The Institute of Asian and African StudiesThe Max Schloessinger Memorial Foundation

Offprint from

JERUSALEM STUDIES INARABIC AND ISLAM

41 (2014)

J.T. Olsson

H. udud in al-Kindı and Ibn Rabbanal-T. abarı

THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEMTHE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

CONTENTS

Ch. Robin Le roi h. imyarite Tha↩ran Yuhan↪im(avant 325–v. 375): stabilisationpolitique et reforme religieuse

1

Ali A. Hussein The old qas. ıda in al-Yamama: aliterary and historical study of theqas. ıdas of the Bahila tribe

97

Phillip I. Ackerman-Lieberman The disappearance of the early pho-netic Judeo-Arabic spelling (EPJAS)and Sa↪adya Gaon’s translation ofthe Bible

137

Nadia Vidro and Almog Kasher How medieval Jews studied classi-cal Arabic grammar: a Kufan primerfrom the Cairo Genizah

173

J.T. Olsson H. udud in al-Kindı and Ibn Rabbanal-T. abarı

245

Godefroid de Callatay Philosophy and Bat.inism in al-Andalus: Ibn Masarra’s Risalat al-I ↪tibar and the Rasa↩il Ikhwan al-s.afa↩

261

REVIEWS

Ali A. Hussein Geert Jan van Gelder. Sound andsense in classical Arabic poetry.

313

Alfred Ivry Haggai Ben-Shammai, Shaul Shaked,Sarah Stroumsa, eds. Exchange andtransmission across cultural bound-aries: philosophy, mysticism and sci-ence in the Mediterranean world.

335

JSAI 41 (2014)

H. UDUD IN AL-KINDI AND IBN RABBANAL-T. ABARI

J.T. OlssonUniversity of Cambridge

Despite Galen’s withering attack on physicians who were unable evento buy a cabbage without defining it first, it is clear that Greek in-tellectuals such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and even Galen himselfconsidered definition an essential part — and perhaps the foundation —of philosophical discourse.1 In terms of the history of Islamic civilisa-tion, from the third/ninth century onwards, various philosophical booksof definitions (kutub al-h. udud) were composed as a result of two effects,in particular of the Translation Movement.2 First, classical treatises inwhich the topic of definition was discussed were translated into Arabicand influenced certain scholars, thus impelling them to consider the issuethemselves. Ibn Sına (d. 428/1037), for instance, when discussing thedefinition of definition in his own Kitab al-h. udud, took his cue from Aris-totle’s Topics.3 Second, as a result of the translation of a large corpusof Greek philosophical texts into Arabic, a new vocabulary had to becreated to express foreign concepts. Books of definitions were a naturalcorollary of this process. Indeed, most recent studies of this phenomenonhave focussed on the development of a Graeco-Arabic philosophical dis-course from the ninth century as the most significant contributory causeof this new genre of Arabic literature.4

1See the series of articles on the subject in Definition in Greek philosophy (Oxford,2010), ed. by D. Charles. For Galen’s attitude to definition, see J. Hood, ‘Galen’sAristotelian definitions’, in ibid.

2The best account of this is D. Gutas, Greek thought, Arabic culture: the Graeco-Arabic translation movement in Baghdad and early ↪Abbasid society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries) (London, 1998).

3K. Kennedy-Day, Books of definition in Islamic philosophy: the limits of words[henceforth, K. Kennedy-Day, Definition] (London and New York, 2003), p. 102, no.18.

4See, for example, K. Kennedy-Day, Definition, p. 9: ‘Since the initial philosoph-ical writings in the Arabic language were translations, someone had to fashion listsof philosophical vocabulary to express technical philosophical language in Arabic.This also led to books of definition, short lexicons of terms used to express foreignconcepts’. Similar points are made by T.Z. Frank, Al-Kindı’s Book of definitions:its place in Arabic definition literature (PhD Thesis, Yale University, 1975), p. 13;

245

246 J.T. Olsson

The most notable philosophical books of definitions seem to havebeen those of al-Farabı (d. 339/950), Ibn Sına, and Isaac Israeli (d.ca. 343/955), while there is also an important treatise On definitionsand descriptions (Fı al-h. udud wa-’l-rusum) among the Epistles of theIkhwan al-s.afa↩ (c. fourth/tenth century). However, the most significantby far is the earliest extant example of the genre, and a work whichhad a profound influence on later Arabic philosophical writings: namely,al-Kindı’s (d. c. 252/866) On the definitions and descriptions of things(Fı h. udud al-ashya↩ wa-rusumiha). This work has been the subject ofa number of modern studies and translations, and so I will avoid dis-cussing it at length so as not to rehearse arguments which are easilyfound elsewhere.5

One feature of the text, however, is worth focussing on for a mo-ment. Namely, the fact that the manuscript tradition of al-Kindı’s trea-tise is particularly unstable. The Istanbul Manuscript (MS Aya Sofya4832), which was published by Abu Rıda in 1950, contains 97 defini-tions6 A few years later, S.M. Stern found and published the BritishLibrary Manuscript (MS Add. 7473) which contains 24 definitions eitherparallel or related to definitions in the Istanbul Manuscript. The BritishLibrary Manuscript also contained 13 definitions of a more eschatologicalcharacter (terms such as ‘resurrection’, ‘the reward’, ‘the punishment’,‘Hell’, and ‘Paradise’), which Stern adjudged as extremely unlikely tohave been composed by al-Kindı, but which were present in the epistleOn definitions and descriptions of the Ikhwan al-s.afa↩. He concluded:

It would be unwise to trust, in a matter of such importance,to the sole authority of a copyist who set down these excerptsat second or third hand. Thus we should opt for the moreprudent course and assume that these eschatological defini-tions are derived from the Epistles of the sincere brethren andfound their way by some accident among definitions takenfrom al-Kindı.7

A third version of al-Kindı’s text was published by Felix Klein-Frankeon the basis of a microfilm of a manuscript in the possession of the

P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann, The philosophical works of al-Kindı [henceforth, P.Adamson and P.E. Pormann, Philosophical works] (Karachi, 2012), p. 297.

5These include M. Allard, ‘L’epıtre de Kindı sur les definitions’, in Bulletind’Etudes Orientales de l’Institut Francais de Damas, 25 (1972): 47–83, D. Gimaret,

Al-Kindı: Cinq Epıtres (Paris, 1976) T.Z. Frank, Al-Kindı’s Book of Definitions: itsplace in Arabic definition literature, K. Kennedy-Day, Definition, pp. 19–31, and P.Adamson and P.E. Pormann, Philosophical works, pp. 297–311.

6Al-Kindı, Rasa↩il al-Kindı al-falsafiyya (Cairo, 1950–1953), vol. 1, pp. 165–179.7S.M. Stern, ‘Notes on al-Kindı’s Treatise on definitions’, Journal of the Royal

Asiatic Society 91 (1959): 32–43.

H. udud in al-Kindı and Ibn Rabban al-T. abarı 247

Academy of Sciences in Lisbon. This manuscript contains 109 defi-nitions, and 33 of these are unrelated to those found in the IstanbulManuscript.8 According to the introduction to a new translation of thetreatise by Pormann and Adamson:

It is easy to see why there are three versions of On definitionsthat differ so much. This is not a discursive treatise or epistle,like al-Kindı’s other works, but a list of entries which couldhave gone through many redactions, probably already in al-Kindı’s circle. It would also be natural for later authors topreserve it selectively, by copying only the definitions thatinterested them, or to add new entries to an earlier version.9

It is clear then, that a significant feature of al-Kindı’s text — andperhaps of books of definitions in general — is its capacity for accretion.Definitions of interest to the copyist from other works, such as the es-chatological definitions in the British Library Manuscript, could, withgreat ease, be extracted and anonymously added to al-Kindı’s text. Thepurpose of this article, which is intended as a proem to a much more thor-ough investigation of definitions in Ibn Sahl Rabban al-T. abarı’s Firdawsal-h. ikma (The Paradise of wisdom), is to show that a group of definitionsfrom the Lisbon Manuscript most likely derive from al-T. abarı’s treatise.What follows shall be divided into three parts: first, since al-T. abarı andhis Firdaws al-h. ikma are not nearly so well known as al-Kindı and hisOn definitions, I will briefly provide some biographical details about theauthor and an overview of this treatise; second, I will address how al-T. abarı dealt with the issue of definition in his treatise; and, finally, Iwill explore the parallels between a cluster of definitions from al-Kindı’stext and those in the Firdaws al-h. ikma.

Al-T. abarı and the Firdaws al-h. ikma

Ibn Sahl Rabban al-T. abarı was a Christian physician and natural scien-tist who was born in T. abaristan, probably around 780–785/163–168.10

8F. Klein-Franke, ‘Al-Kindı’s “On definitions and descriptions of things”’ [hence-forth, F. Klein-Franke, ‘Definitions’], Le Museon 95 (1982): 191–216. Klein-Frankestates (note 17) that Professor Adel Y. Sidarus sent him the microfilm of themanuscript, but he does not provide the catalogue number.

9P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann, Philosophical works, p. 299.10A more detailed biographical assessment of Ibn Rabban is given in J.T. Olsson,

‘↪Alı Ibn Sahl Rabban al-T. abarı: a ninth-century natural scientist in his environment’(forthcoming). Other secondary studies include: M. Meyerhof, ‘↪Alı at.-T. abarı’s “Par-

248 J.T. Olsson

His father, who according to Ibn al-Qift.ı’s (d. 646/1248) Ta↩rıkh al-h. ukama↩ (History of the physicians) was a physician, scientist, scholarof geometry and mathematics, and a translator of Greek scientific works,supervised his early education.11 Details of his career can be pieced to-gether from several entries in biographical dictionaries, the History ofthe prophets and kings of Abu Ja↪far al-T. abarı (d. 310/ 923), and fromnotices in the Firdaws al-h. ikma itself.12 According to the Firdaws al-h. ikma, Ibn Rabban was close to finishing the work when ‘a misfortuneoccurred to me that removed me from my country to the abode of thegreatest king, and he ordered me to be resident and attend him in anumber of services’.13 This seems to be a rather euphemistic way ofsaying that he was captured after the revolt of his patron, the notori-ous rebel leader Mazyar Ibn Qarin (d. 226/841), and brought as a slavefrom T. abaristan to the capital to serve the ↪Abbası Caliph, al-Mu↪tas.im(d. 227/842). Sometime later he seems to have gained both his freedomand a respected place at the court in Samarra↩, and he was able to fin-ish the Firdaws al-h. ikma in 235/850.14 Perhaps partially owing to theerudition of this work, he was made a boon companion by the Caliphal-Mutawakkil (d. 247/861), and converted to Islam sometime after 850in the seventieth year of his life.15 His date of death is unknown.

The Firdaws al-h. ikma contains, according to Ibn Rabban, everythingnecessary for the expert in medicine and philosophy.16 It is primarilya medical treatise with chapters also dedicated to philosophy, meteorol-

adise of wisdom”, one of the oldest Arabic Compendiums of medicine’, in Isis 16/1(1931): 6–54; M.Z. S. iddıqı, Studies in Arabic and Persian medical literature (Cal-cutta, 1959), and D. Thomas, ‘al-T. abarı’, EI 2.

11Ibn al-Qift.ı, Ta↩rıkh al-h. ukama↩ (Leipzig, 1903), p. 187:4–13.12The main entries in biographical dictionaries are: Ibn al-Nadım, Kitab al-fihrist

(Tehran, 1971), p. 354:13–16, Ibn al-Qift.ı, Ta↩rıkh al-h. ukama↩, p. 231:7–20, Ibn AbıUs.aybi↪a, ↪Uyun al-anba↩ fı t.abaqat al-at.ibba↩ (Beirut, 1965), p. 414:13–19, and al-S. afadı, Kitab al-wafı bi-’l-wafayat, 28 vols. (Leipzig, 1931–2008), vol. U, p. 151:2–9.There are several reports in al-T. abarı’s history which are of interest but do notespecially concern us here. See, for example, al-T. abarı, The history of al-T. abarı, vol.33: Storm and stress along the northern frontiers of the ↪Abbasid Caliphate (NewYork, 1991), translated and annotated by C.E. Bosworth, pp. 149–151 and 157–158.

13↪Alı b. Rabban al-T. abarı, Firdausu’l-h. ikmat or Paradise of wisdom (Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1928), ed. by M.Z. S. iddıqı, p. 2:19–22.

14This is according to a notice in the Firdaws al-h. ikma itself. See Firdaws al-h. ikma,p. 2:22–24.

15This information is provided by Ibn al-Rabban in a different treatise. See ↪Alıb. Rabban al-T. abarı, “Ar-Radd ↪ala an-Nas.ara↩,” in Melanges de l’Universite-Saint-Joseph 36 (1959), p. 119. The Firdaws al-h. ikma contains no allusions to Muslimviews nor does it bear witness to any hint of ↪Abbası patronage, and so it seemslikely that Ibn Rabban’s conversion and elevation to the position of boon companionprobably occurred after 850.

16Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 3:12–13.

H. udud in al-Kindı and Ibn Rabban al-T. abarı 249

ogy, astronomy, astrology, and various other disciplines.17 The work islargely epitomising and Ibn Rabban names Hippocrates, Galen, Aris-totle, Yuh. anna b. Masawayh (d. 243/857), and H. unayn the Translator(H. unayn Ibn Ish. aq, d. 260/873) among his chief sources.18 In the pre-face, Ibn Rabban states that after reading the limited monographs ofother scholars he was impelled ‘to compose from them a comprehen-sive book containing the good points of the books of the ancients andmoderns’.19 He also outlined some of the principles which governed theepitomising process: ‘I excluded from it the repeated meanings and theconfused and unprofitable speeches, and I singled out the useful andchoicest points’.20 However, there is also a great deal of material whichwas either added or reworked by Ibn Rabban himself, and so the Firdawsal-h. ikma exhibits a striking degree of originality.21 This curious inclu-sion of recast source material will be seen in the next section, in whichI will briefly examine how Ibn Rabban deals with the issue of definitionin the Firdaws al-h. ikma.

Definition in the Firdaws al-h. ikma

Ibn Rabban establishes his intention to tackle the issue of definition inthe preface to the Firdaws al-h. ikma. He writes that the matters he willaddress in his treatise are:

the secrets of foreign science; the treasures of the craft; worksencompassing more than anyone could desire or could de-scribe about the science of medicine; knowledge of the fun-damental principles of this world and its corollary principles;the quality of its intrinsic substances and its accidents; thegenesis of its souls and its bodies; the composition of its an-imals and plants; the causes of its colours and its tastes; allthat benefits and harms; and the definitions of things whichthe philosophers have defined.22

17For overviews of its contents, see M. Meyerhof, ‘↪Alı at.-T. abarı’s “Paradise ofwisdom”’ and M.Z. S. iddıqı, Studies in Arabic and Persian medical literature.

18Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 8:6–10.19Firdaws al-h. ikma, pp. 1:20–2:2.20Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 2:3–4.21See examples in J.T. Olsson, ‘↪Alı Ibn Sahl Rabban al-T. abarı: a ninth-century

natural scientist in his environment’.22Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 2:4–9.

250 J.T. Olsson

Interestingly, Ibn Rabban neither devotes a methodological chapter tothe topic of definitions nor, indeed, gives a comprehensive list of def-initions. Unlike the books of definitions listed above, in the Firdawsal-h. ikma definitions are found at irregular intervals, and while somephilosophical topics have all of the specialised terms used by Ibn Rab-ban properly defined, definitions are completely absent in other chapters.Despite some absences, however, usage of definitions in the Firdaws al-h. ikma is extensive, and they are frequently found for diseases, emotions,and for philosophical terminology in particular.23

However, Ibn Rabban does not seem to have made up his mind asto how to define his terminology. In his preface, for example, he de-fines medicine according to what he claimes were Aristotelian principles:‘Aristotle said that whoever seeks knowledge of anything cannot do with-out knowledge of four things. The first of them is whether that thingwhich he seeks exists or does not exist. If it exists: then what it is, howit is, then why it is’.24 He then employs this system to define medicine:

Medicine is a thing which exists — which only the obstinateman or the idiot can deny — and as for what it is, it is thepreservation of health and the banishment of disease. Itsperfection is by means of two things: knowledge and action.Knowledge means from books and practical experience intreatments. As for how it is and why it is, whoever knows itknows an important and noble thing and witnesses the actionof nature and its movement.25

The background to this method of classifying knowledge has been stud-ied in detail by A. Altmann and S.M. Stern, who have suggested thatwhile it is ultimately derived from Aristotle, a simple ‘whether’, ‘what’,‘which’, and ‘why’ classification comes from two of the Alexandrian com-mentators, Elias (d. ca. 580 CE) and David (fl. sixth century CE).26 Theclassical development of this classificatory system is beyond the scope ofthe present inquiry. However, it is important to note that Ibn Rabban’sunderstanding of the classical model is faulty, in that he has ‘whether’,‘what’, ‘how’, and ‘why’ and groups these last two questions together.This is particularly interesting, because shortly before his completion ofthe Firdaws al-h. ikma, al-Kindı (d. c. 256/870) addressed this issue inhis most famous treatise, On first philosophy (Fı al-falsafa al-ula), and

23I.e. ‘fever’ at Ibid., p. 285:7–8 and ‘fear’ at p. 89:2–3. See below for examples ofphilosophical definitions.

24Ibid., p. 6:3–5.25Ibid., p. 6:5–9.26A. Altmann and S.M. Stern, Isaac Israeli: a Neoplatonic philosopher of the early

tenth century (Oxford, 1958), pp. 10–27.

H. udud in al-Kindı and Ibn Rabban al-T. abarı 251

he understood the classical model in a completely different way fromIbn Rabban. In this treatise, al-Kindı asserted a relationship betweenthese four questions and the four Aristotelian causes — something IbnRabban failed to do — and has the proper ‘which’ instead of ‘how’. Hethen grouped ‘what’ and ‘which’ together in order to find out both thegenus and the species of the thing under investigation — i.e. to properlynarrow down its definition.27 It might be instructive to see Ibn Rabbanand al-Kindı’s treatments side-by-side:

Al-Kindı Ibn RabbanFirst question Whether? (hal) Whether it exists or not? (a

mawjud. . . aw ghayr mawjud)Second question What? (ma) What? (ma)Third question Which? (ayy) How? (kayfa)Fourth question Why? (li-ma) Why? (li-ma)?

It is highly likely, then, that given the differences in both questionsand terminology, Ibn Rabban was either ignorant of al-Kindı on thissubject, or decided not to use his formulations for some reason. Thishas resulted in a definition which is somewhat lacking in precision, orcertainly a definition in which the ‘why’ has already been answered bythe ‘what’, and the ‘how’ — although one cannot be sure exactly howIbn Rabban intends it — is virtually ignored.28 At any rate, this is theonly case in which he defines a term in this manner.

Perhaps more instructive is Ibn Rabban’s attempt to define defini-tion. H. add actually receives two definitions in the Firdaws al-h. ikma— ‘for the sake of instruction’ and ‘in terms of its actual nature’. Hewrites:29

The definition of definition for the sake of instruction:

It is a brief30 statement that indicates knowledge of the truenatures of things.

27Al-Kindı, Rasa↩il al-Kindı al-falsafiyya, vol. 1, p. 101:3–14. The questions in thefollowing table are at p. 101:6. A translation and discussion of the treatise is given inP. Adamson and P. Pormann, Philosophical works. Especially relevant are pp. 10–11.It was written for the caliph al-Mu↪tas.im, who died in 227/842 and therefore mustpredate the Firdaws al-h. ikma.

28A later attempt to define medicine in terms of the Aristotelian causes is providedby Ibn Sına. See al-Qanun fı ’l-t.ibb, book 1 (New Delhi, 1982), p. 35:3–9.

29Firdaws al-h. ikma, pp. 77:18–78:7. The Arabic text is given below, p. 258.30In S. iddıqı’s edition Xñk. ñÓ (‘existing’) is given, which makes little sense.

Q�g. ð

(‘brief’) could easily have morphed into Xñk. ñÓ and is preferable for two reasons: 1) it isgiven as a characteristic of definition in Ibn al-Muqaffa↪’s introductory paraphrase ofPorphyry’s Isagoge, a work which, as we shall see, Ibn Rabban most likely had knowl-edge of; and, 2) it is the definition of the second occurrence of the term “definition” inthe Lisbon Manuscript of al-Kindı’s On definitions, a manuscript which, as we shallsee, borrowed from the Firdaws al-h. ikma. See Ibn al-Muqaffa↪, al-Mant.iq (Logic) byIbn Muqaffa↪/H. udud al-Mant.iq (Definitions of Logic) by Ibn Bihriz [Henceforth, Ibnal-Muqaffa↪, al-Mant.iq] (Tehran, 1978), p. 1:14 and F. Klein-Franke, ‘Definitions’, p.215, definition 89.

252 J.T. Olsson

Its definition in terms of its actual nature:

It is a statement which if you increase it then you decreasethe thing defined, and if you decrease it then you increasethe thing defined. Thus, if you increase the definition ofpeople, and say that they are living, rational, mortal, andpossess the capacity to write then you have removed most ofthem from the definition of mankind, because you have onlydefined those of them able to write. But if you decrease thedefinition, and you say that people are living and rational— and you do not say mortal — then you include in thedefinition of people all of those who are rational from thespiritual beings.

Instead, you should derive the definitions of all things fromtheir genera and their species (fus. ul), such as your state-ment on the definition of people that they are living. [Thus]mankind is a genus of the living beings.31 Then you shouldseparate them from other things, and from all that is neitherrational nor mortal. Thus you say they are with the livingbeings which are rational and mortal.

Know this and draw analogous conclusions from it!

The most obvious feature of Ibn Rabban’s definition of definition is theclose relationship between it and Ibn al-Muqaffa↪’s (d. ca. 139/756) in-troductory paraphrase of Porphyry’s (d. ca. 305 CE) Isagoge. S.M. Sternargued that Ibn Rabban did not rely on Ibn al-Muqaffa↪’s translation andepitome of the Isagoge, or at least that his version of the philosophicalmaxim ‘the first in thought is the last in action and the last in actionis the first in thought’ does not derive from this source, despite Ibn al-Muqaffa↪ having the first and Ibn Rabban the second extant version ofthis maxim in Arabic literature.32 However, there seem to be sufficientparallels between the texts for it to be difficult not to conclude that theFirdaws al-h. ikma evinces an indebtedness to Ibn al-Muqaffa↪’s work. Forexample, Ibn al-Muqaffa↪ writes:

A property of definition is that increase in it decreases anddecrease in it increases, so that when we say in the definition

31The edition actually states that ‘living things are a genus of mankind’ which isobviously incorrect, whereas ‘mankind is a genus of living things’ accords well withthe rest of the sentence.

32S.M. Stern, “‘The first in thought is the last in action”: the history of a sayingattributed to Aristotle’, in Journal of Semitic Studies 7 (1962): 234–252, especiallypp. 236–238. The passage in Ibn al-Rabban is at Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 6:11–2. Ibnal-Muqaffa↪ has: ‘the last in thought is the first in action, and the last in action isthe first in thought.’ See al-Mant.iq, p. 9:7.

H. udud in al-Kindı and Ibn Rabban al-T. abarı 253

of man: “He is rational and mortal,” if we increase this defi-nition and we say: “He is rational, mortal, and he possessesthe capacity to write” then we have decreased the definitionbecause it will only contain those who can write from thepeople. But if we decrease this definition and we say: “Heis mortal” then that increases the definition so that it goesbeyond people to beasts, birds, and the rest of the animals,because all of them are mortal.33

Ibn Rabban uses a different vocabulary and structure, but he impartsalmost precisely the same meaning as Ibn al-Muqaffa↪. In both texts, onefinds an increase in definition leading to a decrease in the things beingincluded in the definition and vice versa, and this is followed by thestatement that increasing the definition of man to something rational,mortal, and possessing the capacity to write decreases the number ofpeople covered by the definition. In the next part of the argument,instead of removing the term nat.iq (rational), Ibn Rabban removes ma↩it(mortal) and now extends the definition of people to cover the rationalbut immortal spiritual beings instead of the irrational but mortal beasts,birds, and animals in Ibn al-Muqaffa↪’s version. This similarity, alongsidethe inclusion of the maxim ‘the first in thought is the last in action andthe last in action is the first in thought’ in both texts (albeit in differentforms), makes it likely — or at least plausible — that this is an exampleof Ibn Rabban creatively tweaking his source material. This is not atendency that I can address here, but it does seem to be a key feature ofIbn Rabban’s treatment of sources in his Firdaws al-h. ikma.34 It seemslikely, then, that for his definition of definition ‘in terms of its actualnature,’ Ibn Rabban utilised his own adaptation of one of the texts hehad access to. The significance of this will become clear in the nextsection.

The Lisbon Manuscript of al-Kindı’s On definitionsand the Firdaws al-h. ikma

In the Lisbon Manuscript of al-Kindı’s On definitions, there is a curiouscluster of definitions, from items 81–82 and then from 86–89. I shallgive here the Arabic text provided by Klein-Franke (with any corrections

33Ibn al-Muqaffa↪, al-Mant.iq, p. 2: 12–16.34J.T. Olsson, ‘↪Alı Ibn Sahl Rabban al-T. abarı: a ninth-century natural scientist

in his environment.’

254 J.T. Olsson

noted) and, since it is likely to be the standard reference work on al-Kindıfor many years to come, the translation offered by P. Adamson and P.Pormann in their The philosophical works of al-Kindı. References to thetexts will be provided as K-F for Klein-Franke and A-P for Adamsonand Pormann.

The intellect/al-↪aql [K-F, p. 214, nr. 81. A-P, p. 310, nr. 111]:

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Definition of the intellect: for the sake of instruction, it may bedefined as the most excellent substance of the rational soul. In termsof its actual nature, it is the faculty that indicates the knowledge of thetrue natures of things.

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Definition of sensation: for the sake of instruction, it is the facultythat perceives things through the intermediary of air. In terms of itsactual nature, it is the faculty that receives the impression38 of sensiblethings.

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mÌ

40¨AJ.¢Ë@

Definition of matter: for the sake of instruction, it is the power forreceiving various forms. In terms of its actual nature, it is the body forthe unworked thing that underlies the essences possessed by all individualthings.

35For�éË @YË@.

36For á� m.Ì'@. This is the emendation proposed in P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann,

Philosophical works, p. 310, note 169 and is, as we shall see, the term found in thesource-material for the Lisbon Manuscript.

37For�@ñêË @.

38A-P amend ÕË B to Q

�K B. As we shall see, however, F-K’s reading might be more

accurate. P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann, Philosophical works, p. 310, note 171.39For

�èPñ�ÊË. This is the emendation proposed in P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann,

Philosophical works, p. 310, note 173 and is, as we shall see, the term found in thesource-material for the Lisbon Manuscript.

40For ©J.¢Ë@.

41For ÐAmÌ.

H. udud in al-Kindı and Ibn Rabban al-T. abarı 255

Nature/al-t.abı↪a [F-K, p. 215, nr. 87. A-P, p. 311, nr. 117]:

©J.¢Ë@�éêk.

áÓ Aë�Ygð .

àñº�Ë@ð

�é»QmÌ'@

@YJ.Ó Aî

�E @ Õæ

ʪ

�JË @

�éêk.

áÓ ��éªJJ.¢Ë@

�Yg

ÐA�k. C�Ë

�èQ

�K. YÖÏ @

�è�ñ

�®Ë@ Aî

�E @

Definition of nature: for the sake of instruction, it is the principle ofmotion and rest. In terms of its actual nature, it is the organisationalpower for bodies.

Fire/al-nar [F-K, p. 215, nr. 88. A-P, p. 311, nr. 118]:

�éêk.

áÓ42

Aë�Yg . @ñÊ« I. ë

YK Zú

æ

�Ó

��Qm× Õæ�k. Aî

�E @ Õæ

ʪ

�JË @

�éêk.

áÓ � PAJË @

�Yg

i¢�Ë@ éË AÓ�à@ ¨AJ.¢Ë@

�éêk.

áÓ è�Ygð �

�é»QmÌ'@ Õç

' @X

­J¢Ë Qå�

J« Aî

�E @ ¨AJ.¢Ë@

èQ�«

á�K. ð éJ�K.

���Q

®ÖÏ @ð Õæ�m.

Ì'AK. ¡JjÖÏ @

Definition of fire: for the sake of instruction, it is a burning, luminousbody that moves upwards. In terms of its actual nature, it is a subtleelement that is always in motion. [A-P translate the final part of theArabic text in a footnote: ‘in terms of its nature, it is that whose surfaceis surrounded by [another body], with no gap between it and anythingelse’]43

Definition/al-h. add [F-K, p. 215, nr. 89. A-P, p. 311, nr. 119]:

45<�

ÈYK >Q�g. ð Èñ

�¯ ÈA

�®Kð

44, ZAJ

��

B@

��

KA

�®k úΫ

�ÈYK

Q�g. ð Èñ�¯ �

�YmÌ'@

Xñk. ñÖÏ @ Zúæ��Ë @

�éªJJ.£ úΫ

Definition: a brief statement that indicates the true natures of things.And it is said: it is a brief statement [that indicates] the nature of theexisting thing.

The common feature of all of these definitions but the last is, ofcourse, that they are doubly-defined ‘for the sake of instruction’ and ‘interms of its actual nature’. Klein-Franke suggested that these were usedto define things ‘mathematically’ and ‘physically’.46 However, Adamsonand Pormann have more plausibly suggested that ‘the first definitionis a looser but more intuitive one intended for beginners, whereas thesecond is technical and strictly more accurate’.47 Klein-Franke brieflynoted that the definitions of matter, nature, and fire (alongside unspec-ified others) are interpolations, and mentioned that they ‘were at thehead of a similarly arranged but unknown list of definitions n the same

42I have restored Aë�Yg.

43P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann, Philosophical works, p. 311, note 175.44For ZAJ�

B@.

45Added by F-K and accepted by A-P.46F. Klein-Franke, ‘Definitions’, p. 194.47P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann, Philosophical works, p. 310, note 168.

256 J.T. Olsson

manuscript’.48 Until the Lisbon Manuscript comes to light again, I haveno way of verifying Klein-Franke’s comment, or of determining whichdefinitions other than matter, nature, and fire might have been includedon this list. However, Klein-Franke was most likely correct in his judge-ment that these definitions — along with the others of the ‘for the sakeof instruction’ and ‘in terms of its actual nature’ type — are interpo-lations. The source they have been extracted from seems to be IbnRabban’s Firdaws al-h. ikma.

There are thirteen examples of the doubly-defined type of definitionin the Firdaws al-h. ikma, and each entry in the Lisbon Manuscript finds aparallel in that treatise. The thirteen definitions in the Firdaws al-h. ikmacover the subjects of:

1. matter (al-hayula)

2. accident (al-↪arad. )

3. nature (al-t.abı↪a)

4. place (al-makan)

5. fire (al-nar)

6. soul (al-nafs)

7. light (al-nur)

8. intellect (al-↪aql)

9. sensation (al-h. iss)

10. definition (al-h. add)

11. whiteness (al-bayad. )

12. blackness (al-sawad)

13. celestial sphere (al-falak)

We shall now give the counterparts of the six definitions from theLisbon Manuscript in the Firdaws al-h. ikma, along with a brief commentabout the parallels present in each case. References to the text are givenin square brackets.

48F. Klein-Franke, ‘Definitions’, p. 194.

H. udud in al-Kindı and Ibn Rabban al-T. abarı 257

The Intellect [Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 71:5–7]:�éêk.

áÓ è�Ygð ,

�é�®£A

JË @ �

®

JË @ ," �@ñk\ É

�

¯@ é

�K @ Õæ

ʪ

�JË @

�éêk.

áÓ É�®ªË@

�Yg

Aê�Ê¿ ZAJ

��

B@

��

KA

�®k ÕΫ úΫ

�éË @YË@

�èñ

�®Ë@ é

�K @ ©

KAJ.¢Ë@ Õæ

ʪ

�JË @

As can be seen, the two versions are almost exact parallels. S. iddıqıamended khawas.s. which he found in the manuscripts to h. awass (senses).The corruption in the Firdaws manuscripts suggests that the jawahir(substances) of the Lisbon Manuscript is probably preferable.

Sensation [Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 77:18–20]:�éêk.

áÓ è�Ygð , Z@ñêË @

�é¢�@ñK. ZAJ

��

B@ ¼PY

�K

�èñ

�¯ é

�K @ Õæ

ʪ

�JË @

�éêk.

áÓ�

�mÌ'@�Yg

�ñ�jÖÏ@ ÕË CË

�éÊK. A

�¯

�èñ

�¯ é

�K @ ¨AJ.¢Ë@

Again the two versions are virtually identical. The appearance ofalam49 in both the Firdaws al-h. ikma and the Lisbon Manuscript suggeststhat one should probably reject Adamson and Pormann’s emendation ofKleine-Franke’s text, and define sensation ‘in terms of its actual nature’as ‘the faculty for receiving sensible stimulation’. The fact that alam isdefinite in the Firdaws al-h. ikma aids this reading, while Adamson andPormann were right to point out that alam in its indefinite form in theLisbon Manuscript ‘makes no sense’.50

Matter [Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 10:20–11:1]:�éêk.

áÓ Aë�Ygð

�é

®Ê

�J

jÖÏ @ Pñ�ÊË

�éÊK. A

�¯

�èñ

�¯ Aî

�E @ Õæ

ʪ

�JË @

�éêk.

áÓ úÍñJêË @�Yg

é�K@

YK. Õç

'A

�¯ Zú

æ�� é

�K @ ð X@ñ�Ë@ð

�AJJ. Ë @ É

�JÓ èQ�

ªK. B@ éË Ð@ñ

�¯ B Zú

æ�� Aî

�E @ ¨AJ.¢Ë@

@�QÓ�è�QÓð @ñÊg

�è�QÓð

�JK. @

�è�QÓ Xñ�@

�è�QÓ Q��� Õæ�m.

Ì'@�à

@ ½Ë

Xð

�H@XA

�

�JÒÊË ÉK. A

�¯ð

AêËAg úΫ Õç 'A

�®

¯

�éJÒ�m.

Ì'@ A�Ó@ð

The definitions of matter in the Firdaws al-h. ikma and the LisbonManuscript are substantially different. While the definitions ‘for thesake of instruction’ are virtually identical, those ‘in terms of its actualnature’ are radically divergent. The text in the Firdaws al-h. ikma issurely corrupt, because the first part of its definition of matter as ‘a thingwhich does not have subsistence (qiwam) except by means of things other

49The appearance of alam in ninth century texts seems to be a problem for somemodern scholars, since it is generally translated as ‘pain’. However, it is clear fromother texts of this time that it means ‘stimulation’ rather than ‘pain.’ See, for ex-ample, the Arabic version of the Timaeus. Here, alam (the plural of alam) appearsa number of times. At one point, for example, we find: ‘As for the specific al-alamarising in the tongue from tastes... ’ (paralleling Timaeus, 65c). It is clear herethat ‘stimulations’ are meant as opposed to ‘pains’ in particular. See Galen, GaleniCompendium Timaei Platonis (London, 1951), edited by P. Kraus and R. Walzer p.20:1.

50P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann, Philosophical works, p. 310, note 171.

258 J.T. Olsson

than it’ — thus making it like whiteness and blackness — both does notfit any known medieval understanding of matter and actually appearsagain in Ibn Rabban’s definition of accident (↪arad. ), where it far moreappropriately belongs.51 The second part of the definition ‘in terms ofits actual nature’ is that ‘it is a thing which remains as itself [even when]receiving contraries. That is to say the body becomes black then whitethen sweet then bitter but the bodily essence (al-jismiyya) remains inits state’. This tallies with its definition ‘for the sake of instruction’, andthus is probably the original definition intended by Ibn Rabban, makingthe first part a mistaken interpolation, possibly by an early copyist ofthe text.

Nature [Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 12:19–21]:Z @Y

�JK. @

àñºK AÖ

ß @ ð ,

àñº�Ë@ð ,

�é»QmÌ'@ Z @Y

�JK. @ Aî

�E @ Õæ

ʪ

�JË @

�éêk.

áÓ�éªJJ.¢Ë@

�Yg

�èñ

�®Ë@ Aî

�E @ ¨AJ.¢Ë@

�éêk.

áÓ Aë�Ygð ,

àñº�ËAK. Aë

ðAî

�DK @ð

�é»QmÌ'AK. Aê

�ʿ ZAJ

��

B@

àñ»

ÐA�k. CË�èQK. YÖÏ @

The definitions of nature in the two texts are virtually identical,except for the fact that its definition ‘for the sake of instruction’ in theFirdaws al-h. ikma adds: ‘the beginning of the generation of all things isonly by means of movement, while their termination is only by means ofrest’.

Fire [Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 12:23–13:2]:�éêk.

áÓ Aë�Ygð , @ñÊ« I. ë

YK

úæ�Ó

���Qm× Õæ�k. Aî

�E @ Õæ

ʪ

�JË @

�éêk.

áÓ PAJË @

�Yg

�é»QmÌ'@ Õç

' @X

­J¢Ë Qå�

J« Aî

�E @ ¨AJ.¢Ë@

The definition of fire in the two texts is identical.

Definition [Firdaws al-h. ikma, pp. 77:18–78:7]

, ZAJ�

� B@

��

KA

�®k

�éQªÓ úΫ

�ÈYK Xñk. ñÓ Èñ

�¯ é

�K A

¯ Õæ

ʪ

�JË @

�éêk.

áÓ�YmÌ'@

�Yg

à@

ð XðYjÖÏ @ áÓ

�I�

�®

K éJ

¯

�HX P

à@

ø

YË@ Èñ

�®Ë@ é

�K @ ¨AJ.¢Ë@ ÉJ.

�¯ áÓ è

�Ygð

�IJÓ

��£A

K ú

k é

�K @

�IÊ

�®

¯ �A

JË @

�Yg ú

¯

�HX P ñÊ

¯ , XðYjÖÏ @ ú

¯

�HX P é

JÓ

�I�

�®

K

àA¿ áÓ Ñî

DÓ

�HXYg AÖ

�ß @ ½

�KB Ñë Q�

�» @�éJ

K A�

�B

@�Yg áÓ

�Ik. Q

k@

�I

J» I.

�KA¿

ú

¯

�IÊ

gX

@ A

�JJÓ É

�®�K ÕËð

��£A

K ú

k é

�K @

�IÊ

�®

¯

�YmÌ'@ áÓ

�I�

�®

K

à@

ð , ¡

�®

¯ AJ.

�KA¿

Aê�Ê¿ ZAJ

��

B@ XðYg h. Q

j

�J�

�� AÖ

�ß @ ð ,

á�JK AgðQË@ áÓ

��£A

K ñë áÓ ©JÔ

g.

�AJË @

�Yg

Õç�'

52 àA�

�B

@ ��k.

�éJm

Ì'@ð úk é

�K @ �A

JË @

�Yg ú

¯ ½Ëñ

�®» AêËñ�

¯ð AîD�A

Jk.

@ áÓ

��£A

K

�èAJm

Ì'@ ©Ó ñëð Èñ�®�J¯

�HñÖß Bð

��¢

JK B AÓ ©JÔ

g.

áÓð èQ�« áÓ éÊ�

®�K

51Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 11:1–4.52As I have noted above in note 31, reading this as

�èAJm

Ì'@ ��k.

àA�

�B

@ makes muchmore sense.

H. udud in al-Kindı and Ibn Rabban al-T. abarı 259

�éQªÓð ú

æªÖÏ @

�éK. A�@

AîD�

Jk. ð

�é«A

J�Ë@

�è�ñ

�¯ áÓ

�àA

¯ éJÊ« �

�¯ð ½Ë

X Ñê

¯ A¯ ,

�IJÓð

AëQë@ñk. ð ZAJ�

� B@

��

KA

�®k

This passage is discussed and translated above. As I argued then, itis possible that the first part of the definition of definition in the LisbonManuscript derives from the definition ‘for the sake of instruction’ in theFirdaws al-h. ikma.53

Given the high degree of similarity in the definitions above, it seemsincontrovertible that there is some kind of textual relationship betweenthe Lisbon Manuscript and the Firdaws al-h. ikma. This can be one ofthree types:

1. Ibn Rabban (or a later copyist) could have taken the doubly-defined definitions he employed in the Firdaws al-h. ikma from afuller version of al-Kindı’s text than is extant today.

2. A) Al-Kindı (or a later copyist) could have extracted the doubly-defined definitions from the Firdaws al-h. ikma and added them toOn definitions.

B) Al-Kindı (or a later copyist) could have extracted the doubly-defined definitions from a source which had already copied themfrom the Firdaws al-h. ikma, and then added them to On definitions

3. Both Ibn Rabban and al-Kindı (or their later copyists) could havetaken the definitions from a third source.

None of these scenarios is absolutely impossible, although it mustbe stated that the evidence would seem to heavily preclude (1) and (3).As has already been seen, Ibn Rabban’s definition of definition seems tobe a creative adaptation of Ibn al-Muqaffa↪’s epitome of the Isagoge. IfI am correct in my suspicion that it was Ibn Rabban himself who wasresponsible for the adaptation, then there is a strong case for assigningall of the ‘for the sake of instruction’ and ‘in terms of its actual nature’definitions to him. Thus, al-Kindı or some other author is unlikely to beresponsible for the definitions. Also making the case for (1) unlikely is thefact that according to Klein-Franke at least some of the doubly-defineddefinitions were on a separate list as well, suggesting that they wereinterpolations rather than part of any original version of On definitions.Moreover, there does not appear to be any other source in which thesedoubly-defined types of definitions also occur, thus also making the casefor (3) weaker as well. Klein-Franke did state that ‘definitions of thiskind occur also in the 40th epistle of the Sincere Brethren’, however he

53See note 30 above.

260 J.T. Olsson

was basing his argument upon a German translation (actually of the 41st

epistle), and the Arabic text contains no definitions of this kind.54

The fact that there are thirteen examples of the doubly-defined defi-nitions in the Firdaws al-h. ikma, and that the definitions for ‘nature’ and‘definition’ are longer in that text, would seem to make it more plau-sible that the definitions were probably extracted from Ibn Rabban’streatise, and somewhat clumsily abbreviated and placed into the LisbonManuscript. A good example of this is the additional definition placedafter fire in the Lisbon Manuscript which Adamson and Pormann rightlydid not think belonged to the definition of fire. It is actually the defi-nition ‘in terms of its actual nature’ for place (makan) in the Firdawsal-h. ikma55 Given this blatant mistake, and a number of variants betweenthe texts, it would seem most plausible that the scenario at work here is(2B), rather than a copyist of the al-Kindı manuscript relying directlyupon the Firdaws al-h. ikma. As I have already noted, Klein-Franke men-tioned that close to On definitions in his microfilm of the manuscriptwere the doubly-defined versions of matter, nature, and fire (and un-specified other terms) ‘which were at the head of a similarly arrangedbut unknown list of definitions’.56 I strongly suspect that this list con-tains a number of definitions culled from the Firdaws al-h. ikma. Whoeverextracted the definitions would probably have found Ibn Rabban’s def-inition of matter too confusing because of the corruption of the text,and his definition of definition ‘in terms of its actual nature’ too long forinclusion on a list of brief definitions. This would serve to explain themost significant variations between the Firdaws al-h. ikma and the LisbonManuscript.

It seems most likely then, that like Stern’s conclusion that definitionsfrom the Rasa↩il Ikhwan al-s.afa↩ were added to On definitions by a latercopyist, the doubly-defined definitions present in the Lisbon Manuscriptwere ultimately derived from the Firdaws al-h. ikma, possibly through anintermediary text. This demonstrates once again the capacity for accre-tion present in the books of definitions, and it seems likely that furtherstudy will yield additional examples of anonymous borrowings. I havealso introduced ‘Ali Ibn Rabban al-T. abarı and his Firdaws al-h. ikma, andgiven a short overview of some of his ideas about definition. It is hopedthat a subsequent study will explore the function of definitions in thiswork — and in third/ninth century philosophical texts more generally— in much greater detail.

54F. Klein-Franke, ‘Definitions’, p. 194, esp. note 24.55See Firdaws al-h. ikma, p. 12:21–23. The text reads: é

�K @ Õæ

ʪ

�JË @

�éêk.

áÓàA¾ÖÏ @

�Yg

éJ�K.

��Q

®ÖÏ @ð Õæ�m.

Ì'AK. ¡JjÖÏ @ i¢�Ë@�éKAî

E é

�K @ ¨AJ.¢Ë@

�éêk.

áÓ è�Ygð , ÐA�k.

CË ÉK. A

�®Ë @ Zú

æ��Ë @

èQ�«

á�K. ð.56F. Klein-Franke, ‘Definitions’, p. 194