TRIPLE HELIX NETWORKS IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: TRIGGERS AND BARRIERS FOR FOSTERING GROWTH AND...

March 25, 2008 8:48 WSPC WS-JDE SPI-J076 00086

Journal of Developmental EntrepreneurshipVol. 13, No. 1 (2008) 77–98© World Scientific Publishing Company

TRIPLE HELIX NETWORKS IN A MULTICULTURALCONTEXT: TRIGGERS AND BARRIERS FOR FOSTERING

GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY

ETHEL BRUNDIN

Jönköping International Business SchoolP.O. Box 1026, SE 551 11 Jönköping, Sweden

[email protected]

CAROLINE WIGREN

Jönköping International Business School and CircleLund University, Sweden

ESLYN ISAACS, CHRIS FRIEDRICH and KOBUS VISSER

University of the Western CapeSouth Africa

Received September 2006Revised December 2007

This article deals with Triple Helix (university, industry and government cooperation) from an institu-tional theory perspective. The empirical context is the Western Cape Region in South Africa and thefocus is entrepreneurship development. The purpose is two-fold: first, the existing Triple Helix modelis adapted to the South African context; and second, facilities and impediments for working accordingto Triple Helix in South Africa are identified. The empirical material consists of a survey and threelongitudinal case studies illustrating the degree of cooperation between the three parties. The articlecontributes to knowledge about how the Triple Helix model works on a regional level in a developingcountry. The study draws the following conclusions: when cooperation is to be identified between thethree actors, only two of the three are involved; one missing link in the Triple Helix model is the focuson the entrepreneur; cooperation between the three parties are incidental rather than planned and thereis lack of structure. In turn, some of these conclusions may be an effect of institutional changes on anational level. For a normative legacy, the article proposes a set of suggestions for incorporating allrelevant parties on a practical level.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship development; Triple Helix model; institutional theory; emergingeconomies.

1. Introduction

This paper engages the Triple Helix model, as developed and described by Etzkowitz andLeydesdorff (2000) on the dynamism of university-industry-government relations in thecontext of a developing country and in regards to entrepreneurship development. The TripleHelix model and its intricacies received great attention in the Western world as a means

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78 E. Brundin et al.

to foster innovations and growth, implying “the creation of a climate and certain attitudesthat enable coordination between the agents directed to achieving innovation” (Cook et al.,1997). In emerging economies in general, and as in the case of this paper, in South Africa,the concept received lesser attention and, subsequently, an espoused rhetoric about TripleHelix does not exist.

2. Background to the Research Challenge

In terms of the guidelines for small business development and support in a South Africancontext, its government formulated a national framework (White Paper, 1995) which acts asa guide for existing and potential role players. This White Paper outlines a national strategyfor the development and promotion of small business in South Africa where the Triple Helixconcept is indirectly called for.

In view of the diverse and uncoordinated nature of enterprise development in the periodpreceding 1994, a call for coordination, cooperation and a clear national strategy frameworkbecame inevitable. In order to address the economic imbalances of the past, the objectivesof the national policy framework for South Africa are six-fold:

• create an enabling environment for small enterprises;• facilitate greater equalization of income, wealth and economic opportunities;• create long-term jobs;• stimulate economic growth;• strengthen the cohesion between small enterprises; and• “level the playing fields” (i.e., creating levels of equality) between large and small busi-

nesses.

For the policy framework to be effective, the following groups have been targeted forspecific support: women, rural enterprises, undereducated individuals, and previously (eco-nomically) disadvantaged groups. The targeted support areas are of critical importance forthe national support strategy; not only do they stress the need for some degree of public sec-tor involvement, but they also emphasise the need for explicit differentiation in the supportframework.

On whether the national framework has, after 12 years, created an environment con-ducive for enterprise growth and development, research shows that, in general, no significantimprovement in the SME sector had taken place over the stated period. For example, fromthe 2004 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Report (Orford et al., 2004: 25) there is gen-eral agreement that the South African deficient entrepreneurial capacity can be ascribed tothree key elements in the environment, namely, weaknesses in the educational system, thegovernment’s lack of support and difficulty in accessing financial resources. It is withinthe context of low entrepreneurial capacity that the model of Triple Helix is presented as anexus in the discourse of entrepreneurial development.

The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, we aim to adapt the existing Triple Helixmodel to the South African context; and second, we intend to identify facilities and imped-iments for working according to Triple Helix in South Africa.


Triple Helix Networks in a Multicultural Context 79

The study is presented in four sections. Section 3 introduces the Triple Helix conceptand its theoretical underpinning. In this regard, the model as suggested by Etzkowitz andLeydesdorff (2000) is further elaborated upon with theories from the field of institutionaltheory — the latter theory contributes to our argument that innovation, i.e., entrepreneurshipdevelopment, does not come naturally from the tripartite cooperation, as suggested in themodel. Section 4 of the paper introduces the South African case. The relationship betweenuniversity, industry and government is investigated and reported on and three cases arepresented. Facilities and impediments are identified in relation to each case. Section 5 of thepaper is a discussion based on the empirical evidence where we examine the theory of TripleHelix based on our findings. Four observations, of relevance South Africa and the TripleHelix concept in general, are presented and discussed. Section 6 suggests implications tofacilitate entrepreneurship development according to Triple Helix in South Africa and afuture research agenda is presented.

3. Triple Helix: A Theoretical Overview

The Triple Helix model has been advocated as a useful method for fostering entrepreneurshipand growth. The model identifies three helices, namely industry, academia, and govern-ments. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2001) state that…“a ‘Triple Helix’ of academia-industry-government relations is likely to be a key component of any national or multinationalinnovation strategy in the late twentieth century.” The relationships between the three actors“span networks that enable and constrain flux of communication” (Leydesdorff and Meyer,2003: 191). This relationship, as espoused by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000), is pre-sented in Figure 1 as a set of trilateral networks between the state, industry and academia.

Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) propose three different types of Triple Helix config-urations. According to the first model, “the nation state encompasses academia and industryand directs the relationships between them;” the second model “consists of separate institu-tional spheres with strong borders dividing them and highly circumscribed relations amongthe spheres.” Finally, according to Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000), the third model,academia, government and industry together, are “generating a knowledge infrastructure interms of overlapping institutional spheres, with each taking the role of the other and withhybrid organizations emerging at the interfaces.”

The first helix model (or spiral) is applicable to the former Soviet Union and othercountries under existing socialism and gives little room for bottom-up initiatives (Etzkowitz

Academia

Trilateral networks and

hybrid organizationsIndustryState

Fig. 1. The Triple Helix model of university-industry-government relations.



and Leydesdorff, 2000). The aim is to reach the third helix, which implies that the par-ties jointly realize that university spin-off firms, trilateral initiatives for knowledge-basedeconomic development, strategic alliances between different types of firms, governmentallaboratories, and academic research groups together constitute an innovative environment.The role of the government is to support and encourage but not to control. To manage, thedifferent parties have to cooperate even if they have different motives (Eriksson et al., 2002).When interaction between the different actors takes place, relationships are established andboundaries eliminated. Viewed differently, this means that knowledge flows are not linearand there is no longer a sender and a receiver of the knowledge; rather, knowledge is mutu-ally constructed in interaction between the different actors. According to the third model,the helices are assuming the roles of each other, i.e., the university is supposed to transferknowledge to the surrounding world, taking an active role in new venture creation, etc. Thefirm, on the other hand, should develop an academic dimension in their daily work. Tödtling(1998) postulates that:

• innovations are non-linear, common learning takes place in networks between differentactors;• knowledge, both codified and tacit, is important in the innovations process;• institutions (i.e., rules of the game, organizations, values and routines), reduce uncertainty

which benefits the innovation process;• a region’s or country’s governance model (i.e., “actions of public, semi-public and pri-

vate actors and organizations”) is important for the stimulation and implementation ofinnovations; and,• there is a risk for lock-in effects in regions where the world view is too homogenized.

The innovation process is an interactive process and thereby a social process. The pur-pose with the Triple Helix model is that interaction and communication should take placebetween actors from the different helices, which might lead to new institutional arrange-ments. The model aims at increasing the level of innovations in a country or a region andTriple Helix is discussed as a prerequisite for managing the process, i.e., the focus is eitheron the “national systems of innovation” (cf. Freeman, 1995), or the “regional systems ofinnovation” (cf. Cook et al., 1997).

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, an inno-vation system is defined as “the network of public and private institutions, within whichproduction, diffusion, and application of new knowledge and technology takes place” (Eriks-son et al., 2002). Cook et al. (1997) concludes that the innovation system (national as wellas regional) can be studied intellectually by specifying the actors and the linkages betweenthose. However, they emphasize the problem of researching this on a national level and sug-gest that studies should be done at the regional level, which together can give the nationalperspective. To date, the model has been applied mainly in knowledge-based societies,i.e., industrialized countries. This paper focuses on the regional level and contributes tounderstanding about Triple-Helix on a regional level in a developing country.

In a few studies, the model has been applied in developing countries, such as Brazil,where the system of business incubators in the country was researched. Etzkowitz et al.



(2005) identified several Triple Helix hybrids and the relationship between university-industry-government resulted in a focus from (i) incubator to incubation; (ii) from structureto process; and (iii) from firms to creating diverse organizations. Academics formed busi-nesses in addition to being transformers of knowledge; industry became partners in trainingand the government contributed financially to research and development. Furthermore, themodel has been applied in Croatia where it was found that the Triple Helix model hasnot sufficiently developed to a level of significance and that it exists in exceptional casesas two helices, namely government and university (Laznjak and Svarc, 2004). Laznjak andSvarc further postulate that the research sector was government-supported and had a closed-system focus, while, on the other hand, the capability of industry to absorb research servicesin post-socialist Croatia was limited.

From our understanding of the Triple Helix model, we now draw two conclusions:(i) when people from different institutional backgrounds meet, we believe that new con-stellations of networks emerge and thereby new opportunities arise; (ii) identifying whichagenda to follow, which is a shared understanding, regarding the future development of acountry or region facilitates strategic decision-making.

When applying the model in the South African context, we have two limitations. First,we have limited the study to one specific region, the Province of the Western Cape in SouthAfrica. Second, we have chosen to focus on how the Triple Helix actors in this region aredealing with the development of SMEs. The emphasis on the SME sector is made since thisfocus is stressed in the White Paper (1995) and the strong belief in South Africa that theSME sector is of great importance for the development of the country (Orford et al., 2004).This implies that the focus of the paper is quite narrowed, which we find useful, since, toour knowledge, the model has not yet been applied in this context.

Next, we turn to institutional theory and argue that combining the three different institu-tions of university, industry and government might encompass some barriers to cooperationand change.

3.1. Institutional theory

Organizations are embedded in institutional environments (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;Tolbert, 1985; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Teo et al., 2003) and they seek to matchregulatory demands and normative, as well as moral prescriptions and expectations, in orderto obtain and keep legitimacy. The goal is to stand up to standards of “desirable, proper, orappropriate [behaviour] within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefsand definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). Once an organization is regarded as legitimate, itis less vulnerable and more trustworthy in the eyes of its audience, i.e., the environment.Legitimacy leads to persistence, which is desirable, as resources are more likely to be “given”to those institutions that seem appropriate.

Along the way to gain legitimacy as a means to survive, the organization is subjected todifferent pressures. Depending on the pressure from the environment, an organization can bepositioned in a typology where the pressure from the market is combined with the pressurefrom the institutional environment (Meyer et al. 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1983; Scott, 1992).Scott and Meyer (1991) identify the two dimensions of technical control and institutional



Stronger IndustryBanks,

Hospitals

WeakerPublic day-care

centres

University,

Government,

State

Weak Strong

Technical controls

Institutional controls

Fig. 2. Scott and Meyer’s matrix.

Source: Adapted from Scott, WR and JW Meyer (1991). The organization of societal sectors. Propositionsand early evidence. In The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, WW Powell and PJ DiMaggio(eds.). Chicago: Uniersity of Chicago Press, p. 124.

control and they should not be regarded as being mutually exclusive (see Figure 2). Themain drive of technical control is the pressure to conform and to be competitive within themarket. Control is thus based on the output, such as quality and efficiency, and is related toinstrumental rationality (Scott, 2003).

The institutional control is normally considered to originate from state, trade associa-tions, trade unions, professionals and similar organizations. This type of control mechanismlays stress on formal rationality and whether suitable procedures and structures are put inpractice (Scott, 2003). The institutional control is thus harder to measure against a specificoutcome. Along the two dimensions the pressure might be stronger or weaker.

The institutional control can be exercised through coercive, mimetic and/or norma-tive pressures (Oliver, 1997; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Coercive pressure is exertedthrough governmental mandates, mimetic pressure through norms and practices within theorganization’s specific institutional field, and normative pressure is mainly derived fromprofessionalization and exercised through trade and membership associations and the like.

By adapting to environmental pressure (the technical as well as the institutional) theorganization follows a three-step process including: (i) mimetic behaviour, in order to securebetter technical performance; (ii) objectification, whereby it can be understood that practicesare no longer “rational” but becoming habitualized to the degree that they are regardedobjectified, i.e., being more or less the most obvious way of “doing things” right; and (iii)sedimentation, implying width and depth where the practice is “taken for granted”, withoutfurther thought (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). By completing the three steps, the organizationbecomes an institutionalized and “taken-for-granted entity” (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996).

3.2. The three institutions within the Triple Helix concept

Within the Triple Helix model, we argue that it combines three institutionalized entities:university, industry and government (see Figure 2). By combining the different controlmechanisms of Scott and Meyer’s typology (1991), university is placed in the lower, rightquadrant where the pressure to conform to regulations dominate, even if the demands toproduce knowledge meeting certain standards exist as well. Academia/university is thusconstrained to procedural as well as structural controls (Scott, 2003). Academia is not subject



to competition in a general sense, however the more legitimacy an academic institution gains,the more competitive advantage it usually obtains. Government and governmental bodiesare institutions per se and are naturally compelled to their own restrictions and regulations,which constitute a strong institutional pressure. These bodies are, at the same time as theyseek legitimacy, legitimacy judgers and creators for others (cf. Scott, 1995). Their outcomeis not measured by market-driven measurements, but rather in standardized dimensions, andsometimes not at all, in publicly-driven childcare centres for example.

In some cases, governmental bodies, for instance state-owned banks and hospitals ormunicipal energy supply companies, compete on the open market and are subject to hightechnical control mechanisms. A governmental body can thus be placed in the left, lowerquadrant, in the right lower quadrant or in the upper right quadrant. Industry, exclusiveof not-for-profit organizations, normally operates under very strong technical pressure andless of institutional constraints. Some scholars would probably not even consider indus-try as institutionalized. In this paper, we argue that industrial fields have built-up certainindustry-specific rules that may render or reject legitimacy and thereby consciously, andunconsciously, are subject to institutionalization. The institutional control exists, and canbe very strong on requirements for statement of accounts, industry specifications, environ-mental control and the like. Industry, as defined here is placed in the upper, left quadrant.The difference between university and governmental bodies is that the outcome of industryis measured mainly in monetary terms and the technical pressure to survive on the marketis extensive.

University, industry and government are all subject to isomorphism, i.e., the “constrain-ing process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the sameset of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). However, the two formerbodies are subject to institutional isomorphism, rather than competitive isomorphism whichis more apt for industry (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1996). National and contextual differ-ences may interfere with the argumentation here and place the three “institutions” in slightlydifferent positions. However, generally speaking, most people can probably agree upon thesuggested grouping within the typology.

3.3. Institutional theory and change

From the preceding review on institutional theory, the following conclusions can be drawn:

(i) it is considered of vital importance to be regarded as a legitimate body of institution;(ii) the rules of attaining legitimacy and the way to achieve it varies depending on what

kind of pressure the organization is exposed to; and(iii) the rules of gaining and keeping legitimacy differ between them.

For these reasons it is safe to presume that once legitimacy is obtained it is revered andnot easily jeopardized. Furthermore, there is reason to assume that stability is a conditionstrived for and that resistance to change is likely to exist. Scott and Meyer (1991) contendthat the stronger the institutionalized environment is and the tighter the coupling is betweenthe prevailing structure/archetype and a rigid embeddedness of the institution, the harder it



is for change to occur and the more instability is created through change. Greenwood andHinings (1996) argue in a parallel way when they claim that archetypes (i.e., institutionalizedentities) are institutionally derived and that radical change, being a movement toward anotherarchetype, is problematic because of the normative embeddedness of an organization.

According to Greenwood and Hinings (1996), radical change affects deeply rooted andsedimented aspects whereas convergent change is considered to happen within an existingtemplate without challenging the foundation at its roots. Dalum et al. (1992) are of thesame opinion when they conclude that change involving economic growth and innovationsystems is complicated by the fact that it is linked to permanent institutional change.

4. The South African Case with Particular Reference to the Province of theWestern Cape

4.1. The role of universities in entrepreneurship development

The Ministry of Education expects higher education institutions to engage in teaching,research, consultation and community outreach projects. Therefore, universities accumu-late knowledge through research and act as the transferors of knowledge through teach-ing and consultation. This also holds true for entrepreneurship education and, althoughentrepreneurship is not new, it has received more attention during the last three decades.This provides valuable input for entrepreneurship education and consultancy. Furthermore,many academic institutions have been involved in entrepreneurship education for more than30 years; however, the components of entrepreneurship courses vary from institution toinstitution (McMullan and Gillin, 2001; Ladzani and van Vuuren, 2002).

In the Province of the Western Cape, Brijlal (2005) identified four university institutionsand a technical college involved in entrepreneurship education and development in a regionalcontext. These five institutions in the Province of the Western Cape are the University of theWestern Cape, University of Cape Town, University of Stellenbosch, the Cape PeninsulaUniversity of Technology and the Cape Technical College. All of these institutions areinvolved in entrepreneurship development to varying degrees through formal and outreachprograms and consultation. For the purpose of this study, the focus will be on the work doneby the University of the Western Cape and, in particular, its Entrepreneurship DevelopmentUnit. The unit was established to provide training, consulting and engagement in researchprojects to improve the quality of life of the small and medium enterprise community.

4.2. The role of government in entrepreneurship development

The national government tasked the Department of Trade and Industry with the responsibilityof creating an enabling business environment. In 1995, the Department of Trade and Industrypublished the National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Business inSouth Africa, and in 2004, the Review of ten years of small-business support in South Africa1994 to 2004. In 2005, it published the Integrated Small-Business-Development Strategy:Unlocking the potential of South African Entrepreneurs. From the State of Small Businessin South Africa: Annual Review (Ntsika Promotion Agency, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004)



it showed that there is a constant increase in the number of small businesses. The 800,000SMEs in 1995 increased to 2.5 million in 2004 (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004).

In alignment with the South African government’s national strategy for small business,the Provincial government of the Western Cape has been rolling out a range of supportservices to the small business sector via the SMME (small, medium and micro enterprises)sub-directorate of its Department of Economic Development and Tourism. This is primarilydone in the form of facilitating small business development and entrepreneurship support,access to capital, joint ventures, training and mentorship programs (Cape Gateway, 2005a).Therefore, (as a government department) the Department of Economic Development andTourism is viewed as an essential element in the Triple Helix model.

4.3. The role of industry in entrepreneurship development

In South Africa, business development is initiated by industry associations such as the SouthAfrican Chamber of Business, the Black Business Council, the Chamber of Mines, theNational African Federated Chamber of Commerce, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (i.e.,a business chamber), the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services, and theSouth African Foundation. These employer organizations, as well as foreign chambers ofcommerce in South Africa, regularly liaise with government and also comment on draftlegislation.

In the Province of the Western Cape, the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce and Indus-try (CTCCI), the Western Cape Business Opportunities Forum (WECBOF), Western CapeMinibus Taxi Association, Business Opportunities Network (BON) and Clothing and Tex-tile Association (CLOTEX) are the main role players with regard to the initiation of businessdevelopment (Brundin et al. 2006). The industry is also represented by an individual com-pany in this study.

4.4. Evidence of cooperation between university, industry and government: surveyand case illustrations

Initially a survey was carried out in order to form an opinion about the degree of cooperationbetween university, industry and government. Fifteen respondents, equally representinguniversity, industry and government, filled in a questionnaire and were interviewed over thephone. Each interview lasted half an hour. The purpose was to determine if the Triple Helixconcept is too far out of reach for the representatives of the three parties mentioned in themodel. The respondents were from the executive management of the Provincial Government,University (Deans of Faculties) and Industry.

Three closed-ended questions were used to determine first, if there was any interactionbetween the respondent and the other actors; second, whether or not planned cooperationoccurred; and third, whether or not the cooperation was successful. During follow-up inter-views it was also established that the cooperation was primarily of a planned nature andoccurred at the executive level, i.e., at Director-General or Ministerial level for govern-ment, at the Executive Director level in Industry, and at faculty and/or rectorate level foruniversities. Table 1 summarizes Questions 1–3.



Table 1. Summary of findings of survey.a

Q1 Q2 Q3

Yes No Yes No Yes No

University 5 0 5 0 5 0Industry 5 0 4 1 5 0Government 5 0 5 0 5 0Total 15 0 14 1 15 0Percentage 100 0 93 7 100 0

Q1. Have you inter-acted with government/industry/academia at all during the lastfive years? If yes, continue; if no, stop and thank you.

Q2. Did you experience any cooperation between government/industry/academiain a planned way during the last five years?

Q3. Was the cooperation successful?

From these findings, it can be deduced that in the Western Cape there is interaction andpositive cooperation between the universities, government and industry. Some respondentshave expressed sentiments of strength in policy development and weakness in applicationof policy by government. In order to determine if this is an espoused rhetoric that is alsovalid in practice we needed to turn to some practical examples.

As a next step, three examples of cooperation between university-industry-governmentwere selected to demonstrate problems, weaknesses and successes in tripartite agreementswithin the Province of the Western Cape. These cases were selected because they highlightand identify the typical problems and challenges experienced on a regular basis and why itmay be a complex task for the Triple Helix model to work effectively. The cases describethe application of the Triple Helix concept. The cases presented are:

(i) A training program for minibus taxi-owners. This case was followed from September2004 to April 2006. During this time, representatives of the Provincial Departmentof Transport, The Minibus Taxi Association and the University of the Western Capeattended 14 meetings.

(ii) The evaluation of a service provider, namely RED Door (Real Enterprise Develop-ment). The intention from the researchers’ side was to evaluate this initiative through alongitudinal, quantitative study. Management of the University of the Western Cape andthe RED Door attended eight meetings before the research component of the projectwas given up one year later.

(iii) A mini-tunnel farming project in the rural town of Bot River. This case was fol-lowed from January to October 2005 with a half-day on-site visit and one follow-up interview six months after the start and one follow-up interview three monthslater.

aWe express our thanks and appreciation to Goosain Solomon for collecting the data in Table 1.



4.4.1. Case 1: Implementation of a training program for the owners of minibus taxisin the province of the Western Cape.

As a result of the former policies, rules and regulations of separate development (apartheid),the majority of the population was located as distant as 40–100 kilometres from centralbusiness districts. Due to an inadequate system of buses and trains, the only means oftransport was minibus taxis. These taxis have always been considered to be part of theinformal sector and very few of the owners have valid permits to transport commuters.In an environment of informality and lack of proper controls as well as an absence ofappropriate safety procedures, the large number of taxis not only creates congestion, buthas also increasingly been the major cause of accidents. Since 2004, the government hasattempted to change from the old and unsafe 10-seater vehicles currently being used tomodern 25-seater taxis. Most of the owners have poor educational backgrounds and it isimportant for these owners to receive proper business and entrepreneurship education andtraining.

The minibus taxi industry is very lucrative, controlled by a few taxi associations (i.e.,under oligopolistic conditions). This industry is riddled with crime, delivers poor serviceand often adopts a no-care attitude regarding passenger safety. In 2004, the Department ofTransport commissioned a skills audit based on a general belief that the industry shouldplay a major role in the tourism industry, while understanding that for that to becomepossible the industry would need to improve its service delivery. The audit was stronglysupported by the Minibus Taxi Association. Improved service would reduce the strain placedon passengers who often arrive late to work (or not at all), simply because these taxisexperienced mechanical failure or were involved in accidents.

Faculty members of the Department of Management at the University of the WesternCape completed the skills audit in 2004. Not surprisingly, the skills audit highlighted andidentified a need for training the owners and management committee members of the taxiindustry. The aim of such training would be to improve the managerial capacity of the taxiowners and committee/board members by means of a training program specifically designedto cater to the problems and challenges experienced by its members.

By the end of 2004, the university was requested to submit a detailed proposal foroffering 52 three-day programs to the members of this industry at a cost of R1,000,000(approximately 125,000; = R8.00). The minibus taxi council was highly supportive ofthis endeavour. The standard procedure for accepting proposals is guided by cost, e.g., ifthe total project cost is less than R100,000 ( 12,500), no tender needs to be issued; if thetotal project cost exceeds 12,500, a formal tender needs to be issued. Since the total projectcost was 125,000, formal tender should have been offered. However, based on the level ofsatisfaction by the manager of the Provincial Department of Transport with the quality of theresearch produced (i.e., the social audit) the training project was awarded to the Universityof the Western Cape.

The proposal for the training program method and content was developed and presentedto and verbally accepted by the Department of Transport, while the members of the universitydepartment were tasked with the development of the course material. The training was



earmarked to commence early in 2005, at which stage the training responsibility in theDepartment of Transport was transferred to another manager.

However, no single module has been offered to date. A time consuming process consist-ing of numerous meetings to revive the training project has begun. All the hours invested indeveloping course material and attending numerous meetings were fruitless.

4.4.1.1. An empirical analysis

The two institutions involved, the University of the Western Cape and the Department ofTransport, usually get along well. The respective rules of the game are well known to eachother and they both rely on a well-established legitimacy. Furthermore, the two institutionsare both devoted to creating an enabling environment where micro and small businesses canreach sustainability and achieve growth. The conditions for a successful cooperation andoutcome were in place.

However, a number of impediments can be identified. The rules of the game werechanged over time. First, the formal tender was set aside. Second, a legally binding contractwas not set up. Third, the person responsible at the Department of Transport was exchangedand acted according to other rules, following the formal and bureaucratic process. Thisperson was seemingly more guided by institutional pressure.

In their endeavour to gain legitimacy, the representatives for the minibus taxi industrywere eager to fulfil this project. They wanted to get away from low institutional pressurewhere not even the basic rules of safety and permits were followed and to operate on anextended market. As it seems, the taxi industry had the desire to conform to both institutionaland technical pressures while being open to entrepreneurial development.

In this case, we cannot present a win-win-situation, which would be the ultimate effect ofthe tripartite cooperation. The university did not benefit and neither did the taxi-owners, orthe government, as the government department has now put the project out on tender for thefourth time. It is believed that this project was finally awarded to a Gauteng-based consultingcompany. The case illustrates how governmental bodies were unable to recognize technicalpressure. They continued to follow institutional pressure meeting the demands from thegovernment.

4.4.2. Case 2: Evaluation of real enterprise development project: RED Door

In the period preceding the South African democracy of 1994, the majority of its populationhad been restricted to owning micro-enterprises. However, in the post-1994 era, a concerteddrive by government has made more business opportunities available to (formerly) dis-enfranchised communities. Although support services were available, the providers werelocated in central business districts and not in communities where the need for such serviceswas highest.

For this specific purpose, a service marketed as Real Enterprise Development (RED)(Cape Gateway, 2005b) has been developed as a “one-stop” service in locations in closeproximity to most needy communities with an announcement by the Department of Eco-nomic Development and Tourism in 2004 to open 35 RED Doors across the Province of the



Western Cape to complement approximately 1,000 existing small business service providers.By August 2006, seven RED Door units have been made operational to ensure that theirservices are not only relevant to the people, but also to the type of businesses that thesepeople intend to start.

Adopted by the Department of Economic Development and Tourism, this concept hasproved to be highly successful in Brazil, Northern Ireland and Israel. In addition, it isalso based on “Open for Business,” a Canadian concept that has been operational in CapeTown and Gauteng for some time. The capital investment to commence this organizationis approximately 30,000 with an annual operating budget of 120,000 (Department ofEconomic Development and Tourism, 2005).

In light of the considerable investment into this service project, the university suggestedthat, in the interest of all participants (university-industry-government), an evaluation ofa number of these RED Doors be made to ensure that their delivery of services and thetype of services are appropriate for the relevant business communities. The manager of therelevant government department, who was well-acquainted with the university represen-tatives, requested a detailed proposal. The university representatives designed an evalua-tion that was longitudinal in character and made it possible for the university to use it forresearch purposes. This was subsequently approved verbally and in principle by the relevantauthorities.

Since the manager in the provincial government did not have the power to approve thebudget, it was forwarded to a higher authority. After much deliberation, the funds werefinally approved as a gentlemen’s agreement and transferred to a financial service providerwho would monitor the transfer of the funds to the university. The responsible person withwhom the university had all the discussions later resigned and the new manager requiredthe university to revise the initial proposal, which was duly taken care of.

A further resignation in the provincial government resulted in this project being puton a protracted “hold.” The third incoming person was a former student at the university.At a seminar, she had heard the seminar leader from the University of the Western Capemention that many initiatives from governmental bodies were not successful. The incumbentdeclared that she was not satisfied with the university as service provider and also held theopinion that since the RED Door initiative was only in its infancy stage, it was inappropriateto start with an evaluation process. Despite the fact that the tendering process was completed(i.e., tender issued, proposals received and evaluated), the project was never awarded to thesuccessful bidder and the money never reached its final destination.

Eighteen months after the suggested start of the evaluation, nothing had materializedand the RED Door initiative lost essential insights from an evaluation process. All threeparties of university-industry-government have thereby lost an invaluable opportunity forjoint learning and entrepreneurship development.


Initially the three parties of industry, here represented by the individual entrepreneur,academia and government had good intentions of cooperating. However, many impedi-ments undermined those intentions. Personal contacts seem to be one possible explanation



for the delays when people in charge changed positions. The fact that established contactswere exchanged was disadvantageous for the project. The first replacement seemed to beintent on ensuring that things would be run “by the book” when it was demanded that the uni-versity revise its proposal. He thereby stressed the organization’s institutional controls. Thesecond replacement acted as if she was afraid of losing legitimacy on behalf of the provincialgovernmental body when she decided that the university was no longer wanted as a servicedeliverer. There is also a lack of knowledge about the relevance of an evaluation from thegovernmental side. The tacit knowledge that was possessed on the university side was notshared or explained in a convincing way to the representative of the Provincial Departmentof Economic Development and Tourism. The governmental department never understoodhow it could benefit from such an evaluation. The two parties did not discuss and clarifytheir opinions and possible contributions enough. That the initiative was one-sided may alsohave contributed to the aversion to the suggested evaluation on the governmental side.

4.4.3. Case 3: Employment creation at the Bot River mini-tunnel farming

Bot River (locally known as Botrivier) is situated on the scenic route to Hermanus via theHouw Hoek Mountains. Originally, the first inhabitants (the Khoi-Khoi tribes) called thearea “Couga” and translated, it means “rich in fat” or “lots of butter.” The early Europeanssettlers bartered for barrels of butter and they initially referred to the river as “Botter Rivier”(Butter River), which was later changed to Bot River.

Bot River is one of many typical rural towns where the majority of people are unemployedand job creation opportunities are non-existent. The only business activities operational inBot River are a few retail outlets and only a limited number of new houses are being built.Job opportunities are scarce and most of the people work on fruit and wine farms and innearby towns, such as Hermanus, Hawston and Caledon. Due to high unemployment andlimited business opportunities in such a small rural town, it was a natural idea to start afarming business. As a first step, a mini-tunnel farming project was considered a probablesolution with an ultimate aim to produce value-added products, such as canned vegetables.The tunnels are 1 meter high and made of plastic material for rapid cultivation.

Land and financial support were provided by the local municipality, with research andfundraising support forthcoming from the Foundation for Contemporary Research (FCR);the initiator of the project. A researcher from the University of the Western Cape acted as aresearch consultant to the FCR. The business operations, here represented by Eco-tunnels,provided assistance with the tunnel development and installation. The produce is limited toonions and spinach and sold to businesses and the community. Due to the limited numberof tunnels, it is not possible to produce in large enough quantities to supply large businesseson a daily basis.

The project is built on informal contracts. Each party contributes in accordance withtheir assigned role. For example, FCR has research capabilities and, with its networkingskills, is able and capable of obtaining sponsorships; Eco-tunnels provide assistance withthe tunnel construction and business management; the government has financial resourcesand is prepared to invest in this project. Employees are making decisions regarding plantingand all related activities.



The project employs six women and each is paid 75 per month. This joint projectbetween government-academia-business commenced in 2003 with the first 90 tunnelsbecoming operational by 2004. In 2006, 180 tunnels are operational. The future plansinclude purchase of additional produce (such as potatoes and pumpkin) that can be pack-aged with their produce. Other value additions are in the pipeline, and through this process,additional funds could be generated to increase the number of jobs or to increase the wagesof existing staff members.


In the third case, we can identify a few facilities. It appears that each role player recognizesits role and responsibilities. Tangible contributions are made from each party combiningdifferent set of skills or resources. No key persons were exchanged during the initial phasebefore the project commenced. The project has led to an expansion with a possible increasein job creation.

5. Discussion

This study set out to adapt the existing Triple Helix model to the South African context andto identify facilities and impediments for working according to Triple Helix in South Africa.By referring to three typical examples of current endeavors to work according to the model,we have pinpointed triggers and barriers for the model to work in practice. Based on ourfindings, we will attempt to discuss them on a more general level in a set of observations.

Observation 1: Cooperation. Elements of cooperation, as found in the Triple Helix model,have been observed in the South African context. However, in two of the three cases theforms of interaction are between two participants, rather than as the theoretical model wouldsuggest, between all three helices, namely, university, industry and government. This is thesame observation that was made by Laznjak and Svarc (2005) in Croatia. It is also clear thatthe traditional functions performed by these institutions mentioned in the Triple Helix modelare not that “clear cut.” The first two cases illustrate how the Triple Helix intention col-lides with institutional thinking. It is evident that institutional barriers are often the biggeststumbling-block in long-term cooperation and actions. This is in line with institutionaltheory, which can be used for explaining that institutional barriers can obstruct coopera-tion and co-action between academia, government and industry, and thereby innovation.There is thus a certain amount of overlap taking place, which contributes to entrepreneur-ship development which is in agreement with the theory which stresses that overlappinginstitutional spheres of university, industry and government increases cooperation and co-action and thereby innovation. However, if all the institutions were to work together (i.e.cooperate) as a “well-oiled” machine, the outcomes could be significantly better. The con-tribution to entrepreneurship development, i.e., job creation through new venture creationsand ultimately to poverty alleviation could be much greater. Arguably, results of cooperationbetween all three elements of the helix would, on a pro-active and organized basis, contributesignificantly toward an environment of fostering growth and economic development.

Observation 2: Planning and structure. In our empirical analyses, we have concluded thatthere appears to be a missing link in cooperation between the participants of the Triple



Helix model in a South African context, namely lack of planning and structure. The coop-eration is not based on planned and coordinated efforts of cooperation, but more on ad hocinterventions and interactions. The cases also illustrate the lack of structure for handlingcooperation projects. None of the three cases relied on a formed and sealed contract, butmerely on informal, verbal agreements. In the two first cases (Minibus Taxis and REDDoor), representatives from each respective helix knew each other and the informal agree-ments were embedded in a social context of established relationships. In all probability,there would not have been a problem if the people involved in the project had not beenexchanged over time. The replacements had no insight into the prior process and more orless had to rely on formal agreements, which did not exist. However, with written contractsin place, the initiatives would probably have continued as planned.

In conclusion, where the model suggests planned cooperation (Leydesdorff and Meyer,2003), we find incidental cooperation. These incidental approaches are short term and oftendevelop as a result of ideas generated out of urgency, or opportunity scanning by oneparticipant, followed by the “selling” of the idea to another participant, who then “buys into”the process. Although the latter is an explanation for the commencement of many successfulcooperations, it is our view that organizational cooperation of a planned nature far exceedsthe benefits derived from incidental cooperation. Viewed differently, many initiatives arelikely to be more successful when cooperation is planned from the outset. Not only doesthis form of cooperation produce significant elements of synergy, it also implies interactionof a pro-active nature (i.e. planned cooperation), rather than incidental cooperation whichtends to be haphazard and of a reactive nature.

Observation 3: Institutional theory and change. In terms of assessing the three major group-ings of the Triple Helix model in a South African context, it would appear that since insti-tutional change has taken place to some degree in accordance with Broad-Based BlackEconomic Empowerment (BBBEE), it would be easier to form tripartite cooperations. Thesedimentation aspect (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) is, in this context, more or less outof play. Staff members of governmental institutions have been exchanged and the represen-tatives of the three helices respectively are in a situation where they can mould new andinnovative ways to collaborate. However, this does not seem to have been the case. It may bethat the lack of such cooperation can be attributed to institutional change on a national levelrather than on the inability of staff to change. In the new government’s endeavour to form anew nation based on BBBEE, governmental personnel have been exchanged step-by-step.The incoming people have not been able to stay long enough to build up structure and feed-back systems or form continuity before they have been asked to take on new positions in thesystem. Individuals might be open to change, but when they change positions within suchshort periods of time, there is no time to conform to mimetic behaviour (Tolbert and Zucker,1996). Thus, the balancing between change and continuity has been too rapid. As it is now,there is no loop back with requested feedback to any of the helices of tri-partite projects.Had there been the pressure to obtain set goals, this pressure could work as an incentive.

Observation 4: A focus on the entrepreneur. The cases illustrate that there is a need for ashared understanding and a shared language when actors from different parties cooperate.



This understanding has to be shared between the people within respective helices as well.Otherwise it is problematic to transfer knowledge between the involved individuals. Themajor challenge is for the three parties to agree on a shared vision and an idea that they allfind beneficial since they seem to have different objectives for their work. Although involvedin activities such as entrepreneurship education and assessments, like in the above cases,universities are often more interested in the research component, which might not alwaysbenefit the entrepreneur. Second, government is responsible for policies, but fails dismally atensuring that these are successfully implemented or fails to provide the financial resourcesrequired for the implementation of these policies. Third, industry organizations ensure thatthe interests of its members, who are “big business,” are met and are not bothered by thesuccess or failure of micro enterprises.

Within the Triple Helix concept, the three institutions of university, industry and gov-ernmental bodies are supposed to cooperate and jointly foster innovation and growth. Thisimplies a re-conceptualization regarding core beliefs and purposes of these institutions.Taking support from institutional theory, we claim that theoretically-suggested change inbehaviour, thinking and acting might have small practical consequences. Their respectivepresent mindsets are so deeply rooted that inertia may hinder, rather than foster, change.

In other words, the rules of attaining legitimacy differ between the three parties in such away that they work as impediments for focusing on the main purpose for their collaboration,the focus on the entrepreneur and entrepreneurial development. The above observationssupport the claim that the entrepreneur suffers from the three helices’ resistance to radicalchange (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) since all three seem to be victims of coercive,mimetic and normative pressures, as postulated by Oliver (1997). Institutional barriers,such as diverse vision and objectives, organizational structures and the attitudes of peoplemay add complex modalities to cooperation and the achievement of a common focus onthe entrepreneur. Therefore, the focus on the vision to create entrepreneurial developmentneeds much greater emphasis. A determining factor, and therefore an important addendum,is the incorporation of the entrepreneur in the Triple-Helix model. It is our opinion that,for this process to be successful, the entrepreneur should be the driving target and force.In none of our cases was the entrepreneur the initiator of the process, though he/she wasthe targeting person. As stressed in the beginning of this paper, when people from differentinstitutional backgrounds meet, new constellations of networking emerge and thereby newopportunities arise. This is illustrated in Case 3, which is an example of a new institutionalarrangement when the research side, in collaboration with an entrepreneur, formed a newventure.

We are aware that it is probably not feasible in the South African context for the individualentrepreneur to exert power. However, missing out on placing him/her at the top of thepyramid would lead to a fatal interpretation of a future Triple Helix model. We are alsoaware that Etzkowitz and Zhou (2006) doubt an amendment of any new helix, since thedynamic aspect might get lost. Rather, they suggest twin helices to operate in parallel whereone of the helices is exchanged. For the empirically-based study here, we definitely arguethat all three helices remain intact. The adding of the entrepreneur is a way to put the issueat hand, i.e., entrepreneurial development, in the limelight.



E

I

A

G

Cooperation

for growth and

sustainability

Legend

E = Entrepreneur

I = Industry

A = Academia

G = Government

Fig. 3. A proposed model for cooperation between the stakeholders in a South African context.

It is for the above mentioned reasons that an amendment to the Triple Helix model, asshown in Figure 3 is presented. The model is shown as a pyramid-shaped model with thefour relationships shown as the corners of the pyramid, with the entrepreneur (E) at the topand the government (G) at the bottom.

In terms of the relationships between the helices, the government should only be involvedin policy development, identifying partners to cooperate with and to provide the requiredresources as to successfully implement the process. For these reasons, the governmentalbody is placed at the bottom of the pyramid. Furthermore, a model with four helices willneed to include the structure and feedback loops that we have argued for.

6. Triple Helix in the South African Context

We can conclude that the Triple Helix concept is applied in a South African context. In viewof the critical assessment of Triple Helix role players in a South African context, there is littledoubt that the Triple Helix concept (at least from an institutional perspective) could work.However, institutional barriers, such as vision and objectives, organizational structures andthe attitudes of people may add complex modalities to cooperation and the achievement ofcommon goals.

The Triple Helix, from a theoretical perspective, possesses and presents the elementsrequired for introducing innovative practices and procedures for SME growth, i.e., what wehere have referred to as entrepreneurship development. However, a factor negating robustmovement in this direction and that has become a feature of South Africa’s policy environ-ment is reflected in the perception that South Africa is strong on policy (development), yet



weak on implementation. As illustrated in the cases above, it may be that the governmentalbody in the two first cases competed for political power at the expense of entrepreneur-ship development, being a victim of so called institutional isomorphism (cf. DiMaggio andPowell, 1983).

6.1. Implications

In our capacity as researchers and our involvement in entrepreneurship development inthe Western Cape area, we conclude with the following more or less normative advice “towhom it may concern” and suggest the following considerations that lend support for ourillustrated cases. In particular these are:

(i) University: From the standpoint of the university, it would be important to act onlyon written agreements when dealing with government institutions. Furthermore, writ-ten contracts should be entered into before proceeding with any projects. The lattercondition will protect the university against committing scarce resources for which itwould not be remunerated at a later stage.

(ii) Government: From the perspective of the government, it would be beneficial to ensurethat civil servants are properly trained in procedures for dealing with individuals andorganizations outside governmental structures. This will ensure that communicationbetween the managers and departments are improved, that communication filtersthrough to all levels so that projects are successfully implemented and completed, andthat structures including feedback systems are set up. Furthermore, government couldinitiate programs in which the three parties are expected to cooperate. Cooperationbetween the three helices can increase the legitimacy of the government and help itto increase the quality in delivery of support (Etzkowitz and Zhou, 2006).

(iii) Industry: Communication between industry, government and universities can beviewed imperative to improve service delivery to the business community. It wouldalso help if industry applies its influence more effectively to bring about the requiredchanges, which will ensure growth and development, thereby contributing to jobcreation and poverty alleviation.

(iv) “The creation of a climate and certain attitudes that enable coordination between theagents directed to achieving innovation” (Cook et al., 1997), need to be applied inthe context of the examples cited above.

(v) Start with understanding — in the South African context, it appears as if the conceptof reliable insight (i.e., the way in which each of the participants are supposed to haveinsight and understanding for the other) did not manifest itself in a manner that wasconducive for the development of such a dynamic relationship.

(vi) Exert strong leadership and presence — this key ingredient was absent in the SouthAfrican experience, in the sense that participating groups were almost too afraid toassume a dynamic and influential leadership role for fear of being perceived as beingtoo aggressive.

(vii) Design and customize cross-sector engagement — in review, this is the purpose ofa Triple Helix interaction; however, “turfism” (i.e., entering onto the domain that



others perceive as their own) and excessive levels of political correctness may havebeen instrumental in the lack of cross-sector engagement.

(viii) Launch experiments, learn from them and collectively monitor progress — the veryessence of the Triple Helix model is contained in this fourth domain.

If one of the three parties is not functioning at a level regarded as the minimum level ofefficiency by the others, there is a high probability that the project could fail. With particularreference to South Africa, the government often does not have suitably skilled employeesto partner in the Triple Helix application. While academics are keen to become involved inand add value to community projects, it is not reasonable to expect that universities takepart in the cooperation without the pay-back, i.e., the possibility to get research value back.Furthermore, on a more pragmatic level, it is not reasonable to expect that well-educateduniversity academics spend hours in fruitless meetings. Business people (i.e., industry) areanxious to get the projects started and are not interested in too many rules and regulationsto comply with which often precedes the launch of a project.

6.2. Prospects for further research

It is evident that the nature of cooperation between the actors in the Triple Helix modelin the South African context towards entrepreneurship and small business developmentneeds to be explored in greater detail. There exists a need for further research to betterunderstand the relationships of partners while engaged in cooperative activities, the natureand purpose of their cooperation, and the policies under which these forms of cooperationoccur. The potential research will allow opportunity to be leveraged to have a more conduciveenvironment for entrepreneurship and small business development within the conceptualframework of the Triple Helix model. For a start, our findings can form a point of departureto test a set of hypotheses on a larger scale.

South Africa is characterized by a dual economic system and therefore, other dimen-sions can be added to the Triple Helix model, namely donors and non-governmental orga-nizations. Donors currently play a significant role in providing different resources to thenon-governmental sector in particular. Future research can decide to what degree these twoactors add value to the Triple Helix cooperation.

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