate a lot of interest

from outside the polity. Extra-polity interests were found to be spearheaded by actors that

considered the politics of Mandera County as key to the national level political arithmetic

and architecture.

Based on the findings presented above, it is evident that the consociational negotiated

democracy processes were not only subject to interference by people and institutions from

Mandera County but also by extra-county parties with political interests in the county

politics. This can be explained by the view that subnational politics in any polity constitute

part of the national tally, especially in the scheming of national power play. This finding is

in sync with that of a study conducted by Kanyinga (2014) which established

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patrimonialism as the pillar of politics in Kenya and it entailed the use of social networks.

The study established from the interviews that political parties operating at the national

level attempted to reach out to the elders to sway them to endorse candidates from their

parties with the promise of better tidings if the political party won the national elections as

their candidate would act as a bridge with the national government. A Murulle participant

in the males FGD decried thus:

Presidential candidates and their agents make attempts to influence the elders

through emissaries to support particular candidates who they think is a pillar to their

national political programming, irrespective of whether he/she is popular at the

grassroots (Respondent K).

The import of such infiltration attempts would mean that if successful, the interests of the

communities would be subservient to those of the infiltrating party, effectively

undermining the whole logic of consociational negotiated democracy and its attendant

peace package as advanced by its proponents.

An investigation on whether the absence of independent expert negotiators with the

requisite skill set impacted on the strength of agreements reached during negotiations

returned the results illustrated in Figure 4.16.

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Figure 4.16: Absence of independent experts influences strength of agreements

Source: Field data, 2019

Majority of the respondents, 67%, strongly agreed that involvement of independent expert

does influence the strength of the agreements reached between negotiating parties with a

further 12% of the study respondents expressing agreement. 3% of the respondents were

indifferent. A total of 18% of the respondents held dissenting views with 5% of them

indicating strong dissent.

This finding affirms the essence of independent experts with the skill set in negotiation

processes. The finding suggest that majority of the respondents are of the strong opinion

that the agreements reached during the negotiations were weak because of failure to tap

expert knowledge. The results also imply that the negotiation team members did not have

the formal training in negotiations, which in effect led to weak agreements that did not

satisfy all parties.

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Expert knowledge and skill set is a crucial component in negotiations as the holders are

able to undertake a thorough analysis of the conflict and direct interventions towards

addressing the root causes of the inter-ethnic violence. The significance of expert advice

in negotiations is highlighted by Mwagiru (2008) who credited the success of the Koffi

Annan-led negotiation team to the efforts and advice of the backroom advisors who helped

with the negotiations, suggesting potential strengths and pitfalls to positions advocated by

parties in the negotiations.

Community involvement in identification of negotiators and the credibility of outcomes

was investigated and the findings were as presented in Table 4.18. Majority of the

respondents 80% felt excluded from the process and consequently were under no obligation

to consider the outcome credible. Instructively, about 10% of the respondents were not of

the view that failure to involve the community in the choice of negotiators undermined the

credibility of the outcome as a further 10% expressed indifference. (SA=Strongly Agree;

A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree; F=Frequency; %=Percentage).

Table 4.18: Clan participation in choosing negotiators and acceptance of outcomes

SA A N D SD

F % F % F % F % F %

Poor/Limited clan participation

in choosing negotiators

undermines acceptance of

outcomes.

144 48 96 32 27 9 13 4 21 7

Source: Field data, 2019

The findings suggest that failure to include the community in identifying negotiators

effectively isolated the masses and thus denied the process the legitimacy it required. The

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findings further imply that the minority did not consider the involvement of the community

as necessary in the appointment of negotiators. It would seem that majority of the

respondents were not convinced that consociational negotiated democracy was the best

approach in handling ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.

The subject of inclusivity of all people affected by the decision to adopt consociational

negotiated democracy has continued to recur across the study findings. Popular

participation is a cardinal tenet of democracy which requires people to participate in the

decision making process directly or through their authorized representatives. Ethno-

political conflicts can only be managed and eventually resolved when the masses perceive

that they are fully involved in finding solutions to them and are convinced that their say is

considered in any intervention attempt.

The study also sought to establish whether intra-clan rivalries affected the choice of

candidates proposed to various offices and the findings are as presented in Figure 4.17.

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Figure 4.17: Intra-clan rivalries affecting choices of candidates for various offices

Source: Field data, 2019

The study findings indicated that 46% of the respondents strongly agreed that intra-clan

rivalries affected the choice of candidates to various offices while 29% of them agreed with

the question statement. About 7% of the respondents were neutral while 15% of them

disagreed that intra-clan rivalries affect the choice of candidates to various offices. The

remaining 3% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement.

These findings mean that candidates form various clans were competing for the same

position. The findings could also imply that there were clans that sought to undermine the

candidature of particular people from other clans. The findings may also be construed to

suggest that pre-existing differences between clans found their way into the consociational

democracy negotiations.

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The study is cognizant of the fact that clans are constituted by sub-clans whose influence

cannot be underestimated particularly in a process that involves politics whose key defining

feature is numbers. The study argues that for the intra-clan rivalries to be contained so that

they do not undermine consociational negotiated democracy and its contribution to ethno-

political conflict management, there is need by clan leadership to consult extensively across

sub-clans and elders to be more open with information so that they are not perceived as

side-lining certain sub clans. Intra-group rivalries are fuelled by perceptions that only a

member of the immediate family or sub-clan can guarantee his people their rightful share.

Mistrusts which undermine negotiations increase as the group grows and particular limited

resources are being pursued.

Finally, the study intended to find out the significance of regular communication on the

progress of negotiations and the findings are as illustrated in Figure 4.18. The study

findings revealed that 22% of the respondents strongly agreed that failure to regularly

update the community on the progress of the negotiations led to suspicions of foul play in

the process. Slightly more than half of the respondents, that is 51%, agreed with the

statement, increasing the total tally of respondents who believed poor communication

strategy had a destabilizing effect on the progress of the negotiations to 73%. About 8% of

the respondents were indifferent while 13% of them disagreed with the statement. Only 7%

of the survey participants strongly disagreed with the statement.

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Figure 4.18: Irregular updates on negotiation progress creating suspicion of foul play

Source: Field data, 2019

The implication of the above finding is that there was strong need to regularly keep the

public informed about the progress and proceedings of negotiations. The findings also

imply that the negotiators were taking long to arrive at agreements which in turn meant

delayed communication of progress to the community.

The significance of communication in negotiation process is crucial to believability of the

process and elimination of perceptions of foul play. It helps reduce or completely eliminate

anxiety among the members of the public or those affected by a particular decision. The

study agrees with Mwagiru (2008) on the need to ensure the communication strategy

adopted is well thought through and executed, otherwise it could as well undermine

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negotiations or create the wrong impression among constituents, thereby heightening

tensions. Communication is considered critical because the negotiators are representatives

of larger constituencies and failure or miscommunication can undermine the process and

its outcomes.

4.5.19 Institutionalization of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

In this question, the study intended to establish what exactly had been done to entrench

consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. The obtaining findings were as

illustrated in Figure 4.19.

Figure 4.19: Consideration to institutionalize consociational negotiated democracy

Source: Field data, 2019

The study findings indicated that 55% of the respondents agreed that institutionalization of

consociational negotiated democracy as a mechanism of ethno-political conflict

management had been given due consideration while 45% responded otherwise.

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Respondents who affirmed institutionalization of consociational negotiated democracy

pointed to the establishment of formal offices with functional secretariats for each of the

three clans as well as the corner tribes and the group that brings together all non-Somali

communities living in Mandera County, popularly labelled as “others”. The respondents

explained that offices were funded by the community and were being used by the elders to

conduct affairs relating to community issues and interests. The secretariat worked under

the direction of an elder who acted as the organizing secretary of the council of elders of

the respective clan. Some respondents further pointed out that there were increased

sensitization and awareness campaigns among the masses on the existence of the

mechanism and its significance in the pursuit of the community’s interests in their relations

with other clans and even the national government.

4.6 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

This objective was intended to establish whether the practice of consociational negotiated

democracy had been effective in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera

County. To make this determination, data was collected using open-ended questions and a

five point likert scale comprising of five items which the study considered key indicators

of effectiveness. The findings of the research are based on the questions.

4.6.1 Pre-consociationalism Political Dispute Resolution Methods

The researcher sought to establish the mechanisms that were used to resolve political

disputes prior to the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy. The study findings

were as indicated in Table 4.19. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree;

SD=Strongly Disagree).

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Table 4.19: Political dispute resolution methods

SA A N D SD

Method F % F % F % F % F %

The courts 93 31 203 67 2 1 3 1 0 0

Elders Mediation 12 4 41 14 0 0 182 60 66 22

Violence 84 28 104 34 2 1 56 19 55 18

Source: Field Data, 2019

The study findings indicate that the dominant method of dispute resolution used prior to

consociationalism was the courts as supported by 98% of the respondents, 31% of whom

strongly agreed. The second most used method of political dispute resolution prior to

adoption of consociational negotiated democracy was the resort to violence as supported

by 62% of the respondents, with 28% strongly agreeing while the least used method was

mediation by the elders as supported by 18% of the respondents. The findings imply that

the area respondents had a lot of faith in the formal justice system and if that doesn’t work,

violence was used as a quick-fix solution. The findings in Table 4.23 were supported by a

Garre participant in the female FGD who noted thus:

Politicians are bound by the law of the land that clearly states that if one is dissatisfied

with electoral outcomes, they can seek redress in court. Thus, most of them either

directly or through their supporters lodge cases in court to pursue electoral justice.

However, the courts take long to adjudicate the cases and this increases tensions

among the disputing parties and their supporters (Respondent F).

Based on the study findings, it was deduced that politicians or their supporters dissatisfied

with the electoral conduct and outcome of a particular position filed cases in court to

contest those results. The popularity of the formal justice system was found to be informed

by the involvement of parties outside the county who were apolitical and with no direct

interest in local politics. This mechanism has also been used for many decades across the

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world in resolving political disputes in democracies, yielding a mixture of outcomes

ranging from upholding of decisions made by electoral bodies to nullification of others.

Punishment in the form of hefty fines imposed by courts was found to be deterrence for

commission of similar crimes in the future. However, the litigation process was found to

take too long, thus contributing factor to increased tension in the affected areas or

perceptions.

Respondents who supported the resort to violence (62%) claimed that politicians incited

their supporters to rise up in arms and fight what they considered to be theft of their victory

or attempts to exclude “their people” from power. This claim was supported by a PBO

interviewee who explained that:

Conflicts tend to be more during electioneering period and those that occur prior to

Election Day are usually intended to tilt the political equation in favor of a particular

candidate (clan). Those happening during and after elections are geared towards

necessitating nullification of the whole exercise or forcing negotiations for inclusion

in power (Key Informant III).

The study, making reference to the 37% that disagreed on the salience of violence as a

dispute resolution method and the claims made by the key informant above concluded that

political violence may have been considered a swift pathway to justice as the destruction

in its wake mostly led to negotiations to have disputing parties accommodated in the county

power matrix. The researcher further established that violence used during the pre-election

day period was intended to drive away perceived supporters of a rival candidate or to

intimidate them so that they did not participate in the actual elections. In some cases,

violence was deployed during the elections to create an environment conducive for rigging

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the election by way of stuffing ballot boxes. These perspectives were shared by a national

government interviewee who explained thus:

This county has had episodic violent bust ups especially during electioneering period.

Our investigations have consistently established that the violent bust ups were

politically motivated as some politicians sought to drive away populations they

deemed to be supporting their competitors or to create room for stuffing ballot boxes

on the election night. The hotspot has been Rhamu were the Garre and Degodia clans

have violently clashed leading to deaths and displacement (Key Informant XIV).

This assertion was reiterated by various contributors during the FGD sessions held in

Mandera Town. The study established from the FGD participants that the Degodia clan is

the slight majority in Mandera North constituency where Rhamu is located but the Garre

registered in droves there so as to defeat the Degodia in the elections of Member of

Parliament. This was achieved in the 2013 general election which was followed by the

2014 Garre-Degodia clashes that left approximately 13 people dead and properties

destroyed following incitement by politicians and the elite (Interpeace, 2017).

A contributor in the male FGD explained that the strategy used by the Garre worked in the

2013 electoral cycle but in the 2017 cycle, the Degodia worked with Garre candidates who

were against consociational negotiated democracy to win the seat which they argued

belonged to them as the majority clan in Mandera North Constituency. The study noted

that Mandera County had three constituencies prior to the enactment of the CoK 2010

namely Mandera West, Mandera Central and Mandera East. The new constitution created

three more by reorganizing the boundaries and renaming them as follows: Mandera West,

Mandera South, Banissa, Lafey, Mandera East and Mandera North, making a total of six.

The manner in which the boundaries were drawn is indicative of gerrymandering. The

competition thus became stiffer in the 2013 and 2017 election cycles as clans could claim

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dominance in particular electoral units and redistribute their voting strength to other

political areas to expand their control as was found to be the case with the Garre in Mandera

North in their attempt to lock out the Degodia from the county politics. It is no surprise that

political violence was high following the 2013 electoral cycle.

The finding on the mediation of political disputes by elders as supported by 18% of the

respondents was found to be practiced in political units inhabited by overwhelming

majority clans where the competition was between candidates from the same sub-clans or

county level positions which required clans to build alliances to win power. The researcher

found out that intervention by elders was aimed at guarding against the loss of a political

position to a rival sub-clan or consolidating numbers in a sub-clan to defeat competitors

from other sub-clans. A Garre interviewee explained that:

In cases of intra clan/sub-clan competition, the weaker candidate is convinced to drop

their bid and support the stronger candidate with the promise of either future political

support or compensation for the resources they had expended in the campaigns (Key

Informant VI).

In some cases, especially with the advent of devolution, some candidates would be

promised appointment to senior county government position or any other opportunities

accruing to the community from the national government.

The rejection of mediation by elders by majority of the respondents (82%) was found to

have been informed by the tendency to keep elders out of politics as was the practice. A

probe into this argument revealed that traditionally, elders seized of cultural issues and

amity of the community as a whole and politics was not one of their domains. A women

leader in an interview explained thus:

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Traditionally, elders dealt with issues concerning disputes within and between clans.

Their role in politics was limited unlike now when devolution has brought resources

closer and competition is enhanced, obliging them to step in and offer direction to the

community (Key Informant V).

The entry of elders into political dispute resolution was established as causing

fragmentations in clans as they were perceived to be partisan, dictatorial and out of touch

with the evolution of politics in the county. This assertion was adopted by the researcher

as a persuasive explanation as to why most of the respondents did not favour involving

elders in political dispute resolution.

4.6.2 Changes after Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

This aspect of the research was intended by the researcher to be comparative in nature; to

establish any changes that the respondents identified which they associated with the onset

of consociational negotiated democracy. A majority of the respondents indicated that elders

were now taking a more active role in resolution of political disputes compared to the

period prior to the introduction of consociationalism during which their jurisdiction

excluded open active participation in politics. The participants in the FGDs argued that the

increased visibility of elders in politics was mainly attributed to devolution which had

brought with it a lot of resources to the county level which clans were jostling to control.

A Murulle participant in the female FGD explained that:

The coming of devolution has seen many resources being brought to Mandera

County. In fact our county is receiving the third highest allocation of finances after

Nairobi and Turkana counties. With such large amounts of money coming in and the

county government collecting more, the struggle for control of the billions is intense

(Respondent A).

This perspective was shared by various political actors and the leadership of the Non-

Governmental Organizations during interviews. As the custodians of the community

interests (Kariuki, 2015), the elders were found to have become more active in the county

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politics in the post-new constitution era. Their major role was established to have been

identification of the candidates who in their wisdom could best deliver the benefits of

devolution in addition to mobilizing the masses to collectively support their decisions

which they argued were made in the best interest of the community. This turn of events has

raised the elders’ political profile and they were now more visible in the county politics

besides being sought by the politicians keen on riding on their influence for political

reasons.

The respondents further identified deteriorated intra and inter-clan political relations in the

wake of consociational negotiated democracy. The worsening of relations at the intra-clan

level was found to have been the result of perceptions that the elders were favoring some

individuals at the expense of others by prioritizing the financial ability of a candidate to

mount a campaign, more than their leadership ability and popularity with the electorate.

The deterioration of relations at the intra-clan level was found to be particularly

pronounced within the dominant Garre clan and this was demonstrated by some politicians

defying the elders’ choice of candidates in the 2017 election cycle to mount their own

campaigns and winning the support of the electorate and consequently the elections. A case

that was repeatedly cited was that of the sitting governor and senator who had been asked

by the elders not to vie in 2017 but they defied the call to support the consociational

negotiated democracy candidates and successfully defended their respective seats to which

they had been elected in 2013. A Garre respondent in the male FGD explained the 2017

scenario in respect of the clan thus:

The elders were forcing unpopular candidates on the voters and since the elections

are by secret ballot, many people chose to keep quiet and support the governor and

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senator because they didn’t want to be seen as openly defying the elders. Some youths

with the support of the ‘rebel’ candidates openly criticized and chided the elders,

something that had never happened before. Tensions at the sub-clan levels were high

during the electioneering period (Respondent O).

At the inter-clan level, the study established that the relations between the Garre and the

Degodia clans had worsened, with the latter maintaining that there was nothing like

consociational negotiated democracy in the strict sense of the concept because the clan was

not involved in the negotiations. A Degodia nterviewee explained the position thus:

The Garre clan leadership is very arrogant. They cite their clans’ numerical strength

and our ‘dominance’ in Wajir County and Southern Ethiopia to deny us

representation in Mandera County. We thus supported the rebel group opposed to

consociational negotiated democracy as a strategy to deny the practice legitimacy

because Garre elders refused to incorporate us in the negotiations (Key Informant

XIII).

Logically, it would follow that had the Garre elders granted the request of the Degodia clan

for inclusion in the negotiations and an agreement reached on the sharing of power among

all the clans, there would have been more support for consociationalism and the

factionalism within the Garre clan that was manifested would have been minimal and

unsuccessful.

It also emerged from the study that the Murulle were not necessarily in an alliance with the

Garre out of choice; their small population compared to the Garre clan and the threat of

attack and expulsion forced them into the alliance. Some respondents described the alliance

as the manifestation of ‘coercive’ politics. This dissatisfaction was aptly captured by a

Murulle in the males FGD thus:

The Garre are taking advantage of us because they only allocate us the position of

deputy governor. If we disagree with them politically, they will attack us and destroy

our property. The Degodia are also not part of any negotiations as they are considered

outsiders. The bad relations between the Garre and the Degodia have been the major

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cause of violence in Mandera County. Consociational negotiated democracy is

worsening inter-clan relations because of exclusion and unfairness in sharing of

power among them (Respondent L).

Based on the above findings, it is evident that intra and inter-clan relations had deteriorated

in the wake of devolution and more so because of the manner in which power was acquired

and shared. The findings are supported by Wolf (2010) who argues that segmentation

creates fragmentations and worsening of relations within societies. The study thus contends

that consociational negotiated democracy had worsened relations within, between and

among clans because of the manner it was executed.

Another finding with regard to changes reported following the adoption of consociational

negotiated democracy was the emergence of an organic approach to political issues in the

clan as they sought to maximize benefits accruing from the political space. Even though

this finding was only highlighted in the FGDs, the study considered it an important

development that required attention. The organic approach as a new development was

demonstrated by consultations occurring at the sub-clan level feeding into the clan level of

engagement and the significance of this had been a wider public participation in the

political process. The benefits of the consultations were reported as increased political

awareness and strategizing particularly among the Degodia and Murulle clans. A PBO

interviewee noted as follows in this regard;

In my view, there is increased awareness within the Degodia and Murulle clans as

well as the corner tribes as they strategize to benefit from the Garre clan political

fallouts. The split of the Murulle in the same manner as the Garre meant the clan

would retain its deputy governor position as well as the Mandera East and Lafey

parliamentary seats. The Degodia allied with the rebellious faction and captured the

Mandera North Parliamentary seat in 2017. It would appear that the two clans

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position themselves to bargain for better power deals from the Garre factions (Key

informant XV).

Based on the above finding, it is clear that small but significant segments within a polity

seek for opportunities that guarantee them maximum benefits by pooling their numbers or

splitting them as appropriate. They strategize in a way that allows them benefit whichever

way the elections go. The study also took note of the central position of the Garre clan in

the county politics as every decision of the other clans was pegged on developments from

that clan.

In summing up the findings with regard to this research question, it would appear that

consociational negotiated democracy has deteriorated intra and inter-clan relations besides

enhancing political awareness and activism among the clans. Consultations among the

smaller clans coupled with strategizing saw the smaller clans, though significant in their

own right, benefit in 2017 more than they did in the 2013 electoral cycle. Even though the

reported changes were not the kind of outcomes that were contemplated by the proponents

of consociationalism, the study argues that the changes nevertheless had influenced the

political landscape of Mandera County in a major way.

4.6.3 Outcomes of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

In this section, the researcher developed five statements to complement the responses from

the open ended questions and the FGDs and key informant interviews with regard to

specific aspects of the study. The researcher considered responses to those statements

together with data emerging from the FGDs and key informant interviews as important in

making a determination on the extent of effectiveness of consociational negotiated

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democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. The

findings of the study are presented and discussed as per each item.

4.6.3.1 Inclusion of All Clans in the County Political Leadership and Governance

This aspect of the research question sought to establish the extent to which consociational

negotiated democracy had led to inclusion of all clans in the county political leadership

and governance. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.20.

Figure 4.20: Inclusion of all clans in the county political leadership and governance

Source: Field Data, 2019

The findings as presented in Figure 4.20 indicate that 36% of the respondents agreed that

consociational negotiated democracy had led to inclusion of all clans in the county political

leadership and governance, a view shared by another 6% of them who strongly agreed in

favour of the study item. More than half of the respondents (56%) disagreed that

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consociational negotiated democracy had led to inclusion of all clans in the county political

leadership and governance, with 27% of them expressing strong disagreement. About 2%

of the respondents were indifferent.

The study findings suggest that a majority of the respondents, 56%, did not consider

consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County as entrenching

inclusivity of all population segments in the political leadership and governance of the

county. The findings imply that respondents from particular clans did not think

consociational negotiated democracy was a fair political system. The study observed that

the sizeable 42% agreeing with the study item could have been drawn from clans that had

benefited in different ways from the election outcomes. The respondents who were neutral

were deemed as negligible in terms of swinging the foregoing observations either way.

This finding that consociational negotiated democracy had not contributed to inclusivity in

sharing of political and appointive positions was corroborated by a survey of the clan

affiliation of elected leaders in the county governance as shown in Table 4.20.

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Table 4.20: Clan affiliation of elected leaders

Governor Deputy

Governor

Senator Women

Rep.

MP MCA Total

Garre 1 0 1 1 3 19 25

Degodia 0 0 0 0 1 3 4

Murulle 0 1 0 0 2 7 10

Corner Tribe 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 1 1 1 1 6 30 40

Source: Field data, 2019

The findings illustrated in Table 4.20, it is instructive to note that the second largest clan,

the Degodia only managed one position of Member of Parliament and three MCAs while

the slightly numerically inferior Murulle compared to the Degodia managed a deputy

governor position, two members of parliament and seven MCAs. The outcomes reaffirm

the benefits the Murulle obtained from their alliance with the Garre clan. The corner tribes

managed a single position of MCA. The study therefore concurred with the majority

respondents on the basis of the evidence adduced above that consociational negotiated

democracy did not foster inclusivity in the sharing of political positions.

4.6.3.2 Equitable Distribution of County Employment Opportunities

The researcher sought to determine the extent to which consociational negotiated

democracy had led to equitable distribution of employment opportunities among all the

clans and interest groups. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.21.

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Figure 4.21 Equitable distribution of county employment opportunities across clans

Source: Field Data, 2019

From the findings presented in Figure 4.21, 29% of the respondents agreed that

consociational negotiated democracy had led to equitable distribution of employment

opportunities among all the clans and interest groups, a position supported by a further

15% of them who strongly agreed with the study item. Nearly half of the respondents (49%)

disagreed that consociational negotiated democracy had led to equitable distribution of

employment opportunities among all the clans and interest groups, with 22% of them

expressing strong disagreement. A further 7% of the respondents neither agreed nor

disagreed as to whether consociational negotiated democracy had any influence on the

distribution of employment opportunities among the clans and interest groups.

The findings on this item were clear that consociational negotiated democracy did not usher

equity in the sharing of employment opportunities as demonstrated by the dissenting

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response of 49% of the total study respondents. The researcher obtained data from the

county government on the distribution of employment opportunities in four top tier cadres

in the county executive across the clans which were found to be as shown in Table 4.21.

Table 4.21: Distribution of appointive senior county jobs across the clans

Clan Ministers Chief

Officer

Directors Senior

Executives

Total

Garre 5 14 26 15 60

Degodia 2 5 3 1 11

Murulle 2 3 3 3 11

Corner

Tribes

1 1 1 1 4

Others 0 1 1 0 2

Total 10 24 34 20 88

Source: Field data, 2019

The findings in Table 4.21 demonstrate the extent of dominance of the county

executive/appointive positions by the Garre clan. From this finding, the study presumes

that the lower cadres of employment in the county public service were dominated by the

same clan. The study therefore agrees with the majority on the basis of foregoing

incontrovertible evidence that the county appointive positions were not shared fairly or

proportionally based on each clan’s relative strength. The study noted that the sitting

governor was not a beneficiary of consociational negotiated democracy and was therefore

not bound by any pre-election consociational negotiated agreements. This could partly

explain the skewed appointments by his administration in favour of members of his clan,

and perhaps the faction of the clan that supported him. On the basis of the foregoing

evidence, the the researcher concluded that consociational negotiated democracy did not

bring fairness in distribution of county government jobs as would have been expected in a

consociational political arrangement. The study findings are further supported by

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Cheeseman (2015) and Kanyinga (2014) both of whom explain the entrenchment of

cronyism and nepotism in political appointments across Africa.

4.6.3.3 Fairness in Implementation of County Government Development Projects

The research pursued to establish whether consociational negotiated democracy had

resulted in fairness in implementation of county government-funded development projects

across all areas in the county of Mandera. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.22.

Figure 4.22: Fairness in implementation of county government development projects

across sub-counties

Source: Field data, 2019

The study findings in Figure 4.22 indicate that 10% of the respondents agreed that

consociational negotiated democracy had brought fairness in the implementation of

development projects funded by the county government across all the sub-counties, a claim

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supported by a further 26% of them who stated strong opinion in favour of that study item.

A combined 59% of the respondents did not support the claim that consociational

negotiated democracy had brought fairness in the implementation of development projects

funded by the county government across all parts of the county, with 27% of them

expressing strong disagreement. About 5% of the respondents were neutral with regard to

whether consociational negotiated democracy had any influence on fair implementation of

development projects funded by the county government throughout the county.

The study established that there was skewed implementation of development projects

funded by the county government to favour areas that voted for the county political

leadership more than the other areas which voted for the rival group especially in the 2017

election cycle. The tendency to favour areas that supported the political leadership in power

was found to be deliberate; it was a way of retaining that voting bloc in future elections. A

PBO interviewee explained this situation thus:

Politicians do not always engage in development activities in a fair manner. There

are areas that must be favored on account of their loyal support to the ruling class, at

the expense of those areas that merely expressed their political right by supporting a

different candidate (Key informant III).

A Degodia participant in the males FGD elaborated this position more succinctly:

Garre dominated areas have benefitted more from county development projects given

their dominance of the county executive. Even though some Garre dominated areas

did not vote for the administration in power, they still benefit because of being from

the same clan with the governor, which also controls the allocation of county

government-funded projects (Respondent T).

The assertions made by the key informants above are consistent with Cheeseman’s (2015)

exposition of patrimonial politics in Africa; the patron who is the politician has to keep his

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loyal clients - the voters happy by allocating more resources to them while sparing some

to other areas in order to court them for future elections. The study however argues that

given the long periods of marginalization in the county before the advent of devolution,

some areas such as the urban areas may get a bigger share of development projects, not

necessarily because of their support to the administration in power but because of other

factors such as their strategic location in terms of advancing the county interests such as

creating an enabling environment for investments.

4.6.3.4 Successful Resolution of Political Disputes without involving the Courts

The researcher sought to establish whether consociational negotiated democracy had led to

successful resolution of political disputes without involving the courts and the findings

were as presented in Figure 4.24.

Figure 4.23 Successful resolution of political disputes without involving the courts

Source: Field data, 2019

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The study findings as presented in Figure 4.24 indicate that 39% of the respondents agreed

that consociational negotiated democracy had led to successful resolution of political

disputes without involving the courts, with a further 7% expressing strong opinion in

support of the claim. The findings further show that 36% of the respondents did not support

the assertion that consociational negotiated democracy had brought fairness in the

distribution and access to economic resources by all segments comprising the county

population, a view shared by a further 13% of them who expressed strong disagreement.

About 2% of the respondents were indifferent with regard to whether consociational

negotiated democracy had bought about fair distribution and access to economic resources

by the residents of the county.

Based on the study findings, it was evident that the respondents were almost evenly divided

in their opinions (46% for and 49% against) as to whether consociational negotiated

democracy had led to successful resolution of political disputes without involving the

courts; albeit with a tendency towards disagree with the study item. The researcher went

further to ascertain whether there was any increase or decrease in the number of election

related cases filed in court after the 2013 and 2017 cycles and the findings indicated that

in 2013, 12 cases were filed in court while in 2017, the number increased by one to 13. The

neutral group of respondents at 6% was considered significant because if such respondents

were to take either of the two sides, the findings would be tilted to the direction they would

support. The question of resolving political disputes without resorting to the courts has

been used in Africa with some degree of success, with the overriding claim being the need

to understand conflicts within their social setting (Brock–Utne, 2001).

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A Garre interviewee noted that:

Even though there have been disagreements between and within the major clans in

matters politics, the negotiated democracy approach helped resolve some of the

disputes and thus giving stability to the county to allow for service delivery by the

administration in power (Key Informant VII).

The finding suggests that, the consociational approach to the practice of politics was useful

in resolving some of the political disputes. The study noted that even though there were

serious fall outs following the outcomes of the election to office of the governor, the case

filed in court by the losing candidate was withdrawn following negotiations led by the

elders and alternative pathway to power for the losing candidate. The study thus deduced

that consociational negotiated democracy had contributed to management of political

disputes in Mandera County as evidenced by the number of election related cases filed in

court remaining unchanged in 2017 despite the intra and inter-clan political fallouts.

4.6.4 Weaknesses of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

The researcher developed this question to help establish the shortcomings in the

consociational negotiated democracy approach which findings would form the basis for

recommendations on how to improve the approach to make it responsive to the people’s

needs and consequently contribute to the management of ethno-political conflicts in

Mandera County. In this regard, the study established that the practice suffered from

susceptibility to manipulation by vested interests, the exclusion of women and youth,

dependence on political goodwill and autonomy camouflaged in negative clannism. These

findings are discussed below.

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Responses form the open ended question pointed out that consociational negotiated

democracy was susceptible to control and manipulation by politicians and other vested

interests as established in section 4.5.18. The respondents backed this argument by drawing

the attention of the researcher to the fact that the negotiation process was majorly funded

by politicians who had a direct stake in the process and its outcomes. Other than politicians,

some business persons with an interest in the economic opportunities accruing from the

county government fronted certain candidates as proxies in order to attain this interest. A

Murulle participant in the males FGD captured this perspective thus:

There is nothing like negotiated democracy in Mandera County but a capture of the

political process by politicians and business people keen on controlling the resources

in the county. They achieve this by using the elders who are respected in the

community as opinion leaders. As long as politicians and business people fund the

negotiations, the outcome will have all the footprints of their interests (Respondent

M).

This study is persuaded by this argument made by the respondents and further espouses

that politicians and business entities do not entirely support community programs and

activities for purely altruistic reasons. After all, the pursuit of power is about fulfilment of

interests. Cheeseman (2015) alludes to the incontrovertible reality that is corruption in

African politics, noting that this is the bane of the continent’s democratic reform as elected

leaders and political entrepreneurs seek to amass wealth to replace part of what was spent

to ‘buy’ the win and build a war chest for future elections. The negotiators are not free

from the discreet and explicit compromise and manipulation from faceless political

strategists and hitmen.

The study further established that consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County

does not include women and youth in its programming according to the respondents, a

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finding that is supported by the findings of Kanyinga (2014). The respondents argued that

times had changed such that women had become educated and empowered to take an active

role in leadership and governance and so the community’s view of women as incapable of

political leadership had to change. In this regard, a Garre participant in the females FGD

argued as follows:

The elders are still stuck in the past where women had no role in community

leadership. They must realize that we are becoming empowered in different ways to

take up our rightful place in leadership and governance. The world has become more

open and tolerant to women in leadership. Look at Ilhan Omar (a US

Congresswoman) who is an ethnic Somali? As women, we can perfectly balance

between our families and meaningfully participate in the political life of our

community (Respondent E).

The subject of women engagement in political leadership in Kenya is aptly and

persuasively explored by Kamau (2003) who reiterates the need to mainstream women.

This study agrees with her that women are not passive beings with no political interests

and a contribution to make to the attendant political processes in the polities they are part

of. The biggest challenge however remains the patriarchal nature of politics in Kenya and

the Somali community in particular.

The study also established that consociational negotiated democracy spurred negative

clannism in light of perceptions of clan control of particular political units, thus

undermining unity and amity among the people of Mandera County. It would appear that

the concept was not properly understood and executed in the community and clans were

on overdrive to carve out niches of political control to avoid losing out to rivals, thanks to

gerrymandering during the political units boundaries review. Instead of bringing people to

the negotiation table to share available socio-economic and political resources, clannism

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was fomenting toxic relations as each plotted on how to politically and therefore

economically disempower the other.

A review of the literature attributed this behaviour to historical rivalries and lack of trust

among the clans. The views expressed by respondents coalesced to the position that with

an area of control, a clan was safer whether in government or not as other clans would

recognize that control or ownership. Exclusive clan based control of a territory implies that

other clans are cut off or are regarded as immigrants who can always be evicted should

they overstay their welcome. Based on this finding, the study agrees with Elissi (2004) who

alluded that the exclusive territorial control by a segment increases the occurrence of

conflicts between groups, the very thing that consociationalism is intended to manage or

resolve. Binningsbo (2006) arguing against consociationalism and particularly its

proposition for segment control notes that such an approach lowers cooperation due to trust

issues. It would appear that clan territorial control only serves to amplify intergroup

differences and spheres of control.

The respondents further pointed to the practice of clannism in politics as having permeated

the county government public service where distribution of employment opportunities was

skewed in favour of the clan in power. They pointed out that leaders controlling the levers

of government favored people from their own clan, with little regard to the principles of

proportionality as advocated by the proponents of consociational negotiated democracy

such as Lijphart (2012) and the dictates of the CoK. Nepotism in public service reduces

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politics and governance to a zero sum game, producing winners, who enjoy the benefits of

being in power and losers who are condemned to oblivion.

Another important finding that emerged from the study was that the consociational

negotiated democracy approach is dependent on goodwill from among the people directly

involved in it. This response was common among the youthful, educated respondents. A

respondent explained that the approach is not anchored in any known law and any

agreements arising from it are not in any way binding to the target audience. He cited

several cases of politicians who went against the decisions emerging from the negotiations,

pointing out that some won in the elections while others lost. It would appear that the

youthful population, which is estimated at 38% of the Mandera County population by

KNBS in its 2017 demographic projections, do not favour consociational negotiated

democracy mainly because of their exclusion from the process leading to identification of

candidates on account of their age. The study takes note that this particular demographic

segment has some basic or advanced education in addition to a national and global

exposure to political developments in other parts of the world, thanks to technology and

hence their resistance to an elders-driven process. This argument is partly corroborated by

the sentiments of a youthful Garre participant in the males FGD who quipped thus:

Look, we are living in a different time compared to when our fathers were our age.

Things have changed and they still think they can make decisions about us and our

future. Despite educating us, they do not trust us to drive the change we need. We

have no choice but to defy them on matters we believe they are getting wrong. And

this should not be misconstrued to mean we disrespect our parents as some elders

have been saying (Respondent Q).

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The FGD further revealed increasing tension and dissatisfaction among the population in

the polity, clan notwithstanding, that the elders dabbling in politics was frowned upon.

Instructively, all the participants of the male and female FGDs preferred a majoritarian

system of elections.

4.6.5 Evidence of Reduction in Ethno-Political Conflicts

In this section, the researcher developed five statements with regard to reduction in ethno

political conflicts resulting from the use of consociational negotiated democracy to help

with the testing of the hypothesis. The researcher considered responses to those statements

as important in determining the extent of reduction in ethno-political conflicts in Mandera

County resulting from the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy. The findings

were presented and discussed as per each item.

4.6.5.1 Improved Cohesion Among Clans

The study sought to find out whether there was improved cohesion among the clans and

interest groups residing in Mandera County as evidence of reduction in ethno-political

conflicts and the findings were as shown in Figure 4.25.

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Figure 4.24: Growing cohesion among clans

Source: Field data, 2019

The findings as presented in Figure 4.25 indicate that 27% of the respondents agreed that

there was a growing cohesion among the clans and groups residing in Mandera County,

symbolizing reduction in ethno-political conflicts. This view was supported by a further

11% of the respondents who expressed strong concurrence with the study item. Slightly

more than half of the respondents (52%) disagreed that there was a growing cohesion

among the clans and groups residing in Mandera County, with 11% of them expressing

strong disagreement. A significant 10% of the respondents were neutral with regard to the

study item.

Based on the findings, the study established that a majority of the respondents did not think

that there was any growth in social cohesion among the communities living in Mandera

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County. The researcher noted that stereotypes and suspicions were still high among the

clans and bitterness fueled by a range of issues such as exclusion in governance and

inequality in resource sharing as earlier established in sections 4.6.3.1 and 4.6.3.4 of this

study. A Degodia participant in the males FGD lamented that:

The corner tribes and us the Degodia are excluded from the affairs of our county and

treated as outsiders. The Garre are amassing the county resources to benefit

themselves and dominate over other clans (Respondent S).

The study argues that such feelings of bitterness are indicative of the divisions within the

clans and the clearest indicator of elusive cohesion that consociational negotiated

democracy was intended to usher. The process of building cohesion among groups is

homegrown; it comprises of trust, solidarity and collective action among groups (Brown,

2013). The unfairness in sharing of development projects across the different areas as

established in section 4.6.3.3 undermines unity of purpose which in turn militates against

cohesion of groups. The finding in support of growing cohesion among groups in the

county as indicated by 38% of the respondents was ascribed to respondents who identified

with the ruling coalition and who were benefitting from the county largesse. The neutral

respondents (10%) were considered as not significant because they could not swing the

finding with regard to majority of the respondents even if they were to work with those in

favour of the study item’s claim. The study thus concludes that the clans in Mandera

County have not yet experienced cohesion and even though there is no active violence, it

would only take a trigger for violence to become manifest.

4.6.5.2 Decline in Politically Motivated Inter-clan Violence

The researcher sought to investigate whether there was a decline in politically motivated

inter-clan violence in Mandera County. The study findings were as shown in Figure 4.26.

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Figure 4.25: Decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence

Source: Field data, 2019

Based on the study findings as presented in Figure 4.26, 34% of the respondents agreed

that there was a decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence in Mandera County, a

development that meant reduction in ethno-political conflicts. This assessment was

corroborated by a further 17% of the respondents who expressed strong agreement with the

study item. About half of the respondents (51%) disagreed that there was a decline in

politically motivated inter-clan violence in Mandera County, with 16% of them expressing

strong disagreement. About 8% of the respondents were neutral.

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The investigation revealed that a slight majority of the respondents were of the view that

there was a decline in politically motivated violence, a finding that was supported and

elaborated by a national government interviewee thus:

Political violence tends to be pronounced during the electioneering period. If you

look at the history of Mandera County, you will notice that violence is rife during the

electoral year as groups strategize and implement their plans of winning particular

seats. Violence is thus conveniently used to achieve political ends after which

normalcy resumes (Key Informant XIV).

A Garre participant in the females FGD further explained this finding as follows:

Government officials and the NCIC have been working hard to contain political

violence, thus acting as deterrence for war mongers. The period after elections is

always calm in terms of inter-clan violence as the reality is that elections are an event

and when they are over, people move on with their normal routines (Respond D).

The explanations given by the two respondents are consistent that political violence was

high during the electoral period beyond which there was no motivation for it and this is

supported by Oyugi (2000) who contends that political violence was a periodic

phenomenon in Kenya. The study contends that the fact that there was decline in political

violence did not necessary mean that consociational negotiated democracy had contributed

to the decline; rather the electoral cycle acts as a catalyst for it.

4.6.5.3 Voluntary Surrender of Defense/Offence Weapons

The study sought to establish whether civilian residents of Mandera County were

voluntarily surrendering weapons in their possession which they had used to propagate

politically motivated violence and the findings were as shown in Figure 4.27.

The findings as presented in Figure 4.27 show that 17% of the respondents agreed that

illegally held defense/offense weapons were being voluntarily surrendered by the residents,

a view shared by a further 13% of them who strongly agreed with the assertion made by

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the study item. About 69% of the respondents expressed disagreement with the study item,

30% of them strongly disagreeing. The rest of the respondents (2%) were neutral.

Figure 4.26: Voluntary surrender of defense/offence weapons

Source: Field data, 2019

A majority of the respondents (69%) disagreed that there was voluntary surrender of

weapons from among the residents, a position supported by a national government

interviewee who explained that:

Mandera County shares borders with the Federal Republics of Somalia and Ethiopia.

The internal and external threats to the residents are many and they have had to

acquire weapons from the black market to protect themselves given the inadequacy

of security officers in the area. There hasn’t been anyone voluntarily surrendering

their illegally held weapons to the authorities (Key Informant XIV).

These findings point to the burden of self-defense that residents have to contend with, a

situation that has forced them to acquire weapons which at times they use to perpetrate

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political violence against each other during the electoral cycle when ethnic passions

become mobilized. The study finding is supported by the KNFP Survey (2011) which

established that political cycles witness the proliferation and use of small arms and light

weapons to intimidate or drive away perceived hostile populations, a situation exacerbated

by negative ethnicity and the presence of ungoverned spaces especially in the peripheral

areas of the country such as Mandera County.

4.6.5.4 Settlement of People in Places Previously Considered Hostile

This aspect of the research was intended to establish whether settlement patterns had

changed such that people from the different clans were settling in places previously

considered hostile on account of the dominance of a particular clan. The findings of the

inquiry were as illustrated in Figure 4.28.

Figure 4.27: Settlement of people in places previously considered hostile

Source: Field data, 2019

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The research findings indicated in Figure 4.28 show that 17% of the respondents agreed

that residents of Mandera County were freely settling in areas that had previously been

considered hostile due to politically motivated inter-clan rivalries. A further 10% of them

strongly agreed with the claim made by the study item. About 67% of the respondents

expressed disagreement with the study item, 27% of them strongly disagreeing. The rest of

the respondents (6%) were neutral.

The study findings manifest that a majority of the respondents (67%) did not think that

people felt secure enough to freely settle in areas that had previously been considered

hostile during the violent conflicts period. The researcher established that there were some

areas were particular communities were dominant and hence individuals from other

communities did not feel safe enough to settle there and neither were they welcome by the

dominant group in the area. A Murulle key infromant explained the partitioning

phenomenon thus:

It is normal that particular clans dominate particular areas and are very protective of

such dominance especially because of its value in terms of political strength during

voting. For instance, the Garre are dominant in Mandera West, Banissa and Mandera

South sub-counties while the Degodia claim majority population in Mandera North

sub-county. As such, the Degodia do not feel very safe settling in an area where their

rival clan is dominant (Key Informant IV).

This finding is supported by the findings of this research as explained in section 4.4. The

study argues that in multi-cultural societies, there is a tendency by groups that are sensitive

to their primordial identities to demographically dominate an area, including in its political

and economic spheres. The assertion is supported by Boone (2012) who argues that land

and distributive politics characterize the politically motivated violent conflicts that were

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witnessed in the former Rift Valley province of Kenya following the reintroduction of

multiparty politics in Kenya in the early 1990s. Thus the study maintains that the residents

of Mandera County do not feel safe enough to settle in areas they consider hostile due to

domination of such areas by a rival clan. The implication of this finding was that tensions

and mistrust still persist in Mandera County among clans and therefore the possibility of

ethno-political conflicts becoming violent remains high.

4.6.6 Hypothesis Testing

The study was guided by the null hypothesis that:

Consociational negotiated democracy has not been effective in the reduction of ethno-

political conflicts in Mandera County.

To test this hypothesis, the F Test was carried out using simple linear regression analysis.

The findings were as discussed in the following three tables. Consociational negotiated

democracy was the predictor variable while reduction in ethno-political conflicts was the

criterion variable.

Table 4.22: Model summary of effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy

Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate

1 .114a .013 .010 4.96980

a. Predictors: (Constant), Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

Source: Field data, 2019

Table 4.22 indicates that the Adjusted R Square which was used to establish the predictive

power of the study model was found to be .010. This implies that 1% of the variance in

reduction in ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County was explained by consociational

negotiated democracy. The remaining 99% of the variance was attributed to factors not

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examined by the study. The study further checked on the significance of effectiveness

between consociational negotiated democracy and reduction in ethno-political conflicts in

Mandera County. A report of the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is presented in Table

4.23.

Table 4.23: ANOVA between reduction in ethno-political conflicts and efficacy of

consociational negotiated democracy

Model Sum of

Squares

df Mean Square F Sig.

1

Regression 94.119 1 94.119 3.812 .052b

Residual 7382.310 299 24.690

Total 7476.429 300

a. Dependent Variable: Reduction in Ethno-political Conflicts

b. Predictors: (Constant), Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

Source: Field data, 2019

From Table 4.23 the ANOVA results demonstrate that the model is not a statistically

significant predictor of effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy in the

reduction of ethno-political conflicts among the different clans in Mandera County i.e. the

model was not statistically significant in the reduction of ethno-political conflicts in

Mandera County (F(1,300)= 3.812; p=.052>.05). This was further supported by the finding

in the model summary in Table 4.22 which indicated that only 1% of the variance in

reduction in ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County was explained by consociational

negotiated democracy.

The study went further to establish the beta values and the significance of these values to

the regression model. The findings were as shown in Table 4.24.

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Table 4.24: Coefficients of ethno-political conflicts and effectiveness of consociational

negotiated democracy

Model Unstandardized

Coefficients

Standardized

Coefficients

t Sig.

B Std. Error Beta

1

(Constant) 2.217 .181 12.250 .000

Effectiveness of

Consociational

Negotiated

Democracy

-.110 .056 -.160 -1.964 .052

a. Dependent Variable: Reduction in Ethno-political Conflicts

Source: Field data, 2019

Table 4.24 presents the findings on regression coefficient of the study variables. The study

established that the coefficient value for effectiveness of consociational negotiated

democracy was negative (β = -0.110) while the constant had a positive coefficient value (β

= 2.217). Additionally, the study also established that consociational negotiated democracy

had an insignificant value (p – value = 0.052, > 0.05). As a result, the findings revealed

that there was no significant relationship between effectiveness of consociational

negotiated democracy and reduction in ethno-political conflict in Mandera County, Kenya.

Against this finding, the study failed to reject the null hypothesis.

Substitution for the simple linear equation as stated in section 3.6:

Y= 2.217 – 0.110

From the simple linear model of the study; it was established that when all other factors

are held constant, reduction in ethno-political conflict in Mandera County would be 2.217.

However, with the introduction of other factors such as a unit increase in effectiveness of

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consociational negotiated democracy, this will result to a unit decrease in reduction in

ethno-political conflict in Mandera County by -0.110. This revealed that there is little or

no effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy on reduction of ethno-political

conflict in Mandera County, Kenya.

Based on the foregoing evidence which indicates the p value (.052) as greater than the

significance level at .05, the study failed to reject the null hypothesis.

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CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the summary, conclusions and recommendations based on the

findings of the study. It also provides suggestions on possible areas for further research in

the broad area of consociational negotiated democracy as it relates to ethno-political

conflict management. The study was grounded on three objectives which form the outline

of the summary, conclusion and recommendations will be based.

5.1 Summary of findings

The general objective of the study was to examine the contribution of consociational

negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.

This objective was studied by breaking it down to three specific objectives which were

used to guide the summary of findings as presented in this section.

5.1.1 Dynamics Influencing Adoption of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

This objective sought to establish the underlying factors that motivated the clans in

Mandera County to adopt consociational negotiated democracy as a pathway to the

management of the ethno-political conflicts that have beset the county.

Based on the study findings, violence and destruction had been witnessed in Mandera

County during the electoral cycles. Majority of the people, as reported by 87% of the

respondents, expressed their desire for a political process devoid of violence and

destruction which had impoverished families besides rendering many widowed or

orphaned. The prospects of peace and stability by the consociational model as advanced by

its theorists saw the model get support at the inception of devolution in 2013. The support

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for consociational negotiated democracy was fueled by the pre-existing system’s

inadequacies based on its zero-sum orientation; the winner controlled everything, with

skewed sharing of resources being the norm rather than the exception. Consociationalism

which is pro-equity was thus adopted on this consideration as reported by 55% of the

respondents. Over one third of the respondents were however cynical that consociational

negotiated democracy would deliver fairness. The consociational model was found to be

favored by the respondents at its inception because of its ability to uphold the teachings of

the dominant Islamic faith on peaceful dispute resolution as reported by 84% of the

respondents as well as favoring the inter-clan family ties. The study established that the

family ties were threatened by inter-clan violence fanned by politics according to 66% of

the respondents.

The consociational approach was found be the only realistic pathway for small clans to

take their place in the county’s political power configuration according to 57% of the

respondents. Politics being a game of numbers, the study noted that realpolitik demanded

that opportunities of wielding power as promised by consociationalism could not be turned

down by the small clans. The design of consociationalism was seen as cost effective

because agreements during negotiations if upheld would imply decreased expenditure in

campaigns. The system was thus attractive and a break from the finance-intensive

majoritarian system as reported by 74% of the respondents.

Other key pull factors in the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy were

explained as including the fear of self-annihilation and the desire for Somali unity given

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the many cultural aspects the clans in Mandera County share. Advice from elders and state

institutions such as the NCIC were found to have also played a role in persuading the

residents of Mandera County that the consociational model was a game changer in

combating politically motivated inter-clan conflicts. Legal provisions particularly those

contained in article 174 of the CoK pertaining to the objectives of devolution and which

neatly mapped to the principles of the consociational model attractive to the constituent

groups.

In terms of extend of support for consociational democracy, the study established that 57

% of the respondent did not support the model in 2017 compared to 2013. The decline in

support for the model was attributed by the respondents to unfulfilled promises of the

approach such as equity in sharing of political and economic resources and exclusion of

significant segments (clans, youth and women) in the county power configuration. Funding

of the process by interested politicians and business persons, oppression of the numerically

small clans by the big ones, imposition of candidates on the electorates and the tendency

to undermine the spirit of liberal democracy were also cited as reasons informing the

decline in support. The decline in support was demonstrated by intra-clan fallouts in light

of support for the model and the election of leaders not supporting the consociational

model.

5.1.2 The Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

The second objective of the study sought to examine the structure of consociational

negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County in the management of ethno-

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political conflicts. This objective was inspired by the need for contextualization of analyses

as different political units have different experiences.

The study findings revealed that an overwhelming majority of the respondents (85%) did

not believe or perceive consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera

County as inclusive of all significant segments (clans and other interest groups). Indeed,

86% of the respondents were emphatic that consociational negotiated democracy was

purely a Garre clan affair while 83% expressed their concern that the process involved the

Garre and Murulle clans only, much to the chagrin of the Degodia clan, the corner tribes

and other non-Somali groups residing in Mandera County. The study established that the

Degodia, which is the second largest clan in the county, was not involved in the

negotiations despite reaching out to the Garre and Murulle clans which were reported as

spearheading the consociational model.

Women and youth who form a key portion of the political equation in any political unit

were found to have not been involved in the negotiations as reported by 98% of the

respondents. Reasons related to religion, culture and the patriarchal nature of the political

organization of the Somali community were cited as responsible for the exclusion of these

two interest groups. This finding amplified the exclusion narrative, casting doubts on

whether what was being practiced in Mandera County could pass the test of the

consociational model.

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The teachings of the Islamic faith on justice and fairness were found to have been

instrumental in decision making during negotiations. Respect and trust in the elders as

reliable guardians of community interests and peace were cited in support of the

composition of the negotiators.

The study further established the key terms of consociational negotiated democracy as

including review of community political interests and leadership every five years with a

view on rotation of leadership among the various groups or extension of term as deemed

appropriate. Although respondents indicated that sharing of positions was based on a clan’s

numerical strength, a verification outcome revealed that there was no equity in the sharing

of positions, whether elective or appointive. Proportionality which is a key pillar of the

consociational model did not seem to count for anything as the Garre clan monopolized

power and consequently the resources that accompany access to power.

Political leaders were found to be important actors in the realization of consociational

negotiated democracy given the power and influence they wielded with regard to their

constituents. They were found to be particularly significant in funding the negotiations,

providing goodwill to the practice, mobilization of supporters to accept decisions even

when such decisions did not favor them and presentation of opinions of their followers to

the negotiators. The respondents were of the view that excluding politicians would

undermine the process as they could easily incite their supporters against the outcomes.

The study further noted that politics was the kernel of the process and excluding politicians

would damage the credibility of the process.

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On the generation and execution of the agenda, the study established that any member of

the community could approach and share their concerns with an elder who upon

considering it weighty would raise it with other elders for further deliberations and

considerations at the sub-clan level. A given agenda would be considered for deliberation

at the clan level if it satisfied the sub-clan elders as substantive enough and having an

impact on the wider community. The study further found that political actors and

government administrators were also contacted to share their views on the significance of

a proposed agenda item and its implications on the community. The study noted that such

a move was aimed at building goodwill from the onset. Once a proposal had been adopted

as an agenda it would be listed alongside others for discussion. The agenda items were

found to be prioritized based on their complexity during the negotiations, so that the

procedure would be handling complex matters towards easier ones.

The findings also demonstrated that dialogue with a view to obtaining unanimous decisions

was the most preferred consensus building approach even though the use of emissaries and

voting were also considered depending on the issues at hand and positions taken by

members. Taking of a vote in which case the majority vote was adopted as the collective

position, was reported as the least preferred approach. Emissaries were dispatched to

reason and persuade negotiators opposed to a particular collegiate decision on matters that

had implications on the larger community. The implication of this was that negotiations at

times were heated and members disagreed before taking breaks to cool tempers and consult

with constituents. It also emerged that candidates were also briefed before the final

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decisions were made public in an effort to obtain their goodwill. However, such goodwill

was very limited in the 2017 election cycle.

It was established that negotiations occurred at two levels; the sub-clans within a clan to

come up with a common candidate for the clan and at the inter-clan level for purposes of

tradeoffs based on the available positions and other factors such as the need to rotate

positions among clans. The concept of intra-clan negotiations before adopting the common

position in readiness for the inter-clan negotiations was equated to Lijphart’s (2012) idea

of segmental autonomy. This finding was particularly significant because it provided

insights on the complexity of plural societies; especially in African settings were the

concept of an ethnic group is very fluid.

The agreements emanating from the negotiations were declared final and binding on the

parties and they were documented as official records of the negotiations and deposited with

the elders’ office of each participating clan for future reference. The offices with functional

secretariats funded by community members of the respective clans were cited as evidence

of institutionalization of consociational negotiated democracy.

Finally, the study established that the negotiations process faced a myriad of challenges

that negotiators had to contend with, among them financial inducement of some negotiators

to favor certain positions or groups, infiltration by interest groups such as political parties,

limited expertise and skill set for negotiation due to illiteracy among negotiators, inter-clan

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rivalries, leaking of raw deliberations heightening tensions among groups and poor

communication strategies adopted by the team.

5.1.3 Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the Management of

Ethno-Political conflicts in Mandera County.

Having established the motivating factors to adoption of consociational negotiated

democracy and its structure, the study sought to evaluate the efficacy of the practice in the

management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.

The study established that consociational negotiated democracy had not brought about

inclusion of the various clans and interest groups in the political leadership and governance

of the county as reported by 56% of the respondents. Sharing of opportunities among the

clans was found to be highly skewed in favour of the Garre clan members as demonstrated

in Table 4.21. In terms of fairness in the implementation of development projects funded

by the county government, 59% of the respondents did not consider consociational

negotiated democracy as having positively contributed in this regard. The study further

found out that access to and distribution of economic resources was highly skewed in

favour of the Garre clan members and the cooperating Murulle clan as reported by 55% of

the respondents.

Opinion was divided among the respondents as to whether consociational negotiated

democracy had resulted in the successful resolution of political disputes without involving

the courts. A slight majority of 49% were of the view that there was no success recorded

in dispute resolution compared to 46% who thought thare was success albeit not

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pronounced. In terms of the overall support for consociational negotiated democracy when

the 2013 and 2017 electoral cycles were juxtaposed, the study established that there was

no notable increase in support for consociational negotiated democracy in the 2017 election

cycle but rather a decrease compared to 2013 as reported by 69% of the respondents. This

scenario was attributed to increased awareness among individuals and clans on the political

benefits at play. A majoritarian system was viewed more favorably than consociational

negotiated democracy.

5.2 Conclusions

The findings of this study demonstrated that demographic characteristics such as age, level

of education attainment, gender and clan affiliation had significant influence on an

individual’s decision to support or not support consociational negotiated democracy in the

management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. The study concluded that

negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County did not wholly manifest the

principles of consociationalism as advanced by its proponents, leading to its reduced

support particularly in the 2017 election cycle.

The study determined that increased political awareness in the post 2013 period, elite

capture of the process of negotiations, exclusion and factions within significant segments

of the population of Mandera County as the principal factors that undermined the support

for consociational negotiated democracy in the 2017 electoral cycle when compared to the

2013 electoral cycle. In particular, divisions within the dominant Garre clan coupled with

its unwillingness to involve the other clans, especially the Degodia dealt the biggest blow

to consociational negotiated democracy and with it the promise of managing politically

motivated conflicts in the county. The anti-consociational negotiated democracy group

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within the Garre clan, who were labelled ‘rebels’ by the promoters of the consociational

model formed an alliance with the Degodia and Murulle clans to restore majoritarianism,

effectively sinking the opportunities and potential that consociationalism held with regard

to the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.

In terms of the structure of consociational negotiated democracy, the study concluded that

the exclusion of the Degodia clan, women and youth as significant segments of the

population from negotiations undermined the prospects for support of outcomes from them

besides not meeting the criteria for inclusiveness. In addition, the finding on fractionation

of agenda items though in tandem with Berkovitch’s (1996) idea of fractionation and

prioritization in agenda setting, the practice deviated from his psychological approach that

easy issues be dealt with ahead of the complex ones to give negotiators the motivation that

they can find solutions to even the seemingly difficult matters. Participants in the

negotiations noted that cracking the complex matter was more important because the easy

ones would easily be handled. This adds impetus to the need to appreciate context in

research before making generalization.

The process of generating the agenda revealed the negotiations were two tiered; at the sub-

clan level and at the clan levels. This brought to focus the fluid nature of the concept of

significant segment which Lijphart (2012) did not consider in his analysis. This study

concluded in this regard that group dynamics, depending on how pronounced they are, can

and do influence political decision making and consequently conflict management.

212

The consensus-based approach to decision making during negotiation was found to mirror

the expectations of political negotiations in plural societies. Against this finding, the study

concluded that preparation and the implementation of outcomes were partially the

drawbacks to the success of consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. On

the significance of political actors, the study concluded that the process required the

goodwill of politicians for it to succeed, but not in the form of financial contributions

towards the negotiations as that heightened perceptions of attempts to influence outcomes.

Findings on exclusion and disproportionate representation of segments to elective and

appointive positions of power led the study to conclude that the approach had not been

effective in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. Manifestation

of ineffectiveness was demonstrated by lack of inclusivity in the political leadership and

governance as well as unfairness in sharing of employment opportunities and development

projects. These worsened relations between groups constituting the population in Mandera

County, leading to open rejection of consociational negotiated democracy by politicians

and their supporters and hence denying it the much needed goodwill. There was also no

significant reduction in the number of election-related cases filed in court, a finding that

informed the study to conclude that the approach was ineffective since it did not attain the

intended outcomes.

In a nutshell, consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera county rather

than alleviating conflict has antagonized the key stakeholders by accentuating their

differences. A regression analysis of the effectiveness of consociational negotiated

213

democracy as a predictor of reduction in ethno-political conflicts returned a p value of

0.052 which was greater than the significance level of 0.05, thus informing the decision to

fail to reject the null hypothesis.

5.3 Recommendations

The study makes the following recommendations based on the findings and conclusions

made on each of the three specific objectives:

With regard to the first objective, the key pull factors which had included assurance of

fairness in sharing of economic resources as well as political and appointive positions in

2013 were not honored, leading to rejection of negotiated democracy in the 2017 election

cycle. The stakeholders, particularly the elders and elected leaders should therefore ensure

inclusion of all significant segments in decision making as well as in governance and

manage intra-clan differences more amicably to avoid fall outs. Remedial measures should

seek to correct the skewed distribution of economic resources, political and appointive

positions by developing a formula that epitomizes justice and fairness. The elders should

work closely with statutory bodies such as the NCIC to establish proportionally constituted

joint negotiation teams comprising of representatives of all significant segments and

interest groups to thaw relations and enhance perceptions of inclusivity. The NCIC would

act as a neutral party whose interest would be to champion inclusion as a pathway to

cohesion and integration of all constituent groups in the county’s political matrix. Other

critical issues that stakeholders can leverage on to enhance acceptance of consociational

negotiated democracy include the presence of family ties across clans and Islamic religious

teachings on peaceful resolution of disputes given that a vast majority of the polity’s

population identify with and practice the Islamic religion. The study believes such

214

considerations would help the community gain a sense of ownership of consociational

negotiated democracy and support it as the most appropriate mechanism for ethno-political

conflict management.

Based on findings in light of objective two, the study recommends that consociational

negotiated democracy must be anchored on an inclusive process that is driven by a team of

elites who have the unwavering support of the segments they claim to represent besides

being guided by agreed upon terms. Corner tribes, women and the youth who constitute a

significant segment in the county should be included in the negotiations first as a right and

secondly, to stem their rejection of negotiation outcomes, which exacerbates rather than

alleviate conflict. This can be achieved by transforming the council from a male only entity

to one that is accommodative of the variety of significant interest groups in the county.

Stakeholders should also establish alternative ways of funding the negotiations other than

relying on politicians and business persons in order to forestall perceptions of undue

influence of outcomes. As critical actors in the process, politicians should instead play the

role of mobilizing their supporters to accept and support negotiations outcomes irrespective

of whether such decisions favour them or not.

The study also recommends development of programs that foster reconciliation, with the

youth and politicians who are key actors in violence taking a leading role in denouncing

political violence in all its manifestations. Stakeholders should also consider inclusion of

independent experts during negotiations to assist with obtaining agreements that are

inclusive and implementable without having to depend on the goodwill of individuals.

215

In order for the consociational model to deliver justice, fairness, cohesion and unity among

the communities making up the population in Mandera County, the study recommends that

the elites driving the process should adopt an organic approach that is consultative and all-

inclusive to replace the exclusive approach that has treated some groups and the general

population as passive actors whose only role is to implement their decisions. This will go

a long way in promoting acceptance of outcomes and stemming fallouts which exacerbate

rather than alleviate group conflicts.

The leadership of the three major clans needs sensitization training to help manage

expectations of their constituents so that they are not caught by surprise in terms of

negotiation outcomes. The Garre clan which is slightly more populous than the others

should be encouraged to accept that all clans and communities living in Mandera County

have equal rights under the law to not only live there but also engage in the county’s

politics; and that there is no provision, legal or moral that stipulates the county as

exclusively its political sphere of influence. Finally, state agencies mandated with

delimitation of boundaries should consider redrawing of boundaries in the county in such

a way that gerrymandering is eliminated.

5.4 Suggestions for Further Research

Given the delimitations that bound this study and findings from the data collected as well

as gaps in the extant literature, the study suggests further research on the following:

This study focused on consociational negotiated democracy in a largely culturally

homogenous setting. Another study focusing on consociational negotiated democracy in

sub-national political units with culturally distinct groups should be carried out to compare

and develop best practice.

216

The often cited cause of rejection of consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera

County was exclusion of significant segments and interest groups. This study suggests an

examination of the modalities and the influence of including all significant segments and

interest groups on the success or failure of consociational negotiated democracy.

Finally, the study suggests that since most of the study participants turned out to be men

on account of being heads of households or elders, a further study with equal representation

of males and females in the sample size be carried out to establish whether the findings

will hold.

217

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

Joseph M. Mutungi

P.O Box 53067-00200

Nairobi.

Tel: 0724526366

Dear Respondent,

RE: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

I am a student at Kisii University pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Peace and

Conflict Studies. I am conducting a research titled “CONSOCIATIONAL

NEGOTIATED DEMOCRACY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON ETHNO-

POLITICAL CONFLICTS MANAGEMENT IN MANDERA COUNTY, KENYA”.

Mandera County has been reported as practicing negotiated democracy since 2013. This is

an area that is fairly new in the Kenyan political landscape and thus the study would want

to establish more about the nature and process of negotiated democracy, the level of

acceptance in the community, its effectiveness and the challenges experienced in rolling it

out. I have identified you to participate in the study and I would be honored by your kind

acceptance of my request. Your honest response to the questions will be greatly

appreciated. Please note that there is no right or wrong answers. The information you will

provide shall be strictly used for academic purposes and shall remain anonymous and

confidential.

Thank you for your participation.

Sincerely,

Joseph Mutungi

234

APPENDIX II: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire is designed to assist in the collection of information regarding the

influence of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the management of ethno-political

conflicts in Mandera County. The information collected will only be used for the purposes

of this study and shall thus be confidential. Please mark the appropriate answer in the

provided boxes or parentheses ( ) with a tick (√) or an (x) and where applicable write the

required response in the spaces provided.

PART A:

Bio-Data

Please tick (√) or mark with an (x) the choice that is applicable to you.

a. Age: 21-30years ( ) 31-40 years ( ) 41-50 years ( ) Over 51 years ( )

b. Highest Education Level: Primary ( ) Secondary ( ) College ( ) University ( )

c. Gender: Male ( ) Female ( )

d. Marital Status: Single ( ) Married ( ) Divorced ( ) Widowed ( )

e. Clan: Garre ( ) Murrule ( ) Degodia ( ) Corner Tribe ( ) Other ( )

f. Religion: Muslim ( ) Christian ( ) other – please specify ………………..

g. How long have you lived in Mandera County?

0 to 5 years ( ) 6 to 10 years ( ) More than 10 years ( )

PART B:

Dynamics influencing adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in the

management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County

a. To what extent do you agree with the following statements relating to factors

influencing the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy as a means to

managing ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County? (Please tick only one option

for each statement; 1 – Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Disagree and 5

– Strongly Disagree)

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b. Please state any other reason not listed in the table above that you think influence

or has the potential to influence the adoption of consociational negotiated

democracy as a means to the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera

County.

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

c. Do you support the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy in the

management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County? Yes ( ) No ( )

d. If your answer to (c) above is no, please explain your reasons.

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

PART C:

The structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

a. How representative in terms of clans is the negotiating team? (Please tick only one

option for each statement; 1 – Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Disagree

and 5 – Strongly Disagree)

1 2 3 4 5

1 The desire for a political process free of violence and destruction

2 Assurance of fairness in the sharing of political positions

3 The promise of fairness in distribution of economic resources

4 Religious teachings on peaceful dispute resolution

5 Presence of family ties across clans

6 Lack of a sufficient campaign finances required to put up a

typical free-for-all democratic political competition

7 Lessons learned from observing the practice work in similar

situations elsewhere

8 Inclusion of each clan’s representatives in the negotiations

leading to sharing of political positions and other resources

9 It is the only realistic path for small clans to hold any county or

national elective political office

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b. Does the negotiating team comprise of people drawn from across the male and

female sexes? Yes ( ) No ( )

Please explain your answer to (b) above.

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

c. Are the youth involved in the negotiations? Yes ( ) No ( )

Please explain your answer

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

d. What beliefs (cultural or religious) bring about the kind of consociational

negotiated democracy practiced in Mandera County?

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

e. What are the terms of consociational negotiated democracy practiced in Mandera

County?

....................................................................................................................................

....................................................................................................................................

....................................................................................................................................

1 2 3 4 5

1 Comprises of all the clans residing in Mandera, including corner

tribes

2 Comprises of the Garre, Murulle and Degodia clans only

3 Comprises of the Garre only

4 Comprises of coalition of either two of the three big clans

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f. What role do political leaders play in the establishment of consociational negotiated

democracy in Mandera County?

....................................................................................................................................

....................................................................................................................................

....................................................................................................................................

g. In your opinion, do you think that political leaders are necessary in the realization

of consociation democracy in Mandera? Please explain your answer.

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

h. How is the agenda for the negotiations generated?

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

i. How does the negotiating team conduct their discussions of the various items on

the agenda? Please explain.

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

j. How is consensus arrived at among the negotiators?

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

k. To what extent do you agree with the following statements on the structure of

negotiations? (Please tick only one option in each question; 1 – Strongly Agree, 2

– Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Disagree and 5 – Strongly Disagree).

238

1 2 3 4 5

1 Each clan presents several candidates for consideration for each

elective post in the order of the clan preference for each candidate

2 Candidates are briefed about the negotiations prior to the

announcement of agreements to the general public

3 Elective and appointive opportunities and resources are allocated

based on the relative population strength of each clan

4 Interest groups other than clans propose negotiators to represent

their interests during the negotiations

5 The chair of the negotiating team is usually a neutral person not

aligned to any clan during the negotiations

6 Negotiation sessions and outcomes are documented as a true record

of proceedings

l. To what extent do you agree with the following statements with regard to the

challenges encountered during the negotiation processes? (Please tick only one

option in each question; 1 – Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Disagree

and 5 – Strongly Disagree)

1 2 3 4 5

1 Some members of the negotiating team are financially induced to

favor certain candidates

2 Disgruntled opinion leaders not in the negotiating team work to

undermine the negotiation process

3 Parties outside the county rooting for particular candidates attempt

to infiltrate the negotiations to sway it their way

4 Lack of independent experts with the knowledge and skill set in

negotiations leads to weak agreements

5 Lack of community participation in the choice of negotiators

undermines the credibility of the outcome

6 Failure to regularly update the community on the progress of the

negotiations leads to suspicions of foul play in the final decisions

7 Some clan representatives make unrealistic demands which slow

down negotiations as compromise and consensus is sought

8 Intra clan rivalries affect the choice of candidates for various offices

m. Has the leadership in Mandera County considered institutionalization of the

practice of consociational negotiated democracy as a mechanism of managing and

resolving ethno-political conflicts in the community? Yes ( ) No ( )

Please explain.

239

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

PART D: Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the management

of Ethno-Political Conflicts in Mandera County

a. What types of political dispute resolution mechanisms were there before

consociational negotiated democracy was introduced?

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

b. What has changed in the management of inter-clan political disputes after adoption

of consociational negotiated democracy?

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

c. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (Please tick only one

option against each statement; 1 - Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 -

Disagree and 5 – Strongly Disagree)

As a result of Consociational Negotiated Democracy, there is: 1 2 3 4 5

1 Inclusion of all clans in the county political leadership and

governance

2 Equitable distribution of county government employment

opportunities

3 Fairness in implementation of county government development

projects across the sub-counties

4 Successful resolution of political disputes without involving the

courts

d. Please state what you would consider to be the weaknesses of consociational

negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera

County.

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

240

PART E: Reduction in Ethno-Political Conflicts

a. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (Please tick only one

option against each statement; 1 - Strongly Agree, 2 – Agree, 3 – Neutral, 4 -

Disagree and 5 – Strongly Disagree)

Reduction in ethno-political conflicts is evidenced by: 1 2 3 4 5

1 Growing cohesion among different clans in the county

2 Decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence

3 Voluntary surrender of defense/offence weapons

4 Settlement of people in places previously considered hostile

Thank you for your time

241

APPENDIX III: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Thank you so much for honoring my request for an interview on the practice of

consociational negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in

Mandera County. As I indicated to you when I was seeking this opportunity to interview

you, I am a student at Kisii University pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Peace

and Conflict Studies. The main purpose for the interview is to obtain information from you

that will help answer my study questions. The information shared with me shall be treated

with utmost confidentiality and strictly used for academic purposes. Your identity shall be

concealed during reporting of the study findings.

Interview guide

Contextual dynamics influencing acceptance of Consociational Negotiated

Democracy in Mandera County

i. What pull factors (fears, interests, culture, resources sharing etc.) do you think

endeared Consociational Negotiated Democrcay to the people residing in Mandera

County?

ii. Would you say that the practice of Consociational Negotiated Democracy is widely

accepted and supported by all the clans in Mandera County?

Structure of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

i. How inclusive is the practice of consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera

County in terms of clans and special interest groups?

ii. How is the actual negotiation process organized? (Agenda setting, consensus

building on issues etc.)

iii. What particular roles if any do politicians play in the establishment and realization

of the negotiations?

iv. Are the agreements arrived at documented? Why? Who is/are the custodian(s) of

the agreements if any?

v. Has the practice of consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County been

institutionalized?

vi. What are the challenges faced by the team of negotiators during the actual

negotiations?

242

Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy in the management of Ethno-

Political conflicts

i. Do you think consociational negotiated democracy has helped in mainstreaming all

clans and interest groups in Mandera in the governance of the county?

ii. Kindly share with me any case(s) of highly contested political seats that previously

generated violence during elections but have since 2013 experienced peace thanks

to negotiated democracy?

iii. In your assessment, would you say that there is equity in the sharing of the various

resources among the clans and interest groups in Mandera County after the adoption

of consociationalism?

iv. In what ways has consociational negotiated democracy contributed to peaceful

coexistence among clans in Mandera County after the 2013 and 2017 general

elections?

v. What suggestions do you think can help enhance the practice of consociational

negotiated democracy for it to yield more successful and sustainable outcomes?

Thank you very much for your time.

243

APPENDIX IV: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

Thank you so much for honoring my request for a discussion on the practice of

consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County. As I indicated when I was

seeking this opportunity for discussions with you, I am a student at Kisii University

pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Peace and Conflict Studies. The main purpose

for the discussions is to obtain information from you regarding the processes around

consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera that will help answer my

study questions. The information shared with me shall be treated with utmost

confidentiality and strictly used for academic purposes. Your identity shall be concealed

during reporting of the study findings.

Discussion Guiding Questions

i. What pull factors endeared consociational negotiated democracy to the people of

Mandera County to adopt it as the best strategy for managing political conflicts?

ii. How inclusive is the team that leads the negotiations to resolve political conflicts in

Mandera County in terms of clans and special interest groups?

iii. How significant are politicians in the whole process of consociational negotiated

democracy?

iv. Are the negotiation outcomes documented?

v. Has negotiated democracy been institutionalized as a strategy for resolving political

conflicts in Mandera County?

vi. What factors influence the acceptance and adoption of consociational negotiated

democracy in the management of political conflicts in Mandera County?

vii. What indicators demonstrate the effectiveness of consociational negotiated

democracy in the management of political conflicts in Mandera County?

viii. What challenges undermine the practice of consociational negotiated democracy in

the management of political conflicts in Mandera County?

ix. What suggestions do you propose to overcome the challenges facing consociational

negotiated democracy in the management of political conflicts in Mandera County?

244

APPENDIX V: PLAGIARISM REPORT

245

246

247

248

249

APPENDIX VI: INTRODUCTION LETTER FROM KISII UNIVERSITY

250

APPENDIX VII: AUTHORIZATION LETTER FROM NACOSTI

251

APPENDIX VIII: RESEARCH LICENSE

252

APPENDIX IX: AUTHORIZATION LETTER FROM MANDERA COUNTY

COMMISSIONER

253

APPENDIX X: AUTHORIZATION LETTER FROM MANDERA COUNTY

DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION

254

APPENDIX XI: KREJCIE AND MORGAN’S TABLE FOR SAMPLE SIZE

Population

Size

Confidence = 95% Confidence = 99%

Margin of Error Margin of Error

5.0% 3.5% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 3.5% 2.5% 1.0%

10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10

20 19 20 20 20 19 20 20 20

30 28 29 29 30 29 29 30 30

50 44 47 48 50 47 48 49 50

75 63 69 72 74 67 71 73 75

100 80 89 94 99 87 93 96 99

150 108 126 137 148 122 135 142 149

200 132 160 177 196 154 174 186 198

250 152 190 215 244 182 211 229 246

300 169 217 251 291 207 246 270 295

400 196 265 318 384 250 309 348 391

500 217 306 377 475 285 365 421 485

600 234 340 432 565 315 416 490 579

700 248 370 481 653 341 462 554 672

800 260 396 526 739 363 503 615 763

1000 278 440 606 906 399 575 727 943

1200 291 474 674 1067 427 636 827 1119

1500 306 515 759 1297 460 712 959 1376

2000 322 563 869 1655 498 808 1141 1785

2500 333 597 952 1984 524 879 1288 2173

3500 346 641 1068 2565 558 977 1510 2890

5000 357 678 1176 3288 586 1066 1734 3842

7500 365 710 1275 4211 610 1147 1960 5165

10000 370 727 1332 4899 622 1193 2098 6239

25000 378 760 1448 6939 646 1285; 2399 9972

50000 381 772 1491 8056 655 1318 2520 12455

75000 382 776 1506 8514 658 1330 2563 13583

100000 383 778 1513 8762 659 1336 2585 14227

250000 384 782 1527 9248 662 1347 2626 15555

500000 384 783 1532 9423 663 1350 2640 16055

1000000 384 783 1534 9512 663 1352 2647 16317

2500000 384 784 1536 9567 663 1353 2651 16478

10000000 384 784 1536 9594 663 1354 2653 16560

100000000 384 784 1537 9603 663 1354 2654 16584

300000000 384 784 1537 9603 663 1354 2654 16586

255

APPENDIX XII: MAP OF MANDERA COUNTY MAJOR URBAN CENTRES