Ukrainian Crisis 2013 to Present: History, Media and a New Cold War

Ukrainian Crisis: 2013 to Present - History, Media and a NewCold War

Ukrainian Crisis 2013 to Present: History, Media and a NewCold War

Stacy Hackenberg

Southern New Hampshire University

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The current situation in Ukraine, that began unfolding

in November 2013 with protest in the capital city of Kyiv1,

has its roots in the rich and complex history of the people

and nation of Ukraine. This history is often misunderstood

or overlooked in the media reports of the ongoing violence

and unrest. When coupled with a short attention span and the

distraction of multiple crises both abroad and at home, the

American media consumer is left with an incomplete

understanding of events as we slip closer to a new Cold War.

History

To truly understand what is happening in Ukraine,

reviewing the history of the region is the best place to

begin. The current dilemma facing Ukraine is nothing new.

This region has long been caught between the opposing forces

of East and West. “At first there were no such divisions. In

the ninth century, Ukraine, known as Kyivian Rus, was

becoming the early seat of Slavic power and the newly

1 This paper will be using the Ukrainian transliteration spelling, Kyiv versus the Russian transliteration spelling of Kiev which is the standardized name given by the Ukrainian government in 1995.

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adopted Orthodox religion” (Conant, 2014). Kyivian Rus was

the first eastern Slavic state “centered around the city of

Kyiv from the mid-ninth century to 1240”. The territory

claimed by the Rurikid dynasty encompassed parts of modern

day Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia, stretching from

“territories along the Dnieper, the Western Dvina, the

Lovat-Volkhov, and the upper Volga rivers” (Martin, 2004).

Thus, Ukraine and Russia both claim a common homeland in

Kyivian Rus.

This Kyivian Rus “Imperial Dynasty was the largest

political entity in Europe” and became “became a powerhouse

of intellectual discourse, religion, and cultural life”. The

Rus Dynasty promoted education, equal rights for women and

the arts and sciences (Rud, 2014). This all changed in 1227

when the Mongols sacked Kyiv. Rus was divided, as most of

what is northern Rus became part of the Mongol world,

swearing fealty to the Khan. Most of the western part of Rus

was “conquered by a pagan tribe known as the Lithuanians,

one of the most powerful and fierce people of the 13th

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century”(Murphy, 2014). In 1386, a deal is struck allowing

the Lithuanian Prince to become King of Poland as long as he

converts to Roman Catholicism. A unique version of

Catholicism is born with the Union of Brest called Uniate or

Byzantine Catholicism in which priests retained the right to

marry and use the Slavonic liturgy. In 1569, the Lithuanian-

Polish union of monarchs becomes a federated state called

the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth with a parliament and

joint administrative structure” (Murphy, 2014). As part of

the deal, in which this is negotiated, the lands of Ukraine

are transferred from the territory of Lithuanian to the

territory of Poland.” One of the ideas that Ukraine will be

exposed to with this transfer from Lithuanian to Poland is

the idea of the corporate state where certain parts of the

citizenry have rights and privileges. The rights transcend

the King; they were there before the King and the King

serves as protector. “This is not an idea that is at all

relevant to eastern Rus which is now Muscovy where the Czar

owns all the property of the state and effectively all the

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people” (Murphy, 2014). This is not restricted to the

nobles, but extended to citizens in the Ukrainian cites

under the Code of Magdeburg which allowed them to establish

their “own judicial and administrative institutions”

(Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 1993).

This begins a pattern of conflict between East and West

that still exists. Throughout the next several hundred

years, Ukraine will exchange hands, be partitioned and

attempt the creation of an independent state. In 1648, the

Cossacks, a group of mercenary fighters who nominally ruled

the part of eastern Ukraine just north of Crimea, rebelled

from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (PLC). This portion

of the PLC was not farmable and essentially ungovernable

because of constant raids by the Crimean Tartars. The

Cossacks, who made up the infantry and were essential in

securing, Polish victory over Tartars, Moscow and the

Ottoman Empire, wanted recognition as nobles. When this was

refused, they rebelled. Led by Bohdan Khelmensky, they were

able to take control of all Ukrainian territories in the

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PLC. Despite this, Khlemnesky did not have enough power to

take on the Polish army directly and looked for allies. He

signed the Treaty of Pereyaslav with Russian Czar

Mikhailovich in 1654, bringing Ukraine under Russian

protection. Khelmensky was unable to secure Mikhailovich’s

promise to uphold Ukrainian rights and liberties in the

treaty and in 1658 his successor turned to the Poles. The

Union of Haidiach made Rus a third component of the PLC as

the Duchy of Rutheian. Ukraine switched sides a decade later

when in 1667, Poland and Russia divided Ukraine. The

Cossacks are given autonomous control of the Hetmenate until

1709 when Cossack ruler Stepan Mazepa betrays Czar Peter to

the King of Sweden (Murphy, 2014).

While Ukraine fell increasingly under autocratic

Russian rule in the period leading up to World War I, the

Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia, with its strong

Ukrainian component, received universal male suffrage in

1907. Austria-Hungary used the resulting Ukrainian political

parties as a balance against the Polish landowners. They

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also allow the Byzantine Catholic church to thrive. This is

in sharp contrast to the Russian controlled parts of

Ukraine, which are Orthodox, and under much different

political rule.

The complex interplay of East and West can be seen not

just in the politics and ruling elite but in the common

people as well. One way this is revealed is to look at the

opposing catechisms of the Byzantine Catholic and Orthodox

Catholic churches. The Byzantine catechism stressed the

western ideals of legalistic and contractual social

foundations. The Orthodox catechism promoted autocratic

political authority (Wilson, 2011, p. 54). With the

Byzantine church dominating in western Ukraine and the

Orthodox in the east during the pre-Modern era, the

differing backgrounds of West and East were emphasized; one

steeped in the concepts of contractual monarchy and a

communal contract between state and citizen and the other

autocratic and authoritarian patriarchal rule.

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The formation of a Ukrainian state was attempted again

with World War I. Germany and Austria-Hungary set up the

puppet state of Hetmenate in 1918. Germany hoped to secure a

reliable source of grain while Austria-Hungary wanted a

counterweight to Russia. When Austria-Hungary fell, the

western portion of Hetmenate declared itself West Ukraine

Republic. Then, in 1921, Ukraine was divided again between

Poland and Russia. When the Soviet Union was formed in 1922,

the Ukrainian territories became the Ukrainian Soviet

Socialist Republic, in part to give an outlet for the

nationalistic tendencies of the region. At first, the USSR

gave the Ukrainian SSR a good deal of control over its

affairs and allowed the Ukrainian language to be the

official language of the state. By the 1930s, however, all

affirmative action type policies would be repealed,

culminating in the Holodomor in 1932-1933 where 3.5 million

Ukrainians died of starvation under a forced collective

drive (Murphy, 2014).

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With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine

became independent. Its borders contained much of what were

once Kyivian Rus as well as the Hetmenate. For a time,

relations between Ukraine and Russia were cordial. The

Ukrainian leaders had come out of the Soviet system, making

understanding easier. However, as time passed a new

generation of leadership arose in Ukraine that had no strong

ties to Russia. With Kyiv as the political and cultural

center of the country, these leaders were more inclined

towards Europe and a Western outlook. Fraudulent elections

in 2004 gave rise to the Orange Revolution, which resulted

in a strongly pro-Western government under Victor Yushchenko

that looked to inclusion in NATO and stronger ties with

Europe (University of Texas, 2014). Yushchenko lost the

2010 elections to Viktor Yanukovych, the man who won the

fraudulent 2004 election and who quickly steered the Ukraine

back towards Russia. His immediate actions eventually led to

the current crisis.

Media Review

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The complex nature of Ukrainian history does not

translate well into modern media. Television and social

media have neither the time nor space to give a thorough

explanation of the historical background. Added to this is

the long-held conceit that Ukraine was not a historical

nation. The 1919 Congress of Versailles determined which

nations received historical status. “Ukraine was determined

to be a non-historical nation and thus not deserving of a

state” (Murphy, 2014). Since then, westerners and easterners

alike have been taught that Ukraine is a part of Russia. The

truth, of course, is somewhere in the middle.

Against this complex historical background, how

American media reports on the ongoing crisis in Ukraine was

reviewed. The following television networks were studied to

determine the number of mentions of Ukraine from August 1,

2013 to January 25, 2015: ABC, Al-Jazeera America, BBC World

News America, CBS, CNN, Fox News, MSNBC and NBC. Total

mentions for the period between all networks was 15,579 with

an estimated 1-2% error rate due to duplications and/or

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stories unrelated to the crisis. Three website were reviewed

in a similar manner: the Christian Science Monitor, New York

Times and Washington Post. Total mentions for these three

outlets across a similar time period was 9,275. No effort

was made to breakdown the content of the mentions.

Three of the networks reviewed included non-cable

broadcasts: ABC, CBS and NBC. One, BBC World News America

represented a single news program and not the mentions for

an entire network, thus accounting for the relatively small

number. Al-Jazeera America had by the largest number of

mentions. At 5,574 mentions for the time period under

review, their closest broadcast competitor was Fox News at

2,368.

For print medium, the New York Times accounted for the

largest number of mentions at 7,768. The Christian Science

Monitor had only 177.

Coverage of the crisis peaked at similar times across

all mediums. First, beginning in November 2013 when news of

the unrest surrounding Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU

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agreement; again in March when Russia annexed Crimea; in

July with the downing of Malaysia Air MH-17 and last in

November 2014 on the anniversary of the initial unrest and

parliamentary elections. The largest concentration of

mentions occurred in March and July 2014.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea brought the crisis into

sharp relief for most American media. Across the board,

mentions jumped an average of 162%. However, attention began

almost immediately to drift. The following month saw a 17.1

decrease in mentions. Mentions continued to taper off

through June. They increased sharply again when Malaysian

Air MH-17 was shot down over Crimea, resulting in an

increase nearly equal to that in November at 160.5%. The

nature of the questions surrounding this event, speculation

about who was responsible and the delay in reaching the

crash site caused this to increase mentions and, for some

networks, kept a partially sustained interest through August

and September. The increase in mentions between October and

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the November elections was considerably smaller than the

other two events but still significant at 121.45%

Certain co-current events can explain some of the

oscillation in mentions. The police shooting of Michael

Brown and the Ebola outbreak in Africa both contributed to

diluting the interest of events in Ukraine. Brown’s shooting

and the Ebola outbreak both reached a critical mass in the

media in August 2014. These stories dominated news the

summer of 2014 and into the early fall, peaking in August

and October respectively. The confluence of events in

August seemed to have the least effect. However, sharp drop

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off in mentions of Ukraine in October may be partially

accounted by the Ebola outbreak, with patient contracting

the disease in the U.S. for the first time (Cohen, Almasy, &

Yan, 2013).

Television news mentions were gathered using The TV

News archive on the Internet Archive. This site allowed

precise searching by keyword on a month-by-month basis for

each network studied. Information on coverage of Ebola and

the Michael Brown shooting also came from this site

(Internet Archive, 2015). Mentions for print media came

through the archives of each paper, supplemented by a Google

advanced search (Christian Science Monitor, 2015; NY Times,

2015’ Washington Post, 2015).

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One outcome of this crisis has been the creation of a

new media start-up in Ukraine called Hromadske

International. This news portal published on several social

media platforms, including Facebook and Twitter and

broadcasted regular TV news programming over the Internet.

The primary location for their written long form content was

on the new blogging platform Medium. Both foreign and

Ukrainian journalists founded the startup and began

reporting in September 2013.

While traditional news reporting was the focus of the

media review above, one of the most important arenas for the

dissemination of information about Ukraine has been through

new media. In particular, Twitter has seen a war of words

raging “between Russia on the one side, and Ukraine and its

international supporters on the other. Trolling, the act of

intimidation through ridicule and bravado has a long-

standing tradition in diplomacy, especially in Ukraine. The

Cossacks reportedly responded to Turkish Sultan Mehmed IV’s

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demand of surrender with colorful language that would be

right at home on the Internet (Dunnett, 2014a).

This diplomatic trolling tradition continued in the

current crisis, with rebukes and theatrical statements from

both sides. Beginning with tweets about U.S. Ambassador to

Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt, and Assistant Secretary of State for

European and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland handing out

cookies to protestors in December 2013, the twitter war saw

diplomats from both sides trading barbs. “During the

Russian annexation of Crimea, the U.S. Department of State

took the unusual step of issuing a response to ten “false

claims” by President Putin” with a tweet. The back and forth

continued with pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian commenters as

well as official diplomatic accounts joining the fray

(Dunnett, 2014a).

After the November 2014 elections, the newly installed

government created the Ministry of Information to counteract

this information war. “Ukraine has perceived Russia’s

aggressive media campaign as a direct threat to its national

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security, blaming Russia media for inciting pro-Russian

sympathizers in Ukraine and decreasing foreign support for

Kyiv in the face of Russian aggression” (Dunnett, 2014b).

One of the Ministry’s first acts was to block Russian TV

broadcasts. Many journalists inside Ukraine protested the

Ministry, calling it a possible threat to freedom of the

press. International media watchdog group Reporters Without

Borders, said, “In a democratic society, the media should not

be regulated by the government. The creation of an

information ministry is the worst of all possible responses

to the serious challenges that the government is facing”

(RWB, 2014).

Many Ukrainians referred to the Ministry as the

Ministry of Truth, in reference to George Orwell’s 1984 and

took to social media to vent their displeasure, creating

false social media accounts. “The Ministry of Information

Policy has already been creatively renamed as the “Ministry

of Laziness and Spitting at the Ceiling” and the “Ministry

of Sexual Politics,” hinting at the uselessness of the new

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office and the too-close connections between various

government officials” (Lokot, 2014).

The New Cold War

Wars have long been fought and won through information.

This crisis is no different. However, the long-term

implications of renewed conflict between Russia and the

West, primarily the U.S., extend beyond Ukraine’s borders.

Both sides blame the other for the escalating conflict.

Economic sanctions imposed by the West against Russia as

punishment for its perceived invasion of Crimea may be the

opening salvo in a new Cold War.

Several possible outcomes for the current crisis exist,

according to Alexander Motyl. Russian President Vladmir

Putin can choose to continue to threaten invasion and

encourage unrest in southeastern Ukraine. He can refuse to

recognize the new Ukrainian government and retain hold on

Crimea. Both of these would likely result in a new Cold War.

Further incursion into Ukraine “could be a hot war”. Last,

he could choose to recognize the Ukrainian government and

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de-annex Crimea, reducing tensions and promoting a wary

peace (Motyl, 2014). Putin’s actions have placed him in a

position where he cannot show weakness, thus any perceived

retreat from Ukraine is unlikely.

Economic sanctions imposed by the US and European Union

beginning in March 2014, and recently extended by the EU,

have impacted Russia’s economy but not, as of yet, resulted

in any change. Andrey Kostin, chief executive of VTB Bank

calls the continued sanctions an “economic war against

Russia” (Ellyatt, 2015). Russia is expected to go into

recession this year as a result.

While the fighting goes on, arguments on who is to

blame continue. Many in the West place blame squarely on

Putin’s shoulders. His reasoning behind the annexation of

Crimea and calls for the reintegration of the Russian world

are firmly based in Russian and Soviet history. The Soviet

policies of internal migration that encouraged ethnic

Russians to move to outlying Soviet states has stranded

“more than 25 million ethnic Russians” in 14 non-Russian

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republics, including Ukraine (Heleniak, 2002). Imperial and

Soviet expansion policies long sought a warm water port for

the Russian Navy and civilian fleets. These expansions

succeeded with the annexation of Crimea and the port of

Sebastopol. When Nikita Krushchev altered internal borders

in 1954 to grant Ukraine jurisdiction over Crimea, he had no

idea the impact this would have 60 years in the future.

One the one hand, we have Russian aggression in the

form of Putin. On the other, we have NATO enlargement and

the West’s backing of the pro-Democracy movement in Ukraine.

This encroachment of NATO on Russia’s sphere of influence

and the open support of pro-Western politicians are seen a

provocation by some. Not just NATO, but the European Union’s

Eastern Partnership Initiative, which aimed to “foster

prosperity in such countries as Ukraine and integrate them

into the EU economy” added to the West’s intrusions

(Mearsheimer, 2014).

Yet the annexation of Crimea should not be seen as a

power grab by Putin, but rather as Russia resisting the

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West’s political and cultural ambitions in Eastern Europe

(Krastev, 2014). That this invokes images of the Cold War

fought between in US and Soviet Union from 1945-1991 should

come as no surprise. Much of the discourse from both sides

is eerily reminiscent of that time. With the advent of

social media and the Internet, we are able to see into the

lives and events of the region in real time. The game has

stayed the same, only the medium has changed.

In August of 2014, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry tweeted a

“pair of hashtag slogans, #UkraineUnderAttack and

#RussiaInvadedUkraine” and encouraged their spread (Tharoor,

2014b). Before that, in March 2014, the US State Department

issued a hashtag #UnitedForUkraine, that was promptly

repurposed by the Russian Foreign Ministry Twitter account.

Using the tag, they tweeted about Kyiv’s refusal to

negotiate and Russian UN envoy’s talk about calling an

extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council (Tharoor,

2014a).

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Pro-Russian forces in the east, claiming the creation

of Novorossia and holding their own elections, created their

own website, Novorossia Today to promote their cause. That

website links to Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google+

accounts (Novorussia Today, 2015). The information war

continues unabated on social media. Both sides look to

influence opinion. Telling the truth from the fiction is no

easy task.

Ethical Considerations and Conclusions

When faced with opposing information regarding an

ongoing conflict, it becomes especially important that

journalists keep ethics in mind. Ethical journalism in

times of violence is difficult. Maintaining accuracy and

context while avoiding advocacy and distortion is always a

challenge, but never more so during war (SPJ, 2014).

Emotions run high among those directly effected. Sometimes

those involved are the journalists themselves. Seven media

professionals were killed in Ukraine in 2014 (CPJ, n.d.).

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War correspondents are a unique breed, placing

themselves in harm’s way to bring the news to their readers.

They have a constant challenge, as well, to balance truth

with safety and patriotism with witness. The history of war

correspondents begins, ironically, with the Crimean War.

William Howard Russell, author of the Charge of the Light Brigade,

covered the Crimean War for The Times of London. His efforts

“marked the beginning of an organized effort to report a war

to the civilian population at home”. Russell had enormous

influence in Britain and its conduct in the Crimean War

(Knightley, 2004, p.2-3).

Indeed, the simple act of reporting conflict can shape

its outcome, so the responsibility of the journalist grows.

Not only does he or she place himself or herself in danger,

their words and pictures are able to sway public opinion and

influence governments. Why then, are we seeing relatively

little coverage of the continuing conflict in Ukraine?

New media seems a likely culprit but research shows

that 93% of Americans report using television news

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organizations as their news source, regardless of how their

medium of access (API, 2014). So if digital media is not

supplanting traditional news outlets, merely changing how we

access them, why are we seeing a paucity of news out of

Ukraine?

The sheer amount of information available may be to

blame. The seven television news networks reviewed for this

paper only scratch the surface of what’s available. The

Internet Archive has 24 networks in their archive alone.

Cable news provides us with even more options. News websites

and blogs on the Internet are too numerous to count. Still,

regardless of the smorgasbord of choices available to us for

our news consumption, the major media outlets are not

covering the conflict to the same extent they are events in

the Middle East, particularly around ISIS.

At best, this spotty reporting means Ukraine drifts in

and out of the American consciousness. Our national

obsession with Iraq and Afghanistan means that this

conflict, based in long-standing historical and cultural

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differences, slips by us. The danger of escalating the

Ukrainian conflict to a hot war with Russia presents a grave

threat to our national economy and international standing.

Yet, little is being discussed about the potential

reinstitution of the Cold War and the long-term

consequences.

The eventual outcome of the conflict is still unknown.

Just today, reports about fighting in Ukraine continue.

Speculations about the U.S. and Russia’s next actions

abound. Our ability as citizen’s of the world to understand

what is happening, express our opinion to our leaders and

provide support to those involved depends in no small part

on the news. When that news is not forthcoming in the

American media, the savvy media consumer looks elsewhere.

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