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Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and BeyondMeliha Benli Altunişik a

a Middle East Technical University , Ankara, TurkeyPublished online: 02 Nov 2006.

To cite this article: Meliha Benli Altunişik (2006) Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond, Journal of Contemporary EuropeanStudies, 14:2, 183-196, DOI: 10.1080/14782800600892242

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Turkey’s Iraq Policy: The War andBeyond

MELIHA BENLI ALTUNISIKMiddle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

ABSTRACT Turkey’s Iraq policy has come under scrutiny since the Turkish parliament defeateda motion that called for Turkey’s involvement in the war against Iraq in 2003. This study arguesthat rationalist perspectives cannot completely account either for Turkey’s non-cooperationwith the USA in this war or for the articulation and implementation of Iraq policy since then.A comprehensive account of Turkey’s Iraq policy requires a discussion of the impact of identitypolitics and historical narratives on perceptions of interests.

KEY WORDS: Turkey and Iraq, Iraq War of 2003, Turkey and the Middle East, March 1st Motion,Turkey and the US, Kurdish conflict

Introduction

The Iraqi issue has dominated Turkish foreign policy since the 1991 Gulf War.

Throughout the 1990s the post war settlement imposed on Iraq was seen as a source of

threat to Turkey and thus led to an unsettling realization for the political and military elite

that the Middle East could not be ignored. The Iraqi issue also underlined Turkey’s own

insecurities about its domestic identity by enflaming fears about the Kurdish issue. At the

same time, Iraq became a major aspect of Turkish–American relations, unravelling the

opportunities for cooperation as well as the tensions embedded in that relationship. Thus

Iraq has been a complex foreign policy issue for Turkey, with domestic, regional and

international dimensions. This study aims to discuss the impact of the second war against

Iraq in 2003 on Turkey’s Iraq policy and argues that systemic and rationalist perspectives

cannot completely account either for Turkey’s non-cooperation with the USA in this war

or for the articulation and implementation of Iraq policy since then. A comprehensive

account of Turkey’s Iraq policy requires a discussion of the impact of identity politics and

historical narratives on perceptions of interests.1

The War of 2003: The Culmination of Tensions

Despite its misgivings about US Iraq policy, Turkey continued to cooperate with

Washington in sustaining the post-1991 war settlement in Iraq throughout the 1990s.2

1478-2804 Print/1478-2790 Online/06/020183-14 q 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14782800600892242

Correspondence Address: Meliha Benli Altunisik, Middle East Technical University, Department of

International Relations, Ankara 06531, Turkey. Email: maltunis@metu.edu.tr

Journal of Contemporary European StudiesVol. 14, No. 2, 183–196, August 2006

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Incirlik airbase in southern Turkey became crucial in the enforcement of the no-fly zone

north of the 36th parallel. In return Turkey obtained tacit US approval for its own cross-

border operations in pursuit of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), Turkey’s separatist

Kurdish organization that started an armed insurgency in 1984, thereby forestalling the

possibility of another huge influx of refugees from northern Iraq.3 However, the periodic

renewal of the mandate of Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), later renamed Operation

Northern Watch (ONW), in the Turkish parliament became a very contentious issue. On

the one hand, it was an important card in the hands of Turkish policy-makers vis-a-vis the

USA and the Iraqi Kurdish groups. On the other hand, the Operation continued to stir

debates as to its possible contribution to the establishment of a Kurdish state and the ‘real

intentions of the US in Iraq’. Despite several statements coming from Washington on the

US commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq, several Turkish politicians, opinion-

makers and even at times government officials publicly doubted US commitment to that

policy, implicitly suggesting that the aim of US policy was to create an independent

Kurdish state.4 Thus the Operation came to exemplify the complexity of the issues related

to northern Iraq in Turkish foreign policy.

From the mid 1990s Turkey began on occasions to openly dissent from US policy in Iraq,

in part encouraged by the increasing international criticism of US policy. Turkish policy

towards Iraq in general was largely coloured by lingering suspicions and disappointments.

The increasing autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq, despite conflicts between the

two main groups, namely the Kurdistan Workers Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of

Kurdistan (PUK), resembled a de facto state formation process, which deeply disturbed

Ankara. The use of northern Iraqi territory by the PKK was another matter of concern. Thus

Turkey’s Iraq policy emphasized the political unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, while

Ankara was all the more concerned that the US policy of containment was undermining that

objective. In order to deal with these challenges Turkey used several policy avenues, both

diplomatic and military. On the military front, Turkey launched several incursions into

northern Iraq and eventually established a military contingent there. Diplomatically Ankara

aimed to get the USA to support its objectives. Turkey also established ties with the Iraqi

Kurdish groups5 while at the same time building its relations with the Turkmens, the Iraqi

Turkic community, as a counterweight to Kurdish influence.

When the Bush administration came to power there was considerable unease in Ankara as

to possible changes in US Iraq policy. After all George W. Bush and his team were highly

critical of the previous policy and promised to get tough on the Saddam regime, which was

increasingly challenging Washington’s policy of containment. In fact, it was known that

soon after coming to power the Bush administration started a major review of Iraq policy

with a view to making drastic changes. The September 11 attacks only hastened that process

and helped the administration to frame Iraq within the context of a broader war on terrorism.

Turkey’s view of a possible US war on Iraq was ambivalent, as indeed its overall Iraq

policy had been ever since the Gulf war. The status quo in Iraq was not considered

in Turkey’s interest. The aim of maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity had become

increasingly difficult during 10 years of Kurdish autonomy in the north. Thus ending the

status quo was in Turkey’s interest, but Ankara was equally concerned about the aftermath

of a war with Iraq, which might aggravate instability in the region. There was particular

unease about the possible consequences of this war for the territorial integrity of Iraq. Three

years after defeating its own separatist Kurdish insurgency Ankara worried about the

prospect of a new wave of violence on its soil.

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Soon the Bush administration approached Turkey and asked for its cooperation in a

possible war against Iraq. US undersecretary of defence Paul Wolfowitz and assistant

secretary of state Marc Grossman, two officials who knew Turkey well, visited Ankara and

clearly stated that the US administration wanted Turkey’s ‘full and complete cooperation’

in a possible war against Iraq.6 This was followed by a visit of US military officials to

discuss with their counterparts the possibilities of cooperation in Washington’s war plans.

Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s response was to raise the difficulties of such a war

and its possible negative fallout for Turkey, mainly destabilization of the Kurdish issue

and a worsening economic situation. In fact, the Ecevit government (1999–2002) had

already repeatedly expressed apprehension about Iraqi regime change. Ecevit also openly

voiced his dissent to Washington about the proposed war against Iraq: ‘We are advising

that it [the United States] abandon the idea. We’re telling Washington that we are worried

about the matter’. 7

However, realizing the Bush administration’s resolve, Ecevit also tried to convince

Baghdad to change its policy. He personally wrote a letter to Iraqi President Saddam

Hussein stating the seriousness of the matter and urging him especially to cooperate with

the UN weapons inspectors. Saddam’s response was defiant.8 Having failed to engage the

Saddam regime in cooperative behaviour, the Ecevit government tried to convey Turkey’s

concerns to Washington while at the same time leaving a door open for negotiations.

Within this context, Turkey sought US support both in its bid for European Union (EU)

membership and, more importantly, over the Cyprus question.9 This multi-purpose

diplomacy came to characterize Turkey’s policy vis-a-vis the upcoming war. Turkey tried

to prevent the war, protect its relations with the USA, save face with the Arab world and

respond to the Turkish public’s concerns all at the same time. Ultimately, however, this

lack of resolve was a consequence of Turkey’s ambiguities. Concerns over the impact of

such a war on the territorial integrity of Iraq and Turkey’s own Kurdish problem

dominated foreign policy-making. Eventually it was clear that the Ecevit government,

which was going through a crisis due to splits within Ecevit’s own party and was thus

calling for an early election, did not want to make a decision on a matter that deeply

divided the Turkish state and society.

In the meantime, the public debate over Iraq and Turkey’s policy response intensified

with the increasing probability of war.10 The debate was marked by deep divisions

between the proponents and opponents of Turkey’s participation in this war. Those who

argued for Turkey’s involvement based their arguments on strategic necessity. According

to this argument Turkey had no choice but to get involved in this war, which would

inevitably have significant repercussions for the country. Turkey’s early involvement was

necessary both to prevent any negative consequences and to ensure it was ‘at the table’

after the war. It was also argued that Turkey could not afford to alienate its major ally,

especially in such a critical period when Turkey needed US economic and political

support.

The opponents of Turkey’s involvement in a possible war against Iraq, on the other

hand, argued that Turkey should not be ‘fighting somebody else’s war’ and thus,

especially, should not send forces to Iraq. This opposition generally arose not out of any

support for the Iraqi regime, but mainly from concerns about the possible negative effects

of such a war on Turkey. Critics pointed to the possible human losses, the negative

economic consequences, the increasing risk of Iraqi retaliation and terrorism and the

negative impact on Turkey–EU relations. Some in the opposition camp even argued that

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ultimately Turkey’s territorial integrity depended on Turkey’s own political and socio-

economic policies rather than what happened in Iraq. According to this view the US

government, by exaggerating the possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraq,

which would also be against the interests of the USA, was trying to put pressure on Turkey.

In any case, the opponents argued that participating in this war would bring disaster.

The interesting point was that both the proponents and the opponents of Turkey’s

involvement in the war shared a common starting point; neither side was persuaded that

Iraq posed an immediate threat and neither accepted the Bush administration’s logic for

launching a preventive war. Therefore, even those who supported Turkey’s participation

in a possible war against Iraq did so not because they were convinced by the arguments of

the Bush administration, but because they thought that, if the war occurred, not

participating would have higher costs for Turkey. While there was a debate among the

opinion-makers as to the costs and benefits of involvement, the public remained totally

committed to the no-war option. Several public opinion polls conducted in Turkey clearly

showed a lack of support for such an operation.

Turkey’s experience of the 1991 Gulf War, and the way this experience has been read in

the country, was omnipresent in Turkey’s interpretation of the Iraqi crisis, at both the

public and the policy level. According to this reading Turkey failed to bargain effectively

at that time and thus paid dearly. The commitment ‘not to repeat the mistakes of the past’

largely framed the bargaining position of the foreign and security policy elite. For

instance, Ankara believed that Turkey had suffered economically as a result of the Gulf

War of 1991 and the post-war settlement over Iraq, and had still not recovered. Estimates

of Turkey’s cumulative economic losses in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War were

between 40 and 60 billion dollars, including indirect costs. Many economists blamed the

1991 war for the downturn in the Turkish economy. There were similar concerns about the

adverse economic impact of a new confrontation with Iraq on a Turkish economy already

weakened by the 2001 financial crisis. In fact, some believed that economic harm was

being done even by the prospect of war with Iraq. There were concerns about the expected

negative impact of the operation on foreign investment and the general impact of rising oil

prices on the economy. This time Ankara wanted to be assured that its prospective

economic losses were going to be reasonably compensated by other means, such as aid, the

lifting or relaxation of import quotas, the establishment of an economic security zone.

Turkey also wanted to take the necessary precautions to deal more effectively with a

possible refugee outflow as a result of war. Although Turkey cooperated with the UNHCR,

it was to a large extent having to make its own preparations to meet the possible refugee

crisis. Unlike in 1991, Turkey decided not to let Iraqi refugees enter Turkey, but to

accommodate them in tent cities to be built in northern Iraq just off the Turkish border.11

More importantly, as had been the case since the end of the Gulf War, Turkey was

mostly concerned about the possible strategic and political ramifications of such a war.

Turkish policy-makers seemed to be daunted by the enormous scale of the post-war

challenge and possible instability that could emerge in Iraq after such an operation.

Possible ethnic and religious strife in post-war Iraq was expected to cause enormous

instability in the region. In addition there were concerns about a potential upsurge of

Kurdish nationalism with significant implications for Turkish national security. The Ecevit

government quite openly expressed concerns in this regard. In an interview with CNN,

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said that an attack on Iraq ‘could lead to the portioning of

Iraq, which could create problems for Turkey, for Turkey’s territorial integrity.’12 In fact,

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the government and several parties in opposition at that time frequently voiced their

displeasure with developments in northern Iraq, such as the announcement of a

constitution for a federal Kurdish region with claims to Kirkuk as the regional capital. In

this context, Ankara even went as far as warning that the establishment of a Kurdish state

and the expansion of Kurdish control to oil-rich Kirkuk would be a casus belli. In the

meantime the Ecevit government frequently complained about what it called ‘the

ambiguity in Washington’s policies’.

Fast Track Negotiations

The November 3 elections brought the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power.

This was a new party established by those who split from the Islamist Welfare Party,

claiming to break with the traditional Islamist party line. The party won a decisive victory

with a sufficient mandate to form the government alone.13 A week after a vote of

confidence in parliament, Wolfowitz and Grossman again visited Ankara. Washington

presented a long list of war requirements to the Turkish government, including the opening

of several Turkish air bases, both military and civilian, to US use, the opening of seaports

for US transport purposes without any notification requirement, the hosting of US forces in

Turkish bases for landing, respite and hospitalization purposes, the contribution of around

35,000 to 40,000 troops and the deployment of 120,000 US and British combat troops in

south-eastern Turkey. The extent of US demands shocked Ankara. US interest in seaports

and airfields in the northern part of the country could not be understood. The demand for

the deployment of such large numbers of US and UK troops was also overwhelming.

Particularly problematic was the deployment of British troops, which Ankara opposed

right away. Apparently the presence of British troops in south-eastern Turkey and northern

Iraq would invoke historical memories of the last days of the Ottoman Empire, its war

against Britain and the dispute between the two sides about the future of the Mosul

region.14

Initially, however, the US wanted to start with site preparation and the government

accepted this request, which was seen by the US administration as a first sign of Turkey’s

willingness to cooperate. In the meantime, on 10 December the AKP leader Recep Tayyip

Erdogan was invited to the White House as a show of support for the new government and

Erdogan himself, as well as to convey US determination to start this war.15 It is believed

that Erdogan did not commit himself and the AKP to Turkey’s cooperation in a possible

war against Iraq at that meeting.16 In fact, the difficulties that lay ahead for the USA soon

became clear, as it took the Turkish government a long time to bring the motion for site

preparation to parliament, which angered the Bush administration. Parliament eventually

passed a resolution on 6 February, allowing the USA to proceed with the upgrading of

Turkish ports, airfields and bases.17

The coming to power of the AKP did not in fact end the ambiguities in Ankara, but

rather added to them. An increasing number of political actors sought to influence policy-

making and thus complicated the process. Within the AKP a group of parliamentarians led

by influential speaker of the parliament Bulent Arınc, and even some ministers, became

increasingly vocal critics of a war against Iraq and any Turkish participation in it. Their

views were very much backed by the prominent opinion-makers who supported the

AKP.18 The lack of public support in general was particularly problematic. The

overwhelming majority of Turkish people, about 90%, were opposed to the war. It would

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have been very difficult for any government just to ignore such opposition. However, it

was particularly difficult for a party like the AKP. This newly established party got an

impressive 35% of the votes in the elections and its main strength was derived from that

public support. In addition, the party’s Islamist core has been especially sensitive on the

issue.19 This led to significant ambiguity in the AKP’s position towards the Iraqi crisis.

Although the leadership of the party seemingly opted for realpolitik, the rank and file

responded to the public outcry, which they largely endorsed. The first Prime Minister of

the AKP government, Abdullah Gul, made this point clear when he said at a summit on

Iraq on 23 December that ‘I can explain this to the opposition party, but I cannot explain it

to my own party’.20

Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was also openly critical of any war against Iraq

without international legitimacy. Turkey in fact called for a UN resolution to legalize any

action against Iraq. This emphasis reflected Turkey’s concern that involvement in a war

without international legality might have negative effects on its relations with both the

EU and Middle Eastern countries. The lack of international consensus on the issue and

especially French and German opposition to the war made things difficult for Turkey.

Finally, Prime Minister Abdullah Gul was particularly concerned about the views of

other countries in the region. Thus he began a tour of Arab countries with a view to

starting a dialogue to prevent the war. However, that initiative largely failed as most of

the countries in the region, despite their concerns about the war, either did not want to be

seen to oppose the USA or did not want to follow Turkey’s lead in this regard. The only

result of this effort was the convening of an Istanbul Summit of Foreign Ministers of the

regional countries, which was largely inconsequential. Like the previous Prime Minister,

Gul also wanted to make a last ditch effort to convince Saddam Hussein to cooperate.

Minister of Foreign Trade Kursad Tuzmen presented Gul’s letter to Saddam Hussein

during his visit to Baghdad with a large group of business people on 10 January.

Although this visit was framed as part of regular visits within the context of the oil-for-

food programme, it was confusing for those trying to make sense of Turkey’s policy on

the Iraq issue and once again underlined its ambiguities. In any case, Saddam was again

equally defiant in his response to Gul’s letter and tacitly threatened Turkey not to

cooperate with the USA.

In this difficult policy environment Ankara tried to buy time while at the same time

deciding to start negotiations with the USA as to the terms of Turkish cooperation. Thus

Turkey was giving mixed signals. It was clear that some government officials still believed

that war could be avoided. The USA, which was increasingly unhappy about Turkey’s

reluctance to cooperate, increased its pressure on Ankara.

Finally, there seemed to be a silent tug of war between the military and the AKP on who

was going to take responsibility for deciding to engage Turkey in the Iraq war. The AKP,

although critical of the Turkish military’s role in politics in general, preferred the military

to take the lead this time. This could at least provide a party that had just come to power

with an opportunity to blame it on the military. The military for its part was equally

reluctant to take sole responsibility for such an unpopular decision and apparently wanted

to share it with other actors. The military argued that ultimately it was the government’s

job to take a decision on the issue.

In any case, the National Security Council (NSC) convened on 27 December decided

that formal negotiations should start with the USA. The same meeting also established

Turkey’s ‘red lines’ in Iraq policy. These were about the establishment of an independent

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Kurdish state in northern Iraq, the safety of Turkmens living in Iraq and the status of

Kirkuk and Mosul.21

After the NSC decision three committees were established, dealing with military,

political and economic issues, respectively. For Ankara the aim was to get clear

commitments from the USA so that there should be no misunderstandings in the future, as

had happened after the 1991 Gulf War. Washington, however, was getting increasingly

uneasy about tying its hands and equally concerned about the reactions of Iraqi Kurdish

groups. The negotiations, which were quite difficult at times, lasted three months. The

negotiation process once again underscored Turkey’s deep unease about Iraq and brought

to the surface the divide between Turkey and the USA on the Iraqi issue. Torn between its

desire to enjoy the full support of the Kurdish parties and the need to meet Turkey’s

concerns, Washington was allegedly opposing any major Turkish military build-up

in northern Iraq. Ankara, on the other hand, wanted to increase its existing military

contingent in the area22 in order to control both the wave of refugees and any

developments that it deemed undesirable from its point of view. In this way, after

any operation the region would be under Turkish military control rather than that of any

foreign military power.23 The military aspects of any Turkish incursion into northern Iraq,

the numbers and status of US troops, the arming of Kurdish peshmergas, the nature of

northern Iraq’s political future, the political status of the Turkmens and the size and nature

of the economic package were the most significant sticking points in the negotiations.

Eventually, three Memoranda of Understanding, dealing with military, economic and

political affairs, were signed. The Memoranda seemed highly beneficial to Turkey. Turkey

was promised six billion dollars in aid, in addition to some 26 billion dollars in loan

guarantees. The number of troops that the USA wished to deploy through Turkey had been

reduced to some 60,000. It was also agreed that some 40,000 Turkish troops would be

deployed in northern Iraq alongside the USA.24

However on 1 March the Turkish parliament rejected the motion presented by the AKP

government and thus blocked the creation of a northern front. Of the 533 parliamentarians

in session, 264 voted for the motion, 250 voted against it and 19 abstained, leaving the

motion just three votes short of a constitutionally mandated full majority. In addition to

all the deputies of the opposition party, the People’s Republican Party (CHP), 99 AKP

deputies also voted against the motion.25

The vote exposed the divisions within the AKP.26 Furthermore, the government clearly

did not do a good job in explaining Turkey’s position to the public and to the party.

Overwhelmed by the difficult negotiation process and shortage of time, the government

did not create public opinion but rather was swayed by it. However, maybe more

importantly, the government did not inform Parliament or even most of its ministers of

Turkey’s interests and policies.27 Erdogan, who had much more influence over the party

and the constituencies, avoided this subject publicly for a long time. Only in mid February

did he make an important speech in which he said that although morally he was against the

war, they would do whatever was necessary, meaning cooperate with the USA in this war,

‘in order to protect our national interests’.28 Lack of international support for the USA also

seemed to strengthen the hands of those who opposed the war. More importantly, however,

the negotiation process revived some of the issues of mistrust. The US efforts to balance its

commitments to Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds became increasingly difficult and thus led

to the revival of suspicions about ‘real US intentions’ and the US commitment to the

agreements in the long run.

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After the 1 March vote the role of the military in the process also became a subject of

debate. Referring in particular to the failure of the 28 February NSC meeting to offer clear

support for the motion, Paul Wolfowitz argued in an interview he gave to Turkish

journalists that ‘for whatever reason the army did not play the strong leadership role’. 29 As

argued above, the army probably did not want to take sole responsibility for a very

unpopular decision. However, it is also safe to argue that, like other actors in the decision-

making process, the military also had its own ambiguities about the whole matter. Issues

that emerged in the negotiations, such as US efforts to limit the Turkish military’s

involvement and the proposal to put it under US command in northern Iraq (following

Kurdish warnings of serious consequences if the Turkish army intervened alone30)

possibly exacerbated these ambiguities.

Since the War: Between Iraq and a Hard Place

The 1 March parliamentary vote not only created a crisis in Turkish–American relations,

but also effectively curtailed Turkey’s influence over the course of the war. The US

administration secured the use of Turkish territory for humanitarian purposes during

secretary of state Colin Powell’s visit to Ankara. As a contingency measure the Bush

administration did provide in its budget a one billion dollar aid package for Turkey. The

US administration also made it clear that it would not want any Turkish unilateral military

intervention in northern Iraq. For its part the Turkish military denied rumours to that effect

and stated that such an intervention would be considered in the event of a major refugee

flow or Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk and Mosul. Thus a crisis erupted when towards the end

of the war the Kurdish forces of the PUK entered Kirkuk contrary to the understanding

between Turkey and the USA.31 An escalation was prevented only when the USA secured

their withdrawal. In the meantime 15 Turkish officers were assigned to work with the US

troops as military observers.32

In general Ankara watched with dismay as the Iraqi Kurds became the main allies of the

USA over the course of the war in Iraq. Turkish–American relations, on the other hand, hit

a new low with what came to be known as the Suleimaniah incident. On 4 July 2003 11

Turkish Special Forces members, part of the Turkish military contingent that had been

stationed in northern Iraq since 1995, were apprehended by American troops in

Suleimaniah, taken to Baghdad and finally freed when US Vice President Dick Cheney

intervened. The USA claimed that it had information that raised serious concerns about the

activities of Turkish forces in the area. The whole ordeal, however, led to humiliation and

anger in Turkey and created another crisis in American–Turkish relations. The Turkish

chief of staff, Hilmi Ozkok, said that the arrests led to the biggest crisis of confidence ever

between Turkish and US forces.33 The joint Turkish–US fact-finding commission

expressed regret that the unfortunate incident had occurred and decided to establish better

coordination in Iraq. The involvement of Kurdish PUK peshmergas in the affair further

raised the temperature. In response, Talabani’s upcoming visit to Turkey was cancelled.34

Turkish–American relations gradually began to improve as the two sides preferred to

stress their common interests in the Middle East and elsewhere rather than their

differences. Iraq, however, again contributed to the problem of mistrust between the two

allies. Turkey continued to see Iraq through the lens of the Kurdish problem and thus

regarded the developments in Iraq as a grave national security threat. The USA’s

favourable attitude towards some form of autonomy for an Iraqi Kurdistan fuelled

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suspicions on the Turkish side. The USA on the other hand began to consider some

Turkish policies and positions, such as its ties with the Iraqi Turkmen Front, as hindering

its objectives in Iraq.

As part of their efforts to revive cooperation Turkey and the USA came up with the idea

of sending approximately 10,000 Turkish troops to Iraq as a Stability Force. Faced with

increasing security problems in Iraq, Washington was anxious to secure military

contributions from other countries. Turkish troops were to be deployed in the so-called

‘Sunni triangle’ where the US forces were facing the fiercest resistance.35 The risks

involved in such a deployment would be significant. Turkey’s decision highlighted

Ankara’s continuing desire both to influence political, security and economic

arrangements in Iraq and to mend relations with the USA. A team of experts from the

Foreign Ministry and the military visited the areas in question to determine the views of

the local population and leadership on Turkish deployment. Similarly, some tribal leaders

were invited to Ankara for further consultations.36 On 7 October 2003 the Turkish

parliament passed a motion authorizing the deployment of troops in Iraq. However, that

initiative failed because the USA backed down when it faced opposition from the Iraqi

Governing Council (IGC). The Kurdish groups opposed the presence of Turkish troops

and also feared Washington’s close relationship with Ankara.37 The Arab members of the

IGC for their part were against any involvement by neighbouring countries.38 On 7

November Washington officially told Ankara that it did not want Turkey to send troops

into Iraq.

When the Turkish Stabilization Force failed to materialize that meant the end of the

military option for Ankara in its Iraq policy, at least in the short term.39 Thus Turkey

focused its attention more on political and economic means to influence developments in

Iraq and to protect its interests. On the other hand, since the late 1990s significant changes

have occurred in Turkey’s policy-making environment. Turkey is no longer overwhelmed

by insecurities as it was throughout the 1990s; instead there has been a growing self-

confidence. Two events, both in 1999, constituted a turning point in that respect. The arrest

and the trial of Abdullah Ocalan, the head of the PKK, in 1999, the military defeat of the

organization and its declaration of a cease fire in 2000 transformed the Kurdish question in

Turkey by ending a 15 year military conflict with the PKK. This was followed by the

European Council’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999 where Turkey was officially

recognized as a candidate for full EU membership.40 The decision not only ushered in a

new era in Turkey’s democratization process, it also ended the period of uncertainty as to

Turkey’s international identity. The impact of these two developments on the Kurdish

issue was to open up possibilities of reconciliation and non-military approaches to the

issue. The reflection of this new-found self-confidence was observed in Turkish foreign

policy in general. The new policy environment that emerged in the late 1990s even

influenced the policy towards Iraq, despite its continuing characterization as an existential

security issue.

However, two issues in post-war Iraq continue to exacerbate identity conflict and to

influence Turkey’s policy towards Iraq. The first is again related to the Kurdish issue and

its extension into Iraq. In the post-war environment the Iraqi Kurds obtained considerable

clout due to their alliance with the USA. This had an impact on their relations with Turkey.

Feeling no longer as dependent as they were on Turkey in the 1990s, the Iraqi Kurdish

parties, particularly the KDP, became increasingly defiant and at times threatening over

Turkey’s policies on Iraq. Turkey, on the other hand, was highly disturbed by these

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developments. The policy of Iraqi Kurdish groups towards multi-ethnic Kirkuk, which is

characterized as Kurdification by Ankara, further contributes to an atmosphere of mistrust.

Although Kirkuk and its environs are not currently part of the Kurdistan regional

government, Iraqi Kurdish leaders openly express their aim of incorporating the area.

They already dominate the city council and their militias are on the ground as security

forces. Furthermore, in the name of reversing the Arabization policies of the Saddam

regime, Kurds have been encouraged by the Kurdish political parties to return to the city in

large numbers.41 Thus, although there have been attempts to normalize relations since the

war due to mutual recognition of the benefits of such a normalization, mutual mistrust

leads to characterization of the relationship as almost a zero sum game. This is not to deny

that there are real security issues emanating from northern Iraq for Turkey, especially in

the face of the presence of PKK/Kongra-Gel guerrillas in the Qandil Mountains in

northern Iraq. The situation has become more complicated as on 2 September 2004 the

PKK/Kongra-Gel renounced the unilateral ceasefire it had declared in February 2000.

Ankara claimed that just before this announcement, in the summer of 2004, PKK/Kongra-

Gel fighters crossed into Turkey from northern Iraq. Since then there has been an

escalation of PKK activity and violence in Turkey.

Secondly, Turkey’s support for the Turkmens contributes to identity conflicts in its

Iraq policy. Since the establishment of the Turkish republic, with few exceptions, Turkey

has been reluctant to show an interest in the fate of the Turkic communities living in

neighbouring countries. Although some nationalist groups were highly critical of this

policy, such a reluctance was based on the definition of Turkishness. There have been

tensions in the actual realization of this definition, yet the republic has claimed to define

Turkishness on non-ethnic grounds. Despite the existence of domestic pressures to the

contrary and the realization of some of the opportunities such an interest would offer in a

shifting politics of identity around Turkey, this policy remained intact after the Cold

War. This was largely due to Turkey’s own problems of national identity, especially in

the face of the Kurdish challenge. Turkey’s interest in and relations with the Turkmens

of Iraq can be regarded as an important exception in that regard. In the mid 1990s Turkey

developed a policy towards Iraqi Turkmens within the context of its efforts to influence

the developments in northern Iraq that were perceived to present existential threats to

Turkey. Although Ankara’s interest in the Turkmens started as a strategic one, it opened

up a Pandora’s Box. Such a policy not only mobilized groups that had been advocating

such policies all along by legitimizing them, it also led to Iraqi Turkmen groups,

especially the Iraqi Turkmen Front, becoming a factor in Turkey’s policies. More

significantly, however, Turkey’s emphasis on Turkmens in Iraq, while the other two

ethnic communities in Iraq, Kurds and Arabs, also have their ethnic kin in Turkey, put

Ankara in an awkward position. Recently there have been attempts to overcome these

tensions, although they still exist. The AKP government has been emphasizing that

Turkey’s policy towards Iraq is not based on groups in Iraq, but rather it is a policy that

takes the whole of Iraq into consideration. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul recently stated

that Ankara would ‘maintain an equal distance from all ethnic and religious groups in

Iraq who are all relatives’.42

Thus in both cases identity politics ‘is path dependent; past decisions limit the

possibilities of current policy’.43 Furthermore, concerns about the Kurdish issue based on

historical memory and 15 years of war with the separatist PKK, which claimed 30,000

lives, have also shaped Turkey’s Iraq policy.

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Conclusions

Turkish identity is linked to the view that Turkey’s existence is always in jeopardy and

Turkey has no friends but itself. The developments in Iraq after the Gulf War were

perceived as verifying this conceptualization. There was a threat to the territorial integrity

of Turkey in the form of the secessionist PKK, which had made use of northern Iraqi

territory. In addition, the support given to it by Turkey’s neighbours, such as Syria,

strengthened the world view that Turkey had no friends.44 In fact, the Kurdish issue had

become an Achilles Heel for Turkey and it was exposing its vulnerabilities. Turkey’s Iraq

policy was thus framed within that perspective. The involvement of the major external

powers in Iraq seemed to invoke the traumatic experience of the disintegration of the

Ottoman Empire, the war of independence and the establishment of the Turkish republic.

In particular, the security aspect of the Kurdish issue was at the heart of this historical

memory. Not only was early republican history marked by a series of Kurdish rebellions

against the unitary, centralizing and secular regime, but these were also thought to have

external dimensions in the form of British support as part of its imperial designs.

To complicate matters further, these developments were taking place at a time when

there was a contentious domestic debate about national identity in the 1990s. Political

Islamists and Kurdish nationalists began to challenge Turkey’s secular and unitary

identity, respectively. Systemic changes also contributed to the identity crisis. The

disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War opened up a debate about

Turkey’s regional identity. NATO membership was no longer enough to make Turkey part

of ‘the West’ in the post-Cold War era. In fact, the rejection of Turkey’s application for

membership of the European Community (EC) in 1987 underlined this quite dramatically.

The perception further intensified when at the Luxembourg European Council Summit

in 1997 Turkey was not included among the new list of potential candidates for EU

membership.

All these factors had an impact on Turkey’s Iraq policy. The normative map based on

historical memory was very much part of Turkey’s relations with the USA over Iraq.

Turkey had cooperated with the USA since the Gulf War amid lingering suspicions about

its real intentions. During the debates about Operation Provide Comfort and Operation

Northern Watch several actors invoked the Treaty of Sevres, which had been imposed on

Turkey by the Allied powers after World War I. The atmosphere of mistrust affected the

last round of negotiations between Turkey and the USA over Turkey’s participation in the

war. Although Turkey’s rational national interest was against the status quo and for

increasing its influence over the course of events unfolding in Iraq, its normative map

dragged it into a terrain of ambiguity. Ironically, despite the fact that the main actors

within the AKP have traditionally been critical of the republican historical narrative, they

also failed to come up with an alternative framework to redefine Iraq policy. Recep Tayyip

Erdogan’s speech, which made the distinction between the realist (it is in our national

interest to participate in this war) and idealist (this is an immoral war) principles, in fact

underlined some of the tensions in the AKP camp. Similarly, Turkey’s efforts to increase

its influence in Iraq since the end of the war have been limited by its inability to overcome

its ambiguities.

This is not to argue that identity issues were the only or even the main sources of

Turkish foreign policy vis-a-vis Iraq. Nevertheless, identity issues clearly framed policy

choices. The implication of identity politics has been to deter a proactive policy towards

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Iraq in favour of a wait-and-see approach. Turkey has not just been responding to material

conditions and acting according to rationally defined national interest in articulating its

Iraq policy. Both in its relations with the USA over Iraq and in developing its policy

towards Iraq, identity politics have been crucial in constructing and constraining policy

options.

Notes

1 For an articulation of the impact of identity politics on the foreign policies of Middle East countries see

Telhami, S. & Barnett, M. (Eds) (2002) Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press,).2 For a detailed discussion of the impact of the Iraq issue on Turkish–American relations in the 1990s

see Altunısık, M. B. (2004) Turkish–US security relations: the Middle East dimension, in: Aydın, M.

& Erhan, C. (Eds) Turkish–American Relations: 200 years of Divergence and Convergence, pp. 151–

180 (London: Routledge); Martin, L. G. (2004) Turkey’s Middle East foreign policy, in: Martin L. G.

& D. Kerides (Ed.) The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 157–189 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press);

Robins, P. (2003) Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, ch. 9 (Seattle, WA:

University of Washington Press).3 When the Saddam regime suppressed the uprising that erupted after the 1991 War in the north of Iraq,

about half-a-million Iraqi Kurds crossed over the border to Turkey in search of safety. The

humanitarian crisis led to the establishment of Operation Provide Comfort and the imposition of a no-

fly zone over the 36th parallel.4 See note 2.5 In the 1990s Turkey provided diplomatic passports to the leaders of the KDP (Barzani) and PUK

(Talabani), and became their link to the outside world. The two parties opened their representations in

Ankara. In addition to allowing border trade, Ankara also provided economic aid. Turkey also

mediated between the two sides when they engaged in armed conflict. Most importantly, however, by

allowing US and UK forces to use Incirlik airbase Turkey became the key to the continuation of the

north’s de facto independence from Baghdad. The KDP in return at times helped Turkey in its war

against the PKK in northern Iraq.6 Radikal (Istanbul), 2002, 24 December, p. 1.7 Fisher, I. (2002) Turkey grows more worried every day about a US attack on Iraq, New York Times, 28

October, p. A11.8 Yetkin, M. (2004) Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gercek Oykusu (The Motion: The Real Story of the Iraqi

Crisis), pp. 41–42 (Ankara, Turkey: Remzi Kitabevi).9 Yetkin, pp. 66–67.

10 What follows is a summary of the positions in this debate as represented in the Turkish media during

this period.11 Milliyet (Istanbul), 2002, 24 December, p. 1.12 CNN.com, 2002, 16 October.13 The AKP got 34.27% of the votes and became the first political party to win enough seats to form a

single party majority government since 1987.14 Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 2002, 17 December, p. 115 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the AKP, was barred from holding political office because of an

earlier conviction for reading a poem ‘inciting religious hatred’ at a rally. Abdullah Gul therefore took

over as Prime Minister. The AKP then pushed through parliament a constitutional amendment which

would allow Erdogan to run for office. As the AKP was still viewed with suspicion by most of the

secular establishment, the invitation of Erdogan to the White House, when he was still banned from

holding political office, may have contributed to the atmosphere of mistrust as far as Turkey’s foreign

and security establishment was concerned.16 Donat, Y. (2003) Ankara’nın Fotografı (The Panorama of Ankara), Sabah (Istanbul), 24 February, p. 3.17 Among 363 AKP parliamentarians, 22 voted no and 9 abstained, thus giving the first signs of a

willingness to defy party discipline.

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18 Particularly the op-ed pieces in the journal Yeni Safak, which is pro-AKP, were quite vocal in their

criticism of US policy and the possibility of a war against Iraq.19 The previous parties established by Islamists in Turkey since the Gulf War, beginning with the Welfare

Party, were quite critical of US policy towards Iraq and would oppose Turkey’s participation alongside

the USA in a war against a Muslim nation.. These parties were among the most vocal critics of

Operation Northern Watch (formerly Operation Provide Comfort). Erbakan called it a ‘second Sevres’,

referring to the peace agreement imposed on the Ottoman Empire by the Allied powers after World

War I, which effectively carved up the remaining territories into several states.20 Yetkin, p. 117.21 Yetkin, pp. 120–121.22 Starting in the mid 1990s, Turkey stationed a permanent military presence of about 2000 Special

Forces in northern Iraq.23 Bila, F., Milliyet (Istanbul), 2002, 24 December, p. 6.24 Sabah (Istanbul), 2003, 24 February, p. 1.25 Identity politics influenced the votes of the AKP deputies. Deputies with roots in the previous Islamist

parties and movements, as well as those representing those regions of the country with large Kurdish

populations, voted against the motion.26 The divisions within the AKP led some commentators to argue that the party was in fact a coalition of

diverse groups. See, for instance, Alkan, T. (2003) Savasin ilk yaralısı: AKP (AKP: the first casualty of

the war), Radikal (Istanbul), 4 March, p. 5.27 Yetkin, M. (2003) Tezkere dersleri (The lesons of the failed motion), Radikal (Istanbul), 4 March, p. 4.28 This distinction was very much in line with the AKP’s characterization of itself as a conservative

democratic party, emphasizing religious and moral values in social life and focusing on realpolitik in

economics, politics and foreign policy.29 CNNTurk, 2003, 6 June.30 During the negotiations between Ankara and Washington several Kurdish officials thereatened war if

the Turkish army intervened in northern Iraq. For instance, KDP International Relations Director

Hoshyar Zebari, who is currently Iraq’s Foreign Minister, said that any intervention by Turkey would

lead to clashes between Kurds and Turks [Sabah (Istanbul), 2003, 24 February, p. 1].31 ‘Kurds’ looting sweeps across liberated Kirkuk: US forces take action late in day, Washington Post,

2003, 12 April, p. A23.32 Turkey’s response was seen as a step back from its previous threats of military incursion. Pan, P.

(2003) Turkish officials back away from threats to invade northern Iraq, Washington Post, 12 April,

p. A23.33 Hurriyet (Istanbul), 2003, 7 July, p. 1.34 Ozdag, U. (2003) Turk–Amerikan ıliskilerinde Irak krizi (The Iraqi crisis in Turkish–American

relations), Stratejik Analiz, August, pp. 3–5.35 Turkey was given the choice of three regions: the Salah Al-Din Governorate, including Tikrit; the al-

Anbar Euphrates coast area; the northern area of al Anbar province (in west central Iraq).36 Press Conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Hurriyet (Istanbul), 2003, 13 October, p. 1].37 Marquardt, E. (2003) Deployment of necessity: Turkish military involvement in Iraq, Power and

Interest News Report, 10 October, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac¼view_report&report_id¼101

&language_id¼1 (accessed 23 August 2006).38 al-Marashi, I. (2004) A new chapter in Iraqi–Turkish relations? Examining Iraqi and Arab reactions to

the Turkish deployment to Iraq’, Insight Turkey, 6(1), pp. 119–128.39 Although Turkey’s relations with the EU and the USA put serious limitations on unilateral use of

military force, it is safe to argue that it is not completely out of the question, as shown by recent reports

in the Turkish media about the existence of such plans in the case of Kurdish incorporation of Kirkuk

into Iraqi Kurdistan. See, for instance the Turkish dailies Sabah (2004, 30 October, p. 1) and Milliyet

(2004, 1 November, p. 1).40 For the impact of the EU on Turkish foreign policy see Kirisci, K. (2004) Between Europe and the

Middle East: the transformation of Turkish policy’, MERIA Journal, 8(1). Available at http://meria.idc.

ac.il/journal (accessed 14 January 2005).41 For the problems and tensions in Kirkuk see Human Rights Watch (2004) Claims In Conflict:

Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq. http://hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/ (accessed

14 August 2006).

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42 Alpay, S. (2004) Turkiye’nin Irak politikası degisiyor mu?’ (Is Turkey’s policy towards Iraq

changing?), Zaman (Istanbul), 5 June, p. 5.43 Saideman, S. (2004) Thinking theoretically about identity and foreign policy, in: Telhami, S. &

Barnett, M. (Eds) Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, p. 171 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press).44 The support given to the PKK by Syria and Iran, despite the existence of Kurdish minorities in these

countries, does not seem to support the argument that such vulnerability would prevent interference in

the form of supporting dissidents across the border (Saideman, pp. 172–173).

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