Coalition Challengesin Afghanistan

The Politics of Alliance

Edited by Gale A. Mattox andStephen M. Grenier

Stanford Security Studies, An Imprint of Stanford University PressStanford, California

30 S. REBECCA ZIMMERMAN

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WARLORDS AND THE COALITION INAFGHANISTAN

Remain Malejacq

THIS CHAPTER FOCUSES on the relationships between coalition forces andthe so-called warlords of post-2001 Afghanistan. While the term warlordis fre-quently used in political and normative ways to evoke "brutality, racketeeringand the suffering of civil communities, "' these actors are astute political entre-preneurs whose legitimacy rests on "the power to make war effectively"2 andwho play critical roles in people's access to the political arena and economic op-portunities. They act at various times as the principal suppliers of governanceto people in areas where they wield influence. As such, they cannot be, and havenot been, ignored by ISAF. They have been instrumental to allied forces fromthe very beginning of the US-led intervention. In turn, they have exercised asurprising capacity to shape state-building and state formation processes tosuit their interests by exploiting the cross-cutting agendas of external actors.While a multitude ofwariords coexist with the state in post-2001 Afghanistan,this chapter focuses on two typical cases: Abdul Rashid Dostum, the ethnicUzbek leader of northern Afghanistan, and Ismail Khan, the self-proclaimedEmirofHerat.

It is often argued that the main objective of state-building is the centraliza-tion of sovereignty, or conversely, the weakening and destruction of alterna-tive forms of governance. Most international actors involved in Afghanistan(foreign governments, aid agencies, international organizations) therefore pre-fer that warlords recede into insignificance as the central state asserts its au-thority. While this state-building project promotes the construction of a statealong the path most closely associated with the historical rise of Western states,the political survival of Afghan wariords is an indication that the process is in

32 ROMAIN MALEJACQ

reality being shaped by interactions between the state, the international com-munity, and de facto power holders (warlords in particular). State-buildershave to engage in a process of hybridization- arguably the real process of stateformation-as they attempt to construct institutions that at least appear toconform to Weberian ideals of bureaucratic institutional and territorial control.

Warlords are "by definition illegitimate and unrecognized."3 It is thereforestriking (and for some truly shocking) to see that coalition forces that are sup-posed to back and support the official democratically elected government ofAfghanistan have been in business with warlords since the very beginning ofthe US military intervention. The growing role of regular and irregular indig-enous forces in external interventions raises practical concerns about the mili-tary and political objectives of the Afghan war and the nature of state-buildingin Afghanistan and elsewhere. In this chapter, I show that warlords maximizetheir authority in permissive environments-that is, in environments with lim-ited external pressure. They take advantage of the heterogeneity of the interna-tional community, both within and outside NATO, to maximize their interestsand survive. I chose two cases ofwarlordism that illustrate how warlords exertdiplomacy and how it allows them to survive in changing environments.

WORKING WITH THE DEVIL: AFGHAN MODELOF WARFARE AND WARLORD STRATEGY

Coalition forces began to achieve a series of quick military victories soon af-ter they began combat operations in October 2001. The success of the "Afghanmodel of warfare-US air power working in concert with coalition special op-erations and Northern Alliance forces on the ground-quickly expelled Talibanforces from key cities around the country. 4 Unfortunately, the "Afghan model"did not support coalition state-building efforts. Afghan warlords took controlof regional and national state institutions with the blessing of the Bush admin-istration. Seeking short-term stability through deals with regional leaders tocompensate the absence of a central state in turn empowered these illegitimatearmed actors and prevented the long-term emergence of the said central state.This "warlord strategy"5 required "living with ambiguity":6 US special opera-tions forces worked hand in hand with warlords in their fiefdoms in spite oftheir increasing stigmatization by human rights organizations.7

Things started to change around 2003-2004. US policy makers began at thattime to impose "new rules of the game"8 as most in the Bush administrationbelieved the war in Afghanistan to be about to end. Michael Bhatia wrote,

WARLORDS AND THE COALITION IN AFGHANISTAN 33

^:ZrtlT:ea8cdp«e7fDD^Ielra^:broader secur^-sector ref- (SSR), governanceTZra ndZ"proposed creation of a war crimes tribunal. ' " °- """"^lwi"1 auu me

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DOSTUM: THE "UNSAVORY FRIEND""

' shows how they take advantage of this".p'ol?l°^T:^, ';otalm d':^^^^ZU^S^ !n^l:llyonAe ground-Heimmed^l^

t the US-led intervention would give himthe"op'po^Zytorerogn

34 ROMAIN MALEJACQ

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WARLORDS AND THE. COALITION IN AFGHANISTAN 35

Instead, Dostum's close personal ties, right down to individual soldiers accom-panying him, showed how he could manipulate this set of foreign relations tobolster his personalized form of authority.

In the past twenty years, Dostum has acquired the reputation of being "athoroughly self-interested man"23 who "goes where the wind blows. "24 AhmedRashid, a Pakistani journalist and expert on South Asia, claims that Dostumhas "been on every country's payroll, receiving funds from Russia, Uzbekistan,Iran, Pakistan and lately Turkey."25 Dostum owes his survival, above all else, tohis ability to conduct his own diplomacy (toward both foreign and domesticactors) in a highly pragmatic fashion that accommodates to immediate condi-

tions. This is nowhere better exemplified than in his relationship with Turkey,which has offered him great support over the years and has clearly been instru-mental to his political and physical survival.

Dostum s relations with Turkey have been conducted along more formalchannels than the ones with the US, though personal networks have also playeda critical role, at least initially. Dostum managed to develop contacts with thatcountry through Azad Beg, a Turkish nationalist who mobilized Uzbeks andTurkmens from northern Afghanistan in the fight against the Soviet Union.Through his family connections-his cousin, Mirza Aslam Beg, was Pakistan'sChief of Army Staff-Azad Beg became the chief contact between Dostum andPakistani intelligence.26 He then developed ties with Turkey, which started tofinance Dostum's party (the Junbesh). Turkey has been supporting Dostumever since, as illustrated by the Akbar Bai episode. 27

Akbar Bai is an Afghan of Turkmen ethnicity, head of Afghanistan's Asso-ciation of Islamic Turks, and former Junbesh representative in Kabul, who wassacked in 2004 for not being in line with the party's policy. 28 In 2007, he beganto vehemently accuse Dostum of killing Turkmens and Uzbeks, of possessingarms depots, and of entertaining close links with the Inter-Service IntelligenceDirectorate and the Taliban.29 A number of minor episodes followed these dec-larations, during which Dostum's dog was allegedly kidnapped and Akbar Bai'soffice was set on fire.30 In November 2007, the Turkmen leader was arrested bya local branch of the National Directorate of Security under Dostum's controlon charges of insurgency activities and masterminding an attempt on the gen-eral's life.31

The tensions between Dostum and Akbar Bai reached another level in the

night of February 2, 2008, as the general's men reportedly beat up Akbar Baiand members of his family, kidnapped him, and brought him back to Dostum's

36 ROMAIN MALEJACQ

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WARLORDS AND THE. COALITION IN AFGHANISTAN 37

international connections are critical to asserting personal power against thestate-building enterprise. Dostum's post-iooi authority stems directly from hisability to concentrate multiple sources of power while preventing his competi-tors from doing the same. What mattered to Dostum has been to remain theonly Turkic leader able to combine political and military power, as well as theability to act in the international system to receive international protection.

ISMAIL KHAN: THE EMIR OF WESTERN AFGHANISTAN

Ismail Khan is a "creature of the borderland. "43 He is the perfect illustrationof the way warlords have taken advantage of the heterogeneity of the interna-tional system in post-2001 Afghanistan to increase their local autonomy. "TheLion of Herat" portrayed himself as a bulwark against terrorism to benefit fromAmerican largesse, while at the same time receiving extensive support fromIran. In October 2001, he expressed his willingness to cooperate with whoevercould advance his interests: "To win, we need more money, men and weapons.We re willing to accept help from whoever has our best interest in mind."44

Ismail Khan s position vis-a-vis the US has been ambiguous and ambivalentfrom the beginning of the intervention. The Herati leader always publicly op-posed the presence of foreign troops because he understood that they wouldlimit his ability to rule western Afghanistan as he pleased. Interviewed via satel-lite phone in early October 2001, he said, "We have no desire to see any foreigntroops on our soil. The coalition's mission is to provide assistance for the liber-ation of Afghanistan from terrorist occupation by the Pakistanis and the Arabs.The mission is not to impose a new type of foreign rule."45 In other words, theUS-led intervention should not aim at building a conventional Weberian state.

After he had regained control ofHerat, Ismail Khan became more confron-tational vis-a-vis the US: he called the deployment of American and British sol-diers "a mistake, "46 and declared that Afghanistan did not need outside help toform a representative government. 47" [We] do not need the American expert.We have gained enough experience from 23 years of war,"48 he said. After thesigning of the Bonn Agreement in December 2001, Ismail Khan stated that nointernational troops would be allowed to stay in his territory. 49 Since 2001, hehas consistently reiterated his disapproval of foreign interference through theconduct of high-level diplomacy of a sort commonly reserved for formally rec-ognized sovereign states. 50

Ismail Khan has managed to portray himself as a leader able to deal on anequal footing with powerful heads of state and diplomats, which has in turn

38 ROMAIN MALEJACQ

.!SS5S^=:SE==1SSS^^^S.

S==i=^£SSE:c;:S^i^SSSihim^Tt bthTc^eru of'a~power struggle between Ir^andAe US and t

lg;eZdv"antageo7t his peculiar situation. Ahmed Rashid said,

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WARLORDS AND THE.COALITION IN AFGHANISTAN 39

He s getting them both to start reconstruction in the region he controls, build-ing roads and other things. As far as he's concerned, and as far as the local Heratipeople are concerned, he's, you know, been playing a very wise game, which hasbeen helping him and helping the territory under his control. 61

In a typical Afghan ploy, the wily Ismail Khan made sure that the Iraniansand the Americans spent most of the time watching each other rather than him,as he fed them with tidbits of misinformation and gossip that kept their daggersdrawn.62

Both the US and Iran were desperately in need of a strong ally to limit eachother's influence in the border region. 63 Ismail Khan's balancing act dearly al-lowed him to accumulate various sources of power, in particular military andeconomic ones. His military might gave him the means to control Herat andits region and, most of all, to control the borders and the economic benefitsassociated with them. 64 It also gave Ismail Khan the opportunity to portrayhimself as the city's only liberator, even though other factions were involvedas well. Ismail Khan further increased his local legitimacy by providing goodsand services that were in fact paid for by American and Iranian money, customrevenues, and international aid. According to a UN official,

[Ismail Khan] basically presented us with a shopping list of what he wants andstressed the urgency.... But it also seems pretty clear that he wants it to be rec-ognised that he is in charge in this region, not the UN, or western governments,or indeed, the government in Kabul.65

It is true that "[much] of the power Ismail Khan and his fellow warlordsenjoy was a byproduct of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan"66!! ismore accurate that Ismail Khan's survival is largely due to his ability to navi-gate between different levels, and keep pressure on the various actors involvedin western Afghanistan, by never fully cooperating with nor fully defying andantagonizing the central government and its allies. His central position in mul-tiple networks enabled him to acquire military and economic power, whichhe could in turn use to resist Kabul's homogenizing pressure and run his ownfiefdom, without much interference from the center.

CONCLUSION

In the immediate postintervention period, wariords such as Dostum andIsmail Khan developed complex marketing plans to boost their image. Theyused different "farpc" furarr;^ k,, c.;no^^^» ^..-LI.. -11- ̂ _. -.., , " . ^

40 ROMAIN MALEJACQ

actors. 67 Confronted with a changing eim-to instrumentaUze intematio,nd;^s^^ were-n-'"dsw 'ltp:;^,boe«°m.ehr^i.:T^^EE^;^^^^^^^iu"^b:;hp^S.pcdST.Iib.. ..«.W ..d the^..^^SESESi^£^^^5S5S^^^^tobring^^i^^^^^^:^^^^^^^:^^^"m^^^^^^':;M^:.=^S2S5S^^^:zc=:^S^^^^;"d-the Taliban. 69

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WARLORDS AND THE COALITION IN AFGHANISTAN 41

6. Zalmay Khalilzad, "How to Nation-Build: Ten Lessons from Afghanistan,"National Interest (Summer 2005): 22.

7. Michael Bhatia, "The Future of the Mujahideen: Legitimaq?, Legacy and Demobili-zation in Post-Bonn Afghanistan," International Peacekeeping^, no. i (January 2007): 94.

8. Khalilzad, "How to Nation-Build, " 22.

9. Bhatia, "The Future of the Mujahideen, " 95.10. Interview with Afghan researcher, Kabul, March 13, 2011.ii. Olivier Roy, "Afghanistan: la difficile reconstruction d'un Etat," Cahiers de Chail-

lot 73(2004): 37.

12. Khalilzad, "How to Nation-Build," 23.13. Jan Cienski, "Uncle Sam's Shifty New Ally," Chicago Sun-Times, October 21, 2ooi.14. Ann Marlowe, "'Warlords' and 'Leaders,'" National Review, February 18, 2002.15. Doug Stanton, Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Band of U. S. Soldiers

Who Rode to Victory in Afghanistan (New York: Scribner, 2009), 197.16. For a detailed account, see ibid.

17. Quoted in Justin Huggler, "Campaign Against Terrorism: Strategy-AmericanAircraft Carry Out First Carpet Bombing Raids on Front Line," The Independent,November i, 2001.

i8. Jeffrey Schaeffer, "Afghan Soldiers Bid Farewell to U.S. Special Forces," Associ-ated Press Worldstream, December 19, 2ooi.

19. Stanton, Horse Soldiers, 253.20. Ibid., 280.

21. Quoted in Anna Badkhen, "Reports of Rape, Looting by Afghan Militiamen,"San Francisco Chronicle, February 15, 2002.

22. Christopher Torchia, "Afghan Commander Gets Indoor Pool," Associated PressOnline, September 7, 2002.

23. Cienski, "Uncle Sam's Shifty New Ally."24. Sudarsan Raghavan, "Charismatic Uzbek Chieftain Important to Future of

Afghanistan, " Knight Ridder, October 14, 2ooi.25. AhmedRashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia,

2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 56.26. Interview with Afghan researcher, Kabul, February 2, 20ii.27. Interview with Antonio Giustozzi, Kabul, October 11, 2008; interview with

Afghan intellectual, February 21, 2011.28. "Afghan Paper Warns Against Hasty Action in Dealing with Dostum's Incident,"

Hasht-e Sobh, February 6, 2008; Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords'" Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 183.

29. Head of Afghan Islamic Turks Body Accuses Ex-Jonbesh Leader Dostum"Ari-ana TV, January 5, 2007; "Afghan Politicians Accuse Gen Dostum of Establishing Linkswith Taleban,"Ariana TV, January 14, 2007.

42 RONIAIN MALEJACQ

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WARLORDS AND THE COALITION IN AFGHANISTAN 43

48. Behrouz Mehri, "Hatred Drove Afghan People to Rise Up Against Taliban: 'LionofHerat, '"Agence France Presse, November 16, 2001.

49. Kim Sengupta, "Campaign Against Terrorism: Last-Minute Hitch Could Stall

Peace-Keeping Deal; Warlord Insists Western Soldiers Are Not Wanted," The Indepen-dent, December 31, 2001.

50. "Afghan Leader to Visit Iran," IPR Strategic Business Information Database,February 5, 2002; "No Evidence of Iranian Interference in Afghanistan: UN Official,"Agence France Presse, January 24, 2002; "Governor of Herat, Afghanistan, Ismail Khan,"National Public Radio, February 3, 2002; "Afghan Leader to Visit Iran"; Regan Mor-ris, "U.S. Commander Seeks to Shore Up Ties to the Men Who Wield Real Power inAfghanistan," Associated Press Worldstream, July 24, 2002.

51. "Afghan Herat Governor Says Kabul Visit 'Effective and Useful,"' HeratTV, August 18, 2002; "Afghan Governor, UN Envoy Discuss Security Issues," Herat TV,August 18, 2002; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: How the War Against Islamic Ex-tremism Is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (London: Alien Lane,

2008), 143; Susan Glasser, "Karzai Team Sent to Calm Unruly Area; Afghan MilitiaLeader Evasive About Truce," Washington Post, July 25, 2002.

52. "Governor of Herat, Afghanistan, Ismail Khan," National Public Radio, Febru-ary3, 2002.

53. "Afghan governor, UN Officials Agree to Reopen UN Office in West-Iranian Radio," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, February 2, 2002; Morris, "U.S.Commander Seeks to Shore Up Ties."

54. Interview with Jean Malekzade, head of office (Herat), UNAMA, Kabul,March 4, aoii.

55. Interview with Western diplomat, Chicago, October 10, 2011.56. Amy Waldman, "A Nation Challenged: Warlords; Courted by U.S. and Iran, an

Afghan Governor Plays One Side Off the Other, " New York Times, April 3, 2002.57. Warlords in Afghanistan, Like Ismail Khan, Reluctant to Give Up Power After

Election for New Government, " ABC News, June 11, 2002; Margaret Coker, "IranianInfluence, and Guns, Felt in Western Afghanistan," Cox News Service, Februaryi, 2002.

58. Waldman, "Courted by U. S. and Iran"; Coker, "Iranian Influence."

59. Suzanne Goldenberg, "War in Afghanistan: Global Aid for Kabul, Iranian Armsfor Herat: The Warlord Ismail Khan Has Found an Eager Ally in the Fight to Keep HisRegional Fiefdom, " The Guardian, January 24, 2002..

60. Bay Fang, "The Great Game 2002," i7. S. News e^ World Report, August 12, 2002.According to Giustozzi, "Iranian trucks were reported unloading weapons in IsmailKhan's armories" as late as 2004 (Empires of Mud, 236).

6i. Iran and US Seem to Be Competing for Favor of Afghanistan's Warlords andRuling Government," National Public Radio, July 19, 2002.

rr'U^l^c +^

44 ROMAIN MALEJACQ

62. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 125.

i^^^sss::^""NY^o^^^^ss:^ .64; ̂ ^, Descent into Chaos, ̂.'": ̂ ^zs^^- . "of Am-News:NCT^. 2^-, nation- et p^e-bMn, comme process^ m,^

sSSS^i:i=:.:=SES=?S^'^Deal," Associated Press, March 18, 2013.

Part IIWestern Hemisphere