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ARTICLE IN PRESSJIR-1067; No. of Pages 14

International Journal of Intercultural Relations xxx (2014) xxx–xxx

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ictorious justifications and criticism of defeated:nvolvement of nations in world wars, social development,ultural values, social representations of war, and willingnesso fight�

agdalena Bobowika,∗, Darío Páeza, James H. Liub, Laurent Licatac,livier Kleinc, Nekane Basabea

Department of Social Psychology and Methodology of Behaviour Sciences, University of the Basque Country, Avenida de Tolosa 70,0018 San Sebastián, SpainVictoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New ZealandUniversité Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history:eceived 22 August 2014ccepted 25 August 2014

eywords:ocial representationsorld war

ultural valuesillingness to fight

a b s t r a c t

Social representations of the historical past, anchored in historical experience and culturalvalues, play a motivational role for justifying collective behaviour. The First and SecondWorld Wars (WWI and WWII) are the most remembered historical events around the world.The aim of the current study is to investigate, based on country-level data, the relationshipbetween the country’s role during the war, social development, cultural values and will-ingness to fight in a future war, and how social representations of WWII mediate theseprocesses. The data from the World History Survey were collected from a total of 6628 uni-versity students from 36 countries. The results showed that ascribing WWII a progressive(UN creation, democracy) or technological-scientific explanation, but also perceiving WWIIas a social catastrophe, prevailed more than beliefs justifying WWII (just and necessarywar). Directly or indirectly victorious nations endorse legitimizing and positive represen-tations of world wars more than defeated ones. The effects of hierarchical and collectivisticvalues and low social development on willingness to fight in a war are mediated by legit-imizing social representations of WWII. Importantly, when controlled for socio-structuraldifferences (human development index), the indirect effect of being a victorious nation ina war on willingness to fight through legitimizing representations of WWII was also sig-nificant. These findings suggest that social representations of WWII serve as anchors fordetermining the role of a nation in collective violence. Social representations legitimizingpast collective violence seem to facilitate more positive attitudes towards potential future

Please cite this article in press as: Bobowik, M., et al. Victorious justifications and criticism of defeated: Involvementof nations in world wars, social development, cultural values, social representations of war, and willingness to fight.International Journal of Intercultural Relations (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2014.08.013

collective violence in victorious nations.© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

� This work was conducted within the framework of COST Action IS1205 “Social psychological dynamics of historical representations in the enlargeduropean Union”. We are grateful to Chantal Kesteloot for her help in categorizing the countries according to their status during WWII.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34943015738; fax: +34943015670.

E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Bobowik).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2014.08.013147-1767/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2014.08.013


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ARTICLE IN PRESSIJIR-1067; No. of Pages 14
2 M. Bobowik et al. / International Journal of Intercultural Relations xxx (2014) xxx–xxx

Contents

1. How one’s country’s involvement in world wars can influence people’s support for future collective violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 002. Socio-structural factors, cultural values, social representations of WWII and culture of war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 003. Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 004. Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00

4.1. Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 004.2. Procedure and materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00

4.2.1. The country’s status during WWII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 004.2.2. Cultural dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 004.2.3. Evaluation and importance of WWII and WWI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 004.2.4. Social representations of World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 004.2.5. Willingness to fight for one’s country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00

5. Analytical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 006. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00

6.1. Social representations of WWII and WWI: Descriptive data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 006.2. The country’s status during the WWII and social representations of world wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 006.3. Social representations of WWII and willingness to fight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 006.4. The mediation analyses: The effect of cultural indices on willingness to fight through SR of WWII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 006.5. The mediation analyses: The effect of the country’s status in WWII on willingness to fight through SR of WWII . . . . . . . . 00

7. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00

The experience of world wars has left a permanent mark on the collective memory of most nations across the globe.Generally, warfare and collective violence were found to account for 48%, and politics for 27% of events nominated asimportant in international surveys on social representations of history (Liu et al., 2009). Even though wars produced only2% of the 20th century’s death toll (Layard, 2005), people stress the role of political violence in world history becausesuch extreme and negative events have a great impact on individuals’ perception and cognition (Baumeister, Bratslavsky,Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997).

Even if research has confirmed that most war-related events are considered crucial for social representations (SR) of uni-versal history (Liu et al., 2009; Techio et al., 2010), world wars, and particularly WWII, stand out compared to other warfare-related events as they are universally considered as the most relevant historical events in world’s history. That is, world warsbelong to the central nucleus of spontaneously evoked representations of history (Liu et al., 2005, 2009). Especially WWII isconsidered a “critical juncture” point in world history because it led to the fall or rupture (Liu, Fisher Onar, & Woodward, thisissue) of historical colonial empires and to the reconstruction of political systems in Europe and Asia (Hobsbawm, 2009).Also, whereas 5% of WWI casualties were civilian, 60% of WWII victims included non-combatants, and such atrocities asthe Holocaust committed during WWII transformed the existing historical narratives, meta-narratives and philosophicalthinking about the human condition. This might explain why relatively few studies have investigated social representationsof WWI. In this paper, we thus study simultaneously analyze the role of WWII and WWI in predicting intentions of collectivebehaviour.

The SR that people elaborate about the past may play a motivational role for collective behaviour (e.g. Kus, 2013; Smeekes,Verkuyten, & Poppe, 2011; Mols & Jetten, this issue; Klar, this issue), and such impactful historical events as world warsmay have an exceptional and widespread relevance for prompting groups to act collectively. Anchored in the historicalexperience and in the cultural values of nations (Páez et al., 2008), SR of history may help justify actions of the ingrouptowards outgroups (Liu & Hilton, 2005), especially the use of collective violence. More precisely, the present study intendsto address the question whether SR of both world wars may predict intentions of collective behaviour in terms of dispositionto fight in a future war for one’s own country.

1. How one’s country’s involvement in world wars can influence people’s support for future collective violence

Previous research has indicated that historical threats strengthen norms within nations (Gelfand et al., 2011) and incitemore pro-war attitudes (Carnagey & Anderson, 2007). Other studies have shown that being a victorious nation in a war(World War II) was associated with a better recall and a less negative evaluation of the war, and subsequently with astronger willingness to fight for the nation in a hypothetical future war (Basabe & Valencia, 2007; Páez et al., 2008). Wenow address the form of beliefs about war in general and the World Wars in particular that may influence the capacity forcollective violence in the future.


For instance, one can ask how the catastrophe of WWII which inspired a critical and pessimistic view of history thatprevailed in the second half of the 20th century (Dower, 1999; Judt, 2005), may be legitimized. War was and continues tobe central for building nations and states. The experience of victory as a nation in a war may be expected to fuel a nationalnarrative of glorification of the defenders of the homeland and vivid commemorations of battle scenes. The foundational


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vents in a nation’s history are usually independence wars or wars with other nations and these events have profoundmplications for legitimization processes. These social representational mechanisms therefore tend to reproduce the state-ased narratives of history, transmitted by official education and institutional activities such as commemorations, andultivate a “culture of war” (Páez & Liu, 2011).

These processes are best exemplified by the patriotic belief in a just war (see Mols & Jetten, this issue, on such recons-ructions by right-wing political leaders). A belief in “a just war” means that some wars are right because they are perceivedo avenge injury or to maintain earthly justice. These patriotic SR focusing on a positive narrative of violence are usuallyased on the necessity of sacrifice for the good of the nation. Also, collective violence has been frequently legitimized withhe idea of a “holy war” where the nation rises to fight in the name of God to wage war against those lacking in faith andosing a threat to believers. Especially medieval wars or invasions (e.g. Crusades, Muslim conquests, and Ottoman wars inurope) have been characterized as “holy wars”. Religious explanations are often mobilized to justify nationalistic causesWinter, 2006). The “just war” tradition also legitimated both world wars (Walzer, 2004). As regards WWI, for instance, theuge and meaningless casualties in the battle of Verdun were labelled in the patriotic French journals as “a Great Victory”.

n turn, WWII in Anglo-Saxon and Russian collective memories was the “last good war” or “Great Patriotic War” (Neal, 2005;ertsch, 2002; Emelyanova, 2002).Another positive SR of war legitimizing collective violence emphasizes the necessity of war, with all its inevitable conse-

uences, for social change and advance. Among allied nations, WWII was positively connoted as a necessary war to defeatazism or as the war which should be won at all costs. In a similar vein, Russians recall WWII with the label “Great Patri-tic War” that highlights the triumph over foreign invaders and the necessity of defeating Nazism (Pennebaker, Páez, &eschamps, 2006; Wertsch, 2002). Also, the idea of necessary war was present in Poland, where the supporters of the War-

aw Uprising of the uprising claimed that it was necessary because the determination and heroism of the Polish resistanceade Stalin aware of the sacrifice Poles were ready to bear in the name of the independence of Poland. Similarly, in somesian social memories, WWII may have additional meanings of being an anti-colonialist and independence war. In theorld History Survey (Liu et al., 2005), Chinese participants mentioned WWII with two different labels: World War and

ino-Japanese War. Seventeen percent of the respondents mentioned Sino-Japanese War (1931–1945) as a distinctive eventersus 81% recalling WWII.

This pattern confirms that interpreting WWII through its positive political effects, like the nation’s fight for inde-endence, facilitates its legitimization. These representations of the past, dominant in Anglo-Saxon nations as wells in Russia, may contribute to explain their propensity to be involved in new wars, as they enabled them to takection in the international arena in a way that is perceived as relatively legitimate. These world powers may also beore willing to use force “when necessary”, that is, in order to preserve their dominant status, whereas less pow-

rful nations may be more skeptical about the necessity of armed conflict because of their vulnerability and risk ofearing high costs compared to the superpowers. The claim to be “the defenders of the free world” comes more eas-

ly to the United States and United Kingdom than to other nations in view of their role in WWII. Other sources ofositive representations of World Wars are related to the socio-political and technological progresses related to thesexperiences. The creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations, the development of international lawsnd of public interest in human rights, the emergence of new independent nations, and the fall of imperialist pow-rs are seen as positive consequences of WWI and WWII (Judt, 2005). Technological progress in aviation, medicine andommunications are also viewed as positive consequences—even if the evaluation of the atomic power is ambivalentDower, 1999). Together, these legitimizing SR of war have important consequences as they reinforce a culture of war-are.

In contrast, critical SR of war tend to focus on suffering, victims, the murder of civilians, and the meaninglessness ofghting (Lomsky-Feder, 2004; Rosoux, 2001; see Klar, this issue, for alternative Biblical perspectives used to position aolitical paradigm for the present in Israel, from critical to glorifying in-group aggression). These representations emphasizeWII’s huge number of casualties, the Holocaust, extreme destruction, and evil (Dower, 1999; Judt, 2005). The narrative

ased on the negative effects of wars as social catastrophes was largely shared after WWI and WWII, mainly by pacifists.n the case of WWI, the already mentioned battle of Verdun was labelled as “the slaughter” (Winter, 2006; Judt, 2005).oday, the defeated nations of the WWII Axis do not tend to conceal the negative aspects of their participation in WWIInymore but, for example, German defensive narratives stressing the “normality” and decency of the German Army andenying its important role in the Holocaust and the brutality on the Eastern Front, were overcome only in the last 20ears. Usually, the ingroup’s suffering is a core aspect of the social representations of WWII, as illustrated by the Japanesemphasis on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The prevalence of negative meanings of war could explain why, in previous research,efeated nations reported a low willingness to fight in a new war for the nation (Dower, 1999; Páez et al., 2008; Liu et al.,012).

Still, existing empirical research on how SR of the world wars may incite or motivate violent collective behaviours scarce and limited. Páez et al.’s (2008) study was based on free recall and a relatively small sample. Therefore, theresent study sought to overcome these methodological limitations as well as extend the study of SR of world wars


hrough a quantitative examination of the deeper systems of meaning that people around the world draw from in ordero make sense of the experience of world wars. Little research has been dedicated to the specific consequences thatay people attribute to WWII and to analyzing how they relate to their willingness to fight in a new war (Bobowikt al., 2010), and this previous research focused mostly on countries little or not involved in world wars (Spain, Portugal


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and Latin American countries) and therefore could not take into account the role of the country’s status during thewar.

2. Socio-structural factors, cultural values, social representations of WWII and culture of war

Notably, when considering nations as units of analysis, the role of socio-structural factors, such as the level of devel-opment, and culture, as an integral component comprising shared values and behaviours (Bond & Smith, 1996; Schwartz,2011), needs to be examined. Societal psychology requires encompassing structural, processual, and macro-psychologicalindices to complement micro and psychological processes (László & Wagner, 2003). The way a nation constructs its socialrepresentations world wars may also depend on such factors as its level of social development and prevalent cultural values.

Research has indeed revealed that the culture of peace is a consequence of social development. Social (or human) devel-opment can be defined through indices of high literacy, life expectancy, and income (UNDP, 2007). Culture of peace requiresa society to have access to education as well as endorse equality, tolerance, and freedom (De Rivera, 2004). One of the majordimensions of culture of peace, liberal development, places a special emphasis on social development, next to democraticdevelopment and gender equality. Confirming this idea, empirical evidence has demonstrated that GDP is associated withthe opposition to military rule and less willingness to fight a war for one’s country (Diener & Tov, 2007). These findings fitwell the theory of modernization (see Inglehart & Welzel, 2010) which posits that the nations with low social development,leaving traditional culture for a modern industrial one, may appraise war as more positive in this modernization frame-work. That is, collective violence can then be seen as a price to pay for achieving development and hence historical progress(Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, Halman, & Luijkx, 2004).

As far as cultural antecedents are concerned, important cultural facets which may affect one’s willingness to fight is theway people understand power relations (power distance) within the society and whether they feel obliged to care about thewelfare of the society as a whole (collectivism versus individualism) (Hofstede, 2001). Whereas power distance expresses thedegree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally, individualismrefers to a loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are expected to take care of themselves and their immediatefamilies only. Conservative values may also be of importance for predicting pro-war attitudes. For instance, Inglehart’s tra-ditional values emphasize the importance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority and traditional family values.Importantly, these societies have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook (Henderson-King, Henderson-King,Bolea, Koches, & Kaufman, 2004; Nelson & Milburn, 1999). Previous empirical research has also demonstrated that a lessnegative evaluation of WWII and willingness to fight in a war were associated with high power distance and collectivisticvalues (Basabe & Valencia, 2007; Diener & Tov, 2007; Páez et al., 2008; Fischer & Hanke, 2009). These values are plausiblyassociated with a more positive view of WWII, and with an emphasis on a positive narrative of collective violence and war(see Liu et al., 2012).

Also, it should be highlighted that highly developed nations tend to endorse post-materialistic values, making referenceto promoting high subjective well-being, encouraging tolerance, and trusting people, in contrast with materialistic valueswhich reflect the desire for fulfilment of material needs (such as security, sustenance and shelter) (Basabe & Ros, 2005;Inglehart et al., 2004). Special emphasis on post-materialistic values is being put by the middle and upper social classes inWestern developed countries whereas most other nations are generally materialistic. In turn, materialistic non-Western andless developed societies may have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook and may evaluate past wars lessnegatively. Confirming these ideas, using a 30-nation sample, Liu et al. (2012) found that a cross-cultural factor gathering“historical calamities” (e.g. WWI and WWII, the Holocaust, or the Atomic Bombing) in the evaluation of historical eventspredicted willingness to fight for one’s country. Non-Western societies, almost without exception, evaluated historicalcalamities much less negatively but they also tended to be more willing to fight than Western societies did. The less negativeevaluation of past collective violence fits well the content of Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) cross-cultural dimension of survivalversus self-expression. Non-Western societies perceive the SR of past socio-political violence (i.e. historical calamities) moreas a part of the process of survival and progress, whereas Western societies see them as something horrible and fortunatelypast as they live in an era of self-expression.

Taken together, one possible explanation for the association between social development, individualistic and low powerdistance values, and a less favourable attitude towards war may lie in the transition from a developing, industrial, and mate-rialistic society to a developed and post-materialistic one. This transition is reflected in a shift from a relatively positive socialrepresentation of war as just and necessary and a positive connotation of collective violence, towards a more negative socialrepresentation of warfare as a social catastrophe associated with suffering, victimization, and the meaninglessness of fighting(Lomsky-Feder, 2004; Rosoux, 2001). Based on this argumentation, we expect that the relationship between socio-culturalfactors and willingness to fight will be mediated by social representations of WWII, where legitimizing representationsreinforce this association.

In brief, the aim of this study was therefore to examine whether the evaluation and perceived consequences of world


wars would be different according to type of involvement of a nation in a war (being a victorious, defeated or a not involvedcountry), and according to cultural indices characterizing a nation. Furthermore, the study will seek to examine to whatextent these processes may explain intentions of collective behaviour in terms of disposition to fight in a future war. Withthis purpose, we analyze these processes considering nations as units of analysis.


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. Hypotheses

First, we expected that being a victorious country (compared to defeated and, to a lesser extent, not involved countries) inWII would be related to positive evaluation of WWI and WWII, reflecting a positive view of violence in history. In a similaray, victorious nations, compared to defeated (and not involved) nations, should report more agreement more with SR ofWII as a just and necessary war, and disagree with SR of WWII as a social catastrophe (H1). In addition, involved coloniesould also exhibit a more positive SR of WWII compared to defeated and not involved countries, although in a lesser extent.

econd, victorious countries (both principal actors and involved colonies) should also be more willing to fight in a futurear than defeated and not involved (H2). Third, we hypothesized that viewing WWII as a just and necessary war in history,ith positive political (e.g. the creation of the UN) and technological consequences, reinforces a pro-war attitude, whileerceiving WWII as a social catastrophe is associated not only with a more negative evaluation of this episode of collectiveiolence, but also with a lower readiness to fight in a new war (H3). Next, we additionally predicted that cultural indicesould also be associated with willingness to fight through a mediating variable of legitimizing vs. critical SR of WWII (H4).

inally, we expected that SR of WWII would play a mediational role between the country’s status in WWII and willingness toght (H5), controlling for HDI. Being a directly or indirectly (as in the case of former colonies) victorious nation, compared toeing a defeated nation would be associated with more willingness to fight because it leads to strengthening the legitimizingR of WWII. In turn, being a defeated nation would lead to less willingness to fight compared to other groups because iteads to more critical SR of WWII.

. Method

.1. Participants

The data analyzed in this study were collected from a total of 6628 university students from 36 countries spread acrossix continents (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Fiji, France, Germany, Hongong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru,hilippines, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tunisia, USA and UK). Participants wereostly social science students (history as a major was excluded). At the national level, the average percentage of female

articipants per sample was 63% and the participants mean age ranged in terms of country means from 18.96 (SD = 1.65) inhilippines to 34.09 (SD = 13.31) in Pakistan with an average mean age per sample of 21.99 (SD = 4.16). Sample sizes rangedrom 78 to 346 with a mean sample size of 184 participants. Basic socio-demographic characteristics of the 36 samples areresented in Table 1.

.2. Procedure and materials

Among predictors in the present study we included the country’s status in WWII, cultural values and the human devel-pment index.

.2.1. The country’s status during WWIIAll the countries were categorized by two external experts (historians) according to their status during the WWII as

ither on the winners’ side, on the losers’ side, involved colonies (or former colonies of implicated nations), or not involvedountries (see Table 1). Thus, the victorious countries after the WWII included Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, France,he Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, UK, USA and Russia. Involved colonies (or former colonies) included other nations,sually former colonies, indirectly involved in the war, and therefore included Argentina (it remained neutral during mostf the war and only joined the Allies at the very end of the war), Brazil (with a real but low profile participation in the warffort; Brazil sent troops to fight with the Allies), Colombia, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Peruwith no involvement in war effort), Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Tunisia. Portugal, Spain, andwitzerland were not involved in the war. Spain sent troops to fight on the Russian front but was formally neutral, as wasortugal. The defeated nations, belonging to the Axis powers, were Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy and Japan.

.2.2. Cultural dimensionsIn order to examine the effects of cultural dimensions on willingness to fight we used the human development index and

hree well-known indicators of cultural values: post-materialism, power distance, and collectivism–individualism.

.2.2.1. Human development index (HDI). HDI for each country was extracted from the datasets available at the United


ations Development Programme website (United Nations Development Programme, 2007). HDI is a composite statisticased on objective indicators of long and healthy life (life expectancy), education (years of schooling and expected yearsf schooling), and standard of living (GNI per capita). The index range is from 0 to 1, with Norway the highest (.968) andakistan the lowest (.562) among the countries under study. In order to ensure comparability with other cultural scores andnterpretability of the results, the HDI scores were multiplied by 100 (see Table 2).


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(2014) xxx–xxx

Table 1Socio-demographic data and means in social representations of WWII, evaluation and importance of WWII and WWII, and country’s status during WWII.

N Female Age Necessarywar

Justwar

Socialcatastrophe

ColdWar

Technology FormulationUN

Democracy WWIIevaluation

WWIIimportance

WWIevaluation

WWIimportance

Warstatus

N M SD M M M M M M M M M M M

Argentina 346 164 22.51 4.77 3.26 3.47 5.88 4.26 4.98 5.46 4.76 1.95 6.37 1.98 6.27 CAustralia 179 134 27.34 12.13 3.96 4.54 5.69 4.1 4.67 5.46 5.02 1.94 5.96 1.99 5.79 WAustria 194 112 25.07 4.63 2.83 3.02 6.01 4.04 4.73 5.58 5.78 1.31 5.70 1.51 5.41 LBelgium 136 111 20.56 4.47 3.22 4.68 6.21 4.13 4.60 5.96 5.40 1.69 6.36 1.85 6.04 WBrazil 209 153 24.02 7.40 3.76 3.88 4.57 3.95 5.67 5.56 4.99 2.24 5.67 2.05 5.27 CBulgaria 237 200 19.41 1.06 3.77 3.96 6.23 4.55 4.87 5.73 4.98 1.57 6.58 1.66 6.43 LCanada 195 132 19.55 4.62 4.36 4.71 5.23 4.08 4.79 5.56 5.09 2.19 6.23 2.28 6.11 WChina 182 101 19.76 1.17 4.58 4.99 5.61 4.55 5.43 5.19 5.13 2.82 6.03 2.63 5.55 WColombia 159 78 21.26 2.86 4.11 3.81 4.82 4.10 5.28 5.67 5.08 2.38 5.94 2.42 5.83 CFiji 165 85 22.22 3.01 5.29 4.76 4.54 4.12 5.75 6.27 5.99 3.15 5.16 2.82 4.99 CFrance 96 85 20.61 4.74 3.38 4.86 6.22 4.39 4.54 5.79 5.09 1.73 6.47 1.82 6.21 WGermany 146 76 23.95 3.35 2.72 3.56 6.08 4.21 4.15 5.42 5.17 1.35 6.19 1.66 5.63 LHong Kong 151 98 – – 4.06 4.39 5.11 4.43 4.83 5.07 4.91 2.44 5.95 2.49 5.74 CHungary 184 118 21.35 2.21 2.86 3.04 6.03 4.33 4.99 5.30 4.66 1.33 6.28 1.46 6.05 LIndia 200 100 21.26 2.83 4.56 3.94 3.97 3.87 5.41 5.45 5.31 2.67 4.93 2.40 4.87 CIndonesia 198 92 20.69 2.39 5.07 4.65 4.11 3.85 5.54 5.47 5.29 2.41 4.88 2.34 4.61 CItaly 141 77 24.25 7.77 3.13 3.82 5.70 4.01 4.65 5.74 5.23 1.52 6.27 1.69 6.07 LJapan 111 58 21.07 1.53 3.60 2.51 6.47 4.98 5.07 4.73 4.79 1.93 6.09 2.28 5.57 LMalaysia 197 158 23.64 4.38 4.46 4.27 4.28 4.19 5.59 5.44 5.75 2.90 5.40 2.74 5.29 CMexico 198 100 20.19 2.04 4.08 3.59 5.34 4.54 5.69 5.59 5.02 2.38 6.40 2.40 6.18 CNetherlands 199 161 19.73 2.92 3.12 3.89 5.90 4.01 4.67 5.48 5.40 1.45 6.28 1.80 5.71 WNew Zealand 150 114 21.00 6.20 3.85 4.74 5.79 4.15 4.87 5.57 4.97 1.93 6.26 1.91 6.01 WNorway 177 114 22.47 3.57 3.32 4.42 6.01 4.55 4.35 5.27 4.87 1.66 6.14 1.86 5.47 WPakistan 106 40 34.09 13.31 4.16 3.92 4.77 4.45 5.04 5,00 5.11 2.67 5.02 2.51 4.98 CPeru 78 58 20.42 3.06 3.19 3.33 5.91 4.23 4.86 5.70 4.84 1.86 6.26 2.05 5.89 CPhilippines 330 218 18.96 1.65 4.97 4.66 4.18 4.01 5.56 5.98 5.68 2.39 5.62 2.40 5.27 CPortugal 189 128 19.91 2.71 4.15 4.82 4.91 4.41 5.73 6.18 5.69 2.06 6.32 2.08 6.12 NRussia 214 101 20.97 3.61 3.48 4.77 5.57 4.14 4.67 4.82 4.11 2.14 5.93 2.24 5.66 WSingapore 220 162 20.89 1.45 4.35 4.48 5.51 4.25 4.66 4.95 5.02 2.02 6.00 2.20 5.54 CSouth Korea 217 118 21.02 2.39 4.56 4.46 3.59 3.55 5.24 5.31 5.28 2.72 5.46 2.71 5.16 CSpain 231 169 23.90 7.09 3.24 3.70 6.16 4.19 4.76 5.47 4.87 1.60 6.26 1.73 6.00 NSwitzerland 142 104 21.42 3.47 2.82 4.06 6.44 4.92 4.63 5.26 4.58 1.44 6.55 1.64 6.19 NTaiwan 284 134 20.65 1.84 4.75 4.68 5.36 4.65 5.48 5.39 5.23 2.57 5.97 2.62 5.56 CTunisia 93 71 23.31 5.98 4.52 5.03 4.96 4.26 5.77 5.38 4.77 3.33 6.04 3.11 5.86 CUK 121 60 22.69 7.74 4.26 4.67 4.93 3.99 4.50 5.10 4.83 2.42 5.92 2.41 5.67 WUSA 253 145 19.67 1.22 4.32 5.64 6.04 4.92 4.89 5.48 5.10 2.51 6.54 2.67 5.91 W

Note. L—losers’ side, N—not involved, C—involved colonies or former colonies, W—winners’ side.


ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelIJIR-1067; No. of Pages 14


Table 2Cultural values, human development index and willingness to fight by country.

IDV PDI TS PM HDI (2007) WF (WHS)

Argentina 46 49 −66 38 787 3.25Australia 90 36 21 175 931 3.58Austria 55 11 25 143 879 3.02Belgium 75 65 50 113 891 3.43Brazil 39 69 −98 61 710 3.55Bulgaria 30 70 115 −112 766 4.43Canada 80 39 −26 191 909 3.29China 20 80 80 −116 662 5.47Colombia 13 67 −187 60 698 4.45Fiji – – – – 695 5.38France 71 68 63 113 885 3.54Germany 67 35 117 44 907 3.87Hong Kong 25 68 120 −98 877 4.07Hungary 80 46 40 −122 826 3.76India 48 77 −36 −21 525 5.04Indonesia 14 78 −48 −80 595 4.95Italy 76 50 13 60 878 2.74Japan 46 54 106 −5 903 2.59Malaysia 26 104 −73 9 753 5.57Mexico 30 81 −147 103 758 4.01Netherlands 80 38 71 139 911 3.32New Zealand 79 22 0 186 912 3.65Norway 69 31 139 271 952 4.42Pakistan 14 55 −142 −125 498 5.71Peru 16 64 −136 3 716 2.87Philippines 32 94 −121 −11 636 4.84Portugal 27 63 −90 49 806 3.65Russia 39 93 49 −142 770 5.03Singapore 20 74 −28 −64 877 4.83South Korea 18 60 113 −55 890 4.04Spain 51 57 9 54 874 2.64Switzerland 68 34 74 190 901 2.64Taiwan 17 58 116 −118 – 3.78Tunisia1 38 80 – – 694 5.89UK 89 35 6 168 867 3.76USA 91 40 −81 176 929 2.96

N(S

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ote. IDV—individualism; PDI—power distance; TS—traditional/secular–rational values; PM—Post-materialism; HDI—human development index; WFWHS)—willingness to fight from WHS.ample mean: 1 For Tunisia we used Hofstede’s general indices for Arab countries.

.2.2.2. Materialism-post-materialism (PM) and traditional–secular–rational Values (TS). We included Inglehart’s nationalcores of survival/self-expression or post-materialism and traditional/secular-rational available for 32 nations from the

VS (Inglehart et al., 2004, wave 5, 2006).

.2.2.3. Power distance (PDI) and individualism–collectivism (IDV). Hofstede reports scores on these two dimensions for 53ations and regions (Hofstede, 2001). These ratings are based on data collected from IBM employees throughout the worldround 1960. Hofstede’s (2001) scores show high convergent validity with current surveys of values and with currentross-cultural studies. For instance, Hofstede’s PDI scores correlate −.60 with Inglehart’s post-materialism (Basabe & Ros,005).

The examined mediating processes were operationalized through the measurement of evaluation and importance ofWII and WWI, as well as SR of WWII.

.2.3. Evaluation and importance of WWII and WWIFor the purposes of this study we focused on the evaluation and importance of WWII and WWI evaluated in the World

istory Survey (WHS). Details of this inventory of events, both comprehensive and content rich, are available in Liu et al.2012). Participants were asked to rate world events and leaders in terms of their positivity-negativity (1 = extremely neg-tive, 7 = extremely positive) and importance (1 = not at all important, 7 = extremely important). The means per country forhese items are presented in Table 1.

.2.4. Social representations of World War II


The measure of SR of WWII in WHS consisted of seven items concerning World War II and placed on a 7-point Likert scalerom 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed orisagreed with 7 statements about World War II. Specifically, the instructions were: “Many people see World War II as one ofhe most important event in world history. How would you rate the following explanations for the main effects and meaning


G Model

of WWII? (Please, use the scale from 1 to 7)”: (a) “Necessary War (end of colonization and beginning of independence formany nations)”; (b) “Just War (to stop Nazi, fascist, and Japanese aggression)”; (c) “Social Catastrophe (casualties, destruction,human suffering)”; (d) “Cold War (establishment of Communist and Capitalist blocks)”; (e) “Technological and ScientificAdvance” and “Formation of United Nations and Declaration of Human Rights” (positive effects); and (f) “Democracy andEconomic Reconstruction”. The means for the seven beliefs per country are presented in Table 1.

4.2.5. Willingness to fight for one’s countryFinally, the outcome variable in this study was willingness to fight in a future war. Participants’ disposition to fight in

a war (for means see Table 2) was operationalized through the following question adapted from the World Value Survey(Inglehart et al., 2004): “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, wouldyou be willing to fight for your country?”). Participants were asked to indicate their disposition to fight in a war on a scaleranging from 1 (definitely no) to 7 (definitely yes). In order to estimate the representativeness of our student samples, wecorrelated the national means from the present study with the national means extracted from the WVS data collected in54 nations (presented in Table 2), using large representative samples (ranging from 1000 in Argentina to 2500 in Russia;fieldwork carried out in 1999–2002), where participants were asked to answer “yes” or “no” to the same question. Thepercentage of affirmative answers per country was used in the analyses (see Inglehart et al., 2004, page E012 for nationalscores). Confirming the validity of the data, the society-level means of pro-war attitudes of university samples surveyed inWHS for this study correlated strongly, r (25) = .72, p < .001, with the representative samples indicator of willingness to fightextracted from the WVS.

5. Analytical strategy

Current culture-level analyses are based upon aggregation of individual-level data. This study explores the relationshipbetween the country’s role in a war, cultural indices, SR of world wars and disposition to fight in a future war from survey-based data at the national level (using nations as units of analysis). We used ANOVAS with bootstrapping to test H1 and H2.To test H3, we applied bivariate Pearson’s correlation analyses. In order to test the mediation hypotheses (H4 and H5), weused the SPSS macro for bootstrapping indirect effects (Hayes & Preacher, 2011), which provides indirect effect estimatesfor multiple mediators, standard errors (SEs), and the confidence intervals (95% CIs) derived from the bootstrap distribution(based on 10,000 samples). This procedure permits work with small samples and may detect significant indirect effectswhich may exist even if the total effect of the predictor on the outcome (without controlling the effect of mediation) is notsignificant (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Bootstrapped confidence intervals are superior to the standard forms of estimatingstandard errors of indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). An indirect effect is significant if the CI does not include the 0value. When analyzing the effect of the multi-categorical independent variable (such as country’s status in the case of H5),k − 1 variables coding groups are automatically generated (where k is the number of groups) using indicator type coding.In this type of coding, each group is compared to the reference group, which in our case was the losers’ side. Stratifiedbootstraping was used for this type of coding. Mediational analyses with cultural values and HDI as predictors were testedseparately for each of the predictors in order to avoid multicollinearity (correlation between these indicators ranged from.39 to .70). In mediational analyses with country’s status during WWII as a predictor, we introduced HDI as a covariate inorder to test the effect of country’s status during WWII above the effects of this cultural dimension. We selected HDI as acovariate because it is an indicator which reflects objective differences between the nations under analyses.

6. Results

6.1. Social representations of WWII and WWI: Descriptive data

First, we examined the evaluation of and the importance ascribed to WWII and WWI. WWII was generally negativelyevaluated (M = 2.13, SD = .53, 95% CI [1.95; 2.31]), with a minimum score of 1.33 or 1.35 for the countries of the Axis (Austriaand Hungary, and Germany, respectively) and a maximum score of 3.33 in Tunisia. It was rated as an important event(M = 5.98, SD = .46, 95% CI [5.83; 6.14]). In a similar way, WWI was evaluated as negative (M = 2.18, SD = .41, 95% CI [2.03;2.31]) and important (M = 5.69, SD = .43, 95% CI [5.54; 5.84]). The most negative evaluation was by Hungary (M = 1.46),followed by Austria (M = 1.55), Germany, Bulgaria (all belonging to the losing “Central Powers”; see Table 1) and Switzerland(a neutral nation).

As regards the meanings and consequences of WWII, considering national means above 4 as suggesting agreement,all the nations agreed with the idea that one of the main effects of WWII was democracy and economic reconstruction(M = 5.10, SD = .37, 95% CI [4.98; 5.23]), was conducive to the creation of United Nations and Declaration of Human Rights(M = 5.47, SD = .34, 95%CI [5.35; 5.58]) and enhanced technological and scientific advance (M = 5.02, SD = .45, 95%CI [4.87;5.18]). However, 94.4% of nations also agreed with the idea of WWII as a social catastrophe because of human suffering and


destruction (M = 5.39, SD = .77, 95%CI [5.13; 5.65]).), and 86.1% with the idea that this war caused the Cold War (M = 4.26,SD = .31, 95%CI [4.15; 4.36]). Only 58.3% of nations’ viewed WWII as a just war (M = 4.21, SD = .66, 95%CI [3.99; 4.44]) and50% as a necessary war (M = 3.89, SD = .69, 95%CI [3.66; 4.12]). Importantly, whereas the participants overall agreed with theidea of WWII as leading to democracy, the creation of the UN, and technological advance but at the same time as a social




Table 3Country-level correlations of beliefs about the meaning of WWII evaluation and importance of WWII.

WWII WWI

Evaluation Importance Evaluation Importance

WWII as a necessary war .87** −.59** .84** −.53**

WWII as a just war .50** −.04 .49** −.06WWII as a social catastrophe −.73** .79** −.65** .68**

WWII as leading to cold war −.11 .50** −.03 .39*

WWII as leading to technological advance .71** −.45** .63** −.36*

WWII as leading to UN formation −.03 .08 −.12 .16WWII as leading to democracy .22 −.41* .18 −.40*

Note. *** p < .001.**

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p < .10.

atastrophe (the confidence intervals did not include the theoretical mean), there was not a clear agreement with the ideaf WWII as just or necessary (the CIs included the theoretical mean).

As regards the relationship between lay conceptions of WWII and evaluation and importance of both world wars (Table 3),ivariate Pearson’s correlation analyses indicated that justifications and beliefs in the positive consequences of WWII –greement with WWII as a necessary and just war, and leading to technological and scientific progress – were associatedith a less negative evaluation of WWII and WWI. In contrast, the perception of WWII as a social catastrophe correlated withegative evaluations of WWII and WWI. The stronger the belief that WWII was a necessary war and leading to technologicaldvance and democracy, the less both world wars were considered important. In turn, the stronger was the perceptionf WWII as a catastrophe leading to the Cold War, the more importance participants ascribed to these historical collectivexperiences.

.2. The country’s status during the WWII and social representations of world wars

Next, we tested whether being a victorious nation in WWII, as compared with being a defeated nation, was related toositive evaluation of world wars and the endorsement of legitimizing SR of WWII, and with disagreement with SR criticalf WWII (H1). Victorious nations should also be more willing to fight than defeated nations. The means by country’s statusuring WWII are presented in Table 4.

ANOVA results provide bootstrapped CIs for multiple comparisons. Confirming H1, these results revealed than defeatedations evaluated WWII more negatively than involved colonies, 95%CI [−1.26; −.74], and victorious nations, 95%CI [−.83;.24]. Involved colonies also evaluated WWII more positively than not involved countries, 95%CI [.43; 1.14] but also better

han the directly victorious nations 95%CI [.16; .75]. In the case of WWI evaluation, defeated nations also evaluated it


ore negatively than involved colonies 95%CI [−.98; −.46] and victorious nations 95%CI [−.68; −.12]. Not involved coloniesvaluated WWI more negatively than victorious nations 95%CI [−.58; −.03] and involved colonies, 95%CI [−.86; −.38],hereas involved colonies again evaluated WWI more positively than victorious nations 95%CI [.09; .54].

able 4ocial representations of WWII, evaluation and importance of world wars, and willingness to fight by country’ status during WWII: means and standardeviations.

Losers’ side (n = 6) Country’s status during WWII Winners’ side (n = 11)

Not involved(n = 3)

Involved colonies(and formercolonies) (n = 16)

M SD M SD M SD M SD

WWII evaluation 1.50 .23 1.70 .32 2.50 .40 2.04 .41WWII importance 6.19 .29 6.38 .15 5.69 .50 6.19 .22WWI evaluation 1.71 .30 1.82 .23 2.45 .30 2.13 .33WWI importance 5.86 .39 6.10 .09 5.46 .48 5.83 .24WWII as a necessary war 3.15 .44 3.40 .68 4.32 .59 3.80 .52WWII as a just war 3.32 .55 4.19 .57 4.21 .51 4.72 .42WWII as a social catastrophe 6.08 .26 5.83 .81 4.80 .68 5.75 .40WWII as leading to Cold War 4.35 .36 4.51 .38 4.17 .28 4.27 .29WWII as leading to Technological Advance 4.74 .33 5.04 .60 5.33 .36 4.72 .28WWII as leading to UN Formation 5.42 .37 5.64 .48 5.48 .34 5.43 .32WWII as leading to Democracy 5.10 .40 5.05 .58 5.19 .36 5.00 .34Willingness to Fight (WHS) 3.40 .73 2.98 .58 4.52 .91 3.86 .78





A similar pattern was observed in the case of beliefs about the meaning of WWII. Defeated nations evaluated WWII as anecessary war less than involved colonies, 95%CI [−1.60; −.72], and victorious nations, 95%CI [−1.09; −.20]. Also, involvedcolonies evaluated WWII as necessary more than not involved ones, 95%CI [.20; 1.58] and victorious nations 95%CI [.12; .90].Defeated nations evaluated WWII as a just war less than not involved nations, 95%CI [−1.58; −.22], involved colonies, 95%CI[−1.39; −.40], and victorious nations, 95%CI [−1.87; −.94]. Finally, involved colonies evaluated WWII as a just war less thanvictorious nations 95%CI [−.84; −.19].

Regarding technological and scientific advance as a consequence of WWII, involved colonies agreed with this view morethan more directly involved countries: both defeated 95%CI [.34; .89] and victorious nations, 95%CI [.36; .84] but defeatedand victorious nations did not differ significantly in their agreement with this representation of WWII.

As regards critical SR of WWII, involved colonies perceived WWII as a social catastrophe less than other nations (defeated:95%CI [−1.66; −.90], victorious: 95%CI [−1.33; −.55], and not involved: 95%CI [−1.73; −.24]). Defeated nations consideredWWII to be a catastrophe more than victorious nations, 95%CI [.07; .63]. Finally, not involved nations perceived WWII asleading to Cold War more than involved colonies, 95%CI [.02; .70] yet there were no significant differences between defeatedand victorious nations. No significant differences were found in the case of positive political consequences of WWII suchas creation of UN and democracy. Together, these results largely confirmed our hypothesis 1 that the directly or indirectlyvictorious as compared to defeated (and also not involved) nations endorse more legitimizing and positive representationsof world wars.

Finally, only partially confirming hypothesis 2, involved colonies reported more willingness to fight than the other nations(defeated: 95%CI [.43; 1.76], victorious: 95%CI [.03; 1.24], and not involved: 95%CI [.82; 2.19]). Contrary to our expectations,victorious nations presented less willingness to fight than involved colonies, and did not differ from defeated or not involvednations.

6.3. Social representations of WWII and willingness to fight

Next, we explored the association of SR of WWII and evaluation of both world wars with the outcome variable measuringthe disposition to fight in a war. As predicted (H3), the perception of WWII as a necessary and just war correlated positively,and its perception as a social catastrophe correlated negatively with willingness to fight (see Table 5). Also, the endorsementof technological advances as a consequence of WWII was associated with willingness to fight. The hypotheses where notconfirmed in the case of the endorsement of positive political consequences of WWII. Finally, a less negative evaluationattributed to WWII and WWI was positively associated to the willingness to fight.

6.4. The mediation analyses: The effect of cultural indices on willingness to fight through SR of WWII

In the following step we tested H4 about the indirect role of cultural indices on willingness to fight through SR of WWII.Table 5 shows the correlations between cultural indices and SR of WWII and WWI as well as willingness to fight.

First, in order to simplify and reduce the number of variables, we performed principal components analysis with Varimaxrotation on the variables related to SR of WWII (both beliefs and evaluation of WWII, together 8 items), and saved factorscores with regression method. The analysis yielded three factors that together explained 80.7% of variance. The first factor(eigenvalue 3.83, 41.1% of variance explained after rotation) representing legitimizing SR of WWII included the positiveevaluation of WWII (.95), the necessary war item (.94), the technology advances item (.73), the WWII as a social catastrophe

Table 5Country-level correlations of beliefs about the meaning of WWII, its importance and evaluation with cultural values, HDI, evaluation and importance ofWWII, and willingness to fight.

HDI TS PM IDV PDI WF

Necessary War −.48** −.30 −.31+ −.47** .52** .63**

Just War −.03 .02 .11 .08 .21 .37*

Catastrophe .55*** .40* .31+ .49** −.49** −.60**

Cold War .18 .18 .03 .04 −.10 −.19Technology −.55** −.50** −.39* −.61** .60** .47**

UN Formation −.05 −.34+ .30+ .09 .03 −.09Democracy −.11 −.20 .09 −.14 .06 .18WWII Ev −.57*** −.36* −.35* −.49** .57** .69**

WWII Imp .64*** .24 .39* .45** −.33+ −.61**

WWI Ev −.46** −.29+ −.31+ −.47** .53** .61**

WWI Imp .53** .10 .32+ .39* −.24 −.54**

WF −.67*** −.18 −.52** −.53** .60**

Note: HDI—human development index; TS—traditional/secular–rational values; PM—post-materialism; IDV—individualism; PDI—power distance;Ev—evaluation; Imp—importance; WF—willingness to fight in a war.

*** p < .001.** p < .01.* p < .05.

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tem (−.71), and the just war item (.64). The second factor (eigenvalue 1.57; 21.4%), comprising also a positivistic perception ofWII but emphasizing positive political consequences, included the creation of the UN (.94) and advancement of democracy

.81) items. Finally, the last factor (eigenvalue 1.05; 18.2%) was a critical SR of WWII factor including the Cold War (.98) andocial catastrophe (.66) items. Because we did not find previously a relationship between the country’s status and the itemsncluded in the second factor, only the Legitimizing and Critical factors were used in subsequent analyses.

The bootstrapping mediation analyses confirmed the hypothesis that the cultural values of high power distance (boot-trapped indirect effect: B = .011, SE = .005, 95%CI [.003; .024]), HDI (B = −.002, SE = .001, 95%CI [−.004; −.001]), and lowndividualism (B = −.009, SE = .002, 95%CI [−.021; −.002]), (but not post-materialism and traditional/secular-rational val-es) predicted willingness to fight through the legitimizing (but not the critical) SR of WWII. In other words, highower distance and collectivistic values and low human development are associated with more willingness to fight

n a war because, in cultures characterized by these socio-structural and cultural factors, legitimizing SR of WWII arendorsed.

.5. The mediation analyses: The effect of the country’s status in WWII on willingness to fight through SR of WWII

Finally, we tested H5 regarding the indirect effects of the country’s status during world wars on willingness to fighthrough two mediators: legitimizing and critical SR of WWII (H4), controlling for HDI.

With regard to the status of the countries during WWII, the results of the multiple regression analysis, carried out asecessary steps in mediation analysis revealed that, the total effects of dummy coded country’s status variables on willingnesso fight, controlling for HDI (B = −.005, SE = .00, t = −3.73, p = .002), were not significant. However, both involved coloniesB = 1.42, SE = .40, t = 3.50, p = .001) and the victorious nations (B = 1.22, SE = .37, t = 3.30, p = .002) expressed significantly moreupport for legitimizing SR than the defeated nations, controlling for HDI (B = −.003, SE = .00, t = −2.08, p = .046). In the casef critical SR of WWII, the effect of the country’s status in the war on these representations of WWII was not significant (andeither was the effect of HDI). Finally, controlling for the effect of the country’s status and HDI (B = −.004, SE = .00, t = −2.73,

= .011), there was a significant effect of legitimizing SR of WWII on willingness to fight (B = .48, SE = .16, t = 2.98, p = .003),hereas the effect of critical representations was not significant. Finally, when controlling for SR of WWII, the effect of

he country’s status remained not significant. Importantly, the results confirmed the indirect effects of the country’s statusn willingness to fight through legitimizing SR of WWII. As hypothesized, being an involved colony (bootstrapped indirectffect: B = .68, SE = .27, 95% [.17; 1.26]) or a directly involved victorious nation in WWII (bootstrapped indirect effect: B = .60,E = .25, 95% [.13; 1.13]), compared to being a defeated nation, was associated with willingness to fight because it led toegitimization of the collective violence that occurred during WWII. Indirect effects in the case of critical representations

ere not significant.

. Discussion

The present research sought to answer whether SR of world wars could predict intentions of collective behaviour inerms of disposition to fight in a future war. The results revealed that the acknowledgment, across samples from 36 nations,hat WWII was a social catastrophe and caused the Cold War was stronger than the belief that it was a just and necessaryar. However, the purposes and the burden of WWII were perceived as predominantly positive, as it was related to the

econstruction of democracy, resulting in technological advances and the creation of the United Nations. Globally, theseesults support the importance and consequentiality attributed to WWII, which appears as a source of both pain and sufferingnd of social progress. These results suggest that critical junctures in the past leading to ruptures can retain their influencen the historical trajectories of nations well into the future (see Liu et al., this issue).

As far as status in conflict was concerned, on a general basis being both directly and indirectly involved in WWII on theinners’ side, compared to being a defeated nation or not involved at all, was associated with endorsing more legitimizing

nd less critical social representations of WWII. More precisely, defeated nations evaluated WWII as negative, unnecessary,njust and being a social catastrophe more than victorious nations. Defeated nations evaluated the world wars also as moreegative, unnecessary and unjust than involved colonies, and as more unjust than not involved countries. These results to areat extent replicate, on a larger sample and with a more refined measurement of the perceptions of WWII as well as withore nuanced categorization of countries according to their status during the war, the results of the previous research (Páez

t al., 2008). In other words, more positive meanings were attributed to nations belonging to the winning side in the Worldars. One explanation is that victorious nations (both directly and indirectly involved) tend to legitimize past collective

iolence more than the countries which had to “learn their lesson” and bear long-term consequences of provoking and/ornvolvement in collective harm that ended in failure (see Klar, this issue, on how triumph in the 1967 war changed howsraelis mobilized representations of the past).

However, a nuanced view of the effects of the type of involvement in war is especially reflected in the fact that involvedolonies evaluated world wars more positively and assimilated more legitimizing social representations of WWII than


irectly victorious nations. They also perceived technological and scientific advance as a consequence of WWII more thanore directly involved (defeated and victorious) countries. These findings reflect the modernization processes that these

ountries are still undergoing. Also, for many former colonies the end of both world wars is associated with decolonizationnd probably for this reason these nations consider that WWII was more necessary and a social catastrophe less than other


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nations. Still, one should notice that involved colonies evaluated WWII as a just war less than victorious nations. Together,these results largely confirmed our hypothesis 1 that the directly or indirectly victorious as compared to defeated nationsendorse more legitimizing and positive representations of world wars.

Still, when interpreting these findings, some nuances should be emphasized. The results of the present study also showedthat overall the stronger the belief that WWII was a necessary war and leading to technological advance and democracy,the less both world wars were considered important. In order to disentangle this indeed unexpected finding, we carriedout a post hoc exploration of scatterplots and correlation analyses by country’s status in WWII. These additional analysesdemonstrated that countries perceiving WWII as less necessary but also more important were more likely to be uninvolvedand the countries perceiving WWII as more necessary but less important were involved colonies. Surprisingly, countriesthat view WWII as both more important and necessary were more likely to be defeated than victorious countries. Oneexplanation may be that “necessary” may be understood in the contexts of defeated countries as “inevitable” rather than as“morally necessary”, which may reflect a general tendency to attribute strong causes to very impactful events. Admittedly,the war had even stronger consequences for losers than winners: hence, the more necessary the more important (Fiedler,Freytag, & Unkelbach, 2011; Licata & Klein, 2000).

As regards attitudes towards a future collective violence, contrary to our expectations, victorious nations did not presentmore willingness to fight than defeated or not involved nations and also were less prone to engage in a future war thaninvolved colonies. However, we did confirm that the effect of the country’s type of involvement in collective violence predictsattitudes towards future war indirectly, through elaborated social representations that legitimize past collective violence,even when controlling for differences in social development. These findings resonate with previous research demonstratingthat pro-war attitudes are anchored in successful historical experience of war and a less negative general evaluation (Basabe& Valencia, 2007; Páez et al., 2008). This particular finding is important because it reflects the power of collective memory ofnations. Victory demands seeking legitimizing narratives so that a group can protect its positive social identity and preserveits group morality.

With respect to values, the results showed that less developed, more materialistic, collectivistic and hierarchical culturesalso rated WWII less negatively and agreed more with the positive meaning of WWII and disagreed more with the meaningof WWII as a social catastrophe, being at the same time more willing to fight in a possible future war. These findings suggestthat the more post-materialistic values are cultivated in a society, the less prone people are for collective violence. Together,nations with high level of social development rooted in above all post-materialistic values share a disenchanted view of pastcollective violence as well as future war.

Moreover, the findings confirmed that positive and legitimizing SR of WWII were, as expected, associated with willingnessto fight in a war for one’s country. The representations of WWII as a necessary and just war were the most strongly associatedto a pro-war attitude, while the inhibitory role of WWII as a social catastrophe was less central. Importantly, these morepositive meanings attributed to WWII were also mediating processes in the relationship between low social development,collectivistic and hierarchical values and disposition to fight in a war. These findings resonate with previous studies whichfound that collectivistic and hierarchical values were related to willingness to fight in large samples (Fischer & Hanke, 2009;Basabe & Valencia, 2007). Moreover, a less bleak view of historical calamities (including WWII) as well as a higher readinessto fight characterizes nations of materialistic and hierarchical values or non-Western less developed nations such as formercolonies (Liu et al., 2012). These patterns were largely confirmed by our collective level analysis.

One interpretation of these general patterns of results may be based on the dominant role of WWII as a central event thathelps to construct a general social representation of history–even for nations not directly involved in this event. WWII is amain feature of the SR of history because it is frequently associated with world history and is usually the top listed eventin free-recall tasks. WWII is also linked to the anchoring processes of SR of history (Moscovici, 1961). Anchoring implies acognitive process wherein new social objects are integrated into the pre-existing patterns of representation (for instance,September 11th is like Pearl Harbor and Saddam Hussein is like Hitler) and it involves a social aspect in which a groupgives meaning to a representation (for instance, war against terrorism is a just and necessary war, like WWII) (see Jodelet,2006). WWII not only forms part of the main nucleus of SR of history, but also serves as an “anchor” or central point whengenerating new meanings for more current events entering into public life.

Hence, perceiving WWII as a just and necessary war could be considered as anchoring a stoic view of history, whichimplies a higher acceptance of social and natural calamities (WWII and I, Depression, Tsunami etc.). On the other hand, it ispossible that general values, together with historical experience, frame and help nations to attribute coherent meaning to aspecific event like WWII: a stoic view of history helps to construct a less negative view of WWII as a just and necessary war,while a progressive view of history reinforces the attribution of a positive meaning of technology development to WWII. Thelegitimizing dimensions of social representations of WWII that include also interpretations of WWII as allowing advancesin technology appears as a significant mediator between hierarchical and collectivistic values and willingness to fight in awar, because it actually strengthens the influence of these values on willingness to fight.

Still, more than sharing a positive and glorification oriented view of WWII and wars in general, victorious nations, as wellas less developed nations, more materialistic, collectivistic and hierarchical cultures emphasize a less negative view or stoic


view of history, but not a positive evaluation of WWII or glorification of war. WWII was mostly negatively rated. Even inthe case of positive labels for WWII (Great Patriotic War, Sino-Japanese Independence War) the evaluation was neutral andnot positive (see Liu et al., 2009). In fact, our data did not find cultural predispositions to glorify war or a positive attitudetowards warfare, but rather a cultural variation in the degree to which wars and other calamities are negatively perceived.


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hese results are important because they show the consequentiality of SR of history: a less negative view towards pastistorical collective violence is associated with a favorable attitude towards new wars.

One of this study’s limitations is that it used student samples. However, correlations between our convenience samplend representative national samples on willingness to fight were strong, and usually correlations between national samplesnd students samples in beliefs and opinions are high (Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995; see also Liu et al., 2005, Taiwanese dataor the similarities between adult and student representations). Comparisons between countries using matched samples ofoung adults with higher education probably under-estimates cross-cultural differences (Inglehart et al., 2004) because theyompare participants with similar social background and exposure to a similar “globalized culture”. Obtaining results usinguch restrictive samples increases confidence in the subjective culture associated with the differences, because other morealient cultural differences like educational level and basic quality of life are controlled for. Moreover, the scope of nationsn this study available was large and not limited to WEIRD or western white rich developed samples (Henrich, Heine, &orenzayan, 2010). It is important that results using different scores of cultural values and attitudes showed a convergentattern. The current study also used closed ended judgments of history and complement previous studies bases on freeecall (Liu et al., 2005, 2009).

Taken together, the present research provided empirical evidence that social representations of WWII serve as anchorsor determining the role of a nation in collective violence. These representations are themselves in line with cultural values.ocial representations legitimizing past collective violence may facilitate more positive attitudes towards potential futureollective violence in victorious nations. For this reason, future research should investigate more in depth the link betweenocial representations and the culture of war. More importantly, research questions should be raised to determine howocial representations can be modified or how historical conscientiousness oriented towards positive intergroup relationsan be developed in order to cultivate the culture of peace across nations.

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