UncertainFactorsintheDelimitationoftheOuterContinentalShelfandItsInternationalPracticeintheArctic

GuiJing*

* GuiJing,female,holdsaMaster’sDegreeandcurrentlyservesasanAssistantResearchFellowwithNationalMarineDataandInformationService,andstudiesmaritimeintelli-genceandmaintenanceofmaritimerightsandinterests.Email:jingui59167@yahoo.com.cn

Abstract:DisputesovertheArcticareshiftingfromthoseregardingscien-tificresearchtothoseoverentitlementtoresources.Thesedisputescurrentlyfocusondelimitationoftheoutercontinentalshelfandnavigationalchannels.ProvisionsrelatedtotheoutercontinentalshelfboundariesinArticle76oftheUNConventionontheLawoftheSeaareuncertain.Whiletheseprovisionsprovidethebasisforsurroundingcountries’claimstocertainrightsinthere-gion,theyalsoarethesourceofdisputesamongthesecountries.Objectivelyspeaking,itisnecessarytoaddresstheuncertaintyoftheConventionthroughinternationalpractice.Therefore,opinionsrenderedbytheUNCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelfwillhavevitalsignificancefortheresolutionofsimilarconflictsnotonlyintheArctic,butalsointherestoftheworld.AsacountrywithexistinginterestsintheArctic,Chinashouldexaminetheseopin-ionscloselyandrespondaccordingly.

Keywords:Arctic;outercontinentalshelf;LomonosovRidge;delimitationofthecontinentalshelf

TheArcticusuallyreferstotheareaNorthoftheArcticCircle(66°33′N),consistingoftheArcticOcean,marginalcoastalland,islands,theArctictundra,and,atitsouteredge,theTaiga.ItencompassesEurope,Asia,andthenorthernpartofNorthAmerica,totaling21millionsquarekilometers.Withintheregionisapproximately8millionsquarekilometersoflandandislands,be-longingtoeightsurroundingcountries:U.S.A.,Russia,Canada,Denmark,Ice-

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land,Norway,FinlandandSweden.TheArcticseabedisanovalbasindividedbythreemainmid-oceanridges:theMendeleevRidge,theLomonosovRidge,

andtheArcticMid-OceanRidge.TheLomonosovRidge,whichishighandsteep,andextendsfromtheNewSiberianIslandsthroughtheNorthPoletothenortherncoastofGreenland,towering2,500metersabovetheabyssalplain,dominatesthebasin.

SincetheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(“UNCLOS”)

tookeffect,internationalmaritimeboundariesarenowdelimitedbyagreementamongcoastalcountries.WaterswithintwohundrednauticalmilesfromthecoastarenolongertheHighSeas,andnearly2/5oftheworld’swatersnowbelongtocoastalcountries.Inpractice,mostmaritimedelimitationagreementsinvolvetheexclusiveeconomiczone(“EEZ”)andthecontinentalshelf.WhilethereareveryfewpurelyEEZdelimitationagreements,1/3ofallmaritimede-limitationagreementshavetodowithcontinentalshelves.①Astheinternation-alcommunityfocusesmoreattentionontheArctic,thefivecoastalstatessur-roundingtheArcticOcean—Canada,Denmark,Norway,RussiaandtheUnitedStates—havecommittedthemselvestostrengtheningtheirterritorialandjuris-dictionalclaimsintheregion.InDecember2001,RussiasubmitteditsclaimforextendingitsoutercontinentalshelfintheArcticbeyondthe200-nauticalmileEEZ,thusbecomingthefirstcountrytosubmitsuchaclaimunderUN-CLOStotheUNCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelf(“UN-CLCS”).ThecoreargumentofthisclaimisthattheLomonosovandMen-deleevRidgesarenaturalextensionsofRussia’scontinentalshelf.Inresponse,

theUNCLCSrecommendedthatRussiaconductfurtherresearchanddata-gatheringtoamenditssubmission.In2006,NorwayalsosubmitteditsclaimtotheUNCLCStoextendthelimitsofitsoutercontinentalshelfintheArctic.②

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GuoYuan,ResearchonGeopoliticsofNanhai,UniversityofHeilongjiangPress,2007,p.33.TheUNCLCScompleteditsreviewofNorway’ssubmissioninMarch2009andpublisheditsSummaryoftheRecommendations.UNCLCS,SummaryoftheRecommendationsoftheCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelfinRegardtotheSubmissionMadebyNorwayinRespectofAreasintheArcticOcean,theBarentsSeaandtheNorwegianSeaon27November2006,athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_rec_summ.pdf,30November2009.TheUNCLCSrecommendedthat“thede-lineationoftheouterlimitsofthecontinentalshelfintheBananaHoleareaoftheNorwe-gianandGreenlandSeasbeconductedinaccordancewitharticle76,paragraph7[oftheUNCLOS],bystraightlinesnotexceeding60Minlength,connectingfixedpoints,definedbycoordinatesoflatitudeandlongitude.TheestablishmentofthefinalouterlimitsofthecontinentalshelfofNorwayinpartsoftheBananaHolemaydependondelimitationbe-tweenStates.”

Canada,DenmarkandtheUnitedStatesmayalsoseektodelineatetheirconti-nentalshelvesclaimsinthenextfewyears.

Article76oftheUNCLOSprescribesthedefinitionoftheoutercontinen-talshelf.However,thelackofprecisedefinitionofcertaintermshasresultedinambiguityininterpretingthisarticle.

Ⅰ.TheUNCLOSOuterContinentalShelfProvisionsandTheirUncertainty Article76,Paragraph1oftheUNCLOSdefinesthecontinentalshelfofacoastalstateas“compris[ing]theseabedandsubsoilofthesubmarineareasthatextendbeyonditsterritorialseathroughoutthenaturalprolongationofitslandterritorytotheouteredgeofthecontinentalmargin,ortoadistanceof200nauticalmilesfromthebaselinesfromwhichthebreadthoftheterritorialseaismeasuredwheretheouteredgeofthecontinentalmargindoesnotextenduptothatdistance.”①Thisparagraphprescribestworulesfordelineatingtheouterlimitsofthecontinentalshelf:thedistance(200nauticalmiles)ruleandthenaturalextensionrule.Iftheouteredgeofthecontinentalshelfislessthan200nauticalmilesfromthebaselinesfromwhichthebreadthoftheterritorialseaismeasured,thedistanceruleapplies,andthecontinentalshelfisextendedto200nauticalmiles.Iftheouteredgeofthecontinentalshelfisover200nau-ticalmilesfromthebaselines,thenaturalextensionruleapplies,andtheconti-nentalshelfisestablishedbyoneofthetwomethodsprescribedinParagraph4(a).However,Paragraphs5and6limitthemaximumwidthofacoastalstate’scontinentalshelf.Here,thedistanceruleprovidesaminimumwidthof200nau-ticalmilesforwherethecontinentalshelfdoesnotnaturallyextendtothatdis-tance.Naturalextensionisakeyindicatorofthedefinitionofthecontinentalshelf,andthecoastalstatesclaimingcontinentalshelvesbeyond200nauticalmilesmustinvokethenaturalextensionprovisions.The“extension”mustbecontinuousfromtheshorelinetotheouteredgeofthecontinentalmargin.Par-agraph3providesabroaderlegaldefinitionofthecontinentalmarginfromthegeomorphologicalperspective:“Thecontinentalmargincomprisesthesub-mergedprolongationofthelandmassofthecoastalState,andconsistsoftheseabedandsubsoiloftheshelf,theslopeandtherise.Itdoesnotincludethe

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① UnitedNations,TheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea,1833U.N.T.S.397,1982.

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deepoceanfloorwithitsoceanicridgesorthesubsoilthereof.”①Article76,

Paragraphs4-6oftheUNCLOSsetforthhowtodefinethecontinentalshelfinthelegalsense,includingdeterminationsbasedonthecontinentalslope,themaximumlimitsofthecontinentalshelf,outercontinentalmarginandridge.A.TheFootoftheContinentalSlope

ThereisnoUNCLOSprovisionregardingtheeffectofdifferentcrustaltypesondelineatingthecontinentalmargin,despiteevidenceoftheirinfluencefromthenegotiationprocessinmanycases.ThisimpliesthatthesubmergedprolongationofthelandmassofacoastalState,regardlessofitssedimentchar-acteristics,belongstoitscontinentalmargin(legalcontinentalshelf).Howev-er,topography,physiognomyandthicknessofmarinesedimentareimportanttechnicalindicatorsinidentifyingthenaturalextensionoflandmass.Thefootofthecontinentalslopeistheprimaryfeatureinthedelimitationoftheconti-nentalshelfbeyondthe200-nauticalmilelimit.ItservesasthereferencebaselinefordelineatingtheouterlimitsofthecontinentalshelfunderPara-graph7:theconnectingoutermostfixedpointsmusteitherhavesedimentaryrocksatleast1%oftheshortestdistancefromsuchpointtothefootofthecontinentalslope(theIrishformula),orbenomorethan60nauticalmilesfromthefootofthecontinentalslope(theHudbergformula).②TheIrishformulaprescribesdelimitationbyconnectingfixedpointswithstraightlinesnotmorethan60nauticalmilesapart,ateachofwhichpointsthethicknessofsedimentsisatleast1percentoftheshortestdistancefromsuchpointtothefootoftheslope.③Applyingthisformula,therefore,sedimentaryrocksmustmeasureatleast1Mthickat100nauticalmilesfromthefootoftheslope.TheUNCLCSinvokes“aprincipleofcontinuity”inimplementingthisformula,statingthat:

(a)toestablishfixedpointsacoastalStatemaychoosetheoutermostlo-cationwherethe1percentorgreatersedimentthicknessoccurswithinandbe-lowthesamecontinuoussedimentaryapron;andthat

(b)foreachofthefixedpointschosen,theUNCLCSexpectsdocumenta-tionofthecontinuitybetweenthesedimentsatthesepointsandthesedimentsatthefootofthecontinentalslope④

TheHedbergformulainvolvesdrawingalineconnectingpointsnotmore

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Id.,art.76,3.Seeid.,art.76,4(a)(i)-(ii).Seeid.,art.76,4(a)(i),7.UNCLCS,ScientificandTechnicalGuidelinesoftheCommissionontheLimitsoftheCon-tinentalShelf,CLCS/11,1999,8.5.3(hereinafter“ScientificGuidelines”).

than60nauticalmilesfromthefootoftheslope.①AStatemayapplythetwoformulasalternatively,i.e.,itmayapplytheIrishformulaincertainportionsofitscontinentalshelfandtheHedbergformulainotherportions,inamannertomaximizeitscontinentalshelfranges.

Thefootofthecontinentalslopealsoplaysaveryimportantroleindefi-ningthewidthofthecontinentalshelf.Article76,Paragraph4(b)oftheCon-ventionprovidesthat,asageneralrule,“intheabsenceofevidencetothecon-trary,thefootofthecontinentalslopeshallbedeterminedasthepointofmaxi-mumchangeinthegradientatitsbase.”②Butthisparagraphonlydefinesthefootofthecontinentalslopeintermsofgradientattheslope’sbase,withoutprovidinganactualdefinitionoftheterm“thefootofthecontinentalslope.”③

Therefore,itisreasonableforstatestousegeologicandgeophysicalevidenceinsupportingtheirclaimsonthepositioningofthefootofthecontinentalslope.Thisrequiresconsiderationoftheterms“sedimentary”and“rock”.However,

theConventiondoesnotprovideprecisedefinitionsoftheterms“sedimentaryrock”and“thefootofthecontinentalslope”,andthishascreateduncertaintyintheinterpretationofArticle76.④

B.LimitationsontheOuterLimitoftheContinentalShelfArticle76,Paragraph5ofUNCLOSlimitsthemaximumwidthofthelegal

continentalshelfto350nauticalmilesor100nauticalmilesfromthe2,500me-treisobathfromthebaselinefromwhichthebreadthoftheterritorialseaismeasured.Theformerstandard(350nauticalmiles)ispurelybasedondis-tance,whilethelatter(100nauticalmilesfromthe2,500metreisobath)isbasedonbothdepthanddistance.Thetwostandardscanbeappliedselectivelyandseparatelytoeachpartofthecontinentalshelf.Therefore,insomecases,

theouterlimitsofthecontinentalshelfmaybeextendedbeyond350nauticalmiles.C.Ridges

ThemostcontroversialissueontheidentificationofridgesindelimitingtheouterlimitofthecontinentalshelfunderArticle76ishowtodistinguish

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SeeUNCLOS,art.76,4(a)(ii),7.UNCLOS,art.76,4(b).DuncanJ.McMillan,TheExtentoftheContinentalShelf—FactorsAffectingtheAccuracyofaContinentalMarginBoundary,MarinePolicy,vol.9(issue2),1985,p.149.Id.,at156.

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submarineelevationsfromsubmarineridgesanddeepoceanridges.①

Article76,Paragraphs3and6involvesthreegeomorphologyconcepts,

namelytheridgesonthedeepoceanfloor,submarineridgesandsubmarineele-vations.②TheUNCLOSdoesnotprovidecleardefinitionsoftheseterms.InitsScientificGuidelines,theUNCLCSindicatesthattherelationshipbetween“theoceanicridges”inparagraph3and“thesubmarineridges”inParagraph6islessthanclear.Bothtermsaredistinctfromthe“submarineelevations”inPar-agraph6.③TheUNCLCSappearstoprovidethefollowingsimpledistinctionamongthethreeconceptsinitsrelatedtechnicaldocuments:

[P]aragraph3referstothedeepoceanfloorwithits“oceanicridges,”

statingthattheyarenotincludedinthesubmergedprolongationofthelandmassofthecoastalState.Withreferencetoparagraph1,thismakesitclearthattheseoceanicridgesarenottobeconsideredpartofthecontinentalshelf.“Submarineridges”mustbeconsideredamoregenerictermthanoceanicrid-gesandincludesboththelatterandridgeswhichhavetheirorigininthecon-tinentalmarginbutmayextendintotheareaofthedeepoceanfloor.Thepro-visionsofparagraph6donotapplytosubmarineelevationsthatarenaturalcomponentsofthecontinentalmargin,suchas“plateaux,rises,caps,banksandspurs.”④

Soarethereoceanicridgesthatareneitheradeepoceanicridgesnorter-restrialoceanicridges?

Theterm“oceanic”inParagraph3referstoridgesthatsharegeologicalcharacteristicsororiginswiththedeepseaflooranditssubsoil.Thereappearstobetwowaysinwhicharidgemaybeclassifiedasanoceanicridgeofthedeepoceanfloor.First,whenanunderwaterridgeislocatedbeyondtheouteredgeofthelegalcontinentalmarginandsharesgeologicalcharacteristicsandoriginwiththedeepoceanfloor,itisanoceanicridgeofthedeepoceanfloor.Second,whenanunderwaterridgeislocatedwithinthecontinentalmarginbutdetachedfromtheenvelopeofthefootofthecontinentalslopeandextendsinto

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JongseongRyuandVladimirKaczynski,ReviewonSomeAspectsofLegalandScientificUnderstandingsRegardingOuterContinentalShelfLimitsintheArcticOcean,KMIIn-ternationalJournal,vol.1(issue1),2009,p.20.SeeScientificGuidelines,7.1.2.Seeid.,at7.1.3.Int’lCooperationDep’toftheNat’lOceanicBureauandOfficeofOceanicReconnaissanceLeadershipGroup,TheTechnicalDocumentCollectionoftheCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelf (Chinese-English),Beijing,2000,pp.134,58~59.

thedeepoceanfloor,itshouldberegardedasanoceanicridge.①Somesubma-rineridgesthatlieentirelybeyondthefootofthecontinentalslopeandareei-therwhollywithinthedeepoceanfloororaroundtheouteredgeoftheconti-nentalmargin,mayhaveoriginatedfromthecontinentalmargin,butwerelaterseparatedfromitbygeologicalcrustmovements.Fromageologicalperspec-tive,suchridgesshouldnotbeclassifiedasoceanicridgesbecausetheydonotsharegeologicalcharacteristicsandoriginwiththedeepoceanfloor.However,

sincetheyliebeyondthefootoftheslopeovertheirfullrange,suchridgescan-notbecomepartsoftheouteredgeofthecontinentalmargin.Inthisrespect,

suchridgesshouldbetreatedasanoceanicridgeinexactlythesamemannerunderArticle76.②

Paragraph6excludestheridgeswithtypicaloceaniccharacteristicsfromthecontinentalmarginusingthemaximumlimitof350nauticalmiles.Howev-er,geologicalcrusttypescannotbethesolecriterioninclassifyingridgesandsubmarineelevationsintothelegalcategoriesofParagraph6ofArticle76.③

Rather,thedeterminationshouldbebasedonscientificandlegalconsiderationssuchasnaturalprolongationoflandterritoryandlandmass,morphologyofridgesandtheirrelationtothecontinentalmarginasdefinedinParagraph4,

andcontinuityofridges.④Therefore,geologyaloneappearstoprovideinsuffi-cientbasistodistinguish“submarineridges”fromthe“submarineelevations”

thatarethenaturalcomponentsofthecontinentalmargin.Inshort,a“submarineridge”isaridgethatisanintegralpartoftheconti-

nentalmarginmorphologically,butisdifferentfromthelandmassofthecoastalStatepartiallyorentirely.Italsosharesgeologicalcharacteristicsandoriginswiththedeepoceanfloor.Atthesametime,a“submarineridge”must,atleastinitslandwardpart,begeneticallylinkedwiththecontinentalmarginandnotbelongtothedeepoceanfloorinitsoceanicpart.Asitisdifficulttodefinethedetailsconcerningvariousconditions,theCLCSstatesthatitisappropriatetoexaminetheridgeissueonacase-by-casebasis.⑤

Inaddition,theConventiontreatseachtypeofgeomorphologyconceptdif-ferently.AccordingtoParagraph6,the“100nauticalmilesfromthe2,500me-

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RyuandKaczynski,AspectsofLegalandScientificUnderstandingsRegardingOuterCon-tinentalShelfLimitsintheArcticOcean,supranote13,at11.Id.,at10.SeeScientificGuidelines,7.2.9.Seeid.,at7.2.10.Seeid.,at7.2.11.

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treisobaths”limitdoesnotapplytosubmarineridges,themaximumwidthofwhichis350nauticalmilesmeasuredfromthebaseline.Submarineridgeswith-inthe350nauticalmileslimitqualifyascontinentalmargins,whileridgesex-ceedingthatlimitdonot.However,theseprovisionsunderParagraph6donotapplytoothersubmarineelevationssuchasplateaus,rises,caps,banksandspursthatarenaturalcomponentsofthecontinentalmargin.

Ⅱ.InternationalPracticeofOuterContinentalShelfDelim-itationintheArctic

DisputesovertheArcticareshiftingfromthoseregardingscientificexpe-ditiontothoseoverresources.Atpresent,disputesintheArcticfocusonthedelimitationoftheoutercontinentalshelfandnavigationalcontrol.Disputeso-vernavigationalcontrolarenotwithinthescopeofthisarticle.

Todate,fivecoastalStatessurroundingtheArcticOceanhavemadeclaimsforoutercontinentalshelfdelimitation.Amongthese,Russia,DenmarkandNorwayhavesubmittedapplicationsfortheouterlimitofthecontinentalshelftotheCLCS.①RussiaandNorway,whichhavealreadysubmittedtheirdelimi-tationapplications,andDenmarkandCanada,whicharepreparingtosubmittheirapplications,eachclaimtohavesovereigntyovertheLomonosovRidgeontheArcticseabedpursuanttothesubmarineelevationprovisionsofArticle76.TheCLCShasalreadyonceconsideredthematter.②Inaddition,theUnitedStateshasalsomadeitssovereigntyclaimovertheChukchiSeaplatformunderthesameprovisions.A.Russia’sSubmissionandResponsesfromtheInternationalCommunity

1.Russia’sApplicationfortheExtensionofItsOuterContinentalShelfIn2001,Russiabecamethefirstcountrytosubmitanapplicationtothe

CLCS.Partoftheapplicationrelatedtowaters200nauticalmilesofftheArcticcoast.③

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SeealsoTheUnitedNationsOfficeofLegalAffairs/DivisionforOceanAffairsandtheLawoftheSea Website,athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/index.htm,3September2009.RobertLeeHotz,TheUnitedStatesThrewItselfintheFightforContestingtheArctic,athttp://www.cetin.net.cn/cetin2/servlet/cetin/action/HtmlDocumentAction? baseid=1&docno=320480,3September2009.SeeSubmissionbyRussianFederationtotheCLCSin2001,athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm,3September2009.

RussiasubmitteditsapplicationtotheCLCSonDecember20,2001,see-kingtoextenditsjurisdictiontotheouterlimitsofitscontinentalshelf,whichcoversanareatheequivalentofGermany,FranceandItalycombined,extending1,191,000squarekilometersintheArcticOcean.MostofthetriangularareaclaimedlaybeyondRussia’s200-nauticalmileEEZ.Thespecificprovisionsci-tedinRussian’ssubmissiontotheCLCSareunknown,astheyareprotectedbytheconfidentialityrulesofthe“RulesofProcedureoftheCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelf”.Butitappearsfrompreviouslyavailablepub-licdocumentsandresearchthatRussiaregardedtheLomonosovRidgeandtheMendeleevRidgeassubmarineelevationsconstitutingnaturalextensionsofitscontinentalmargin.Thus,Russia’sclaimisclearlybasedonArticle76’sprovi-sionsrelatedto“submarineelevations”-namely,provisionsthatallowsubma-rineelevationstoextendthecontinentalshelfbeyond350nauticalmilesaslongasthefixedpointscomprisingthelineoftheouterlimitofthecontinentalshelfontheseabedcomplywiththe“100nauticalmilesfromthe2,500metreiso-baths”rule.

However,Russia’sclaimwasdeniedbytheCLCS.Ithasalsobeenques-tionedbycertainexpertswhopointedoutthat,underRussia’sargument,Cana-dacouldalsoclaimjurisdictionoftheLomonosovRidgebasedonitsconnectionwiththeNorthAmericancontinent.ExpertshavepredictedthatRussia’sclaimovertheLomonosovRidgewouldultimatelyterminateattheNorthPole,fortwopossiblereasons.Firstofall,theRussian-sidecontinentalplatehappenstoendattheNorthPole.Second,Russiamaywishtoterminateitsnaturalexten-sionattheNorthPole,inordertoavoidconflictswithDenmarkandCanada,

andtogaintheirsupportforapplying“sectoraldivision”totheArcticOceanseabed,asproposedinRussia’s2001CLCSsubmission.①

CLCSestablishedasubcommitteetoreviewtheRussiansubmission.ThissubcommitteeheldseveralmeetingsinSpring2002,andurgedRussiatopro-videgeologicalevidencetotheCLCSprovingthattheLomonosovRidgeandtheMendeleevRidgearenaturalcomponentsofRussia’scontinentalmargin.ItthenmadeareporttotheCLCS.InJune2002,theCLCSadoptedthesubcommittee’srecommendationsforRussia’sdelimitationsubmission.Regard-ingtheBarentsandBeringSeas,theCommissionrecommendedthattheRus-sianFederationtransmitthechartsandcoordinatesofthedelimitationlinesto

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① RyuandKaczynski,AspectsofLegalandScientificUnderstandingsRegardingOuterCon-tinentalShelfLimitsintheArcticOcean,supranote13,pp.16~17.

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theCommissiononcethemaritimeboundarydelimitationagreementswithNor-wayintheBarentsSeaandwiththeUnitedStatesofAmericaintheBeringSeaenterintoforce,fortheywouldrepresenttheouterlimitsofthecontinentalshelfoftheRussianFederationextendingbeyond200nauticalmilesintheBar-entsSeaandtheBeringSea,respectively.①AsfortheCentralArcticOcean,

theCommissionrecommendedthattheRussianFederationmakearevisedsub-missiontoextenditscontinentalshelfintheregionbasedonthefindingscon-tainedinthesubcommittee’srecommendations.②

2.ResponsesfromtheInternationalCommunityFivecountriesrespondedtoRussia’ssubmission,includingtheUnited

States,Canada,Denmark,JapanandNorway.③ WiththeexceptionoftheU.S.,thesecountriesonlymadecommentsontheoverlapbetweentheextensionofthecontinentalshelfproposedin Russia’ssubmissionandtheirEEZ.Canada’sresponseisthatneithertheRussiansubmissiononexpandingitscon-tinentalshelfbeyond200miles,northeUNCLCS’srecommendationsthereonshouldadverselyaffectthecontinentalshelfdelimitationbetweenCanadaandtheRussianFederation.④Norwayclaimedthattheunresolveddelimitationis-sueintheBarentsSeashouldbeconsideredasa“maritimedispute”forthepurposesofRule5(a)ofAnnexItotheRulesofProcedureoftheCommis-sion.⑤Japan’sresponsewasthatfortheSeaofOkhotskthetwocountries

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Inearly2007,RussiaandNorwayenteredintoan“AgreementontheDelimitationoftheContinentalShelf[inthe]BarentsSea,”whichwouldendthedisputeoverthe155,000-squarekilometer“grayseaarea.”SeeGuoPing-qing,TheArcticin-fighting”,TheOceanWorld,issue9,2007,p.24.Fifty-seventhsession,Agendaitem25(a),OceansandtheLawoftheSea,ReportoftheSecretary-General,Addendum,A/57/57Add.1(8October2002),para.41,athttp://daccess- dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/276/16/PDF/N0227616.pdf?OpenElement,21November2009.Allfivenations’notificationsregardingRussia’ssubmissiontotheUNCLCSareavailableathttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm,3September2009.NotificationfromCanada,RefNo.CLCS.01.2001.LOS/CAN(26Feb.2002),athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__CAN-text.pdf,3September2009.NotificationfromNorway,RefNo.CLCS.01.2001.LOS/NOR(2Apr.2002),p.2,atht-tp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__NORtext.pdf,3September2009.

shouldcontinuevigorousnegotiationsinafriendlyatmosphere.①Denmarkre-markedthatitwasnotabletoformanopinionontheRussiansubmissionbe-causeofthelackofmorespecificdatatomakeaqualifiedassessmentanditsstatusasanon-partytotheUNCLOS.② However,suchabsenceofopiniondidnotimplyDenmark’sagreementoracquiescencetotheRussianFederation’ssubmission.③

TheU.S.istheonlycountrytorefertothescientificandtechnologicalfactorsinitsresponsetotheRussiansubmission.RegardingtheLomonosovRidge,theU.S.claimedthat“theridgeisafreestandingfeatureinthedeepo-ceanicpartoftheArcticOceanBasinandnotanaturalcomponentoftheconti-nentalmarginofeitherRussiaoranyotherState.”④MoredetailedstatementswereprovidedwithrespecttotheAlpha-MendeleevRidge,sayingthat“theridgeisavolcanicfeatureofoceanicorigin...ItisnotpartofanyState’sconti-nentalshelf.”⑤Inordertosupportthesestatements,theU.S.providedspecificbathymetric,aeromagnetic,seismic,andbedrockcollectiondatawithitsre-sponse.B.ThePracticeofOtherArcticStates

FollowingontheheelsofRussia’ssubmission,NorwaysubmitteditsclaimtoextenditscontinentalshelfintheArcticOcean,theBarentsSeaandtheNorwegianSeatotheUNCLCSinNovember2006.⑥ Norwayacknowledgedthatthereexistedlingeringissueswithneighboringcountriesonbilateralconti-nentalshelfdelimitationinthisarea.TheseincludeoverlappingclaimsamongNorway,IcelandandDenmark—theFaroeIslandsforthecontinentalshelfex-tendingbeyond200nauticalmilesinthesouthernpartoftheBananaHole;re-neweddiscussionsamongNorway,DenmarkandGreenlandonthedelimitation

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NotificationfromJapan,RefNo.CLCS.01.2001.LOS/JPN (14Mar.2002),pp.1~2,athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__JPNtext.pdf,3September2009.NotificationfromDenmark,RefNo.CLCS.01.2001.LOS/DNK (26Feb.2002),p.1,athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__DNKtext.pdf,3September2009.Id.NotificationfromtheUnitedStatesofAmerica,RefNo.CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA (18Mar.2002),p.3,athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__USAtext.pdf,3September2009.Id.,at2.ContinentalShelfSubmissionofNorwayinrespectofareasintheArcticOcean,theBar-entsSeaandtheNorwegianSea,pp.10~12,athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_exec_sum.pdf,3September2009.

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ofthecontinentalshelfbeyond200nauticalmilesintheareabetweenGreen-landandtheSvalbardarchipelago;andthedelimitationoftheoutercontinentalshelfbeyond200nauticalmilesbetweenNorwayandRussiaintheBarentsSeaLoopHoleandintheWesternNansenBasinintheArcticOcean.①

Denmarkannounced,inSeptember2004,thata1240km-longunderwatermountainrange(theLomonosovRidge)undertheArcticwasjoinedwithitsland(Greenland),andthatDenmarkhadaninterestintheArcticresourcesun-dertheUNCLOS.②InresponsetoRussian’sflag-settingintheArcticin2007,

DanishresearcherssetofftotheArcticonAugust12,2007,andinamonthcol-lectedgeologicaldatafromtheLomonosovRidgetomaptheseabedundertheArcticicecap.DenmarkhasalsoplannedArcticexpeditionsfor2009and2011,

mainlytostudywhethertheLomonosovRidgewasgeographicallyconnectedtoGreenlandthroughthecollectionofgeologicaldata,inordertoprovethattheArcticbelongstoDenmark.DenmarkbecameamemberstatetotheUNCLOSin2004,soDenmarkalsoplanstomakeasubmissiontoclaimanextensionofitscontinentalshelfin2014.③

CanadahasalsoclaimeditsjurisdictionovertheArcticregionbasedontheLomonosovRidge’sconnectionwiththeNorthAmericancontinentandtheGreenlandplate.InAugust2008,CanadaissuedanofficialannouncementthattheLomonosovRidgejoinswiththeNorthAmericancontinentandtheGreen-landplate,accordingtothescientificinvestigationjointlyaccomplishedbyCan-adaandDenmark,anddoesnotbelongtotheRussianEEZ,asRussiahadclaimed.Onthisbasis,CanadashouldhaveeconomicrightstotheabundantoilresourcesintheArctic.TheCanadiangovernmentplanstomakeitssubmissiontotheUNCLCSbeforetheendof2013toformallyclaimjurisdictionoverthisarea.CanadabecameamemberstatetotheUNCLOSin2003,andsoitmustmakeitssubmissionoftheoutercontinentalshelfdelimitationwithin10years.InthisbattlefortheArctic,theU.S.isunwillingtobeabystander.Inad-

ditiontoitsresistanceagainsttheexpansionambitionsofRussiaandCanada,

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Id.,pp.10~12.YueNing,TheArcticBelongstotheMankindasaWhole,OrientalBusiness,athttp://www.oribiz.cn/biznews/2007-10-8/2007-10-08-24.html,18August2009.DenmarkWillDispatchItsVesseltotheArcticAndProvetheLomonosovRidgeBelongstoIt,athttp://news.qq.com/a/20070811/001013.htm,18August2009.Meanwhile,DenmarkhadmadeitssubmissionwithrespecttotheFaroeIslandsarea.SeeSubmission,athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_dnk.htm,18August2009.

theU.S.isalsoattemptingtoexpanditsowncontinentalshelf.TheU.S.hassetitssightsontheChukchiSeaandtheBeaufortSea.TheU.S.believesthattheChukchiPlatformisanaturalcomponentoftheArcticshelfinAlaska,andclaimsthatithasjurisdictionoveranareaundertheArcticOceanthatislargerthanthestateofCalifornia.OnAugust17,2007,theU.S.CoastGuardice-breaker,“Healey”,embarkedfortheNorthPoleforafour-weekmappingas-signment.AccordingtotheU.S.media,themaintaskofthisvoyagewastomaptheseabedofthenorthernChukchicrownandtoascertaintheextensionoftheNorthernAlaskacontinentalshelfsoastoevaluatethepossibilityofmer-gingthisareaintotheAmericancontinentalshelf,andtopreparetheregistryofboundarydatawiththeUNCLCS.Thismappingassignmentfollowedsimilarassignmentsin2003and2004.U.S.Scientistssaidthatthevoyagehadbeenplanningforthreeyearsandwaspartofanongoinglong-termproject.①

Ⅲ.TrendsandEffects

UNCLOSArticle76,paragraph6isextremelyattractivetocoastalstatesclaimingouterlimitsoftheircontinentalshelvesbeyondthe200-nauticalmi-lesEEZbecausetheprovisionpermitsextensionofthecontinentalshelfbeyondthe350nauticalmilesbasedonsubmarineelevations.ThefactthatArcticcoastalstatessuchasNorway,Denmark,CanadaandtheUnitedStatesfol-lowedRussia’sleadinclaimingtheextensionoftheoutercontinentalshelfu-singtheArcticOceanRidgeisproofofthis.Inotherregions,anumberofothernationsmayalsoraiseclaimstoextendtheircontinentalshelvesbeyond200or350nauticalmilesundertheUNCLOSprovisiononsubmarineelevations.②

Atthesametime,theclaimsputforthbythesestateswillinspireheateddebateswithintheinternationalcommunity.Somescientistsbelievethat,inor-dertoextendtheouterlimitsofitscontinentalshelf,acoastalstatemustprovethattheextendedareainquestionsharessimilargeologicalstructureswiththatstate’sterritorialland.Forexample,Russia,CanadaandDenmarkallwanttosupporttheirclaimsforextendingthecontinentalshelfbycollectingscientificevidenceconnectingtheLomonosovRidgewithNorthernSiberia,theNorthA-mericancontinent,andGreenland,respectively.Butitisnearlyimpossibleto

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TheU.S.CoastalGuard(USCG)isBoundfortheArctictoMap,TheOceanWorld,vol.9,2007,p.4.RyuandKaczynski,AspectsofLegalandScientificUnderstandingsRegardingOuterCon-tinentalShelfLimitsintheArcticOcean,supranote13,at21.

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scientificallyprovethattheLomonosovRidgeislinkedtoNorthAmerica,AsiaandEuropeatthesametime.①

Underthesecircumstances,howtheUNCLCSdealswiththegeologicaldatarelatingtodisputedridgessuchastheLomonosovRidgebecomesveryim-portantandsignificant.Article76oftheUNCLOSdoesnotprovideprecisedefinitionsfortheterms“submarineelevation”,“submarineoceanicridge”and“deepoceanicridge”.Thisleadstouncertaintyinthedelimitationoftheouteredgeofcontinentalshelves,② whichallowscoastalstatestoputforththeirclaims.Objectivelyspeaking,theprovisionsoftheUNCLOSneedpreciselythiskindofinternationalapplicationandrelatedinternationaljudicatoryprecedentstoenhanceandconfirmtheirmeaning,thusmakingtheConvention’sprovisionsthebasisofinternationalcustomarylaw.Assuch,theopinionoftheUNCLCStakesonsignificancefornotonlytheArcticOcean,butworldwideaswell.

ItcanbesaidthatRussia’sactionsandtheUNCLCS’sconsiderationofandconclusionsonRussia’sdelimitationsubmissionwillundoubtedlyspurcoastalcountries’preparationandapplicationsforthedelimitationoftheirouterconti-nentalshelves.

AlthoughtheArcticcountries’claimsfortheoutercontinentalshelfareonlyoneaspectofArcticaffairs,itreflectsthecomplexityofthepoliticalsitua-tionintheArctic.AstheUNCLOSestablishedthesystemsofhighseasandin-ternationalseabedareas,allofmankindhasequalrightstobenefitfromthein-ternationalseabedareas.ThereductionoftheinternationalseabedareaintheArcticwillaffectthecommoninterestsoftheinternationalcommunity,inclu-dingChina,insuchaspectsasnaturalresources,environment,navigationandscientificresearch,etc.Uptonow,therehasbeennoevidencetoprovethatthatanycountry’scontinentalshelfextendstotheNorthPoleundertheUNCLOS,

sotheNorthPoleanditssurroundingareadoesnotbelongtoanyparticularcountryandisconsideredtobeinternationalterritory,andtheice-coveredArcticOceanisinternationalwaters,subjecttothesupervisionandmanage-

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CanadaProvidesProofforthePurposeofContentionintheArctic,athttp://m1st.cn/www/doc_on_web-sm-0-ci-401-vi-1255-rc-0-cd-47489.html,18August2009.McMillan,TheExtentoftheContinentalShelf—FactorsAffectingtheAccuracyofaCon-tinentalMarginBoundary,supranote11,at156.

mentbytheInternationalSeabedAuthority.① However,iftheArcticstates’claimsregardingtheiroutercontinentalshelvessucceed,theinternationalsea-bedareasintheArcticwillbedrasticallyreduced.Forexample,ifRussia’sclaimforextendingtheouterlimitofitscontinentalshelfprovessuccessful,

RussianwillobtaintherightstothetriangularareabetweentheNorthPoleandRussia’sNortherncoastline,extendingfromtheKolaPeninsulatotheChukchiAutonomousRegion.Thisareaspans120,000km2,andisequivalenttoItaly,GermanyandFrancecombined.Further,itwouldbordertheunderwa-terjurisdictionofDenmark’sGreenland,Canada,andperhapseventheU.S.Russiawilltherebyobtaintheequivalentof10billiontonsoffueloilandgasreserves.②Thissituationwillinevitablyaffecttheinternationalcommunity’srighttofairlybenefitfromtheArctic.

Ⅳ.LessonsforChina

TheArcticisofactualandpotentialvaluetoChinaintermsofclimate,re-sources,andmanyotheraspects,asisalreadybeingstudiedbyscholars.AsthefuturetreatmentoftheArcticwillaffecttheglobalpoliticalsituation,itwillsurelyalsoaffectChina,andwemustpaycloseattentiontothisissue.③ Weshouldrecognizethepossibleadverseeffectswemayfaceintheregion,andre-flectonwhetherwehaveproperlyprotectedourrightsintheArctic.Further,

weshouldtakeastrategicperspectiveinincludingtheArcticasanimportantcomponenttoourmarinerightsstrategicplanning,andtakepracticalmeasurestopreventandaddressthepossiblepassivepositionwemayfaceinourfutureinvolvementintheArctic.IbelievethattherecentdisputesovertheArcticout-ercontinentalshelfprovideuswiththefollowinglessons:

A.Fromanoceanicstrategyperspective,itshowsthatChinashouldpayattentiontoitsinterestsintheArctic. China’sinterestsintheArcticmainlyinvolvenaturalresources,environ-

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TianXingchun,TheCrazyTussleintheGlobalNorthernEnd:Flag-InsertingArousesDifferentResponses,athttp://world.people.com.cn/GB/89881/97034/6073364.html,10June2009.TheFightingoftheEightCountriesaroundtheArctic:RussiaDoesNotHesitateinTak-ingExtremeMeasuresattheCriticalMoment,athttp://sanmen.zjol.com.cn/news/2009/206380.shtml,18November2009.YangLiangqing,WangMengjie,WhatDoesIceMeltingintheArcticMeanforChina?TheoryandtheContemporaryEra,issue9,2008,p.48.

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ment,scientificresearchandnavigation.①Inthisageofglobalization,interestsinthe Arcticresourcesarecontinuouslyallocatedtoperipheralcountriesthroughtheindustrialchain.Theexploitationandtransportationofoilandgasresourcesprovidesopportunitiesfortheinfusionofforeigncapital;givingChinaatleastindirectinterestsintheArcticresources.TheArctichasprofoundin-fluenceonourcountry’stemperatureandprecipitation,makingitimperativetostudyitsoperationfurther.ThefactthatmanycountrieshavealreadyinvestedheavilyinsettingupresearchstationsintheArcticandfurtheringtheirscien-tificresearchintheArcticOceanunderscoresthescientificvalueoftheArctic.TheresourceholdingmostpracticalpromiseforChinaisthenewnavigationalroutetobeopenedintheArctic.ThisistheshortestrouteconnectingAsia,Eu-rope,andtheAmericas.Currently,themajorityofChina’sforeigntradeisrou-tedthroughtheMalaccaStraitandtheSuezCanal.However,thisroutehasbeencontrolledbypowerfulnationalinterestsandplaguedbypirates,thusde-creasingthelevelofsafetyandincreasingthecostofutilization.Moreover,thetrafficthroughtheSuezCanalisnearcapacity,causingseriouscongestioninre-centyears.Arcticroutescanalleviatetheseproblems.Asnotedabove,iftheArcticstatessucceedintheirclaimstoextendtheiroutercontinentalshelves,

theinternationalcommunity’sandChina’srighttofairlybenefitfrom Arcticresourceswillbeweakened.Therefore,Chinashouldformitsstrategiesinpro-tectingitsmaritimeinterestsfromaglobalperspective,andincludetheArcticregioninitsstrategicanalysis.Itshouldalsoemphasizeandstrengthenitsre-searchintheArcticOcean,inordertoprotectthecountry’smaritimeinterests.B.FromtheperspectiveofsafeguardingandrealizingChina’smaritimestrategicinterests,itarguesforincreasingandrealizingthecountry’saccesstocommonin-ternationalinterests. SummarizingthecurrentChinesescholarshiponthemaritimerightsandinterests,IbelievethatthelegalsystemofChina’smaritimerightsandinter-estsshouldincludefourparts,namely,thebasiclegalregimeofmarinerightsandinterests,thelegalsystemonmarineresourcesandenvironmentalrightsandinterests,thelegalsystemonsafeguardingtheinterestsofmaritimesafety,

andthelegalsystemofmaritimelawenforcementandmarinejurisdiction.Forcompleteness,weshouldalsoincludelegalsystemsfortherightsandinterestsregardingislands,mineralresourcesoftheinternationalseabedarea,thehigh

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① GuoPeiqing,thegreatpowershouldhaveglobalstrategywhichmustincludetheArctic,LookoutNewsweekly,issue27,2009,p.64.

seas,andmarinescientificresearch.①Underinternationallaw,theinternationalseabedareaisthecommonpropertyofallmankind,ownedbytheentireinter-nationalcommunity,andmanagedbytheInternationalSeabedAuthorityonbe-halfofallmankind.TheArcticregionconsistsofhighseasandinternationalseabedareas,andtherighttoitsdevelopmentissharedbyallnations.

China’sinfluenceonlegalaffairsintheArcticisratherlimited,mainlyin-volvingscientificresearch.However,thiscanprovideapointofentryforChi-na,ifwecontinuouslyaddtoourArcticexperiencebyactivelypromotingcoop-erativescientificexpeditionsintheArcticandparticipatingintheprocessofin-ternationalrulemaking.Meanwhile,Chinacanexerciseitsroleandinfluenceininternationalaffairsasapowerfulnation,clarifyingourclaimsandpositionsontheissueofthedelimitationofArcticcontinentalshelves-withoutcontradictingourpositionsonoutercontinentalshelvesinothercontextsandemphasizingtheArctic’sstatusasthehighseasandinternationalseabedareas,andthere-sultantequalrightstotheregion.②Throughthesevariousavenues,ChinacanincreaseitsinfluenceonArcticaffairs,strengthenitsdecision-makingpowersintheArcticregion,andadvocateonbehalfofothernon-Arcticstates.C.Fromtheperspectiveoftheoperationofinternationallawofthesea,thereisalegalbasisforChina’smaritimerightsintheArctic. Internationalconventionsareapartofourlegalsystem.Thisisparticular-lytrueforlawofthesea,whichisinherentlyinternationalinnature.Thelawoftheseaplaysanimportantroleintheformationofinternationaloceanicor-derbyprovidingformaritimerightsandinterests.Therefore,itispossibleandnecessarytoprotectourcountry’smaritimerightsthroughavenuesavailableunderinternationallawofthesearegime.Forthisreason,weshouldseekoutthelegalbasisunderinternationallawthatmayberelatedtoChina’sexerciseofArcticmaritimerights,studytheseprovisionsandconventionsindepth,andmakefulluseofthem.

Currently,themaininternationalconventionssupportingChina’srightsandinterestsintheArcticaretheUNCLOSandthe1920SvalbardTreaty.③

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GuiJing,ResearchontheNationalLegalRegimeofMarineRightsandInterests-fromthePerspectiveofSystemsBuilding,OceanDevelopmentandManagement,vol.1,2010,pp.22~26.DongYue,ArcticDisputeandItsSolutionsUndertheLawoftheSea,JournalofOceanUniversityofChina (SocialSciencesEdition),vol.3,2009,pp.6~9.DongYueandSongXin,AStudyonInternationalLawoftheSeaConcerningArcticSci-entificInvestigation,JournalofOceanUniversityofChina,vol.4,2009,pp.11~15.

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The1982UNCLOSsetforththesystemsofhighseasandinternationalseabedareas,providingthemostimportantlegalbasisforChina’sdevelopmentanduseofresourcesandconductofscientificresearchexpeditionintheArcticregion.ThedefinitionoftheouterlimitsofthecontinentalshelfsetforthinArticle76isnotonlyimportanttopartystateswhohavesignedandratifiedtheConven-tion,butalsototherestoftheworld,becauseitmaybecomethebasesofcus-tomaryinternationallawthroughpractice.①Therefore,weshouldpaycloseat-tentiontothedelimitationofoutercontinentalshelvesintheArctic,therebystayinguptodatewiththedevelopmentofArticle76.The1920SvalbardTrea-tyremainstheonlyintergovernmentaltreatyrelatedtotheArcticregion.In1925,Chinabecameapartystatetothattreaty.PartystateshavetherighttoexploitresourcesandconductscientificresearcharoundtheSpitsbergenIslands.However,asidefromtheformerSovietUnion,whichminedcoalinthearea,mostotherpartystateshavenotpursuedtheireconomicinterestshere.InordertouserelatedtreatiesasapointofentryintopursuingourArcticinter-ests,weneedtostudyandanalyzethespirit,content,andcorrespondingrightsandobligationsofthesetreatiesindepth.Onthebasisofrespectforinterna-tionallaw,ChinacanpursueitsrightsundertreatiesrelatedtotheArctic,andtakeanactivepositioninprotectingandrealizingournationalinterestsintheregion.

(SeniorEditor:Tzung-linFUEditors:StephenPire;YANGSi-si)

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① McMillan,TheExtentoftheContinentalShelf—FactorsAffectingtheAccuracyofaCon-tinentalMarginBoundary,supranote11,at148.