Report No. 10751

World Bank Assistance toAgriculItural Higher Education1964 -1990June 18, 1992

Operatio,.s Evaluation Department

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY *.

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Document of the World Bank

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipientsonly in tie performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwisebe disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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GLOSSARY

AHE Agricultural Higher EducationBAU Bangladesh AgricuRtural UniversityCGIAR Consuftive Group on International Agricuftural ResearchDGHE Directorate General of Higher Education (Indonesia)EMENA Europe, Mlddle East, and North Africa RegionFAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationFSR Farming Systems ResearchIARC Intemational Agricultural Research CenterIBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentIDA International Development AgencyISNAR Intemational Service for Agricultural ResearchLAC Latin America RegionMIS Management Information SystemM&E Monitoring and EvaluationNARS National Agricultural Rasearch SystemOED Operations Evaluation DepartmentPCARRD Philippine Council for Agricultural Resources Research &

DevelopmentPCR Project Completion ReportPIU Project Implementation UnitPPAR Project Performance Audit ReportPRT Project Related TrainingR&D Research and DevelopmentSACCAR Southern African Coordination Council for Agricultural

ResearchSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSPAAR Special Program on African Agricultural ResearchTA Technical AssistanceTPAE Technilcal Panel on Agricultural Education (Philippines)UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cuitural

OrganizationUNDP United Natlons Development ProgramUPLB University of the Philippines, Los BahosUSAID United States Agency for Intemational Development

FOR OFFCIAL UE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washington, D.C. 20433I J.S.A.

ONk. of DtOector-CswaiOp.4atianh Evahaatb

June 18, 1992

HEMORAUDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIMECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: World Bank Assistance to AgriculturalHither Educations 1964-1990

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled"World Bank Assistance to Agricultural Higher Education: 1964-1990"prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department.

Attachment 2

This document has a restricted distribution and May be used by rcipients only In the performanCeof their omcil duties. Its contents may not otherwiso be dcbloed without World Bank authouiition.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WORLD BANK ASSISTANCE TOAGRICULTURAL HiGHER EDUCATION

1964 - 1m

Table ofContem

PMg No.

Preface ............................. iExecutiveSunmary ............................. ih

1. Bacgmound .... ............ ... . ... ........ 1A. Introduction .. .B. StudyApproach .............. 1. C Conte forBank Asistanceto AUE .......... ....... . 3

2. Profile of Bank Assistance to AgrfcUltUWd Hgher Educatlom FY64.. 5Overview S................. .. 5

Project Portfolio ...... ........................................ SProject Outcomes ............ . . 6

B. Design Issues ...... . ........ 7Project Formulation... ... 9 9.....9 . ... 7Objectives and Inputs................. 11

C. Implementation Issues .. *............................... 16Implementation Arrangements .. .. ................... .* ............. 16Adherence to Schedules . . ...... * . .............................. 17Bank Supervision Isues ............................................ 18Performance of Technical Assistance Experts ........................... 18Monitoring and Evaluation of Implementaton and Outcomes .... .......... 19

D. Arhievement of Objective ...................... ... ...... 20EDhancing Agricultural Production and Prouctivity. . 20Meeting Manpower Needs.......... ........... . 22Illsdtution Building ........................ 24

E. Factors nfluencing Sustainability of AHE Imestments ....... .............. 28Intemal Factors ............................................. 28External Factors ........... 3... ..................... 32LIinkages to Clients and Colleagupes 34

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwse be dislosed without World lank authorization.

Pe No,

3. Related Lending and Asslstance: The Bank and Others ......................... 36A. Technical Assistance in Agricultural Projects ............ .................. 36B. Human and Institutional Resource Support in Agricultural Projects ........ . 37

Dialogue between Education and Agriculture Staff ...................... 39Organizational Differentiation ...................................... 39Coordination and Cooperation .................. .................... 40Relevance and Responsiveness ................. .................... 42

C. AHE Development and Other Donors .................................. 43USAID: Experience and Fmdings .............. .. ................... 43FAQ: Results of Recent Case S.idies of AHE ........... ........... 47

4. Issues, Conclusions and Recommendatlons ................................. 49A. Key Issues . ........................................................ 49

Scope and Impact of Bank Assistance ................................ 49Regional Variations .............................. 52The Role of Agricultural Projects .............. 53The World Bank and USAID in Comparison ........................... 53

B. Conclusions and Recommendations ..................................... 54Project Formulation and Design ......... ................. 54University Management and Governance ............................ 57Linkages and Institutional Relevance ............................. 58

Annexes:1. Education Projects Supporting AHE ................................... 612. Project with AHE Components .......................................... 623. AHE Components: Number of Projects by Region ........................... 634. ARE Components: Loan/Credit Amounts by Region .......................... 645. Data on Projects with AHE Components .................................. 656. Projects with AEDE Components ......................................... 677. Proportion of Appraised Total Project Costs Allocated ........................ 688. Proportion of Appraised costs Allocated for AHE ............................ 699. Institutions Involved in Bank Fnanced Projects .............................. 7010. Bank/IDA Project with Technical Assistance in Agriculture ..................... 7211. Agricultural Project Containing Fnancing for Research, Extension,

Training and Management: FY63-90 ........... ......................... 7312. World Bank Assisted and USAID Project Institutions in Comparison ..... ........ 74

Appendixes:1. Methodology for Ausssing AHE Components ............................... 752. Background to Bank Assistance for Agriculture and Education ..... ............. 773. USAID Experience in Assisting Agricultural Higher Education .................. 83

WORLD BANK ASSISTANCE TOAGRICULTURAL HIGHER EDUCATION

1964-1990

PREFACE

In terms of lending amounts and proportion of the education portfolio, projects assistinghigher education institutions represent a major slice of total Bank assistance to education. Of the398 education and training projects approved during FY64-90, 135 (or some 34 percent) involvedhigher education.

Half of all projects at the tertiary level supported agr'cultural higher education.Concurrently, the agriculture sector was the largest in terms of Bank lending, a significant portionof the development programs of most Borrowers. Agricultural colleges and universities were amongthe first education institutions to receive Bank assistance, and the Bank itself was among the earliestmultilateral donors to support these institutions. Bank assistance was based upon the need to supplytechnicians to support the science-based agriculture which was to play such an important part inincreasing food security and promoting economic development. Governments looked to these highereducation institutions to produce the technical personnel, managers, teachers, researchers, andextensionists required to staff agricultural agencies.

Mhis study reviews the Bank's experience with 41 education sector projects containingagricultural higher education components - some 88 percent of which had been completed - to discussperformance and outcomes of this lending, and suggest directions for future assistance.

The tem Bank refer to botb Intatonal Dak for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association.

WORLD BANK ASSISTANCE TOAGRICULTURAL HIGHER EDUCATION

1964 1990

EXECUTIVE StMMARY

Introduction benefits generated. As these controversiesmounted during the 1970s and 1980s, so did

1. This study examines World Bank assis- the Bank's ambivalence about investing intance to agricultural higher education over the university development (paras. 1.1-12).period FY64-90, during which time 68 tertiaryinstitutions were assisted through 41 education Study Approachprojects in 25 countries. This is the firstcomprehensive review of the Bank's experi- 3. This study is based on an evaluation ofence with such operations; it is also the first the relevant education portfolio, and supple-time Operations Evaluation Department has mentary examination of other factors, thoughtreviewed such subset of Bank lending activity to condition the performance and sustainabilityin education. Fmally, it is the first time that of project institutions. The bulk of the 41some aspects of sustainability analysis (as projects examined - nearly 90 percent - wererecently developed by OED) have been either completed or nearing completion whenbrought to bear on a particular educa ional reviewed so the results could be viewed fronsubsector. the perspective of both implementation experi-

ence and outcomes. The portfolio evaluation2. The study was undertaken because, entailed examination of a standard set of issuesdespite the generally satisfactory outcomes for covering project design, implementation,such components visible at project completion, achievement of objectivcs, and sustainability, inquestions were emerging about the longer- the course of eight case study audits. Theterm effectiveness of insdtutions supported. findings of the case study audits were supple,These concerns included a growing mismatch mented by desk reviews of the remaining 33between institutional output and manpower projects in the cohort (para. 1.3). In addition,needs, the persistence of low productivity and a more superficial review of the Bank's andrural poverty, and the inadequate levels of OED's data bases was conducted for the 469recurrent funding for many project-assisted agricultural projects with components relatedinstitutions (and consequent weakening of to higher education.educational and research programs supportedby the Bank). Morewer, higher education in 4. The review focused on the designgeneral was becoming a more controversial process, since problems noted at completionsubsector, as universities were increasingly were often traceable to flaws in identifyingplagued by problems of quality and relevance problems and socuring adequate consensusof programs and output, inequitable acces, about potential solutions. Standard designand heavy reliance on public coffers that issues examined were: (i) the adequacy ofseemed to many disproportionate to the social project formulation; (ii) the elaboration of

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objectives; and (iii) the determination of more scientifically-based activity. Notionsproject inputs. Standard implementation issues regarding the role of tertiary education inincluded: (i) implementation arrangements; (ii) development were based primarily upon west-adherence to -,chedules; (iii) the quality and em notions of the research university and theappropriateness of Bank supe -vision; (iv) the experience of the U.S. land grant college.adequacy and appropriateness of the technical Unfortunately, however, there was inadequateassistance inputs; and (v) the comprehensive- recognition of the full set of factors which hadness of the monitoring and evaluation arrange- made these models workable Land grantments for the project (para. 1.5). universities, in particular, were characterized

by several unique features: a triple mandate5. Relevant objectives were grouped into (teaching, research, and extension); contrml byfour major categories. They were then local (state) interests, which also supportedmatched with the inputs provided to achieve them financially; and strong in-house manage-them (i.e., physical facilities, consultants or ment and administration.specialist assistance, fellowships for training,learning materials, and process undertakings). 8. Furthermore, the growth of the landThe implementation experiences were exam- grant college system had been accompanied byined for recurrent patterns, and project out- circumstances which favored their developmen-comes were analyzed by determining the tal impact. Chief among these were: generallydegree to which the objectives were achieved. favorable state intervention in setting theThe sustainability of the investments beyond prices of agricultural commodities; the pres.the project period was examined in light of: ence of a largely literate, numerate, politicallyinternal factors (those directly affecting an vocal and landed rural populace whose chil-organization's ability to make internal allo- dren attended the university and whose needscative decisions); external factors (those origi- and priorities were reflected in universitynating in the macro-context in which the programs; the wide availability of credit, tech-institution operates) and linkages (the relation- nical packages, and complementary serviceship between institutions and their clients) networks both from government and private(paras. 13-1.5). sources for enhancing agricultural production;

and the predominance of notions of productive6. Fmally, the findings of project analysis efficiency which encouraged the consolidationwere set in the context of the circumstances and development of profitable (not just subsis-under which projects were appraised and tence) farming operations. As it turned out,implemented. The purpose was to examine few of these conditions prevailed in Borrowingthe impact of such factors on project perfor- countrie3, and neither the agriculture normance (paras. 1.6-1.12). education projects sought to foster them in

any concerted way.indings fom the Agricultural Higher Educa-

tlion Portfolio 9. PROPILE OF ASsgrANCL Many projectsin the cohort were designed to assist several

7. UNDELYNG AsSUMmONS AmD MODzS sub-sectors, so allocations to agriculturalThe Bank started financing agricultural higher higher education usually represented a smalleducation development in 1964 in the belief slice of project resources. Although totalthat such institutions would supply the trained project costs were estimated at US$2.84 billionmanpower and adapt the new technologies to (of which US$1.5 billion was to be providedspur agricultural production and make it a through Bank financing), the costs of the

relevant components was no more than one- 12. The strategy for institution buildingfourth of that, or about US$715 million. focused mainly on strengthening the teachingFurthermore, assistance was highly skewed in function through faculty upgrading, curriculumfavor of the Asia region, which reeeived about development, reinforcing basic and appliedhalf of all projects and about 80 percent of the sciences, and making programs more relevanttotal investment. The vast majority of opera- and practical. Improving the quality of agricul-tions assisted one or two institutions in a given tural research was frequently listed among thecountry. Only a handful supported several or SAR objectives, but with varying degrees ofprovided assistance over a series of projects, genuine support. The development of aca-and most of these were in Asia (paras. 2.1-2.6). demic programs and research focused primarily

on the natural sciences, with little attention to10. DESIGN ISSUE. Problems undermining social sciences or inter-disciplinary studies.the quality of the formulation process includ- With a few notable exceptions, proj-cts madeed: (i) cursory issues analysis, (ii) an inade- little or no attempt to develop tL vxu.,iis6iquate understanding of - or commitment to - function of universities. Over the periodthe agricultural higher education component under review, an increasing number of proiectsby the Borrower and (iii) unworkable impile- did stress the need to improve universitymentation arrangements. Issues analysis was administration and management, particularlybased on forward-looking manpower projec- with regard to improving resource allocationtioas (themselves stemming from questionable and internal efficiency, rationalizing programassumptions about economic growth and the development, and controlling the growth -'*

development of the agricultural sector) rather recurrent expenditures. Many institutiorthan a realistic assessment of labor market building objectives were subject to policyissues. Also, it lacked the organizational conditionalities and inputs (such as study tours,perspective necessary to provide the type of fellowships, .-nd expert assistance). Nonethe-inputs which would create institutional capacity less, although consultants were supposed toover the longer term (paras. 2.8-2.21). help improve university management practices,

there was little reference to specific process11. An increase in agricultural production reforms or proposed outcomes. Furthermore,and productivity was a major goal for most there seems to be little recognition that theprojects, but the specific strategy for achieving activities supported could involve measuresthis through strengthening agricultural univer- potentially unpopular with university staffsities was not always clearly spelled out or (paras. 2.29-2.38).even alluded to. Meeting manpower needswas an objective in all projects. Most opera- 13. IMPLEMENTATioN ISSUES Agriculturaltions sought to meet it by expanding training higher education components were deletedcapacity and program coverage at the under- from three projects after effectiveness andgraduate level through the provision of addi- were drastically altered in two others. Thetional facilities (paras. 2.22-2.28). A third remaining 36 were implemented largely asobjective - that of strengthening university designed, although with substantial time andsystems or agricultural services - appeared in cost overruns in some cases. While comple-about one-third of the projects, mostly cases in tion delays increased costs and postponedAsian countries where assistance to tertiary benefits, implementation lags did not necessar-level education had been ongoing for some ily affect project outcomes adversely, but gavetime (paras. 2.39-2.44). an opportunity for some aspects of institution-

al development to catch up with the pace of

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project implementation. ITe main implemen- most obvious and enduring contributiou oftation problems arose from: (i) implementation Bank assistance. As a result, enrollments inarrangements that did not allow for autono. agriculture undergraduate programs rosemous execution of the agricultural university dramatically, and most institutions becamecomponent and that did not sufficiently involve a major source of trained manpower touniversity staff; (ii) supervision by Bank staff their country's agricultural service. Thisinsufficiently familiar with higher education was a major accomplishment. These posi-issues or the agricultural portfolio in the tive developmeints notwithstanding, foliow-country; (iii) poor performance by technical up and external efficiency indicators -assistance experts; qnd (iv) weak monitoring although somewhat weak - indicated mixedand evaluation mechanisms that did not allow outcomes. In the first place, tracer studiesimplementation problems to be flagged and mandated by projects were either not un-dealt with in a timely fashion (paras. 2.45- dertaken, too limited in time or coverage,2.56). or not used, so the ability of the university

(and the Bank) to follow up on manpower14. AcmHEmNT OF O UEnvu. Tis was impact was circumscribed. Secondly, eco-mixed. Projects usually achieved, or exceeded nomic problems in many countries made ittargets for expanding and improving physical increasingly difficult for graduates to findplant and upgrading staff. At project comple- employment commensurate with theirtion, enrollments and outputs were usually in training, and universities found it difficultline with estimates, with occasional major to alter their programs to suit evolvingdeviations. However, less was accomplished needs. Part of the blame lay with stateledwith various software inputs and with regard to approaches to economic development,the broader economic development and insti- centralized manpower planning models, andtutional impact objectives, overoptimistic growth scenarios assumed by

project planners throughout the period* ENHNCING AGRICULTURUl PRoDucTioN AND (paras. 2.61-2.65).

PRoDucTvI. Inputs for this objectivewere not well specified. Even so, the * INsTuToN BuiiNG. Project investmentsdegree to which this essentially long term established some institutions, and enhancedgoal was met had less to do with the agri- the academic status of others, aDlowingcultural higher education component than some to be upgraded from coDeges to fullwith two other factors: (i) the conditions universities. They also contributed tofor promoting growth within the agicultur- improving the quality of undergraduateal sector and (ii) linkages between the education in many cases (through provi-university and the community. Where sion of better equipment and learningeconomies had prospered and the wi iersity materials and overseas fellowships forwas actively engaged with farmers and the upgrading instructional staff). In otherbusiness community, institutions were ful- ways, however, institution building achieve-filing a multiplicity of roles and demonstra- ments were modest. Although fellowshipsbly contributing toward production increas- were useful, they exacerbated brain draines (paras. 2.57-2.60). problems and did not ensure periodic facul-

ty renewal. Projects that set out to im-* MENG NfPowuR NEEs. The expan- prove graduate education often achieved

sion/upgrading of physical capacity and mixed results, in part because they failed toprogran. coverage were achieved and the provide the complementary research activi-

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ties essential to graduate level study (jour- potential solutions. For agricultural universi-nar, library books, equipment and consum- ties - outwardly-oriented service institutionsables) and did not contribute toward devel- dependent upon public funds and social de-opment of an effective local research net- mand - the extemal environment a&.d thework Projects that sought to promote interaction between internal and externalcontract research or community outreach environments are key to institutional relevancefor the university frequently suffered from and survival. A university's ability to balancea poor understanding of the economics or autonomy and accountability concerns is linkedpolitics that fueled the demand for and to its ability to administer and renew itself; itsresponse to these services. Most shortcom- ability to stay relevant to the economy isings in institution building involved pro- linked to its re'.-ionship to clients and col-posed changes in the organization and leagues and its ability to alapt programs tomanagement of institutions. Hardest to their needs. In the cases reviewed the projectachieve were any improvements to internal paid scant attention to almost all of theseefficiency or resource allocation patterns factors influencing university sustainability.within institutions (paras. 2.66-2.72).

* INTENAL FACToRs. Project institutionsDEvEOPING UNImRsnTv SYS-EMS OR AGiR1- frequently lacked the autonomy to set manyCULTmRAL SUPPORT SERVICES Several pro- of their own policies, including those affect-iects seeking such goals had not been com- ing enrollment levels and rescurce utiliza-pleted at the time of the review. Those tion. The Bank had in project designwhich were completed achieved mixed generally ignored issues affecting the make-results, in some cases because of lack of up of the student body (including issues offoilow-through with necessary policy chang- equal access across the sexes). Similarly,es or political support. The few projects although the ability to obtain and managethat sought to build linkages between agri- resources - whether financial, human, orcultural universities and support services physical - was essential to institutionalgeneraLly did not accomplish the objective survival, Bank-financed projects did littleowing to: (i) unworkable management or toward supporting this qpe of capacityfinancing arrangements; (ii) inadequate or building. For example, the ability of institu-inappropriate inputs; (iii) ministerial rivalry tions to raise funds was either circum-and insufficient consensus between univer- scribed or ineffective, in part due to exces-sities and central governments concerning sive government regulation. Finally, thethe role of each in support service provi- organization of some universities precludedsion; (iv) poor coordination witi and direc- their developing a leadership structuretion from national agricultural research which could guide university developmentsystems; (v) competition - i professional over the longer term (paras. 2.79-2.92).rivalry among scientists; ahu (vi) suspicionof the university's potential role in foment- * EXTERNAL FACTOR8. Not surprisingly, theing social unrest (paras. 2.73-2.76). most important external factors were the

growth and development of the economy -15. FAcrORos INiLECING SuSrAiNABIuTY oF particularly the agricultural sector - and theIwm'm. As noted earlier, the Bank's position of the institution within the nation-technical knowledge of universities as organi- al higher education system. The impact ofzations was limited. This humpered the Bank's the economy was so important that, in atunderstanding of the problems and their least one case, Bank assistance to agricul-

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tural higher education was deemed prema- entrepreneurs, or emphasize farm manage-ture when the sectoral growth needed to ment or farming systems analysis in theircreate a demand for irniversity services programs. Similarly, many Bank-assistedfailed to materialize as anticipated. Aspects institutions were considerably isolated fromof agricultural development that had a business and farming communities, perhapsperceptible impact on agricultural higher in consequence of the lack of attention toeducation institutions included: pricing building strong linkages with these groups.policies for agricultural commodities; infra- Finally, by not recognizing that universitiesstructural development ia rural areas; de- operate in an intemational academic andvelopment of social services; development research community, projects failed toof markets, processing and storage facilities; foster the kind of professional associationand the development of support services that helps infuse new ideas and reduceswith adequate interface with agricultural faculty isolation (paras. 2.97-2.103).universities. With regard to administrativeplacement, agricultural universities were 16. REGIONAL VA1oN8. Regional varia-often caught in a dilemma. On the one tions were most discermible across Asian andhand, institutions nGi closely associated African projects, which represented the ibalkwith or accountable to Ministries of Agri- of the cohort. Agricaltural higher educationculture were frequently perceived by them components were not only more prominentlyas mere pre-service training agencies or featured in Asia, but they out-performed alleven marginal to the Ministries' functions. the other regions by any standard. They wereOn the other hand, universities generally the most far-reaching in terms of scope, com-considered their public service mandate to prehensiveness of objectives, and amounts ofextend well beyond the purview of a single financing brought to bear. They often workedgovernment agency (paras. 2.93-2.96). with established institutions, over successive

operations, and with well designed inputs. TheLmNKAGEs TO CLENTS AND COLLLAGUE. The Borrower's history of involvement with highermost crucial aspect of sustainability over- education was an important factor, since thelooked by project designers was linkage more experienced Borrowers and establishedformation - i.e., encouraging the university institutions were more active in shaping pro-to identify and interact with relevant groups ject design, overseeing implementation, andin the society. Generally speaing, projects monitoring outcomes. There were fewerdid not seek to promote the type of profes- implementation problems in Asian projects,sional association among academics that more participation by university staff prior tofac--- y standards depend upon. Projects and during project execution, and a higherdid not assist universities to recognize, proportion of satisfactory outcomes. Projectsmuch less tackle, the problems of their in Asia ofteni were instrumental in improvingrural clientele, much of which consisted of tertiary education systems, laying a solid basissmalLholders or landless peasants. Neither in the agricultur'I sciences and assisting somedid they place much emphasis on building institutions to become acknowledged "centersup lines of communication and collabora- of excellence" in the country and the region.tion between universities and the govern-ment-sponsored support programs serving 17. Outcomes in Africa were far less satis-these groups. Projects rarely encouraged factory. Although facilities were built anduniversities to undertake activities with equipped, books, journals and other learningdirect economic benefits, liaise with local materials were frequently missing. Declining

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economies imposed great hardship on African of "making" versus continuing to "buy" (anduniversities and their faculty, whose mot.21y usually import) such expertise (paras. 3.2-3.5).income might suffice to feed a family for aweek Projects were only moderately success- 19. Most agricultural projects did not fosterful in making curriculum more practical, elimi- increased collaboration between agriculturalnating the need for expatriate staff, and con-< service agencies and the universities as antrolling costs. In some countries, attempts to important step in institution building for thecontain a 'missiors were futile, resulting in sector. Between FY64-FY90, 469 agriculturalcli znic overcrowding. Where containment of projects financed vanious aspects of research,enrollments was successful (because sagging extension, training and project management ineconomies could not absorb more graduates), the 25 countries in the cohort, and less thaninstitutions were underutilized and unit costs one-fourth of these acknowledged a role forexorbitant. Even where Bank and Borrower agricultural universities in these support activi-had been mindful of economies of scale by ties. Loans and credits provided US$5.00fosterit.g regional facilities, such solutions had billion for various support service and manage-not obtained in at least two out of the three ment activities, which was more than sevencases tried. >ost disappointing were the lack times the total investment in agriculturalof research capacity in African universities - higher education over the same period. Theparticularly notable in some scientific disci- review noted several factors that seemed topiines - and the deteriorating quality of she contribute to maintaining distance betweenvery programs that had been established with university and support service functions, inBank assistance (paras. 4.13-4.16). addition to those already mentioned. These

included: (i) insufficient dialogue betweenRelated Findings: Agricultural Lending and education and agricultural staff in the Bank;Other Donors (ii) the tendency to create totally separate and

discrete systems for research, extension, and18. AGRICULTURAL LENDING. Agricultural hight rlevel training; (ili) weak mechanisms forprojects - even those focused on institution ensuring collaboration or cooperation amongbuilding - made little conscious effort to en- national institutions undertaking similar func-courage Borrowers to get maximum utilization tions; and (iv) paucity of mechanisms forof university resources, other than by absorb- ensuring relevance and responsiveness of theing some graduates into the work force. In research, extension, and training to clientfact, the Bank probably undercut potential needs (paras. 3.8-3.11).university effectiveness through some of itsagricultural lending. Many agricultural pro- 20. For example, although the 1981 Agri-jects did not demonstrate a real commitment cultural Research Sector Policy Paper notedto reducing dependence on expatriate exper- the importance of enhancing coordination andtise. Bank-financed technical assistance provi- cooperation within the total national researchsions in agricultural projects remained substan- establishment, the development of agriculturaltial throughout the quarter century under research systems has not particularly empha-review, in most of the 25 countries outstrip- sized a role for universities, except amongping total investments in agricultural higher those Borrowers whose universities are alreadyeducation institutions by a factor of ten. At active partners or leaders in the researchno time did the Bank tackle the relative merits system. International agencies may also have- from an economic perspecive or any other - inadvertently contributed to the benign neglect

of university research capacities by overlooking

opportunities for bringing universities into full neglect of the research function overall; (vi)participation in the national research systems with few exceptions, the lack of involvement of(paras. 3.6-3.24 and 4.17) u;iversities with extension; (vii) erosion of

earlier successes in faculty development; (viii)21. DONOR ExIrnENCE IN COMPARISON, declining financial support and consequentDuring the period under review, while the weakening of education and research pro-World Bank was the major lender in the sub- grams; (ix) weak linkages to clients, colleaguessector development community (assisting 68 and occasionally, Ministries of Agriculture; andinstitutions in 25 countries), the USAID assis- (x) lack of institutional autonomy and weaktance program to agricultural higher education governance structures (paras. 3.25-3.40, 4.1-was broad in scope and the biggest of the 4.10, and 4.18-4.20).bilateral agencies (assisting 70 institutions in40 countries). Conclusions and Recommendations

22. Ten institutions in twelve countries PROJcr FORmuwAiIoN AND DESIGNwere assisted by both the Bank and USAID,which had similar aims (i.e. increasing produc- 23. Throughout the period, the Bank onlytivity, manpower development, and institution imperfectly understood the problems of agri-building) and provided similar inputs (physical cultural education at the tertiary level, whichfacilities, expansion of academic programs, and resulted in inappropriately staffed and de-faculty upgrading). There appeared to be signed Bank contributions to the developmentrelatively little duplication of effort by the two of the subsector. Components were based onagencies and, in fact, considerable complemen- standard justifications and key assumptions -tarity over the quarter of a century under many of which proved inadequate or unfound-review. Although vehicles for assistance ed - about: (i) a country's natural resourcediffered, both agencies were influenced by the base; (ii) labor market needs and absorptiveland grant model and sought to incorporate capacities; (iii) necessary conditions for devel-some elements of this prototype in their assis- oping the agricultural sector and the govern-tance packages, especially the tripartite func- ment's role in fostering these conditions; (iv)tions of teaching, research, and outreach. organizational issues contributing to financialInterestingly, both agencies arrived at similar and political stability of institutions of higherfindings through independent ex post evalua- learning; and (v) an institution's or system'stions of their programs. Chief among these capacity or willingness to undertake funda-findings were: (i) the relative success in mental institutional reforms.strengthening education functions as comparedwith research and extension functions; (ii) the 24. Project designers did not focus onstronger emphasis on traditional agricultural conditions necessary to the stability, relevance,science disciplines rather than on social and effectiveness of agricultural higher educa-sciences, interdisciplinary studies, and tion, including: (i) ensuring an adequate flowinnovative pedagogies, and consequent of resources to the institution; (ii) engenderingprogrammatic imbalance; (iii) the relative conditions - including good governance andweakness of postgraduate programs in Africa management at the university level - to pro-compared to Asia; (iv) lack of women in mote institutional autonomy and accountabili-agricultural degree programs; (v) the successful ty-, (iii) creating linkages to clients and col-establishment in a few Asian institutions of a leagues; and (iv) coordinating research andproductive research capacity, but the general extension investments with those in agricultur-

al universities to promote institutional syner- to the sustainablity of prospective projectgies, responsiveness, and adaptability on the institutions; (ii) a set of realistic objectivespart of the education institutions. and appropriate activities that can be im-

plemented during the time frame and cost25. There were numerous cases where parameters of the project; (iii) an elabora-project inputs did not fit with desired objec- tion of the key assumptions undergirdingtives or were insufficiently elaborated. Studies the project and how these will influencehad limited impact unless Borrower commit- achievement of project objectives; and (iv)ment to implementing the findings was strong. the elaboration of project inputs via anInputs designed to control the proliferation of implementation plan or matrix to facilitateacademic institutions, rationalize or consolidate analysis of outcomes.university programs, or regulate academicquality accomplished little in absence of the * RECOMmDATION 2: INVOLVE A BROADpolitical support for such activities. RANGE oF AcToRs IN IS6UEs ANALYSIs AND

PROJECr DESIGN. Although university staff26. The lack of rigor in project formulation and the government must take the lead inalso contrbuted to an oversimplified notion of developing a sense of ownership of theinstitution building, which is a long term and project, others who will benefit from theessentially endogenous process. The failure to investment, including faculty, students,distinguish between immediate and long term business leaders and farmers, must partici-objectives and among the external, internal, pate in the formulation process. Thisand process factors affecting university devel- requires the government's commitment toopment foreshortened the time horizon and consensus building as a precursor for Bankoversimplified the process. While donor support.assistance can encourage and even accelerateconsensus building, it cannot replace an inher- * RECOMMENDATION 3: ImpRovE z ojwcrently internal iteration which produces a EVALuATION DESIGN. Adequate projectsustainable institution. It is not clear that the formulation should lead naturally to theBank recognized the limits of its potential development of effective monitoring andcontribution under the best of circumstances, evaluation components designed to capturemuch less via provision of a rather limited set both process and product outcomes, sinceof inputs concentrating on hardware and the former, in particular, may prove crucialtechnical assistance (paras. 4.214.29). to project success and the durability v the

outcomes. University involvement in the* RECOMMEDAToN 1F IMPRovE IssuEs ANALY- design, implementation and utilization of

sis From sector work through project monitoring and evaluation components isgeneration and appraisal the Bank should an integral part of institution-building.pay closer attention to the context andconditions necessary to sustain viable and UNIVERsnTv MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCEhigh quality institutions, including retainingstaff who have demonstrated competence in 27. This review, as well as those of othermanaging universities or university systems. agencies, noted that many AHE institutionsBy the time the appraisal mission is in the had weak control over some very basic internalfield, the following minimal conditions decisions regarding funding, staffing, programs,should be achieved: (i) an understanding admissions and enrollments. Although projectsof the internal and external factors critical ostensibly sought to build up academic capa-

bilities, they did little to enhance the institu- with practical experience in academic man-tion's ability to guide, direct and manage these agement. Alternatively, the Bank couldcapabilities. Governments remained heavily identify those institutions in developinginvolved in regulating universities, thereby countries which appear to have been suc-paralying momentum and destroying the cessful in engineering strong self-gover-capacity for institutional responsiveness and nance capabilities and either recruit individ-innovation, and undermining the independence uals from those institutions as consultants,essential to self governance and good universi- or support "twinning" arrangements on aty performance (para. 4.30-4.32). case-by-case basis, based upon a thorough

needs assessment and long term institution-RILOMMmNDATION 4: Focus PRoJEcT Assis- al development plan.TANCE ON UPGRADING UNwERIrrY MANAGE-MET AND DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE GOVER- IKAGEs AND INsTITUTONAL RmLwANcENANCE STRucruRs. Further investmentshould focus considerable resources on 28. The most successful components en-assisting institutions to manage themselves, couraged or enabled institutions to formboth individually and as part of a larger linkages with groups served by them; this wasbody of tertiary institutions. University the single best way to keep university pro-administration and managerial processes grams relevant. Universities needed to main-need to be strengthened as a first priority, tain good contacts with employers and takewhich may involve changes in government responsibility for assisting with graduate place-policies and regulations, or creating univer- ment. They needed to be able to addresssity grants commissions or accreditation rural poverty and the variety of socio-economicboards which can act as brokers for the issues arising there from, as wel as support theuniversity, standard bearers of academic rapid development of key agricultural sectors.excellence, or buffers between universities This meant that they needed to be activeand the government. Functions relating to participants with other agencies responsible foruniversity planning, graduate programs, research and extension efforts. Graduatemaintenance systems, continuing education, programs should encourage, if not require,graduate placement, and research and students to conduct applied research withextension activities need to be properly potential economic benefit, the findings oforganized, programmed and financed to which can be widely disseminated. This willenhance the institution's ability to generate probably mean attention to building up aand allocate resources. Universities should national clearinghouse function for researchbe allowed to engage in directly productive (paras. 4.33-4.39).activities and to derive benefits from them.

RECOMMEDATION 6: INCORPORATE AGRIuCUL-* RECOMMENDATION 5: STRENGTIEN THE TURAL CONCERNS AMD ORGAIZATIONS INTO

BANs CAPACII IN UNIVERsTy MANAGE- UNIVERSMSTRUUREs. UniversityadvisorymEn. One of the reasons university man- boards and panels in which farmers, agri-agement was neglected was the unfamiliari- business concerns and public agencies arety of Bank staff with the importance of the represented would be more effective inissue. If lending for agricultural higher identifying priorities and strategies foreducation is to increase (if only to rehabili- training and research programs relevant totate previously-assisted institutions), the the country potentials, and this would alsoBank needs to involve more individuals ensure that prospective employers and

research clients support AHE institutions play an important role in helping NARSand their graduates. A problem-solving identify opportunities for cooperation withapproach to research training, using visits AHE institutions when a national researchand field exercises on local farming systems, organization assesses its priorities andwould help ensure that graduates are pre- prepares a long-term work program andpared to work on subjects relevant to local staffing plan. Such opportunities are mostneeds and are exposed to realistic teaching frequent for farming systems research andand research situations. The creation of socio-economic aspects of technologydevel-funding mechanisms for location-specific opment, to which the universities can con-adaptive research, for which research pro- tribute social sciences and managementposals would be evaluated in part on their skills rarely available in NARS.economic feasibility and the potential eco-nomic impact of research findings, would * RECOMMENDATioN & ENCOURAGE A DONOR

encourage a problem-solving approach to COORDINATION FOR AGRICULTURAL HIGHtraining and research as well as inter-disci- EDUCATION. Recent evaluations by theplinary work. Incentives (licensing privi- World Bank, USAID, and FAO have ar-leges, awards) could encourage universities rived at similar conclusions regarding theand the private sector to become more development of agricultural higher educa-focussed on technology development to a tion and the impact of donor assistance.country situation. These findings could provide a basis for

initiating a dialogue between BorrowersRECOMMEATION 7: STRENGTEIEN FIS TO and the donor community that is region,TE INRNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESERCH country or institution specific. WheneverINSmUTONs AND NARS. Linkages should possible, donors should endeavor to chan-be encouraged between AHIE institutions nel assistance through a single cofinancedand the IARCs, as well as with local project, or a series of projects in a compre-NARS, through training, intermships and hensive development program. In this way,joint research programs, similar to what project assistance itself can become thealready exists between national and intema- operational force for donor coordination.tional research organizations. ISNAR can

WORLD BANK ASSISTANCE TOAGRICULTURAL HIGHER EDUCATION Y

1964 -1990

1. BACKGROUND

A. Introduction

1.1 Between FY64-FY90, the World Bank approved over US$1.50 billion for 41 educationprojects in 25 countries that contained agricultural higher education (AHE) components (Annex 1).The premise underlying this assistance was that such institutions could enhance the scientific basisof agriculture and promote agricultural production, much as they evidently had done in the developedworld. The primary intention was to strengthen borrower capacity to generate the highly trainedmanpower necessary to mobilize agricultural productivity. During this quarter century, the Bnk'sscope of assistance for AHE broadened from a narrow focus on physical facilities - an approach whicheffectively left many pedagogic and institutional aspects untouched - to include most capital costsinvolved in developing the staff, facilities, and educational materials necessary for tertiary leveleducation. By the 1980s, projects routinely addressed some aspects of university administration andmanagement-as well.

1.2 Over the past decade tertiary education has become a more controversial subsector, andthe Bank less inclina to finance it. Universities everywhere became plagued by problems ofrelevance and the quality of programs and output; inequitable access; and heavy reliance on publiccoffers that seemed to many disproportionate to the social benefits generated. In many countries,the growth of higher education was clearly outstripping the capacity of the economy to usefullyabsorb the graduates. Ineffective communication between employers and training institutions wasresulting in a supply of graduates whose skills were poorly matched to employment opportunities andeconomic need, leading to the paradox - particularly in Afica - of a pool of unemployed universitygraduates co-existing with continued dependence upon expatriate expertise. The aim of makinguniversity programs more practical and the institutions more relevant often was not achieved, theprovision of workshops, laboratories, and experimental farms notwithstanding. Fnally, the universitieshad not assumed a lead role - or, in some cases, even a supporting role - in the generation of newknowledge and its successful application to rural development problems.

B. Studv Approac

13 Between 1983-1991, eight case study axudits of AHE projects were undertaken.1 Amongthe issues addressed by these audits were design, uiplementation, achievement of objectives, and

Y For purpo of this study, hgr education will be synonymous with colleges and uniesitis Al a minimum, suc Institutins Inude4-S year degree programs that operate at grade 16 or higher. lhey may also offer a variety of short term or In-sevice taining progrms,conduct contract search and prvide extension services to the community. Only Agicultural Higher Education insttutions financedthrough education prqoects were included as the numben amisted through the lending progmms of other sectors or sub-sectors, formample Agricultural Extension and Taning Projects, were very smlL

I These includedi Ethiopia V Education, Senegal I Educatin, Bangladesh I Education, Bangladesh Agricltural and Rural DTiniy,China Agrltural Higher Education and Resarcb, Hlppines Education IV, Philppidn FWiay 7ainig, and Pakistan m EducatinConditions in the country or the region prevented the timely auditing of two additional pnroects Peru U Education and Egpt mEducation

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sustainability of AHE components. As a starting point for this study, the findings of these auditswere compiled and compared with similarly-oriented desk reviews of other completed and ongoingprojects.

1.4 Early audits showed that difficulties during implementation were traceable to flaws inidentifying problems and securing consenwus about solutions. Noting this, the review focused on howthe design process shaped objectives, inputs, and outcomes of AHE components.

1.5 Another set of issues concerned objectives and their achievement. AHE objectives - asexpressed in Staff Appraisal Reports (SARs) - were grouped into four major categories: i)enhancing agricultural production and productivity; (ii) manpower development; (iii) institutionbuilding; and (iv) strengthening university systems or agricultural services. Frequently, objectives werenot defined, but instead were presented as a general benefit that would flow from the project. Insuch cases, links between the objectives and the means to achieving them - or the inputs - were notwell made. In other SARs - usually the more recent ones - objectives were better elaborated,proposed inputs were relevant to the goals, and they were linked to monitorable indicators againstwhich project performance could be judged. Inputs were grouped in five categories: (i) physicalfacilities, (ii) consultants or specialist assistance, (iii) fellowships for training, (iv) learning materials,and (v) process undertakingsk. Inputs could be supported through financing, policy measures,covenants, or a combination of all three.

1.6 Project outcomes were analyzed by determining the degree to which the project objectives(as stated or implied at Appraisal and as obtained throughout the project) were achieved. Fnally,the sustainability of AHE investments was examined from three perspectives: internal factors(financing structures,3' admissions and enrollment policies, facilities and staff utilization andgovemance); external - environmental - factors (development of the agricultural sector and universitysystem); and linkages to clients. (Appendix 1 descnbes the methodology for assessing AHEcomponent design and outcome issues in more detaiL)

1.7 An understanding of the context which gave rise to the components and the expectationsfor their performance is essential to an assessment of sustainability, so the analysis of the AHEportfolio was supplemented by reviews of: (i) the literature on agricultural higher education; (ii)Bank lending policies for agriculture and education; (iii) projects in the agricultural portfolio withrelevant human and institutional resource investments; and (iv) the experience of other donors andagencies assisting AHE. The remainder of this chapter will present why and how the Bank gotinvolved in assisting AHE in the first place. Tle second chapter will present the findings of the casestudy audits and desk reviews. The third chapter will examine the relationship between lending forAHE and lending for agriculture as well as the results of some evaluations by other agencies. The

P Proces undetakings we actiities aimed at changing polices or pracdcs The Included, for cample studies and follow-up,legislative actions, reorgnizaton or restuactg of institutins, changes to currlculum or program, changa to admions or studentrciftment procedures, em

Y' Univasity financing was both an Intemal and an temnal factor, relating to the ur and rdliability of funding, pivsisos for elf-finuacing, and the rliance on public coffer

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final chapter will summarize the lessons that have emerged in the course of this review and suggestrecommendations for future assistance to AHE.

C. Context for Bank Assistance to AHE

1.8 Bank assistance to AHE was shaped by several factors: (i) fundamental shifts in economicthinking which influenced notions of development, growth, and productivity and allowed an expansionof the Bank's lending program; (ii) the evolution of Bank lending policies with regard to agricultureand education; (iii) the changing character of the Bank's membership during the 1960s; (iv) theadvent of the Green Revolution; and (v) the model of the land grant universityY (A backgroundpaper that expands upon criteria and focus of the Bank's lending program in agriculture andeducation is presented as Appendix 2.)

1.9 Neither education nor agriculture was among the Bank's initial concerns, since earlyinvestments focused on the pf;-sical infrastructure necessary for industrial development - consideredin the immediate post-World War II period as the sector with the greatest productive potential. Bythe 1960s it was apparent that the economies of member countries were not "taking off, and benefitswere not "trickling down" to the agricultural sector as predicted. As newly-independent nations withlarge rural populations joined the Bank, the Umitations of this strategy became ever more apparent.As the development of scientifically-based agricultural practices and of the human resources necessaryto sustain them became important considerations for the Bank, the groundwork for supportingagdcultural higher education began to be laid.

1.10 Bank assistance for agriculture started with a narrow focus on infrastructure and supportfor plantation crops to enhance export earnings. Such assistance did little to benefit most ruralpopulations, however. During the 1960s, important discoveries and shifts in development thinkingjustified broadening the scope of lending. Schultz's book demonstrated that it was not the size of thefarmer's holding, but the removal of key resource constraints, that determined agricultural growth.Thus, smallholders could be as good an investment target as their larger counterparts. The validationof an experimental approach using applied agrcultural research to produce high-yielding seedvarieties appeared to provide another key. During the late 1960s, donors and governments joinedforces to set up several other International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) like the onesalready established in Mexico (for wheat) and the Philippines (for rice). It was felt that such centerscould access the global pool of scientific knowledge, talent, and plant material, and thus create theoptimal conditions for rapidly engineering new high-yielding varieties. By 1971, broad support forthe centers led to the establishment of the Consultative Group on International AgriculturalResearch (CGIAR) and the placing of the CGLAR Secretariat at World Bank headquarters.

1.11 The dissemination of high-yielding varieties and the resulting "Green Revolution! offeredthe hope of food security through self-sufficient grain production and increased earnings throughexports. Importantly, such technologies also appeared to be scale-neutral - that is, potentially

V Colonial antecde and the tmcuf bow bigher education s also played a key role In shaping the context of specficopations, and wll be dbsoud subsequently, (See pam. 2.13).

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replicable regardless of the size of the farm holding. The advent of the Green Revolution wasimportant in formulating the Bank's new agricultural strategy because it offered the possibility of aproduction-led rural development approach which could also meet the aim of growth with equity.The President's Nairobi Address in 1973 provided the official impetus for the elaboration of thestrategy and setting of lending targets. The new style projects depended heavily upon a cadre oftrained scientists and professionals to guide and administer them, and frequently no such cadre wasto be found locally. Financing for technical assistance (TA) and project-related training (PRT)increased, as did assistance for more permanent forms of institution building in agricultural servicesand manpower development. While Bank agricultural staff took over assisting research andextension capacity building, agricultural higher education was left primarily to education staff in theBank.

1.12 During this same period, Bank assistance to education was being defined, shaped primarilyby the early human capital economists, manpower theorists, and the educational experience of thedeveloped countries, particularly the United States. The Bank did not fully regard educationinvestments as 'productive" until the early 1960s, by which time economists demonstrated that thevalue added to labor through education could enhance productivity significantly. This allowed certaintypes of training to be reclassified as "productive."' Interestingly, agricultural higher education,because of its vocation-specific focus, was accepted as an investment target very early. Of the firstseven lending operations in education (FY64-69), four supported AHE. From the outset, lendingfor tertiary education relied on manpower forecasting and analysis. This remained the chiefmethodological device even though experience began to show that its estimates of unconstraineddemand were an inadequate basis for predicting manpower needs.

1.13 As in agriculture, the Nairobi address had a significant impact on assistance to education.Bank educators typically interpreted the basic needs arguments underpinning the President's speechas a shift toward lending for primary education and improved coverage in the rural areas. Some alsoused the speech to support arguments for postponing Bank support for investments in tertiaryeducation until basic education could be strengthened. One very real impact of the address was tocenter the Bank's policy and research work on basic education issues, further eroding the knowledgebase for lending to higher education. Although critics argued that the Bank had gone overboard inits focus on technical education and training, AHE was usually safe from these criticisms because ofits perceived link to agricultural production and the development of the rural economy. In fact, ifanything, the position of AHE in the lending portfolio was strengthened temporarily as a result ofthe President's speech. By all accounts, the only explicit policy directive on AHE can be found inthe 1980 Education Sector Policy Paper, which noted:

"There is a need, at the post-secondary level, for institutions to train professionalmanpower in agriculture and related fields. In the process, the dual function ofstaffing the upper echelons of public and private agricultural bodies and ofgenerating technical knowledge adapted to local conditions for use by extensionservices should be served." (pg. 51)

Eve though the Seventh Annual Report of the Wodd Bfnk acknoaledged in 19S3 that 'low standards of education and training weamong the obIads to deopmen,V inadequate traig continued to be regarded as an csogeous factor, not subject to remedy by anappcrt lending pwram, for another decad

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2. PROFILE OF BANK ASSISTANCE TO AGRICULTURAL HIGHER EDUCATION: FY64-90

A. Overview

Projec Portfolo

2.1 Lending for AIE rapidly took shape after the first three projects were approved in the1960s. During the 1970s, 22 projects were approved, folowed by 16 in the 1980s (Annex 2). Duringthe 1980s, the number of projects approved continued to climb in Asia and Latin America butdecreased in Africa and EMENAY

2.2 Project distribution among the regions was highly uneven, with over two-thirds of projectlending in the Asia region alone. There were 19 projects in Asia (US$1,018.87 million), 13 in Africa(US$295.13 million), 8 in EMENA (US$171.20 million), and 1 in LAC (US$17.30 million) (Annexes3 and 4). Nine countries had two projects or more; two Asian countries had the greatestconcentration with four projects each (China and Philippines).

2.3 Thirty-six of the 41 projects had been completed by FY91Y Accounts for only fiveprojects remained open in October 1991. Of these, four were in Asia and one in Africa. Loans orcredits were approved prior to FY82 and closed by the end of FY91 in three-fourths of the casesstudied.

2.4 Many projects in the cohort were designed to assist several sub-sectors. Thus, allocationsfor AHE development usuaLly represented a small fraction of total project resources. Although totalproject costs were estimated at US$2.84 billion, only about US$712.5 milion - or one-fourth of thetotal - could be identified specifically with AHE (Annexes 5 and 6))' Only 6 operations allocated76 pecent or more of total project resources to AHF. By contrast, 28 operations - over two-thirds -allocated 25 percent or less to AHE, and of these, 18 allocated less than 10 percent (Annexes 7 and

8).

2.5 The greatest concentration of AHE components was to be found in Asia. US$581 million,over 80 percent of total investment, was in Asia, and nearly one-half of this amount went,to onecountry (China). Most Asia projects allocated one-fourth or more of total project resources to AHE.

/ stdy osee the reional caeorluon In pla 19S1-1991, during wcb time thee wre four regio (Afica; Asi; Ewuroe,Mddle Eat nd Nor ; a d Latin Amedc and the Cuabbe). Pakitan w considered a part of Europe and the iddle Hut

Y lbT nuded 15 of the 19 In Asa 12 of te 13 in ia, aU 8 in MENA, and the sole Latin Amican project PCRs and Audthae been bued for 33 and 27 of the completd pocts, reipectiv.

I Atu pwrjet cos bmea dawn by compoont war not avilabk for a sufcent number of compkted projecs to perdt ush)comasons Tberfore, total buein cot of t E component as eimated at Appria wa umd Intead. In cs whereetiaXtewea not easi avable km Apprai Report, easim wee made In couaon a ith the Region concerned

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Even where a lower proportion was allocated to AHE, the major thrust of the project was usuallyon developing the tertiary education system. By contrast, only three projects in Africa and EMENAdevoted more than one-fourth of project resources to AHE. Furthermore, most Africa and EMENAprojects scattered resources over a broad range of education sub-sectors, tertiary education being butone.

2.6 In total, some 68 agricultural colleges and universities were to be assisted, along withnumerous related facilities (Annex 9)!3 In three cases, institutions assisted were to serve regionalneeds in Africa;,' the remaining institutions were national in scope. The vast majority of projects -over 80 percent - supported on one or two AHE institutions. In Africa, EMENA, and LAC everyproject but one focused on a single institution, which was typically the only agricultural highereducation facility in the country. Projects that assisted several institutions under a single operationwere found in three Asian countries only (China, Indonesia, Philippines).

Project Outcomes

2.7 That outcomes of crmpleted AHE components were mixed was noticeable from the early1980s. On the one hand, ppiws were being completed, institutions and programs established,instructors upgraded, and students enrolled as intended. As far as could be established in theimmediate ex Rot period, projected manpower needs were being met. According to standard ratingsfor completed projects (conducted in the course of OED's Annual Review of Project PerformanceEvaluation), over three-quarters were rated satisfactory, about on a par with education projects ingeneraL Of the 33 projects in the cohort that had been rated by FY91, 25 were deemed satisfactory,7 unsatisfactory, 1 was not rated.-W On the other hand, implementation problems occasionally hadbeen severe, with attendant delays and cost overruns. Moreover, there were consistent shortfalls inseveral areas: undertaking project financed tracer and/or manpower studies; establishing some typesof programs; providing adequate library and learning materials; and achieving broader institutionaldevelopment goals. Most worrsome was the appearance of three unanticipated problems: (i) agrowing mismatch between institutional output and manpower needs - frequently manifested inconsiderable over-production of graduates, (ii) the persistence of low productivity and rural poverty,and (iii) inadequate recurrent funding for many project-assisted institutions and the consequentweakening of educational and research programs.

-Related dadlitia onitedow o m^ pa4edzy agdcutu tenal inttute t earh intitute coaboating in pot-

gauate poram tbn8 centen, e tc

lY These lduded ntutions Cam Gabn nd Swaand.

' Mhe Sownd Education Pect in Zai wot rated beus the prjct was not Impemtd nd 90% of the Cedit proceeds werecanceed

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B. Design Issues

Project Formulation

2.8 PREPATON Tv& Am DESIGN CowLExry. Actual preparation times for the 41 projectsranged from a few months to several years. By itself, the time devoted to preparation made littledifference to the quality of the design. Neither did design complexity (or the number, sequencing,and diversity of elements within a single operation), when implementation capacities were adequatelyreckoned with (as was the case of the successful projects in Swaziland and Ireland). 'hus, robustAHE components neither took longer to prepare nor were more prominent within a p.oject. Forexample, Ethiopia V Education devoted only 2 percent of its baseline costs to AHE, the remainderof project resources going to a variety of other educational sub-sectors. its minority status within theproject notwithstanding, the AHE component was weil designed to meet its objective of trainingveterinarians.

2.9 In instances where preparation times and design complexity featured as problems, otherdesign shortcomings were also mentioned: cursory issues analysis, inadequate understanding of - orcommitment to the AHE component by the borrower or participating institutions, or unworkableimplementation arrangements. The AHE component in Cameroon I Education (FY70) suffered fromall three. In the end, the AHE program financed retained its academic orientation and length inspite of IDAs expressed desire for a shorter, more flexible, and more practical program. The PCRconcluded that IDA's contribution had been too small to influence the school's development in thedesired direction and recommended that,

"project objectives should be formulated more realistically in light of countrycommitment, curront trends and agreements reached, and projects shouldprovide adequately for these objectives. In instances where project inputs aresmall, project objectives and justification should be made based on a soundassessment of the Governent of Cameroon's intentions as manifested in pasttrends, not the creation of a program." (para. 5.4)

2.10 COUNTRY CONDITIONS. The government's commitment to AHE, the institutional consensussurrounding its development, and the country's prior experience with AHE affected the quality ofproject design and project outcomes. Throughout the period, governments were largely in favor ofspecialized tertiary education in agriculture. Newly independent states were eager to develop tertiaryeducation systems in any event, and the arguments put forth by UN or bilateral agencies - that AHEcould replace expatriates as well as be a catalyst for increasing agricultural production andproductivity - were very persuasive (Liberia I). Among many there was a zsire to move away fromcolonial antecedents, make education more practical and relevant to indigenous circumstances, andreplace expatriates with trained locals (Cameroon I, Swazfland II, Kenya projects). Some countrieswere further motivated by the desire to rehabilitate facilities damaged by war or years of isolationfrom the international scientific community (Philippines projects; China projects).

2.11 Receptivity on the part of governments needed to be followed by a careful dialoguebetween the Bank and the Borrower and within the country itselE Problems that subsequently arosefrom insufficient consensus between the Bank and the Borrower took many forms, including delays,outright deletion of the AHE component, and shortfalls in desired outcomes. Some examples follow.

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* The AHE component in Zambia m was deleted when, after project implementationcommenced, the Government decided to split the university into three separate campuses(one of which would be the new school of Agric W Iural Sciences), and IDA did not agreeto this fundamental change to project scope.

* The Borrower resisted the Bank's desire to link manpower and research studies financedunder the Agricultural Education and Res.-arch Project in China to specific projectobjectives, a move which would have forced more accountability and subjected the fate ofthese studies to closer scrutiny. Although the stand-alone study components werecompleted as per agreement with the Bank, there was no official follow-up to them, muchless any evidence that the Borrower had moved toward 'a more unified system ofagricultural research, a more efficient resource allocation model for agricultural collegesand universities, or a more flexible system of labor allocation for agricultural manpower.

* The goals of the Government and those of the Bank for Peru II Education were verydifferent. The Bank was primarily interested in: upgrading university staff - particularlyin agricultural economics and management; enhancing the research function through thedevelopment of associated regional development institutes; and upgrading the physicalplant. The government saw the project as a post-earthquake relief effort intended toupgrade facilities only, and this was the only outcome eventually achieved.

2.12 Projects that demonstrated inadequate ex ante consultation with or consensus amongparticipants also ran into serious problems. Two Asia projects (Thailand II Education and PhilippinesFishery Training) set out to relocate an existing AHE institution. Although eventually accomplishingthis goal, delays were severe and the end result was thorough disruption of the university for severalyears, largely because staff of the concerned institutions had not been sufficiently in favor of themove. The AHE component in Algeria I was deleted when ministerial rivalry over jurisdiction of thecomponent could not be overcome, while IDA assistance to the Bangladesh Agricultural University(BAU) achieved Uttle owing to the legacy of mistrust between the university and the government inpower. Projects were not designed to take into considera'ion such issues as tension between thegovernment and the university or rivalries between Ministries of Education (or Higher Education)and Agriculture over jurisdiction of AHE, even though these were recurring themes for someborrowers. One of the main lessons to emerge from the Bangladesh case study audit was, "thecomplexities involved when the Government attempts to influence the internal policies or coordinatethe activities of autonomous institutions, such as a university." (pg. v) (see also paras. 2.96 and 2.102)

2.13 Another factor influencing country conditions was the Borrower's prior experience withAHE For many African nations, institutional antecedents had been limited. Countries either hadno experience with tertiary education or agricultural training (much less an" combination of the two)or were still deeply rooted in colonial education systems whibh eschewed scientific studies in favorof preparing middle level ad& inistrators and technicians for the public service. There wasgenerally a longer history of local education structures in the Asian and EMENA countries on which

-9 It is obwgd tht, in the final anly, t ma Bak-ated prjecs aso dHid1e mom tha pzpa midle lel adnintrasodtanidam for the publck e

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colonial governments, independent states, and subsequently, donors could build. AHE institutionsin Asia frequently started out as agricultural high schools or colleges that were upgraded oramalgamated over time. By the time of Bank assistance, many had become actively involved ininstitutional partnerships with U.S. land grant universities, and were heavily influenced by theteaching, research, and extension ethos of this system, even though they lacked the mandate,financing, or structure to adopt it (see paras. 4.18-4.20).

2.14 Where antecedents were few, borrowers tended to depend heavily upon project preparationassistance extended by the Bank, UNESCO, F4AQ, and bilateral donor agencies. This was especiallytrue for projects generated in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. By contrast, where institutions werealready established, local staff became more actively involved in shaping the AHE component. Someindependently contracted their own consultants - from bi-lateral sources, universities abroad, orinternational philanthropic agencies - to assist with the development of a campus plan or a specificaspect of the project proposal. The greater the involvement of the Borrower - and particularly ofuniversity staff inheriting the AHE component at project completion - the more robust the design(China, India, Indonesia, and Philippines projects). Although increasing the number of actors oftencomplicated and lengthened the preparation process, a more satisfactory product emerged.

2.15 ExPERTIsE OF PROJECT DESIGNERS. Generation of the AHE components involvedrepresentatives of government and academia on one hand, and a variety of specialists representingthe Bank on the other. economists, educators, agriculturalists, architects, and research scientists.Projects were cast within the scope of the expertise brought to bear by these various actors. Duringthe first d&cade of lending for AHE, the Bank relied heavily on UNESCO and FAO for projectpreparation. These international civil servants were frequently agricultural educators, educationplanners, or agriculturalists who themselves had worked as expatriates in the governments oruniversity systems of developing countries. Relatively few, however, had ever held a majoradministrative post (president, vice chancellor, department chair, faculty head) at any agriculturalcollege or university. These staff participated in the initial sector studies that had identified potentialprojects continued to assist throughout project formulation and supervision. Their understanding ofthe country context, agricultural sector, and educational structures of the borrowers varied greatly.

2.16 From the mid-1970s until the reorganization in 1987, a handful of training specialists -classified as agricultural educators - were recruited into the Bank and employed largely in theeducation divisions. About half had held faculty positions at agricultural universities; some camedirectly from FAO or UNESCO. None had held a senior administrative post at a university, andnone had advanced academic qualifications in higher education administration. This small group(ranging from 5-8 persons over the period) formed the core of experise developing AHE projects.They helped to move the Bank away from the narrow focus on physical infrastructure that haddominated assistance to AHE up to that point, orienting it toward a more comprehensive investmentapproach that included the development of undergraduate curricula and programs, learning materials,and faculty. However, as many did not possess direct experience in university administration, theydid not emphasize the managerial, financial, or organizational aspects of university development. Theinvolvement of other Bank staff varied greatly with the country and the region. Early projects (suchPhilippines I Education) were frequently conceived by agricultural staff, although their formulation,development and implementation, was overseen by educators. Later projects, (such as PhilippinesFisheries Training) were often developed without sufficient collaboration between Bark staff

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developing AHE components ani those developing agricultural projects. The problems arising frominsufficient collaboration are discussed in paras. 2.93-2.95.

2.17 IssuEs ANALysIs. Initial issues analysis - or the process that identifies problems andsuggests potential solutions - is the key to an effective preparation and appraisal process. This reviewsuggested that issues analysis of AHE was weak in two major respects. In the first place, Banksuppr-t for AHE was not based on a realistic assessment of labor market issues (including surveyswhic.i studied labor trends over time), but rather on forward-looking manpower projections basedupon questionable assumptions about economic prospects for the country (paras. 4.21-4.27). Effortsto inject a greater factual base into this process - either through sector work or project-financedstudies - were ad hoc resisted by Borrowers, or discarded in the final analysis. The chronic absenceof data discouraged an examination of actual labor patterns, while the importance assigned tocentralized manpower planning encouraged the setting of (sometimes overoptimistic) future targets.

2.18 The second problem was the failure to understand universities as organizations, withimportant consequences for the sustainability of the investments (see paras. 2.77-2.99). There waslittle attention to how the organizational structure would support or undermine fulfillment ofuniversity functions, or how the socio-economic and political environment in which the universityoperated would affect institutional behavior. There was no recognition of the important dimensionof internal academic politics, or how the dynamics of such relationships would color universityperformance (Bangladesh projects). Sociologists studying the structure and institutional features ofuniversities have long noted that they are relatively open systems whose internal structures are highlyinteractive with and dependent upon their "environments." Yet, within the Bank there was noacknowledgement of this viewpoint, or attempt to incorporate it into project design.

2.19 Critical assessments that could have provided a sound macro-economic context for justifyingthe investment as sustainable were either not undertaken or were inadequately reflected by thosepreparing the AHE components. The recurrent cost analysis undertaken during the course ofpreparing components was weak, and the long term financial implications of building up AHEcapacities was rarely addressed. Reviews of university financing sources and government publicexpenditure patterns in education were cursory, inadequate to determine whether the investment wasfinancially sustainable. There was little attention to the political commitment to continue funding ofAHE institutions at the levels necessary to sustain satisfactory operation. Until the late 1970s therewas minimal attention to institutional self-financing issues, whether through fees and tuition or othersources, such as directly productive activities in agriculture.

2.20 There was insufficient attention to the educational and organizational context in whichAHE institutions would be operating. SARs limited discussions of the education system to fairlysuperficial descriptions of how various levels of education were organized and administered. Initialassessments did not explore potential support for the agricultural sciences among the rest of thescientific community in the country, or potential competition for scarce research resources within theresearch community. Finally, assessments did not exammine crucial institutional features or governancepatterns within the higher education system and whether these would constrain or promote autonomy,innovation, and accountabiity within institutions (paras. 2.91-2.92).

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2.21 Many issues relative to the developident of the agricultural sector itself were not addressed.In so far as they could shape the demand for or utilization of the services provided by the AHE,these issues were relevant to its development. They included: (i) whether actual consumer demandand government pricing policies (as well as landholding/asset holding patterns) would act as anincentive or a disincentive in changing production patterns; (ii) whether inputs and technical packagesnecessary to support new technologies being promoted would be available in sufficient quantity; (iii)whether the institutional infrastructure existed to produce research, disseminate findings to farmers,and monitor acceptance; and (iv) whether the backup provided by agricultural storage and marketingsystems would be adequate. In many instances the Bank's economic and sector work did not addressthese issues either.

Objectfves and Inputs

2.22 ENHANcING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCrlON AND PRoDucrvrry. When the power of economicmodels emphasizing industrializatian and import substitution began to fade in the face of conflictingevidence, new approaches emerged that focused on agricultural development and rural areas. Thesenew paradigms generally supported: bringing new lands under cultivation, developing new highyielding varieties of food grains, and enhancing efficient utilization of factors of production to boostproductivity. Increasingly, they also tried to increase the focus on disadvantaged rural areas orsmailholders.

2.23 In the Bank, country agricultural strategies were developed on the basis of this growth-with-equity scenario, and support for agricultural colleges and universities was a common element in thesestrategies. By enhancing the scientific basis, relevance, and practical content of curriculum it washoped that AHE components would spur the growth of a modernized and technologically advancedagricultural sector and boost self-sufficiency in grain production.

2.24 Nevertheless, it was rarely made clear how AHE institutions were to facilitate the increasein production and productivity. In presenting AHE components, SARs typically gave a cursorydescription of the nature and extent of rural poverty and the role of agriculture in the economy, andthen skipped to the conclusion that more trained agriculturalists were needed. Project designersneglected to develop the specific inputs and monitorable outcomes necessary to concretize objectives.The SAR for the relatively recent Fifth Education Project in Kenya (FY81) is illustrative:

"Because of the large number of people and high proportion of area involvedin small farms, it is cruciaL.-that efficiency of this subsector be significantlyincreased. Training of additional skilled manpower for the sub-sector is urgentlyrequired." (para. 1.02)

2.25 SARs rarely referred to the university's mandate or its official statement of purposedirectly. Vague references to teaching, research, and extension functions were not followed by inputswhich would selectively strengthen these roles. In fact, from the perspective of Bank assistance, thepurpose of project institutions was to contribute trained manpower and possibly research. SARsrarely mentioned specific ways in which AHE institutions would make useful contributions to: (i)national agricultural research systems (NARS), (ii) extension systems, (iii) agricultural policy analysis,or (iv) project development. The potential of the university as a consultant to the government orthe private sector was also rarely explored. The few cases where such issues were addressed were

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in Asia (specifically China and the Philippines) which received the greatest attention to AHE overthe longest period of time.

2.26 MEETING MANPowER NEEDs. All AHE coL ponents contained manpower objectives, whichentailed increasing the quantity and quality of agricultural scientists and professionals - chieflyveterinarians, agricultural engineers, agricultural teachers, specialists in crop and animal production,forestry, and fisheries. Most project inputs and the bulk of project resources could be identifiedunder this objective. Aspects of manpower development supported under AHE componentsincluded: (i) expanding physical capacity and (ii) expanding program coverage. The bulk of inputsfor this objective were physical facilities, and to a lesser extent, consultant assistance, fellowships, andlearning materials. Generally speaking, where new programs were developed, consultants were hiredand staff sent abroad for upgrading.

2.27 Most early projects - and virtually all Africa projects - sought to expand training capacityand increase enrollments in an effort to reduce dependence on expatriate specialists.N This wasto be accomplished by constructing and equipping classrooms, laboratorie;, and administrative spaces.To varying degrees, boarding facilities, staff housing, libraries, and ancillary buildings for research andextension activities were also covered. Actual usage patterns, however, were not studied thoroughlyprior to the approval of most AHE components.

2.28 A majority of projects also intended to expand program coverage by introducing newcourses and undergraduate degree programs in some branch of the agricultural sciences. Projects inAsia frequently included establishing postgraduate training or institutional centers of excellence(Philippines, China). It was hoped that such model programs would: set national standards forteaching, contnbute toward agricultural research, or allow the country to staff itself with its ownnationals. In the Philippines there was an explicit intention to create an institution of sufficientcalibre to staff other agricultural colleges in the system. ITpically, expanding program coverage wasto be accomplished through a combination of equipment provision - for the new facilities - andtechnical assistance provision - for the new programs.

2.29 INsTrIUmoN BUnDING. "Institution building' means more than just the physical expansionof the campus or its programs, it includes organizational development in the broadest sense, ie.enhancing the institution's ability to manage and renew itself. Ideally, institutional development atthe university level should entail three things: (i) ensuring the quality and relevance of universityprograms and functions; (ii) improving intemal resource organization and management practices; and(iii) maximzing institutional responsiveness to the demands of client groups. While most SARsadvocated enhancing the quality and relevance of university programs, and some sought bettermanagement of these programs as well, none thought to directly address the issue of institutionalresponsiveness.

2.30 There was considerable attention to enhancing the qualiy of the teaching function throughstaff and curriculum development. Quality-enhancing inputs includedc (i) improving professional

l One exception was Inda , approved in October 197I which oWpliHdtl aimed at improveents in educationl qualty, reardb, adexziesion, with little or no iname in output of gnduates from the two univesities supported under the poject.

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qualifications of faculty; (ii) strengthening the practical aspect of university curriculum, (iii) makingprograms more rel_vant to the agricultural economy or rural communities, and (iv) reinforcing basicand applied sciences. Asia projects, in particular, emphasized the need to reinforce the scientific basisof agricultural disciplines. Paradoxically, many attempts to make agricultural education morerelevant and practical overlooked the need to supplement the hard sciences with other aspects offarming systems development (via courses in farm management, farming systems, rural sociology, etc.)

2.31 Many projects sought to diversify existing academic structures which lacked any practicalagricultural orientation. In some instances, this meant overcoming the inertia of low-budgetoperations that were clinging to an ivory tower self image that kept them isolated from rural realities.A better balance between theoretical and practical content was to be achieved by establishingexpenmental farms or workshops and revising course content (Ethiopia V, Gabon II, Senegal IL,Morocco IIL Portugal II).

2.32 For most AHE components, curriculum development was to be undertaken with theassistance of expatriate experts - frequently agricultural scientists from universities in developedcountries. In most cases the experts were to work on designated disciplines in conjinction with thestaff of project-assisted institutions. However, terms of reference were often vague regarding theexact process, timeframe, and product of the collaboration.

2.33 A small proportion of AHE components - mostly in Africa - sought to strengthenagricultural education at lower levels (Cameroon I and m, Ethiopia VII, Kenya II, TV, V, SwazilandII, Tunisia V, Philippines Fishery Training), usually through establishing training programs forsecondary or technical agricultural teachers at the AHE institutions concemed. While the projectssupported staff development at lower levels, few tried to involve local AHE institutions inparticipating in, much less guiding, curriculum development for these levels. This was indicative ofthe minimal attention devoted to such pedagogic issues as integrating or sequencing curriculum atvarious levels of formal education. One exception to this was Swaziland II, which provided funds tosupport a model agricultural center - comprising some livestock and crop facilities - similar to thosebeing included in junior secondary schools.

2.34 In addition to strengthening the teaching function of universities, most Asia and Africaprojects also mentioned a desire to improve the quality of research in the university, although withvarying degrees of genuine support. The First Education Project in Bangladesh, for example,included a covenant requiring the preparation of a development plan for the university that includedits role in research and extension, but no financing was provided under the Credit to support thepreparation of this development plan. Project assistance for postgraduate programs and the need tosupport graduate training in research provided the most common rationale for assistance tostrengthen university research capacity (China Agricultural Education and Research, all projects inthe Philippines, Ethiopia VII, Kenya V). The need for academics to stay abreast of developmentsin their disciplines - a necessary corollary for maintaining quality at the tertiary level - was rarelynoted. Other reasons for supporting university research, such as creating a directly productive orcontract research capability or strengthening the university's outreach or extension function, were alsorarely noted.

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2.35 Research was largely focused on agricultural science and technology disciplines. Someincluded agricultural economics and multidisciplinary study, but very few emphasized any other aspectof social science research. The better components - usually the more recent ones - not only specifiedthe area of research to be improved but also supplied the specialized facilities, equipment, spareparts, reference materials and consumables needed. While most linked improving research capacityto enhancing the development of graduate programs, a few specified certain research products (areasof knowledge generation) which were to result from project efforts. Unfortunately, no project soughtto build in-house capacity to generate and manage research programs.

2.36 With a few notable exceptions (Philippines II, Nepal Agricultural Manpower Development,Tunisia V, China Agricultural Education Il) most projects either made no attempt to develop theoutbachextension function of AHE institutions or, like thc Bangladesh case cited above, paid lipservice only. While some projects sought to improve training programs for agricultural extensionofficers and field specialists, few assisted universities to identify community needs and foltow up withspecific outreach activities. Those that did focused resources on social sciences laboratories, farmertraining centers, broadcasting facilities for radio transmissions, and staff and materials development.

2.37 Most projects in Asia and some in Africa devoted resources to improving universityadministration and management. This objective increasingly reflected a perceived need to improveresource allocation within the universities, enhance internal efficiency, rationaize programdevelopment, and control the growth of recurrent educational expenditures. Early SARs devotedlittle specific attention to university management issues, other than to discuss the need for improvedcampus planning. Later projects became more explicit regarding the actions to be supported, inter3w: consolidating university programs, altering staff/student ratios, improving admission policies,developing computerized information systems, improving the quality of library management, andreviewing financing and fee structures.

2.38 Attempts to improve administration usually consisted of study touws, fellowships andtechnical assistance, although funds were increasingly provided for administrative buildings andcomputer-based management information systems. As with program and curriculum development,foreign consultants were to play a major role in improving university management practices, but withlittle reference in SARs to specific process reforms or ultimate outcomes. Furthermore, thereappeared to be minimal recognition that these types of activities could involve potentiatly unpopularmeasures to change patterns of behavior or resource altocation, and therefore were inherently risky.

2.39 STRNGTHENING UNnm rry SYsTEMs OR AoRICuLTURAL SERvicEs. A reference tostrengthening either: (i) university systems or (ii) the connection between AHE and agriculturalservices appeared as an objective in about a third of the cohort. Such references occasionally alludedto the need to reform aspects of AHE systems in particular higher education systems in general.Inputs directed at achieving such goals often did not reckon with the long term and often costlyprocess of linkage formation and systems development. Those instances where Bank assistance waspart of a broader effort to upgrade tertiary education or integrate various aspects of agriculturalservices and was sustained over the course of several projects occurred in the Asia region.

2.40 The Bank assisted eleven projects in the Philippines, China and Indonesia designed tostrenithen or reform university systems. The four projects in the Philippines represent the longest

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and most coherent attempt by the Bank to develop a national AHE system per se. Loans and creditswere approved between 1964 and 1979, and implementation extended into the late 1980s. Assistancefocused primarily on improving the quality of education at five agricultural colleges and universitieswhich were to become the core of the system. Important aspects of the strategy included: (i) longterm commitment to creating a network of post-secondary education institutions; (ii) targetinginvestments at a limited number of institutions which would become national or regional "centers ofexcellence" in undergraduate or graduate education and research in particular commodities; and (iii)involving the AHE institutions in self-regulation and the establishment of common academicstandards.

2A41 More recent lending for Indonesia (three projects, begiming in 1980) and China (fourprojects, beginning in 1981) has been part of a new approach to developing tertiary education, ofwhich agricultural faculties or colleges form a par e a The primary focus in China has been on therecovery and expansion of selected 'key'l universities (including AHE institutions) many of which weredamaged over the course of successive poltical upheavals over the last half century. Tahere has beenlittle explicit attention to strengthening system management.

2.42 By contrast, the Indonesia projects have ambitiously introduced the inprovement ofuniversity system management as a central theme, providing resources the Directorate General ofHigher Education (DGHE) to develop, inter aliag i) guideines and course materials for new courses;ii) a monitoring and evaluation system to test poucy measures aimed at rationalecing universityorgan2ation and staffing and fproving system efficiency; iii) a management and info1mation systemto improve the planning functions of the DGHE; iv) a university management training program; andv) a network of obrary resourcce plnters.

2.43 With some notable exceptions, assistance to strengthen links between AHE institutions and2gr4cu2tBal suconrt services has not been a major focus of the Au lending programt India I (FY72)was to strengthen the capacity of two agricultural universities to participate in state-wide, multi-disciplinary, applied research programs within the context of the national agricultural research

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network This was part of the national strategy for encouraging widespread adoption of the newhigh-yielding varieties of food grains and the efficient application of the required inputs. In additionto physical facilities and staff development for the universities, the credit also financed a newcomputer facility for the Institute of Agricultural Research Statistics.W The Agricultural Educationand Research Project in China assisted AHE and agricultural research institutions under oneoperation. Linkages were to be formed in collaborative training of graduate students, the universitiesproviding the course work, and the research institutes helping students' to design and execute theirresearch projects.

2.44 The few projects that sought to strengthen university outreach activities often tried tostrengthen linkages between AHE and tie extension service as well (para. 2.36). Projects financedconstruction of farmer training centers or regional development institutes adjacent to the campus andwhich, although administered by the extension service, were supposed to access the skldls andexpertise of university faculty as welL Such ancillary facilities were to train farmers and give extensionofficers experience in different agro-climatic zones.

C. Implementation Issues

2.45 AHE components were deleted from three projects after effectiveness (Morocco II, Algeriai, and Zambia HI) and were drastically altered in two others (Zaire II and Peru II). Implementationof the remainder was judged satisfactory, although with substantial time and cost overruns in somecases (both Bangladesh projects, Liberia I, Cameroon III). Aside from the problems that could betraced to inadequate commitment or consensus and faulty issues analysis - amply detailed earlier - themain implementation issues regarded: (i) implementation arrangements for the AHE component, (ii)adherence to implementation schedules, (iii) Bank supervision of the AHE component, (iv) theeffectiveness of technical assistance inputs, and (v) the nature of monitoring and evaluationarrangements.

Implementation Arrangements

2.46 With regard to optimizing implementation arrangements for AHE, two considerations stoodout. (i) the autonomy of the component and its ability to be administered independently of the restof the project; and (ii) the involvement of university staff with implementation. Implementation ofprojects that were organized to allow independent execution of AHE components (even whereassistance was quite small, as in the case of Egypt m Education) generally went more smoothly thanthose which attempted a more integrated implementation.

2.47 Although implementation arrangements incorporated some consultation with end users -if only in drawing up equipment lists - the quality of the consultation varied, both between theimplementing agency and the university and within the university itsel£ Outcomes were generally themost satisfactory when university staff felt a senre of ownership of the process. Unsatisfactory

W It Is notew&t tat this early start engtening Uns to agrIcltural support sevies wa subyequenty piked up thuh theBans aricultural portfolio, spcillcally its lending for agricultural rear and te deelopment of zonal reser capabiitie

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outcomes were normally a reflection of insufficient ownership or consensus or administrative bunglingon the part of the institutions concerned (Bangladesh L, Peru U). Two projects in the Philippines -the Fourth Educadon Project (FY77) and the Fishery Training Project (FY80) - were adversely

affected by an ill-considered attempt to decentralize project administration mid-stream. Theostensible reason for this transfer of authority to sub-units in the universities was the immanentdissolution of the main implementing unit in 1982 when its ten-year mandate was due to e.pire.However, because lines of responsibility had not been clearly designated and the individualinstitutions had not been adequately prepared, implementation ground to a halt and it was severalyears before the projects were back on track In the final analysis, according to the Audit of theFishery Training Project, "the attempt to broaden the participatory base of implementation nettedfew real benefits since major procurement responsibilities were never devolved to the end users."(para. 29) Major findings and lessons from the Fourth Education Project included the need to: (i)avoid changes in project management during the life of the project and (ii) involve end users inpreparing equipment lists, and inspecting and testing equipment on delivery.

2.48 Not surprisingly, the best implementation performance came from colleges and universitiesthat were well established institutions, solidly committed to the project, and with considerableresponsibility for day-to-day implementation. Loan and Credit Agreements typically required AHEinstitutions being financed under projects to have some liaison with implementing agencies, but thiscould range from the appointment of a single faculty member with many other responsibilities to thecreation of several large and active standing committees (procurement, fellowshi- and training,currculum development, management). University implementation units which relied on expatriatetechnical assistance but made adequate provision for local counterpart participation also were ableto achieve permanent implementation capacity - particularly in areas of equipment procurement(Pakistan L, Liberia I, and China Agricultural Education and Research). Placing an implementationunit within the university gave the institution the opportunity to grapple with real investment issues,although in some cases, this was not always welcome. Academics interviewed did not necessarilyenjoy this involvement, considering it a detour from their primary academic function. But few deniedit had been a valuable experience which had strengthened the university as a whole.

Adherence to Schedules

2.49 Although completion delays increased costs and postponed benefits, implementation lagsdid not necessarily affect project outcomes adversely. For example, the delayed completion ofPakistan I gave sufficient time to: (i) prepare and incorporate into project design an improved campusplan and (ii) allow staff development financed under the project to keep pace with the slower-than-anticipated expansion of enrollments. In fact, where original implementation schedules allowedinsufficient time, or where process aspects of institutional development were insufficientlyaccommodated in implementation schedules, delays sometimes helped to improve outcomes.

Bank Supervision Issues

2.50 Supervision missions were generally staffed by Bank education staff: economists, architects,and general or technical educators. Participation by agricultural educators varied; supervision bytertiary education specialists was virtually niL Generally speaking, the larger the AHE componentin relation to the overall project, the greater the consistent participation by agricultural educators

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over the course of implementation. Thus, although minor AHE components did not necessarily fareworse in terms of attention at the preparation and design stages, they frequently did suffer frominadequate attention during supervision. The paucity of specialist staff within the Bank frequentlymeant that substantive supervision of the AHE component fell on outside consultants. In some casesthese consultants had more direct experience with university administration than did Bank staff, andtheir input was very effective, provided the Borrower perceived the consultant and the Bank to bespeaking with one voice.

2.51 Aside from educators, few other types of agricultural specialists ever participated in thesupervision of these projects. Among the case study audits, only the China Agricultural Educationand Research Project received substantial attention from Bank agricultural staff. In fact, the reviewfelt that there should have been much greater collaboration between the education and agriculturaldivisions affected, particularly in areas of: research (where studies were being financed of relevanceto the Banks's agricultural portfolio) and extension (where attempts to meet the needs of nationalextension systems hinged on the usefulness of university output).

Performance of Technical Assistance Experts

2.52 Technical assistance experts were involved in overseeing implementation as well ascontributing to achievement of particular objectives. Their performance varied. In a few instances,specialists were highly effective in affirming project gains or guiding mid-course corrections. Theprovision of the "experts' review panel" in the China University Development Project, for example,demonstrated the utility of an independent assessment by a respected yet neutral party. By contrast,components that involved expatriate experts to develop new curricula, expand program coverage orumprove university management practices were not always implemented as designed, and hadsubsequent shortfalls in the achievement of objectives (see para 2.74). Funds allocated for expertswere under-utilized and/or transferred tc other categories, such as fellowships for staff training(Portugal II). Reasons for underutilization of funds and the impression of poor performance byforeign specialists were sometime difficult to discern, but included: (i) language difficulties/poorcommunication skills; (ii) poor advanced preparation on the part of specialists; (iii) lack of receptivityto the material on the part of local scholars; (iv) availability of lower cost technical assistance outsidethe project context; and (v) a sense by Borrowers that the activities could be undertaken withoutexpatriate guidance. One consistent problem that was rarely overcome during implementation waseffective overlap between technical assistance experts and counterparts. Tuming was generaly suchthat potential benefits from their collaboration during implementation was lost.

2.53 Supervision missions often noted lags in implementing specialist assistance components, butseemed unable or unwillng to force the issue with borrowers. It appeared that such componentswere frequently designed and implemented with insufficient commitment and rigor on both sides.Presumed or hoped-for contributions from technical assistance in such areas as staff/programupgrading and the development of postgraduate curriculum were insufficiently specified. Detailedterms of reference for experts were rarely put forth - contrary to established Bank procedures.Evaluation indicators, such as they were, did not measure performance (much less impact) of thespecialists against agreed criteria. Noting this problem in the Agricultural Education and ResearchProject in China, the audit concluded DA's response throughout was passive, perhaps a reflectionof the vagueness in which the specialist assistance was couched. Ultimately, IDA did not insist on

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reviewing terms of reference and hesitated to insist in some of the areas (such asconsolidation/rationalization of university programs) where specialist input was expected to make animpact" (para. 3.18).

Monitoring and Evaluation of Implementation and Outcomes

2.54 Arrangements for project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) were generally weakthroughout the quarter-century of lending. Given the frequently incomplete or ambiguousspecification of objectives and inputs, the inability to structure succinct M&E component is hardlysurprising. The situation began to change in the 1980s, when SARs began to improve this importantaspect of project design, but this was far too late to affect the majority of AHE componentsconsidered in this study, which were mostly underway or already completed. M&E components,detailing the activities to be undertaken and the parties responsible, could have helped to flagproblems as soon as they emerged, allowing them to be dealt with in a more timely fashion.

2.55 The only evaluation components to routinely appear in early projects were tracer studies,and these turned out to be largely useless. Tracer studies were included in projects with littlereference to their institutional context, immediate use, or ultimate purpose. They were not connectedto efforts to promote self-evaluation capabilities in universities (which would include studentplacement and feedback by employers and graduates), and they bore little relationship to whetherAHE components were declared satisfactory or not. They were almost universally regarded as a lowpriority by Bank and Borrower alike, and even where such studies were satisfactorily conducted, theyreceived little or no attention by the Bank or those executing the project, and often their findingscould not be traced (Korea m; see para 2.65).

2.56 More recent projects have included implementation plans which tied objectives tomonitorable actions and outcomes through key performance indicators (see, for example recentprojects in China and Indonesia). One of the main findings of the Audit of the China AgriculturalEducation and Research Project was that, "the elaboration of explicit project objectives and keyproject indicators, their incorporation into an evaluation matrix, and the regular monitoring ofachievements immeasurably facilitates ex gost evaluation" (para. 5.13 <b>, emphasis added).Implementation plans varied in coverage and detail, but the better ones incorporated: the specificactions or investments to be made; the parties responsible and the timeframe; the expected outcomesor outputs; and how this would be monitored (the "performance indicators"), by what date, and bywhom. It should be noted that implementation plans required considerable attention to detail, sincethe definition of appropriate performance indicators required a high degree of conceptual clarity onthe part of project designers. In the above mentioned China project for example, the number ofuniversity staff sent abroad for training was to be a key indicator of success of that input. In boththis project and its predecessor, many more staff were sent overseas than anticipated, thus giving theimpression of great success. However, at the time the case study audit mission was in the field (late1990), only about one-third of the fellowship holders had actually returned to resume their teachingand research duties. This postponed - if not denied - the real benefit of the overseas training to thehost institution. In retrospect, the number trained and returned to Most would have been a moreappropriate key indicator for improved staff quality.

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D. Achievement of Objectives

Enhancing Agricultunl Production and Productivity

2.57 The degree to which this essentially long term objective was met had less to do with thespecific outcomes of the AHE component than with: (i) the conditions for promoting growth withinthe agricultural sector and (ii) linkages between the university and the community. The contrastingcases of the Philippines and China illustrate this point.

2.58 The First Education Project in the Philippines (FY64) focused on developing the institutionthat eventually became the University of the Philippines at Los Bafios (UPLB). At the time theproject was prepared, certain persistent problems in the agricultural sector were already wellrecognized, including: weak support services (especially extension); inequitable tenure systems whichconcentrated land in the hands of a few absentee landlords and perpetuated share tenancy suidpoverq.y, lack of adequate production supports (fertilizer, credit, etc); and low yields. The Bank wasweDl aware that, without land reform and a major reorganization of government services, agricultutecould not be exected to benefit from improvements to UPLB. In fact, the SAR noted:

"... the Program is considered of high value to the long run improvement ofPhilippine agriculture, provided the Government's agricultural services areeffectively organized, research activities are well coordinated, andcomplementary inputs...are forthcoming" (SAR para. 52, sic).

Although the Bank continued to support AHE in the Philippines over the next quarter century, thefundamental issues of land reform, support services development and production supports remainedunresolved.

2.59 After three projects focusing on building up the AHE system, Bank and Borrower turnedattention to developing an integrated fishery training system which would have the University of thePhilippines College of Fsheries at the apex. As laudable a goal as this was, and as sturdy as thedesign was from a purely educational standpoint, the conception of the project was rendered mootwhen the key assumptions upon which the project rested did not obtain.

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liberaliz the ruralh ecnom,inldng (rni) dimatln the comm#Iutr und esu atind shifting proucionresponsibilieyto thhusple hrold; aii)rapidaty mosnetizon andl commercidalzng lrural economcactvtis

p(ieiia) tnceasn fampihes;e (*)or rinfa itroeuwirngttaly &ee* Itl naurets,e. and (v mrvn ulcscorare

and d~istbuin newostrks.nder 'the pnewIo "upro eductio rhespons erbialt ytm faretrs w~erea give mrautnomyafae in choingropping ptterstw acta nd d*ecsifing acdptites. and utregsumalts weredrmtcPodtucto increased bny kovera10 percent p.a Botaathwincomes anGovensmpnt iaone rosectn Iredr setr

capitaincoms of armr nd18 c wmeret2.n atie wheat theyshed beeIn.amrgtsewfour tear earierm TheAuitfo the AgtricultuanlOs Education and theserc Project inh ChnVoetefvrbl mato

agiutrldevelopment adhleton spurodeman foruthoes tp.fsrie rvddyteAEisiuin

-22

... A A V .V S :.:.: ... .. .. ....... ... ... ... ........ . .....

; '~~~W '., 'i g:. ... . . ............ . . .. .......... ... -. ..: ' ......... A. : ' O di.:J : ............................A...§.'. ... '

i: Dun.r. . .A *.... .... P. T a at o nlMOa .te..d totisa...ge.hti.....c..... .... e hch rerme" on instut.o. s o u ot

.... .ns .. o.r a.goa pro n . . rodu.io.in s a ue 1 :

in .h.... o rte inn e n ....

tE::S >i<''< B x:~~~~~~....h. .-... .. .. . t"'WI

.51 For taojec t te a importantsp of mt ing manpowern wsthe lc epiuansio

nof nl p hvscled ca acintay the AHEiningtueioel (aragies.uet 2.7-.2).Overall tihing waeIes atcc~edomp lshevrsatisfactorl. xept for srujents uhose AHE compon fhenrtswreaeetdordaiinlyalee. l

prrjects thatnstt- ote tos enlrg the p c .. ect ma ... ded tesir g o The re alse

geeal sucsfliqipn thas exane fcltries. ID act,r mthepovisio of eloalrgedermndimproed physicl inrastrductuorcycas probabl diminisinglte mostmobviustaIndb iendurn poentriauio ofthe Inatituto AHEdev0erl popment. Anothr dranti ally satnthisftadctional a tcomplshmn waThe de-up velomnofnecushnrpricl andtheyer hexpansionsofproraml coverate-eseion l ir n the agrlicultural wcinoe (areetncomagen Tincwasvtery imortyantfr borrowers reucn d e thodsnc ron i exptreiate eperotaisean

exranocng neededwn nomer onf i yagriclyurale piroessoals (vetnae romnahriants, e undverstake intuctrsn, scintfi

seradonseventuallyexpo eem d thact from trdronamafishing ,d t th i o a

Meein Manpwer eed

261nFo projmecth designrs ansmprtntasec of meeting manpower ithagcuurlseneedThs was th emanson

of vhysieal capacity of iaccomplishedner

saisacorly Exept foriiv prveojmets whosetH vitmponeints wxerea deletedenor drsicaliy alemosraed, l

improed phcal infrastruture waserobably uthlied asinglene most obviouats anindureaingl cotriutiond ofthiBnk tmpoyAEeeoment Momnuat ihtheir genrallyng Samtisfatos acomlshmetint wasc thabee deselpmntd

2.30-2o33). Thise wnas ver i eporta it for borrowers, reducingusepe. t e aons .expatr.ia eetisand

expanding neeed numbersao agricltual rfsin als (v teiaan,uvrstisrcos,cetfcresearchers, crop specialists for extension services). As a result of Bank assistance, enrollments in~~~~~~~~. .... ...

undergraduate programs in agriculture rose dramatically, and most of the institutions assisted by. the... ......... .........

toMered reinaManpower nee eddiso os eaueteasmtosreadn ut-on

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support did not materialize (Cameroon and Gabon). Where agricultural economies had prosperedand expectations for manpower needs had obtained, project institutions were generaliy meetingdesired targets. However, where predictions about agricultural performance proved false or wherethere was an overall economic decline, one of two unfortunate situations was present - both of whichcarried negative implications for the sustainability of the institutions involved (see para. 2.93-2.95).Either governments and institutions were restricting intake to accommodate the decreased needs -thus raising unit costs to unacceptable levels - or they were allowing intake to proceed unchecked -with consequent problems of underemployment of graduates.2 In either case, the public sector wasproving unable to absorb the levels of graduates anticipated, and no account had been taken of howdemand in the private sector might develop, or how the university could better adapt its programsto the economic conditions prevailing. These problems were particularly notable in the Africancountries in the cohort.

2.63 Part of the blame for this situation lay in the state-led approaches to economicdevelopment and the centralized planning models assumed by project planners throughout the period.Manpower objectives rested on some form of manpower forecasting, although the thoroughness withwhich forecasting exercises had been undertaken varied considerably among components and overthe 25 years of lending. Some components merely linked manpower needs to the projected growthof particular activities in the agricultural sector (irrigation systems and grain or fisheries production,for example). Others estimated needs using standardized ratios of university graduates to techniciansto farm families.3 Some sampled relevant government agencies to determine what categories oflabor would be needed and in what numbers. However the projections wcre derived, too often theywere based on very optimistic scenarios about public sector employment and agricultural growth.

2.64 Rarely was there serious attention to the real issues affecting the supply ef and demandfor certain categories of labor. In only a few cases were manpower shortages demonstrably extantduring project formulationA Rarely were actual employment conditions or prospects foremployment squarely addressed. Sector work did not focus on the relative needs, salary scales, andabsorptive capacities of the private and public sectors. Nor were the recurrent cost implications (ofgraduates who would likely expect public employment) fully analyzed. Even where it was logical toexpect that hard data would be available - because high level manpower was centrally allocated anduniversity graduates were virtually assured employment in the public sector - projects remained vagueon employment issues.

2.65 Aware of the weakness of the manpower database, the Bank often lobbied to includesurvey components in this area. Over one-third of the projects included agricultural manpower

S In fact, the Audit of the Fourth Education Prjoea in the Philippines concluded, "although the total actual output of graduates was about

two-thirds of what was projected, the shortfall was probably a more accurate flection of the market demand for trained agiculturalmanpwver and a blessing in disguise in view of the unemployment rate in the agricltural sector (pg. vii).

1Y/ For ceample, the Second Education Project In Zaire was to enable the country by 1990 to have one practical agricultural technician

per 800 farming families and one university graduate in agriculture for eveiy five technicians.

MY Such a case was Morocco. IDA financing for the Department of Veternary Medicine, to be provided under the Second EducationProject, was reallocated when the Govement decided that it did not want to wait for IDA financing. From the Governmenat's perspective,IDA procedures were too lengthy and the countiy desperately needee the trained veterinaans.

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surveys. Audit findings suggest that such studies were either not conducted or had mi, imal impacton subsequent lending. As noted earlier, tracer studies had a similar fate (para. 2.55). This apparentdisinterest in external efficiency issues was reinforced by the fact that few institutions routinely carriedout any form of student follow-up on their own. The lack of student guidance or placement officeswithin universities was also indicative of the university's continued reliance on the role of the statein the allocation of labor.

Institution Building

2.66 Investments had a major - if occasionally inadvertent - institutional impact in theestablishment of new institutions or the upgrading of existing ones (Philippines I and IV Education,Pakistan D). For example, the Audit of the Third Education Project in Pakistan noted that theproject was "well timed to achieve the desired upgrading of the former agricultural college into a fullfledged university." (para. 132) In other aspects of institutional development, however, results wereoften more modest. Major accomplishments took place in improving the quality of underuraduateeducation through the provision of better equipment and learning materials. In addition tostrengthening agricultural sciences (especially in the Asia projects) evidence suggests that there wassome success in introducing measures to enhance the practical content of curricula. Experience withtrying to improve program balance was frequently disappointing. Objectives of broadening programsby adding social sciences courses rarely materialized as intended. One exception was Ireland, wereinterdisciplinary programs were satisfactorily introduced under the Second Education Project (FY74).Where attempts to enhance the relevance of course content failed, some of the following conditionswere present: (i) lack of adequate attention by the university to the practical concerns of farmers; (ii)student disinterest in such courses owing to cultural conditions or lack of perceived economicopportunity, (iii) university disinterest in non-traditional activities or studies outside the traditionalagricultural science disciplines; or (iv) government disinterest manifested in inadequate supportservices for agriculture.

2.67 Upgrading instructional staff was often crucial to improving instructional quality, and wasoften noted as one of the most satisfactorily accomplished inputs (Thailand II, China projects, IndiaI). Staff development through fellowsnips was generally quite successfuL In general, proportions ofuniversity staff with BAs, MAs, PhDs in project institutions increased along the lines envisaged in theSARs, although occasionally resources were stretched and faculty upgrading targets were exceededby a wide margin. Where language might present a barrier to potential overseas scholars, projectssometimes included language training for prospective fellows. This was a good example of learningfrom experience in the Indonesia projects which was then transferred to projects in China.

2.68 While generally regarded as successfuL, there were problems with overseas feliowships asan input to permanent capacity building. In the first place, fellowships represented a one-time staffrenewal effort that, while upgrading the humalA capital of the individual concerned, eid little to ensurethis value added would be captured by the employer and did nothing to incrf.ase national self-

' It iB important to note that socalled impwflments to the quality of education were not actually measured in most projects, but wereasumed based upon the prvision of an improved physical plant In fact, it would be more correct to say that the conditions affeting thequality of education werc enhanced.

I - 25 -

sufficiency in the production of post-graduates. Without a constant infusion of new blood orinstitutionalized program of staff renewal, the lack of staff renewal caused quality gains made duringprojects to be eroded over time (Pakistan IH Education, African projects). For example, the Auditmission for the Third Education Project in Pakistan, undertaken in March 1990, noted that in theseveral years that had elapsed since the completion of the project, the level of PhD staff at the SindhAgricultural University had dropped from 32 percent to only 20 percent.

2.69 Another problem was the temporary, and sometimes even permanent, siphoning-off ofscholars to institutions overseas. While some projects attempted to stem this brain drain through avariety of (usually unsuccessful) bonding arrangements, other projects inadvertently exacerbated theproblem. Higher education projects in China provided such an example. In these projects, fundswere provided for short term study tours and degree programs at the Masters and Doctoral levels.The Government encouraged fellowship holders to seek other sources of financing after the first yearand allowed those selected for Masters programs to continue studying and pursue additional degreeswhenever possible. The successful implementation of this policy meant that more scholars wentabroad and for a longer time than anticipated, but that fewer returned in a timely fashion to resumetheir teaching posts. In fact, as the Audit of the University Development Project (Cr. 1167/Ln. 2021-CHA) noted, 'Fhe practice of requiring overseas fellows on higher degree programs, after completingthe first year of study, to obtain a scholarship from the host university or other sources to finance therest of their studies, apparently had contnbuted to delays in the return of trained staff to their homeuniversities. ...The abovementioned practice was aimed at increasing the number of staff trained inpost-graduate degrees, but the inadvertent hidden costs might include the severance of links betweenthe fellows and their home universities." (para. 42) Such problems as these pointed up the need tcdesign fellowship assistance in such a way as to: (i) minimize permanent brain drain; (ii) movescholars quickly through designated programs so they could return to the institutions awaiting theirincreased skills; (iii) provide re-entry and re-absorption programs as needed for returned trainees; and(iv) provide a permanent vehicle for periodic renewal and skill upgrading of university staff, so thatthose finishing a Masters degree could return to complete a Doctorate at some later stage.

270 A further problem was the continuing presence of large numbers of expatriate instructorson the faculty of Afican institutions, and the heavy reliance of these institutions on expatriate staff.At the time of the Audit of the Senegal Ill Education Project in early 1991 for example, the ratioof full-time local and expatriate professors was 3:2. The inability of institutions to staff themselveswith qualified nationals attested to the persistent difficulties in becoming truly indigenous institutions.

2.71 Projects that set out to develop graduate programs achieved mixed results. Althoughcourses were added and staff upgraded, the performance of these components suffered from seriousshortfalls in the design of the assistance package, inter alia: (i) lack of adequate financial support forsupplemental research activities essential to graduate level study; (ii) inadequate provision ofjournals, library books, computers and other equipment, as well as consumables necessary forexperimentation and basic research; (iii) lack of an effective research network locally to promotequality within the field and lack of linkage to international researchers in the same field; and (iv) lackof a clearinghouse function to print and disseminate graduate research.

2.72 Projects that sought to promote a contract research or community outreach role for theuniversity frequently suffered from a poor understanding of the economics or politics that fueled the

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demand for and response to these services or provided inputs that were inadequate to the task.-'As noted earlier, projects rarely promoted development of university capacity to undertake contractresearch (as distinct from research related to graduate training). Furthermore, inadequate supervisionor follow-up of the few research components that did exist often meant outcomes could not be tracedor research capacity institutionalized (Pakistan Ell Education; Philippines Fishery Training; ChinaAgricultural Education and Research). Regarding outreach, extension education departments wereset up according to project plans, but little was accomplished in the way of establishing permanentextension capabilities. For example, an attempt to introduce "social laboratories' as an extension aidunder the Second Education project in the Philippines eventually was phased out, in part due tominimal support from the government which grew to guard the extension function rather jealously.Case study audit missions discovered that the majority of institutions visited devoted no more than10 percent of total annual budgets to extension and outreach activities, and there were often fewincentives for faculty to participate in community service projects. (see para. 2.72).

2.73 The few projects that sought to build linkages between AHE and agricultural supportservices generally did not achieve these objectives. There were several reasons for this: (i)unworkable management or financing arrangements; (ii) inadequate or inappropriate inputs; (iii)ministerial rivaLry and insufficient consensus between universities and central governments concerningthe role of each in support services; (iv) poor coordination with and direction from NARS; (v)competition and professional rivalry among scientists; and (vi) suspicion of the university's potentialrole in fomenting social unrest. The administrative arrangements intended to facilitate inter-organizational coordination of roles and responsibilities (and circumvent bureaucratic turf battles)were not spelied out prior to projects and were difficult to achieve subsequently. Collaborativeefforts broke down, especially when it came to sharing facilities. Time and staff resources often didnot materialize as anticipated. More subtle pressures were also present. Farmer training centers orregional development institutes adjacent to university campuses often were unable to attract thedesired support from faculty specialists because of perceived status differences between university andextension staff or because faculty performance evaluation systems gave little professional recognitionto staff engaged in outreach or extension activities (see para. 2.73).

2.74 Most shortcomings in institution building involved objectives aimed at improvine theorganization and management of institutions. Some projects succeeded in establishing MIS systems,thus providing a better base for university management. However, the majority that soughtorganizational reform, rationalization or consolidation did not achieve these aims. Affectedcomponents suffered most from poor design, lack of consensus and commitment among affectedgroups, and inappropriate inputs. Often there was little understanding in the Bank of what wasentailed, and there was equally little desire within Ltnstitutions to enforce unpopular decisions, such

2 Where actant or emerging demand for these srvices was obtained over the couwse of the prqect or the Government sought anintegrated approach to research oratendion devlopment, uniesity peformane of the functions was strengthened, as projects in Indiaand China demonstrated.

W For ammple, at the time of the Audit of the Fishezy luing Project in the Philippines (mid-1989), university faculty wae consideringthe adoption of a merit performance system which would assign weights to various activties. Whie teadig and research featuredprominently, edension and outreach were accorded les wight In the ovenall pictur The adoption of such a ystem might render esreeradvancement and public service via community outreach incompatible goals.

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as consolidating undersubscribed courses. Improvement of utilization factors that involved reducingthe size of the staff or rationalizing programs were strenuously resisted, as they would be in anyuniversity system. Hardest to achieve were any improvements to internal efficiency or resourceallocation, as sector work had paid little attention to the issues of financing, revenues, and feestructures which would have allowed a policy dialogue on these issues to take place over the courseof the project. In consequence, teacher:student ratios remained high, facilities underutilized, and unitcosts high (Senegal HI Education).W As noted earlier, objectives involving organizational reformfrequently relied on expatriate consultants, s'hose understanding of university politics - let aloneability to introduce unpopular university reforms in the absence of considerable support from faculty -was usually nil (para. 2.52). The Audit of the Agricultural Education and Research Project in Chinanoted:

"Neither IDA nor the Project Office was actively involved in overseeing theimplementation of specialist assistance, and it was considerably underutilized.The Audit questions whether specialists and study tours can have much impactin achieving fundamental institutional reform under the best of circumstances.Although undoubtedly useful for the individuals who participated, the vagueapplication of these inputs in this project did little to restructure the institutions"(para. 5.05).

2.75 The PCR for the very first AHE component, the First Education Project in the Philippines(FY64), observed that one of the generic lessons learned was that "comprehensive academic planningshould be the basis for physical and financial planning" (PCR para. 9.02i). Although among theacademic community suth planning models have broadened to accommodate contingency and strategicapproaches, there is little evidence that the Bank has encouraged or supported systematic academicplanning exercises of any type. Hence, university development generally continues to lurch along inan ad hoc and unplanned manner, with insufficient attention to issues of long term sustainability.One potential exception to this is the Indonesia projects. The PPAR for the recently completed FirstUniversity Development Project noted that, although the project did not succeed in developing theagreed-upon ten-year development program for higher education, it did make strides in introducinga long-term perspective into university planning and built an administrative, institutional andpersonnel framework for a coordinated approach to public higher education.

2.76 Many projects aimed at developing university systems have not yet been completed, chieflyin China and Indonesia. Those completed have achieved mixed success. In the Philippines, forexample, the Technical Panel for Agricultural Education (TPAE) was established with Bankassistance and has been successful in setting standards in various agricultural disciplines.Nevertheless, the next step - of linking standards to accreditation and public funding - has been veryslow in coming. The consensus needed to put into effect a moratorium on creating degree programswas not achieved for over twenty years, the consistent efforts of the TPAE notwithstanding. Thus,proliferation of AHE institutions of indifferent quality remained a problem during the entire quartercentury of Bank assistance.

- An appropriate ratio of instructional staff to the student body of a teaiary institution vares with the type and level of material. Thus,a ratio of 1:12 to 1:15 for an undergaduate institution foacsing pimarily on provision of liberal arls educatioa may be adequate, whereasa ratio of 1:7 to 1::0 for sientific ourne spanning undergaduate and postgraduate degrees is more appropriate.

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E. Factors Influencing Sustainability of AHE Investments

2.77 As has been pointed out by OED previously, the sustainability of project investments ineducation is intimately linked to internal and external factors which affect the institution's ability toperform its designated functions.A' For AHE institutions - outwardly-oriented service institutionsdependent upon public funds and social demands - external factors and the interaction betweenexternal and internal factors are extremely important to university survival and relevance. The degreeof university autonomy and accountability is linked to the institution's ability to administer and renewitself; its ability to stay relevant is linked to its relationship to clients and colleagues.u' The Bankseems to have paid insufficient attention during project formulation to the particular factors affectinguniversity sustainability. While some progress had been made under the newer (and as yetuncompleted) operations, the Bank needs to improve the quality of work in these areas.

2.78 Distinctions between the external and internal realms are arbitrary, especially given thepropensity of their boundaries to overlap. For purposes of this review, however, internal factors arecharacterized as those directly affecting governance and an organization's capacity to make internalallocative decisions, whereas external factors are those emanating in the macro-context in which theorganization operates. Given its special position in this bipolar matrix, the organization's linkagesto clients and colleagues will be treated separately as a third sustainability factor.

Internal Factors

2.79 The most important internal factors for the institutions reviewed were: control overpolicies affecting admissions and enrollment; control over policies affecting utilization of resources(financial, human, and physical); and the organization of university administration. The institution'sability to attract adequate financing had both internal and external dimensions, since financing policiesand mechanisms (initiated from sources outside the university) strongly influenced the degree oforganizational autonomy and the patterns of internal resource allocation.

2.80 The review noted that AHE institutions frequently had insufficient control over the settingof admissions and enrollment policies and that such policies (and how they were determined) hadreceived little attention by Bank staff preparing the projects. By and large, admission to theuniversities in the cohort was based upon student performance in standard national exams, whichwere often of variable quality. Enrollments at some AHE institutions were actually determined bythe govermment, who also allocated budgets accordingly. Other universities were under considerablepopular pressure to accommodate more entrants than they could reasonably handle, but they wereconstrained from raising their admission standards or fees to reflect this increased demand. Lack ofcontrol over admissions meant that the university had little effective control over the size,composition or quality of the student body.

- See, in particular, Chapter 4, "Sustainability in Educational Projects An Operational Appoach," pages 11-14 in The Sustalnabilhtvof Investment Prolects in Education. (OED Report No. 9225; December 28, 1990)

V In this contet, "clients and collcagues would include all those desiring a sevice provided by the unhwsity, coHaborating or competingwith un%iVetty staff in the provision of this service, or associated professionally with the unieity or one of its functionsL

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2.81 The Bank paid equally little attention to issues of equal access and affirmative action.VWhatever programs were undertaken to reverse discriminatory patterns based on considerations ofculture, socio-economic status, ethnicity, age, gender, etc., were largely at the behest of borrowersthemselves and were tangential to Bank-financing. Whatever gains were made in this regard werenot attributable to Bank assistance. One exception was China, where the Agricultural Education andResearch Project explicitly sought to raise the proportion of females in the student body of AHEinstitutions to 25 percent - a goal which was monitored and achieved under the project. Althoughthere was tremendous variation among countries, it was estimated that female students made up nomore than 20 percent of all enrollments at the undergraduate level in AHE institutions, a meagerrepresentation considering the importance of women in the agricultural sector. The China projectswere among the few completed to specify greater access for women; none specified measures toincrease representation of other types of disadvantaged groups.

2.82 Institutions included in the review suffered from both gross underutilization (Senegal,Gabon) as well as substantial overutilization (Pakistan). Chronic underenrollment led to unacceptablyhigh unit costs; chronic overenrollment led to a deterioration in educational quality. Facilitiesutilization issues were multilayered and complex - involving optimality, appropriateness, andmaintenance - issues we1l beyond the scope of the review. Among project institutions surveyed,however, it was noted that institutions did not always use the facilities as intended originally.(Bangladesh; China)

2.83 The ability of university management to influence utilization decisions was often hamperedfrom outside. Potential income eawning activities using university facilities - training vessels, universityfarms, specialized laboratories - vere frequently subject to such strict regulation so as to positivelydiscourage innovation, cost recovery, or collaboration with the private sector. Another aspect of theproblem was the inevitable tension between teaching and research functions. Ideal allocationsbetween these functions (and "public service", in some cases) are difficult to achieve in any university.On the one hand, facilities and equipment need to be available for their primary function, which isundergraduate training. On the other hand, automatically equating certain levels of utilization withappropriate and adequate usage can be misleading, since the use of expensive state-of-the-artequipment for teaching purposes or for industrial research and development work (rather than forresearch) is sub-optimal. In the final analysis, the leadership of the various faculties and theuniversity itself were in the best position to make such decisions, and projects studied made littlecontribution to strengthening the capacity of university management to deal with these complex issuesand make the management decisions necessary.

2.84 Staffing policies and staff utilization continued to present problems for many universities.Both staff/student and teacher/student ratios were overly generous for most institutions in thecohort.L In some sub-Saharan African countries, the situation had gotten completely out of hand,with teacherstudent ratios dropping to 1:3 or even 1:1 (Senegal Im Education). The excessive

J For these purposes, "affirwe actionse are policis and programs undertaken for the espress purpose of increang acess to andpaentatin by d vtaged groups withn selected publcly-financed sevices

N Teachi staff wete ndividuals employed in an Instrctional capaclt remaining staff were primaily for adminiastae and supportfunction&

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number of non-teaching staff on university payrolls was frequently a reflection of the degree ofnational economic hardship and the important, if inadvertent, employment generation functionuniversities served in meliorating this hardship. Staffing issues were further complicated by: lowsalaries, pay structures insufficiently differentiated among various categories of staff, and weakinstitutional control over remuneration levels or policies. Although most staffing problems emerged(or were acknowledged) definitively only in the ex Rost stage, the few projects which did address staffutilization problems directly not surprisingly ran into massive resistance on the part of staff affected(para. 2.74).

2.85 Ironically, while universities often had excessive administrative staffs, some types of non-teaching positions remained vacant for want of trained candidates or sufficient salaries. The PCRfor Egypt III Education, for example, noted the lack of qualified technical staff to operate andmaintain equipment, since suitable candidates were not available at government salaries. In manycountries, severe problems with retention of good faculty were beginning to appear. Where thesetting of university salaries came under civil service guidelines, such salaries were often among theleast competitive. In countries that had experienced a stagnation or decline of their economy,university salaries had been eroded to the point where many staff had to rely on additional jobs tosupplement their incomes. By contrast, in countries where there had been considerable growth inthe agricultural sector, university salaries could not keep up, and good staff were lost to moreprofitable careers. University administrations whose salary structures were less influenced byperformance norms than pressures from outside the university had little room to maneuver.

2.86 Staffing problems in sub-Saharan African AHEs were particularly acute. Pay was low andretention problematic, since the monthly take-home pay of a university dean could be as low asUS$60 equivalent, while that of the average faculty member would cover personal expenses for nolonger than a week or two. The qualifications and academic profile of teaching staff often did notfit with university needs, so part-time lecturers from outside the university were brought in.Furthermore, expatriate instructors continued to play a major and expensive role for someinstitutions. The capacity for and the opportunity to conduct meaningful agricultural research waswholly inadequate. Recent observers have noted that, although university scientists constituted thelargest body of highly trained scientific manpower in agriculture, they remained a poorly utilizedresource.W

2.87 Severe cuts in research budgets, weaknesses in research management, and a lack ofopportunity among faculty for academic renewal have contnbuted to the erosion of research capacityamong sub-Saharan Afrcan institutions over the last quarter century. This deterioration was notonly a problem for universities, but was beginning to be felt by national agricultural research servicesas welL Recent observers have commented upon the dominant role played by universities in thenational research effort, noting that in some countries university staff virtually constitute the bulk of

nl Coombe, Trevor, -A Cansultation on Higher Education in Afiica A Report to the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller roundation."Department of Internatonal and Comparative Education, Institute of Education, Univsity of London, January 1991; pg3.

iV H. K Jain, Orsanizatlon and Structure In National Anricultural Research Systema (Worldng Paper No. 21) International Service forNational Agricultural Reserch; he Hapgue, Netherlands, 1989. pg 26.

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NARS personnel. These observers have expressed concern that the deterioration of research capacityamong university faculty was presenting a serious impediment to further NARS development.A

2.88 Aware of these issues, borrowers, regional organizations and donors initiated discussionswith some sub-Saharan agriculture colleges and universities in the late 1980s, under the aegis of theSpecial Program on African Agricultural Research. These discussions were mounted in an effort toidentify means to strengthen the quality and selectively expand the capacity of university level training(especially M.Sc. training). Several key issues have been identified, inter alia: (i) the potential forsmall African countries to agree to cooperate on agricultural specializations in their respectiveuniversities, in an effort to better serve the sub-region's needs in an economic fashion; (ii) the neecito look at the governmental budgetary constraints as a key determinant of effective demand (sincevirtually all researchers are engaged by the government); and (iii) the feasibility of selectivelystrengthening certain faculties or departments outside the context of resolving major institutionalproblems of financing, staff development, and library resources. Given the mixed success of earlierattempts at developing regional facilities in Africa (Cameroon, Gabon, and Swaziland), this option,however desirable from an economic perspective, may be extremely difficult to implement. Whateverthe results of the dialogue, the inherent political and cultural sensitivity of the issues being discussedprobably will merit a commitment to long term assistance on the part of the Bank, as the occasionalad hoc operation will 'o little to produce the policy changes needed. Furthermore, any decisionsreached and directions ultimately taken will need to be made on the basis of the broadest possibleconsensus among those concerned to ensure that institutions assisted will continue to be utilized andreceive an appropriate level of financial support.

2.89 Ensuring dependable sources of recurrent funding was the sine gua non of establishmentof all AHE institutions. In this respect, all Bank-supported institutions were at least initiallysuccessfuL However, the financial position of many had been seriously eroded since projectcompletion. As public institutions heavly dependent upon public treasuries (typically for 80%-90%of annual budgets), universities frequently had little say in how much money they would actually haveto work with each year. Tuition and fees rarely made up more than 10 percent of working budgets,and funds from research grants, contracts, and miscellaneous productive activities made up another10 percent. Worsening economic conditions had forced Borrowers to abandon project items thatwere not completed at the time of loan closure. In the Philippines, for example, buildings that hadnot been completed at the UPLB campus under the Second Education Project were still unfinisheda decade later. If recurrent budgets were inadequate, capital budgets were even less so, and moresubject to the fluctuations of the macro-environment. !'enerally speaking, new investments (unlessdonor financed) were the first item on university budgcbs to be pared down, followed by maintenanceand provision of learning materials and consumables; staff salaries were the last.

2.90 University ability to raise additional funds through whatever means (tuition, directlyproductive activities, grants and solicitations of alumnae) was typically very circumscnbed or not very

2 Makocls, DaviL Sthe Attdion of Institutional Capacity among Sub-Sann Agcultual UnIvusitIe An Impediment to theOperadons and Devdopment of National Agricltural Researmh Systemni& Paper presented at the Seventh Geneml Conference of theAssodation of Faculties of Agriculture in Afica; Nabi, Kea; June 10-14, 1991. See also, Van den Bor, W.; Shute, J.C34; and Moore;GAB.; North-South Partneishio in Strenethenine Hi_herEducation In Aerculture; Center forAgricdultural Publshing and Doaumentadon:Wageng, the Netherlands, (1989).

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effective. Furthermore, institutions that were in a position to undertake income generation (byconducting specialized training courses, selling university products, etc), frequently had to remit allearnings to central treasuries which did not then increase university allocations to reflect thesecontributions. Such policies acted as a strong disincentive to reducing dependence on public coffersand diversifying funding sources.

2.91 Fnally, the governance and management structures of AHE institutions frequently servedto undermine even the small degree of autonomy present. Universities were administered in suchas way as to inhibit internal cohesiveness and exacerbate intemal dissention. Weak universitymanagement, with little power or authority given to the chief administrative officer (whetherpresident, vice-chancellor, or the like), left the university functionally leaderless and unable to marshalsufficient support to undertake the guidance and planning functions essential to effectivemanagement.

2.92 Caught between strong faculty groups on the one hand and government regulations on theother, university administrations frequently had little scope for setting policies or planning the courseof their development. Even where organizational structures were inherently sturdy - providinguniversity leadership with the autonomy and powers necessary to direct this development - the lackof adequate funding often reduced university presidents to little more than beggars asking for scrapsat the tables of bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors. In such desperate situations, administrators oftensacrificed desired goals in order to secure external funding for donor-desired activities, or allowed themore dynamic and well connected faculty members to solicit assistance for their programs. Althoughthis did not appear as a problem over the course of Bank financing, several universities had sinceacquired facilities whose functions either overlapped or were not directly relevant to universityprograms (note UPLB in the Philippines). The tendency to establish numerous and frequently poorlycoordinated "institutes' was evidence of the lack of attention to enhancing the capacity of universitymanagement to set its own course and acquire funding in a manner consistent with this vision.

External Factors

2.93 The most important external factors were: (i) the growth and development of theagricultural sector; and (ii) the position of the AHE institution(s) within the national higher educationsystem. As discussed earlier, certain aspects of the growth and development of the agricultural sectorand rural areas had a crucial impact upon the formation of vital, sustainable AHE institutions (paras.2.57-2.60). These distinct, but closely linked aspects, included. effective pricing policies foragricultural commodities; infrastructural development in rural areas; development of social services;development of markets, processing, and storage facilities; and development of adequate supportservices in agriculture which have a close interface with the agricultural universities.

2.94 In fact, for most of the 25 countries in the cohort, rural development did not materializeas anticipated. A downturn in international commodity prices throughout the latter part of the 1970sand into the 1980s, together with over-valued currencies, slowed the growth of agricultural economies.Bank assistance to particular agricultural sub-sectors did not materialize or was unsuccessful instimulating production in the desired direction.

2.95 In one of the case study audits it was apparent that Bank assistance to AHE had beenpremature from an economic standpoint. By the time the Fishery Training Project and the National

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Fsheries Development Project (Ln. 2156-PH) were approved (FY80 and FY82, respectively), therewere alreadcy nine other projects directly or indirectly engaged in fisheries development in thePhilippines. Despite this rather extensive involvement, the Fisheries Development Project itself wentforward trailing a history of serious reservations and with the open acknowled-3ment in the SAR thatit was a "Whigh-risk project." Risks were associated with a total absence of an adequate assessment offish resources, new and fragile organizational structures, inadequate knowledge of basic economic andsocial parameters, and the like. Within 4.5 years of approval, US$20.0 million (or nearly 90 percent)of an original loan amount of US$22.4 million was canceled, with the project achieving few, if anyof its intended objectives. The Project Completion Report subsequently confirmed what everyonealready knew from the start, namely, "that the project was designed on the basis of two majorassumptions which proved to be inaccurate: that fish resources in the project area were under-exploited, and that marketing arrangements and infrastructure used by artisanal fishermen wereinadequate."S As noted earlier, the Audit of the Fishery Training Project had come to similarconclusions about the faulty assumptions upon which that project had been based. The audit for thisproject concluded,

"It is also the judgement of the Audit that the Bank assumed too muchregarding the synergistic impact of agricultural education institutions, especiallyin the absence of a strongly supportive institutional structure and economicpolicy framework. A growing economy creates the demand for a technicallycompetent workforce, not vise-versa." (para. 65)

.96 Another important external factor was the position of AHE within the national highereducation system. This was a sensitive issue, with no blueprint for success. On the one hand, AHEinstitutions not administered by or closely associated with Ministries of Agriculture were oftenperceived by them as marginal to their mission. In such cases, Ministries of Agriculture pressuredthe Bank for - and frequently obtained - assistance to strengthen training capacity within the ministryitself The establishment of such autonomous training units effectively bypassed one useful andpotentially profitable role for the university: that of a contractor of in-service training programs forpublic service agencies. On the other hand, a perception of "overinvolvement" by the Ministry ofAgriculture could be equally Lamaging. In Bangladesh, for example, the Bangladesh AgriculturalUniversity was relocated from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Agriculture in 1980, afternearly a decade of controversy. A study financed under the Agricultural and Rural Training Project(Cr. 621-BD, FY74) made recommendations which advocated an even closer relationship betweenthe university and the agricultural agencies of the Government. These proposals were viewed withreservation by university officials interviewed during the course of the audit visit in 1985, many ofwhom were still not reconciled to the administrative relocation of the university. The Audit for thisproject noted,

"These officials expressed to the audit mission the need for BAU to retain thedelicate balance between maintaining academic freedom and autonomy whileserving the needs of the public as perceived by the Government. While notinherently opposing, the goals of autonomy and public service were not alwayscongruent." (para. 74; see also para. 2.12 of this report).

;' wProject Compledon Report for the National Fimheies Development Project (Ln. 21S6-PH)," parm 4.1. (O0D Report No. 9891;December 9, 1991)

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Linkages to Clients and Colleagues

2.97 A crucial aspect of AHE sustainability that was generally overlooked by the projects underreview was linkage formation - i.e. encouraging the university to identify and interact with relevantgroups in the society. Even within the narrow undergraduate teaching mandate there was a need to:periodically review local farming conditions (to keep programs relevant) and the quality of universityentrants (to advise authorities at the secondary level of any deficiencies of students entering intoagricultural studies), and to encourage professional associations among staff (to sharpen skills,establish standards, and reduce inbreeding). Only in a few cases, such as the establishment of th_TPAE in the Philippines, did the Bank take an active role in promoting the institutionalization ofprofessional linkages between agricultural faculty in different institutions.

2.98 There were a number of ways in which linkage factors were insufficiently addressed. Inthe first place, projects did not help institutions grapple with the fact that a large portion of the ruralclientele comprised small holders or even landless peasants. Although most of the institutionsreviewed were established in socio-economic environments of subsistence economic activities, withfarming practices specific to that culture and its agro-ecological context, projects emphasized theestablishment of traditional crop and animal science curriculum, which turned out graduates whocould perform technologically-advanced adaptive research but were not able to respond to localneeds, because the "good farming" paradigm they operated from were all wrong. Even where multi-disciplinary or social science approaches were encouraged via projects, these were often resisted bythe universities themselves.

2.99 The reasons behind the generalized reticence were not known, but at least threepossibilities have been offered. One is that university staff or borrower officials viewed suchapproaches as more "subjective" than traditional scientific disciplines, and therefore more culturallyintrusive. The fact that expatriate technical assistance experts were frequently designated as thevehicle for implanting such approaches suggests that this interpretation is not without merit. Anotherpossibility was that Bank-financed projects were viewed primarily as hardware projects - vehicles forprocuring expensive scientific equipment for laboratories, not for transferring or even stimulatingcreative problem solving approaches. Fnally, borrowers may not have fully appreciated the needfor such programs themselves, preferring to build up capacity in the already well-established and well-respected scientific disciplines (paras. 2.72-2.73). Whatever the reasons, the consequences of thisimbalanced development have been ironic. Some AHE institutions, mostly in Asia, have acquiredadmirable reputations in the agricultural sciences; many have become regional or even internationalcenters of excellence whose training and research capacities are well respected in the largercommunity of agricultural scientists. Their scientists, on a par with the best in the world, often havebeen siphoned off to staff other universities or international agricultural research bodies. In themeantime, however, little headway has been made in resolving fundamental problems faced by localfarm communities.

2.100 In the second place, there was little coherent attention to building networks between AHEinstitutions and government-sponsored agrcultural support programs linkages that would be criticalin garnering political support, enhancing accountability and assisting universities to maintain a relevantprogram focus. Topic relevance and the use of university research findings was also a dilemma, andmany NARS emphasized technology/commodity approaches and new technology development over

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the testing and dissemination of useful findings. In most cases, Bank-financed projects either ignoredlinkage issues completely or encouraged them within the confines of project financing only (ChinaAgricultural Education and Research). Weak relationships often put both universities and supportservices at risk (para. 2.87-2.88).

2.101 In the third place, projects did not generally encourage universities to undeyke activitieswith direct economic benefits. liaise with local entrepreneurs or emphasize farm management analysisin their programs. Praxis and the ability to synthesize, an essential element of an agricultural degree,were missing. As a consequence, OED observed considerable isolation of AHE from the businessand farming communities. University involvement with community income-generating projects wasfrequently marginal; involvement with larger agro-business interests was generally nii, as interviewswith business leaders emphasized. Faculty in most AHE institutions preferred to focus attention ondeveloping scientific capabilities, an attitude evidently supported by most borrowers. Where theuniversity was discouraged from undertaking income-generating activities or directly productiveresearch, the tendency to an "ivory tower" stance was further accentuated. One major exception tothis pattern was China, where, as the result of the introduction of the "responsibility system"(essentially the reintroduction of private enterprise) universities were being actively pulled into everyaspect of economic activity. University staff in China frequently could point to the exact productiveor economic impact of certain university-sponsored technologies or practices.

2.102 Getting intimately involved with local issues from a problem-solving perspective was notonly beyond the scope, capacity, and interest of many universities. In many cases it was activelydiscouraged by the government, which - in some cases legitimately - feared the university as a sourceof social unrest (Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan). For the university to move from a limited andcircumscribed focus on agricultural production and productivity factors to a more meta-analytical orholistic perspective would entail tackling many politically sensitive issues: landholding patterns;marketing, storage, and post-harvest management practices; equality of access to capital andresources; etc. Exploration of these issues is inherently politically sensitive; moreover, the elaborationof solutions in this larger context may be much more costly than already developed paradigms.

2.103 Finally, universities operate in an international academic and research communitv, a factwhich projects did not address or provide for, other than via overseas scholarships for facultydevelopment. In the years since project completion, the growing isolation of scholars and lack ofaccess to research materials, professional journals and opportunities for renewal and grc vth (suchas offered in professional meetings and conferences) have started to erode gains made under theprojects themsehles. Linkages to international agricultural research centers, such as those in theCGIAR network, have been ad hoc and sporadic, since the CGIAR mandate has never specificallyextended to developing unversity research capacity.

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3. RELATED LENDING AND ASSISTANCE: THE BANK AND OTHERS

3.1 This chapter will examine some aspects of the broader context in which the 41 AHEprojects were developed and implemented. The first two sections review other types of Bank supportto the agricultural sector, namely technical assistance in agricultural projects and allocations toagricultural research, extension and training. Such operations arguably represent the main projectmanagement and human resource development thrust in the sector, and as such complement supportfor AHE. The purpose of this discussion is not to suggest an a priori ratio for the various types oflending activities, but rather to demonstrate the relative weights given by the Bank to differentinvestments over the quarter century of Bank involvement in AHE. The final section reviews theexperience of other agencies assisting AHE, noting in particular common lessons and observations.

A. Technical Assistance in Agricultural Projects

3.2 During the quarter-century covered by the review, the agricultural sector not only becamethe largest in terms of Bank assistance, but a cornerstone of the investment portfolio of manycountries. Despite ongoing efforts at permanent capacity building (as lending for AHE represented)agricultural projects continued to rely heavily on technical assistance. Technical assistance allocationscovered a variety of inputs, but most frequently the salaries of expatriate experts who were to assistwith a particular aspect of project implementation and/or train local counterparts.

3.3 Between FY69-FY90, the Bank approved loans and credits totalling US$24.15 billionfor 498 agricultural projects in the 25 countries in the cohorL Of this amount, nearly US$1.8 billion(or 7 percent) was allocated for a variety of technical assistance activities (see Annex 10). This wasgreater than the US$1.5 billion the Bank lent for the 41 education projects, and much greater thanthe US$0.7 billion of total project assistance destined for the 68 AHE institutions. Given thedifferent base units of measurement, further comparisons between project costs for AHE and Bankfinancing for TA in agriculture might be regarded as an apples and oranges exercise. Therefore, thefol!owing analysis is intended to demonstrate various orders of magnitude only and not to suggestexact comparisons.

3.4 In every country but two, TA for agriculture exceeded amounts for AHE by a wide margin.In Peru and China, however, the situation was reversed; in China the allocation to AHE was overeight times that for agricultural TA. This is not surprising in light of the importance assigned by thatborrower to rebuilding its higher education system. In regional terms, differences between AHE andTA allocations were smaller in Asia and larger in Africa and EMENA. Thus, the ratio of AHE toTA in Asian countries was generally between 1:2 and 1:3, while it ranged from 1:10 to 1:15 in Africanand EMENA countries. If nothing else, this demonstrated the continued dependence on TA foragricultural projects in Africa and EMENA Exceptions to this general pattern were Ethiopia, Kenya,

Wy FY69-FY9 s the timefae for wch data asavailable from the Central Operstions Department on techcal assistnce aloctiobnPr1 to that time, tecdnical tance catego were not sadardized Unless otherwise aprLessed, figures incude all Jxe of techicalasanw (Le. cpes and consultans to povide a y, supervion, and engineering merices, as well aS funds for trainig).

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and Tunisia, where ratios could be said to be more favorable (i.e. about 1:4 as opposed to 1:10).Interestingly, these countries also contained the most recent lending to AHE in the two regions. Forthe remaining countries, it would seem as if the Bank had simply given up assisting AHE in favor ofcontinuing to provide project-related technical assistance.

3.5 The relative merits of "making" expertise (by building up local training capacity) versus"buying" it (by emp!oying foreign consultants) has always been a highly complex issue and one noteasily amenable to quantitativ'.- analysis. There has never been a uniformly accepted methodologyfor measuring potential costs and benefits of the "make or buy" option during the short term contextof a single project - much less over a longer time horizon. Specific decisions whether to finance AHEand/or experts have not been taken strictly on the basis of economic merit, and there was no explicitBank policy informing or guiding such decisions. In recent years arguments over the conditions underwhich the Bank should support tertiary education have gained complexity given two additional factors:(i) the now-acknowledged weakness of manpower forecasting as a predictive tool and (ii) the clearindication that, whatever the social demand for training at the tertiary level is, it must be sustainedand supported by a growing economy (paras. 2.62-2.64 and 2.93-2.95). In the final analysis, theexpeaient solution of providing technica-L assistance which could be tailored to meet the needs of aparticular project usually prevailed over longer term options.

B. Human and Institutional Resource Support in Agricultural Projects

3.6 From 1965 onward, assistance to agriculture not only grew but changed in scope. Inparticular, increased attention was paid to agricultural services and support systems, notably research,extension, and - to a lesser extent - agricultural training. The case for supporting such activities wasbased primarily on: the need to bring new technologies to farmers; the need to develop high levelmanpower to conduct research and manage the sector; a desire to disseminate new cropping orproduction patterns; and the need to strengthen research capacity or research output in a given area.Ironically, most solutions were seen to come from outside a country's technological or institutionalbase; there is little evidence to suggest that a perceived need to better understand the indigenousfarming system drove increased assistance to agricultural services.

3.7 Assistance to agricultural research dates from the late 1960s and early 1970s, wnen theBank was becoming more involved with rural development projects and realizing that improvedtechnology suitable for low-income producers - particularly those in areas with difficult agro-ecologicconditions - was relatively scarce. The notion that agriculture research was a necery input to thedevelopment of the sector was not widely or immediately accepted in the Bank The laggingacceptance was based in part on: (i) a view that technology was already available, and - if properlyapplied - was adequate to achieve production objectives; (ii) the prevailing opinion thatagrcultural growth was primarily inhibited by inadequate capital investment, not a shortage of goodtechnology, and (iii) the concern in the Bank with integrated development and farm-level inputsA

With the powIo that appropriate TA could be usd to introduce the tehnolog into the project as needed

3 "AgrIcultuw Raearckb Sector Policy Paper," World Bank June 1981, pg. 35.

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3.8 Over the period of investment in AHE in the 25 countries, 469 agricultural projectsfSnianced various aspects of research, extension, training and project management (Annex 11).'Inputs included the establishment of physical facilities, provision of technical assistance, and fundsfor staff or beneficiary training. Less than one-fourth of these projects acknowledged the presenceof local AHE institutions. Even fewer indicated that some portion of project funds would go to themfor technical assistance, contract research, collaborative extension ventures, policy advice, or trainingof agricultural managers. It would appear that the issue of "Local Competitive Bidding" preferenceshas not effectively carried over from equipment procurement to skills procurement.

3.9 The Bank provided loans and credits amounting to US$22.39 billion for these 469agricultural projects. Their total cost was estimated at US$60.03 billion. Of this, base costs of thecomponents under consideration were estimated to be: US$1.23 billion for research, US$1.40 billionfor extension, USS0.62 billion for training, and US$1.6 billion for management. Thus, nearly US$5.0billion was allocated for various types of agricultural service activities -evidently the main institutionaldevelopment thrust in the sector. It is well worth noting that these agricultural projects allocatednearly as much for various types of p:oject-related training alone as the education projects did forthe establishment of agricultural colleges and universities (US$621.6 million for training versusUS$712.5 milion for AHE). And in Africa and EMENA projects, allocations for training were muchhigher than for AHE development (US$79.2 versus US$59.7 million in Africa; US$71.3 versusUS$34.76 mfllion in EMENA). Once again, however, the relative merits (in terms of costs or otherconsiderations) of project-sponsored training versus other options - including building up local AHE -were rarely examined.

3.10 Of the 469 projects, 51 (or 11 percent) designated half or more of estimated project coststo research, extension or training activities. Interestingly, these 51 projects were distributed amongthe regions in a manner very similar to the AHE investments: 31 projects in Asia; 10 in Africa; 9 inEMENA, and 1 in LAC Moreover, while Asia projects had been ongoing since the 1970s, suchprojects in Africa and EMENA only began in the 1980s. The distribution and timing of theseoperations suggests that the lag in developing AHE in Africa and EMENA countries has beenaccompanied by a similar lag in developing other types of support services.

3.11 Although an exhaustive analysis of this subset exceeded the scope of the study, a cursoryreview of the content, the policies affecting the Bank's assistance to research and extension, andevaluatiodis of some completed operations revealed interesting patterns. In so far as these patternsaffected the "environment" of the 68 A.E institutions assisted by the Bank, they conditioned thesustainability of the institutions. and had relevance for this study. The main patterns included: (i)insufficient dialogue between education and agricultural staff in the Bank; (ii) the tendency to createtotally separate institutions to cover research, extension and higher level training; (iii) tie lack ofattention to ensuring collabotation among national institutions or building linkageE betweenresearch/exteiwion networks and AHE; and (iv) the problems of ensuring relevance of technologies,

Information based on data by project charactedstic and component cost at Appraisal, compiled primarily fmm the BaWnks AgricultureData Bas (suppUed by the Agrcwlture and Rurl Development Department-AGR), ane supplemented by an OED review of years andprojets not captured In the AOR data base

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research, and extension approaches on the one hand, and responsiveness to client groups on theother.

Dialogue between Education and Agriculture Staff

3.12 As noted earlier, Bank education staff generally had only vague notions about theagricultural sector and what the country's agricultural portfolio involved (paras 2.16, 2.21, 2.93-2.95).Governments sometimes approached Bank education staff directly about agricultural manpower needsin particular areas (veterinarians in Ethiopia V, staff upgrading in Egypt E). At other times thegeneral weakness of agricultural education and training at various levels was such that the Banksuggested more systemic approaches (Cameroon I and mll). Frequently, notions about actual orpotential manpower needs in agriculture emerged in the context of prospective Bank involvement ina particular agricultural subsector, where sustained competence by local individuals was highlydesirable. Thus, as the Bank became active in financing large scale irrigation works in thePhilippines, the need to establish local competence in agricultural engineering and hydrology becameapparent, and the Second Education Project provided funds to introduce such courses into thecurriculum of the state university in Central Luzon, where much of the irrigation network was to beinstalled. Fmally, where knowledge of particular areas was weak, or where greater research capacitywas desired, agriculture staff suggested AHE components.

3.13 However, there is considerable evidence that there was insufficient dialogue andconsultation among agricultural and education staff in the Bank and their counterparts in Ministriesof Agriculture and Education. In many countries, governmental functions in the agricultural sectorhave been spread over a number of agencies or even ministries, enhancing territoriality and inter-agency competition without necessarily enhancing effectiveness. This territoriality frequently carriedover to the extension services where, for example, cropping specialists were in a separate careerstream from animal specialists. Ministries of Agriculture have been very interested in consolidatingtheir sector and building up their own in-house research, extension, and training functions wheneverpossible. From their point of view, building up such capacity not only enhances ministerial status andenlarges ministerial budgets, it simplifies prioritizing and directing research and extension efforts. Forthe Bank, centralizing research and extension functions under a single ministry also reducesduplication of effort and enhances rational allocative decisions. Given the desire of both to focusresources, consideration of the benefits of linkage with AHE may have been overlooked.

Organizational Differentiation

3.14 Thus, lending patterns may have evolved that emphasized the creation of separateinstitutions with separate mandates for research, extension and higher level training. In agriculturalresearch there have been six major channels for assistance: (i) research components in agriculturaland rural development projects; (ii) loans and credits for "free standing" research projects; (iii)agricultural research components in education projects; (iv) agricultural research reform related topolicy based lending; (v) grants to the CGIAR system; and (vi) grants to non-CGIAR researchagencies. The two major channels in terms of lending amounts and number of projects have beenthe first two, with free-standing research projects having the greatest project investment. BetweenFY70 and FY87, loans and credits for 600 projects were approved which contained agriculturalresearch components, and 60 percent of this lending went into free-standing projects aimed directly

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at developing permanent research capacity among NARS. Over the last decade, in particular,acceptance among Bank agricultural staff of the role of research has grown, along with a willingnessto finance it. The most popular way of developing research capacity has been to help with theestablishment of national agricultural research systems. Such systems are either autonomous oraffiliated with ministries of agriculture. Their function is to prioritize, coordinate, and undertakeresearch programs and sometimes even to aliocate financing for agricultural research. Even thoughthe bulk of their staff may come from the local AHE, NARS may or may not have a formal linkageto AHE institutions.

3.15 Only nineteen of the 600 projects supporting research were education projects. Eighteenof these were approved between FY65-FY80; one was approved subsequently. This and otherindicators demonstrate the general decline of double-duty projects which contained assistance to bothresearch and extension or education and research under a single operation.A' Usually representingthe first (or quasi-experimental) approach to agricultural services, such projects were quickly followedby a second phase with a single focus. Thus, the Agricultural Education and Research Project inChina was followed by two separate operations - Agricultural Education II and Agricultural ResearchIL This was the common patterm.

Coordnation and Cooperation

3.16 Unquestionably, single focus projects (such as those aimed at building up NARS capacity)have a more streamlined design, are easier to structure and administer, and are more popular withborrower agencies who do not have to share the project limelight or resources. Exhortations by theBank to form high-level coordinating committees across ministries are also easier to avoid the less"integrated" the project management structure is.M The issue is not simply whether separate systemsfor research, extension, and education should be set up, but whether more emphasis should have beenplaced at the outset on developing an integrated structure with more efficient linkages betweenconstituent parts.

3.17 Even universities with official mandates of teaching, research, and extension services cando little in these areas in a hostile or indifferent environment, as noted above (para. 2.72, 2.73, 2.97-2.103). Thus, experimental extension programs tried in the Second Education Project in thePhilippines eventually failed, partly because of flaws in the initial design, and partly because thegovernment in power at the time was not interested in having universities as active extension agentsand therefore did not support these or other outreach activities once project financing ceased.Similar problems have been noted with research establishment In some countries, because thegovernment is the point of entry for an LARC, there can be resistance to letting the IARC work

pi 1bl, of coune, cludes lending for agcultural research in India, which, becamue of the nature of that national stem, invo tateagriculturl unhesities.

ay For aample, the Natinal Commluee on Rural fralnin whch consisted of reprentatives of a number of mnstides, had a crucialrole to play under the Agiture and Rural Thinig Project In Bangladesh It was supposed to recte the technical asstcecomponent s well as delop trining policies and formulate an integrated training phn for the agricultural sector. The audit found thatthe failure to fullill this mandate stemmed from the nature of the committees composition (over-atended ministerial staff with itdeincentive to make time for committee meeting), the lack of adequate support staff and the absence of a dear policy decion

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outside the strict context that the government lays down. Where AHE is not well integrated into theNARS structure, universities may not have access to the international expertise present.

3.18 In some cases the Bank has not lived up to its own mandate to promote coordination andcooperation among agencies.9 Inattention to creating linkages have left AHE institutionsincreasingly outside the agricultural research loop. Independent cadres of agricultural researchershave evolved who regard the university as little more than a training agency. In some cases,university facilities have been so eroded due to underfunding that institutions are losing their abilityto staff NARS, much less participate in contract research (paras. 2.86-2.87).

3.19 Ironically, the CGIAR system may have inadvertently added to the growing isolation ofagricultural universities from the agricultural research community. IARCs, by virtue of their highlydecentralized nature and "international" mandate, have not been required to liaise with the tertiaryinstitutions in the countries which host them. As a consequence, relationships between IARCs andlocal AHEs are ad hoc and take many forms, from collaborative partnerships to complete lack ofcontact. In the course of undertaking field work for two of the case study audits, university staff incountries hosting IARCs were interviewed about their perceptions of the center. Staff mentionedthat, although some had personal contacts with this or another center, there were no formalinstitutional linkages between the university and the IARCs located in the country.

3.20 Even the establishment of the International Service for National Agricultural Research(ISNAR) may have added to the troubles of AHE. Set up in 1980, ISNAR's prirnary purpose is toassist governments in strengthening their agricultural research capacities. To this end, ISNARundertakes several information gathering and clearinghouse functions, and one of its main productsare country-specific assessments of agricultural research capacity prepared jointly with thegovernments. These assessments frequently form an important element of project proposals todevelop research capacity, subsequently funded by the World Bank or other donors. ISNAR has nospecial mandate with regard to AHE or upgrading research capacity at the university leveL Whileits assessments include an analysis of research capacity aomong AHE institutions, its primary directiveleads it to liaise with national research institutes and spend relatively less attention on researchcontnrbutions from the university community. Nevertheless, as it became more aware of the growingproblems of AHE (which ISNAR's own research has shown), as well as of the ramifications of thisdeteriorating capacity for NARS, the CGIAR system is turning greater attention to strengtheningAHE research.

3.21 There were a few cases in the 25 countries where a concerted effort was made to integrateAHE lending with assistance for agricultural research or extension. These operations achieved mixedsuccess, attesting to the difficulties even when conscientious efforts are made.

U Jhe 1981 AgIcultural Resarc Sector Policy Paper noted several features of effective rsearch program. hese Included a clearstatement of resarch goals and continuity in adhering to and administering them; acceptable bvels of autonomy and resouror for thersearch ntiles; effecive 2-wy communication channel between farmers and researchers; and coordination and cooveration among thecounitfs total research estblishment (emphasis added).

N lbs dedsion to indude univasities in opeating strtegies is a decision left up to the IARC in question. Some centers maintan activerlationhips with univerty faculty in developing countries, althougb not necessarily in the host county where the center is located.

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* Both projects in Peru (the Second Education Pioject and the Research and ExtensionProject) largely failed to build the desired linkage between education and research; in fact,about half of the proceeds of the latter loan were canceled. In addition to the drasticdeterioration of the economy, other problems plagued these projects, particularly theunwillingness of local institutions, and in particular the university, to participate in thebroader objectives.

* The Philippines achieved considerable success in linking NARS and AHE over the quartercentury of Bank assistance. Under the Philippine Council for Agricultural ResourcesResearch and Development (PCARRD), various AHE institutions were designated asnational research centers for certain commodities, and also played and active role incoordinating region-based research efforts. AHE institutions were also active andsuccessful in bidding for contract research.

* Although the Bank supported only one AHE project per se in India, financing for nearlya dozen agricultural research projects effectively reinforced the leadership role of AHE inNARS. Although there has been concern among some circles that the research approachof the state agricultural universities (the cornerstone of the agricultural research system)has been too isolationist and therefore subject to duplication, there is little question thatthe decentralized system in India has: (i) been successful in devolving financialresponsibilities from the federal to the state level; (ii) has been useful in reflecting theneeds of different agro-ecological zones.

Relevance anti Responsiveness

3.22 One of the major problems that has continued to plague NARS, AHE, and the extensionservices is the need to maintain institutional relevance and responsiveness to client groups andagricultural needs. On the positive side, the emphasis on more relevant research in several of theAsian AHE institutions helped change the orientation of university research from theoretical toapplied. Institutions with the mandate and adequate sources of financing have frequently becomeleaders in areas of applied research and policy guidance. For example, Kasetsart University inThailand has been active in supporting a fruit export industry and establishing watershed managementguidelines for the country; Bogor Agricultural Institute in Indonesia has aided the government inlegislative and policy initiatives for natural resource management.

3.23 On a less positive note, there has been substantial reticence within traditional universityand research communities towards branching into needs-based research approaches (such as farmingsystems research) or more practical training approaches. Many AHE components demonstrated aresistance to adapt multi-disciplinary techniques or expand social science inquiries. Part of thisresistance may be cultural, as noted earlier (paras. 2.97-2.102). Another part may be the traditionaldominance and status of certain scientific disciplines in the research establishment, which acts todiscourage more innovative approaches. Whether AHE institutions become involved in leadingfarmiDg systems research efforts would depend upon their position in the agricultural researchcommunity. In any event, however, they should be meeting the need for training in farming systemsresearch or similar approaches, since their role as educators is extremely important in thedissemination of new research techniques.

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3.24 In many countries university staff form a small insular society which, after years ofinbreeding and living academic isolation, are unable or unwilling to conduct training courses wherea premium is placed, not on scientific knowledge in a particular discipline but on practical skills, solidfield knowledge and good communication.

C. AHE Development and Other Donors

3.25 During the period under review the World Bank was the primary lender within thedevelopment banking community. Regional development banks - such as the Asian DevelopmentBank and the Inter-American Development Bank -tended not to provide direct support for universitydevelopment, and thus were less involved. International philanthropic agencies, such as the Ford andRockefeller Foundations, and UN agencies, such as FAO and UNESCO, provided AHE considerabletechnical support - chiefly in program development and curriculum design. Bi-lateral aid agencies,primarily the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), often played a majorrole in helping to establish particular institutions. Recently, some evaluations of AHE experiencehave been undertaken by or on behalf of FAO and USAID. This section will review this material,primarily in order to point up insights and lessons common to the Bank's experience.

USAID: Experience and Findings

3.26 Between 1952 and 1989, United States bi-lateral assistance provided the equivalent ofUS$245 million for the development of 70 agricultural institutes, colleges and universities in 40countries.9 In the mid-1980s, USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluationreviewed the agency's experience, undertaking impact evaluations of 23 AHE institutions in tencountries. (Appendix 3 provides a summary of these evaluation findings drawn primarily from anoverview paper prepared in 1989.)&

3.27 It is interesting that the assistance profiles of the two agencies - the major donors to AHEover the period - were remarkably similar with regard to the number of AHE institutions andcountries involved and the types of inputs provided. Like the Bank, USAID assisted with physicalinfrastructure (campus construction, laboratory equipment, and library materials) as well as staffdevelopment.

LW Cited In Mattocks, David L nAitutbonal dinsfer and the Tird World Misguided Poliq and Future Institutional DevelopmentIitiatives in Africa." (Paper ddivered at Ohio State Univsty Annual Symposium of the Center for African Studies, May 23.25, 1991.)Note that United States aistane to AHE was actually launched under the Technical Cooperation Agency, the predecesor to USAID.

-V "Universities for DavelopmenL Lemons for Ehancing the Role of Agricultural Universities in Developing Countriese (CDIM/ALD.Evaluation Occaional Paper No. 31, August 1989).

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3.28 For all the similarities, there did not appear to be excessive duplication of effort betweenthe Bank and USAID assistanceA1' Whether by accident or design, countries or regions thatreceived substantial USAID assistance either received less support from the World Bank (as in thecase of Latin America), or the support received from the two agencies was complementary (India,Philippines, Thailand). Twelve countries and ten AHE institutions were assisted by both the Bankand USAID (Annex 12). Although in many cases the time frames of assistance overlapped, thereappeared to be little actual duplication of effort. In fact, during in the 1960s, when many institutionswere just getting established, assistance from the two sources was mutualy reinforcing, with the Bankproviding the hardware items and USAID the software items (usually staff and curriculumdevelopment). In one case (UPLB in the Philippines), the U.S. land grant partner helped the AHEinstitution design the proposal request upon which World Bank assistance in the form of the FirstEducation Project to the Philippines was subsequently based.

3.29 A major difference between the two agencies was the conduit for assistance and thetimeframe involved. Rather than a single project, financed by a loan or credit guaranteed by thegovernment, USAID provided grants, frequently over several years. These grants provided for"twinning' arrangements that paired an institution in the host country with a U.S. land grant universitythat remained the primary source of technical assistance and guidance. Under these arrangements,U.S. faculty were sent to advise and work in a wide range of teaching, research and extension rolesin AHE institutions overseas. Likewise, thousands of young faculty members from sister institutionsreceived advanced training in the United States. At its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, nearly everymajor U.S. land grant university was involved in one or more USAID-supported universitydevelopment projects.9 Thus, the halmark of USAID's involvement was an explicit attempt tobuild or transfer land-grant style institutions - including their comprehensive teaching, research andextension mandate - to the developing world.9 By and large, USAID support was framed in thecontext of a long-term relationship between two institutions, providing inputs from a spectrum ofexperienced academics and administrators - especially advice on university problems by peopleintimately involved with academic organizations.

3.30 USAI] impact studies noted many features of that agency's experience which were similarto those observed by OED. They noted, for example, that the impact on agricultural manpower andeducation functions of AHE was much greater than it had been on research and extension functions.Major USAID findings will be presented below, and where these overlap with OED findings of Bankexperience, cross references wil be provided to relevant paragraphs in the current review.

h Ihe complementaty relationship oberved in these cases did not emend to all AME invesmentL In one ca uuntury (Senqe,two post-econdary n0icul institutions had been established, one with support fom IMA and some bi-lateal agencbes and the otherwith assistance from another set of bi-lateal agencieL The audit for the Thid Education Project felt that the establishment of twoinstitutions had been unjustified from the pespective of program, cost, or manpower needL Indeed, at the time the audit mission wasin the field rewiewing this projea (winter 1991), the total crollment was at the IDA assisted institution was 31, the stafEstudent ratio was1:0.6, and the cost per student was about US$20,000.

Ibid.

/ Mattock., OD. ci

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3.31 With respect to the education functions of USAID-assisted AHE institutions, some of themost significant outcomes were:.'* The sharp rise in the number of undergraduates enrolled in agricultural programs and the

impact on the labor force. Most AHE institutions became major sources of trainedmanpower in the agricultural sciences in their respective countries (para. 2.61).

* The strong emphasis on crop and animal sciences: social sciences was not a strong interest(paras. 2.28, 2.30, 2.61 and 2.66).

* The persistence of traditional pedago.ies. Only a few introduced innovative curriculumand problem-solving approaches to teaching; the majority concentrated on traditionalagricultural science disciplines with few instructional aids, inadequate library facilities, andoutdated pedagogical methods. In addition, the quality of teaching frequently has gonedown as a result of economic hardship and reduction of teaching materials (paras. 2.67,2.86-2.89).

* The irowth of post-graduate programs in Asia and the paucitv of such programs in AfdcaMany AHE institutions created their own post-graduate training programs, although a goodnumber - especially in Africa - continued to depend upon foreign training for advanceddegrees and faculty upgrading. Only the larger universities were able to support substantialapplied research through their post-graduate programs. Smaller universities had muchweaker post graduate programs (paras 2.40-2.41 and 2.71).

- The development of some AHE institutions into regional or international centers ofexcellence. A number provided assistance through a variety of training programs and othertypes of technical assistance (paras. 2.39-2.42 and 2.76).

* The lack of women in agricultural degree programs (para 2.81)

3.32 With respect to research and extension, the following observations were made in theUSAID studies:* The success of some Asian universities in establishing productive research capabilities. A

few AHE institutions were active and effective in channeling their findings into directlyproductive activities. A few established capacity in resource and environmentalmanagement, aiding the government in legislative and policy initiatives. Many of thesecases were in Asia (paras. 2.34-2.35).

* The predominant focus of research on cereals and, to a lesser extent, ivestock horticultureand vegetable crops research were less outstanding.

* With the exception of India. the lack of involvement of AHE with extension. In mostcountries, line agencies guard this function for themselves (paras. 2.36 and 2.72).

r Pszurphs In t dom-'mt which diss simian findW in Bnk projt ame gen in paurntbhes

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3.33 With respect to the overall experience of USAID in assisting AHE. the folowing stand out:* Initial successes in faculty develogment have not been sustained There was minimal brain

drain; most faculty staff returned to their posts. However, the effective decrease inoverseas training opportunities over the last decade has resulted in younger facultymembers being appointed to the institutions where they have received their entireeducation, a phenomenon referred to as "inbreeding" (paras. 2.67-2.68).

* Evidence of declining financial support and consequent weakening of education andresearch programs: faculty salaries are not indexed for inflation and many have resulted topart-time jobs or consultancies which remove them from their primary teaching function(paras. 2.86-2.89).

* Weak linkages to clients, colleagues, and Ministries of Agriculture. Institutions that arenot administratively part of Ministries of Agriculture may be bypassed for researchcontracts (paras. 2.96). In Thailand, for example, the three agricultural universities get lessthan three percent of the total national budget devoted to agricultural research.

Lack of autonomy and weak governance structures. In centralized political systems, mostdecisions concerning university curricula, program priority, enrollments and finances aremade by national agencies, inhibiting university ability to adapt innovative programs (paras.279-2.80 and 2.83-2.92).

Focus on production agriculture: less research attention to nolihy or inFtitutgional factorsconstraining production. income and employment generation in the rural Saj F.

3.34 Fmally, the major lessons to emerge frum the USAID experience in assisting AHE are thefollowing-* Emphasize strong links with external constituencies and policy arenas when strengthening

a university.

University research should address both policy and institutional concerns as well astechnological factors which contribute to development.

Use strategic planning when setting up university management agenda and buildinglinkages.

Universities should be encouraged to pioneer innovative rural strategies in natural resourceuse, income gene ration and poverty alleviation.

The government should participate as a facilitator not a regulator of university innovation.

Issues of institutional sustainability should be emphasized.

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FAO: Results of Recent Case Studies of AHE

3.35 Between 1988 and 1990, FAO commissioned case studies which reported on the currentstatus of institutional and program development (including management and linkage issues) for AHEinstitutions in 20 countries.A In FAO's estimation, these institutions represented top level AHEinstitutions in their countries and occasionally their regions. The cases and their findings werepresented in a discussion paper for an expert consultation on AHE held in Rome in December1991. ' The discussion paper not only presented the findings and preliminary analysis of the casestudies, but also proposed issues and ideas for further consideration.

3.36 Like the USAID impact evaluations, the FAO case studies reinforced many OEDobservations regarding tertiary level education in agriculture. In the first place, they confirmedperceptions about organizational mandates. Although institutional goals and objectives (referred toas "mission statements) often emphasized education, research, and extensien as equal partners, thereality was somewhat different, particularly with regard to the time devoted by staff to the threefunctions and the resources made available. Manpower development was generally perceived as theprimary institutional function, and some institutions were assigned specific human resourcedevelopment requirements by the government. Research - although regarded as essential by theinstitutions themselves - frequently received less support from outside. The size of the researchprogram not linked to the postgraduate program was often very limited, owing to lack of budgetaryprovisions, support staff, and physical facilities. Universities also found that their participation in thesetting of national research policies or the execution of priority research activities was not alwaysassured. Agricultural extension was the responsibility of sector ministries in most countries, and theinstitutions' extension role was often negligible. Outreach or public service activities suffered froma lack of commitment on the part of institutional administrators and instructional staff.

3.37 In the second place, the case studies underscored problematic aspects of the relationshipbetween institutions and the state. Most institutions were heavily dependent upon governments fortheir financial support, and such support had been seriously curtailed in many institutions. Moreover,the need to follow the government's accounting and budgeting procedures precluded some types ofresearch and agricultural production activities. In many countries the relationship between theinstitutions and the government (specifically, those ministries providing program supervision orfinance) was perceived as inadequate, resulting in a "lack of constructive consultation on programmegoals, structures and contents" (pg. iv Draft Discussion Paper).

3.38 In the third place, the program focus of most institutions emphasized undergraduateeducation in preparation for a career in the agricultural or rural development services. In noinstitution was preparation for farming as an individual entrepreneur a major aim of theundergraduate program. In the past, the majority of first degree holders were absorbed bygovernmental departments and other public or parastatal bodies. However, the severe economic

T Ihe FAO case studies included institutions in 6 countries that had also received assistance for AHE from the Bank (Cameroon, Kenya,Philippines, Thailand, Moro=o, and Peru).

" "Higher Education in Agxiculture: Status, issues and Ideas for Future Development." (Expert Consultation on Stratea Options forHigher Agricultural Education, Rome, December 16.20, 1991)

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decline has served to reduce public service employment and make it increasingly difficult forgraduates to secure jobs commensurate with their training within a year of graduation.

3.39 Fmally, the organization and management structure of institutions often inhibited theirability to be more responsive. In most, the department was still the dominant base unit ofadministration, which inhibited the development of programs and research of an interdisciplinarycharacter. In view of the steady advance of multi-disciplinary work, however, larger units needed tobe formed which could direct this integrative function while still retaining a decentralized decisionmaking structure. Other points regarding management were: the lack of strategic planning in manyinstitutions-1J; inadequate procedures and monitoring of educational efficiency indicators (throughstudent placement and follow-up); and insufficient efforts to broaden institutions' financial base.

3.40 The FAO discussion paper outlined some ideas for improving institutional management ofAHE. These included: (i) enhancing functional in-country linkages to policy makers, governmentdepartments, main employers, and other educational and research institutions, extepr-ion services andrural communities; (ii) enhancing linkages among AHE institutions worldwide through exchange ofinformation, students and faculty; (iii) encouraging administrative structures which foster decentralizeddecision making and the development of interdisciplinary programs; and (iv) strengthening financialmanagement through reduced dependency upon governments and increased financial self-management. The discussion paper highlighted the importance of increased marketing of universityservices (in the form of contract training and research, laboratory and library services, tarmingoperations and consultancies) and higher fees, tuition levels, and donations. An important corollaryof this increased financial freedom was the ability to manage it without interference from thegovernment. In many cases this would mean loosening the rigid budgetng and accounting proceduresimposed by government rules and allowing institutions freedom to draw up and follow budget byprogram without government interference. Models for increasing autonomy and accountability wouldneed to be developed on a case-by-case basis and approved by governments for implementation ona trial basis.

EJ An inlutuonal bkte mter pn ndiates the progam changes, Infrasure requiement, aource requiements, etc, for aperiod of 5-15 yeas

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4. ISSUES, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Ke Issues

Scope and Impact of Bank Assistance

4.1 Between FY64-90 the Bank approved over US$1.5 billion for 41 education projects in 25countries that contained agricultural higher education components. By October 1991, nearly 90percent of these projects had been completed. Some 68 agricultural colleges and universities wereto be assisted. Although total project costs were estimated at US$2.84 billion, only about US$0.71billion - or one-fourth of the total - could be identified specifically with AHE, since the projectsgenerally focused on several sub-sectors. Investment in AHE was heavily weighted in favor of Asiancountries, with nearly half of the projects and some 80 percent of the total investment slated for thatregion.

4.2 The chief objectives over the quarter of a century of assistance were to enhanceagricultural productivity and meet manpower needs. Institutional development was an objective inabout half of the projects, while the goal of strengthening university systems or agricultural servicesfeatured in about one third of the cohort. The chief methodological device for justifying Bankassistance remained manpower forecasting, even though its premises were increasingly recognized asquestionable. The main focus of the lending remained the institutionalization of undergraduate and,to a lesser extent, graduate training capacity, particularly in the agriculture sciences. Despite theobvious influence of the U.S. land grant university as an institutional model, there was little concertedattention to developing the research and extension functions of project institutions, or tounderstanding what conditions were necessary for the university to develop the triple mandate ofteaching, research, and public service advocated by so many.

43 Curriculum development routinely focused on making courses more practical and buildingup traditional technical disciplines in crop and animal sciences. The social sciences and the creationof innovative interdisciplinary programs were given relatively less weight. Most support for AHEprograms was directed toward enhancing the ability to increase farm output by efforts to adapt (notcreate) high-yielding seed varieties; few projects explicitly sought to establish programs that wouldimprove natural resource conservation and management practices. Several AHE components soughtto strengthen faculties of agricultural economics, but few mentioned the need to develop practicalskills in finance, accounting, marketing, and management. Although the assistance to AHE wasmotivated in part by growth-with-equity scenarios, there was remarkably little attention to making theuniversity a more equitable or socially responsive institution, either through its outreach programsor its admissions policies. Thus, considerations of gender, ethnicity, or family income were rarely partof the agenda of these projects.

4.4 Except in a few cases, inputs directed at developing postgraduate education programs wereinadequate. The capacity to undertake research is a sine qua non for sustaining graduate levelprograms, which in turn depend upon the availability of research facilities and support for thatfunction. Adequate support for research was absent, and projects shoul,t not have addressed theissue of developing graduate programs outside this more comprehensive approach. Moreover, there

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is a difference between Masters and Doctoral level training, and the review queries whether the Banktook adequate cognizance of these differences in formulating inputs for graduate training in projectinstitutions. A Masters program may require little beyond the staff and facilities needed for goodtraining at the senior level of undergraduate programs. A Doctoral program, on the other hand,requires a greater breadth and depth of academic support, including the capacity to fill in knowledgegaps left from training at the lower levels. A Doctoral program - particularly in any branch of thesciences - is very expensive if done on a small scale. For small institutions in developing countriesthe cost may be exorbitant. The availaDility of particular equipment and expertise in a givendiscipline - and not the greater needs of society or the agricultural sector - may be the driving forcein a student's choice of thesis topic for Doctoral candidates.

4.5 Having access to good training at the graduate level (from whatever source) is extremelyimportant to the maintenance of high quality university staff. Although project-sponsored facultyupgrading programs were extremely useful at the time, gains have been eroded since no provisionswere made for routine maintenance and upgrading of staff. Relative merits of "making" or "buying"faculty expertise were never considered in Bank-financed projects. In any event, the expense of goodDoctoral level training precludes much possibility of small agricultural colleges in developing countriesbeing sufficiently capitalized to compete with the larger and better established institutions in thedeveloped world in the near future. But options may exist between the "make" or "buy" extremes thathave been insufficiently explored to date. These include: (i) establishing Masters level programs atthe smaller institutions, supplemented by or linked to Doctoral programs in already establisheduniversities and (ii) supporting Doctoral programs in established universities which routinelyincorporate field research abroad under the auspices of the smaller and "less developed" institutions.It is the opinion of the review that the potential for useful types of partnership arrangements betweenuniversities has by no means been fully exploited.

4.6 Despite the fact improving AHE was noted as an essential complement to strengtheningagricultural support services, Bank assistance strategies did not stress the need to integrate or in anyway link the development of the relevant institutions. Few projects devoted any resources tostrengthening university extension/outreach programs or studies in rural sociology, farm management,farming systems or indigenous knowledge systems. There was little attention in projects to buildingup a constituency of supporters or client groups among farmers, scientists, the business community,and government agencies. University research capabilities were to be strengthened in so far as theysupported the development of postgraduate education in traditional scientific disciplines and not,generally speaking, so the university could develop contract research capacity. Objectives such asorganizational and system development were occasionally featured, but were less systematicallyaddresed and their inputs less carefully elaborated. Few tackled the financial, structural, andgovernance issues that would make such development possible.

4.7 Projects were very successful in providing the infrastructure necessary to initially upgradethe quality and/or expand the coverage of agricultural higher education in most of the 25 countriessurveyed. From a narrow base of bricks and mortar, Bank assistance grew to cover most types ofphysical inputs needed to strengthen the scientific and practical bases for tertiary level agriculturaleducation programs. Staff development was also an important contribution of these projects. In fact,among the institutions urveyed, faculty development was often cited as a major contribution of Bankassistance. Fellowships for faculty upgrading were usually well executed, enabling institutions to

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strengthen competence and develop new curricula and programs in the agricultural sciences. Asidefrom staff development, however, other aspects of institutional or system development were lessconscientiously pursued, and often with inputs that were inadequate or inappropriate. Projects rarelysought or succeeded in: rationalizing university programs or making institutions more self-financing;enhancing university autonomy or capacity for self-goverr ance, strengthening education or agriculturalsupport service systems, or building linkages to client groups and colleagues. Technical assistance todesign improved university management systems or promote institutional or academic reforms wasoften unsuccessfuL

4.8 The assistance provided strengthened the undergraduate, and to a lesser extent, post-graduate, teaching functions of over 60 institutions. Many of these became the major souice of highlytrained agricultural manpower in the country, assisting projects to meet their manpower objectives(at least initially and in so far as the needs were elaborated at Appraisal). As project follow-up wasgenerally weak, however - even where tracer studies and covenants were present - it was difficult todetermine the exact extent of manpower impact.

4.9 By comparison with the education function, Bank projects were more ambivalent in theirsupport for university research, the explicit policies of both the education and agricultural sectors inthis regard notwithstanding. Bank projects did not routinely adt ress the need for iniversity facultyto be involved with research in order to supplement their pericrmance as teachers, which at thetertiary level is essential to academic excellence. In very few cases did Bank-financing coverproduction-oriented research; in no case was the need to strengthen research management addressed.For their part, agricultural research projects devoted most attention and resources to building up free-standing national agricultural research institutes to prioritize, administer, and sometimes financenational research programs. There was little explicit attention to bringing AHE into such systems.Unless AHE institutions were already active and full participants in the research community - andsome borrowers conscientiously made sure they were - they tended to be left out. Most AHEprojects that addressed research at all did so in the context of stroengthening graduate education. Buteven in these projects the full complement of activities and inputs needed to support graduateresearch was not addressed. Perhaps as a consequence of this lopsided development, agriculturaluniversities frequently came to be regarded by the research community as little more than glorifiedtechnical training institutes.

4.10 Aside from some attention to enhancing extension education programs, Bank-assistedprojects generally did not pursue a major outreach function for AHE institutions. Projects thatsought an active extension role for the university were either approved during the early period ofAHE lending (before financing was made available for agricultural extersion projects) or weredeveloped at the specific behest of borrowers or agricultural staff in the Bank.

4.11 The objective of increasing agricultural production and productivity was well beyond thescope of most AHE institutions, much less the project investments that supported them. The degreeto which this essentially long-term goal was met had less to do with the specific outcomes of the AHEcomponent than with the conditiobs for promoting growth within the agricultural sector and thelinkages between the university and the community. Sustainability analysis undertaken in the courseof the case study audits emphasized the importance of the socio-economic context in which AHEinstitutions functioned - a topic that generally had received little attention by preparation and

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appraisal missions. Universities frequently had inadequate control over internal factors affecting theirwell being (policies governing staffing, admissions and enrollments; and financing sources and internalbudget decisions), and were equally ill-equipped to respond to the myriad pressures emanating fromoutside (see paras. 2.77-2.96).

4.12 The most crucial aspect of AHE sustainability overlooked by project designers was linkageformation, which conditioned the institution's ability to evolve and to maintain relevant programs(paras. 2.97-2.103). A capacity to interact with clients - whether through direct contact withcommunities or through linkages and interactions with other service institutions - was necessary forboth the training and research functions. The review noted that universities often developed thecapacity to undertake sophisticated research in crop or animal sciences, but were ill-equipped toidentify areas of research which would be most relevant to addressing constraints and potential of thedominant smallholder farming systems. This inability to deal with real world problems frequentlyextended into the business community. Even where universities were successful in creating orimproving food processing capacities, seed varieties, or agricultural technologies, they were frequentlyunable to profit from these directly productive activities because of highly centralized treasury systemsthat discouraged any form of financial independence. Fmally, opportunities for periodic professionalgrowth and renewal - elements which are essential to maintaining the quality of university programsand staff - were largely overlooked in these projects. This, combined with declining budgets, resultedin problems of staff retention and an erosion of institutional quality and project gains.

Regional Variations

4.13 These general outcomes notwithstanding, considerable variation by region was notable, withAHE components in Asia out-performing all the other regions by any standard. They were the mostfar-reaching in terms of scope, objectives, and financing (para. 2.1-2.6). They often worked withestablished institutions, over successive operations, and with well designed inputs. There were fewerimplementation problems in the Asia projects, more participation by university staff prior to andduring project execution, and generally better outcomes. Where economies had prospered, graduatesgenerally found employment relevant to their training. Moreover, projects were crucial in establishingsolid agricultural science capabilities in most Asian countries, at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels (paras. 2.40-2.42, 2.66). In many cases, these became not only the foremost AHEinstitution in the country, but grew to be regional or international "centers of excellence" as welLMany collaborated in international agricultural research ventures, and their staff were of sufficientpwu;tssional calibre to be recruited to COIAR centers and other international bodies.

4.14 AHE lending in Asia was better integrated with development of tertiary sAucation ingeneraL In the Philippines in particular, projects were somewhat successful in promoting anintegrated agricultural higher education system. This system: encompassed national and regionalinstitutions at various levels; was sufficiently strong at the graduate level to meet its own needs forinstructional staff; and formed a professional body that, inter ali introduced professional standardsand national standards for coursework (paras. 2.75-2.76).

4.15 Problems remained in disseminating research findings - particularlv the output of postgi-aduate research. Topic relevance and the use of research findings was also a dilemma, as manyNARS emphasized technology/commodity approaches and new technology development over the

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testing and dissemination of useful findings (paras. 2.71, 2.96). Attention to university management,rationalization of university programs, and integration with agricultural research and extensionactivities was also better in Asia than elsewhere, but still needed improvement.

4.16 There was no single pattern in the EMENA countries, where the scope of assistance variedfrom country to country and two AHE of the eight projects were not implemented as intended.Arguably, the most satisfactory AHE components in EMENA were found in the more advancedcountries. With the exception the single, and unsatisfactory, attempt to strengthen AHE in LatinAmerica, the highest proportion of unsatisfactory outcomes occurred in Africa. The AHE componentwas abandoned altogether in one Africa project and was significantly reduced in another (para. 2.75).Most of the remaining AHE components in Afrca were completed, but had not achieved aDl theirobjectives. Regional institutions intended to serve more than one country had difficulty in doing sobecause beneficiary countries preferred to set up their own training institutions, irrespective of theeconomies of scale to be achieved under the shared arrangement (paras 2.7, 2.66, 2.88). In Africa,although facilities were built and equipped, books, journals and other learning materials werefrequently missing. Quality achievements were mixed. Projects were only moderately successful inmaking curriculum more practical or relevant to needs, getting rid of expatriate staff, and controlingcosts. Attempts to contaia admissions were often futile, resulting in chronic overcrowding. Wherecontainment of enrollments was successfuL unit costs were often unacceptably high. Mostdisappointing was the lack of research capacity in Africa - particularly notable in some scientificdisciplines - and the deteriorating quality of programs that had been established with Bank assistance(paras. 2.68, 2.70, 2.82, 2.86-2.87).

The Role of Agricultural Projects

4.17 Even though AHE institutions were designed to support the agricultural sector, Bankagricultural assistance did little to reinforce the service role of these institutions. In fact, the Bankprobably undercut potential university effectiveness throughout much of its agricultural lending. Inthe frst place, agricultural projects did not demonstrate a real commitment to building up localcapacities and reducing dependence on expatriate expertise, although more recent projects do tendto distinguish betweWii "externar and "internar degree training at the post-graduate leveL Bank-financed technical assistance provisions in agricultural projects remained substantiaL, in most of the25 countries outstripping total investments in AHE by a factor of ten (paras. 3.2-3.4). In the secondplace, there was a general tendency in the Bank to support the build up of separate systems foragricultural research and extension - and in some cases even iraining - without eamining theuniversity's capacity to usefully contribute to such activities. Loans and credits were approved whichprovided a total of US$5.00 billion fcr various support service and management activities. This wasmore than seven times the total amount of US$0.71 billion for ARE (paras. 3.5-3.10).

The World Bank and USAID In Comparison

4.18 The US. land grant univeksity provided a model for many of the World Bank projects, asfor all those of USAID. The Bank never actively promoted it as a prototype, yet there were frequentreferences in SARs to "land grant type universities," or to the idealized teaching, research, andextension mandate that institutions were supposed to strive for. That nearly half of the countries

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receiving assistance by the Bank also received assistance from USAID attests to the (at least implicit)presence of this institutional model.

4.19 Leaving aside for a moment questions of the inherent desirability or applicability of theland grant model for developing countries, it is interesting to note that, in the final analysis, the,nodel was not fully absorbed by any countries in the cohort. In many cases, the key elements of landgrant institutions - tripartite functions, strong university governance, strong constituent support(manifested in both financial and political support) - and the interaction of these elements in a check-and-balance environment that encouraged both institutional autonomy and accountability, simply didnot obtain for the institutions supported by the two donors. In most cases, the enabling conditionswhich spurred the growth of the agricultural economy in the United States and kept universityprograms relevant to this development - such as the type of agricultural pricing policies, inputs, orservices or "ownership" by client groups - did not prevail either. Finally, the basically stable fundingfrom multiple sources at the local and national level - which allowed for the maintenance of relativelyopen enrollment and fairly low student fees - was certainly not present in the majority of countries.

4.20 Although Bank-financed projects frequently paid lip service to the land grant model, veryfew carried through to providing: (i) serious attention to the extension function; (ii) support forbuilding contract research capacity; or (iii) support to devolve control of university programs touniversity management and local farm communities. Ironically, even though USAID was explicit inits attempt at institutional transfer, it was equally unsuccessful in these areas. Some analysts in theUnited States have suggested that the USAID approach represents a failed attempt at socialengineering which led to the development of non-responsive institutions which did not fit within theirenvironmental context). Whether a conscious attempt at social engineering or a leitmotifunderpinning assistance, the desire to make universities agents of social change and active participantsin agricultural research and extension was rarely accomplished under either World Bank or USAIDassistance, and this has been picked up in recent FAO evaluations as well as in the findings of thetwo donors.

B. Conclusions and Recommendations

Project Formulatlon and Design

4.21 Throughout the period, the Bank only imperfectly understood the problems of tertiaryeducation, which resulted in inappropriately staffed and designed Bank contributions to AHEdevelopment This was mediated somewhat the more experience with AHE the Borrower had priorto Bank assistance. Although increasing the number of actors often complicated and lengthened theappraisal process, a more satisfactory product emerged (para. 2.14). AHE components were basedon standard justifications and untested ley assumptions - many of which proved inadequate orunfounded. Components frequently rest_d on assumptions about: (i) the country's natural resource

Swc, for mple Mattoc4, Davi4 Institutional Trenafer and the Third World: Misguided Policy and Future InstitutionalDevelopment Initlativa in AfiuW Paper delmi at the Annual Symposium of the Center for African Studies, Ohio State Uaivenity,May 23-25, 1991.

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base; (ii) labor market needs and absorptive capacities; (iii) necessary conditions for developing theagricultural sector and the govermnent's role in fostering these conditions; (iv) organizational issuescontributing to financial and political stability of AHE institutions; and (v) an institution's or system'scapacity or willingness to undertake fundamental institutional reform, frequently in isolation from thenecessary policy framework needed to sustain such change. The single analytical tool used to justifyAHE investments was manpower projections, inadequate basis for making institutional investments.

4.22 The failure to distinguish between immediate and long term objectives and betweenexternal and internal factors affecting AHE had several negative consequences. It led to the designof inadequate or inappropriate inputs. It reinforced a view of projects as free-standing and isolatedentities, rather than as elements of a process. It reinforced uncritical acceptance of and reliance uponthe standard justifications and premises. It discouraged monitoring of actual component outcomes,incorporation of new knowledge emerging from project experience, and refinement or revision ofbasic premises in the light of new knowledge. Finally, by telescoping processes (involving institutionalintrospecti a and consensus building regarding the institution's mandate, functions and capacities)it tended to minimize genuine project achievements, which the initial establishment of the institutionsindeed represented. University development - like any institution building exercise - is a lengthyprocess. While external assistance can encourage and even accelerate consensus building, outsidesupport cannot replace this inherently internal iteration which ends with the institution beingpolitically and financially sustainable. It is not clear that the Bank ever properly understood the limitsof its potential contribution under the best of circumstances, much less via provision of a ratherlimited set of inputs concentrating on external hardware and technical assistanceA

4.23 There were nuiierous cases where project inputs did not fit with the desired objective orwere insufficiently elaborated (paras. 2.22-2.44 and 2.57-2.76). Inputs intended to achieve policychanges or institutional reforms were frequently inadequate to the task. Studies had limitedeffectiveness as policy instruments unless borrower commitment was strong. In several cases theinstitutional arrangements and desire to profit from the research and manpower studies did not existand were not created during the project. Recent reviews have confirmed that Bank Group lendingfor research and study components in education projects needs improvement.9 Similarly, inputsdesigned to control the proliferation of tertiary institutions and regulate academic quality, such astechnical panels and accreditation boards, accomplished little in the absence of political support forsuch bodies (para. 2.75).

4.24 Unless they received strong support from the university community, activities of expatriateexperts frequently had limited effectiveness in improving internal efficiency and rationalizinguniversity programs. Where projects did not specify how inputs were to achieve such goals -amounting to fundamental institutional reform in some cases - or how performance of the expertswas to be judged - through specific terms of reference or institutional action plans - evaluation of

: Expezince with Inputs dLectd at Institution building has repatedly demonstrated a very paradadcal lesson: namely, that such inputstend to be morc effective the Len they can be Identified after the fact, sikce successfu contributiom wi have been so thoroughly digestand absorbed as to Ise their inital authorship and animate the institution to develop on Its own.

9 Tan, J.P, _Rbearh Componets In World Bank Education ProJecs," 1982 (Woodd Bank EdLeaton Depanment); and Lockheed,Marlaine E. and Rodd, Alagair G. 'World Bank Lending for Education Research, 182-89,! January 1991, (PRE Working Paper No. S83).

- 56 -

outcomes remained a very speculative exercise. In many such cases, neither the Bank nor the projectunit was actively involved in overseeing the implementation of the specialist assistance, and it wasconsiderably underutilized (paras. 2.52-2.53, 2.74).

4.25 The lack of rigor in project formulation also contnbuted to an overly simplified notion ofinstitution building. SARs did not convey familiarity with the sequence of the steps in creating aviable and sustainable AHE institution. Insufficient attention to the process aspects of universitydevelopment caused the AHE components to confuse actions or activities that could be achievedwithin the time horizon and resource constraints of a project with the broader goals to which theproject would contribute.

4.26 Project designers did not focus on the very conditions necessary to the stability, relevance,and effectiveness of AHE, including: (i) ensuring an adequate flow of resources to the institudon;(ii) engendering conditions - including good governance and management at the university level - topromote institutional autonomy and accountability; (iii) creating linkages to clients and colleagues;and (iv) coordinating agricultural research and extension investments with AHE to promoteinstitutional synergies, responsiveness and adaptability (paras. 2.77-2.103).

4.27 RECOMMENDATION 1: IMPROVE ISSUES ANALYSIS. From initial sector work through projectgeneration and appraisal, the Bank should pay closer attention to the kinds of economic demands andlabor market signals that will be necessary to sustain investments in AHE Whether AHE is anappropriate target for public investment, private investment, or some combination of the two, willdepend on how weU these demands and signals can be translated into practical and useful universityprograms. A ciiucial aspect of this process will be assisting the universities themselves to recognizeand respond to such signals by building up university responsibility for graduate placement andconcomitantly reducing the role of the state in labor allocation. The Bank should retain staff orconsultants who have been trained and had careers in AHE administration. If the project formulationprocess is adequate, the following should be the minimum conditions by the time the appraisalmission is in the field: (i) an understanding of the internal and external factors that are critical to thesustainability of the AHE; (ii) a set of realistic project objectives and appropriate activities that canbe implemented during the timeframe and cost parameters of the project; (iii) an elaboration of thekey assumptions undergirding the project and how they will influence achievement of projectobjectives; and (iv) the elaboration of project inputs to facilitate evaluation of outcomes.

4.28 RECOMMENDATION 2: INVOLVE A BRoAD RANGE OF Acroas IN IssuEs ANALysis A ND

PROJECT DESIGN. Although university staff and the government must take the lead in developing asense of ownership of the project, others who will benefit from university development must alsoparticipate in the formulation process, including faculty, students, business leaders, and farmers. TIisrequires the government's commitment to consensus building as a precursor for Bank support

4.29 RECOMMDAION 3: IeRovE PRoJECT EVALUATION DESIGN. Adequate projectformulation should lead naturaly to the development of effective M&E components, designed tocapture both process and product outcomes, since the former, in particular, may prove crucial toproject success and the durability of outcomes. Such mechanisn= are useful for the university inmonitoring its program and for Bank supervision of the project, because they provide a clear linkbetween project objectives and the actions proposed to meet them. They also help determine project

- 57 -

effectiveness and the sustainability of investments. This is in marked distinction to an analysis bycategory of expenditure, which - while useful for monitoring disbursements - is ineffective for judgingachievements of un-financible (and sometimes intangible) project items, such as changes inpolicies. The involvement of the university in designing, implementing and using the monitoring andevaluation process is an integral part of institution building (paras. 2.54-256).

University Mangement and Govenance

430 This review, as well as the USAID and FAO evaluations, noted that many AHE institutionshad weak control over some very basic internal decisions regarding funding, staffing, programs,admissions and enrollment (paras. 279-2.92). Projects strove to build up academic capabilities, butdid not pay sufficient attention to the institutions's capacity to guide, direct, and manage thesecapabilities. Governments remained heavily involved in regulating universities, paralyzing momentumand destroying the independence essential to self-governance and good university performance,including the capacity for institutional responsiveness and innovation.

431 REcommeDAoN 4: Focus PRoscrAssisTANcE ON UPGRADING UNIvEsrrY MANAGEMENTAND DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE GOVERNANCE STRucruREs. The development of AHE should startby assisting institutions to manage themselves, both individually and as part of a larger body of tertiaryinstitutions. University administration and managerial processes need to be strengthened as a firstpriority. This may involve changes in government policies and regulations and in administrativestructures, to give institutions more genuine autonomy. It may mean creating university grantscommissions or accreditation boards to act as brokers for the university community, standard bearersof academic quality, or buffers between the universities and the government. In cases where it isfeasible (because of the number of institutions) to attempt an integrated university or AHE system,attention must also focus on strengthening faculty associations and mechanisms for the periodicreform and renewal of university programs. This may mean restructuring university governance itself,as well as setting the stage for policy reforms of the tertiary education structure. It will meanbroadening the basis of support for institutions - including the financial basis - and strengthening theability of university management to raise funds and allocate resources. Certain functions, particularlythose relating to university planning graduate programs, maintenance systems, continuing education,graduate placement, and research and extension functions need to be properly programmed andfinaned. Universities should be allowed to engage in directly productive activities and to dernveeconomic benefits from there. They should be encouraged to seek means of self-financing - includingraising funds through tuition and fees, creating university "foundations," and undertaking contractresearch.

432 REOMmDATION 5: STRENoTN BmAK CAPACITES IN UNIvERsry MANAGEMENT. Asnoted, one of the reasons management remained a neglected issue was the unfamiliarity of Bank staffwith such issues If lending for AHE is going to increase, if only to rehabilitate previously-assistedinstitutions, more individuals with demonstrated competence in managing universities or universitysystems need to be employed. Altematively, the Bank could identify those AHE institutions whichhave been effective as development institutions and successful in engineeriag strong self-govemancecapabilities and either (i) recruit individuals from those institutions as consultants, or (ii) support"twinning' arrangements based upon a thorough needs assessment and a long term institutionaldevelopment plan.

- 58-

Linkages and Institutional Relevance

4.33 The most successful AHE components enabled and encouraged institutions to formlinkages with their clients. This was the single best way for keeping AHE programs relevant to needs,while avoiding duplication of effort between organizations with a comprehensive role in ruraldevelopment and poverty alleviation. AHE institutions also need to maintain good contacts withemployers, to facilitate placement of their graduates.

4.34 Most of the time, projects did not emphasize the importance of building such linkages, andmany institutions became ever more removed from agricultural realities. Ironically, the availabilityof Bank financing may have led some institutions to ignore or underestimate the importance ofindigenous support and the problem-solving capacities of indigenous knowledge systems. On the onehand, as institutions became increasingly allied - intellectually, if not in fact - with the findings ofstate-of-the-art scientific research and the rigors of the scientific method, they often became divorcedfrom local agricultural 'realities": farmers, their limited resources, and the indigenous knowledgesystems they possessed. On the other hand, AHE institutions were often established in isolation fromother bodies (both locally and internationally) that were actually involved with related research, andso were operating in a vacuum and without sufficient access to latest technological breakthroughs.Even in countries where an IARC was present or where there has been considerable support andattention to NARS development, local attitudes were often prejudiced against agricultural universitiesbecoming more involved in research

4.35 Another aspect of the research dilemma was the function of graduate programs. Graduateresearchers need to confront realistic problems if they are to be adequately prepared for researchcareers and should gain experience with on-farm research and assessments of the constraints affectingsmaiLholders, as well as have access to recent findings worldwide. Too often, poor facilities, scantylibraries, lack of journals, lack of outlets to publish research findings, weak professional associations,inadequate contact with foreign researchers hamper the quality of their studies and researchexperience.

4.36 Even the most basic form of linkage for AHE institutions - namely, to the labor market -was frequently neglected. In most cases, project-supported student advisory services and follow up

were not acted upon, much less institutionalized. Even in a command economy where labor iscentrally allocated, universities need to take a keen interest in student placement. They should helpfit the talent of their graduates to the positions needing to be filled and assess the resulting matchbetween student training and work requirements. As labor markets are freed up, and the universitybecomes more accountable to the economy (and less to planning models) the creation of studentguidance and feedback mechanisms becomes essential for maintaining relevance to labor markets.

4.37 RECOMMENDATION 6: INCORPORATE AGRICULTURAL CONCRNS AND ORoANzATIONS NTOUNIVBRSrrY STRucrnns. University advisory boards and panels in which farmers, agnbusinessconcerns and public agencies are represented would be more effective in identifying priorities andstrategies for training and research programs relevant to the country potentials, and this would alsoensure that prospective employers and research clients support AHE institutions and their graduates.A problem-solving approach to research training, using visits and field emercises on local farmingsystems, would help ensure that graduates are prepared to work on subjects relevant to local needs

- 59 -

and are exposed to realistic teaching and research situations. The .reation of funding mechanismsfor location-specific adaptive tesearch, for which research proposi. would be evaluated in part ontheir economic feasibility and the potential economic impact of research findings, would encouragea problem-solving approach to training and research as weli as inter-disciplinary work Incentives(licensing privileges, awards) could encourage universities and the private sector to become morefocussed on technology development to a country situation.

4.38 RECwmENDATIoN 7: STmNoTEN Tns TO THE INTRNATIoNAL AGRICuLTURAL RE-EARcH

INSTITMTIONS AND NARS. Linkages should be encouraged between AHE institutions and the IARCs,as well as with local NARS, through training, internships and joint research programs, similar to whatalready exists between national and international research organizations. ISNAR can play animportant role in helping NARS identify opportunities for cooperation with AHE institutions whena national research oirganization assesses its priorities and prepares a long-term work program andstaffing plan. Such opportunities are most frequent for farming systems research and socio-economicaspects of technology development, to which the universities can contnrbute social sciences andmanagement skills rarely available in NARS.

4.39 RECOMmENDAmON 8: ENCOURAOE DONOR COORDINATiON FoR AHE. Recent evaluationsby the World Bank, USAID, and FAO have arrived at some very similar conclusions regarding thedevelopment of agriultural higher education and the impact of donor assistance. These findings, incombination with those of other donors, international philanthropic and agricultural researchinstitutions, and the AHE institutions themselves, should form the basis for developing furtherassistance to AHE. Given the nature of many of the problems noted, it would probably be advisableto make such bodies region-specific, as has already been done for Africa through the SPAARinitiative. Whenever posbible, donors should endeavor to channel their assistance through a singleco-financed project, or series of projects in a comprehensive development program. In this way,project assistance itself can be the operational force for donor coordination.

- 61 -

.'mnex 1

Education Project Supportng AHE "v

LA/Cr LAICF Appxnl aC_ng

lo. Regin Camry Prolect Nam AmWot 21 Dat Da 3/

WSSMIn)

Cr. 0161 AfrIca Camerom Education I 11.70 04-Sep49 314-Dec76

Ln. 1248 AMos C_ameoon Education Ul 1700 20-A76 31-Doc4Cr. 1141 AhUrb EthiFi Education V 85.Oo 14May41 30-Sp4S5

Cr. 117 Aura Ethopla Education VII 70.00 26-lan46 3.p.94

Ln. 10114 Africa Gabon Education II 6.00 034o..74 30-Jun43Cr.0185 AfIca K-ya Eduatbon U 6m 122ty.70 3140.0.77

Cr. 0 Aica Knp Educatin IV 21.00 06May-76 31.0..4U

Cr. 1107 AfUIca Kena Educaton V 40.0 17-Ma41 30SOp-91

Cr. C30M Afrc Uba Educato 7.20 23-Mar72 31-4ac-79cr. 090 Afrc Sanl Educaton I 22.00 154a79 3140.046Ln. 1475 Afrc Swland Education 4.00 05-Jul77 314DoI

Cr. 024 Afra lar Education N 21.00 13-Apr76 304ep-82

La. 0900 Alria Zambia Education Ia 83.00 31MAv73 314Mar43

Cr. 0049 Aala lana h Educaio 1 21.00 07elun-73 314.0.40

Cr. 062 Aa Bangadhb Agri e and Aural Taining 12LO0 16-Mr.76 30lJun83Cr. 113/iLa 2021 A China Unklrmt DOsibogar 200.00 22-Jun41 30-Ju468Cr. 1207 Aea Chin Agicultu Eduean and Research 740 02-Nov2 31- 49

Cr. lso0/ 2444 A China Second Agriutua Educaton 66S0 14-un4t4 304un-91Cr. 167 Anab Chin ProAncal Un lves_it 120.00 26-Mar46 314-1c-Ol

Cr. A3(1 Ab dba Educaion 1 12.00 24-Oct.72 31-c4)82

La. 1004 Ads I_bndoe Unverlty Devlopmant 45O0 164ep40 31-a4T7

La. 267 AMs gidonea Unversit DavlpIIa 147.00 21-May4- 314)tc-O1

La. 2944 Ads bdons Higher Education DI _p 140Ji) 31-M 31-nuo-91Cr. 0151 As Krom Eduualn I 1S.13 27-May49 30-Sap-T6

Cr. 0394L 0 Asa Ko" Education U 400 2M1y73 3t-D78.L 0m Ass Korea Education m 3.60 2.bM2r-76 30SJun81Cr. 1534 Asia NWp Agricultural Manpo Deusoput am40 13t 44 30%u-592

La0 Asia PhNlpn Educaton I 6O. 13-Oct44 3140.0.72Cr. 0349 Asia Phn Education n 12.70 1240.0.72 27-Aug40

La 1374 Aa Phippine Education IV 1624 01-aOr-77 3140s0-63

La. 17 Aai Phippirns FihyTraing 36.00 1$4Dwo9 31t4ac47

La.e0M As Thailand Education U 1640 02-May-72 31Jul0

La 03 ENEMA Algwb Eda"tion I eLo 14-Jun-73 30-Jun-TO

Cr. 1069 EMEA Eg Education 410 07-o40 314.0.-87

L. 0969 EMNEA band Educato U 2L5o 156-at.74 224-Jul-4Cr. 026 EMENA Moocc Educaton U 6O 20-Jul.71 24-F*eb78

Cr. 0060 ENEM Pakdatan Educatin I 6o 24-Ma44 16-an.77

Cr. 7 ENEMA Pastn EduceIon I 16.0 26-Jan.77 31-0n -3

L. 1793 ENA Po Eduatin H 40.00 16-Jan4o 314Dc47

La. 0ENMA Tunisi Eduestion V 27TA 28-002 31-tec49

La U0 LAC Per Eduotaon 1730 09-NV42 31-O48S

TOTAL 1.02

1i Agruld Hher Eduon include oeg and u.s-4md4educatdonal i u onls only.

2/ OdiI pidipa p supppamardwn V.

3/ Actuacosigdate or motr etmate ts.t 'ALoas& 9dbAugu t1.

Sourc Wod W nk. Pt_tamitof d lp I Loan/Credft nd World Pbnk Panll Dt Now

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Annex 2

Projects with AHE Components by Approval & Closing Date (tr2ennial) U

1 -APPROVED

CLOSING DATE

7-

o 0

ELi040 4-

z

2-

-8 67-09 70-72 73-76 78-78 79-8 82-84 85-87 88+YEAR (FY)

I11CJ or L"st ESImS Cosig Date

- 63 -

Annex 3

AHE Components - Number of Projects by Region

EMENA ()

-Asia (1 9)

Africa (1 3)-

- 64 -

Annex 4

ABE Components - Loan/Credit Amounts by Regon

EMENA (11.6%) LAC (1.2%)

AfrIca (19.9%)

Asia (67.4%)

- 65 -

Annex 5

Data On Project with AHE Components(d 11ge hi Us$ no"

COUnoM FROMc LaO" UN CANcLE PuRr oAar AM

NA CDW ma osrr

A (AMUA) (ACWAL (APRAIM )

Cmme Sci C0161 IL70 0 1.0 1596 0.26

cam m Ed.. uw 17.00 Om N4.M5 3180 450

E3*opbi SissV C1141 600 0 1S5 37.3 0.94

EbO Sic E C17 70.00 0 95.0 NA 3220

gbo. BoinE LiO 5.00 114 .08 1172 0.2

Keep BudW coin .2 0 9.30 9.40 1.95

K-V 54W 73A 2303 31.0a 2L0o 441

1Yn 5dbeV C1107 40.0 0 ss.e0 NA &94

Lb Edgasi C5 7.20 0 9.40 1090 .60

S_ea sdwm a6 nss A3s -S 27.0 690

Swaiaa Edwn L1478 4.00 0O04 440 5. 0.03

7AiZ E. 61 21A0 U 9S 2425 I_ 1.03

7A=hb BSineS 180 30 0 "A.~ 395 1.72

SUIJ TAL 13 295.1 210 4056 z 6 59.71

SanJaPAM IDa 2 2n0 19 3iuo. 3899 1215

DA&dub AgR&Thda CW07 aU0 . 16.50 1607 0.23

chin Un D beip C1167m21 200oe2s 0 290 o 335

Cm= AgNdiRo C027 75.40 0 201.4 M4 201.60

013. AgEil CUOR.44 48.4 0 175.00 NA 12L11

cum POW Univ cl7n 1ae 0 47.00 NA 10O.

lab Eda. can 120 0 19.36 19.40 1936

ain.uia univ Devd LUN 450 a9 65.3 49.70 195

Wodee UnIvD 5wI .25 147eo 0 24 NMA 7n36

Ind_is HIB EdDw 244 140 0 27.0 NA 3566

Ker. E _twini an51 a3 A. 248 24.0 0.6

Kamn. C*mle= a 39440 460 0 703 574.3

Kom Edam U097 2Zs3 0 39.11 47.47 2n

Neu AgMMDew C154 &40 0 1426 NA 43

lrnp,.m El 13 49 0.14 IL" 4e90 11.68

FbEp Edsduan C3S 1a70 0 17.70 21.40 1O0

p1 _ppie Ed_ianmv L#74 142 0lo 40 48. 2670

flppiu FI"Ta U736 300 0.A 7U40 54,70 17.60

Thdbmd Edw enl 19n 1540 0.3 2L30 30 28.30

ASIA

SLWT-Oe'AL 19 1.0188 GM3 21111.77 88990 581.60

- 66 -

CO(flU> Y PRonr LOAN LeaN CANCZZ 1PROMr PROM= AMECOMP

NAM EmmUl CRDtfr AMOtW Nsr cosr

AMoW (AMAE ) (AUAL) (APPASE)

A.I4d EducaeI 600 4.07 102 6AO 32

Bo RAymM 4010 0.21 56 496 260

ImJaad Egmadosfa VA.0 U0 a"8 VA8 5.17mato ado_sa zMo QQ "A aS ,1Momeco Ed~ii. 85 0 D O 15 3.0 S I 8

r.kwa Edcamdm 9.60 02 17.00 17J.0 1o0

Pak#a EdAMM 10 L4e 27.2 2.77 3.70

rma Edestio n 4QODA 503 9.00 55.79 126

M S M.ueM V 27.00 6 40.70 2750 690

SU3TOTAL 8 171JD 1935 97.37 m61 37.04

Pag EAwadn 1130 1 S19 3476 74 34-761

LAC

SUI.1V)TAL 1 170 1U79 1476 7.44 34.76

wrA-L41 1.50150 .2 4-46 147.01" 71

' oa projue ol ucldqotapm

Projct wit AHE CompmMF, FbcU Yew o Aprovi- d -iseW s hi USS nm )

KOR I 69 26.80 056 2.10 CAM I 70 14.00 0.26 1.90 ETH V 81 53.65 0.94 1.80

PHL 65 11.08 11.68 100.00 CAMM 76 24.85 4.50 M0OO EThVIU 88 95. 322 33.82

ASIA GGhB a 7S UoS 023 2.85 KEN V 81 55.00 3.94 720

__ 1KENU 70 9.30 1.95 21.00 AFRICAPAK 64 17.00 13.40 79.00 KEN IV 78 31.00 4.41 14.00

EMENA LIBI 72 9.60 1.60 16.70 CHAUniD 81 295.00 3.35 1.13

SEN m 79 33.15 6.90 21.00 CHAAER 83 201.60 201.60 100.00SWA H 78 6.40 0.03 0.47 CHAAII 84 175.00 121.70 70.00

ZAID 76 24.25 1.03 4.00 CHAPrUn 86 477.00 10.00 2.10

UTemiprgdbez _mk ZAMM 73 40.08 1.72 4.30 INS UnivD 81 65.20 3.95 6.00

ii ARE - -f qpubud 1 URICi pweAINS Un nDI 85 244.50 75.36 31.00

INS Hi Ed 88 257.30 35.66 14.00

BAN I 73 36.34 12.15 33.00 NEP AMD 85 14.26 4.83 34.00

BAN ART 76 1650 0.23 0.10 PHL Fsh 80 70.60 17.60 25.00

DID 1 73 19.36 19.36 100.00 ASIA

KORU 73 70.22 222 3.00

KORIm 75 39.11 2.75 7.00 EGT m S0 56.93 2.60 4.60

PHL 73 17.70 3.0D 17.00 POR1 80 59.00 1.26 2.14

PHLIV 77 4530 26.70 59.00 TUNV 83 40.70 6.90 17.00

THL 72 2830 28.3 100.00 EMENA

ASIA --__1 ERII 83 34.76 34.76 100.00

ALG I 73 10.20 3.20 3137 C

IRRU 74 62.84 5.17 822,

MYCU 72 13.50 0.81 6.00

PAK m 77 2120 3.70 14.00

EMENA .6

SUBTOT JS25.64 SUBTODT 22. St3DX SUBTOT 16 S556.65 __e

- 68 -

Annex 7

Poportbon of Appaised Totl Project Cost Alecated for AHE1'

LAR&d l0% 11-us S1t919.739 7"M%-Abev

AV31A (13 *jmeb) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

cun,eonI L.90% casroom 18O0% BEbhhV;: 33.EIiopiaV Lm% XenU 210Oamli Z3 KekpIV 1400%Kya V 7.20% IblaI 16Swzilandt & % SeQ eaiI 2L0SZAire U 4100%ZmbiaM 430%

ASIA (seIt cJb)BanlaiuhA 0.10%6 lMIAb JEd 1400% Baqindesl 3.0% 1UME IuV 59.0% CWna Ag Edac OIOChinaUnvDe L%.13% Pb ippnnU 170% 1.no. IDU 31.00 ChIMA AgE 70.00% lbNal 10China Pro, Un 2.0 PhlPpiu 2F300% NeAg ID s4n% Pbline I 10O.00S

MIdO Uni0ht 6.00% 7b 100.KO1 I 110%xan 300%Koem 7.00%

DID4A (S Project)Boptm 4609 Pakisam H101 Ala 3137% PakalnAMorocon 6.00% nsIab V 1100P%nall 114%

LAC(OprotA)

L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ lhoO.s_ g = i = = _ $ _ _ _ e _ _ l~~~~~~~~~Peal 00_L mei rqua_tped et fte I aaa.heuh*suu omy~ rm piu q

- 69 -

Annex 8

Proportion of Appraised Costs ARocated for AHE

10- .

9-.

8-1

D7- ]

* 6-.

z3 -,...........

0-10( 1 1-30 31-50 51 -75 7-1 00AHE Percentage of Appraised Costs

|iz Africa S Asia Emena = Lac

- 70 -

Annex 9

Institutions Involved In Bank-Financed Projects

COUNTRY INSTrIUTION PROJECT

AFRICACameroon Agricultural University at Dschang (previously Education I, I

Ecole Federale Superieure d'Agriculture)Ethiopia Alemaya University of Agriculture Education V, VIIEthiopia Asmara University Education VIIGabon National Forestry School Education IIKenya University of Nairobi Faculty of Agiculture Education IL, IV, & VLiberia College of Agrculture & Forestry - Univenity Education I

IIberlaSenegal lstitut National de Development Rural/ Education m

National Instute for Rural DevelopmentSwaziland University of Botswana & Swaziland - College Education II

of AgricultureZaire Institut Supericur d'Etudes Agricoles/ Education II

Higher Institute of Agricultural StudiesZambia University of Zambia- School of Agricultural Education m

Sciences

ASIABangladesh Bangladesh Agricultural University Ag & Rural Training, Education IChina Beijing Agricultural University University Development ProjectChina Nanjing AU, Central China AC; South China Agricultural Education & Research

AC. Northwest AC, Shenyang AC, East China & Agricultural Education IITechnical Univ of Water Resources, ShanghaiAquatic Products C'ollege, NanjingMeteorological College, Beijing ForestryCollege, Southwestern Agricultural College

China Sichuan Agricultural College, Provincial Universities ProjectXinjiang Agricultural College

Chinm South China Tropical Crops Agricultural College Agricultural Education & ResearchChina Beijing Agricultural Mechanition College, Agricultural Education IJ

Dalian Fisheries College, Shihezi AC,Nanjing Forestry College, NortheastForestry CoUege, Wuhan Hydraulic &Electrical Engineering College, ChengduMeterolog College, Guangxi AgriculturalCollege, Inner Mongolia Ag & AnimalHusbandry College, Northeast AC, ShandongAC, Zhejiang Agricultual University

India Assam Ag Univ, Rajendra Ag Univ (Bihar) Education IIndonesia University of Gadjah Mada University Development 1, 11Indonesia Insttute of Technology (Bandung), University Development II

Ilstitute of Pertanian (Bogor)

- 71 -

COUNTRY INSTITUTION PROJECr

Indonesia Riau University, Universities of Tadulako & Higher Education DevelopmentCenderawisila

Korea Seoul National Univ, Dept of Agricultudal Educ Education I & IIKorea Jeon Bug National University, Gyeong Sang Education II

CollegeKorea Irshuis College at Busan Education IIINepal Institute of Agriculture & Animal Sciences Agricultural Manpower DevelopPhilippines Univ of Philippines at Los Banos Education H II, & r1Philippines Central Mindanao, Central Luzon State, Education IIPhilippines Visayas College of Agriculture Education IVPhilippines Univ of Philippines in Visayas College of Fishery Training

FisheriesThailand Kasetsart University Education II

EMENAAlgeria Institute of Agricultural Technology Education IEgypt Cairo University - Faculty of Agriculture Education mIreland University College at Dublin Education IIMorocco Institute of Agronomy Hassan II - Dept of Education I

Veterinary Medicine (Rabat), Royal Schoolof Forestry

Pakistan Lyallpur Agricultural University Education IPakistan Sindh Agricultural University Education IIIPortugal University of Lisbon - Faculty of Education II

Agriculture & Veterinary MedicineTunisia National Institute of Agronomy of Tunis; Education V

Higher Level Agricultural Institutions atMedjez El-Bab, Cbott-Mariem, Mateur, Kef,Tunis

IACPeru University of Agriculture at La Molina Education II

- 72 -

Annex 10

Bank/DA Projects ith Technical Assistance in Agriculture FY1969-90OMS tosads) N

COUNTRY LNICR SIE TRG EC TFS TOTAL TA

AFRICACamer_. 440.1 7,700 17,727 31.105 4,902 61.434Ehdopia 4708 1,070 11390 27,718 7,371 4754Ken 4713 9563 8.481 19.132 2,654 39,989Liia 55.2 0 1,493 2,043 2,092 5628S_1a 214.7 1300 7.626 19-584 75 36,9Swazlad 4.0 0 0 738 180 918Zak. IZ9 970 4,668 12,877 1365 19,880Zabia 1492 1.524 6,810 24,067 370 371

REGION 1,929.2 22,127 58,194 137,363 26,463 244,147

ASIABagadab 33 2,405 17,407 9,353 8120 55.

202117 1,660 24185 6.610 2,875 39,330I1 1282 63.115 85,33 49,312 28.69 2,9Intanmia 3At 89,697 146,096 204,750 233615 674.158Koa 4705 530 920 5.2S5 5,617 12.332Nepa 344.0 13,053 5,468 10390 5,828 34.739plpin 1=8 14,646 15,025 19,478 27,181 76.3307haland 8415 7.977 5.010 2239 7.59 43.115

REGION 17,351.5 211,083 303,945 327,697 319,394 1,162,119

EAfENAA!Wg I 40 9,480 7,900 5,t30 1870 41,710Eopt 7937 5,364 5,676 11,440 2,994 2S,474''ro-m 919 3.2 7?,693 1Z594 18,44 42,451pahha 1', .9 2,508 69.7 57,782 47,483 203,815p Jtga A4 0 2.485 4,400 9,730 i6,6151hinbla 3539 250 13C001 10210 3.145 3.936REGION 4,533.8 50,652 105,792 102,056 100,501 359,001

LACPau 3366 522 9550 10.790 6.725 32285

REGION 336.6 S220 9,550 10,790 6,725 32,285

ITOTAL 2415111 289,02 477.481 577.906 453,083 1,797,552

RI/Appauumim.dwetomudagSome WOW Ba.kT.dImlAMMs Annua Repmta by fth C4Mtre Opemalona DepwetmatLNntm fig wn - i i fulUSS heem, FY79a m r, aer a i USS tbomaa*lnfabuanf.G CouwAppaC and Pideata Repat Pefore FY3 a .Aftw"date shh wle bansed kmm Bufleoveerappm and Pmidetat Repoea

* Supuuiia maathiEnglmemlng or'hrd TX amu ksm (orpjeatmauudtin.mal.and uihi plma.aIm m i..amiss nthadwng up bdidng damumtenad desA..le

agi .U. SIBnSDiappurd In tbeTAAnnu_lRpua in FY79x la .a*Teaalgeo nndsOvm� Tnlnlne until FY74 IaasemLe.* Expupa C _hitm a d ftruadvlwysa vln or gementaewuningfin and

t,mlmi.e ut do.mm hd.dmspuvlse.yseele (or pTCJm eaxwUuctln.* Tolbl ski 1*1 d Ma m.apazt dtbs_mynot mthdo somnlgaello sofaaI ish tabe* ThFY193 maaddedh .teTAAnl Repau semedto o6'yepors gt m .* Tls data wmtad b ugh, mmy n (ben Frwitha untyabs ha

* O adidm c4 l1 wi ta Whie rd bad an apitiue pjct(Ll kDeui3p0mm 06appe ad June 14.1973) which did sos ac stain tedun amuaancea

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Annex 11

Agricult la ProJect Containig Financng forResearch, Extension, Training and Management FY63.90

(US$ nAUwu)

COUNTRY RESEARCHI EXTENSION TRAINING 3 PROJECT BANKItDA PROJECTREGION MANAGM LENDING COST

Ca_ 5S4.1 74.9 25 1627 4563 LI3.0E lb* 37.5 19.4 1336 75 4154 641

KM" 19 1 31.7 19.2 40Q1 55s89 3,5

Ub 3.4 19.8 2I8 196 5.A j

s_mp 309.5 22?7 L 323 172.5 403

Snob" 0 4.1 0.4 0 40 173ZAN 7$ 19A 73 30.7 W 347

Z_Mp MG18 2.2 53 114 U112 23

A ALLAFRICA 4 n1 72 3714 L0 4.

Bo 44? 57.7 45,5 353 L 4D 2 J ,4

::a 95 30.3 413 7. 2.08 537U

ih n1u4 4834 18 438.9 7,M3 AV7S8_IOU 1743 1335 32il M199 SA

3Com 2.9 2.2 1.9 0 655 136*

K.m.Ru0 80 0.6 Zl 27 2630 61

Nqi 3 l4 19.5 2D5 293 35MS 481IbEiph. 39.0 6V7 18 45. 8723 LU9A

643 107.4 15.2 109.1 83L6 21z2

ALLASIA 60 941 4678 LOW 14W73 AL

Mph 358 172 5.7 0 4210 L398l

EoF 72 16.7 IZ5 45.1 77Z2 I.4

30mm 39.7 613 82 4Z7 855 33

754 743 30.4 32 1.1912 6.4

LI I0 Li 4.2 27.4 431

To" 179 2 1.4 34 315.4 1L5ALLEMEIENA 177.i 39L1 713 18 387 14408

NM VA.8 303 3 3U8 331 709

TOTAL. 34 L4&1 62A O7.2 391 6OA"

NamsLRhauchnd.dm a 1_0anin, reac, cwps (fld and plmd03csps lvewolt fkty,£hdo4mhom1 IheA U b, FSR, blo4chnolo, and engineng remcm (cel J90521)2LEUmi ncmp, su,, Rvetock forsa fWers, aamrcadm FSR, lgtMooa (cdis f3W 37)3.T-Waft bnm p ojem vaS mulaal enfIcay an S6un ied (cob 9040Smoaa xmdof dw AGRPS aond EDDI dmom* Dabm uwves ad apI9 a and rur developM projec in he 2S projet couni* Mm AGRPSD B mu pojec approved in FY1974090 IcudtIg a cmn an extnsion ngage whic

RimoDak begandommnugInFYl98L* lbo OED DB eneam FY19P6373, exuoive of props maagemeoL.* ¶hfcun gealmI01er Il mbeshI unidenfitd extesion ew and research mpone, and

e43=Ua CMPM and eIe lI link2ge* Gabon d Ielm ta- no relevant projms.

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Annex 12

World Bank Assisted and USAII) Project Institutions in Comparison

COUNMRY WORLDBAKFIANCED USADFIANMC

Cameroo Apk UJdwrytDdwMg (pM-dyE.AFe&-seSwpvi- d'A4sk) Ag [. U rxas at D&*-gEthipia Alae UiWrdiyofAgia"- Abmyw Uiverailef4gvf

Amam Univesty

AAaUKews UnNervity of Ndbrobi -Fwculy of Agtculture Eeon A i <;olkC s

Banglah RADsg1aIhAricub- UXAiVa Zu.gh*A Atiuu1 Uxbereiy

in" RajuaIbMA5IuLIM Uxkem&y (A*-) XAj-f" Apmbe, UxUaweiy(h-)Am Agrclra University Aadhr Pradeh AU, P Pao AU, Haya AU, Madh&p Padeh AU.

Mahaubta AU, oe AU (Banove), Orua UA Punjab AU, Uof Udaepr,TalNadu AU?

Indonesia In-mWwof AgE abmn (E,hag) IxA rw of Aru4w (BD-ag,)Atlturaln wte (Bogor). ntItu of Peatadnm(Bogr), EumlReglnUnlvmites Westen Rgiond UnvertiesUn:v of Andalas, Univ of Cdja MadL% Univ of Indonesia, PUauUniv, Uni of Tadulako & Cendaa

KOr &ouLN"wM UIOan&A SmlNationd UOeatyCoUege of A&. hhrles College (B ) Seoul Naiond Uv.Jeon Bug Nadonal Unv, Oyeng Sang Collee, 1 Colege (Buan)

PhWippin- Unr wof Om ePappi- n @L aJBl, Vmyea Cdkrgof Ar ik&o Vxab eJof VlpWp# Law Baex, VLpuCaeeIArf iekuatwCntral MLadanao, Cental I --o Stte, Univof Phiippines In tbeVisy. College of Fishies

'Thailad KaatUwt Unbemymi Eaueta, fJenhariy

Miorocco InaaLtueofAgrwmuk& Vetnalwp5arwfiasamnft(Realw) Iuaitatof Agrsawdc & V.ta'daar Sdewa Hsm, II (labe)Royal Forestry Sclool

uakktan Sindh Ag Univ. LyaeIpurAguiltue Uniesisy Punja AU Pesiwr Uni Northwaet rtnterAU

PeN Nal_ Agrfot4lwexfJah yde laMeMaD NationaAphwLlN UaiemaiiatLa MON

* Univeides included in the USAID 10 nation study but) ot Lom"ndpient of USLA IDmsutane

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Appendix 1

METIIODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING AHE COMPONENTS

In assessing the quality of the Bank's AHE portfolio, four dimensions were examined: designissues, implementation issues, achievement of objectives, and sustainability fators. Assessments werebased on a review of relevant documentation, including Economic and Sector Memoranda, SARs,PCRs, Audits, various reports and studies produced over the course of project implementation, andproject correspondence files. Thirty-six of the 41 projects in the cohort had been completed at thetime of the review; completion reports were available for thirty-three of them. Audits had beenundertaken for 27 of the completed projects. Case study audits - involving an in-depth examinatie aof the AHE component - were undertaken for eight projectsY Case study audits involvedinterviews with over 350 project staff government officials and selected farmer groups, and site visitsto 18 project institutions.

Design Issues

the adequacy of the design of AHE components was examined from three perspectives: (i)the process of project formulation, (ii) the elaboration of objectives of the AHE component, and (ii)the choice of inputs.

PROJwrC FoRwuAnoN. What the Bank designates as project identification, preparation, andappraisal could be summed up in the term "formulation." It is the process by which issues orproblems are identified and potential solutions are put forth. With regard to the design ofAHE components, five dimensions of the formulation process were examined: (i) the amountof time devoted to project generation; (ii) the complexity of the design (or the number,sequencing, and diversity of elements to be undertaken within a single operation); (iii) thecountry conditions (its pror experience with AHE, the government's comnlitment to it, andinstitutional consensus supporting it); (iv) the expertise of project desirners; and (v) therobustness of issues analysis (process by which problems are identified and potential solutionsconsidered). In crafting solutions, issues analysis must distinguish between end?n.nous factors(which project inputs can influence) and exogenous factors (which are outside the directsphere of project influence).

ELABORATION OF Omwrvus "Objectives' are the aims and targets that the project seeks toaccomplish. Ideally, they are clearly speDed out and consistent with the implementationcapacities of the borrower and the resources devoted to the project. A robust designdistinguishes between proximate objectives (actions/activities likely to be achieved within thetime horizon and resource constraints of the project) and ultimate c jectives (broader goalsto which the project will contribute). In practice, however, the process of delineating projectgoals rarely approaches this ideal, and objectives may be neither explicitly stated (but implied)nor accomplishable within the time frame or resource constraints of a single operation.

Y Ethiopia V Educatlion, Seneal m Education, Ranglads I Education and Agriculture and Rural TainIng, China Agrcultual HigherEducation and Reearch, Philppines Educatio IV and Fishery Train,& and Pakistan Education IIL Country conditions preveted thetimely auditing of two additional proJects Pren 1U Education and Egpt 111 EducatioL

- 76 -

CHoICE OF INpUsT 'Inputs" are the measures or activities to be undertaken to assist in theaccomplishment of objectives. For purposes of this study, the terms "components' and"inputs" will be used synonymously. Inputs typically include: (i) components financed throughthe project and that the loan or credit can disburse against; (ii) standard operating proceduresand specific conditionalities that are formalized as side letters to or covenants in theLoan/Credit Agreement; and (iii) other activities acknowledged as essential to theachievement of project objectives, but not supported through financing or mandated throughcovenants.

bmpltmentatlon Issues

Aside from problems that could be traced to shortcomings in design, the main implementationissues arose regarding: (i) implementation arrangements for the AHE component; (ii) adherence toimplementation schedules; (iii) adequacy of Bank supervision of the AHE component; and (iv) thenature of the monitoring and evaluation arrangements.

Achievement of Objectives

The review assessed the achievement of objectives along two general dimensions - by regionand type of objective. Attempts to aggregate achievements them over time were complicated byseveral factors: (i) the consistent confusion of ultimate and proximate objectives; (ii) the combiningof activities directed at several institutions within a single operation; (iii) the lack of standardterminology to describe or measure objectives, inputs and outputs; and (iv) the fact that interpretationof some outcomes was subjective and not amenable to quantification. It was virtually impossible todetermine what production/productivity or manpower objectives projects were able to achieve duringin the immediate ex ost phase, when most completed projects were reviewed and case study auditsassembled. Institutional and system development outcomes were somewhat easier to determine,particularly when care had been taken to structure M&E components accordingly.

Factors Influencing Sustainability

As has been pointed out by OED previously, the sustainability of projects is intimately linkedto factors in both the internal and external environments of an organization. For AHE institutions -service institutions heavily dependent upon public funds and social demands - external factors and

the way the institutions interacted with their environment was extrenmely important to achieving theright degree of autonomy and accountability. Although a rigorous sustainability analysis was notundertaken for most of the AHE components, the first three AHE projects in the Philippines wereexamined in greater detail, while some audits undertaken 4 to 8 years after project completion(Bangladesh I Education, Senegal IiI Education, and Pakistan m Education), offered additionalperspectives on austain2bility issues. Fndings were substantiated through a survey of othersustainability-related research.

Review of the Agriculture PortfoUo

During the period under consideration, some 469 agricultural projects financed varioljs aspectsof research, extension, training and management. Project characteristfs and component costs werereviewed to identify examples of linkages with, and eventually support to, AHE institutions.

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Appendix 2

BACKGROUND TO BANK ASSISTANCE FOR AGRICULTURE AND EDUCATION

Early investments were primarily for physical infrastructure to support industrial development;neither agriculture nor education were among the initial concerns. However, it became increasinglyapparent in the 1960s that member countries - and particularly the newer nations - were not 'takingoff' as predicted, nor were benefits from industrial development "trickling down" to the agriculturalsector. In fact, such benefits often failed to materialize or remained concentrated in the modernurban areas, exa-erbating dual economies.

Po1Ides and Foc s In Agricultural Lending

The first important shift was away from the exclusive focus on industry toward a morebalanced approach to growth for both the industrial and agricultural sectors. In keeping withprevailing notions about appropriate targets for public funds, early agricultural projects tended toconcentrate on irrigation, drainage and flood control systems, and other types of physicalinfrastructure. As the potential importance of agricultural commodities in bolstering nationalaccounts was recognized, lending focus expanded to include parastatal rural credit intermediaries andprocessing industries, as well as inputs for plantation cash crops and livestock.

Within a short time, even this broader investment strategy seemed inadequate. It was clearthat growth in agricultural productivity could not be achieved simply by transferring technology fromdeveloped to developing countries. The outlook for world food supplies remained bleak, exacerbatedby rapid population growth and sluggish food production. Most of the world's arable land was alreadyunder the plow, and expanding into less suitable, marginal lands was highly risky and entailedconsiderable resource commitment. The vast majority of rural dwellers remained at the subsistencelevel, caught in a cycle of poverty and susceptible to occasionally severe food shortages. The humanresources and institutional infrastructure necessary to direct, manage, and support the developmentof the sector were generally lacking.

Within the Bank, dissatisfaction with the earlier development approaches led to the searchfor a strategy for agriculture that would: (i) improve both the productivity and welfare ofsmallholders; (ii) increase farm incomes; and (iii) insure more reliable food supplies. Resolving thegrowth- with-equity dilemma posed a problem for the Bank As an economic institution, it was boundto justify its investments as financiafly sound, and there was little empirical evidence Jo suggest thatthe rural poor were a good investment. As a development institution, however, it could hardly affordto ignore the majority of the world's population.

Parallel wevelopments within the academic and agricultural research communities eased thedflemma and helped to give substance to the new direction sought by the Bank. In the realm ofeconomics, concerns over the possible merits of investing in the rural poor were being laid to restthrough sich ground-breaking economic research as T.W. Shultz's Transforming Traditional

dik3g.~, published in 1964. This work satisfactorily demonstratf:d that all farmers - regardless ofthe relative size of their operation - could be rational and efficient (within their resource constraints).This realization made small farmers as good an investment target as their larger counterparts. The

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hypothesized key to stimulating small holders was the removal of the major resource constraintsfacing them: education, production inputs, credit, technology, and markets.

About the same time, an experimental approach for increasing production of basic food cropsthrough applied research was being validated. Begun in 1942 as a collaborative effort between theGovernment of Mexico and the Rockefeller Foundation, the approach entailed research aimed atraising wheat and maize yields and training local researchers. By the late 1960s this experiment hadpaid handsome benefits: it had helped Mexico become self-sufficient in grain proJuction, it hadencouraged the government to develop a national agricultural research institution, and it had wona Nobel Prize for the development of high-yielding wheat varietiesY Succeses in Mexicoencouraged participation by a wider audience of foundations, international agencies, governments,and agricultural researchers. In 1961, the Ford Foundation joined the effort and established aninternational center for rice research in the Philippines. Within six years, additional InternationalAgricultural Research Centers - or IARCs, as they were being called - were established in Nigeriaand Colombia to focus on the research needs of tropical agriculture. The desire to provide for thecontinued support and possible expansion of IARCs prompted governments and internationalagencies to join forces in 1971 to form the Consultative Group on International AgriculturalResearch (CGIAR). The Secretariat of CGIAR was established at World Bank Headquarters.

LARCs were established to help increase food production. Through their ability to access theglobal pool of scientific knowledge, talent, and plant material, and staffed with the some of the bestagricultural scientists in the world, IARCs could to develop and test new varieties of high yieldinggrains. As the improved, technology-based varieties became more widely available to farmers andaaopted by them, the "Green Revolution" was born. The potentil of Green Revolution technologiesfor reducing both rural poverty and chronic balance of payments problems was regarded asimpressive, as the new varieties provided opportunities to increase food production and farm incomesand reduce dependence on grain imports. They offered governments the hope of food securitythrough self-sufficient production and exchange earnings through exports. Most importantly, GreenRevolution technologies appeared to be 'scale-neutral" - that is, potentially successful regardless ofthe size of the holdingY

For the World Bank in particular, the advent of the Green Revolution was important informulating the new agricultural strategy. High-yielding varieties signaled the possibility of areplicable, production-led rural development approach which would be available to large and smallfarmers alike and could meet the aim of growth with equity if provided with strong governmentcommitment and sound macroeconomic policies. Policy areas to be addressed in the course of sector

International Development Research Center (IDRC), Tbe Frdle Web: The international agrlcultural research Mstem. 1983; Ottwa,Canada (pg m

Y Bnthusiasm for the Green Revolution was not uniform. A key tenet was that both the technology and the lnfmatc necessary toactivate it would be forthcoming, an amumption that some critics found without bas As early as 1969, artiles began to appear cautioningaginst blnket aosepn of the new acientiflc breakthrough as the answer to agricultural development On the one hand, the spreadof the new sophisticated varieties might not be as rapid as early studies indicated bemause their heaoy dependence upon equallysophbisticatedi complimentaiy input packages (eg. fewies), nfrastrucwue (e.& Irription) Institutions (eg. cenaion services) andrecipients (e.g. literate fanneras). On the other, even U the new varieties did spread rapidly and widely, the increased production could leadto another et of diMficulties It warehousing facilities and marketing strctures were unequal to the task of handling the inreawd yields.Tbes warning were acknowledged but generly did not dampen the enthusiam of scientists and development practitionema

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work would include, inter alia. pricing of agricultural inputs and commodities, taxation, technologydevelopment, land tenure and utilization issues and public sector expenditures. Bank staffacknowledged that essential elements of the new strategy would include stronger -.Aral institutions,acceleration of the rate of land and tenancy reform, improved access to credit and markets, assuredavailability of water, intensified agricultural research and expanded extension facilities, and greateraccess to public services.

The President's Nairobi Address in 1973 provided the official impetus for the elaboration ofthe growth-with-equity strategy. Over the next two years, intensive research was undertaken andpolicy guidelines were issued.- For the first time, Bank documents frankly acknowledged that: (i)the rate of transfer of people out of low productivity agriculture had been slower than predicted andwas likely to remain sluggish, and (ii) most rural people were poor and likely to remain so given thehigh rates of population growth relative.to existing available resources. Any sustainable solution tothis situation would need to be a comprehensive growth strategy for the rural poor which, whileretaining a clear orientation toward increasing production and raising productivity, would alsorecognize the importance of improved food supplies, nutrition, and provision of basic services (suchas health and education).

Rural development, growth with equity and application of Green Revolution technologiesrepresented a shift to a type of project that was more demanding on the local institutional and bumanresource capacities. These development programs required a cadre of managers who were familiarwith local agricultural issues and a specialized labor force to staff the agricultural support services(chiefly research and extension) upon which the production and diffusion of appropriate technologicalpackages depended. Fnally, such projects required an appropriately trained receptor/farmer whowould understand the benefit of the new technologies and be able to operationalize them.

The need to upgrade human and institutional capital to support agicultural development andBank-financed projects grew in two different directions. Education projects became moreagricuiturally sensitive and incorporated more attention to improving education services indisadvantaged areas. Agrcultural universities were also actively supportei. Agricultural projectsincreased allocations for project-related training and technical assistance as well as turned moreattention to developing research and extension capacities. Initial attempts to assist agriculturalsupport services were largely undertaken in the context of rural and area development projects. Afterabout 1980, however, greater attention turned to helping borrowers establish or rationalize researchand extension structures.

Criteria and Policies for Lending In Education

rue Bank was initially constrained from direct lwIL. T for human resource development.Although the 1945 Articles of Agreement had authorized the Bank to provide investment capital tosuplnrt projects for "productive purposes," for the first fifteen years this did not include education,which was regarded as a consumer good, not a productive input. As early as 1953 the Bankrecognized that "low standards of education and traiing were among the obstacles to development,"

N See, for ezample, Rural Developmwent and Bank Pocdes A re Regor' (Rsport No. 588, Daeember 2, 1974); and RuralDevelonment Sector Policy Paper. (Febmary 1975).

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(Seventh Annual Report). Yet it was not until the early 1960s, when human capital economistsestablished that the value added to labor through education significantly enhanced productivity andthat the education of the work force was a key determinant in economic perfnrmance that the Bankbegan to view education as "productive" and to consider lending directly for education. Similarly,although aware of the importance of trained local staff in facilitating project execution, the Banktended to concentrate on the hardware aspects of projects and leave training to bilateral and othermultilateral agencies - particularly the UNDP, which worked on collaboration with other UNspecialized agencies.

INrnrAL PoucIES Even though increasingly regarded on the production side of the equation,education investments did not lend themselves easily to the rate of return calculations used to justifyinvestments in other sectors. Eventually, both a cogent rationale and an analytical approach weredevelop'Ad to permit education lending that was couched in economic terms. Initial lending policiesin the education sector stressed: (i) the need for trained manpower as the primary rationale for Bankassistance to education (as opposed to meeting basic needs or keeping up with population growth)and (ii) the production of trained manpower through specialized technical and vocational traininginstitutions the primary focus of Bank assistance (as opposed to assistance for general or liberal artseducation). In so far as they produced specialized technical and vocational manpower, universitieswere eligible for financing.

Thu., the first important policy position of the Bank affecting higher education was taken atthe inception of the lending program and was linked to enhancing production in sectors where theBank was already active. Vocation-specific universities such as engineering and agriculture wereaccepted; general universities were not. During the decade of the 1960s, lending bioadened toinclude agricultural colleges which, while integral parts of general universities, were still deemedsufficiently autonomous to qualify for Bank/IDA assistance. Given these attitudes, it is not surprisingthat of the Bank's first seven lending operations in educ .tion (FY63-69), four supported agriculturalhigher education. The Bank, along with USAID, was among the earliest externa' agencies to suppoi.such institutions.

The President's Nairobi address in 1973 induced the second major policy directive affectinghigher education. Educators ia the Bank generally interpreted the poverty and basic needs argumentunderpinning the President's address as a shift toward lending for primary education and rural needs.The Education Sector Working Paper issued the following year suggested that secondary and highereducation had been overemphasized by the manpower planning advocates of the 1960s. Nevertheless,because of their perceived link to agricultural production and the development of rural economnies,agricultural colleges and universities generally fell outside this criticism and continued to be widelysupported throughout the remainder of the decade. Indeed, the Education Sector Policy Paper of1980 noted:

There is a need, at the post secondary level, for institutions to train professionalmanpower in agriculture and related fields. In the process, the dual function ofstaffing the upper echelons of public and private agricultural bodies and of generatingtechnical knowledge adapted to local conditions for use by extension services shouldbe served."Y

E Education Sector Policy Paner World Bank, April 1990 pg. S1.

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As far as agricultural higher education is concerweW, there has been no explicit policy directive.supplanting the 1980 Policy "aper. However, the thinking - about planning for higher levelmanpower needs, manpower forecasting tools, and the actual effectiveness of tertiary education - hasshifted in light of emerging evidence, and this has greatly influenced lending programs.

MNAmowmt, CosT BENEI T,D Orm ANjxncAL TooLs FOR EDUCATION PNojums As noted,during the 1960s and 70s, the Bank continued to rely heavily on manpower forecasting as a technicalarguments in its assistance to education. The manpower requirements paradigm observes past labor,employment and output structures in order to determine labor productivity and, by extension, sogenerate point estimates of skills required in the future. Manpower forecasting be.came the mostpopular element in educational planning methodology in the decade following the Second World Warbecause of its similarity to the Harrod-Domar model (a major development analytic tool of that era),its intuitive appeal (i.e., that a country's cutput would grow if the necessary type of labor weresupplied for production), its rather straightforward data needs, and its apparent utility in suggestingfuture optimal investments in education.

Although several approaches emerged within the basic approach, all shared the followingassumptions: (i) that it is possible to forecast levels of labor productivity; (ii) that past, present, andfuture structures of employment are predominantly determined by demand (or technically determinedrequirements) and minimally by available supply; (iii) that only one occupational structure isconsistent with each level and structure of output aAiNor labor productivity; (iv) that a specificoptimal education profile exists for each occupation; and (v) that shortages in specific occupationalcategories requiring specific educational qualifications will result in significant falls in economicoutput. Placing this paradigm within a broader economic framework requires assuming further that(i) both the demand and supply for individual labor categories are inelastic; (ii) there is zero elasticityof substitution between different labor categories; and that (iii) the costs of producing the manpowerneeded are justified.

However, even as it gained greater acceptance with a wider audience (chiefly ministries ofplanning or education in developing countries), the manpower forecasting approach came underincreasing scrutiny from the academic cummunity and practicing educational economists inindustrialized countries. The basic theoretical difference of opinion between its advocates anddetractors pertained to the relative elasticities or substitutability of occupations and skills, with theformer maintaining the independence of the supply of and demand for labor and the latter arguingtheir essential inseparability.The misgivings were supported by a mounting body of evidence fromcompleted education projects. The capacity of manpower forecasting techniques for actuallycalculating the labor needs of a developing economy, allocating resources and legitimating investmentchoices was in serious doubt by the middle to late 1970s, but there were no other tools for linkingfuture labor needs to cufrent educational investments, and so it continued in use for the next decade.

Some educational economists began to suggest that cost-benefit (or rate of return) analysiswhich was the standard tool for project evaluation of ordinary ini Vntments - could be extended toinclude education investments. It was argued that cost-benefit anaiysis would have a number ofadvantages over manpower f-.-ecasting as a planning tool: (i) it would introduce flexibility (via notionsof elasticity and substitutab 1:.y); (ii) it would focus attention on the heretofore ignored element ofeducation costs; and (iii) it would distinguish between social and private rates of return, thereby

- 82 -

p.roviding a useful tool for distinguishing which types of investments should be a greater priority forpublic sector fjnds and ergo Bank financing. It could also assirt in making allocative decisions withinor between sub-sectors.

In the 1970s, an increasing number of proponents of rate of return analysis began to applythis tool to data from both developed and developing countries. The results of their work reinforcedand amplified some earlier thinking. But as it also contradicted much of it, there was a measurableimpact on the type of education projects likely to receive Bank assistance. Among the most powerfulconclusions to emerge were: (i) social returns to education investments average between 13 percentfor higher and 27 percent for primary and are comparable to, if not well above, the yield ofalternative investments and the Bank's cut-off level for financing (10 percent); (ii) private returns toeducation exceed social returns (due to the subsidization of education); (iii) the highest returns toany level of education are for primary (in part because of lower costs); and (iv) the returns toinvestments in general curricula (such as the arts) are at least on a par with the returns to directlyvocational subjects (such as engineering). Thus, while investment in education continued to bereinforced as sound from an economic perspective, apportionment issues with regards to both costsand sub-sectors were raised.

With regard to higher education in particular, cost-benefit analysis suggested that social ratesof return to investments in primary were much higher than for investments in tertiary, that privatebenefits from tertiary education were much higher than social benefits, and that social benefits tohigher education by type of curriculum were in fact lower for agronomy (an agricultural science), thanfor a variety of other disciplines, including social sciences.

The analysis indicating the relatively high social costs relative to benefits for higher educationcoincided with emerging observations regarding the performance of tertiary education in thedeveloping world. Some of these observations have concerned, for example: (i) the persistence ofcurricula (and hence "output" in terms of trained manpower) irrelevant to the needs of a developingeconomy; (ii) the poor quality of the output; and (iii) the inequitable financing patterns that haveevolved to support higher education institutionsY

Many educational practitioners have been contented neither with manpower nor rate ofreturn analysis as the basis for justifying investment in higher education. Whereas manpower analysislimits notions of substitutability and projects a static future which rarely obtains even in commandeconomies, rate-of-return analysis posits limitless substitutability and does not adequately capture allthe benefits of higher education for the society. Moreover, the rigid wage structures and lack ofgenuine labor markets in most developing countries renders findings based solely on wage ratesquestionable. It may be that a combination of the two approaches, in combination with (i) an analysisof the organizational environment in which the university operates and (ii) a review of the financingand governance structures of the university system, could offer a more comprehensive basis foranalyzing potential investments in agricultural higher education.

§e Se, for ample, Chapter 6, "Prepamation for Reaponsibilit Higper Educatlon," In Education Polices for Sub-Saha,m, AfricmAdiustment Reitalization, and Exhsnsio" (Report No. 6934, September 15, 1987).

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Appendix 3

USAID EEPERIENCE IN ASSISTING AGRICULTURAL HIGHER EDUCATION

A. BACKGROUND AND APPROACH1. Aiding development of agricultural universities and faculties in 40 developing countries since

1952.2. Usually aid was for campus construction, laboratory equipment and library material.3. Offers twinning arrangements with a US land grant university as the primary source of

technical assistance to aid in developing the curriculum and research programs (includingoverseas training).

4. The largest university development programs were in India, Brazil, Nigeria and Indonesia. Forexample, in India, six US universities were involved in developing nine agricultural universities.More than 300 US faculty have worked in this effort, and 1,018 Indian faculty have been sentto the US for advanced training. Sometimes this entailed the establishment of new universitieswhere the US advisors would teach as well as occupy management positions until the nationalsreturned.

B. IMPACI1. Education

(a) Most of the beneficiaries have become major sources of trained manpower in theagricultural sciences. The enrollment number of agriculturalists has risen especially at theundergrdduate leveL

(b) Some universities have become multi-campus with a wide variety of degree programs.Example: Bandung Institute of Agriculture (Indonesia) had 9,000 students and expected20,000 by the end of the century. Also, the Institute of Agronomic and VeterinarySciences in Morocco had 2,550. Some are much smaller such as Alemaya AgriculturalUniversity in Ethiopia which had 1,173.

(c) Few women have enrolled.(d) Major training fields are in crop and animal sciences, with social sciences not being a

strong program.(e) Some universities instituted a learning by doing" undergraduate curriculum. Example:

Institute of Agriculture ari Veterinary Medicine in Morocco have difficult field trainingexercises.

(f) Education technologies were outdated and inefficient with few instructional aids using thememorization and lecture method.

(g) Many universities have created their own programs of graduate level agricultural training.However, a good number are still depending on foreign training for their advanceddegree. (Especially in Africa).

2. Research and Extension(a) Some large universities support applied research and their research capacity increased

with the number of Ph.D. degrees. (India, Indonesia and Thailand). Smaller universitieshave smaller and limited research roles (Ethiopia).

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(b) Research is focused on cereals (wheat rice, sorghum, millet and maize). Secondary focusis livestock rcsearch.

(c) Horticulture and vegetable crops research are less outstanding. Kasetsart University inThailand supported a fuit export industry. Alemaya University in Ethiopia introduceda number of improvements in peppers, tomatoes and potatoes.

(d) Some universities have research and leadership roles in resource and environmentalmanagement. Example: Kasetsart has watershed management guidelines for Thailand andwas requested to plan for the national parks and wildlife. The Bogor AgriculturalInstitute (Indonesia) has aided the GOM in legislative and policy initiatives for naturalresource management.

(e) Most of the universities were not greatly involved in extension because the line agenciesguard this function for themselves. Exception: in India the state agricultural universitiestrain the extension agents.

3. International Training and Assistance(a) Some universities are providing assistance to other countries. Example: Institute of

Agronomic and Veterinary Sciences (Morocco) are training African agricultural scientists.The Institute's staff is also providing technical assistance to Mauritania, Senegal andRwanda. Also, the Postgraduate College at Chapingo in Mexico was training AfricanAgriculturalists. Thailand's Kasetsart University has become a regional training centerwith international research programs.

C. FINDINGS1. Faculty Development

(a) Most of the USAID aided university staff returned to their countries after the overseaseducation and thus, little brain drain.

(b) Overseas training opportunities have decreased in the last decade. The problem is that80 to 90 percent of the newly trained faculty are employed by the same university fromwhich they received their undergraduate and graduate training.

2. Project Duration(a) University development projects tend to be more successful the longer the duration. Ten

to 15 years are necessary to train the necessary amount of faculty and then another 10years of experience in effective research programs.

(b) US advisors can give researchers and teachers a support network in applying new skils.

3. Declining Fnancial Support(a) Research and education programs are weakening because of underfunding of agricultui-1

universities. Faculty salaries are not indexed for inflation and many take part timeconsultancies.

(b) Involves lack of close ties to ministries of agriculture, lack of institutional autonomy, andnarrow focus of many universities on production agriculture.

4. Linkages to Ministry of Agriculture(a) Links with the Ministry of Agriculture is essential for adequate funding and political

support for universities.

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(b) In many countries, the agricultural universities and faculties have not developed nationalsupporL This is complicated because many of the agricultural universities and facultiesare under ministries of education. Thus the ministries of agriculture create their ownresearch agencies in which they invest their resources. Example: the 3 agriculturaluniversities in Thailand get less than 3 percent of the total national budget devoted toagricultural research.

F. University Autonomy1. In centralized political systems the national agencies control most decisions concerning

the universities curricula, program priorities, enroliments and finances. Theoverregulation change the universities to passive cad reactive entities.

2. With institutional autonomy universities tend to become innovative in developingprograms. Example: Institute of Agronomic and Veterinary Sciences in Morocco, it isorganizing a consortium of universities for international development projects.

F. Production Agriculture1. Improvements in the biological practices and cultivation of crop and animal production

have been the focus of agricultural iesearch and outreach programs. Less focus onimproving the policy and institutional factors that constrain production, income andemployment generation in the rural sector.

2. Emphasis on production technology has not allowed the universities to have a voice inimportant areas in the public and private sectors.

D. Lessons Learned1. Emphasize strong links with the external constituencies and policy arenas when

strengthening a university.2. University research and education should address policy and institutional concerns plus

technological factors which contnbute in developing urban and rural ares .3. Use strategic planning when setting the university management agenda and linkages.4. Universities should pioneer innovative rural strategies especialy in natural resource us,

income growth and poverty alleviation.5. The universitv's role should be expanded by the government agencies as facilitator rather

than regulators of university innovation.6. Institutional sustainability issues should be emphasized.