What were the real reasons surrounding the Maimonides

controversy in the 13 th Century?

The burning of Mamonides’ Guide of the Perplexed and Sefer Ha

Madah by the Dominicans in Montpellier in 1232 sent shock waves

throughout the Jewish communities of Spain, Germany and

France. A strong assumption existed that it had been carried

out on upon denunciation from the anti-Maimonist camp who had

banned the works and put them into herem. The episode lived long

in collective Jewish memory as being the cause of the burning

of the Talmud in Paris in 1240.1 The Maimonides controversy, as

it became known, is widely understood as bringing to a head

several conflicts within Jewish thought such as reason and

philosophy in their relation to faith and tradition and what

components are permitted and prohibited in the education of an

individual following the Torah.2 Maimonides was a revered yet

controversial figure; even within his lifetime, Maimonides’

Mishneh Torah had attracted criticism for its claim to have

definitively codified the tradition of rabbinic law. However,

1 Hillel of Girona, writing in 1290, made the association between the two.2 Haim Hillel Ben Sasson, ‘The Maimonides Controversy’ in Encyclopedia Judaica (1972), vol.11, 747.

1

by the first few decades of the thirteenth Century it was his

philosophical works that were met with the greatest

resistance. This paper will largely concern itself with

exploring the dynamics of the late twelfth and early

thirteenth century leading to the ban in Montpellier. It is

important to emphasise that this controversy was largely

rabbinic in making and as such the prioritisation of rabbinic

source material is entirely justified. Whilst fighting broke

out between different factions in the 1230s, the attack on the

legitimacy of Maimonides’ works was instigated and supported

by rabbinic leaders. In fact, few of the bans or attempted

bans on Maimonides’ works ever received significant popular

support. Most of the studies which focus on the controversies

surrounding Maimonides were written between the late 19th

century and the 1970s and there has been little recent

scholarship in this particular area. In terms of

historiography, whereas accounts by Graetz and Baer discuss

how the controversy came to be defined in terms of its

theoretical issues and Joseph Sarachek’s study focuses on the

tension between classical rabbinic thought and philosophy,

Daniel Silver’s work is the most systematic in analysing the

2

context and issues affecting the controversy directly between

1180 and 1240. In this paper I will argue, however, that

Silver’s conclusions do not to correspond to his research in

determining the ‘real issues’ behind the controversy. Silver

contests that the controversy had very little to do with

Maimonides himself or his approach towards religion. It was a

controversy borne of fear. As Christian persecution increased

so did the threat of apostasy and it is this that led to the

extreme response of the herem. Yet in analysing the

correspondence between R. Meir Abulafia and the rabbis of

Lunel, the contextual sociological factors and the discussions

of the anti-Maimonists in the 1230s I will argue that whilst

fear of apostasy was an important issue in the initial

exchanges of the early thirteenth century, by the time of the

burnings it had been largely supplanted by fundamental

questions of Jewish thought. The anti-Maimonist camp rejected

Maimonides’ works not for their potential pitfalls but rather

for their non-Jewish nature. It was not a question of the

legitimacy of studying of philosophy per se but whether it

could be legitimately synthesised into Jewish thought. The

contextual factors of persecution in Christian Spain and

3

France forced a more detailed examination of the religious

boundaries of Jewish thought and for many, Maimonidean

rationalism with its universalistic elements was found

wanting. I would like to present this analysis by showing how

Silver’s thesis is convincing if contextual and

historiographical factors are given priority as evidence, but

not if close attention is paid to the correspondence of the

protagonists. Silver’s ‘de-personalised’ approach will be

explored thoroughly before I suggest my own counter thesis;

Having analysed Silver’s source material I will justify my own

position, with particular attention to the compilation of R.

Meir Abulafia’s correspondence and how the halakhist attitude

evolved into a fundamental esoteric objection to Maimonides’

approach.

The ‘real issue’ in the controversy, Silver argues, was the

widespread rabbinic fear of apostasy brought about by the

increased interest in proselytising from the Catholic Church.3

It is evident that Maimonides’ rationalist philosophy could be

misused to justify religious laxity. The first issue was one

of integration: Symbiosis had been a key feature of twelfth

3 Daniel Silver, Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy 1180-1240 (London, 1965), 3.

4

century Spain, which had not only tolerated but encouraged

philosophical enquiry; the Jews of Castille and Aragon had

been at home with such speculations. The Jews of northern

France and Germany, however, were not given the time to

integrate this new world into theirs. Their world was

dominated by Talmud study, and Greek systematics were unknown

except through occasional reflections based on Midrash and

classical sources. The rabbis of Provence feared that the

doubts caused by philosophical speculation could lead many

astray.4 Apologetically, Silver suggests that philosophy was a

volatile explosive and that Maimonides ‘could not escape

becoming the centre of this storm’.5

The letters between R. Meir Abulafia and the rabbis of Lunel

show the rabbinic fears that Maimonides’ works could lead to

laxity in religious observance. The less than pious believed

that they had found some support in the Mishneh Torah for

their denial of the traditional assumption of resurrection.

Whilst rabbinic tradition itself was open ended regarding the

reward of resurrection, a non-literal interpretation opened

4 ibid, 2.5 ibid, 5.

5

the door for deviation.6 What concerned the rabbis associated

with the anti-Maimonist camp was less the content of

Maimonides’ works and more their potential for misuse.

In terms of context, there is some evidence that indifference

towards religious life, apostasy and intermarriage had become

an increasing issue during this period. According to Graetz,

among Jews of Southern Spain this indifference towards halakha

went so far that intermarriage was occurring with Christians

and Muslims.7 The Guide was only translated into Hebrew two

weeks before Maimonides’ death,8 and upon its printing in 1211

it was widely disseminated and quoted. The translations gave

understanding of philosophical issues as well as the plain

meaning of the text and increased interest throughout Provence

in secular philosophies. Its audience was not the one that

Maimonides had envisaged; whilst Maimonides assumed an

audience with a grounding in Aristotelian philosophy, the

Guide was generally read by literate non-experts. It never

seemed to interest the intellectuals of Northern French

6 ibid, 196.7 H. Graetz, History of the Jews, vol.3 (London, 1892), 544.8 J. Sarachek , Faith and Reason, the Conflict over the Rationalism of Maimonides (Pennsylvania, 1935), 49.

6

communities whose world was comprised solely of Talmudic

study. It was seized upon avidly by number of Aragonese,

Catalan and Castilian sophisticates who lacked the training to

understand its depths but were eager to assume that Maimonides

defence of reason justified their rejection of laws that they

had discarded out of simple disinclination.9

Over thirty years after his initial correspondence had failed

to win the support of the Lunel rabbis, R. Abulafia’s fears

appears to have been confirmed, having before him an

aristocracy which cultivated philosophy not as a means to a

higher spiritual life, but as a convenient rationalisation for

a life of pleasure.10 The physician Judah ben Joseph Alfakhar

of Toledo, responded to the visit of Maimonist R. David Kimhe:

‘You regard the Guide as your teacher and guide; but among us

it serves as a pretext for the wayward and defiant.’11

Silver argues that rabbinic fear of apostasy was increased by

the fact that Jews had begun to be seen as theological

opponents rather than occasional targets of oppression during

9 ibid, 9.10ibid, 107.11 ibid, 107.

7

this period. Increasingly hostile measures were taken against

mixing between Christians and Jews in the Lateran council of

1215 and in papal correspondence, including the introduction

of the Jewish badge and a gradual segregation of the Jewish

inhabitants from the non-Jewish community.12 Crucially, a shift

had occurred in how Jews were perceived: Instead of being seen

as the remnants of an antiquated faith based on the Old

Testament, the dynamic and continuous nature of the rabbinic

tradition had been recognised. The focus turned to conversion,

with attacks on the Talmud and the oral law in particular.

Jewish apostates came forward denouncing the Talmud as

heretical and anti-Christian.13 It was not the new

scholasticism of the advanced philosophers that concerned the

Christians but the old Judaism of Talmud and tradition. Whilst

traditional Judaism was under attack, Maimonides and his works

became controversial among Jews because he was accused of

misleading other Jews into heterodoxy and placing the

integrity of the community in danger.14

12 ibid, 13.13 Ibid, 9.14 ibid, 15.

8

What emerges from this context is that Maimonides was

problematic as a symbol who legitimised deviant lifestyles

rather than for his particular views. He had written the Guide

to bolster the faith of pupils troubled by the incongruity of

their religious and secular training, but in Aragon, Castille

and Provence many simply wished to abandon their religious

faith. They read the Guide not as an apologetic for Judaism but

as an apologetic for their spiritual and religious

disinterest.15 Inadvertently, in the words of Yitzhak Baer,

Maimonides ‘started out to save Judaism from the undermining

effects of philosophic rationalism, and wound up by giving

reason primacy over tradition.'16 Silver removes Maimonides

entirely from the controversy and presents him as tenuously

linked to those who had been led astray by their own religious

apathy.

I contend that Silver is far too apologetic on Maimonides’

behalf; it is true that apostasy was considered an issue in

the minds of several rabbinic leaders during this period. It

is nevertheless unconvincing to claim that this was the sole

15 Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 196.16 Yitzhak Baer, History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol.1 (New York, 1961), 96.

9

or even the dominant cause of rabbinic animosity towards

Maimonides. Firstly, the use of polemics and counter polemics

surrounding the religiosity of the Maimonist group is

unreliable to use as convincing historical evidence once

tensions had erupted. R. David Kimhe furiously attacked

accusations of the lack of observance within the Maimonist

camp and the extreme response of the herem was not accepted

uniformly by either communities or rabbinic colleagues. If

applied, excommunication was the most potent tool at rabbinic

disposal and would almost certainly lead to destitution and

possible death. The ‘sword of apostasy’ may well have been

felt in some circles but it is hard to imagine that this was

conceived of as a good solution to the problem, particularly

with the lack of other support. Additionally, the link between

the increased Christian interest in attacking the Jewish

religion and the risk of apostasy is unclear. Whilst it is

plausible that Maimonidean rationalism might diminish the

loyalty of particular individuals, it is hard to know how much

impact the papal decrees actually had in this period:

according Silver’s own analysis, Christian missionary activity

seems to have increased in intensity after not before 1240,

10

and peaked in the 1250s and 1260s. Book burning was a relative

novelty of the thirteenth century, and whilst the Dominicans

burned some of Aristotle’s works in 1210 for heresy, the

concentration of anti-Jewish book burnings peaked from 1247

onwards by this time the internal controversies had died down,

probably as a result.17

Therefore, to argue that fear of apostasy was the dominant

issue of the controversy is to unnecessarily minimise a

conflict that had become far more fundamental. The controversy

came to be about the legitimacy of the synthesis between

religion and philosophy. This is not a simplistic appraisal of

the situation; fear of apostasy and social implications

certainly triggered a deeper investigation into what could be

considered legitimate within Jewish thought, catalysed by the

increased Christian persecution which seemed to trivialise

Maimonidean universalism. Baer’s statement that philosophic

rationalism ‘negated the very meaning and purpose of the Galut

by denying the value of the nation's suffering in exile and of

its survival in spite of its tribulations’ is particularly

17 Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 13.11

apt.18 What I will seek to demonstrate is that it was this

problem that proved to be the most significant for the anti-

Maimonideans in the thirteenth century. Fear gave way to

fundamental self-examination.

One of the first problems that arose amongst prominent

halakhists was Maimonides’ singular authority. Renouned

throughout the Jewish world, his philosophical works carried

far more authority and political weight than more far-reaching

and controversial studies such as that of R. Avraham ben Daud.

The rabbis of Montpellier and Lunel commissioned his works

sight unseen because of his multifaceted brilliance. In R.

Abulafia’s compilation of correspondence, Maimonides is

referred to as by R. Avraham b. Natan ha Yarhi in the

following way: ‘I saw the Ram trampling north south and west,

and no wild animals would stand before him, no one would stand

up to him.’19 Revered and also feared, Abulafia was heavily

reprimanded for his attempts to criticise Maimonides and R.

Aharon of Lunel spends six pages reprimanding him. 20

Maimonides’ insistence on true Aggadic understanding being 18 ibid, 100.19 Meir Abulafia, Kitab Alrasʾayil (1871), 103.20 ibid, 30.

12

based upon Aristotelian philosophy was particularly

problematic. Others accused him, furthermore, of ignoring

accepted custom and Talmudic methodology in presenting his

Mishneh Torah as definitve. The Provencal scholar Rabad of

Posquierres wrote critical glosses on the Mishneh Torah;

whilst many of them deal with halakhic issues alone, he

consistently disapproves of Maimonides’ prioritisation of

philosophy in halakhic issues e.g. Maimonides' barring of

excessive fasting due to the inability to understand or

research the sciences rather than cessation from Torah study.21

Rabad was suspicious of philosophy and its validity, but only

expressed outrage when Maimonides referred to an

anthropomorphic conception of God as heretical. Maimonides had

decided something conclusively based on something that did not

appear to be self-evident to great halakhic scholars. He is

particularly critical of Maimonides for not citing sources and

argues that halakhic decision-making is based on living legal

decision-makers rather than a code.22 Any decisions on Jewish

law or thought had to be based on chapter and verse in the

Talmud. Rabad and other rabbinic figures in the French centres

21 Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 87.22 ibid, 87-88.

13

of Torah study felt that halakhic decision-making relied on

proofs based on a clear understanding of Talmudic passages and

Maimonides’ great work seemed to threaten this procedure.

Importantly, this contextualises the correspondence between R.

Meir Abulafia and the other communal leaders of Lunel in 1203-

04 as it gives an insight into the mind of the halakhist when

approaching classical texts. It emerges, I will suggest, that

amongst several concerns was the fear that Maimonides’

authority subverted the halakhic process. Abulafia’s

correspondence begins as a critique of Maimonides’ responses

to the questions of the rabbis of Lunel, the most significant

for this study being the response pertaining to the world to

come and the resurrection.

It is true that the topic of apostasy prefaces the

correspondence; Abulafia feared that Maimonides’ views of both

the resurrection and the world to come could lead to apostasy

and calls for his philosophical writings to be banned.23 He

felt that Maimonides’ insistence on non-corporeal

understandings of resurrection and the world to come

undermined a fundamental part of the covenant between God and 23 Abulafia, Kitab, 6.

14

Israel. Maimonides is accused of undermining the hope and

faith of the people of Israel: the land of Israel had been

promised to the resurrected in the future and what sense did

this make if there were no bodies to return to? However,

Maimonides is equally attacked for misinterpreting and

misconstruing Talmudic texts in the manner that seemed to

concern Rabad. Abulafia is particular to cite evidence that

this non-corporeal representation did not correspond with many

Talmudic sources, and that Maimonides’ objections to a literal

understanding of the resurrection were absurd objections for

the infinite God. In going on to forthrightly discuss his

other objections to Maimonides’ legal positions, Abulafia

demonstrates his priorities as a halakhist, thinking along the

same lines as Rabad;24 Maimonides was a great scholar but no

different to any other halakhic authority; he could and should

be challenged on his positions in the classical manner using

classical Talmudic methodology. Maimonides’ very authority

meant that in order to uphold this position the points needed

to be made in the most strident terms.

24 ibid, 14.15

The question of Maimonides’ Aggadic interpretation became

paramount for Abulafia. In reference to Maimonides’ insistence

on using allegory in Aggadic interpretation, Abulafia remarks

that ‘there is no positive mitzvah to complicate the simple

meaning,’ and uses Talmudic logic to argue that the burden of

proof is on those who claim that Aggadah must be understood

metaphorically.25 He questions an attempt to prove the need for

allegory with a fascinating insight into conflicting attitudes

towards this world:

‘How can you judge the life of the world to come, whose life

has no death, whose light has no shade, and whose good has not

evil…to this life which ends in death, and whose light is

engulfed by shadow.’26 The world to come is a place of

miraculous existence in complete contradistinction to this

world. Whilst rationalism and Maimonides’ whole world view is

predicated on the glory of God manifest in this world,

Abulafia’s description assumes axiomatically that this world

is one of confusion and darkness. With increasing passion,

Abulafia exclaims that ‘Heaven forbid to deprive Midrash and

Aggadah of its literal meaning! Metaphorical interpretation is

25 ibid, 55.26 ibid, 56.

16

only valid when the sages permit it.’27 Abulafia spends three

pages providing textual sources for corporeal resurrection

from Tanakh. It becomes increasingly clear that the idea of

the metaphor, such a crucial device in Maimonidean thought, is

seen as an inferior form of interpretation, particularly when

regarding rabbinic writings. Abulafia found an ally in R.

Samson of Sens, who argued for the need to bend human will to

that of the sages, agreeing that Aggadah couldn’t be taken

lightly against its literal meaning, citing Hullin 90b that

there were only three cases where the Aggadah was to be taken

non-literally.28 Faithfulness to the literal nature of rabbinic

writings was not merely a precautionary exercise but was

indicative of faith to the Torah itself. By insisting on the

superiority of philosophical and allegorical interpretation,

Maimonides’ authority seemed to be undermining trust in the

sages and traditional piety. Whilst apostasy remained a

concern, it is clear that for many rabbinic thinkers in the

early thirteenth century Maimonides’ whole approach towards

understanding the spiritual world deviated from accepted

tradition and was intrinsically problematic.

27 ibid, 56-57.28 Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 128.

17

Whilst Abulafia’s correspondence warns against the danger of

Maimonidean philosophy overpowering halakhic norms and

Talmudic Judaism, the second controversy repeatedly attacks

any attempt of a synthesis between religion and philosophy. I

am careful to use the word synthesis as this differs from

Silver’s argument of a fear of the effects of philosophy. It

was not the fear of Maimonidean philosophy that worried the

anti-Maimonists but rather its synthesis into Jewish thought

as a valid, authentic and desirable means of interpretation.

When the controversy reached its height in the 1230s it

becomes evident that for the anti-Maimonists, Maimonides’

philosophical interpretation of Jewish thought was completely

illegitimate. The increasingly aggressive Christian targeting

of Judaism as a religion seems to have increased the antipathy

towards Maimonidean universalism. R. Solomon of Montpellier,

the main instigator of the ban in 1232, found Maimonides’

works to be heretical and un-Jewish. Nahmanides initially

supported this and requested that the religious leaders of

18

Castile and Aragon join hands in supporting the cause. The

content of the ban is particularly revealing; it was

pronounced in 1232 against anyone who read Maimonides’

compositions, and in particular the Guide and Sefer ha-Madah. It

was also enacted against those who occupied themselves with

any studies except Bible and Talmud and anyone who explained

the bible according to its simple meaning other than Rashi’s

understanding. It was generally supported by the Tosafists,

and Graetz describes it as a moment where ‘simple faith and

philosophical apprehension of religion came to a head’.29

Whilst anti-Maimonist protagonists such as Nahmanides and

Joseph b. Todros spoke of people who denied providence to God

and insisted that the Bible was entirely allegorical,30 it is

mistaken to attribute this to simply misunderstanding the

Guide. Maimonides had constructed a system which many felt was

alien to the spirit of Judaism. Sarachek summarises this point

as follows: 'Although Maimonides retained the old nomenclature

of Judaism, he seems to have understood the terms very

differently'.31 To list a few examples, Maimonides broke

significantly with traditional thought on a number of crucial 29 Graetz, History of the Jews, 548.30 Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 146-147.31 Sarachek, Faith, 14.

19

issues: his Aristotelian concept of God; incorporation of

philosophy into basic tenets of faith; concept of providence;

comparative research method and denial of the existence of

demons and spirits, as well as the aforementioned objection to

the literal meaning of Midrash and Aggadot.

These conceptions were particularly problematic to the new

group of Kabbalistic scholars who were particularly prominent

in the controversy. They saw the Kabbalah as the authentic

esoteric tradition and felt that a synthesis with secular

philosophy was an invalid way of understanding Jewish

tradition. Central to this group’s identity was an ideology of

halakha, the idea that the religious commandments were not

allegories of a more or less profound idea or pedagogic

measure, but rather commands to perform secret rites or

mysteries of cosmic significance. Literalism was given greater

prominence in the sense that the letters and words of the

biblical text were seen to have great esoteric significance;

whilst some studied philosophy and appreciated it to an

extent, most saw it as dangerous. They saw philosophy as

reducing Torah to natural law.32

32 Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 183.20

For example, in his poems describing the controversy, the poet

Meshullam denounces the Guide as heretical. He scoffs the

Maimonidean idea of rational reasons behind laws. To

Meshullam, Maimonides’ explanation of the commandments not

only led to an attenuation of practice, but denied the

esoteric value of revealed tradition.33 Maimonides denied God

by denying His attributes. Meshullam claims that miracles are

the greatest revelation of God, and that there is nothing in

the natural world which is causally controlled or operated

according to natural law. This theme had already been touched

upon by Abulafia but the kabbalists extended its scope.

Nahmanides furthermore insisted that prophecy depends on

divine will exclusively and had little to do with the virtue

of the prophet. The world as we know it is illusionary and

miraculous and anyone who believes otherwise is not part of

the people of Israel.34 Maimonides’ mechanical conception of

Angelic power was similarly condemned. Silver seems to think

that this is an example of excessive condemnation in response

to increasing heresy as Maimonides had not violated any 33 Ibid, 182.34 Nahmanides, Commentary on the Torah, (Chavel ed. Jerusalem, 1959), Exodus, 13:16.

21

dogmatic prohibition. 35 This assumption of dogma being the

axiom of Jewish faith is ironically Maimonidean; for it

appears that Nahmanides and Meshullam see Maimonides’ whole

system as heretical not in the technical sense of not

conforming to theological precepts but rather as simply not

belonging to the realm of Jewish thought.

Similarly, in Toledo, Judah ibn Alfakhar’s response to R.

David Kimhe’s attempt at securing reconciliation between the

opposing factions bitterly attacks Maimonides’ attempt to

explain away miracles and wondrous tales, combining Torah and

Greek wisdom:

He imagined that one would live with the other like two lovingtwin deer. In reality this has resulted in sorrow and dissension, for they cannot live together on the earth and be like two sisters, for the Hebrew women are not like the Egyptian ones. 36

Like Nahmanides and Meshullam, ibn Alfakhar attacks

Maimonides’ system as one which was not only dangerous but

which was built on false foundations.

R. Abraham Maimonides published a response to those who

attacked his father. It is clear that he felt that it was his

father’s system and reputation at stake rather than its 35 Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 196.36 Letter to Kimhi, Iggerot Kenaot in Kovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam (1859),2a in EJ, 747.

22

inherent dangers. The elementary components of reason versus

revelation are the core issues of this response. R. Abraham

defends not only his father’s reputation but also his father’s

method, claiming that ‘Reason was implanted in each and every

one of the seed of Israel before his knowledge of Torah.’37 It

seems that by 1240 when the Talmud was burned in Paris, the

key issues surrounding Maimonides were fundamental questions

pertaining to his whole theological system.

My study has assessed the issues surrounding the various

controversies that erupted around Maimonides and his works in

the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, arguing that

they became increasingly fundamental and personal. Silver’s

research, I have argued, does not support his conclusions. The

key issue in the Maimonides controversy was that Maimonides’

philosophy appeared non-Jewish to many of his opponents. Both

the Kabbalists and the more orthodox halakhists of Germany and

France could not tolerate a theology that seemed so alien to

the Jewish spirit. Yet Maimonides’ piety was never questioned

nor was his halakhic greatness. Solomon of Montpellier praises

Maimonides greatly as a jurist and for the Mishneh Torah: ‘At

37 Milhamot ha-Shem, ed R. Margalioth (1953) in EJ, 752.23

every lecture we refer to his decisions, we discuss his views

and endeavour to understand them.’38 One of legacies of the

Maimonides controversy was that Maimonides’ reputation was

recreated as a pure halakhist. Maimonides was therefore

protected personally whilst his religious ideology was

marginalised. It is simply not accurate to argue that the

‘real’ issue of the controversy can be reduced to a fear of

apostasy. Caution is always required when ascribing historical

circumstance a direct causational role and I would suggest

that the effect of the increase in systematic Christian

targeting of Jewish faith was as much to create a mistrust of

the Universalist tendencies of rationalism as it was to

increase fear of apostasy. The seeds of this fundamental

objection to Maimonides’ religious worldview had already been

sown over thirty years earlier in the correspondence between

Meir and the rabbis of Lunel, although the overt fears were of

dissention and apostasy. By the time of the burning of the

Guide in Montpellier, Maimonides and his works were viewed as

dangerous both for what they contained and for the lifestyles

they appeared to legitimise.

38 Sarachek, Faith, 13.24

Bibliography

Abulafia, Meir, Kitab Alrasʾayil, (1871).

Baer, Yitzhak, History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol.1 (New York, 1961).

Ben Sasson, Haim Hillel, ‘The Maimonides Controversy’ in Encyclopedia Judaica (1972), vol.11, 745-754.

Encyclopaedia Judaica, 16 Vols. (Keter Publishing House, Jerusalem 1972).

Graetz, H., History of the Jews, vol.3 (London, 1892).

Nahmanides, Commentary on the Torah, (Chavel ed. Jerusalem, 1959).

Sarachek, J. , Faith and Reason, the Conflict over the Rationalism of Maimonides (Pennsylvania, 1935).

Silver, Daniel Jeremy. Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy 1180-1240 (London, 1965).

25

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27

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d) Is the argument convincing?

a)

b)

c)

d)

Or: Short summary of the above

RESEARCH AND SOURCES

Primary sources:

a) Are primary sources a)

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cited?

b) Are they used appropriately?

b)

Secondary literature:

a) Is secondary literature referred to?

b) Is it up to date, scholarly, and

relevant?

c) Are scholarly debates/opinions

discussed in the essay?

a)

b)

c)

Or: Short summary of theabove

PRESENTATION

English: Clarity of expression; vocabulary, spelling, and grammar.

Presentation and layout: Does it conform to the style-guide?

Bibliography: Is it correctly presented and accurate?

Or: Short summary of the above

GENERAL COMMENTS:

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First Marker:

Signature: ………………………… Date:…………………………….. Mark:………………………

Second marker /Moderator:

Signature: ………………………. Date:………………………………… Mark:………………………….

AGREED PROVISIONAL MARK : ……………………………………………………………………

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