We all live in Germany but … Ingroup projection, group-based emotions and prejudice against...

European Journal of Social Psychology

Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 985–997 (2010)

Published online 13 October 2009 in Wiley Online Library

(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.673

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Research article

We all live in Germany but . . . Ingroup projection,group-based emotions and prejudice against immigrants

Correspondence to: Thomas Kessler, Universi-mail: [email protected]

opyright # 2009 John Wiley & Son

THOMAS KESSLER1*, AMELIE MUMMENDEY2,FRIEDRICH FUNKE2, RUPERT BROWN3, JENS BINDER4,HANNA ZAGEFKA5, JACQUES-PHILIPPE LEYENS6,STEPHANIE DEMOULIN6 AND ANNEMIE MAQUIL6

1University of Exeter, UK2Friedrich-Schiller-University, Germany3University of Sussex, UK4University of Manchester, UK5Royal Holloway, University of London, UK6University of Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium

Abstract

Immigration, cultural diversity and integration are among the most central challenges for modern societies. Integration is

often impeded by negative emotions and prejudices held by the majority members towards immigrants in a common

society. Based on the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), we examined the impact of perceived

relative ingroup prototypicality on intergroup emotions and prejudice. Additionally, we examined whether this impact is

causal and explored the issue of causality in more detail contrasting a linear causal model with bi-directional or

reciprocal causality. Hypotheses were tested in a study with a two-wave panel of majority members (N¼1085) in Germany.

We examined the proposed relations between relative ingroup prototypicality, intergroup emotions and prejudice and

determined the causal direction of these relationships. Results support the predictive power of relative ingroup

prototypicality on intergroup emotions and prejudice. Moreover, most causal relations between our measures are

reciprocally causal. We discuss the implications of these findings for the general conception of prejudice and intergroup

emotions. Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Modern societies of developed countries have been receiving an increasing number of immigrants in the past decades. For

instance, three–four million immigrants became official residents in OECD countries in 2004 (OECD, 2006). Germany

started from roughly half a million immigrants in the early 1960s to more than seven million immigrants in 2003 (BAMF,

2006). The integration of culturally diverse groups such as native majority members and immigrants is one of the most

central challenges for modern societies. Integration, however, is often impeded by a lack of acceptance and respect on both

sides, in spite of the fact that both majority members and immigrants also share a common ingroup identity because they

both are citizens of one common society. Although negative emotions and prejudice against each other are usually held by

both majority members and immigrants, in the present paper we only focus on the majority or dominant group. Our aim is

to examine determinants of majority members’ negative attitude towards and rejection of minorities.

ty of Exeter, Washington Singer Laboratories, Perry Road, Exeter EX4 4QG, UK.

s, Ltd.

Received 23 December 2008

Accepted 10 June 2009

986 Thomas Kessler et al.

Group members tend to see their group as prototypical for a common ingroup which serves as a common reference

frame (Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2008). Arguably, majority members may have a particularly strong tendency to

perceive themselves as prototypical for a common society. Some majority members may not even differentiate between

their group and the society as a whole but take their group as ‘pars pro toto’ (Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus,

2003). Majority members may perceive immigrant groups as different and therefore as less prototypical of the common

society. Moreover, immigrant groups may also be perceived as challenging societal norms and values and thereby

threatening the majority group’s identity (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). This

may lead majority members to feel negative emotions like intergroup anxiety when interacting with immigrants; they may

even feel disadvantaged or relative deprived compared to immigrants (e.g. Leach, Iyer, & Pederson, 2007). They may

express their prejudice either in open and blatant hostile rejection or in more subtle ways such as overstating the actual

dissimilarity and stressing social distance between majority and immigrant culture (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Finally,

majority members may tend to compete with immigrants over relative prestige and dominance (e.g. how much influence

immigrants should have in shaping the common society?) and over scarce resources (e.g. jobs).

The present research approaches the context of immigration in Germany from the perspective of the ingroup projection

model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). As indicators of group evaluation we focus on a variety of emotions (e.g. group-

based emotions, intergroup anxiety and relative deprivation) as well as on various prejudice measures (subtle and blatant

prejudice, social and realistic competition). According to the ingroup projection model, we assume that relative ingroup

prototypicality influences group evaluation. Thus, the main question is whether relative ingroup prototypicality

determines intergroup emotions and prejudice. Moreover, we also examine the relations between intergroup emotions and

prejudice because both have been conceptualized as competing approaches to intergroup evaluation (e.g. Cottrell &

Neuberg, 2005; Smith, 1993). However, their relation is not well studied. Also of interest are the causal relations between

relative ingroup prototypicality, intergroup emotions and prejudice: are these causal at all, uni-directional or bi-directional

(e.g. Kessler & Mummendey, 2002).

INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THE EVALUATION OF SOCIAL GROUPS

According to self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Whetherell, 1987), social groups are evaluated

with reference to a group on a higher level of inclusiveness. The evaluation of subgroups is determined by their distance

from the prototype of the superordinate and inclusive group. More prototypical groups represent the inclusive group better

than less prototypical groups. A prototype provides information about how a subgroup is (descriptive norm) and how it

should be (prescriptive norm) in order to be a valuable and acceptable part of the inclusive group. Thus, the closer a

subgroup comes to the prototype, the higher is its prototypicality and the more positive it will be evaluated. For instance,

the more French people are perceived to be typical of Europeans by other non-French Europeans, the more positively they

will be evaluated. However, the evaluation of one group within a superordinate common group also depends on one’s own

group standing. Thus, French people may be evaluated differently by Germans or Portuguese because both groups may

perceive their prototypicality for being European differently. For instance, assuming the perceived prototypicality of the

French to be constant, relative prototypicality would lead to different evaluations of the French because Germans may

perceive themselves as relative more prototypical (thereby entertaining a more positive view of their ingroup and a less

positive evaluation of the French) whereas Portuguese may perceive themselves as relatively less prototypical compared to

the French (thereby entertaining a less positive view of their ingroup and a more positive evaluation of the French). Thus, it

is not a group’s prototypicality per se but the relative prototypicality of one group compared to another that determines

their relative evaluation.

Following the ingroup projection model, group members tend to project ingroup attributes onto the superordinate

group. As group members vary in their tendency to project ingroup attributes, they may also vary in the degree in which the

ingroup is perceived to be more prototypical than an outgroup, which leads to differences regarding how much the ingroup

is evaluated as more positive than the outgroup. As members of subgroups tend to project ingroup attributes, subgroups are

perceived as more prototypical for the inclusive group by ingroup members compared to outgroup members. Thus, a

perspective divergence on the relative prototypicality of subgroups emerges (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 985–997 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Group-based emotions and prejudice 987

A first additional assumption underlying this line of argument is that the superordinate group (e.g. Europeans) is

evaluated positively. Being prototypical will lead to positive evaluations only for positively evaluated superordinate

groups which seem to be true for most self-categories (Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000). Moreover, ingroup projection

and enhanced relative ingroup prototypicality will increase when individuals are highly identified with both the subgroup

and the superordinate group (Ullrich, Christ, & Schluter, 2006; Waldzus, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 2003). In an

immigration context, majority groups are expected to identify on both levels of self-categorization, which enhances

tendencies for ingroup projection and the perception of high relative ingroup prototypicality.1 Moreover, perceived higher

relative ingroup prototypicality leads to a less positive evaluation of the outgroup, and more negative behavioural

intentions such as avoidance of contact with the outgroup (e.g. Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003; Waldzus,

Mummendey, Boettcher & Wenzel, 2004; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003).

In most previous studies, conditions for ingroup projection have been manipulated and relative ingroup prototypicality

and group evaluations and behavioural intentions have been measured. Although these studies consistently show a

correlation between relative ingroup prototypicality and group evaluation, the issue of causality is not settled yet. Relative

ingroup prototypicality may also function as a justification of one’s prejudice. Moreover, extending the ingroup projection

model, we assume that due to an appraisal of a normative discrepancy, relative ingroup prototypicality might lead to

negative intergroup emotions which add to the effect of outgroup devaluation. We want to broaden the empirical evidence,

which was limited to group evaluation and behavioural intentions in previous research (Wenzel et al., 2008), by focussing

on measures of prejudice. In sum, we propose to examine whether perceived relative ingroup prototypicality of majority

members determines intergroup emotions and prejudice towards immigrants.

PREJUDICE AND INTERGROUP EMOTIONS

According to many definitions, prejudice can be regarded as an antipathetic attitude towards outgroups and their members

(Allport, 1954; Brown, 1995). The functions of prejudice vary from being a value expression to being a justification of a

negative treatment of outgroups by ingroup members (e.g. Turner, 2005). As an alternative to prejudice as attitude, Smith

(1993) defined prejudice as ‘a social emotion experienced with respect to one’s social identity as a group member, with an

outgroup as a target’ (Smith, 1993, p. 304). Integrating concepts of self-categorization theory and appraisal theories of

emotions, Smith (1993, see also Smith, 1999; Mackie & Smith, 2002) conceived of intergroup or group-based emotions as

emotions that are experienced when individuals self-categorize as members of a particular group. Group members can

experience group-based emotions even when they individually have not been directly affected by the events eliciting the

emotions. Two preconditions for intergroup emotions to be experienced are that a particular intergroup context has to be

salient and that group members identify with their ingroup (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Gordijin,

Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001; Kessler & Hollbach, 2005; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003).

Another emotion that occurs in intergroup contexts is intergroup anxiety (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Intergroup

anxiety may be felt in intergroup contact situations when an interacting individual anticipates something negative in an

encounter with outgroup members. According to Stephan and Stephan (1985), anxiety may arise from any or all of

apprehension about appropriate behavioural norms, anticipated negative treatment by the outgroup and generalized

negative affect associated with the outgroup. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) identify anxiety provoking intergroup contact

situations as conditions that will enhance intergroup tensions and prejudice. Thus, one may expect that intergroup anxiety

may be one mediator connecting intergroup perception to prejudice (Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns,

& Voci, 2006; Voci & Hewstone, 2003).

A classical approach to intergroup emotions is relative deprivation (Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966). Collective relative

deprivation will be expressed in feelings of resentment and anger depending on the degree of disadvantage, the stability

and legitimacy of the disadvantage and reduced permeability of group boundaries (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, &

Mielke, 1999). According to Smith and Ho (2002), feelings of disadvantage are a prime example of group-based emotions.

Finally, collective relative deprivation has been shown to lead to prejudice (Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972; Pettigrew,

Christ, Wagner, Meertens, van Dick, & Zick, 2008).

1Compared to majority members, minority group members may identify less with the common superordinate category (e.g., our common society) whichmay reduce their tendency to perceive this superordinate category as a reference frame (Mummendey & Kessler, 2008).


DOI: 10.1002/ejsp


RELATION BETWEEN PREJUDICE AND INTERGROUP EMOTIONS

Although the distinction between prejudice as attitude and prejudice as intergroup emotion has led to vibrant research

endeavours (particularly in the field of intergroup emotions, e.g. Mackie & Smith, 2002), the relations between both constructs

have been less well studied. As one advantage, prejudice as an intergroup emotion is more context specific than prejudice as

attitude (Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005; Smith, 1993). For instance, old fashioned racists may perceive ethnic minorities as

generally threatening and therefore disparage them in many situations. However, they may accept and value ethnic minority

members in certain menial roles such as servants and nannies because in such roles they may not be seen as threatening (e.g.

Smith, 1993). In contrast, prejudice as attitude simply predicts a generalized antipathy towards an outgroup, irrespective of

situation. The only qualification to this would be distinctions between ‘old fashioned’ and ‘modern’ forms of prejudice, which

are thought to predict different forms of exclusionary or discriminatory behaviour (McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens,

1995). Up to now, prejudice as intergroup emotion and prejudice as social attitude have been discussed as alternative

conceptualizations of prejudice. The present work aimed to explore and test various possible relations between prejudice as an

intergroup emotion and prejudice as an attitude with a view to provide some theoretical integration. We assume that group-

based emotions as context specific experiences may mediate the relation between intergroup perceptions and prejudice.

Alternatively, it is also reasonable to assume that prejudice will shape emotional experiences in particular situations because

people will sometimes have prejudiced attitudes before they get first hand experiences with outgroups or their members.

Hypotheses

Our hypotheses can be summarized as follows:

1. R

2ThMuwe

Cop

elative ingroup prototypicality predicts intergroup emotions and prejudice: relative ingroup prototypicality deter-

mines intergroup emotions and prejudice over and above single ingroup and outgroup prototypicality. Thus, when

controlling for the single prototypicality measures the coefficient for relative ingroup prototypicality will have an

additional impact on group evaluations.

2. C
ausal relations between relative ingroup prototypicality, intergroup emotions and prejudice: we expect that relative
ingroup prototypicality causally determines intergroup emotions and prejudice. As an alternative hypothesis, one may

expect that intergroup emotions and prejudice may causally determine relative ingroup prototypicality.

METHOD

Field Situation

In Germany, as in many other societies, native Germans and various immigrant groups live together. This intergroup situation

provides a prime case for applying and testing the ingroup projection model: The different groups are aware of each other’s

presence, and they may have group- and culture-specific views and beliefs about what the society as a whole should be like. It

seems reasonable to assume that majority members will perceive themselves as more prototypical compared to immigrant

groups for the society as a whole. This is because most majority members are likely to (erroneously) equate the groups of ‘all

people living in the country’ and ‘people who adhere to the mainstream culture’. In other words, German majority members

can be expected to equate ‘Germans’ and ‘people living in Germany’. This means that they will take the native majority group

as pars pro toto for the whole society, neglecting the social fact of cultural or ethnic diversity.

Participants and Procedure

In the present study,2 1082 pupils (596 female and 485 male) from 25 German schools took part in a longitudinal study

with two measurement points the first in autumn 2004 and the second in spring 2005 which leads to a time lag of about half

is sample is part of a larger research project on ‘‘Immigration, racism, and acculturation: A three nation study’’ awarded to R. Brown, J.-P. Leyens, A.mmendey and T. Kessler. Altogether, about 7000 school children from Belgium, the UK, and Germany were surveyed on various themes. In this studyfocus on a German majority sample that is not involved in the comparison of the three nations or minority and majority relations.

yright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 985–997 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp


a year between the measures. We assessed the same variables at both measurement points. All participants were ‘native

Germans’ (i.e. without migration background). In the first wave, the mean age was on average 15 year (ranging from 13–

18 years). The convenience sample covered school students from six Federal Counties, cities of different size and all types

of secondary schools. However, it does not meet the high standards of probability sampling; generalizability is slightly

limited because of a certain amount of inevitable self-selective participation (voluntariness is stipulated by legal

requirements). Still, the use of school students ensures greater representativeness and heterogeneity than would be

possible using the university students.

Assessment of Variables

First, participants indicated whether their status was ‘native Germans’. Participants also indicated whether their parents’

place of birth was in Germany, and they were only included in the sample of ‘native Germans’ if this was the case.

Participants who did not fulfil both criteria were not included in the present majority sample. For the following items, if not

stated otherwise, all items were rated on a 5 point rating scale ranging from 1¼ not at all–5¼ very much.

Self-Categorization and Group Membership

Then, participants indicated their identification with two groups on two items (‘I perceive myself as German [‘someone

from Germany’]’ and ‘I like to be a German [‘someone from Germany’])’. Identification had an internal consistency of

at1¼ .76 for the measurement at time 1 (at2¼ .80 for the measurement time 2) for Germans and a t1¼ .64 (at2¼ .62) for

‘someone from Germany’.

Group Prototypicality

In the second part of the questionnaire, participants rated how typical they perceive their ingroup (Germans) and the

outgroup (Immigrants) to be of the superordinate category (‘all people living in Germany’).3

Prejudice as Intergroup Emotions

We conceived of intergroup emotions very broadly to tap general emotional tendencies towards immigrants. Following

Dijker (1987), we assessed positive emotions (admire, trust, like) and negative emotions (feeling angry, irritated, annoyed)

towards immigrants. We asked ‘in general, what are your feelings towards immigrants’? Then, the emotion words were

presented, followed by a 5 point scale ranging from 1¼ never–5¼ very often. In a factor analysis the emotion items turned

out to be highly correlated and only one factor with an Eigenvalue above 1 emerged. In line with other studies on emotions

in intergroup contexts, various emotions are highly correlated (Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008). Accordingly, we

aggregated all emotion items to measure one single construct, a t1¼ .76 (at2¼ .88) with higher values indicating more

positive emotions.

Intergroup anxiety was assessed as a specific emotional measure towards immigrants in contact situations. Following

Stephan and colleagues (e.g. Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Stephan, & Gudykust, 2000), we asked respondents to

imagine themselves in situations in which they were interacting with several outgroup members (e.g. ‘If you were the only

German and you were working with some immigrants, how would you feel’?). Participants rated whether they would feel

nervous, comfortable (recoded), anxious, at ease (recoded), awkward and accepted (recoded) in such situations, a t1¼ .76

(at2¼ .80).

3The original wording of the self-categorization items are ‘‘Ich sehe mich selbst als Jemand aus Deutschland [als Deutscher/Deutsche]’’ and of theprototypicality measures are ‘‘Wie typisch sind die Deutschen [die Zuwanderer] mit Blick auf alle Menschen in Deutschland?’’.


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Table 1. Mean, standard deviation and correlations of all variables

M (SD) RIPPositiveemotions

Intergroupanxiety Resentment

Blatantprejudice

Socialdistance

Culturaldistance

Socialcompetition

Relative ingroupprototypicality (RIP)

1.27 (.66)

Positive emotions 3.16 (.86) �.125��

Intergroup anxiety 2.71 (.81) .070� �.440��

Resentment 3.08 (1.17) .100�� .400�� 0.246��

Blatant prejudice 2.76 (.93) .127�� .662�� 0.374�� 0.466��

Social distance 3.00 (1.04) .173�� .682�� 0.447�� 0.399�� 0.712��

Cultural distance 3.51 (.80) .181�� .418�� 0.254�� 0.228�� 0.397�� 0.373��

Social competition 3.00 (.97) .163�� .608�� 0.358�� 0.381�� 0.585�� 0.643�� 0.361��

Realistic competition 3.12 (1.09) .143�� .589�� 0.306�� 0.455�� 0.728�� 0.628�� 0.333�� 0.581��

Note: M¼mean, SD¼ standard deviation, RIP¼ relative ingroup prototypicality.�p<.05, ��<.001.


Finally, we included a single item measure of relative deprivation. This item assessed the feeling of anger about the

relative standing of the ingroup compared to its perceived entitlements (‘Thinking about what Germans deserve and what

we have makes me very angry’; 1¼ not at all to 5¼ very much).

Prejudice as Attitude

We included items assessing blatant as well as subtle forms of prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). In addition, we also

assessed two types of competition tendencies to examine whether the conflict between native Germans and immigrants

was seen to be more about the relative standing or more about material resources.

Subtle prejudice towards the outgroup (intimacy factor) was assessed with five items (e.g. ‘I would generally prefer to

have German teachers’; 1¼ disagree strongly to 5¼ agree strongly), a t1¼ .84 (at2¼ .86).

Blatant prejudice (threat and rejection factor) was assessed with five items derived from Pettigrew and Meertens (e.g.

‘Germans and immigrants will never be really comfortable with each other even if they are close friends’). The internal

consistency of this scale was satisfactory, a t1¼ .78 (at2¼ .82).

Moreover, we measured cultural distance (subtle scale) with four items tapping perceived difference in fundamental

values, work ethic, and the attitudes towards women, a t1¼ .71 (at2¼ .72).

To assess potential behavioural outcomes of prejudice, we included social competition (competition about the relative

standing of the ingroup) and realistic competition (competition about real resources such as jobs or subsidiaries, see for

instance Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). We measured social competition with three items (e.g. ‘I would

never make any effort to ensure that my group has a better reputation than immigrants’ (reverse coded), a t1¼ .61

(at1¼ .68). Three items tapped realistic competition (e.g. ‘In the next 5 years, we Germans will do everything to ensure

that more money will be invested for Germans’), a t1¼ .83 (at1¼ .85).

The different prejudice and competition measures are derived from different theoretical backgrounds and are intended

to tap various aspects of negative intergroup relations. They are empirically closely related (see Table 1).

RESULTS

In the first step, we examined whether the preconditions of the projection model are given. Then, we analysed the impact of

relative prototypicality on the various emotion and prejudice measures in first wave of our longitudinal study. Moreover,

we also assessed the potential impact of emotions on the prejudice measure and subsequently analysed whether emotions

mediate the influence of relative prototypicality on the prejudice measures. In the final section, we examined the causal

relations between relative prototypicality, emotions and prejudice with a cross lagged panel analysis using our longitudinal

sample.


DOI: 10.1002/ejsp


Check of Preconditions for the Ingroup Projection Model

First, we examined whether preconditions for the application of the ingroup projection model are satisfied in the present

situation. We focus in this analysis on data of the first measurement only.4 For processes of ingroup projection to work,

participants should identify with the ingroup (i.e. Germans) and the superordinate group (i.e. people in Germany). Ingroup

identification shows a mean well above the scale midpoint of 3, M¼ 4.20, t(1054)¼ 42.22, p< .001. Moreover,

identification with the superordinate group is equally strong compared to ingroup identification, M¼ 4.17, t< 1, and also

well above the scale mid point, t(1007)¼ 43.68, p< .001.

The participants evaluated the superordinate category as generally positive, M¼ 3.40, which is significantly above the

scale midpoint, t(1069)¼ 15.80, p< .001. Hence, a higher prototypicality fosters a positive view of an included group.

Effects of Relative Prototypicality

We computed a relative prototypicality score by dividing ingroup prototypicality by outgroup prototypicality. We

computed relative prototypicality as a quotient for two reasons: (1) relative prototypicality denotes the fit of the ingroup

relative to the fit of an outgroup for a common superordinate category which is best represented as a quotient. (2) the

representation of relative prototypicality as a quotient enables us to control for the single prototypicality scores which

would not be possible if we would have computed a difference score (note, a difference score and its constituents are

redundant, one number always drops out in a regression analysis, see Ullrich, 2009 for an extended discussion of relative

prototypicality as a difference score). In several regression analyses we examined whether this relative prototypicality

score predicts emotions and prejudice over and above the single ingroup and outgroup prototypicality (see Table 2). In line

with our predictions, relative ingroup prototypicality predicts significantly the different emotion measures. Relative

prototypicality is positively associated with intergroup anxiety and with feelings of being disadvantaged, and negatively

with positive emotions.5 Moreover, relative ingroup prototypicality relates significantly to the different prejudice and

competition measures. Relative ingroup prototypicality relates positively to blatant prejudice, social distance, cultural

distance, social competition and to realistic competition.

Intergroup Emotions and Prejudice

Finally, the different intergroup emotions predict aspects of intergroup conflict. In a series of regression analyses we

examined the unique contribution of the three emotion measures in predicting prejudice and competition measures (see

Table 2). Positive intergroup emotions relate negatively with social distance, blatant prejudice, cultural distance, social

competition and realistic competition. Intergroup anxiety relates positively to social distance, blatant prejudice, cultural

distance, social competition, and not to realistic competition. The feeling of relative deprivation associates positively with

social distance, blatant prejudice, marginally with cultural distance, social competition, and realistic competition.

Intergroup Emotions as Mediators of the Effects of Prototypicality

The above results demonstrate that relative ingroup prototypicality effectively predicts intergroup emotions as well as

prejudice. Moreover, intergroup emotions also predict diverse measures of prejudice. This pattern of results is consistent

with the assumption that intergroup emotions may mediate the impact of relative ingroup prototypicality on diverse

prejudice indicators. With structural equation modelling (LISREL 8.30) we set up a saturated model in which relative

4The data of the second measurement will be used basically to assess causal effects with cross lagged panel analyses which is the most appropriateanalysis to assess causality in longitudinal studies. However, the data pattern for the second measurement is basically the same as in the first measurement.5For the sake of simplicity, we only report the coefficients for relative prototypicality. Outgroup prototypicality typically shows a regression coefficientthat is smaller and of the same sign as relative prototypicality and ingroup typicality also shows smaller coefficients but of the opposite sign. Moreover, astepwise inclusion of relative prototypicality leads to significant improvement of the regressions: F-changes range between F(1,1029)¼ 10.45 to 60.95,all ps< .001. Finally, we also checked carefully potential problems of multicollinearity. Although multicollinearity is high, the stress indicators show thatthe results are in an acceptable area.


DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Table 2. Prediction of prejudice, and intergroup emotions by relative ingroup prototypicality

Standardized b t, df¼ 991–1030 p

Relative ingroup prototypicalitya predictsSocial distance .42 6.85 .001Blatant prejudice .48 7.81 .001Cultural distance .45 7.34 .001Social competition .35 5.62 .001Realistic competition .38 6.10 .001Intergroup anxiety .20 3.23 .001Relative deprivation .21 3.40 .001Positive Emotions �.44 7.25 .001

Positive emotionsb predictSocial distance �.55 21.57 .001Blatant prejudice �.54 20.44 .001Cultural distance �.36 10.77 .001Social competition �.50 17.59 .001Realistic competition �.47 16.46 .001

Intergroup anxietyb predictsSocial distance .17 7.13 .001Blatant prejudice .08 3.17 .001Cultural distance .09 2.85 .005Social competition .10 3.78 .001Realistic competition .03 1.17 .242

Relative deprivationb predictsSocial distance .14 5.69 .001

Blatant prejudice .23 9.57 .001Cultural distance .06 1.86 .060Social competition .15 5.84 .001Realistic competition .26 9.78 .001

aControlled for ingroup and outgroup typicality.bControlled for the other emotion measures.


ingroup prototypicality determines (over and above the single prototypicality measure for ingroup and outgroup)

intergroup emotions and prejudice. Intergroup emotions were also assumed to predict prejudice. With this model we

examined the strength of the indirect effects that relative ingroup prototypicality may have on diverse prejudice measures.

The results show that relative ingroup prototypicality has highly significant indirect effects on all prejudice measures:

blatant prejudice, bindirect¼ .22, p< .001, subtle prejudice, bindirect¼ .12, p< .001, cultural distance, bindirect¼ .06,

p< .001, social competition, bindirect¼ .15, p< .001 and realistic competition, bindirect¼ .25, p< .001. However, for all

prejudice measures the direct effect of relative ingroup prototypicality remains significant (except for social competition)

indicating that the mediation is substantial but not complete.

Evaluation of Causality

Although the results of the regression analyses clearly support our assumption that relative prototypicality predicts

intergroup emotions and prejudice, we have to analyse whether this relation is causal. To assess causality in survey

research one has to have longitudinal data with repeated measures of the same variables at two (or more) time points (Cook

& Campbell, 1979; Rogosa, 1980). In a cross-lagged regression approach, one variable measured at a second time point

will be regressed on the same variable measured at a first time point (i.e. the stability of this variable over time) and a

second variable that is assumed to be a causal variable also measured at a first time point (i.e. cross-lagged influence). If

this second variable has a significant regression weight (while simultaneously controlling for the stability of the predicted

variable), one can conclude that it has a causal influence on the predicted variable. With such an approach we can decide

whether the relation between two variables is either negligible (no cross-lagged regression is significant), uni-directional

(only one cross-lagged regression is significant), or bi-directional causal (both cross-lagged regressions are significant).


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Table 3. Results of the cross-lagged regression analyses

Variable A Variable B Variable B regressed on Aa Variable A regressed on Bb

Effects of relative prototypicalityRelative prototypicality Positive emotion �.06, p¼ .012 .16, p< .001

Intergroup anxiety �.036, n.s. .04, n.s.Resentment .07, p¼ .016 .12, p< .001Blatant prejudice .05, p¼ .065 .19, p< .001Subtle prejudice .00, n.s. .20, p< .001Cultural distance .03, n.s. .12, p< .001Social competition .05, p¼ .052 .13, p< .001Realistic competition .08, p¼ .002 .15, p< .001

Effects of emotions on prejudicePositive emotions Blatant prejudice �.22, p< .001 �.30, p< .001

Subtle prejudice �.15, p< .001 �.32, p< .001Cultural distance �.24, p< .001 �.12, p< .001Social competition �.27, p< .001 �.20, p< .001Realistic competition �.20, p< .001 �.21, p< .001

Intergroup anxiety Blatant prejudice .06, p¼ .021 .19, p< .001Subtle prejudice .02, n.s. .23, p< .001Cultural distance .07, p¼ .009 .16, p< .001Social competition .08, p¼ .004 .15, p< .001Realistic competition .08, p¼ .002 .16, p< .001

Resentment Blatant prejudice .12, p< .001 .35, p< .001Subtle prejudice .07, p¼ .002 .32, p< .001Cultural distance .11, p< .001 .15, p< .001Social competition .13, p< .001 .28, p< .001Realistic competition .11, p< .001 .36, p< .001

Effects of emotions on emotionsPositive emotions Intergroup anxiety �.20, p< .001 �.09, p¼ .001

Resentment �.26, p< .001 �.13, p< .001Intergroup anxiety resentment .16, p< .001 .08, p¼ .006

Effects of prejudice on prejudiceBlatant prejudice Subtle prejudice .14, p< .001 .32, p< .001

Cultural distance .22, p< .001 .04, n.s.Social competition .31, p< .001 .16, p< .001Realistic competition .27, p< .001 .19, p< .001

Subtle prejudice Cultural distance .20, p< .001 .04, p¼ .088Social competition .32, p< .001 .09, p¼ .001Realistic competition .28, p< .001 .13, p< .001

Cultural distance Social competition .15, p< .001 .11, p< .001Realistic competition .10, p< .001 .18, p< .001

Social competition Realistic competition .16, p< .001 .29, p< .001

Note: aVariable B (time 2) regressed on A (time 1 controlling B time 1).bVariable A (time 2) regressed on B (time 1 controlling A time 1)


We computed cross-lagged regressions for each pair of variables. The results of these cross-lagged regression analyses (see

Table 3) show that most of the relationships between relative prototypicality, intergroup emotions and the various forms of

prejudice and competition are bi-directional. Only seven out of 36 possible relations are not bi-directional, and only one shows

no causal relation at all (relative prototypicality and intergroup anxiety). Moreover, relative ingroup prototypicality does not

seem to be a very strong causal factor because it fails to show significant cross-lagged relationships for five outcome variables.

DISCUSSION

The immigration context is a prime context in which assumptions of the ingroup projection model (Mummendey &

Wenzel, 1999) can be examined. The indigenous majority and immigrant groups are integrated within a common society


DOI: 10.1002/ejsp


that provides the frame of reference for the evaluation of the included groups. The results of our study demonstrate that our

participants identify as majority members as well as with the society at whole. Thus, the society as the inclusive group provides

the reference frame for the evaluation of majority group and immigrants groups. Moreover, the inclusive category is basically

evaluated positively, revealing that it is a positive frame of reference in which higher relative prototypicality leads to a more

positive evaluation. Taken together, the preconditions for ingroup projection were clearly satisfied in the present context.

The results of the cross sectional analyses reveal that relative ingroup (i.e. majority group) prototypicality predicts

intergroup emotions, intergroup anxiety and resentment as well as various measures of prejudice (blatant and subtle

prejudice, cultural distance) and competitive behaviour over and above the single prototypicality of ingroup and outgroup

for the whole society. This extends the range of possible effects of relative ingroup prototypicality from group evaluation

and behavioural intentions (e.g. contact intentions) to group-based emotions, prejudice and competitive behaviour.

Moreover, the effectiveness of relative prototypicality as a determinant of intergroup emotions (positive emotions and

resentment) indicates that these emotions are truly intergroup or group-based emotions (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007), in

contrast to individual emotions. This is because relative prototypicality is a genuine intergroup appraisal in which

individual concerns are absent.

The present study examined for the first time whether relative ingroup prototypicality causally influences several

outcome measures. The cross lagged panel analyses indicate that relative ingroup prototypicality has some significant

cross lagged effects on emotions, prejudice and competitive behaviour confirming that relative ingroup prototypicality has

causal precedence on these variables. However, our cross lagged panel analyses also show that the reverse causality also

holds, and usually more strongly. This means that relative ingroup prototypicality not only influences emotions, prejudice

and competitive behaviour but is also influenced by them. However, the influence of relative prototypicality on emotion

and prejudice is smaller than the reverse causal impact. This is consistent with the assumption that people may justify their

prejudice by referring to the relatively lower typicality of their targets of prejudice (e.g. Turner, 2005). Moreover, group-

based emotions, prejudice and competitive behaviour also are linked in a bi-directional way, and here the relationships

were equally strong in each direction, taken as a whole. This indicates that changes in one of these variables will also lead

to changes in these other variables.

Given these results, we like to suggest that the assumption of a clear linear causal sequence of relative prototypicality,

emotions and prejudice may be too simple. We speculate that relative prototypicality, intergroup emotions and prejudice

form a ‘belief system’ in which the components are reciprocally related (Kessler & Mummendey, 2002). The results

clearly indicate that most relations between relative ingroup prototypicality, different intergroup emotions and different

prejudice measures are reciprocally causal. Thus, the more relative prototypical the majority members perceive their group

to be, the less positive emotions they feel and the more relative deprivation, blatant prejudice and tendencies to compete

against immigrants they acknowledge. However, the reverse holds, too: the more majority members endorse blatant

prejudice, the more they entertain subtle prejudice, competitive tendencies, negative intergroup emotions and the more

they perceive their group as relatively prototypical.

Our findings suggest a bi-directional causal link between our measures. However, the measures were explicit and some

are also very direct measures. This may raise the issue of social desirability. Thus, our participants might have the tendency

to express their prejudice balanced with whatever they think is normative. To put more directly, prejudice and societal

norms correlate very highly (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brian, 2002). However, this close relation between societal norms

and prejudice is not necessarily a measurement problem but part of a conception of prejudice because prejudice can be

seen as socially shared (e.g. Allport, 1954). Moreover, participants may feel the urge to justify their evaluations (of

outgroups) which may explain the strong reverse causal influence from prejudice to relative ingroup prototypicality. This

tendency to express consistent attitudes may apply only to explicit beliefs and thoughts but it may also extend to more

implicit beliefs as well (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).

One critical issue is whether our various measures represent different underlying constructs or whether they represent

only one underlying dimension. Here we would like to argue that the strong effects in the cross-lagged regression analyses

indicate that we in fact measured different underlying constructs. If two variables were the same, they would be redundant

and, hence, the change in one variable could not depend on the other variable. In contrast, as most of the variables are

reliable causes for change in the other variables, this indicates that, although they overlap, the variables represent different

constructs (or at least, different facets of one more global construct).

The results of this study clearly favour a ‘belief systems’ approach with bi-directional causal relations between the

components. Such belief systems approaches are also found in political psychology as image theory. Image theory


DOI: 10.1002/ejsp


proposes that individuals entertain general belief systems about the relations between ingroup and outgroup (Alexander,

Brewer, & Hermann, 1999). The perception of the intergroup relations, assumptions about the relative strengths of the

groups, cultural values and behavioural tendencies are proposed to form a consistent representation. If one component of

the belief system is triggered, the rest of the belief system will become activated. However, the tacit assumption that the

relations between components of such belief systems are bi-directionally causal has, to our knowledge, not been tested yet.

Our study fills in this gap, by revealing the bi-directional causal relations between ingroup prototypicality, intergroup

emotions and prejudice.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The present work demonstrates that perceived relative ingroup prototypicality not only predicts but also causally

influences intergroup emotions, prejudice and competitive behaviour. Majority members perceive that immigrants are part

of the whole society. However, this inclusion means that immigrants are evaluated according to the standards of the

society, at least as they are perceived by the majority. Hence, our participants might have had in mind that ‘we all live in

Germany, but we are more typical Germans than you (the immigrants); therefore we feel negatively towards you and

evaluate you negatively’. An important question for future research is how people have to perceive the common society in

order to feel less negative about immigrants and—possibly—evaluate the difference between majority members and

immigrants more favourably.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The studies reported here were conducted within a research project supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft

(DFG; MU 551/25-1 u. MU 551/25-3), Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Belgium Science

Foundation (Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique). We are grateful to Immo Fritsche for his helpful comments and

suggestions on an earlier draft.

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