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UNIT 3: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY HANDOUT 5: HUME’S MORAL ENQUIRY, SECTION III AND “OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT”

1: THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF JUSTICE One of Locke’s central claims, which he appeals to often, is that there is a law of nature which dictates that we must respect the life, liberty, and property of other human beings. These are the rights which compromise justice and, for Locke, these rights are held naturally. This means that these rights are held before the institution of civil society in the state of nature. Hume, however, believes that justice is artificial. While justice is absolutely essential for the preservation of human society, it is not something that exists prior to conventions that are established by human beings. This is the conclusion that he argues for in section III of his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.

1.1 JUSTICE AND UTILITY At the foundation of Hume’s argument is the view that justice is only valued based upon its utility or the usefulness it has for society.

THAT Justice is useful to society, and consequently that PART of its merit, at least, must arise from that consideration, it would be a superfluous undertaking to prove. That public utility is the SOLE origin of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the SOLE foundation of its merit; this proposition, being more curious and important, will better deserve our examination and enquiry (197).

By justice Hume understands a conventional system put into place in order to regulate the ownership of property. While all would admit that have such a system is highly useful to society, Hume argues that utility is the only foundation of such a system. To show this, Hume argues that it would only make sense to establish justice within a limited set of circumstances which John Rawls would later refer to as the “circumstances of justice.”1

1.2 MODERATE SCARCITY Hume does this by having us consider a variety of hypothetical scenarios in which he believes it would not make any sense to abide by conventions of justice. First, Hume has us imagine that there was no scarcity of external resources.

Let us suppose that nature has bestowed on the human race such profuse ABUNDANCE of all EXTERNAL conveniencies, that, without any uncertainty in the event, without any care or industry on our part, every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites can want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire (197).

If this was the case, then it would seem like there is no reason to institute rules of property.

1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 126n.

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Why call this object MINE, when upon the seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand to possess myself to what is equally valuable? Justice, in that case, being totally useless, would be an idle ceremonial, and could never possibly have place in the catalogue of virtues (197).

If resources were so abundant that there was more than enough for all, and they were all easily attainable, then property rights would seem pointless. There is no point in jealously guarding what can be replaced with no effort. Hume points out that this is the case with goods such as water and air.

Water and air, though the most necessary of all objects, are not challenged as the property of individuals; nor can any man commit injustice by the most lavish use and enjoyment of these blessings (197).

Because these resources are so abundant, we do not institute property over them (despite the fact that they are the more important than anything else for our survival). Hume’s conclusion seems further supported by the fact that at present, as our recognition of the damage we are doing to the environment becomes clearer that we are starting to have rights over these resources (or at least the right to do activities that can lead to their degradation). Hume also believes that the conventions of justice would have no place if there was too much scarcity.

Suppose a society to fall into such want of all common necessaries, that the utmost frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the whole from extreme misery; it will readily, I believe, be admitted, that the strict laws of justice are suspended, in such a pressing emergence, and give place to the stronger motives of necessity and self-preservation (199).

In an emergency situation, where there are hardly any resources at all, Hume argues that the rules of justice would be set aside in favor of self-preservation. It would be pointless to require people to follow rules that would lead directly to their own destruction. Hume provides the example of a shipwreck: “[i]s it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without regard to former limitations of property” (199)?” From this Hume concludes that justice can only be applicable under the condition of moderate scarcity. Either too much or too little scarcity renders justice useless and, for Hume, if justice would not serve public utility it has no foundation.

1.3 LIMITED BENEVOLENCE Not only does Hume believe that the external circumstances of human life must be characterized a certain way for justice to be useful, but the psychological constitution of human beings must be characterized a certain way as well. Imagine that human beings were characterized by complete benevolence.

Again; suppose, that, though the necessities of human race continue the same as at present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship and generosity,

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that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man, and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that of his fellows (198).

If we did not care for ourselves any more than we cared for others, and this was a universal trait of human beings, then there would be no need to protect ourselves from others.

Why should I bind another, by a deed or promise, to do me any good office, when I know that he is already prompted, by the strongest inclination, to seek my happiness, and would, of himself, perform the desired service; except the hurt, he thereby receives, be greater than the benefit accruing to me (198)?

Hume does not believe that we can point to any real examples which exactly mirror such a situation, but he holds that family life and marriage at least approximates it.

In the present disposition of the human heart, it would, perhaps, be difficult to find complete instances of such enlarged affections; but still we may observe, that the case of families approaches towards it; and the stronger the mutual benevolence is among the individuals, the nearer it approaches; till all distinction of property be, in a great measure, lost and confounded among them. Between married persons, the cement of friendship is by the laws supposed so strong as to abolish all division of possessions; and has often, in reality, the force ascribed to it (198).

Additionally, in communities which are formed during the “ardour of new enthusiasms” (perhaps a community of people united in a single cause) the “community of goods” has been attempted. However, Hume points out that this cannot last because the “disguised selfishness of men” returns (199). Furthermore, justice would be equally irrelevant if human beings were too lacking in benevolence.

Suppose likewise, that it should be a virtuous man's fate to fall into the society of ruffians, remote from the protection of laws and government; what conduct must he embrace in that melancholy situation? He sees such a desperate rapaciousness prevail; such a disregard to equity, such contempt of order, such stupid blindness to future consequences […] And his particular regard to justice being no longer of use to his own safety or that of others, he must consult the dictates of self-preservation alone, without concern for those who no longer merit his care and attention (199).

Just as it would make no sense to follow rules of justice in a situation of absolute scarcity, neither would such rules be of any use if human beings simply refused to regulate their conduct according to any rules. In this case one would have to simply act for their own self-preservation. Hume notes that this is essentially what occurs when we punish someone for breaking the law.

When any man, even in political society, renders himself by his crimes, obnoxious to the public, he is punished by the laws in his goods and person; that is, the ordinary rules of justice are, with regard to him, suspended for a moment, and it becomes equitable to inflict on him, for the BENEFIT of society, what otherwise he could not suffer without wrong or injury (200).

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Because the criminal refuses to abide by the rules of justice, it is no longer beneficial to treat them justly. Hume makes a similar point regarding following the rules of war (200). Thus, in addition to moderate scarcity there must also be limited benevolence for justice to have any place.

1.4 THE STATE OF NATURE

Hume’s point is not that the rules of justice are often suspended. He makes clear that he thinks the conditions he has outlined thus far characterized human society the vast majority of the time: “[t]he common situation of society is a medium amidst all these extremes” (201). Hume thinks this shows that the state of nature could not have existed as Hobbes’s imagines it where “[p]ower was the only measure of right; and a perpetual war of all against all was the result of men's untamed selfishness and barbarity” (201). This is because if we humans were really as malevolent and self-interested as Hobbes claims, then we would never find ourselves within the circumstances of justice.

Whether such a condition of human nature could ever exist, or if it did, could continue so long as to merit the appellation of a STATE, may justly be doubted. Men are necessarily born in a family-society, at least; and are trained up by their parents to some rule of conduct and behaviour. But this must be admitted, that, if such a state of mutual war and violence was ever real, the suspension of all laws of justice, from their absolute inutility, is a necessary and infallible consequence (202).

1.5 MUTUAL DEPENDENCE The final circumstance Hume outlines has to do with mutual dependence. First, Hume notes that justice would have no place if there was too much dependence.

Were there a species of creatures intermingled with men, which, though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment; the necessary consequence, I think, is that we should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them, nor could they possess any right or property, exclusive of such arbitrary lords. Our intercourse with them could not be called society, which supposes a degree of equality; but absolute command on the one side, and servile obedience on the other. Whatever we covet, they must instantly resign: Our permission is the only tenure, by which they hold their possessions: Our compassion and kindness the only check, by which they curb our lawless will: And as no inconvenience ever results from the exercise of a power, so firmly established in nature, the restraints of justice and property, being totally USELESS, would never have place in so unequal a confederacy (202).

Hume notes that if there was a species of creatures who, although rational, were too weak to “make their resentments felt” about being excluded from the scope of justice, then we would only be constrained by benevolence in our treatment toward them. That is, we would be obligated to treat them kindly but not justly. In the next paragraph Hume notes that this is essentially the situation we find ourselves in with regard to animals and that these sorts of considerations “tempted” the Europeans to treat Native Americans and men to treat women in this way (202-203). The

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fundamental reason for this is that justice is put into place in order to resolve conflict. However, just like in the case where all human beings were benevolent but for a different reason, there could be no conflict between the humans and the imagined species. This is because the imagined species is wholly dependent upon the human beings without any ability to resist. Additionally, Hume also argues that justice would have no place if there were not enough dependence upon one another.

Were the human species so framed by nature as that each individual possessed within himself every faculty, requisite both for his own preservation and for the propagation of his kind: Were all society and intercourse cut off between man and man, by the primary intention of the supreme Creator: It seems evident, that so solitary a being would be as much incapable of justice, as of social discourse and conversation. Where mutual regards and forbearance serve to no manner of purpose, they would never direct the conduct of any reasonable man. The headlong course of the passions would be checked by no reflection on future consequences. And as each man is here supposed to love himself alone, and to depend only on himself and his own activity for safety and happiness, he would, on every occasion, to the utmost of his power, challenge the preference above every other being, to none of which he is bound by any ties, either of nature or of interest (203).

Here Hume has us imagine that the human species was constructed such that we were wholly indifferent to the company of other human beings. We did not need to unite with others to satisfy any of our survival needs or our social needs. Because justice is put into place to resolve conflicts and allow us to live together peacefully, in such a case justice would again become useless. From these circumstances, Hume concludes that justice is artificial or something that humans construct for a certain purpose (as opposed to a law of nature that is binding on all rational beings at all times).

2: THE DEBATE ABOUT THE LEGITIMACY OF GOVERNMENT Hume’s purpose in the essay “Of the Social Contract” is to criticize Locke’s claim that government is only legitimate if it is founded upon a contract or voluntary consent.

2.1 DIVINE RIGHT AND CONSENT In the first paragraph of the essay, Hume lays out the controversy by explaining the two main views about the legitimacy of government popular at the time, each of which corresponded to one of the major political parties of England: the Tories and the Whigs.

The one party, by tracing up government to the Deity, endeavoured to render it so sacred and inviolate, that it must be little less than sacrilege, however, tyrannical it may become, to touch or invade it in the smallest article. The other party, by founding government altogether on the consent of the people, suppose that there is a kind of original contract, by which the subjects have tacitly reserved the power of resisting their sovereign, whenever they find themselves aggrieved by that authority, with which they have, for certain purposes, voluntarily intrusted him (361).

The Tories, the more conservative party, supported the views of Robert Filmer. Kings have a divine right to rule and the subjects do not retain the right to resist that rule (the doctrine of passive

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resistance). The Whigs, the more liberal party, supported the views of Locke. Rulers gain the right to rule from the consent of the subjects and the subjects retain the right to take that power back if the government no longer serves their interest. Hume states that each position is to certain extent both right and wrong (361).

2.2 DIVINE RIGHT He agrees that, if in fact God exists, then rulers were divinely chosen by God (insofar as everything that occurs in the universe is the product of God’s will. But this does not mean that God purposely gave those rules a special right to rule (that would imply it is wrong to resist them).

But since he gave rise to it, not by any particular or miraculous interposition, but by his concealed and universal efficacy, a sovereign cannot, properly speaking, be called his vicegerent in any other sense than every power or force, being derived from him, may be said to act by his commission. Whatever actually happens is comprehended in the general plan or intention of Providence; nor has the greatest and most lawful prince any more reason, upon that account, to plead a peculiar sacredness or inviolable authority, than an inferior magistrate, or even an usurper, or even a robber and a pirate (361-362).

The fact that a pirate takes control of some community does not give that pirate the right to rule (even though that occurrence must be a part of God’s plan).

2.3 THE CONTRACT VIEW Hume doesn’t deny the fact that the origin of many governments is through contract. He agrees with Hobbes and Locke that this follows from “how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education” (362). What he denies, however, is that consent is the only legitimate foundation for government.

But philosophers, who have embraced a party (if that be not a contradiction in terms), are not contented with these concessions. They assert, not only that government in its earliest infancy arose from consent, or rather the voluntary acquiescence of the people; but also that, even at present, when it has attained its full maturity, it rests on no other foundation (363).

Hume also disagrees with the consequences that the consent view has for the right of resistance which he describes as the following.

These advantages the sovereign promises him in return; and if he fail in the execution, he has broken, on his part, the articles of engagement, and has thereby freed his subject from all obligations to allegiance. Such, according to these philosophers, is the foundation of authority in every government, and such the right of resistance possessed by every subject (363).

Hume does not believe that we are necessarily justified in resisting government for every breech of contract or when no contract exists.

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3: CRITICISM OF THE CONTRACT THEORY Hume spends the remainder of the essay outlining various criticisms of the contract view.

3.1 COMMON EXPERIENCE AND HISTORY Hume first notes that the contract view seems to contradict our common sense notion of the legitimacy of government.

These connexions are always conceived to be equally independent of our consent, in Persia and China; in France and Spain; and even in Holland and England, wherever the doctrines above-mentioned have not been carefully inculcated. Obedience or subjection becomes so familiar, that most men never make any inquiry about its origin or cause, more than about the principle of gravity, resistance, or the most universal laws of nature. Or if curiosity ever move them; as soon as they learn that they themselves and their ancestors have, for several ages, or from time immemorial, been subject to such a form of government or such a family, they immediately acquiesce, and acknowledge their obligation to allegiance (363).

The great majority of people do not feel themselves to be under the allegiance of government because they suppose there is a contract between themselves and government. Instead, it is generally sufficient for them to realize that their ancestors obligated themselves to government. Furthermore, many people are obedient to government out of custom and habit. If one were to argue that the government is rendered legitimate by being based upon a first contract, this would make almost every government in human history illegitimate.

Almost all the governments which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any presence of a fair consent or voluntary subjection of the people (364).

If we take a wider view of history we should see that what lies behind the various changes of governments in empires is not a contract but “force and violence” (364). Hume even thinks that the historical examples that seem to best support contract theory (i.e. revolutions where a new government is put into place on the basis of an explicit agreement) are not necessarily as they appear.

Let not the establishment at the Revolution deceive us, or make us so much in love with a philosophical origin to government, as to imagine all others monstrous and irregular. Even that event was far from corresponding to these refined ideas. It was only the succession, and that only in the regal part of the government, which was then changed: and it was only the majority of seven hundred, who determined that change for near ten millions. I doubt not, indeed, but the bulk of those ten millions acquiesced willingly in the determination: but was the matter left, in the least, to their choice? Was it not justly supposed to be, from that moment, decided, and every man punished, who refused to submit to the new sovereign? How otherwise could the matter have ever been brought to any issue or conclusion (365)?

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The revolution that Hume is referring to here is the English revolution of 1668 where King Charles II was replaced by William and Mary of Orange. The move put a constitutional monarchy in place of an absolute monarchy. Yet, even here Hume notes that the decision to do so was made by a relatively small minority and the will of the majority was not considered. In essence, then, the revolution was performed by a sort of force. Hume does not deny the benefits of a government that is establish through contract: “[i]t is surely the best and most sacred of any” (366). This is because such an establishment is generally more peaceful than the establishment of government through war and conquest. However, Hume does note that in time the inconveniences of that sort of government dissipate.

When a new government is established, by whatever means, the people are commonly dissatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear and necessity, than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation. The prince is watchful and jealous, and must carefully guard against every beginning or appearance of insurrection. Time, by degrees, removes all these difficulties, and accustoms the nation to regard, as their lawful or native princes, that family which at first they considered as usurpers or foreign conquerors (367).

3.2 HUME’S DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH V.S. LOCKE’S NORMATIVE APPROACH The basic structure of Hume’s criticism is that there are very few examples in history of governments founded through consent and contract. This might seem like a strange criticism to make, however, since we can simply imagine a contract theorist like Locke making the following reply: “if very few governments were established through contract, then very few governments in history have been legitimate. But that does not refute any of my arguments.” This point speaks to the different approaches that Locke and Hume take to the question of the legitimacy of government. John Rawls explains this in the following way.

(i) Locke is like a constitutional laywer working within the system of law defined by the Fundamental Law of Nature; and Locke argues the case for resistance to the Crown within a mixed constitution within that framework. The argument proceeds within the moral system of the FLN; it is, as it were, legal and historical.

(ii) Hume’s view is that of a naturalist observing and studying the phenomena of human institutions and practices, and the role of moral concepts, judgments, and sentiments, in supporting these institutions and practices, and in regulating human conduct.2

In other words, Locke takes a normative approach, while Hume takes a descriptive approach. Locke is concerned with, given the framework of the law of nature, under what conditions a government has the right to rule over people. Hume, on the other hand, is concerned with describing the conditions under which people consider themselves obligated to follow the dictates of government. Just like he was concerned with describing the process by which he make the inference from cause to effect, he also wants to describe the process by which people take themselves to be obligated to a government. He finds, through historical examples, that people feel the sentiments associated with governmental obligation even when there is no consent or contract in place.

2 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, 164.

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3.3 CRITICIZING TACIT CONSENT Of course, we saw that Locke does believe that there must be explicit consent for a government to be legitimate. He also employs a notion of implicit consent whereby one consents to government rule by not leaving and taking advantage of the benefits of society. Hume also argues against this notion.

Should it be said, that, by living under the dominion of a prince which one might leave, every individual has given a tacit consent to his authority, and promised him obedience; it may be answered, that such an implied consent can only have place where a man imagines that the matter depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind do who are born under established governments) that, by his birth, he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain form of government; it would be absurd to infer a consent or choice, which he expressly, in this case, renounces and disclaims (367).

The idea of consent does not make sense, according to Hume, because all consent is intentional. People simply consider themselves subject to government without ever considering consent. Furthermore, Hume points out that the consent would have to be voluntary.

Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish, the moment he leaves her (367).

Many people have no genuine choice to stay or leave their home country. Therefore, they cannot truly give their consent (something that Locke should recognize given that he emphasizes that forced consent is not real consent). Furthermore, if consent was the origin of our obligation to obey government, then the strongest obligation would be with immigrants who explicitly consented to be under that rule. However, Hume notes that the allegiance of such a person is “much less expected or depended on” (368).

3.4 THE ARTIFICIALITY OF JUSTICE AND ALLEGIANCE TO GOVERNMENT Hume also opposes contract theory on the basis that our obligation to abide by government, like our obligation to respect property rights (i.e. the duties of justice) is artificial. Earlier we saw that one aspect of Hume’s view that justice is artificial is that justice is circumstantial. In this essay Hume also points out that justice, and the duty to obey government (or allegiance to government), is artificial in that there is no natural instinct that impels us to do so. Hume notes that the duty we have to love our children is completely natural (370). We do not need to be trained to do this or put some system in place for this action to make sense. However, justice (and allegiance to government) are not this way. We would never imagine that we had to respect someone else’s property before a system of property rights was put into place, and this system is put into place because we see it is useful for preserving society. This causes Hume to hold that what really explains our obligation to obey

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government is that doing so is useful and that consent or contract is not a necessary step in the explanation.

If the reason be asked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer, Because society could not otherwise subsist; and this answer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your answer is, Because we should keep our word. But besides, that no body, till trained in a philosophical system, can either comprehend or relish this answer; besides this, I say, you find yourself embarrassed when it is asked, Why we are bound to keep our word? Nor can you give any answer but what would, immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance (371).

For Hume our allegiance to obey government stems simply from the fact that doing so makes us better off. If someone says it is because we gave our word, then we must ask that person why we are bound to keep our promises. Hume believes the answer to this question is also that doing so tends to increase utility. Therefore, the notion of consent is simply a “middle man” that does not do any real work.

4: HUME’S CONSERVATISM AND THE RIGHT TO REVOLUTION These arguments reveal that Hume has a much more conservative political outlook than Locke. We can outline the general orientation of conservatism or liberalism in the following way.

Core Conservative Values/Beliefs (i) Conservatives tend to emphasize the limitations of human beings. (ii) Conservatives tend to favor reliance upon tradition and authority. (iii) Conservatives tend to be pessimistic about the possibility of “perfecting” human social and political relationships through deliberate central planning. (iv) Conservatives tend to favor gradual change of human social and political relationships/institutions when they are found to be deficient and/or morally unacceptable.

Core Liberal Values/Beliefs (i) Liberals tend to emphasize the transformative power of human beings to overcome their limitations. (ii) Liberals tend to eschew reliance on tradition and authority in favor of reliance upon reason. (iii) Liberals tend to be more optimistic about the possibility of “perfecting,” or at least greatly improving, human social and political relationships through central planning. (iv) Liberals tend to favor swift change of human social and political relationships/institutions when they are found to be deficient and/or morally unacceptable.

Hume’s conservatism comes through most clearly when he emphasizes the paramount necessity of political stability.

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Did one generation of men go off the stage at once, and another succeed, as is the case with silkworms and butterflies, the new race, if they had sense enough to choose their government, which surely is never the case with men, might voluntarily, and by general consent, establish their own form of civil polity, without any regard to the laws or precedents which prevailed among their ancestors. But as human society is in perpetual flux, one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary, in order to preserve stability in government, that the new brood should conform themselves to the established constitution, and nearly follow the path which their fathers, treading in the footsteps of theirs, had marked out to them (368).

Human society does not die off and then come back into existence all at once. Because of this ensuring stability from one generation to the next is of critical importance. Hume then emphasizes that the power to radically change existing the existing structures of government (of the sort that Locke’s contract theory seems to allow for) poses a threat to this stability. While there are certain innovations that “must necessarily have place in every human institution,” others run the risk of being destructive.

but violent innovations no individual is entitled to make: they are even dangerous to be attempted by the legislature: more ill than good is ever to be expected from them: and if history affords examples to the contrary, they are not to be drawn into precedent, and are only to be regarded as proofs, that the science of politics affords few rules, which will not admit of some exception, and which may not sometimes be controlled by fortune and accident (368).

Radical reforms are more likely to bring about harm than good. Thus, we must again rely upon custom and habit and the practices of previous generations. For the same reason, we should not suppose that a stable government is illegitimate simply because it was founded upon our habit of abiding by what is familiar rather than our explicit consent. Thus, Hume would not support as wide a right to revolution as Locke. This is not to say that Hume thinks we must submit blindly. In the Treatise he notes that the doctrine of passive obedience is absurd.

Accordingly we may observe, that this is both the general practice and principle of mankind, and that no nation, that cou’d find any remedy, ever yet suffer’d the cruel ravages of a tyrant, or were blam’d for their resistance. Those who took up arms against Dionysius or Nero, or Philip the second, have the favour of every reader in the perusal of their history; and nothing but the most violent perversion of common sense can ever lead us to condemn them. ’Tis certain, therefore, that in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive obedience, but make allowances for resistance in the more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression (Treatise 3.2.9.4).

However, as Hume stats in the essay “Of Passive Obedience,” Hume believes it is unwise to allow for a wide right to resistance.

And here I must confess, that I shall always incline to their side, who draw the bond of allegiance very close, and consider an infringement of it, as the last refuge in desperate cases, when the public is in the highest danger, from violence and tyranny (Hume, “Of Passive Obedience”).

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Not only does resistance tend to cause violence and instability by inciting civil war, but he also argues that it tends to make political rulers more violent than they were in the first place. Ultimately, Hume’s political conservatism can be traced back to his view on the nature of reason. It is this conception of reason which explains why he is so concerned with common opinions about political obligation.

We shall only observe, before we conclude, that though an appeal to general opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or astronomy, be deemed unfair and inconclusive, yet in all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is really no other standard, by which any controversy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous, than to find, that it leads to paradoxes repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind, and to the practice and opinion of all nations and all ages (374).

In the first Enquiry we saw Hume argue that our power of reasoning is not what some philosophers have supposed it is. It is not a faculty capable of revealing to us the ultimate structure of the universe. Rather, it is just another sort of instinct that allows us to make inferences on the basis of custom and habit which is not all that much different from the inferential capacity of non-human animals. For this reason, Hume is also skeptical about our ability to use reason to conceive of how existent political institutions could be radically changed for the better. Thus, we are better off relying upon common intuitions about these matters.