Article Title: What matters most in selecting top Chinese leaders? A Qualitative

Comparative Analysis

Author: Jinghan Zeng

Note: Jinghan ZENG is a doctoral student in the Department of Politics and International

Studies (PaIS) at the University of Warwick. His research focuses on legitimacy, institutional

change, ideology, and elite politics of contemporary China. This article is based on a chapter

of his PhD thesis The Communist Party’s Right to Rule: Political Legitimacy in China. For

more information, please see https://sites.google.com/site/zengjinghan/home

Acknowledgement: I am very grateful to Dr. Clive Gray for helping me with QCA. I also

would like to thank Professor Shaun Breslin, Professor Sujian Guo, and two anonymous

referees for their valuable comments. My special thanks go to Dr. Renske Doorenspleet for

suggesting that I apply QCA. Of course, all mistakes are my own.

Email address: Jinghan.Zeng@warwick.ac.uk

Mailing address:

Department of Politics and International Studies, Social Sciences Building,

University of Warwick,

Coventry, CV4 7AL

UK

Abstract:

This article analyses the selection criterion of China’s most powerful leading body - the

Politburo Standing Committee - by using Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the latest

data of the 18th

Party Congress in 2012. It finds that age, combined with institutional rules, is

one of the dominant factors in deciding the appointment of leaders in 2012, suggesting the

significance of institutional rules in today’s elite politics in China. It also finds that candidates’

patron-client ties with senior leaders did play a role but they are not always positive in terms

of the career advancement of candidates. Moreover, and perhaps surprisingly, this study finds

that powerful family backgrounds do not have positive impacts on promotion at the highest

level.

Key Words: qualitative comparative analysis, elite politics, political leader, political mobility,

patronage, faction, performance, power succession, institutionalization, meritocracy,

leadership selection.

1. INTRODUCTION

In 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) orderly performed its once-in-a-decade

leadership transition. As the second smooth transition of the authoritarian regime, it received

widespread attention around the world. Enormous academic interest has been generated by

the intense competition of the 18th

Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) seats, especially after

the affair of Bo Xilai who had publicly campaigned for a PSC seat. Before the opening of the

18th

Party Congress, competition between the remaining eight candidates - Yu Zhengsheng,

Zhang Dejiang, Wang Qishan, Zhang Gaoli, Wang Yang, Liu Yandong, Li Yuanchao, and

Liu Yunshan - was widely reported and predicted by various mass media outlets including the

BBC (2012), Reuters (Lim and Blanchard, 2012), the Financial Times (Anderlini, 2012), the

New York Times (Wong, 2012a), and The Economist (Economist, 2012).1 Some China

analysts also joined in this game of line-up prediction (e.g. Li, 2012b).

Not surprisingly, the opaque nature of China’s elite politics has stimulated enormous

interests in the selection criteria of the new leadership. These criteria criterion involve a set of

three related on-going intellectual debates over the Chinese politics of power succession. The

first debate is about how to understand the outcome of the 18th

Party Congress: whether it is

simply a result of informal politics. The second debate is about whether the Chinese political

system is based on meritocratic bureaucracy or factional politics. The third is about the

practical significance of increasingly institutional norms: whether these norms have been

changed power succession or they are simply a political tool for factional struggle.

The purpose of this article is to assess what factors really mattered in selecting members

of the leading body in China. In the fields of political science and economics, a sizeable

theoretical and empirical literature has extensively studied the selection criteria of Chinese

cadres.2 To date, however, there is no systematic attempt to analyse the selection criteria of

the most important and powerful level, the PSC. This article addresses the gap by using the

method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and the latest data of 2012. The findings

of this study make an interesting and notable addition to the on-going debates. This study also

provides a guide to interpreting the obscure leadership dynamics and updates the

understandings of China’s elite politics.

Several key findings of this study can be highlighted. First, with regards to age, this article

establishes that – whether the candidates are above sixty-two years old in 2012 – plays a key

role in the transition of 2012. While many have been questioning the institutionalization of

the political system (Fewsmith, 2013; Report, 2012; Zheng and Lye, 2003), this finding

indicates that institutional rules of power succession have been shaping elite politics in China,

and that the outcome of the 18th

PSC should not be simply considered a failure of Hu Jintao’s

coalition.

Second, this article establishes that political patronage of both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao

did matter; however, being aligned with both senior leaders is self-defeating as it hinders and

does not help. It suggests that patron-client ties are not valuable assets for promotion at all

times. Third, “princeling status”3 either did not matter or had negative effects on the chances

of being promoted into the highest level of party ranks, challenging the widely shared view

that princelings’ family ties make them more likely to win higher party ranks (Dotson, 2012a;

Dotson, 2012b; Li, 2001b; Shih, et al., 2012; Wong, 2012b; Zheng and Chen, 2009). Also,

this finding again indicates that political connections are not always positive to the career

advancement of Chinese leaders.

Finally, while many argue that educational qualifications boosted the chance of promotion

(Lee, 1991; Shih, et al., 2012; Sun and Hu, 2012), this study finds that they did not play a role

at the highest level. Last, as the only female candidate failed to be promoted, the line-up of

the 18th

PSC suggests that politics is still a game of men at the top.

1 The other predictions of the 18

th PSC line-up include American Voice (Chen, 2012), Sing Tao Daily(Daily,

2012), South China Morning Post (Shi, 2012), Boxun News (2012b; 2012a), Duowei News (2012), Fanhua

News(2012), The Epoch Times(Jin, 2012), Chosun Daily (Cui, 2012), Mirror Books (He, 2012)

2 For empirical studies, please see Choi 2012; Shih, et al., 2012; Qiao 2013; Chen, Li and Zhou 2005; Li and

Zhou 2005; Maskin, Qian and Xu 2000; Landry 2003; Bo 2002; Bo 1996. For qualitative analysis, see Li

2012b; Li 2012c; Pei 2012a; Pei 2012b; Bell 2012; Zhang 2012

3 In this study, princeling refers to state/party/military leaders who come from families of senior party leaders

(vice minister or vice governor level or above) or military generals (deputy military region level or above).

2. THE ON-GOING INTELLECTUAL DEBATES

2.1 The outcome of the 18th

Party Congress: factional conflicts versus seniority

The first debate is about how to understand the outcome of the 18th

Party Congress. On

the one hand, many interpret the line-up of new leadership from a perspective of factional

conflicts. A widely accepted theory is that Jiang Zemin successfully defeated Hu Jintao to put

Jiang’s protégés – Yu Zhengsheng, Wang Qishan, Zhang Dejiang, and Zhang Gaoli – into the

PSC (Dotson, 2012a; Fewsmith, 2013; Li, 2012a; Whiteman, 2012; Wong, 2012a; Wong,

2012b). According to some, Jiang Zemin’s camp – princelings in particular – became the

biggest winners of the 18th

Party Congress at the expense of Hu Jintao’s coalition (Dotson,

2012a; Li, 2012a; Whiteman, 2012; Wong, 2012a).

On the other hand, however, some argue that the factional view overestimates the

influence of Jiang Zemin, who was eighty-six years old (Shirk, 2012b). They argue that

seniority, rather than factional politics, is the key in deciding the appointment of the 18th

PSC

(Miller, 2013; Shirk, 2012b). The logic of this view is that Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang –

who are Hu Jintao’s protégés and failed to be promoted in 2012 – are still young enough to

compete for the 19th

PSC, while others are not under the institutional rules of retirement age

(Miller, 2013; Rajan, 2012; Shirk, 2012b). Therefore, in the words of Miller (2013), “it is just

arithmetic.” In this sense, Hu Jintao’s coalition was not simply defeated in the 18th

Party

Congress and the outcome of the 18th

PSC is a kind of factional bargain, because Hu’s

coalition has reserved two seats in the 19th

PSC for his protégés Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang.

2.2 Selection criteria: meritocratic bureaucracy versus factional politics

On the second issue, there are two main clusters of opinions, which can be labelled as

the meritocratic bureaucracy school and the factional politics school.

2.2.1 Meritocratic bureaucracy

The meritocratic bureaucracy school emphasizes the role of merit – candidates’

performance and quality in particular – in the selection criteria of Chinese leaders. It is

important to clarify the definition of “meritocracy” here because there is a slight but

important dispute over its meaning. Meritocracy can be translated in Chinese as “任人唯贤”

“贤能” “选贤任能”, etc.4 Some refer to meritocracy as an identical standard that is “judged

superior according to an objective standard of ability (like an examination of philosophical

knowledge and literary skill)” (Elliott, 2012). Others consider meritocracy as selecting

intelligent and capable officials; however, it lacks a unified standard to measure this

intelligence and capability. In this article, meritocracy refers to employing people based on a

set of measurable criteria, including educational qualifications, leadership experience and

economic performance.

Needless to say, the primary foundation of this school is China’s economic prosperity.

Many consider the cadres’ evaluation system as a key causal factor of economic prosperity in

China. It is argued that officials’ economic performance is the key to deciding their

promotions, which has provided strong political incentives for Chinese cadres to promote

economic growth (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Chen, et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005;

4 This article will not go into details of regarding the accuracy of and differences between each translation

because of the topic.

Whiting, 2001). Many empirical studies also find that the economic performance of provinces

substantially impacts upon the promotion or demotion of provincial leaders (Bo, 1996; Bo,

2002b; Chen, et al., 2005; Choi, 2012; Li and Zhou, 2005; Maskin, et al., 2000). Some

studies also find that the performance of revenue collections plays a more important role than

growth performance in cadres’ promotion (Bo, 2002b; Shih, et al., 2012). In addition to

economic performance, other aspects of performance also matter. Qiao’s study (2013) finds

that demotions of local leaders are closely associated with power-abusing, corruption and

mishandlings of accidents in post-Deng era (1997-2010).

Notably, the selection bias of cadres varies significantly at different levels and time

periods. Landry’s study (2003) on the level of mayors between 1990 and 2000 and the study

of Shih, Adolph and Liu (2012) on the level of the CCP Central Committee between 1982 and

2002 find that there is no evidence to prove that the strong economic performance of political

elites would lead to their promotion or demotion.

In addition to performance, some also argues that educational qualification matters in

selecting Chinese leaders (Lee, 1991; Shih, et al., 2012; Sun and Hu, 2012). This view is

supported by empirical evidence (Shih, et al., 2012). Indeed, educational qualifications have

become increasingly important since the CCP launched the “four modernizations (四化)”

project of Chinese cadres. My recent study on the institutionalization of power succession

finds that, in 1982 when this project had just launched, only 4% of Politburo members had

received a college education, but in 2012 only 4% of them did not attend colleges(Zeng,

2013). In 2012, over 68% of the 18th

Politburo members held masters or PhD degrees

including Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang(Zeng, 2013).

Chinese culture and history have also been linked with meritocratic bureaucracy. Some

argue that the Chinese political culture’s emphasis on the ideal of political meritocracy and an

imperial examination system (科举制度 ) was institutionalized to practice it in ancient

times(Bell, 2012; Zhang, 2012). The imperial examination system has been an examination

mechanism of ancient China in selecting civil servants since the Sui (隋) Dynasty in 605.

This system mainly examines students’ philosophical knowledge and literary skills, such as

writing eight-legged essays (八股文).5 Zhang (2012) considers the imperial examination

system an effective way of facilitating social mobility. On the contrary, Elman (1991: 17)

argues that “over 90%” of the Chinese population are not eligible to take the test because of

the unequal distribution of social and educational resources. Elliott (2012) argues that “family

connections and material resources” rather than merit are the keys to political success for “a

majority” of Chinese imperial political elites.6

2.2.2 Factional Politics

5 Eight-legged essay is a special writing style for the imperial examination system.

6 An important dimension of the examination system which is not pointed out in the debate is whether those

who succeed in this examination because of their better literary skills are capable of managing the nation.

Excellent writing skills do not necessarily mean management expertise. The old method of writing eight-legged

essays, in particular, is very pedantic. Similarly, a PhD degree indicates expertise in specific areas rather than

general administration or management skills. Despite the many problems of the imperial examination system, it

is better considered as a critical way to co-opt educated elites and build an image - if not a channel - of social

mobility, rather than a search for governing talents.

The factional politics school argues that patron-client ties are more important than merit

in the selection mechanism of Chinese leaders (Li, 2012d; Li, 2012e; Pei, 2012b; Pei, 2012a;

Shih, et al., 2012). Some even consider patron-client ties as the most influential factor (Li,

2012d; Li, 2012e; Minxin, 2012; Pei, 2012b; Wong, 2012b). Some empirical evidence also

demonstrates the importance of political allegiance(Choi, 2012; Shih, et al., 2012).

Notably, princelings’ powerful family ties have been considered crucial for them to win

higher party ranks. Princelings tend to have more political resources in terms of networks and

connections because of their families (Dotson, 2012a; Dotson, 2012b; Li, 2001a; Wong,

2012b). Some argue that senior leaders might benefit from princelings’ families by promoting

their children (Shih, et al., 2012). Princelings also know more about various informal and

formal rules of the party (Li, 2001a; Zheng and Chen, 2009). In addition, princelings are

considered more loyal and reliable to the regime (Dotson, 2012a; Dotson, 2012b; Economist,

2011; Li, 2001a; Zheng and Chen, 2009; Zheng and Lye, 2003), not only because this regime

was founded by their parents, but also to ensure that they and their families continue to enjoy

the privileges of “red nobility.”

The impact of family ties varies at different levels and times. The study of Shih, Adolph

and Liu (2012) finds that princeling status has substantial impacts on political elites’ party

rank at the level of the CCP Central Committee based on the data from 1982 to 2002;

however, Choi (2012) finds that princelings status did not matter at the level of provincial

leaders based on the data from 1989 to 2009.

The main assumption of the factional politics school is that Chinese leaders have to

select loyal followers in order to survive the intense factional struggles. Indeed, many

factional studies suggest that selecting loyal followers rather than the most capable ones is the

key to maintaining their leadership (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006; Pye, 1992). Shih,

Adolph and Liu (2012) argue that less clever followers tend to be more loyal; therefore,

promoting these kinds of subordinates can help leaders to prevent a coup and stay in power.

Li Cheng (2012d) argues that political groups might attempt to support their members to get

into the PSC in order to “protect their interests and exert their influence”.

This study emphasizes patron-client ties and family ties instead of factional background

for two reasons. First, personal relationships among a relatively small group of leaders are

clearly important, but it is not the same as trying to identify firm, coherent and stable

factional groupings. It is very important to make the distinction between the importance of

patronage and the formation of factions.7 Political faction implies ties between members

including horizontal ones, but patronage is more based on hierarchical relationships with

loose or no contacts horizontally at lower levels. Factionalism also implies that people are

aware that they are in a group together.

Many elite studies fail to notice this significant distinction and they mostly tend to use

the language of factions to refer to loose sets of relationships. Nathan’s factional models

(1973), for example, was not describing about political factions at all. He was actually

describing the network of patron-client relationships that created vertical links rather than

horizontal ones. In the study of Shih, Adolph and Liu (2012), they also use the language of

factions when they actually refer to what might be captured under patronage.

Second, we should be wary of placing our trust in certain inside stories of the CCP.

Politics at the very top of the Chinese system is mysterious and the state never responds to or

7 I owe this idea to Professor Shaun Breslin.

denies the existence of factional politics. The opaque nature of China’s elite politics has

cultivated various rumours, hearsay and myth. Ascertaining who belongs to which factions is

subjective, and China does not have party factional politics like western democratic parties

which show clearly who belongs to which faction. Some elite studies actually rest their

arguments on the grounds of rumours, hearsay and sometimes guesswork, instead of building

on credible evidences (Breslin, 2008; Li and White, 2003). The community of Chinese

political studies has been tolerating questionable sources of factional studies for a long time.

2.3 The divergence over institutionalization

Since the 1980s, the CCP has taken impressive efforts to institutionalize its political

system, in particular power succession. Various institutional rules, such as age and term limits,

have been increasingly enforced to ensure the rapid circulation of political elites(Zeng, 2013).

In the intellectual discourse of institutionalization, the core of divergence lies over the

impacts of institutionalization. While many recognized that power succession in China has

been increasingly institutionalized (Huang, 2008; Miller, 2008; Miller, 2013; Teiwes, 2001),

others focus on the limits of institutionalization (Fewsmith, 1999; Fewsmith, 2013; Zheng

and Lye, 2003).

The two debates previously outlined are both central to the third. From the perspectives

of factional politics, institutional rules are nothing but a tool of power struggle. Specifically,

the retirement age limit has been considered by many as a tool to force Jiang Zemin’s

political rivalry out of the game (Fewsmith, 2003; Fewsmith, 2008; Fewsmith, 2013; Ou,

2012; Shirk, 2012a; Zheng and Lye, 2003). The proponents of institutional rules, however,

argue that the increasingly institutionalized power transition has been changing China’s elite

politics (Huang, 2008; Li, 2012f; Nathan, 2003; Teiwes, 2001). These kinds of view suggest

that institutional rules have become a key factor in reshaping power succession. The above

competing views leave opposing interpretations over the deciding-pattern of the 18th

Party

Congress. The factional approach argues that informal politics dominates the decision-making

of the transition in 2012 (Fewsmith, 2013). The institutional approach argues that “the

seniority principle” is the dominating factor (Miller, 2013; Shirk, 2012b). Miller (2013), for

example, argues that the 18th

Party Congress marked a remarkable progress in the

institutionalization of China’s elite politics.

By linking institutional rules – step-by-step promotion in particular - with political

meritocracy, some argue that selected Chinese top leaders are well-trained and experienced

before they assume power (Bell, 2012; Zhang, 2012). Step-by-step promotion means that

leaders are usually promoted level-by-level. For instance, a candidate should usually be a

regular or alternate member of the Central Committee or a minister level official in order to

be eligible for Politburo membership. This promotion mode helps the Chinese leaders to

broaden their visions, increase their leadership experiences and hone their skills.

Theoretically, this institutional rule also provides a way of filtering out incapable

leaders as there are many chances to test their capability. Provincial administration is an

important ground upon which to examine leaders’ capability and skills. With China’s rapid

economic growth, many Chinese provinces are now much bigger than many countries in

terms of not only population but also total economic output (Li, 2010; Zhang, 2012). Thus,

Zhang (2012), an advocate of the meritocratic bureaucracy school, argues that “it takes

extraordinary talent and skills to govern a typical Chinese province, which is on average the

size of four to five European states. Indeed, with the Chinese system of meritocracy in place,

it is inconceivable that people as weak and incompetent as George W. Bush or Yoshihiko

Noda of Japan could ever get to the top leadership position.”

Nowadays, the provincial experience has become increasingly crucial for national

leadership8. 59.1% of the 15

th Politburo, 66.7% of the 16

th Politburo, and 76% of the 17

th

Politburo members have worked as provincial chief before (Li, 2010). Most top Chinese

leaders have served as head of (at fewest two) local provinces. Arguably, provincial

leadership is “the most pivotal stepping stone to top national leadership offices in post-Deng

China” (Li, 2010).

3. KEY HYPOTHESES

For the purposes of this study, this section summarizes several key hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Candidates whose family members are high-level party leaders have a distinct

advantage in competing for promotion.

Hypothesis 2: Political patronage matters in selecting top leaders.

Hypothesis 2a: Patron-client ties with Hu Jintao play a positive role in influencing promotion.

Hypothesis 2b: Patron-client ties with Jiang Zemin have positive impacts on promotion.

Hypothesis 3: Senior leaders who are under the age limit are more likely to be promoted.

Seniority (论资排辈 ) as an important element of Chinese political culture might be a

significant factor in the selection mechanism. Senior leaders tend to accumulate more

political capitals and experiences of political struggle, which makes them more competitive

(Shih, et al., 2012). Of course, their age should not exceed the retirement age limit.

Hypothesis 4: Higher education qualifications facilitate the likelihood of promotion.

Hypothesis 5: Experiences in being provincial leaders (governors) have a positive impact on

promotion.

Hypothesis 6: Gender does matter in selecting Chinese leaders. Some argue that the current

selection mechanism in China tends to discriminate against women (Bell, 2012; Shih, et al.,

2012). As a higher representation of women helps to eliminate gender discrimination and

enhance the legitimacy of leadership, the CCP Organization Department has ruled that there

ought to be a certain proportion of female cadres in leading posts and the state should give

priority to female cadres in the same conditions. Yet, these kinds of rules have not been

applied at the top level. As the first systematic attempt to study political competition at the

highest level, it would be interesting to examine the significance of gender.

4. DATA

To analyse the selection criteria of the PSC, it is important to find a pool of eligible

candidates and winners. No data before 2002 can be used because various institutional rules,

such as age limits and step-by-step promotion, were not well-developed or adhered to before

8 For studies on provincial leadership, please see (Bo, 2002a; Li, 2002; Li, 2010)

2002. Thus, we have no clear idea about the list of candidates. Neither the 16th

nor the 17th

PSCs form appropriate data. This is because the retirement age was changed at the 16th

Party

Congress in 2002. In addition, all eligible candidates for the 16th

PSC were promoted and thus

it was a kind of “uncontested election” that lacked competition. The selection of the 17th

PSC

includes the consideration of establishing heirs apparent in order to prepare for taking over

the top power. Thus, the 18th

PSC is the only remaining and latest valuable research object.

In 2012, eleven of the 17th Politburo members were eligible for the 18th PSC

membership according to the age limit of sixty-eight and the practice of step-by-step

promotion. Those candidates were Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Li Yuanchao, Liu

Yandong, Wang Qishan, Zhang Dejiang, Liu Yunshan, Wangyang, Bo Xilai and Zhang Gaoli.

Because of the institutionalized system of power succession, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang who

were the 17th

PSC members would certainly maintain their PSC seats. Bo Xilai was removed

in early 2012, so there are actually five seats available for the real competition among these

eight candidates. As discussed, the line-up predictions of various mass media and China

experts were based on the competition between these eight candidates.

Table 1 lists the backgrounds of all eight candidates.9 Information of the personal

qualifications and working experience is summarized by the author from the Xinhua News

Agency.10

The eligibility of the 19th

PSC is based on the retirement age limit of sixty-eight. If

the age of a candidate is under sixty-eight at the 19th

Party Congress in 2017, then he or she is

eligible for the competition of the 19th

PSC. Only Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang are eligible

for the next PSC membership. Among all candidates, Liu Yunshan and Liu Yandong are the

only two who have not worked as provincial heads.

Five candidates are princelings: Yu Zhengsheng’s father is Yu Qiwei (more often

called Huang Jing), who was the first mayor of Tianjin and the former Minister of Machinery

Industry; Wang Qishan’s father-in-law is the former Vice Premier Yao Yilin; Zhang

Dejiang’s father is the Major General of PLA Zhang Zhiyi; Li Yuanchao’s father Li

Gancheng was the former deputy Mayor of Shanghai (vice-minister level); and Liu

Yundong’s father Liu Ruilong was the former deputy Minister of Agriculture.

Data on political patronage are drawn from the existing literature. Among the eight

candidates, many argue that Jiang Zemin’s protégés include Wang Qishan(Li, 2012b; Rajan,

2012), Yu Zhengsheng(Li, 2012c; Rajan, 2012), Zhang Gaoli (Li, 2010; Li, 2012c; Rajan,

2012; Zheng and Chen, 2009), and Zhang Dejiang (Fewsmith, 2004:81; Li, 2012b; Rajan,

2012; Zheng and Chen, 2009:13). Wang Yang, Liu Yunshan, and Li Yuanchao are considered

by many to be Hu Jintao’s protégés (Li, 2009; Li, 2012c; Rajan, 2012). According to

Li(2012c:8), Liu Yandong is “widely” considered as the protégé of both Hu Jintao and Jiang

Zemin because of her family ties with Jiang and her work experience with Hu.

9 Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are not included as they would certainly maintain their PSC seats: they did not need

to compete for the PSC seats. As their heir apparent status is dominating, other variables have almost no effect.

10 Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-07/14/content_1600008.htm on 20 December, 2012.

Table 1: Background of the 18th PSC candidates

Outcome

Candidates

Personal Qualification Political Patronage Working

Experience

Age Eligible for

the 19th

PSC?

Education Gender Princeling

Jiang Zemin's

Protégé

Hu Jintao's

Protégé

Provincial leaders

(Governors)

Winners

Zhang Dejiang 66 No Bachelor Male Yes Yes No Yes

Yu Zhengsheng 67 No Bachelor Male Yes Yes No Yes

Wang Qishan 64 No Bachelor Male Yes Yes No Yes

Zhang Gaoli 66 No Bachelor Male No Yes No Yes

Liu Yunshan 65 No Bachelor Male No No Yes No

Losers

Li Yuanchao 62 Yes PhD in law Male Yes No Yes Yes

Liu Yandong 67 No PhD in law Female Yes Yes Yes No

Wang Yang 57 Yes Master Male No No Yes Yes

5. RESEARCH METHOD

As the data of this study only include eight cases, conventional quantitative methods

are difficult to apply in such a small N research design. QCA, however, offers an alternative

approach to investigating the research question of this study. QCA is a case-oriented analytic

technique that can systemically deal with small numbers of cases (i.e. 5-50) by applying

“Boolean algebra to implement principles of comparison used by scholars engaged in the

qualitative study of macro social phenomena”.11

It is proposed by Ragin (1987) and has

gradually developed into a widely applied method in various research fields.12

In the field of

political science, there are not many studies using QCA.13

As the same outcome can be produced by multiple causal mechanisms, one feature of

QCA is that it considers the outcome a result of the combination of several conditions. Using

the survival of mankind as an example, air, water and food are necessary conditions and the

lack of any of these is sufficient for a person to die. The regression model can only tell that

the higher the frequency of such conditions’ absence, the more likely it is that a person will

die; however, QCA treats these conditions equally and pays more attentions to the absence or

presence of such conditions instead of their frequency.

Moreover, QCA can detect conditioning effects of independent variables and specify

different paths to the outcome. The limitation of QCA is that in many cases it is better to use

binary, nominal-scale variables (assigned as 0 and 1) in order to preserve the accuracy. With

the development of the methodology, there are several software programs available for QCA,

including fs/QCA, Tosmana, Stata’s fuzzy, etc.14

In order to avoid software errors, this study

employs both fs/QCA and Tosmana to run QCA.

5.1 Outcome

The outcome is whether the candidate wins a seat in the 18th

PSC. Winners in Table 1

are assigned as 1 and losers are assigned as 0.

5.2 Five Conditions

Considering the small number of cases, the appropriate number of variables should be

four to six. This study selects five key variables as conditions for outcome.

a. 19th

PSC / eligibility of the 19th

PSC (age): candidates who are under sixty-three in 2012

are assigned 1 and those who are not are assigned 0.

b. Princeling: candidates who have a princeling background are assigned 1 and those who do

not are assigned 0

c. Jiangzemin/ Jiang Zemin’s Protégé: those who are Jiang Zemin’s protégés are assigned 1

and those who are not are assigned 0

d. Hujintao/ Hu Jintao’s Protégé: those who are Hu Jintao’s protégés are assigned 1 and those

who are not are assigned 0.

e. Governors : those who have worked as a governor in local provinces are assigned 1 and

those who have not are assigned 0

5.3 Other variables

11 For more information about QCA, see http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/

12 For more literature that applies QCA, see http://www.compasss.org/index.htm;

13 My thanks to the anonymous reviewer for this information. For political science studies that have been

conducted with QCA, please see Chan, S. (2003). Explaining war termination: A Boolean analysis of Causes.

Journal of Peace Research 40(1), pp. 49-66. Osa, M. and Corduneanu-Huci, C. (2003). Running uphill: political

opportunity in non-democracies. Comparative Sociology 2(4), pp. 605-629.

14 For fs/QCA, see http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/links.shtml; for Tosmana, see

http://www.tosmana.net/

To maintain the accuracy of this study, it is important to select the most important factors.

As indicated in Table 1, the following variables do not have much variation across the

outcome, thus they are not selected as conditions for QCA.

5.3.1 Gender

As indicated in Table 1, there is only one female among eight candidates and she failed to

be promoted. Although we cannot test this variable, the line-up of the 18th

PSC did suggest

that politics is still a men’s game at the high level of party rank.

5.3.2 Education

All candidates with postgraduate degrees failed to be promoted, but it is not reasonable to

conclude that higher educational qualifications are negative assets for candidates to seek for

promotion. It is notable here that both heirs apparent, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, have PhD

degrees. Therefore, this study considers this result a coincidence, which means educational

qualifications do not play a role in this selection.

5.4 Interpretation of results

This study runs a Crip-Set Analysis using the software fs/QCA and Tosmana. They

provide exactly the same results, as follows (see Appendix):

Solution 1: “~19th

PSC * Jiangzemin *~ Hujintao *Governors”

Solution 2: “~19th

PSC * ~princeling*~Jiangzemin *Hujintao*~Governors”

The solution of QCA uncovers different paths to achieving the outcome. For this study, it

provides two solutions to achieving the outcome (membership of the 18th

PSC). The major

solution includes four conditions: that the candidates should not be eligible for 19th

PSC

membership (Condition 1) AND being a protégé of Jiang Zemin (Condition 3) AND not

being a protégé of Hu Jintao (Condition 4) AND having worked as governors in local

provinces (Condition 5). The second solution is that the candidates are not eligible for the

19th

PSC membership (Condition 1) AND not being a princeling (Condition 2) AND not

being a protégé of Jiang Zemin (Condition 3) AND being a protégé of Hu Jintao (Condition 4)

AND have not worked as governors in local provinces (Condition 5).

Among all variables, not being eligible for the 19th

PSC membership (Condition 1) is the

only condition shared by both solutions, suggesting its significance in the selection. This

finding is not surprising as the only two candidates who are eligible for the 19th

PSC - Li

Yuanchao and Wang Yang - failed to be promoted into the 18th

PSC. Political patronage

matters as well, but they are not always helpful. This condition only helps to win PSC seats

when the candidate is close either to Jiang Zemin or to Hu Jintao. When the candidate is close

to both or neither Jiang and Hu, he or she is not likely to be promoted into the 18th

PSC. In

the case of Liu Yandong, she is not selected into the 18th

PSC, although she is close to both

Jiang and Hu.

The variable of princeling is particularly notable. It disappears in the first solution,

suggesting that it does not play a role in this solution. This variable appears in the second

solution, however, and the output shows that the condition not to have princeling background

is necessary for the candidate to achieve the outcome (18th

PSC membership). In other words,

princeling status is a burden on the second solution. This finding indicates that princeling

background either does not matter or has a negative impact upon promotion. Either way, it

can be argued that princeling background is not a valuable asset in selecting Chinese leaders

at the highest level. As indicated in Table 1, two out of three losers, Li Yuanchao and Liu

Yandong, were princelings.

In terms of the governor variable, the outputs show that provincial experience matters to

Jiang Zemin’s protégé but not to Hu Jintao’s. This is perhaps because most of Hu Jintao’s

protégés rose from the Communist Youth League, who are experts in propaganda, while

Jiang Zemin’s protégés usually lack the relevant experience (Li, 2012d). As the CCP has

been keen on propaganda and ideology, the capability of coordinating ideological campaigns

and guiding public opinions are highly valuable and irreplaceable. Thus, it perhaps offsets

their inadequate provincial experience.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

By using QCA, this study analyzes the selection criteria of Chinese leaders at the

highest party rank. The key finding is that seniority plays a significant role in the leadership

transition of 2012. The personnel arrangement of seniority perhaps attempts to maximize

power-sharing among all eligible candidates, as seven out of eight candidates would be PSC

members eventually under this arrangement. Thus, it is the most efficient solution in terms of

distributing positions to as many candidates as possible without breaking any of the existing

institutional rules. To a certain extent, it is also an effort to prevent individuals’ excessive

power by widening power-sharing.

Most importantly, this arrangement, based on seniority, helps to maintain political

stability by reducing the risks of cruel political struggles over the most powerful positions

(Shirk, 2012b). As demonstrated by the history, the dangers of authoritarian regimes usually

come from the inside. The majority of authoritarian leaders are overthrown by the ruling

elites rather than the masses (Svolik, 2012:5). The CCP learned a lesson with enormous cost

from the protests of 1989 about the risks of a split leadership; Bo Xilai’s affairs in early 2012

perhaps evoked this memory. The regime knows its weakness during the transfer of power

very well - therefore, they choose to use the seniority principle to reduce the discontent of

losers by minimizing their numbers. In this way, political stability during the transition is

maintained at the expense of selecting the most capable leaders and practicing intra-party

democracy (Shirk, 2012b).

The role of age-related promotion in 2012 indicates the significance of institutional

rules, which resulted from the incremental institutionalization of the political system, and has

been changing leadership dynamics. Arguably, the 18th

Party Congress actually “advanced

rather than retarded the progress of institutionalization” (Miller, 2013). Telling who belongs

to which faction is subjective, and China does not have party factional politics like western

democratic parties which show clearly who belongs to which faction. Therefore, using

"factions" as criteria for evaluation and determining who will be selected to top leaders in a

power transition is always uncertain, unpredictable, and even wrong. Age is a factor of

selection in the institutional rule, which rules out people for selection, regardless of who you

are or to which faction you belong. In this sense, the outcome of the 18th

PSC should be

better understood as a product of institutional rules rather than simply a failure of Hu Jintao

and his coalition.

Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that princeling status is helpful to winning the

highest party rank. Interestingly, it either did not matter or had negative effects. This finding

challenges a widely accepted sense that princelings have distinct advantages when competing

for promotion. It is valid to a certain point that princelings might benefit greatly from their

family connections and understand more about various informal rules of the CCP than non-

princelings; however, public resistance to nepotism and favouritism, institutional restraints

and other powerful networks might restrict their political career (Li, 2001b). Therefore,

princeling status might be a burden to promotion, in particular at the highest level of authority.

A leadership filled with princelings would undoubtedly harm the legitimacy of not only the

leadership, but the entire regime. Thus, in 2012, a relatively positive public image of new

leadership is built perhaps at the expense of the failure of two princelings, Li Yuanchao and

Liu Yandong.

In addition, while the factional politics school argues that leaders are able to stay in

power because of their active engagement in factions (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006;

Pye, 1992; Shih, et al., 2012), the findings of this study suggests that it is not always the case.

The self-defeating effects of senior leaders’ patronage as well as the negative impacts of

princeling status indicate that patron-client ties are not valuable assets in seeking promotion

at all times.15

Many argue that Xi Jinping is selected as the first leader because of his

factional neutrality (Breslin, 2008; Zheng and Chen, 2009), which indicates that factional

neutrality sometimes can be crucial.

APPENDIX

Figure 1: Output of fs/QCA

Figure 2: Output 1 of Tosmana

15 Of course, this is not to say that patron-client ties are not important

Note: If a condition is present (1) for the outcome, it is indicated by UPPER-CASE notations.

If it is absent (0) for the outcome, it is indicated by lower-case.

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