1

When and how does Europe matter? Higher education policy

change in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia

Abstract

The study underlying this article investigates the factors under which European policy

initiatives with respect to higher education, such as the Bologna Process, lead to policy

change at the national level. In theoretical terms it uses institutionalist approaches to

Europeanization of public policy developed in the fields of comparative politics and

international relations. The empirical focus is on higher education policy changes in three

countries of the former Yugoslavia from 1990 onwards. More specifically, the focus is on

changes of policy goals, normative basis and instruments with regards to quality assurance. A

process-tracing approach based on document analysis and interviews with policy actors is

used, to safeguard against overestimating the influence of European initiatives on national

policy change. What matters for European influences on national policy changes are clarity of

European initiatives and consequences of non-compliance, as well as density of veto players

in the domestic policy context. While legitimacy of European initiatives, strength of domestic

institutional legacies and the participation of domestic actors in the European epistemic

communities may also be conducive to European influence on national policy change, the

study identifies points where better operationalization and further research in relation to these

factors is necessary.

Key words: Bologna Process, quality assurance, policy change, Europeanization, former

Yugoslavia

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Introductioni

No higher education system is an island: “… systemic changes and policy shifts in

higher education are linked in various ways to what is happening in the international arena,

as well as to developments in other national systems” (Gornitzka, 2006, 19), suggesting that

any analysis of policy change in higher education (HE) must take into account possible

influences from abroad. The Bologna Processii brought about a boom in studies focusing on

topics such as the types of and conditions for policy convergence (e.g. Heinze and Knill, 2008;

Voegtle et al., 2011), the relationship between European initiatives and higher education and

research (e.g. Kehm et al., 2009; Maassen and Musselin, 2009; Pabian, 2009; Primeri and

Reale, 2012), change of degree structures in the context of the Bologna Process (Witte, 2006),

and the use of Bologna for legitimising other domestic policy preferences (Gornitzka, 2006).

Despite this boom and the explicit theoretical foundations of some of the aforementioned

studies, HE research still by and large suffers from the so-called double-isolatedness

(Maassen, 2009): not doing justice to the impact the emergent European governance layer in

general has on higher education (isolation from studies on integration processes as such), and

isolation from mainstream social sciences in terms of not sufficiently employing their

theoretical insights.

The underlying study seeks to reduce this double-isolatedness by answering the

question – what are the factors under which European policy initiatives with respect to HE

lead to national policy change? – using insights from comparative politics and international

relations studies on Europeanization of public policy (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Sedelmeier,

2011). It builds on an extensive literature review focusing on European integration and

transformation of HE (Elken et al., 2011) and adaptation of theoretical perspectives on

Europeanization to the HE context (Vukasovic, 2013). The study also provides an empirical

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contribution by focusing on thus far relatively under-researched HE systems: Croatia, Serbia

and Slovenia, where, for reasons explained in more detail below, the impact of European

initiatives can be expected to be strong. Furthermore, the three systems exhibit a unique

combination of similarities and differences, allowing a more nuanced analysis of the impact

of European initiatives on domestic policy change. The study focuses on one particular aspect

of HE policy: quality assurance (QA). It is an area of intrinsic national concern, i.e. an area in

which national policy change may be driven by national (internal) concerns alone. It is also an

area in the core of the Bologna Process: it was one of the initial action lines in 1999, and in

2005 the European Standards and Guidelines were adopted (ENQA, 2005). Coupled with the

choice of countries, this further allows for exploring the relationship between the changing

characteristics of European initiatives and the possible impact of these changes on national

policy processes.

The next section presents the analytical framework of the study, clarifying the

dependent and independent variables. This is followed by the description of the study design,

data and methods. The analysis of the three cases over the period under study is then

presented, followed by a discussion and conclusion section which, apart from summing up the

key findings, also provides an evaluation of the analytical framework and suggests a number

of topics for further research.

Analytical framework

The analytical framework employed in this study is based on comparative politics and

international relations studies of Europeanization of public policy (Börzel and Risse, 2003;

Radaelli, 2003; Sedelmeier, 2011), providing a predominantly institutionalist perspective on

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the relationship between European policy initiatives in HE and the domestic policy dynamics.

The potential role of (domestic) actors is not entirely downplayed; theoretical perspectives

employed in this article rely both on the more traditional sociological instiutionalism and on

its more actor-oriented rational-choice variety. This section starts with a conceptualization

and operationalization of the dependent variable – policy change, after which

conceptualization and operationalization of the independent variables are presented.

The dependent variable: Policy change

The conceptualization and operationalization of the dependent variable – policy

change, builds on Gornitzka’s (1999) understanding of characteristics of policy content and

Hall’s (1993) classification of different levels of policy change. Policy change can be

understood as change in policy content, i.e. as change in (1) what problems the policy is

expected to address and what the objectives of the policy are, (2) what the normative basis of

the policy is, (3) what kind of policy instruments are developed and (4) what vertical and

horizontal policy linkages exist (Gornitzka, 1999). Inspired by Kuhn’s work on scientific

revolutions, Hall (1993) made a distinction between three order of change (from least to most

change): first order corresponding primarily to adaptation of existing policy instruments

(while all other aspects of policy remain the same), second order implying development of

new instruments (while overarching policy goals as well as ideological basis are intact), and

third order change which relates to fundamental change of ideology and goals. First and

second level changes correspond to what can be termed as “normal policy”, while third level

change implies a paradigmatic policy shift (Hall, 1993).

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Combining these two insights, the focus on HE policy change with regards to QA

implies focus on (1) changes in policy goals and the normative basis, and (2) changes in

specific policy instruments. Changes in policy goals and normative basis primarily reflect

fundamental changes in how quality of higher education is understood and assessed, e.g. from

an implicit understanding that HE is of good quality by default to explicitly referring to the

necessity of external QA, therefore indicating third order change. Changes in policy

instruments, e.g. change in the composition of structures responsible for QA or changes in

criteria for external QA, unless coupled with the former, indicate first or second order change.

The independent variables: the European and the domestic context

The choice of factors under which the European initiatives are expected to impact

domestic policy change has been informed by literature on Europeanization of public policy

(Börzel and Risse, 2003; Radaelli, 2003; Sedelmeier, 2011). First of all, this choice implies a

narrow understanding of the concept of Europeanization as domestic impact of European

level processes, one that has also been used for analysing side effects of the Bologna Process

(Musselin, 2009). iii

Secondly, it combines the more traditional sociological institutionalism

view which highlights social learning with a rational-choice version of institutionalism which

stresses the role of external incentives. The former relies on the logic of appropriateness and

highlights legitimacy of European initiatives, domestic institutional legacies and participation

of domestic actors in transnational epistemic communities as important factors of

Europeanization. The latter relies on the logic of consequence and focuses on clarity of

European initiatives, consequences of (non-)compliance to these initiatives, and the

positioning of domestic veto players. The two perspectives are seen as complementary in

terms of accounting for the relationship between the European initiatives and the domestic

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policy changes. The specific discussion of each of the factors, those primarily related to the

European context (clarity, consequences and legitimacy) as well those primarily related to the

domestic context (veto players, institutional legacies and epistemic communities) below is

based on an extended discussion of Europeanization perspectives in general (Börzel and Risse,

2003; Sedelmeier, 2011) and an adaptation of these perspectives to HE (Vukasovic, 2013).

Clarity. European initiatives are more likely to impact national policies if they consist of clear

policy preferences and even more so if a particular model is promoted as the desirable one. In

terms of QA, this brings forward the distinction between three different periods. The first one

marked the time before 1999 and the Bologna Process; while there was some European level

cooperation in the area of QA (e.g. EU funded Pilot Projects, see ENQA, 2010; Westerheijden

et al., 1994), there was no overarching HE policy initiative on the scale of the Bologna

Process. The second started in 1999 with the Bologna Process and identification of QA as one

of the main Bologna action lines. However, in the beginning, the focus on QA was rather

ambiguous and was limited to the “promotion of European cooperation in QA” (Bologna

Declaration, 1999) and stressing the need to “develop mutually shared criteria and

methodologies for quality assurance” (Berlin Communiqué, 2003). The third period roughly

began in 2005 with the adoption of the European Standards and Guidelines for QA (ENQA,

2005, hereinafter ESG), which, though not without their own ambiguities, do signify an

increase in clarity. The ESG defines 23 standards for three distinct areas of QA: internal

evaluation of HEIs (Part 1), external evaluation of HEIs (Part 2), and external evaluation of

QA agencies (Part 3). Thus, it can be expected that the influence of European initiatives on

national policy processes in the area of QA of HE will be more evident after 1999 and,

comparatively, most evident from 2005 onwards.

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Consequences of compliance. Whether a European initiative will have an impact on national

policy processes also depends on the consequences of not adapting national policies to

European initiatives. This is related to more than a simple distinction between European

integration processes using soft law and OMC (Bruno et al., 2006; Neave and Maassen, 2007)

and processes in areas where the European integration proceeds primarily through ‘hard law’,

e.g. in the form of directives. Compared to a strict understanding of the concept of

“compliance” which refers to regulation only, this article adopts Etzioni’s (1961)

understanding which also encompasses compliance to softer rules, such as norms, values and

beliefs. Even in cases of voluntary policy coordination, such as the Bologna Process,

countries may be keen on adapting their policies in order to avoid shaming and blaming, as

well as potential mid-term to long-term consequences of lack of compliance. Similar to the

clarity factor, the distinction should be made between pre-2005 and post-2005 period. While

pre-2005 lack of compliance to the vague “promotion of European cooperation in QA” would

have virtually no consequences for the particular HE system, post-2005 compliance to the

ESG is linked to the membership of national QA agencies in ENQA and their registration in

EQAR, which in turn are linked with the facilitation of inward and outward mobility and

obstacles to recognition of domestic degrees abroad. In addition to the ESG, the development

of the Stocktaking exerciseiv

in which QA was identified as one of the three main areas in

which countries are named and, potentially, shamed, also contributes to an expectation that

post-2005 one can expect a stronger impact of European initiatives on national policy

processes in HE.

Legitimacy. Apart from a European initiative being clear and being tied to a particular set of

consequences, it should also be seen as legitimate by the domestic policy actors in order to

lead to policy change. While one could argue that the legitimacy of the Bologna Process is

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provided by its intergovernmental character, given the bottom-heaviness of HE (Clark, 1983)

and reliance on normative compliance (Etzioni, 1961), effective HE steering in general

requires support from the academic community (Neave and Maassen, 2007). In the European

context, this implies that participation of transnational representative organizations (e.g. EUA,

ESU, EURASHE and EI) boosts the legitimacy of the European initiatives. Thus, the

legitimacy of ESG is based on (a) being adopted by the ministers, but also (b) being

developed by the so-called E4 groupv

in an extensive two-year consultation process.

Therefore, the European initiatives in QA did not only increase in clarity and consequences

after 2005, but also in legitimacy, adding to the expectation of stronger influence on national

policy processes after 2005. vi

Veto players and costs they incur from change. Whether European initiatives will have an

impact on national policy development depends on a number of characteristics of the

domestic policy context, first of which is the density of veto players. Veto players are policy

actors who are in the position to block particular policy decisions (Tsebelis, 2002). Density of

veto players is a reflection of governance, so in countries where the steering of HE has

features of the corporate-pluralist or institutional model (Gornitzka and Maassen, 2000) the

density of veto players is higher; in the former there are more actors whose support is

necessary to adopt policy change while in the latter the academic oligarchy (Clark, 1983)

dominates the governance structures. The veto player position can be based on formal rules,

e.g. in cases where the legislation states that the support of the national QA agency is

necessary for any changes in the country’s QA system. However, Tsebelis’ concept of veto

players can be extended to include policy actors who are in a veto player position because of

informal aspects of the policy-making process. For example, large public universities, by

virtue of their central position in the society, may act as veto players by mobilizing their

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academic staff and the general public against government reform plans. Density of veto

players may differ from one issue to the other. The steering can be organised in such a way as

to require support from particular policy actors only in some aspects of HE policy.

Furthermore, the potential for mobilizing the academia or the public can differ; e.g.

mobilization is most likely easier when it comes to tuition fees than for changes in the

retirement age of academic staff. Furthermore, veto players need to perceive negative

consequences of the proposed policy change in order to decide to act as veto players. Thus, (a)

where formal or informal support of powerful policy actors is required for policy change, and

(b) where these policy actors perceive to be facing negative consequences from policy change

reflecting European initiatives in HE, lesser influence of said European initiatives on national

policy processes can be expected.

Institutional legacies. Theoretical perspectives on Europeanization, adapted to HE imply that

policy changes related to QA in HE which imply setting up a QA system where no systemic

QA existed before are easier to adopt then policy changes which are designed to substantially

reform an existing QA system. This is related to the strength of institutional legacies of

existing policy in the specific area: a change in an existing policy instrument, partly also due

to the interconnectedness of policy instruments is expected to be more difficult than a

development of a new set of policy instruments related to new policy. The key issue here

appears to be the strength of such legacies, which not only implies the focus on whether there

are legacies or not, but also how strong they are or whether there is build-up of dissatisfaction

with the existing arrangement. The importance of strength of existing institutional legacies

thus leads to two related expectations: (1) policy change that introduces QA in response to

European initiatives in HE in a system where no systemic QA existed before is expected to be

easier than policy change that focuses on adapting an existing (non-Europeanized) QA system

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to European initiatives in HE, and (2) policy change that seeks to adapt an existing QA system

to European initiatives in HE may be more likely to be adopted if there has been

dissatisfaction with the previous (non-Europeanized) QA system.

Domestic actors in European epistemic communities. Change of policy needs to be supported

by relevant domestic actors whose preferences, however, change over time. Actors may

change their preferences after, for example, analysing the policy implications in more detail

and realizing that the negative consequences are smaller than previously believed. They may

also be socialized into accepting particular policy preferences (see Checkel, 2005 on "going

native") by participating in the so-called epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), through which

policy actors can be exposed to new policy preferences and persuaded in their effectiveness.

In the context of QA, such epistemic communities were already established through the EU

Pilot Projects in the 1990s as well as through cooperation between Western and Central and

Eastern European QA agencies. The Bologna Process added additional impetus through the

steady schedule of the so-called Bologna seminars and the mushrooming of EU funded

projects focusing on EHEA in general and QA in particular, e.g. ENQA’s TEEP or EUA’s

Quality Culture projects. Therefore, it can be expected that the European initiatives in HE will

have a stronger influence on national policy processes in cases where the relevant policy

actors were more active in European epistemic communities focusing on QA.

In sum, stronger impact of European initiatives in HE on national policy making is

expected as: (a) clarity of European initiatives increases, (b) possible consequences of (non-)

compliance become more evident and more profound, (c) legitimacy of European initiatives

increases, (d) density of veto players who may incur adoption costs is low, (e) institutional

legacies are non-existent or weak, and (f) domestic policy actors are more active in European

epistemic communities. The first three characteristics lead to an expectation of three distinct

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periods, in order of increasing impact of European initiatives on domestic policy change: until

1999 (i.e. before the Bologna Process), from 1999 to 2005 (i.e. prior to the adoption of the

ESG), and post 2005. Said impact may appear in terms of changes of domestic policy goals,

for example, domestic policies focusing on quality more explicitly as European initiatives also

increase their clarity and consequences of (non-)compliance. It can also appear in terms of

changes of particular instruments, for example, by introducing ESG standards and guidelines

as integral elements of the national QA system. Whether this amounts to first, second or third

level policy change, as well as whether there are any other features of the European and/or

domestic contexts that are important for accounting for particular change dynamics depends

also on the prior situation, justifying a process-tracing approach employed in the underlying

study.

Design, data and method

The three countries compared in this study were until early 1990s part of the Socialist

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). They are often considered post-Communist

countries and assumed to be similar in terms of broad characteristics of higher education

systems and how policy processes unfold. Further similarities relate to the overall political

and economic transition being strongly marked with the idea of a “return to Europe” (Héritier,

2005). This leads to an expectation of a rather prominent role of European HE initiatives in

national policy changes, and may imply that the comparison is between most-similar cases.

However, there are also differences in terms of how the transition processes actually unfolded

over the last 20 years and the impact this had on HE policies, not least due to external

isolation and internal instability within two of the countries (Croatia and Serbia) during the

1990s. Further differences include the evolution of the relationship with and position towards

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the EU, as well as participation in different transnational (including European) HE initiatives.

These differences allow for exploring the role of European initiatives in a more nuanced

manner, in terms of the how the impact of European initiatives depends on participation of the

countries in them and the specificities of the domestic context.

The empirical basis consists of various HE policy documents and interviews with

different policy actors from the three countries for the entire period under study, as well as

documents related to European policy initiatives (primarily official declarations and

communiques of the Bologna Process and ENQA publications, including the actual ESG).

The domestic policy documents used include white papers, legislation, other regulation,

founding documents of relevant QA structures (e.g. national agencies) as well as annual

reports of these structures, where available.vii

The selection of relevant policy documents was

made from the comprehensive collection of all policy documents related to HE available from

various data sources (official gazettes, archives of ministries, HEIs, policy think-tanks or

personal archives of some of the interviewees), by focusing on those dealing with quality and

QA of HE. On the basis of this, timelines for each of the three countries were developed,

including information on HE policy change specifically linked to QA, more general HE

changes, as well as general political changes. The three timelines were complemented, where

necessary due to poorer documentation in the early 1990s, by information obtained from

interviewees or secondary sources.

The interviewees were selected based on one key condition: that they were in

leadership positions of ministries responsible for HE, buffer structures and/or of HEIs

(primarily flagship universities) at times of policy changes during the period under study.viii

In

total, 24 interviews were conducted. The interviews were semi-structured; all focusing on

actors’ formal and informal roles, perceptions about the Bologna Process and policy changes

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in general, their participation in epistemic communities, etc., but also more specifically on the

policy processes the particular policy actor was involved in.

Content analysis of documents and interview transcripts was used in relation to both

the dependent and independent variables side of the analysis. It was used to identify instances

of change of policy goals and instruments and determine the level of policy change. For each

instance of policy change identified, the documents and interview transcripts were used to

trace back the process and identify the situation with regards to independent variables. Thus,

the national policy changes (as the dependent variable) are in the centre and the study maps

the factors of change by process-tracing, assuming that these factors can be related to both the

national and the European context. This approach is used to safeguard against overestimating

the influence of European policy initiatives with respect to HE on national policy

development, and reflects concerns about causality claims which have been raised in

comparative politics and international relations literature (Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2012;

Haverland, 2005).

Policy changes in QA of HE in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia

1990-1999

Prior to 1990 in all three countries under study HE was considered to be of sufficient

quality by virtue of being provided by the state, indicating that there was no legacy of prior

systemic QA policy. Furthermore, unlike in other post-Communist countries (cf. Dobbins and

Knill, 2009), the state control over HE in SFRY (i.e. pre-1990) was not as strong. This is of

particular relevance for the policy dynamics in Slovenia in this period, which, unlike Croatia

and Serbia, during the 1990s had a rather stable liberal-democratic government. Given its then

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recent independence, Slovenia was in the midst of overall political and economic transition,

“was in love with Europe” (high ministry official), and changes in general were seen as

positive. This means that even though the first legislative changes in Slovenia in 1993

introduced two buffer structures (Council of Higher Education, CHE and Quality Commission,

QC) heavily dominated by the academic oligarchy, which in theory would put them in the

position of acting as veto players, there was essentially no veto player activity in this period

concerning changes related to QA of HE. In Croatia and Serbia, which were both governed by

undemocratic regimes until 1999/2000, there were no domestic veto players by default.

Similarly, while Slovenia took part in various, then fledgling, European epistemic

communities by being heavily involved, for example, in TEMPUS projects and CoE’s

Legislative Reform Programme, Croatia and Serbia were internationally isolated for political

reasons. However, the situation in Serbia was somewhat different in the second half of the

1990s, given that an alternative HE policy community was formed by academic staff who

stood in stark opposition to the Milosevic regime. Towards the end of the 1990s they got in

contact with various European organizations (CRE, UNESCO, and CoE) dealing with higher

education and got some access to epistemic communities:

“…by chance we were invited to Strasbourg, to the session of the Committee for

higher education, ix

and were by them considered to represent Serbia, even though

we had no such mandate …” (member of the alternative policy arena, later high

ministry official)

When it comes to policy changes related to QA of HE in this period, there was very

little happening in Croatia and Serbia. In Croatia “that whole decade [the 1990s] went with the

system being in some form of hibernation” (member of HEI leadership). Although HE

legislation changed in 1993 and a National Council for Higher Education was introduced and

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put in charge of QA, its work was considered ineffective (Orosz, 2008) and the accreditation

criteria that it developed were very vague and had no reference to any developments from

abroad. The same period in Serbia was marked with several legislative changes (1991, 1992

and 1998), though none related to QA of HE but rather geared to prevent further involvement

of the academic community in the opposition movement. In Slovenia, the work of the CHE

and the Quality Commission were, similar to Croatia, ineffective and met “with certain

scepticism” (Zgaga, 2002, 330). Although a draft Master Plan developed in 1997 included

improvement of quality of HE as one of the main goals and referred to EU countries as

suitable benchmarks, the standards and criteria developed by the CHE for accreditation were

(as in Croatia) rather vague.

Thus, in summary, in all three countries, though for different reasons and to a different

extent, HE policy change with regards to QA was rather limited, at best introducing new but

ineffective structures and not linking QA criteria to then fledgling European developments or

experiences from abroad.

(Table 1 about here)

1999-2005

The period between the Bologna Declaration and the ESG is marked with more

similarities between the three countries than the previous one. All three countries joined the

Bologna Process, though at different times. Slovenia was in the midst of its EU negotiations

in 1999 and, according to a high ministry official from that time, “joining Bologna was more

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or less joining Europe” so it was natural to see Slovenia together with other EU candidates

amongst the signatories of the Bologna Declaration. Croatia and Serbia were at the time of the

meeting in Bologna still controlled by undemocratic regimes and isolated. After regime

changes in both countries new governments took a clear “return to Europe” course, which

included also joining the Bologna Process: in 2001 by Croatia and in 2003 by Serbia. Joining

Bologna was not only about returning to Europe but also about focusing on much needed

reforms of HE, e.g.:

“… we had a rather strong motive to restructure Croatian universities so we fully

embraced the Bologna Process. In addition… we did not want to be left on the

side. We realized that the Bologna Process is about how European universities

should function …” (high ministry official)

In Serbia, the members of the alternative policy community from the late 1990s emerged as

leaders of HEIs and high ministry officials, so from early on HE reform discussion in Serbia

were clearly framed in relation to the Bologna Process and the idea of a “European University

2010” (cf. Nikolić and Malbaša, 2002; Turajlić et al., 2001).

Some characteristics of the domestic policy context changed compared to the 1990-

1999 period. First of all, the academic community, primarily the flagship universities in all

three countries, more by virtue of public pressure and less so by the formal position in the

policy arena, found themselves in the position of possible veto players. However, what is

interesting is that in all three countries the issue in which they attempted to block government

reform initiatives was not QA of HE, but internal organization of HEIs. The latter is related to

SFRY heritage of very fragmented HEIs common to all three countries and vested interests of

faculty deans. In addition, all three countries had relatively weak or almost non-existent

institutional legacies with regards to policies on QA of HE: Croatia and Slovenia had

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established some buffer structures that had QA competences in the 1990s, but these were not

very effective, while Serbia did not introduce any QA structure at all in that time.

As mentioned, the Bologna Process also brought a stream of seminars and conferences,

and Croatia and Serbia started to take part in the new round of the TEMPUS programme.

Thus, domestic actors in all three countries participated in European epistemic communities,

though Slovenian involvement was to an extent higher than that of Serbia or Croatia: Slovenia

was in addition part of ENQA’s TEEP and EUA’s Quality Culture projects and was rather

prominent in the Bologna Process as such, e.g. former Minister and State Secretary Pavel

Zgaga was the Bologna General Rapporteur for the 2003 Ministerial Summit in Berlin.

All three countries introduced the so-called “Bologna” legislation in this period.

Croatia adopted its Bologna legislation in 2003 introducing accreditation of study

programmes and HEIs, and setting the deadline for the first round of accreditation to be

completed by June 2005. The legislation explicitly referred to EHEA and ERA, as well as

“international standards” in the area of QA. The Agency for Science and HE was established

under the already existing NCHE and was tasked with providing expert support for NCHE in

external evaluation of HEIs.

HE reform discussions in Serbia were strongly framed as part and parcel of Bologna.

Though formally there were legislative changes in 2002, these were primarily adopted to

redress the consequences of the 1998 repressive legislation pushed forward by Milosevic. A

draft intended to provide the necessary legal basis for a root-and-branch reform of HE was

developed in late 2003. The draft itself caused some controversy due to provisions related to

internal governance of HEIs, but the provisions related to QA were not seen as problematic by

the relevant actors (Branković, 2010). The legislation was eventually adopted by the

Parliament in August 2005, foreseeing accreditation of study programmes and HEIs, the

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establishment of the National Council for HE (NCHE) and the Commission for Accreditation

and Quality Control (CAQC).

The Slovenian Parliament adopted the Master Plan for HE in 2002 that closely

resembled the draft developed in 1997. Compared to two years in Croatia and Serbia, it took

Slovenia five years after joining the Bologna Process to adopt its “Bologna legislation”. This

was partly related to ambiguity of Bologna action lines since, from the perspective of high

ministry officials from that time, “Bologna action lines were rather ambiguous” and “we

wanted to see what Germany [sic!] would do”. However, this relative delay was also due to

the resistance of the leadership of the flagship university in Ljubljana which was opposed to

the Bologna Process. The opposition was primarily on ideological grounds, based on the

perception that Bologna is about “reducing the University to something that produces human

capital” (member of university leadership), while the provisions related to QA in HE as an

issue of state policy or specific policy instruments related to QA were not referred to as

particularly problematic. Eventually, the “Bologna legislation” was adopted in 2004 and it

introduced a national HE agency responsible for external evaluation of HEIs, cooperation

with QA agencies from other European countries, and for supporting HEIs with self-

evaluation. Criteria developed for these processes highlighted the fitness-for-purpose

principle (in line with the European developments), an expectation that HEIs should have

their own QA system and that students should participate in QA processes, the latter two

reflecting the preferences that would later became an integral part of the ESG. 2004 was also

the year in which, after almost 15 years of relatively stable governments of liberal-democratic

orientation, a conservative government came to power in Slovenia.

Thus, in all three countries in this period significant policy changes in the area of QA

of HE took place. Comparing to the previous period, these changes were more profound in

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Croatia and Serbia, which were quick to start with Bologna-inspired HE reforms immediately

after the fall of their undemocratic regimes. Slovenia on the other hand, continued on the

European course it started on in the 1990s, though more cautiously, despite being an active

participant in the Bologna Process from the beginning.

(Table 2 about here)

Post-2005

The time after 2005, marked with higher clarity and legitimacy of the European

initiatives in QA as well as more explicit consequences of non-compliance, can be expected to

be a period of clear linkages between domestic policy changes with the Bologna Process and

consolidation of Bologna-inspired policy changes that started prior to 2005. This indeed was

largely the case for Croatia and Serbia.

The first generation of the so-called “Bologna students” enrolled into newly accredited

study programmes in Croatia in late 2005. Until 2009 not much took place in terms of policy

changes in the area of QA of HE, though there was dissatisfaction amongst the academic

community and the students concerning the effects of Bologna-inspired reforms 2003-2005,

concerning primarily the fast paced accreditation which decreased the overall legitimacy of

Bologna-inspired reforms of HE in Croatia (Doolan, 2011). Thus, changes in the QA

approach were seen to be necessary, but opening up the discussion of the general HE legal

framework would also open up other aspects of HE for discussion (e.g. the internal

organization of universities) which both the government and actors in the position of veto

20

players (academic community) seemed keen on avoiding. Thus, a specific Law on QA in HE

was adopted in 2009, and it included provisions about internal QA of HEIs (cf. ESG Part 1)

and external QA of HEI (cf. ESG Part 2). The Agency that was created with legislative

changes from 2003 remained in charge of QA, and the Law reflected to a large extent the

procedures already in use, but now gave them a higher – legal – status. In addition, as of 2009

the Agency has been explicitly expected to follow the ESG in its own work (cf. ESG Part 3)

and was given the deadline until 2013 to become member of ENQA and be registered in

EQAR. x

Having adopted its Bologna legislation in late summer 2005, the following period in

Serbia was marked by the establishment of two new structures foreseen in the Bologna

legislation, both of which had QA tasks and were dominated by the academic oligarchy: the

NCHE (a buffer structure appointed by the Parliament) and NCHE’s expert and advisory body

– the Commission for Accreditation and Quality Control (CAQC). The NCHE adopted in

2006 standards for accreditation of programmes and HEIs, largely in line with the ESG, the

key departure being lack of students’ and international experts’ participation. The first round

of accreditation was completed by early 2012. Minimal changes of the legislation were

introduced in relation to QA in 2010, related to participation of students in expert teams

responsible for re-accreditation of programmes and HEIs. In most recent years (2012 and

2013), in response to ENQA and EQAR membership criteria, the CAQC also started

conducting external evaluation of HEIs in addition to accreditation. xi

This same period in Slovenia was, however, marked with much more profound policy

changes. As indicated earlier, a conservative government came to power in 2004 and started

immediately working towards changes in HE policy in general and the legislative framework

in particular (Zgaga and Miklavič, 2011). In 2006, despite significant resistance from

21

universities and students and only in the second attempt the new government pushed

amendments to the HE legislation through the Parliament with one vote majority. These

changes led to the closing of the HE agency, a significant expansion of CHE competences,

and, most importantly, introduced QA through competition between domestic HEIs as well as

through opening up the system to foreign providers. While Slovenia did not experience

mushrooming of private HEIs during the 1990s as some other CEE countries, e.g. Poland and

Romania, during the mandate of this government 24 private HEIs were accredited. However,

this profound policy change was not long-term since in 2008 there was another change in

government representing a move back to the liberal-democratic orientation, and legislative

changes redressing the ones from 2006 were adopted in 2009. The HE agency was restored

and the role of the CHE was diminished to an advisory one. The founding act of the HE

agency included explicit references to the ESG in terms of support of HEIs in developing

internal QA (cf. ESG Part 1), standards to be used in external evaluation of HEIs (cf. ESG

Part 2), and the internal organization of the agency, including its internal QA mechanisms and

regular external evaluations of the agency itself (cf. ESG Part 3). Possibly to prevent further

major shifts in HE policy in the future, after extensive consultations with a variety of

stakeholders who could have acted as veto players, the Parliament in 2011 adopted a new

Master Plan for HE which includes the plan for the agency to be registered in EQAR. xii

(Table 3 about here)

22

Discussion and conclusion

As expected, clarity of and consequences from non-compliance to European initiatives

can be observed to have a strong impact on national policy change. This is first of all

supported by policy changes more explicitly following the ESG after 2005 in all the three

countries, i.e. after the ESG defined a set of preferences with regards to QA and after said

preferences were linked to ENQA and EQAR memberships. One deviation to this trend is the

2006 shift in Slovenia, but it should be seen as related to issues other than clarity and

consequences of non-compliance (see below). However, the Slovenian case 1999-2005 is

illustrative with regards to clarity: given its longer and more active involvement in European

initiatives, one would expect a strong European influence on national policy processes, but the

Slovenian policy actors indicated that European initiatives were simply too ambiguous in the

1999-2005 period to have a clearer impact on national policy development.

The issue of legitimacy is complex. The European initiatives are not seen as suffering

from legitimacy problems in the countries under study, primarily because they are perceived

to be strongly linked to EU integration processes (even if they formally are not) and these

processes, at least in transition and accession stages do not suffer from lack of legitimacy (see

Pabian, 2009 on stages of Europeanization). Thus, though there were instances in which the

academic community was in the position to act as the veto player to Bologna-inspired reforms,

QA in general was not the controversial issue in proposals for HE reforms. This is somewhat

surprising, given that the costs for some of the actors can be assessed as rather high, e.g. in

terms of the complex adaptation of courses and degree structures required for accreditation in

only two years in Croatia. That does not necessarily mean that the veto players are not a

relevant factor, but that it is also important to investigate how veto players anticipate the costs

of policy changes: (1) whether the policy changes are formulated in such a way to allow for

23

assessment of costs, (2) whether the veto players have the capacity to do such an assessment

and/or (3) whether there are issues that imply even higher adoption costs and veto players

strategically decide which issue to focus on (cf. internal governance of HEIs).

With regard to the importance of strength of institutional legacies, the empirical

material also provides an ambiguous picture. The introduction of QA where no QA existed

before seems to have gone rather smoothly, though aspects of QA that contradicted some

institutional legacies outside of the narrow QA focus (e.g. lack of student participation in

governance) seem to have faced more resistance. The need for a more nuanced approach to

how strength of institutional legacies is assessed is illustrated by the case of Croatia, where

the speedy accreditation in the mid-2000s may have hampered fuller implementation of the

QA system developed in 2003 and facilitated the adoption of the Law on QA in 2009.

Another illustration is the Slovenian case and the major shift in HE policy that took place in

2006. It could be argued that the HE agency established in 2004 in Slovenia simply did not

take sufficient root in the system and that therefore it was easy to close it down in 2006.

However, the subsequent shift back in 2009 with the HE agency being reinstated rather

quickly may indicate that the agency legacy was actually strong, despite formal changes. The

2009 shift back also points to vulnerability of HE policy changes to more general political

disruptions, but can also indicate potential of European initiatives in HE to maintain their

influence on national policy processes despite these general political shifts. In sum, unlike

other independent variables used in the study, the institutional legacies variables appears to be

not only about the quantitative aspect (are there institutional legacies or not and how strong

they are), but also about the qualitative characteristics of institutional legacies – some legacies

may facilitate European influence and some may impede it.

24

The issue of the participation of domestic actors in European epistemic communities

as conducive to European impact on national policy processes is also complex. The Serbian

case of the alternative policy community tells the story in which domestic actors’ participation

in epistemic communities facilitates European influence on domestic policy change. It also

indicates the need to have a wider perspective on who are the relevant actors in autocratic

regimes. In contrast, the participation of Slovenian policy actors in epistemic communities

between 1999 and 2005 seems to have actually contributed to their fence-sitting, given that it

seems to have made them more aware of the extent of ambiguity of European initiatives at

that time.

In sum, the European initiatives in HE are more likely to impact domestic policy

change: (a) the clearer the initiatives in terms of the policy preferences proposed are; (b) the

higher the consequences of compliance (or lack thereof) to these initiatives are; and (c) the

lower the density of domestic veto players that may incur costs of adaptation is, under the

condition that the domestic veto players can assess the implications of said policy changes.

The strength of existing institutional legacies, participation of domestic actors in epistemic

communities, as well as legitimacy of European initiatives in HE may also play a role, though

it is necessary to provide a more nuanced operationalization of these factors and to explore

how the interaction between the factors moderates the impact European initiatives may have

on domestic policy changes.

With regards to Hall’s three orders of policy change (1993), the initial changes

(1990s in Slovenia and 1999-2005 in Croatia and Serbia) were primarily third level changes,

indicating paradigmatic shifts from a situation in which quality was not at all a policy issue

(quality is ensured by default) to a situation in which improving quality becomes a major

policy goal, also implying a change in the normative basis. Third order changes were

25

followed by second order changes (e.g. Croatia and the Law on QA in HE adopted in 2009) or

first order changes (e.g. minor legislative changes in Serbia in 2010). However, third order

change was not necessarily always immediately followed by changes in instruments. For

example, though Slovenia started focusing on QA as a system level issue already in the 1990s,

it only started developing specific and effective policy instruments in this area after the

Bologna Process started and even then it took its time. Furthermore, as the two major shifts in

policy in Slovenia post-2005 indicate, third order change is not necessarily irreversible,

indicating (a) that analysis of policy change needs to focus in empirical terms both on the

proclaimed policy goals and changes in the normative basis as well as on the policy

instruments, and (b) that a diachronic perspective with carefully cut empirical material is

essential.

Finally, in terms of generalizability of findings, the choice of cases invites a

discussion of the importance of temporal ordering (Zahariadis, 2007) between domestic and

European developments. In two of the countries under study (Croatia and Serbia), profound

political changes and the shift of focus towards EU integration coincided with the emergence

of one European initiative – the intergovernmental Bologna Process. Thus the link between

the European and the domestic developments may have happened through what possibly

comes close to a garbage-can decision-making process (Cohen et al., 1972). Quality emerged

as a domestic policy problem in the countries under study at the same time that European

cooperation in QA and later the ESG emerged as solutions in the European context, possibly

prompting domestic policy actors to accept the European solution, even though the (European)

problem may have been quite different from the domestic one. Though such temporal

ordering may seem as a plausible mechanism, it should still be empirically tested using

studies involving countries where this temporal ordering does not exist (e.g. Western

European countries).

26

i The author would like to thank Mari Elken, Jens Jungblut, Peter Maassen, Bjørn Stensaker, other members of

the Higher Education: Institutional Dynamics and Knowledge Cultures research group at the Department of

Education of the University of Oslo, two anonymous reviewers and the editor of the journal for very helpful

comments on previous versions of this article.

ii Apart from the Bologna Process, this is also true to a somewhat lesser extent for the EU’s Lisbon Strategy in

2000, as well as the related Modernisation Agenda from 2006 and the “Lisbon-successor” EU 2020 Strategy.

iii For a review of uses of the term “Europeanization” see Olsen (2002).

iv All reports from the Stocktaking exercise are available in the “Main Documents” section of the official

Bologna Process website: www.ehea.info, page accessed 19 August 2013.

v EUA, ESU, EURASHE and ENQA.

vi The ESG are currently under revision that includes consultations not only with European transnational

organizations, but also at the grass-root level, so it can be expected that the legitimacy of the revised ESG will be

boosted even more. This is beyond the scope of this article, but should be nevertheless the focus of future

empirical scrutiny.

vii The full list of analysed documents used is available upon request.

viii Due to requirements related to informed consent and anonymity, more specific description of interviewees’

positions is not possible.

ix The respondent refers to the recently abolished Steering Committee for Higher Education and Research of the

Council of Europe.

x Both tasks were completed by 2012.

xi CAQC became a candidate member of ENQA in April 2013.

xii At this moment (August 2013), the Slovenian HE agency is neither a member of ENQA nor registered in

EQAR.

27

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Table 1 – Summary of characteristics of the domestic policy context and the policy changes in relation to QA of HE in the three countries for 1990-1999 period

Croatia Serbia Slovenia

Independent

variables

related to the

domestic

context

Domestic veto players and

costs they incur

None (undemocratic regime) None (undemocratic regime) None (in effect)

Institutional legacies in terms

of QA policy

None None None

Participation of domestic

actors in European epistemic

communities

None

Officially none, alternative

community took part in late 1990s

Yes

Dependent

variable –

policy change

Policy goals No explicit change No explicit change

Draft 1997 Master plan introduced

quality improvement as one of the

goals, EU countries as benchmarks

Policy instruments

1993 legislation changes: introduced a

buffer structure (deemed inefficient)

and accreditation

Accreditation criteria very vague, no

reference to European initiatives

None related to QA

(1991, 1992, 1998 changes

increasingly decreasing autonomy of

HEIs for political reasons)

1993 new legislation – introducing

CHE and QC

Neither structure effective and met

with scepticism from the academic

community

33

Table 2 – Summary of characteristics of the domestic policy context and the policy changes in relation to QA of HE in the three countries for 1999-2005 period

Croatia Serbia Slovenia

Independent

variables

related to the

domestic

context

Domestic veto players and

costs they incur

Academic community in general,

primarily flagship university –

though not in relation to QA

Academic community in general,

primarily flagship university – though

not in relation to QA

Academic community in general,

primarily flagship university – though

not in relation to QA

Institutional legacies in terms

of QA policy No strong legacy None No strong legacy

Participation of domestic

actors in European epistemic

communities

Yes Yes Yes, more than Croatia and Serbia

Dependent

variable –

policy change

Policy goals

Implementation of the Bologna

Process, root-and-branch reform of

HE, QA an explicit policy issue

Implementation of the Bologna

Process, root-and-branch reform of HE,

QA becomes an explicit policy issue

Implementation of the Bologna

Process, QA formalized as an explicit

policy issue

Policy instruments

2003 “Bologna legislation” refers to

EHEA, ERA and “international QA

standards” and introduces

accreditation of programmes and

HEIs

(2002 changes in legislation not related

to Bologna, redressing changes from

1998)

2005 “Bologna legislation” introduces

accreditation of programmes and HEIs

2004 “Bologna legislation”

A national agency set up (external

evaluation of HEIs, supporting HEIs

self-evaluation and cooperation with

QAAs from abroad)

34

Table 3 – Summary of characteristics of the domestic policy context and the policy changes in relation to QA of HE in the three countries for the period after 2005

Croatia Serbia Slovenia

Independent

variables

related to the

domestic

context

Domestic veto players and

costs they incur

None in relation to QA None in relation to QA

Academic community and

stakeholder groups

Institutional legacies in terms

of QA policy

Existing agency and negative

experience with 1st round of

accreditation

No strong legacy (2005 legislative

changes still “fresh”)

No strong legacy, Agency set up, but

did not become functional

Participation of domestic

actors in European epistemic

communities

Yes Yes Yes

Dependent

variable –

policy change

Policy goals No change

No significant change

(2005 legislation result of a process

that belongs to the previous period)

Two significant changes:

2006 – QA only through competition

2009 – QA approach stressing

fitness-for-purpose

Policy instruments

2009 Law on quality in HE, in line

with the ESG

2006 NCHE and CAQC established,

accreditation standards developed,

mostly in line with ESG 2010 minor

changes of standards

2009 HE agency restored

2010 criteria for accreditation and

external evaluation of HEI and

programmes, in line with the ESG