Issue No. 899, 19 April 2011

Articles & Other Documents:

Iran Advances Nuclear Program, Increases Arms

Smuggling

N. Korea Continues 'Masking' Illicit Arms Trade, U.N.

Panel Reports

Asia Nuclear Reactors Face Tsunami Risk

N. Korea Ready for Atomic Test any Time: S. Korea

Pakistan Plays Hardball

Pakistan Test-Fires Hatf-IX

Japan Crisis Raises Doubts about Nuclear Fuels Plant at

SRS

Y-12 Material Used in Test of Mock Bomb

Lab Halts Web Access after Cyber Attack

If Pakistan Fails, US Will Also Fail: PM

Revisiting the CTBT: The US' Conundrum

Iran Will Not Hinder Plans for a Nuclear-Free World

India‘s Military‘s Cold Start Doctrine and Impact on

Deterrence Stability in South Asia – Analysis

Russia‘s Military Modernization: The Geostrategic and

Political Implications

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons

of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a

source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents

addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and

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Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force,

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CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Global Arab Network – U.K.

Iran Advances Nuclear Program, Increases Arms Smuggling By Gerlinde Gerber

Monday, 18 April 2011

Iran has been able to take advantage of the World's preoccupation with the wave of unrest in the Middle East to

accelerate its suspected nuclear weapons program and boost arms smuggling to terrorist groups.

Nuclear program

At the occasion of Nuclear Technology Day celebrated in Tehran earlier this month, Iranian scientists and officials

said they had successfully tested advanced centrifuges for enriching uranium and were getting prepared to activate

the country's first nuclear reactor.

Western officials and experts say these gains in Iran's nuclear program could effectively erase setbacks from recent

cyber-attacks and shorten the timeline for acquiring nuclear weapons.

Fereidoun Abbasi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Agency said that "second and third generation" centrifuges had

been produced and tested and that two assembly lines had now been established at the Natanz enrichment site in

central Iran producing uranium enriched to 20 percent purity.

According to Olli Heinonein, a former nuclear safeguards chief for the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN

nuclear watchdog, a few hundred of these new generation centrifuges could produce enough enriched uranium for a

nuclear weapon in less than a year.

"If they can get the new machines performing well, and in large numbers, it will make a big difference," he

explained.

Also this month, Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi confirmed that fuel rods which had been inserted into the

Bushehr power plant last October, but were then removed, were now being reloaded. He added that Bushehr should

reach its "critical phase" by May 5-10.

Moreover, supporters of an Iranian opposition group said recently they had information about another secret Iranian

nuclear facility. The facility is at a site referred to as TABA, west of Tehran, and is designed to manufacture parts

for centrifuges used to enrich uranium.

Iran's Foreign Minister confirmed the existence of such a factory manufacturing centrifuge parts, but said the facility

was no secret and that many other factories in the country were making components for Iran's nuclear program.

Arms smuggling

As international attention is focused on the Middle East turmoil, Iran has also enhanced its efforts to arm terrorist

organizations across the region.

Several cases of Iranian weapons smuggling - by sea, air and land - have been reported during the past two months.

These incidents are part of a long string of arms shipments originating in Iran and destined for terrorist organizations

worldwide.

In March, Israel seized the Victoria cargo ship carrying Iranian weapons to terrorists groups in Gaza.

Just a few days later, Turkey announced it had stopped two Iranian planes to be searched on suspicion of carrying

weapons to Syria.

Still in mid-March, Egyptian security forces shelled and seized several vehicles carrying what were likely Iranian-

supplied arms from Sudan into the country, apparently headed for terrorist organizations in Gaza.

The latest incident took place earlier this month in Sudan, when an air strike killed two people in a car near the city

of Port Sudan. According to some reports, one of the men was "Hamas weapons man", Abdul-Latif Ashkar. The

Sudanese government blamed Israel for the attack.

http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/2011041810773/World-Politics/iran-advances-nuclear-program-

increases-arms-smuggling.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Breitbart News

N. Korea Continues 'Masking' Illicit Arms Trade, U.N. Panel

Reports By Seana K. Magee, Associated Press (AP)

April 16, 2011

NEW YORK, April 16 (AP) - (Kyodo)—North Korea, in defiance of previously imposed U.N. Security Council

resolutions, continues to carry out an illicit trade in nuclear and missile-related materials and arms by employing

various "masking" methods, a panel of nuclear experts working with the council has reported.

The panel has "identified various masking techniques for illicit trade employed by the DPRK such as physical

concealment, mislabeling, false description of cargo/manifest and consignor/consignee and use of circuitous routes,"

according to a 21-page report recently shown to Kyodo News. DPRK is the acronym for North Korea's official

name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The panel under the U.N. committee on North Korean sanctions compiled the report in January to verify

Pyongyang's claims to have built a new uranium enrichment facility.

The panel consists of experts from the five permanent council members -- Britain, China, France, Russia and the

United States -- as well as Japan and South Korea. The report has not been made public due to China's opposition.

According to the report, panel members were concerned about how the "re-exportation" of prohibited goods has

taken place through purchasing companies in various countries. While certificates were signed and used, the unused

items were sent back to North Korea with no evidence of a sale being recorded.

There were also "indications" that sensitive nuclear items "can be bought over the counter" and shipped to North

Korea through various means, including diplomatic cargos, the report said.

Trade offices and even diplomatic missions, it said, are "often charged with illicit trade and covert acquisitions" of

nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and missile-related items and technologies.

It mentioned Pyongyang's failed attempt to acquire ultrapure graphite concentrate processing capability, reported in

June 2010, allegedly involving the country's chamber of commerce through a diplomatic mission.

North Korea has also "established links with overseas criminal networks" to transport and distribute smuggled

cargos, including nuclear-related materials and components, it said.

While it is well known that Pyongyang acquired uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan's disgraced nuclear

scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who admitted to selling nuclear secrets to North Korea, as well as to Iran and Libya,

the report said it "seems very likely" that Pyongyang has acquired advanced technology from both public and private

laboratories and universities in the industrialized countries as well.

As part of its recommendations, the panel called on U.N. member states to provide information on companies and

individuals suspected of being involved in illicit trade to add them to a list of those subject to sanctions such as an

assets freeze and travel ban.

It suggested that among key individuals, Pak Do Chun and Li Sang Kun be added to the list due to their "serious

role" in the development of the nuclear program.

The report said Pak is in charge of military arms production at the Worker's Party of Korea, while Li is head of the

Yongbyon nuclear research center.

The U.N. Security Council adopted two sanctions resolutions imposed on North Korea for conducting two

underground nuclear tests in 2006 and in 2009, respectively.

Much of the latest report was based on discussions with Siegfried Hecker, former chief of the Los Alamos National

Laboratory and co- director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, who visited

the Yongbyon nuclear complex in November, as well as with government officials during meetings in Japan and

South Korea and past reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

During the visit, Hecker was shown the uranium enrichment facility, located about 90 kilometers north of the capital

city, and told that construction of the facility began in April 2009 and was completed prior to his visit.

The report said, however, "The DPRK must have been developing a uranium enrichment program for several years

or decades." Given the required time frame of 10-20 years to reach a pilot plant level, the panel believes it is likely

that the enrichment program began in the according to the report.

It said that panel members believe that North Korea has purchased uranium enrichment clandestinely for a long

period of time "primarily for military reasons or at least for dual-use," meaning both for peaceful and military uses.

The report also pointed out that if the Yongbyon uranium enrichment facility is operated to produce highly enriched

uranium, it could make 25-33 kilograms of it, which would be sufficient for making one to two nuclear bombs per

year.

The panel also believes that North Korea "has enrichment-related facilities other than the revealed enrichment

plant."

There are also concerns over the possibility that the country could potentially export fissile material or the means of

producing it, particularly as it is increasingly in short supply of hard currencies due to economic difficulties.

http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9MKLO080&show_article=1

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Mainichi Daily News – Japan

April 19, 2011

Asia Nuclear Reactors Face Tsunami Risk

JAKARTA, Indonesia (AP) -- The skeleton of what will soon be one of the world's biggest nuclear plants is slowly

taking shape along China's southeastern coast -- right on the doorstep of Hong Kong's bustling metropolis. Three

other facilities nearby are up and running or under construction.

Like Japan's Fukushima No. 1 plant they lie within a few hundred miles of the type of fault known to unleash the

largest tsunami-spawning earthquakes.

Called subduction zones, these happen when one tectonic plate is lodged beneath another. And because the so-called

Manila Trench hasn't been the source of a huge quake in at least 440 years, some experts say tremendous stresses are

building, increasing the chances of a major rupture.

Should that happen, the four plants in southern China, and a fifth perched on Taiwan's southern tip, could be in the

path of a towering wave like the one that struck Fukushima.

"We have to assume they'll be hit," said David Yuen, a University of Minnesota professor who has modeled seismic

probabilities for the fault. "Maybe not in the next 10 years, but in 50 or 100 years."

Asia, the world's most seismically charged region, is undergoing a nuclear renaissance as it struggles to harness

enough power for its huge populations and booming economies.

But China, Taiwan, India and several other countries frantically building coastal facilities have made little use of

new science to determine whether these areas are safe. At least 32 plants in operation or under construction in Asia

are at risk of one day being hit by a tsunami, nuclear experts and geologists warn.

And even when nations have conducted appropriate seismic hazard assessments, in many cases they have not shared

the findings with the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency, leaving experts frustrated and in the dark.

"It's pretty astonishing to a lot of us that so little priority is placed on the work we do," said Kerry Sieh of the Earth

Observatory of Singapore, who has studied and written about the Manila Trench, where pressure has been building

for millions of years.

He is among those who say it is only a matter of time before it snaps.

In assessing the tsunami risks to nuclear power stations, scientists focus on their proximity to subduction faults,

volcanoes and areas frequently hit by underwater landslides --- all of which can trigger seismic waves. Because

giant tsunamis recur, they also look at historic and scientific records, going back up to 4,000 years if possible.

The greatest threat comes from the subduction faults crisscrossing the globe, some far from the minds of

policymakers, nuclear industry officials and the public because it has been so long since they exploded.

In places where tectonic plates that form these faults are "coupled," or stuck together, the stresses are the biggest,

especially if centuries have passed without a major energy-releasing earthquake.

When the strain eventually forces one plate to pop up or dive under the other, the resulting temblor can spawn

mammoth waves like the one that struck off Japan's northeast coast on March 11, triggering the nuclear crisis that

has carried on for more than a month.

While there is some "coupling" at the Manila Trench, there is debate about just how much. Scientists say more

research needs to be done to determine if pressure is building and along which segments.

A computerized simulation by Yuen's students shows a magnitude-9.0 quake along the Manila Trench sending

waves racing along the South China Sea, before slamming Taiwan's southern shore 15 minutes later. The tsunami

reaches China's southeast coast in around two hours. It also strikes Hong Kong, which sits just 30 miles from the

nearest nuclear plant -- close enough to see increased radiation levels if a plant were to be damaged by a Fukushima-

like event.

Scientists paint a worst-case scenario in which waves 15 to 24 feet (5 to 8 meters) high could strike the plants in

China and Taiwan.

Science has come a long way since the first nuclear plant was built in the 1950s.

By carbon dating the ash, pollen or other organic material attached to tsunami sand deposits swept inland with the

giant walls of water, geologists can determine to the decade, and sometimes even the year, when the wave hit and

how big it was when it roared ashore.

That's important because some tsunamis only strike once a millennium.

"This is the smoking gun, the calling card of the tsunami, and when you find it, especially far inland, you know that

this is an area that has been hit with a large tsunami in the past," said Bruce Jaffe, an oceanographer and tsunami

expert at the U.S. Geological Survey.

Such research is considered essential in deciding where to locate nuclear power stations because most are built along

seashores, rivers and lakes to supply the massive amounts of water needed to keep their reactors from overheating.

Even plants perched on hills or cliffs may be in danger because the pipes used to carry up water used for cooling

could be damaged in a powerful tsunami.

Japan, which sits atop three highly active tectonic plates with 54 reactors dotting its coastlines, has probably done

the most when it comes to looking back in history.

Even so, Tokyo Electric Power Co., which runs the hobbled Fukushima plant, did not factor geologic evidence of

the giant Jogan tsunami of 869 A.D. into its preparedness. When the tsunami hit last month, it unleashed waves up

to 42 feet (14 meters) high, swamping the backup generators needed for cooling.

The same region was also walloped twice before, once around 140 B.C. and again sometime between 600 B.C. and

900 B.C., scientific studies revealed.

Experts hope Japan has taught the world an important lesson: When it comes to nuclear safety, it's essential to

imagine the unimaginable. Looking back 50 years, or even 500, is not enough.

"When you're talking about radioactivity and possibilities of explosions ... you have to look at what is within the

realm of possibility," said Jody Bourgeois, a tsunami expert at the University of Washington who was doing

research in Japan when the disaster struck. "You should be building it with factors of safety for the maximum

possible events."

It's not the first time a tsunami has threatened nuclear reactors.

The 2004 earthquake off Indonesia's subduction fault spawned the monster tsunami that killed 230,000 people in a

dozen nations.

It also sent waves slamming into a nuclear plant in the southern Indian township of Kalpakkam, the country's center

of atomic research, nearly a thousand miles from the quake's epicenter.

Though the reactors automatically shut down and no radioactive material was released, it showed that even facilities

far from dangerous faults need to prepare for the worst.

While the near miss in India raised awareness, it did not prompt major changes to the safety design at the Madras

Atomic Power Station, said its director, K. Ramamurthy. Last week, however, a top government official said India

would revamp the safety features at all its nuclear plants to try to prevent a Japan-style crisis.

The Madras plant is among the scores that have yet to ask the IAEA for an independent review to determine if their

tsunami preparedness assessments meet international standards.

The same holds for Pakistan, which built a plant along a coastline near Karachi that was hit by a tsunami in 1945, as

well as for China, Taiwan and the U.S.

Though the reports aren't mandatory, Antonio Godoy, the IAEA's recently retired top seismic safety expert, said

many countries have held up efforts to build a comprehensive database identifying the plants vulnerable to tsunamis

based on such reviews.

The Fukushima crisis does seem to have jolted some governments into action.

Tsunami expert Tso-Ren Wu of Taiwan's National Central University, warns that "we are long overdue" for a

similar quake on the Manila Trench. He was recently commissioned by Taiwan to model worst-case scenarios for all

three of the island's nuclear plants and a fourth under construction. His findings will be used to help redesign the

facilities or raise their seawalls, if necessary.

His studies indicate two plates that form the subduction zone are pushing against each other at a relatively fast 8.7

centimeters (3.4 inches) per year, forcing extreme amounts of energy to build up. A fault slip from the two plates

would be up to 38 meters, comparable to what occurred during the 1960 magnitude-9.5 Chile earthquake, the largest

on record. By comparison, the slips in Indonesia and Japan were estimated at around 20 meters. The greater the slip,

the more water is heaved up to create bigger tsunami waves.

It's not yet clear, however, if the Japan disaster was a wake-up call for energy-starved China, which has the world's

most ambitious nuclear power expansion.

China's nuclear regulators declined to answer questions submitted by The Associated Press, but have said in the past

that plants along their southeastern coast have been fitted with the most modern technology and are able to

withstand huge storm surges from typhoons, which hit with far less force than tsunamis.

As for the likelihood of a mammoth tsunami, Li Zhong-Cheng of the National Energy Center told the state-run

China Daily newspaper after last month's disaster that coastal areas are protected by a wide, shallow continental

shelf that is not conducive to the formation of big seismically triggered waves.

Other scientists say there isn't enough research to make such a declaration.

Some historical records, though inconsistent, indicate a 30-foot (10-meter) tsunami in 1782 from the South China

Sea killed as many as 40,000 people after hitting southern Taiwan. Records also point to a 27-foot wave in 1765 that

swept as many as 10,000 people out to sea in the same province where the Chinese plants are located.

But experts say China needs to look much further back in time.

Unlike Japan, sand deposit studies have just begun there and have not yet yielded evidence of ancient tsunamis.

More research is needed along the coast and in the Philippines -- which would have been within reach of the same

waves.

If that data, along with predictions about future earthquake-spawned tsunamis are not taken into account, some fear

disaster could strike again someday.

Plants in the Mediterranean and along the Atlantic and Persian Gulf also need to be prepared.

The only candidate for a large tsunami in the continental U.S. is the Cascadian subduction zone, more than 200

miles off the West coast. Experts say neither the Diablo Canyon nor San Onofre stations in California are considered

in the path of destruction, though they may still be vulnerable to local tsunamis generated by other faults or

submarine landslides. Both have recently promised to carry out more advanced seismic testing to guarantee safety.

"What happened in Japan was not a surprise," said Godoy, who remains an IAEA consultant and has spent much of

the past 20 years warning governments to prepare for worst-case scenarios. "Maybe now they'll wake up, listen and

act."

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/features/news/20110419p2g00m0fe064000c.html

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Bangkok Post – Thailand

N. Korea Ready for Atomic Test any Time: S. Korea Agence France-Presse (AFP)

Tuesday, April 19, 2011

SEOUL - North Korea is ready to conduct another nuclear test if its current approaches for dialogue fail although

there are no current signs of preparations, South Korea's spy chief said Tuesday.

"Another atomic test is always possible as (North Korea) has various nuclear test sites and construction of (new)

sites is under way," National Intelligence Service chief Won Sei-Hoon was quoted as telling a parliamentary

intelligence committee.

Won's comments to the closed-door session were quoted by ruling party lawmaker Hwang Jin-Ha.

North Korea conducted its first two nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009.

The South's Yonhap news agency reported in February that the North was digging at least two new tunnels at its

nuclear test site in apparent preparation for a third atomic detonation.

"I believe North Korea will use military action such as nuclear and missile (tests) to turn the tables if its current tack

of dialogue fails," Won said.

Multinational talks on ending the North's nuclear programmes in return for diplomatic and economic benefits have

been stalled since December 2008.

Pyongyang has expressed interest in restarting them. But Seoul and Washington say it should first show it is serious

about disarmament and mend cross-border ties.

The North fuelled regional security fears last November by disclosing an apparently functional uranium enrichment

plant, which could give it a second way to make atomic bombs in addition to its plutonium stockpile.

Lawmaker Hwang said Won expressed concern over the safety of the North's ageing nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.

"They appear to be inferior, but we cannot say exactly which part is weak.

So we're paying attention to this problem," the spy chief was quoted as saying.

Regarding the uranium enrichment plant, South Korean officials have questioned whether Pyongyang can build a

facility that meets international safety standards.

Yongbyon for decades has been at the heart of the North's drive for nuclear weapons, with a gas graphite reactor

there having produced enough plutonium for possibly six to eight bombs.

http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/232616/n-korea-ready-for-atomic-test-any-time-s-korea

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Newsweek

Pakistan Plays Hardball Relations with Washington are on the skids. But if the alliance really goes south, only Al Qaeda wins.

By Bruce Riedel

April 17, 2011

Forward Operating Base Bostick - the most northern U.S. military base in Afghanistan. The Swat Valley of Pakistan

is directly across the mountains.

Tensions between Islamabad and Washington have reached a fever pitch in recent months. As President Obama

plans a visit for later this year to the world‘s second-most-populous Muslim country, the White House wants above

all else to fight Al Qaeda and wage its war in Afghanistan. Islamabad has something else in mind.

In January, the war strategy Obama announced more than two years ago was abruptly put in cold storage. After the

American contractor Raymond Davis killed two Pakistanis on a street in Lahore and was then released in March

after $2.3 million in compensation (so-called blood money) was paid to the victims‘ families, the Pakistani public

was more roiled than it has been in recent memory. The majority sentiment is that Pakistan‘s national sovereignty

comes under daily attack from U.S. drones and private contract operatives running around their country killing

people. The Pakistani media fuels the anger, exerting untold amounts of energy on elaborate conspiracy theories

about American spies sneaking around the country setting the stage for an American-Indian-Israeli master plan to

steal Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani Army—which unquestionably remains the power behind the throne—has grown

increasingly restive and angry with American intelligence work over the past two years. For the Army, blunders like

the Davis case or operations like the drone strikes serve as incendiary daily reminders that full control of the

country‘s territory remains out of their grasp.

So what‘s Pakistan‘s solution? The leadership, including Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and

Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, want a return to

what they remember as ―Reagan rules.‖

These rules date back to the CIA-ISI relationship of the 1980s, when the agency and the Saudis provided the ISI

with money and arms to underwrite the mujahedin‘s battle against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Allies, indeed. But

back in those days, Washington remained largely hands-off. They left the administration of the program and the

running of the war to the ISI. The Americans had a very small footprint—fewer than 100 CIA officers ran the entire

covert program in Washington, Islamabad, and Riyadh. In turn, there was rarely, if ever, a sense that Pakistani

sovereignty or dignity was being challenged, much less violated. The ISI called the shots.

Reagan rules also included a tacit agreement that the U.S. would ignore Pakistan‘s nuclear program. Every year the

president certified to Congress that Pakistan‘s nuclear efforts were ―incomplete,‖ allowing U.S. assistance to

continue to flow to Gen. Zia ul-Haq‘s dictatorship. Only after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 did

the U.S. sanction Pakistan for their nuclear program. In 1990 Washington abruptly cut off the supply of F-16s and

other weapons that Pakistan had already paid for. The Pakistani Army has never forgotten that betrayal.

The problem today is that we can‘t go back to this Cold War world. The Pakistani Army and the ISI cannot be relied

upon to fight all of the jihadi Frankensteins they have helped create over the past three decades. Even Pakistan‘s

own president, Asif Ali Zardari, has accused the Army of playing both sides of the war on terror—distressingly, an

abundance of evidence backs him up. Take Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terror group that attacked the Indian financial

capital of Mumbai in 2008, killing 164 people. Today, LeT continues to enjoy Army patronage. Pasha, the

intelligence chief, has even been summoned by a New York City court to answer charges that the ISI oversaw the

Mumbai attack.

Of course, Pakistan is also a victim of terror. Thousands of Pakistanis have died in suicide bombings. Since January,

two senior civilian officials—the governor of Punjab and the minister for minority affairs—have been murdered by

jihadi extremists. According to the United Nations, late Pakistani president Benazir Bhutto, Zardari‘s wife, was

assassinated by Al Qaeda. And Pakistan, more than any other country in the world, has been crucial to the capture of

senior Qaeda operatives, including 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Irrefutable: Pakistan has more

troops deployed fighting jihadi militants on the Afghan border than NATO has in all of Afghanistan.

The complexity and contradictions of Pakistani behavior—most of which is driven by the Army‘s obsession with

India, actually—lies at the heart of the dispute between Islamabad and Washington. There is no simple solution.

Should things go further south, though, there is only one real winner: Al Qaeda. If drone operations slow and the

two intel agencies clam up, Obama‘s goal to ―disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda‖ will become an ever-more-

distant possibility.

Since Pakistan today has the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world—soon to be the fifth largest, just behind

the U.S., Russia, China, and France—Islamabad is growing more and more resistant to outside pressure and

intimidation. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya, the U.S. cannot even consider the use of force to pressure Pakistan,

a fact of which Kayani is very well aware. Not to mention, Pakistan controls the main supply line for NATO forces

from Karachi to Kabul in Afghanistan. Whenever U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan have strayed across the border

to chase terrorists, Pakistan twists a tourniquet on the supply chain.

So at the end of the day, Washington knows it needs Pakistan, no matter how frustrating and irritating the

relationship may be. Meanwhile, India, the target of most of the worst of Pakistani-abetted terror and the target for

its nuclear weapons, finds itself in much the same dilemma. It demands Pakistan destroy Lashkar-e-Taiba and other

militant groups, but it has no means to force Islamabad to do so. It doesn‘t want a failed state on its border armed

with dozens of loose nukes, so it can‘t undermine Pakistan‘s fragile democracy with covert operations that would

only strengthen the extremists. It can‘t intimidate a nuclear rival. So India last month resumed its engagement and

dialogue with Pakistan, which had been suspended after the Mumbai attacks. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

acknowledged that even a frustrating and deceitful dialogue is better than none. So he invited his counterpart to

watch the semifinal of the Cricket World Cup.

The trick, for everyone involved, is to help strengthen those forces in Pakistan that want to get out of the endless

rivalry with India. Then, end Pakistan‘s dance with terror. For all his faults, Zardari is one of those who want a

different approach. So, too, was Benazir. Both Singh and Obama understand this, too. Unfortunately the civilians

and modernists are on the defensive in Islamabad today. In the short term the best help would be for outsiders to

keep the footprint as light as possible. In the long term, however, it‘s the India–Pakistan tensions that drive the most

dangerous tendencies. The battle for the soul of this crucial nation between extremists and moderates is going

poorly. We are the loser.

Riedel, a former CIA officer, is a senior fellow in the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution and the author of

Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad.

http://www.newsweek.com/2011/04/17/pakistan-plays-hardball.html

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The Hindu – India

April 19, 2011

Pakistan Test-Fires Hatf-IX By Anita Joshua

Pakistan on Tuesday claimed to have successfully conducted the first flight test of the newly developed Short Range

Surface-to-Surface Multi Tube Ballistic Missile `Hatf IX‘ (NASR). Viewed by some strategic analysts as Pakistan‘s

answer to India‘s Cold Start Doctrine, NASR has a range of 60 km and ``shoot-and-scoot‘‘ nuclear delivery

capability.

Announcing the test, the Inter Services Public Relations said the quick response system of NASR addresses the need

to deter evolving threats. Addressing the gathering at the undisclosed site of the test, Director General of the

Strategic Plans Division Khalid Ahmed Kidwai said the successful flight marked an important milestone in

consolidating Pakistan‘s strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum.

Further, Lt. Gen (retd) Kidwai pointed out that in the hierarchy of military operations, the NASR Weapon System

provided Pakistan with short range missile capability in addition to the already available medium and long range

ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in its inventory.

Welcoming the test, security analyst, Shireen Mazari, said in a statement that now Pakistan has acquired tactical

nuclear capability with a low yield that can be used in the battlefield. ``It will act as a deterrent against use of

mechanised conventional land forces. This was essential in the wake of India‘s adventurist war-fighting doctrine

formulations which envisaged the use of rapid deployment of armed brigades and divisions in surprise and rapid

attacks.‘‘

Referring to India‘s Cold Start Doctrine, Ms. Mazari added: ``India has always felt that Pakistan had a loophole in

terms of lacking short range battlefield nuclear weapons, which it could exploit on the assumption that it made little

sense for Pakistan to respond to such conventional attacks with strategic nuclear weapons. With NASR, Pakistan has

plugged that loophole. Indian dreams of a limited war against Pakistan through its Cold Start strategy have been laid

to rest. This will allow for a reassertion of a stable nuclear deterrence in the region.‘‘

http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article1709352.ece?homepage=true

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Greenville News – South Carolina

Japan Crisis Raises Doubts about Nuclear Fuels Plant at SRS Massive complex would turn weapons material into fuel

By Tim Smith, Staff Witter

April 17, 2011

The continuing crisis at a Japanese nuclear reactor may affect the future of a $5 billion South Carolina plant

designed to turn nuclear weapons material into reactor fuel for electricity.

The huge construction project at the Savannah River Site is an ambitious attempt to get rid of dangerous nuclear

weapons plutonium by turning it into something called mixed-oxide fuel, or MOX, as part of a nonproliferation

agreement with Russia.

One of the stricken nuclear reactors in Japan contains MOX, and the crippled plant has raised fears that it could

release dangerous plutonium into the atmosphere, which could escalate the crisis.

U.S. nuclear officials have told GreenvilleOnline.com they want to study what‘s happening in Japan before

committing to using the MOX fuel that would be produced here, though MOX isn‘t being blamed for the problems

in Japan and there is no evidence that it has caused any health issues.

The Tennessee Valley Authority, which has agreed to consider using MOX fuel in up to five of its reactors in

Tennessee and Alabama, wants to study what happened with the MOX used in the Japanese reactor before

committing to using it in its reactors, a spokesman said.

―We're still investigating the potential use,‖ said TVA spokesman Ray Golden. ―We are very interested in the

ongoing events in Japan and there likely will be lessons learned.‖

But he said that doesn‘t mean the utility has decided not to use MOX or that it will delay its decision on the issue

past next year.

Ken Bromberg, head of fissile materials disposition for the National Nuclear Security Administration, said the TVA

is conducting an independent safety study on the use of MOX fuel as a result of the Japanese crisis, a step he said is

―prudent and what I would do if I were in their position.‖

TVA agreed to consider using MOX after Duke Energy's interest cooled following a test of the fuel in its Catawba

reactor in Rock Hill. Duke ended testing in 2008 after about three years when an examination found some

excessive growth in the fuel assemblies, according to the company.

TVA hasn‘t agreed to use MOX, only to consider using I,t and hadn‘t planned to make a decision until next year.

That is still the case, said Golden.

―We continue to evaluate the situation,‖ Bromberg said. ―But right now, we don't see any evidence that MOX

played any role in that unfortunate situation in Japan."

MOX opposition

Environmental groups opposed to the MOX factory at SRS likely will use the accident to request more studies from

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which must license the plant and the use of the fuel, an official with one

of the groups said.

Bromberg said there has been no evidence the MOX used in Japan caused the problems there.

―The administration's top priority is the safety of the energy and fuel sources we produce, and as the president has

made clear, as a result of Japan we will continue to evaluate any lessons learned and review all aspects of nuclear

technology used in the U.S., which includes MOX,‖ Bromberg said.

The Japanese crisis is the latest in a string of hiccups for the MOX program, which is designed to convert 34 metric

tons of weapons-grade plutonium into nuclear reactor fuel and may convert an additional nine tons.

The presence of MOX in one of the Japanese reactors has fueled opposition to the U.S. MOX program, which is

scheduled to begin producing fuel in 2018 but has yet to sign a utility to use the fuel.

Critics of MOX have raised questions ranging from its safety to the risks of it falling into the hands of terrorists.

Supporters say MOX has been used safely elsewhere on the globe for many years and will allow the government to

shrink its nuclear arsenal.

Construction on the $4.8 billion MOX complex at SRS began in 2007 and is expected to be completed in 2016.

When completed, the mammoth plant will contain 170,000 cubic yards of concrete, 35,000 tons of steel rebar, 80

miles of piping and three million feet of power and control cable, according to Shaw AREVA MOX Services, which

is building the plant.

Federal review

A three-judge panel of the NRC has agreed to hear contentions by opponents of the MOX factory that Shaw

AREVA MOX Services has failed to adequately address accounting and security controls to prevent plutonium theft

at the plant.

Two of the judges said in their ruling that they consider the issues to be so serious they would have raised the issues

themselves had they ruled the request untimely.

The crisis in Japan was triggered when an earthquake and tsunami knocked out power to the plant‘s six reactors.

One of the three damaged reactors was loaded with about 6 percent of MOX fuel last September.

MOX is a combination of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide. Most commercial fuel is made from uranium.

Plutonium occurs as a natural byproduct when uranium fuel is used in a reactor.

European facilities have recycled spent fuel into MOX for years, and MOX is now used in about 35 reactors around

the globe, but none in the United States.

The MOX to be created at SRS would be different because it would use plutonium from nuclear weapons, not from

spent commercial reactor fuel.

Scientists say the concern about plutonium in reactor fuel is that its release could increase cancer risks in

comparison to uranium.

A committee of the American Nuclear Society reported last month that MOX has been used safely for decades in

other countries and the accident in Japan likely will not show any serious consequences as a result of such fuel.

Other scientists and those opposed to the MOX plant want the Japanese crisis studied more before allowing MOX

use in the United States.

Ed Lyman, senior scientist for the Union of Concerned Scientists, said the amount of plutonium used in the Japanese

reactor is small enough that it likely will make no significant difference in the amount that will escape into the

environment.

However, he said the issue is with larger amounts used in other MOX fuel assemblies or when MOX has been in the

reactor a long time.

Bromberg said weapons-grade MOX has fewer of the plutonium isotopes than MOX made from recycled spent fuel.

Environmental groups are planning to ask the NRC to reopen the environmental impact statement process on MOX

to consider the impacts of the Japanese reactor problems and also potential problems with having MOX in spent

nuclear fuel pools, said Tom Clements, who studies nuclear issues for the group Friends of the Earth.

Glenn Carroll, coordinator for Nuclear Watch South, a group opposed to the plant and one of those that asked the

NRC to consider the accounting and security control protections, said she believes the Japanese nuclear crisis will

have an impact on MOX.

http://www.greenvilleonline.com/article/20110417/NEWS/304170005/Japan-crisis-raises-doubts-about-nuclear-

fuels-plant-at-SRS

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Knoxville News Sentinel

Y-12 Material Used in Test of Mock Bomb B61 Mod 11 mimics strategic weapon's design, performance

By Frank Munger

April 18, 2011

OAK RIDGE - The government recently announced a successful testing of a mock B61 bomb - called a Joint Test

Assembly - and the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge played a role.

The National Nuclear Security Administration and the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command collaborated on a

flight test using a Joint Test Assembly of the B61 Mod 11 Strategic Bomb.

The test device is a detailed mock-up of a nuclear bomb, designed to be as much like the real thing without using the

strategic nuclear materials - highly enriched uranium and/or plutonium.

A B-2A Spirit Stealth Bomber delivered and released the Joint Test Assembly at the Tonopah Test Range in

Nevada, federal officials said.

The actual date of the test was not revealed.

According to information provided by the government, "A JTA contains instrumentation and sensors that monitor

the performance of numerous weapon components during the flight test to determine if the weapon functions as

designed. This JTA also included a flight recorder that stored the bomb performance data for the entire test. The data

is used in a reliability model, developed by Sandia National Laboratories, to evaluate the reliability of the bomb."

Steven Wyatt, a federal spokesman at the Y-12 National Security Complex, confirmed that the Oak Ridge plant

manufactured hardware for the test. Y-12 specializes in so-called secondaries - the second stage of thermonuclear

weapons.

"Y-12 typically provides hardware (for test operations) that is similar to components we manufacture for the nuclear

stockpile," Wyatt said. "However, the special nuclear materials are replaced by surrogate or mock materials. JTAs

can have a variety of configurations depending on the test being performed."

http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/apr/18/y-12-material-used-in-test-of-mock-bomb/

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Knoxville News Sentinel

Lab Halts Web Access after Cyber Attack By Frank Munger

Knoxville News Sentinel

April 19, 2011

OAK RIDGE — A highly sophisticated cyber attack — known as Advanced Persistent Threat — forced Oak Ridge

National Laboratory to shut down all Internet access and email systems over the weekend.

Those restrictions will remain in place until lab officials and others investigating the attack are sure the situation is

well controlled and manageable, ORNL Director Thom Mason said Monday.

Mason said he expects that email functions may be restored today on a limited basis, with no attachments allowed

and restrictions on length.

―We made the decision (at about midnight Friday) to close down the connection to the Internet to make sure there

was no data exfiltrated from the lab while we got the system cleaned up,‖ he said.

The lab‘s cyber specialists had been monitoring the attack and recommended further action after it looked like

efforts were under way to remove data from ORNL systems, Mason said.

Mason said the APT threat at ORNL is similar to attacks in recent times on Google, a security company known as

RSA and other government institutions and corporations.

―In this case, it was initiated with phishing email, which led to the download of some software that took advantage

of a ‗zero day exploit,‘ a vulnerability for which there is no patch yet issued,‖ he said. The vulnerability involved

Internet Explorer, he said.

Mason said the lab has not, to this point, detected any large-scale exfiltration of data, and the decision to shut down

Internet access was made to prevent that or anything similar to a 2007 cyber attack at ORNL in which large amounts

of data were stolen. Following that event, the lab sent 12,000 letters to former lab visitors, informing them that their

Social Security numbers may have been compromised (although there were no subsequent reports of identity thefts

or major problems).

―We haven‘t really completed the post-mortem on what happened, so it would be foolish to kind of speculate on

where things were going,‖ Mason said, when asked about a report that the attack may have originated in China.

―There was no significant exfiltration of data that we detected,‖ he said. ―There were attempts and small volumes of

things that were suspicious in terms of Internet traffic.‖

ORNL has solicited help from throughout government, including other Department of Energy labs. He confirmed

that some outside experts had arrived in Oak Ridge to participate in the investigation.

In addition, he said virtually all of the lab‘s information technology staff (about 200 people) was involved, either in

the investigation or maintaining the functionality of internal systems.

Mason confirmed that some computers were confiscated and quarantined. He also confirmed that the phishing email

messages in this case were disguised as coming from the lab‘s human resource department.

He said that some lessons learned from the 2007 attack helped lab officials with the current situation, but he said this

is a much more advanced attack that the event four years ago.

―Well, if you look at this APT, it is much more sophisticated than what was being used a few years ago,‖ he said.

―Certainly what we‘ve seen is very consistent with the RSA attack. … Whoever is doing this attempts to get a

foothold in the network system, works patiently and relatively quietly to try to expand that and is looking for

specific types of information.‖

Without email or Internet access, thousands of ORNL employees weren‘t able to do business as usual on Monday.

―It hampered our normal communications,‖ said Mason, who was out of town and could not check his email. ―It

means we‘re dusting off some fax machines.‖

http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/apr/19/lab-halts-web-access-after-cyber-attack/

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The News International – Pakistan

If Pakistan Fails, US Will Also Fail: PM Monday, April 18, 2011

ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani has said since the fight against terrorism is a Pakistan-

United States combined effort, if Pakistan fails, the US will also fail.

―By now the US is convinced that we are part of the solution to terrorism but not a part of the problem,‖ the web-

based rt.com quoted the prime minister as saying. He added that terrorism was a global challenge and Pakistan a

frontline state in a global war.

―Terrorism has neither boundaries nor ideology; it is meant only to destabilise. It has no support in Pakistan because

it works for a foreign agenda and is sponsored from abroad,‖ the website quoted the prime minister as saying. He

added that there was also drug money behind terrorism in Pakistan.

About the use of US/CIA drone strikes on Pakistani territory, the prime minister said while Islamabad had been

successful in separating the militants from the local tribes that now supported the government, drone attacks which

kill innocent civilians only helped create sympathy for terrorists among the locals. ―It [using drones] is not in favour

of either military or political strategy. Drones make Pakistan‘s work difficult,‖ he said, adding that Pakistan can do

the job itself.

The prime minister emphatically denied allegations about militants getting their hands on money allocated by the

US to Pakistan. He said Pakistan‘s nuclear programme was very secure and recognised as such by the international

community. The country‘s authorities intend to keep it that way, said the PM.

To a question about extending American military presence in the country, Gilani insisted there should be respect for

the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. He added that, ―Pakistan and Afghanistan are closely cooperating in their

joint fight against militants, but the border between the countries is too long and proper security is something to be

desired, largely because Pakistan has been accepting refugees from Afghanistan for the last 30 years.‖ The PM said

inter-relations of the border districts of the two countries were too complicated now.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=5371&Cat=13&dt=4/18/2011

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Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS) – India

OPINION/Analysis

16 April 2011

Revisiting the CTBT: The US' Conundrum By Siddharth Ramana

Research Officer, IPCS

US President Barack Obama in his historic address in Prague in April 2009 laid down his administration‘s nuclear

ambitions, including the ideal of an eventual global nuclear disarmament. While he conceded that it may not occur

in his own lifetime, especially given the Republican victory, he has however continued to push forward for these

ideals. This includes the support for contentious issues such as the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

While the FMCT continues to be in a bedlam in the Conference on Disarmament, the CTBT is an area where the US

can, and should unilaterally move forward. Obama‘s democratic predecessor Bill Clinton had to face an

embarrassing defeat in his efforts to push forward the ratification of this treaty in 1999, and this weighs heavily on

the minds of the disarmament pundits who wish to revive it. In fact any present attempts to re-visit the CTBT have

been emphatically opposed by the Republican minority whip, Jon Kyl, who is quite influential in the Senate.

However this should not deter the revisionists.

There still exists hope for the CTBT especially since the New START agreement with Russia was ratified by the

Senate earlier this year despite Kyl‘s opposition to it. Obama‘s preference to go ahead with the CTBT in these

difficult times will serve to strengthen US' geo-strategic interests worldwide. It will provide increased international

leverage on NPT violators like North Korea and Iran, will help in pushing forward disarmament agendas with

holdout states like India, Israel and Pakistan, and in improving relations with Russia, which is the only nuclear

power state to have ratified the CTBT so far.

For Obama, the need to push forward for ratification is also to be seen in the light of the urgency to boost his

credibility, more so if he chooses to stand for re-election. Bearing in mind his promises in the electoral manifesto,

President Obama has had very little to his credit in international relations. The only exception being the nuclear

sphere where he has successfully held a Security Summit. This summit dealt with the non-state actors, brought into

affect a new START agreement with Russia, revamped the Nuclear Posture and improved leverages against Iran‘s

nuclear program.

Furthermore, for the democrats, the push through of a contentious but internationally important treaty, will lead to a

sense of domestic confidence and optimism, particularly if it comes after a highly contested budget session. It will

help to serve the US fiscal policy by reducing expenditure on weapons which have been repeatedly described as a

futile investment. Even the revamped Nuclear Review Posture, which further raises the bar on authorizing the use of

a nuclear weapon, makes them untenable in the long term and therefore avoids further expenses associated with their

testing, simulations and related exercises which will be beneficial to the US in the long term.

The Republican opposition to reviving the CTBT can be simplistically described as subscribing to an ideological

opposition to a rival. However, the arguments given by opponents to the CTBT include apprehensions that the

present US stockpiles are untested to augment American deterrence policy, and that the New START agreement

would encourage rivals such as China to achieve nuclear parity with the US.

Opponents of the 1999 discussion are particularly concerned that the current monitoring mechanisms are not fool-

proof and therefore the verification clauses in the treaty need to be strengthened before the US can consider

revisiting the treaty. Jon Kyl has even cited the views of Paul Robinson, chairman emeritus of Sandia National

Laboratory, who had testified before Congress that the reliability of US nuclear weapons still cannot be guaranteed

without testing them properly, despite more than a decade of investments in technological advancements.

Nonetheless, significant strides have been made forward in monitoring mechanisms, including addition of new

sensors and augmentation of existing ones in operation by the US to counter such arguments. A look at the

recordings made by a number of monitoring stations of the two North Korean tests in 2006 and 2009 attest in favor

of the new sensors. The yields provided were on the scale which opponents believed would not be detected. To

further strengthen the argument in favor of the CTBT, Thomas D'Agostin, the US National Nuclear Security

Administration chief, who is responsible for the integrity of the nuclear stockpile, said ―we have a safe and secure

and reliable stockpile. ... There's no need to conduct underground (nuclear) testing‖ in an interview to Arms Control

Today.

Though proponents of actual testing express misgivings about the data collected from simulations, especially those

based on tests last conducted as early as two decades ago. But it is imperative to keep in mind that nuclear weapons

plutonium is not affected by the aging process for 85 years or more. Moreover, significant strides made in the US

Stockpile stewardship address concerns of weapons longevity. Additionally, with the advent of the Stockpile

Curatorship program, advances have been made to replace only parts as and when necessary. These measures should

go a long way in addressing concerns relating to the fears of untested stockpiles. Based on these facts, the Senate

should reconsider the debate on the CTBT and push for its ratification at the earliest.

http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/revisiting-the-ctbt-the-us-conundrum-3357.html

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Financial Times – Britain

OPINION

Iran Will Not Hinder Plans for a Nuclear-Free World By Tom Donilon

April 17, 2011

Two years ago this month in Prague, President Barack Obama proposed steps to advance the goal of ―a world

without nuclear weapons‖. In the 24 months since, we have laid the foundation for these next steps in arms control.

But now new action is needed.

The record so far is strong. The new Start treaty with Russia will see the lowest level of deployed nuclear weapons

since the 1950s. The UN Security Council has imposed unprecedented sanctions on Iran and North Korea for failing

to meet their obligations. And enough nuclear materials for hundreds of weapons have been removed, secured or

eliminated around the world.

Now, to end illegal nuclear programmes and stop proliferation, we will maintain pressure on both Iran and North

Korea. Iran, in particular, is trying to exploit the changes sweeping across the Middle East. But the hypocrisy of

claiming to support reform in other countries while suppressing it at home is obvious for all the world to see. Some

believe that the changes in the region will increase Iran‘s influence. In fact the opposite will happen: in a Middle

East where more citizens determine their own destiny, Iran will be increasingly isolated by its actions.

Elsewhere, we will work to secure the world‘s vulnerable nuclear materials within four years, and use a new

international fuel bank to ensure that the use of nuclear energy does not lead to proliferation. We will also seek to

bring the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty into force, while pursuing a further treaty to ban the production of fissile

material for nuclear weapons.

Significant political hurdles must be overcome to make progress on these last two aims. In the case of the CTBT, we

must build support in the US Senate by showing that the treaty will advance American interests, especially by

limiting the current nuclear build-up in Asia. Meanwhile if a deal to proceed with negotiations for the Fissile

Material Cutoff treaty proves illusive, we will move to create a new forum of like-minded states to move forward.

As we implement the new Start treaty, the next round of nuclear weapons reductions must also begin. A review,

under President Obama‘s direction, will develop options for new reductions in the US stockpile. Once complete, this

will shape our approach to a new agreement with Russia. Past agreements have only dealt with some categories of

nuclear weapons, but we believe the next round must be as wide as possible, including both non-deployed and

tactical nuclear weapons.

We must address the issue of Russia‘s tactical nuclear weapons, which have never been subject to numerical limits.

To do this we seek to reduce the role and number of US tactical nuclear weapons, as Russia takes reciprocal

measures to reduce its own tactical forces, and also to relocate these away from Nato‘s borders. We would also like

increased transparency concerning the numbers, locations and types of these tactical forces in Europe.

These new reductions will not be easy. While protecting national security information both sides will need to be able

to monitor nuclear weapons in storage and weapons awaiting destruction. This means more demanding verification,

to confirm that any future agreements will actually be implemented – and we plan to begin discussions on this with

Russia in the near future.

Finally, the US remains committed to an effective missile defence system to defend against emerging missile

threats, such as from Iran and North Korea. In Europe our approach was embraced by Nato at the Lisbon summit,

and it paves the way for missile defence co-operation between Russia and the US, enhancing the security of both

nations, and Europe.

Standing in Prague two years ago, President Obama said some believe ―we are destined to live in a world where

more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction‖. But he also warned that ―such fatalism is a

deadly adversary‖. Two years on, it is clear that, when the international community works together to meet a shared

threat, progress is possible. We remain confident that if this momentum is sustained, a world where fewer nations

possess these ultimate tools of destruction is within our grasp.

The writer is national security adviser to President Barack Obama

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f087e198-6917-11e0-9040-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Jt91iqvq

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Eurasia Review – Spain

OPINION/Analysis

India’s Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and Impact on Deterrence

Stability in South Asia – Analysis By Masood-Ur-Rehman Khattak

April 17, 2011

Deterrence in South Asia is delicate because of rapid militarization and operationalisation of Indian Military‘s Cold

Start Doctrine (CSD). CSD has the potential not only to operationalise Indian military‘s aggressive doctrine on the

basis of pre-emption but can also trigger a nuclear conflict. Main purpose of Cold Start is to give a ―punishing‖ reply

to Pakistan in case of any alleged terrorist attack on Indian soil with totally different orientation of the Indian armed

forces from defensive to offensive.

Under CSD the Indian army would carry out swift, quick and offensive joint operations against the Pakistan

military. Main objective of such operations is to create an element of surprise and give no response time to

thePakistan military. CSD would require reformation of the army‘s offensive power into eight smaller division-sized

Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) that would have mechanized infantry, artillery and armour. (Indian army‘s division

size is around 23,000 troops). These IBGs would be self-contained and highly-mobile, with Russian-origin T-90

MBT and upgraded T-72 M1 tanks at their core, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid

thrusts into Pakistan within 72-96 hours. Possible deployment of these IBGs would be in Punjab and Rajastan sector

close to the border with Pakistan.

India

In 2005 the Vajra Shakti Exercise, brought flexibility in its Holding corps or defensive corps. These holding corps

were designated as Pivot corps. Pivot corps can initiate offensive if required in the battlefield. It would have

offensive punch in it and could be used as mixed corps. According to the then Chief of Army Staff, Gen J J Singh,

‗‗They (Pivot Corps) have assigned roles, which are offensive as well as defensive and the doctrine does not spell

them out in detail. The decision making has been left to theatre commanders, depending upon their assessment and

evaluation of the situation. These pivot corps has an infantry division, armoured regiments and an independent

mechanized brigade. Such a reformation in the Indian army shows its intentions to operationalise Cold Start

Doctrine against Pakistan.

To operationalise this concept (CSD) the Indian military has carried out almost 10 major exercises close to the

border with Pakistan. Main purpose of these exercises was to overcome the deficiencies in the Indian military and

develop synergy and integration among the armed forces to carry out integrated operations against Pakistan. In these

exercises the Indian Army introduced latest weapons and equipment, including Long Range Reconnaissance and

Observation System-(LORROS), this system would enhance her surveillance, observation and targeting capabilities.

In 2005 Indian military practiced Force Multiplication Command Post- (FMCP) to integrate real-time flow of

information as a principal tool for decision making and NCW capabilities in the Indian Army.

The Indian Army has also worked hard to improve it capabilities to supply logistics in the dark formations without

lights. In last six years the Indian military has practiced its capabilities to carry out Swift and Quick operations

without any time barrier.

In 2007 the Indian military introduced its capabilities to fight a war in the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC)

environment in the Ashwamedh exercise. This demonstrates that India is ready to wage a limited war under the

nuclear umbrella. From 2004 to 2010 the Indian military practiced offensive operations with its special forces; it has

tested its capabilities to carry out heli-borne operations behind the enemy lines. Such capabilities are essential as far

as surgical strikes are concerned. In 2009 the Indian army carried out an exercise called Hind Shakti, on that

occasion Indian army‘s former Chief General Deepak Kapoor claimed that, ―this exercise is another step in army‘s

continued venture to fine tune its Cold Start Doctrine‖ which shows Indian military‘s continued efforts to

operationalise this doctrine against Pakistan.

The years 2009 and 2010 were very important, as far as operationalisation of the CSD is concerned. In these years

Indian military introduced and practiced, Intensive Electronic and Information Warfare capabilities, Satellite

imagery, Helicopter borne operations and, Surveillance systems. Another important induction in the Indian

military‘s weapon and equipment were Battlefield Surveillance Radars (BFSRs) and Weapon Locating Radars

(WLRs). All these inductions are serious threat to the national security of Pakistan.

In addition to that the Indian Air Force practiced its precision strike capabilities during day and night operations and

also carried out a massive fire power blitzkrieg, they have also practiced their joint operations with the army and

mechanised forces. Such synergy and integration is necessary for the quick and swift operations. Despite all these

elements India is working to overcome shortages in the Indian military machine. To fill this gap India will spend

around US $ 200 billion on defence acquisitions over the next 12 years. It has plans to buy 278 Sukhoi-30 MKI

fighters by 2015 from Russia and 1000 T-90 Tanks by 2020. The Indian Defence budget for 2011-12 has crossed the

34 billion $ mark. India has become the world‘s biggest arms importer according SIPRI think tank 2011. All these

trends are destabilising factors and would provoke arms race in the region.

On the nuclear side, India would be able to secure huge reserves of stockpiles under the Indo-US deal. Currently

India possesses 500 kg plutonium and 11.5 metric tons of reactor grade plutonium in spent fuel. According to some

estimates India would be able to increase its nuclear arsenal from 100 warheads currently to 300-400 warheads in

the next five years, putting strategic stability of south Asia in disarray.

Indian Cold Start Doctrine and technological advancement in the conventional and nuclear field will bring

qualitative and quantitative transformation in the Indian Military and impinge upon Pakistan‘s national security

interests. So keeping in view the strategic realities of South Asia it is advisable for Pakistan to take concrete

measures to safeguard the National Security interests of Pakistan. Moreover it is imperative for the international

community including US-EU-OIC-and SCO members to come forward and resolve the outstanding issues between

India and Pakistan, only then we can establish long term peace and stability in the region.

Note: Excerpts are taken from the research paper Masood Ur Rehman Khattak, ―Indian Military‘s Cold Start

Doctrine: Capabilities, Limitations and Possible Response from Pakistan‖ SASSI Research Paper 42, September

2010.

Mr. Masood-Ur-Rehman Khattak is working at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) Islamabad as

Research Fellow. He did his M.Phil in Defence and Strategic Studies from Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad.

His major research areas are Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia, Terrorism, Non-Proliferation issues, FATA,

Afghanistan and Regional Security issues.

http://www.eurasiareview.com/indias-military%e2%80%99s-cold-start-doctrine-and-impact-on-deterrence-stability-

in-south-asia-analysis-17042011/

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South Asia Analysis Group

OPINION/Analysis

April 18, 2011

Russia’s Military Modernization: The Geostrategic and Political

Implications By Dr Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

Russia‘s political resurgence was an established fact by the middle of the last decade and arose from a determined

overdrive by then President Putin to restore Russia to the status of being a strategic co-equal of the United States, a

status lost with the disintegration of the Former Soviet Union. With President Putin‘s ascendancy to power in 2000

this was a burning ambition of the new President.

Russia may have been down and out politically and economically post-1991 but it is often forgotten that

strategically Russia was not down and out. Russia‘s strategic arsenal in terms of quantitative holdings was a match

for the United States strategic weapons arsenal. Admittedly, the massive conventional military might of Russia

became jaded due to lack of cash flows and slide back of modernization plans of the Russian Armed Forces.

President Putin seemed to adopt a two-pronged strategy to achieve Russia‘s ambition to regain its lost status of

being a strategic co-equal of the United States. The first step was for a resurgence of Russia‘s political influence and

bring about a global consciousness that Russia had arrived on the global political scene.

Russia achieved this by focusing on the Middle East and especially on the Arab monarchial kingdoms which had

close military alliance links with the United States. President Putin successfully achieved this objective with two

major strategic forays in the Middle East. My Papers of that period so titled refer. Saudi Arabia more notably moved

closer to Russia including billions of dollars of Russian arms purchases.

Russia could achieve this as the United States was strategically bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and events

post-9/11 had forced countries like Saudi Arabia to look for countervailing alternatives.

The second prong of then President Putin‘s strategy was to initiate the military modernization of Russian Armed

Forces which stood neglected for far too long. Resurgent foreign policy without muscular strength in the background

to back it up was a strategic imperative for Russia.

In the last five years or so one notices at least two surges in the military modernization of Russian Armed Forces.

The first was somewhere around 2005-2007 facilitated by increased revenues flowing in due to rising oil prices and

also increases in Russian arms exports.

The second surge in the modernization of Russian Armed Forces seems to be currently underway, once again with

increasing oil revenues as a result of rise in global oil prices.

In the present case Russia is reported to have earmarked $ 400 billion over the next ten years for Russian military

modernization. In the earlier case one had read somewhere that Russia had the set up a sum of $ 200 billion as a

hedge fund for military modernization to offset fluctuations in Russian oil revenues.

In sum Russian military modernization has been underway for nearly five years or so and can be expected to pick up

pace as a more confident and assertive Russia emerges. Military modernization of Russia has continued without

interruption even with the change of Presidents in 2008.

The present surge in Russian military modernization has been more sharply noticed by American and Western

strategic analysts presumably with the noticeable modernization of Russia‘s strategic nuclear missiles, nuclear

submarines, sea-launched nuclear missiles and the resumption of global air patrols by Russian strategic bombers.

Also noticeable is Russia‘s plans for priority modernization of Russia‘s force projection capabilities.

This Paper has no intention to dwell on the nuts and bolts of Russian military modernization programs. Details of

these are available in open media as Western analysts belatedly begin to size up Russia‘s emerging military

capabilities with its ongoing military modernization programs, item by item.

This Paper on the contrary would attempt to examine the geostrategic and geopolitical implications of Russian

military modernization at the global and regional levels, but with first an overview of the strategic imperatives that

have spurred Russian military modernization. Accordingly, this Paper is set out as under:

Russia‘s Military Modernization: The Underlying Imperatives & Priorities

Russia‘s Military Modernization: The Geostrategic and Geopolitical Impact at the Global

Level

Russian Military Modernization: Geopolitical Impact in Different Regions of the World

Russia’s Military Modernization: The Underlying Imperatives& Priorities

Russia‘s military modernization as a well thought-out and calibrated strategy was an imperative necessitated by

three major factors that were implicit in President Putin‘s address in 2006. These three factors were read in my

Paper then as follows:

Russia‘s intention to rebuild military resources and capabilities to emerge once again as a

credible counterweight to United States in the global strategic calculus.

Russia must strategize to emerge as an independent international power center as it

existed prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

United States unbridled global influence and use of power needs to be curtailed

especially the propensity of the United States for military interventions on humanitarian

grounds by- passing the United Nations Security Council.

The geostrategic and geopolitical landscape of the world has changed since for Russia in many challenging ways

calling for the creation of credible military deterrence and force projection capabilities. Notable geopolitical

developments that would now have a bearing on Russia‘s military modernization programs can be recounted as

follows:

The United States and NATO while slowing their ‗mission creep‘ towards Russia‘s

borders by enlisting new NATO members on Russian peripheries has not been given up.

United States and NATO have not given up their plans to deploy BMD deployments in

Eastern Europe countries. This erodes Russia‘s credible nuclear deterrence.

The Middle East is in a state of political upheaval with uncertain strategic consequences

which have a bearing on Russian national security. United States ability to control that

turbulence stands greatly diluted

In Russia‘s Near Abroad, the United States has not fully given up playing the ‗Great

Game‘ on Russia‘s doorsteps.

Afghanistan‘s strategic picture is both uncertain and complex and directly impinges on

Russian security

The US-Iran confrontation on nuclear issues shows no signs of abating

Despite the so-called Russia-China strategic nexus, China is playing its own Great Games

in Central Asia and the Middle East

Pakistan with direct impact on the situation in Afghanistan may be ripe for implosion and

thereby creating further uncertainties in Greater South West Asia

China‘s massive military modernization cannot be ignored in Russia‘s military

modernization calculus as Russia has a long border with China, a history of territorial

disputes and armed clashes in the late 1960s.

Terrorism especially of the Islamic Jihadi type posing serious threats to both Russia itself

and to Russia‘s soft underbelly in the Central Asian region.

With such a wide range of complex challenges and uncertainties any Russian military modernization would have to

dwell on fashioning its military modernization to cater for (1) Credible nuclear deterrence and credible First Strike

capabilities(2) Credible and strong conventional military machine in terms of credible conventional military

deterrence at least on its peripheries (3) Strong Air Force and Navy capabilities both as an instrument of deterrence

and also force projection(4) Russian Army organizational structures to be transformed into leaner and meaner

organizational structures capable of speedy deployments and capable of decisively dealing with asymmetric threats

It is precisely in these areas of military requirements that Russian military modernization is focused on. in a visible

manner. New generation of strategic nuclear ICBMs and nuclear attack submarines are entering service.

Development of long range cruise missiles with nuclear tips is underway. Russian Army organizational structures

are now focused on reorganization of battle formations from the ponderous divisional structures to independent

brigade sized structures, more suited for military interventions and dealing with asymmetric challenges to Russian

security.

One also has to keep in mind that the Russian military establishment in its military modernization programs would

be keeping in mind the military lessons learnt from its experiences of limitations against US military interventions in

Serbia and Kosovo and also from Russia‘s own military intervention in Georgia in the recent past.

A point that needs to be stressed is that Russian military modernization is not aimed at preparing for an eventuality

of a war with the United States like China is doing but more importantly to Russia being counted significantly in the

global strategic calculus and also Russia‘s re-emergence as an independent global power center.

Russia’s Military Modernization: The Geostrategic and Geopolitical Impact at the Global Level

The geostrategic and geopolitical impact of Russian military modernization boils down basically to one question and

that is how it will materially affect United States unilateral global strategic and political predominance enjoyed so

far for the last two decades, virtually. It also has to be measured in terms of slowing down American propensity for

unilateralism without any checks; would it be possible?

Coming first to the power equations between the United States and Russia presently, it is an undeniable fact that in

terms of capabilities only, the United States has a clear edge in superiority and this is likely to continue in the

foreseeable future. However what can reduce the differentials in power between the two is the global perception that

the United States power is on the decline not in a dilution of its military power but by the military nibbling at its

strength by its very own allies in Iraq and Afghanistan and by such challenges resulting in the perception of

America‘s decline.

Similarly, the United States for far too long has not been ‗resetting its policy buttons‘ on Russia in the belief that it

can always play the ‗China Card‘ against Russia. This is a counterproductive approach which again highlights the

perception that American power is declining and that the United States needs Chinese crutches.

In such an emerging scenario, Russia‘s military modernization throws up strong challenges to the United States both

geostrategically and geopolitically. Geostrategically, the nature, content and directions of Russia‘s military

modernization would over time dilute the existing differentials in global power between the United States and

Russia.

However, when power is also dependant on others' comparative perceptions of power, the United States loses out to

Russia in the war of perceptions. Even without Russia‘s military modernization in full play one witnessed the

spectacle of US traditional military allies in the Gulf Region led by Saudi Arabia veering over to Russia in terms of

political signaling to the United States that they have alternative choices.

So in overall terms while the United States is likely to prevail geostrategically all over the globe, the Russian

resurgence and its accompanying military modernization have definitely altered the geopolitical predominant

strengths of the United States.

Russian Military Modernization: Geopolitical Impact in Different Regions of the World

The point already stands made that the United States geostrategic predominance globally is likely to continue for

some time. However, Russia‘s political resurgence and military modernization do confer on Russia significant

advantages in terms of geopolitical impact in different regions of the world. One would like to focus on the three

most critical strategic regions of the world, namely, the Middle East, East Asia and Asia Pacific and Central Asian

Republics in which intersect vitally not only the security and strategic interests of the United States and Russia but

also of China.

The Middle East region has been of critical geostrategic and geopolitical significance for the United States for

decades now both in terms of energy security and the security of Israel. It is in this region that one finds many

geopolitical gains made by Russia at American expense. Russia has strong energy linkages with the Middle East in

terms of global prices of both crude oil and natural gas. The Middle East geostrategically was an arena during the

Cold War era in which Russia could muster much regional support in the form of military client states who also

counted on the Former Soviet Union‘s countervailing power against the United States.

The wheel has taken a full circle where one witnesses America‘s traditional military allies of long standing led by

Saudi Arabia etc now following hedging strategies to seek Russia‘s potential countervailing power. This is a big

gain for Russia in the power game.

The next critically significant region for the United States is East Asia where both the geopolitics and the

geostrategics are churning up in a big way. This region sees the powerplay of the United States, Russia, China,

Japan, North and South Korea running a complex and intense course.

In this region following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States had all but forgotten that Russia

had significant strategic interests in East Asia. The United States for reasons of its own has all along overplayed

China‘s strategic rise and build-up of massive military power.

Russia with its military modernization and in terms of strategic naval modernization and also a growing focus on

credible military postures in Russia‘s Far East seems to be sending out two major signals to all concerned, and that

is:

Russia‘s intention to regain its status as the other key player particularly in East Asia and

the Asia Pacific. The contours are already visible in terms of Russia‘s hardening of

stances over the Kuriles and Northern Islands dispute with Japan and the strengthening of

military linkages with Vietnam.

More significantly, Russia is signaling to China that despite any strategic nexus with

China, Russia intends to regain its former strategic status in the Pacific as the co-equal of

the United States. Also this may be a political and strategic signal to China that Russia is

prepared for any ‗Swing Strategy‘ of China in collusion with the United States.

Many would like to debate the above direction but there are a host of other indicators that suggest that Russia is

strengthening its military profile in its Far East Regions. Russia would have taken into account China‘s reactions to

these moves?

The last critically strategic region to be impacted by Russia‘s resurgence and military modernization happens to be

the Central Asian Republics region. This region is on Russia‘s immediate Southern periphery and after Soviet

disintegration had become the focus of United States penetration to outflank Russia from the South. The events in

Afghanistan and Russia‘s mistaken perception that the United States would further the cause of controlling Islamic

Jihad in its areas like Chechnya had prompted Russia to acquiesce with US penetration of Central Asia region.

Russia stood disappointed with follow-up US strategies and actions in this region.

Recently, there is a change in the perceptions of those Central Asia Republics that were playing around with the

United States at Russian expense. Russian resurgence coupled with Russian military might and added with Russia

not hesitating to resort to military intervention like in Georgia to protect its national security interests on its

immediate periphery have forced these Republics to be more respectful and sensitive to Russian strategic

sensitivities. This is a distinct political gain brought about by Russian military modernization.

One cannot move away from the examination of this aspect without dwelling on the geostrategic and geopolitical

impact of Russian resurgence and military modernization on China. China strategic nexus with Russia in the form of

a strategic partnership or through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has all along been a marriage of

convenience aimed at the United States. Its longevity was always a ‗variable‘ in strategic analysis.

Briefly, the overall impact on China of Russian resurgence and military modernization can be outlined as follows:

Russia‘s resurgence to reclaim its erstwhile status as the second pole in a bi-polar world

would limit China‘s emergence as the second Superpower.

China‘s propensity for playing a ‗Swing Strategy‘ between USA and Russia would be

that much more limited. It has to be remembered that no amount of Chinese military

modernization can help it to reduce its military differentials with Russia in terms of size

of strategic arsenals, force projection and political influence on China‘s peripheries.

Politically China cannot emerge as an independent global power center as this aspect is

dependant on United States munificence to endow overplayed strategic significance on

China‘s superpower potential. It is only a tactical expediency of the United States to do

so. Neither in the same vein can the United States downplay Russia‘s strategic resurgence

and the impact of its military modernization.

Russia‘s impact on global power politics cannot be underestimated by the United States and no amount of a crafted

and over-exaggerated build-up of China‘s strategic potential can help the United States to reduce the true import of

Russia‘s resurgence and military modernization..

Concluding Observations

Russia‘s political resurgence coupled with an attendant military modernization of its strategic and conventional

military might may not be an immediate ‗game-changer‘ in the existing global power calculus. Yet it has all the

substantive potential to emerge as one in the foreseeable future.

Russian strategic resurgence and military modernization has already started impacting in critical strategic regions of

the world as discussed above. It is only a matter of time for it to be visible in pronounced contours.

As Russia‘s strategic and military resurgence becomes more pronounced and Russian military power grows, China‘s

striking resonance in the global strategic calculus can expectedly become that much more muted.

Neither the United States nor China can be dismissive of Russia‘s military modernization which is now a given and

a reality that the United States needs to factor-in in its global and regional strategic calculations.

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers45/paper4431.html

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