Transition from the OAU to the African Union

Background

The highlight of the 2000 OAU/AEC Assembly of Heads of

State and Government in Lomé, Togo was the adoption of

the Constitutive Act of the African Union, in terms of

the Sirte Declaration of 9 September 1999.

Following this event, a decision declaring the

establishment of the African Union, based on the

unanimous will of Member States was adopted by the 5th

Extraordinary OAU/AEC Summit held in Sirte, Libya from

1 to 2 March 2001. In the decision, Heads of State and

Government specified that the legal requirements for

the Union would have been completed upon the deposit of

the 36th instrument of ratification of the Constitutive

Act of the African Union.

South Africa deposited its instrument of ratification

of the Constitutive Act of the African Union on 23

April 2001 with the OAU General Secretariat and became

the 35th Member State to do so. South Africa's

ratification as one of these 36 member states means

that it is a founding member of the African Union. On

26 April 2001 Nigeria became the 36th Member State to

deposit its instrument of ratification. This concluded

the two-thirds requirement and the Act entered into

force on the 26th of May 2001.

Historical overview

The OAU was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa,

on signature of the OAU Charter by representatives of

32 governments. A further 21 states have joined

gradually over the years, with South Africa becoming

the 53rd member in 1994. It had become evident and

accepted as early as 1979, when the Committee on the

Review of the Charter was established that a need

existed to amend the OAU Charter in order to streamline

the Organisation to gear it more accurately for the

challenges of a changing world. Despite numerous

meetings the Charter Review Committee did not manage to

formulate substantive amendments. The result of this

was three fold:

• The Charter was "amended" by being augmented through

ad hoc decisions of

Summit such as the Cairo Declaration Establishing the

Mechanism for Conflict

Prevention, Management and Resolution, etc;

• A growing realisation that the need for greater

efficiency and effectivity of the

Organisation required urgent action; and

• The need to integrate the political activities of the

OAU with the economic and

developmental issues as articulated in the Abuja

Treaty.

Since the entry into force of the Abuja Treaty

establishing the African Economic Community, the OAU

has been operating on the basis of two legal

instruments. The Abuja Treaty came into force after the

requisite numbers of ratification in May 1994. It

provided for the African Economic Community to be set

up through a gradual process, which would be achieved

by coordination, harmonisation and progressive

integration of the activities of existing and future

regional economic Since the entry into force of the

Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic

Community, the OAU has been operating on the basis of

two legal instruments

Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, 9 Sept 1999

It was by acclamation that the Assembly of Heads of

State and Government in July 1999 in Algiers accepted

an invitation from Colonel Muhammar Ghadafi to the 4th

Extraordinary Summit in September in Sirte. The purpose

of the Extraordinary Summit was to amend the OAU

Charter to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of

the OAU. The theme of the Sirte Summit was

'Strengthening OAU capacity to enable it to meet the

challenges of the new millennium'. This Summit

concluded on 9 September 1999 with the Sirte

Declaration aimed at:

• Effectively addressing the new social, political and

economic realities in Africa and the world;

• Fulfilling the peoples' aspirations for greater unity

in conforming with the objectives of the OAU Charter

and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic

Community;

• Revitalising the Continental Organisation to play a

more active role in addressing the needs of the people;

• Eliminating the scourge of conflicts;

• Meeting global challenges; and

• Harnessing the human and natural resources of the

continent to improve living

conditions.

To achieve these aims Summit, inter alia, decided to:

'Establish an African Union in conformity with the

ultimate objectives of the Charter of our Continental

Organisation and the provisions of the Treaty

establishing the African Economic Community.

Accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty

establishing the African Economic Community, in

particular:

• Shorten the implementation periods of the Abuja

Treaty,

• Ensure the speedy establishment of all the

institutions provided for in the Abuja

Treaty; such as the African Central Bank, the African

Monetary Union, the African

Court of Justice and in particular, the Pan-African

Parliament.

• Strengthening and consolidating the RECs as the

pillars for achieving the objectives of the African

Economic Community and realising the envisaged Union.

• Convene an African Ministerial Conference on

Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in the

Continent, as soon as possible'.

Objectives of the AU

In general, the African Union objectives are different

and more comprehensive than those of the OAU. The OAU

has served its mission and was due for replacement by a

structure geared towards addressing the current needs

of the continent.

The aims of the OAU are:

• To promote the unity and solidarity of African

States;

• To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and

efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of

Africa;

• To defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity

and independence;

• To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa;

and

• To promote international cooperation.

Comparatively, the objectives of the African Union, as

contained in the Constitutive Act, are to:

• Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the

African countries and the peoples of Africa;

• Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and

independence of its Member States;

• Accelerate the political and socio-economic

integration of the continent;

• Promote and defend African common positions on issues

of interest to the continent and its peoples;

Encourage international cooperation, taking due account

of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights;

• Promote peace, security, and stability on the

continent;

• Promote democratic principles and institutions,

popular participation and good

governance;

• Promote and protect human peoples' rights in

accordance with the African Charter on Human and

Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights

instruments;

• Establish the necessary conditions which enable the

continent to play its rightful role in the global

economy and in international negotiations;

• Promote sustainable development at the economic,

social and cultural levels as well as the integration

of African economies;

• Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity

to raise the living standards of

African peoples;

• Coordinate and harmonise the policies between the

existing and future Regional

Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the

objectives of the Union;

• Advance the development of the continent by promoting

research in all fields, in

particular in science and technology; and

• Work with relevant international partners in the

eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion

of good health on the continent.

OAU/AEC Summit, Lusaka 2001

The main objective of the Lusaka Summit was to look at

the implementation of the African Union.

The Secretary General was mandated to work out the

modalities and guidelines for the launching of the

organs of the Union, including the preparation of the

Draft Rules of Procedure of such organs and to also

ensure the effective exercising of authority and

discharging of their responsibilities. The priority

organs are the Assembly, the Executive Council, the

Commission and the Permanent Representative Committee.

Rules of Procedure for all these organs will have to be

developed prior to the First Summit of the African

Union in July 2002 (the Pan-African Parliament will

develop its own Rules of Procedures).

Decisions of the Lusaka Summit re implementation

• The Secretary-General was mandated to, in

consultation with Member States, work with Member

States through their Permanent Representatives and

Experts. A

Representative Committee of Ministers will be

established for this purpose, which will oversee the

process and present its proposals and recommendations

to the Council.

• The Secretary-General was mandated to, in

consultation with Member States, submit proposals

regarding the Structure, Functions and Powers of the

Commission.

• It is the responsibility of each Member State to

popularise the African Union and

should in doing so, also involve citizens.

• NGOs, Professional Associations and Civil Society

Organisations should be involved in the formulation and

implementation of the Economic, Social and Cultural

Council (ECOSOCC) Programmes. Proposals and

recommendations on Structure, Function, Area of

Competence and relationships should be submitted to the

next Council of Ministers meeting. Recommendations

should also include the Procedure and Criteria in

selecting members of ECOSOCC as well as the Rules of

Procedure.

• The ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) as provided

for in the Abuja Treaty ceases to exist at the end of

the transition period.

• The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and

Resolution (Central Organ) must be incorporated into

the Union as an organ and the Secretary-General should

undertake a review of its structure, procedure and

working methods, including a possible change of name.

o The Secretary General should consult the Regional

Economic Communities

(RECs), and RECs should be involved in the formulation

and implementation

of all Programmes of the Union. The Protocol

establishing the relations

between the AEC and REC should be amended or a new

Protocol be prepared. Summit also called upon the

policy organs of the RECs to initiate a reflection of

their relationships with the Union.

o The Secretary-General should undertake a review of

existing OAU Specialised Agencies and make

recommendations on possible incorporation as

Specialised Agencies of the African Union.

o The Secretary General should prepare and submit a

report on all aspects of the functioning of the

Specialised Technical Committees.

o 25 May will remain a commemoration day and an

official public holiday of the African Union, while 2

March will be recognised as a Union Day (see paragraph

4.11 above).

o The transitional period will be one year following

the adoption of this Decision

(Decision AHG/Dec. 1 (XXXVIII)), that is from 11 July

2001 to 10 July 2002.

o The Secretary General should continue using the OAU

symbols, i.e. Logo, Flag and Anthem until such time

that new symbols are decided upon. The processes to

decide on the new symbols should involve citizens and

competitions.

o The Secretary General should take the necessary

measures for the devolution of Assets and Liabilities

of the OAU to the Union. The Secretary General should

review and seek where necessary, amendment of the OAU

Agreements with the Parties, including Headquarters and

Host Agreements.

Design of the African Union

Of crucial importance in the establishment of the

organs of the Union is the challenge to move away from

the overly state-centric character of the OAU and its

concomitant lack of civil participation. The

cooperation of African NGOs, civil societies, labour

unions, business organisations are essential in the

process of cooperation and implementation of the Abuja

Treaty, as was expressed in the Ouagadougou Declaration

and provided for in the Sirte Declaration.

During the Lusaka Summit several references were made

to the African Union being loosely based on the

European Union model, in which respect it was said that

Africa 'should not reinvent the wheel'. However, it was

agreed that the African Union should be something new,

with the emphasis on being an African experience.

Whereas the OAU was in principle a political

organisation that also discussed matters of economic

and social concern, the African Union should be an

organisation aimed at economic integration and social

development, which should lead to political unity.

Organs of the African Union

Assembly

The Constitutive Act is very specific about the

functions and powers of the Assembly as the supreme

organ of the AU comprising of Heads of State and

Government. South Africa has participated in the

development of the Rules of Procedure for the Assembly,

and the same process has taken place at SADC level.

Executive Council

The Executive Council is a meeting of Ministers of

Foreign Affairs or other Ministers charged with the

responsibility of dealing with the AU. The issues

discussed by the Executive Council will have to feed

into the Assembly.

Permanent Representatives Committee

The Permanent Representative Committee is composed of

Permanent Representatives and other Plenipotentiaries

to the Union. This structure was not formally

recognised under the OAU, even though the Ambassadors

do meet on an ongoing basis. The PRC, amongst other

things, will work closely with the Commission; be

involved in the process of nomination and appointment

of Commissioners; look into the selection and

appointment of consultants and follow-up on the

implementation of Summit decisions. The work of the PRC

will feed into the Executive Council.

Commission

The Commission will be based at the Headquarters of the

AU and will be headed by the Chairperson of the AU. The

Chairperson will be assisted by a Deputy Chairperson

and Commissioners, as well as other members of staff.

Specialised Technical Committees

There will also be Specialised Technical Committees

(STCs) established within the

Secretariat and headed by Commissioners. The STCs will

deal with issues such as Rural Economy and Agricultural

Matters, Monetary and Financial Affairs, Trade, Customs

and Immigration Matters, Science, Technology,

Transport, Communications, Education, Culture, amongst

other things.

Pan-African Parliament (PAP)

The Protocol establishing the Pan African Parliament

was adopted in 2000 during the OAU Summit in Lomè,

Togo. The Protocol is now open for signature and

ratification. So far 21 member states have signed and

three have ratified. Article 22 of the PAP protocol

provides for the Protocol to enter into force after

deposit of the instruments of ratification by a simple

majority of the member states.

Though the Constitutive Act of the African Union does

not elaborate on the functions and powers of the Pan

African Parliament, the Protocol provides that, for the

first five years of the Parliament's existence, it will

have advisory and consultative powers only.

Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)

The Lusaka OAU Summit requested the Secretary General

to submit to the 76th Ordinary

Session of Council, i.e. July 2002, a report on ECOSOCC

with recommendations on structure, areas of competence,

criteria for selecting members of ECOSOCC, relationship

between ECOSOCC and African regional NGOs and

professional groups, ECOSOCC's Rules of Procedure and

its work programme. This is one organ of the AU that

will provide for civil society participation. The

Lusaka Summit decision on ECOSOCC directs that member

states will have to decide on the structure,

functioning, areas of competence selection criteria,

Rules of Procedure and work programme of the ECOSOCC.

Court of Justice

The Constitutive Act of the AU provides for the

establishment of the Court of Justice and for a

Protocol on its statute, composition and functions. It

is still unclear what the exact functions and powers of

the Court will be, and whether it will have

jurisdiction over states or nationals.

The functions and powers of the Court will be

elaborated upon in a Protocol, which will clarify what

the impact on domestic legislation will be.

Financial Institutions

Article 19 of the Act provides for the establishment of

financial institutions whose rules and regulations

shall be defined in protocols relating thereto. The

implications of hosting these organs will only become

apparent once the relevant protocols have been

concluded. The institutions are:

• The African Bank

• The African Monetary Fund

• African Investment Bank

The struggle against colonialism

Right from the outset, the main objectives of the

organisation have been to eradicate colonialism and to

combat racial discrimination. So its first resolutions

were about combating apartheid and about the liberation

movements. Among the OAU’s missions are strengthening

unity and solidarity between African states,

coordinating cooperation for development, preserving

the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member

states and promoting international cooperation in the

framework of the United Nations.

Through its coordination committee for the liberation

of Africa, the OAU supported the emancipation of

African territories that were not yet independent. The

aim was achieved in 1990 with Namibia securing its

independence. Africa also witnessed the crowning

achievement of its fight against apartheid with the

liberation of Nelson Mandela and his election as

President of South Africa. Thirty years after the

creation of the OAU, South Africa became its 53rd

member during the Tunis summit in June 1994.

OAU and the quest for political and economic unity

Since it was created, the OAU has given the peaceful

settlement of inter-African conflicts a key place in

its work. A mediation, conciliation and arbitration

commission was set up for this purpose but its

resources are limited and the organisation often uses

Councils of Wise People or ad hoc committees to try to

find solutions to disputes. An African Charter on Human

and People’s Rights was adopted at the 1981 summit in

Nairobi and led to the creation, in 1986, of the

African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.

After the collapse of the communist bloc, the end of

the Cold War and East-West confrontation, Africa had to

redefine its policy against the backdrop of a

proliferation of internal conflicts. At the Cairo

summit in June 1993, it approved the creation of a

mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve African

conflicts. Its main body is made up of the heads of

state of the member countries of the conference’s

bureau in office.

The organisation is also involved in issues related to

development and economic cooperation. The Lagos action

plan, which was adopted at the April 1980 summit, was

designed to  boost economic development and the

integration of African economies by, in particular,

recommending regional groupings and food self-

sufficiency. In June 1991, it was replaced by the

Treaty of Abuja, setting up the African economic

community. This treaty envisages in particular the

creation, within a period of 30 years, of an African

common market, a parliament, a central bank and

monetary fund.

The AU and the acceleration of the integration process

Despite limited capacity for action and low levels of

financial resources, the intense diplomatic work done

by the OAU has enabled it to confer a tangible reality

on a united Africa. The continental organisation has

given its member states a forum to adopt coordinated

positions on common issues in international bodies and

to defend the continent’s interests. Its initiatives

were to pave the way for the birth of the African

Union. In July 1999, during an extraordinary summit in

Sirte, the OAU decided to set up a new organisation to

replace it. The AU, officially launched at the Durban

summit in 2002, was to be the spearhead tasked with

accelerating and deepening the process of economic and

political integration on the continent. Its founding

act envisages bodies and institutions inspired in

particular by the model of the European Union.

The African Union’s vision is to “build an Africa that

is integrated, prosperous and at peace, led by its

citizens and constituting a dynamic force on the world

stage”. It is about moving quicker along the path of

unity. It is also about a change of perspective through

the definition of common policies in priority areas:

defence, peace and continental security, integration of

African economies, the free movement of people, goods

and capital, food security, the fight against poverty,

development, trade, the environment, the fight against

pandemics etc. The peaceful resolution of conflicts is

in particular at the heart of its concerns. In 2004, a

Peace and Security Council was created. This new and

key institution can, further to authorisation from the

conference of heads of state, order military

intervention in serious circumstances (war crimes,

genocide, crimes against humanity). This is the

principle of ‘non-indifference’ which breaks with the

principle of non-interference without exceptions set

down in the OAU’s charter.

In 2007, the strategic partnership between the African

Union and the European Union was launched.

Five decades after the creation of the OAU and 10 years

after the creation of the AU, Africa has established a

dynamic of progress. At the same time, it is aware of

the challenges that it faces and the urgent need to

give new momentum to its mission through pan-Africanism

and an African renaissance. It is about freeing up

potential and mobilising energy, which will enable the

continent to become, through initiatives such as the

2063 Africa Programme, a emerging global power in the

decades to come.

Challenges

It is of critical importance that member States are

active in the design and implementation of the African

Union. In this way it will foster a sense of ownership

and Member States will be able to address those aspects

of the day-to-day functioning of the organisation which

will streamline the implementation of decisions.

Evaluating the OAU: From Addis Ababa 1963 to Sirte 2001

Africa from the OAU to the AU entails evaluating the

OAU and this essentially means looking at the progress

or otherwise Africa has made from the formation of the

OAU in 1963 to the formation of the AU at Sirte

(9/9/1999 and 2/3/2001) and its inauguration in Durban

in 2002. And the inauguration of the AU also means

looking at the future prospect of Africa as the AU

makes its impact felt.

 

From the 1959 Accra All Africa Conference to the 1963

Addis Ababa founding summit of the OAU, there was a

serious ideological struggle throughout the continent

centred on (a) whether full continental political

unity should be established immediately – at the

founding of the OAU, or whether it should be achieved

gradually through a building block approach, by first

strengthening the new states and then establishing sub-

regional economic blocks; and (b) whether development

should be carried through social and economic planning

driven by the state, or whether it should be based and

driven by free and open market with foreign investment

playing a major role. These two approaches to the

future of the continent and to the development model of

the new states, were hotly and passionately debated and

discussed throughout Africa. Indeed two ideologically

opposed blocks of countries the Casablanca and Monrovia

blocks emerged - one stood for development based on

social planning and the other for market driven

development. The two blocks also had different approach

to external relations – delinking and relinking as

opposed to strengthening inherited colonial links.

Hence at the time the atmosphere throughout the

continent was militantly and passionately discussing

these issues. And the militancy and passion over these

issues expressed themselves fully during the debates at

the founding of the OAU.

 

It will be useful to look at the various phases which

the OAU went through.

 

Phase 1: OAU 1963 –1980

The founding OAU Summit adopted the gradual approach of

strengthening the new states, but retaining the

aspirations for continental unity as a driving ideology

of the OAU. This resolved the first issue. And by

resolving the first issue in this way, the OAU had

denied itself any powers over the sovereignty of the

new states and therefore could not impose on its member

states as to what development approach they should

adopt. The Casablanca and Monrovia blocks soon

dissipated, but there were several countries which

adopted the social planning development model. These

countries such as Egypt, Ghana, Tanzania, Guinea faced

great difficulties from the former colonial powers who

were joined by the Americans. The Western powers worked

hard – by various means of persuasion or by covert

support of military takeover - to dissuade these

countries from following the “socialist” model of

development.

 

The Charter of the OAU was therefore essentially “

designed to protect the fragile sovereignty recently

achieved by African states, and to help those still

under colonial or racist rule to achieve sovereign

independence” (Abdul Mohammed). These were the two most

important objectives that drove the OAU, from its

inception in 1963 to 1975. During this period, the

issue of economic development was not on the OAU

agenda. The OAU was mainly concerned with (a) the few

inter-state conflicts that took place at the time, and

(b) with political support to the struggle for

eradicating racist and colonial rule in southern

Africa. While the first concern involved mediation and

therefore some practical action by the OAU, the second

concern was mainly conducted through the OAU Liberation

Committee which provided political, diplomatic and some

financial support. During this period, strengthening

of the sovereignty of the new states was the paramount

objective of the OAU. And this was done by stressing

the sovereignty of these state and non-interference in

activities of member states by the OAU. This principle

and that of equality of all member states has made the

OAU and all continental African institutions to be

“driven by the lowest common denominator’s approach, to

cater for the wishes of the weakest and most

undemocratic states. Sovereignty has been fetishised”.

(Abdul Mohammed). In the famous words of the late

President Nyerere, the OAU became essentially “ a

talking Club of Heads of States”. And presumably based

on this view of the OAU, Nyerere organised the 6th Pan

African Congress in Dar es Salaam in 1976. The theme of

the Congress was the liberation of southern Africa.

This was an attempt to revive the Pan African Movement

as a mass movement and perhaps to strengthen its link

with the various liberation movements of southern

Africa.

 

There are two main reason for the OAU’s lacklustre

behaviour and being label a “talking Club”. Firstly

during the decade of the 1970s the fierce Cold War

going on in the world seriously affected African

countries, many of which were forced to take side in

the ideological war of the Cold War. While in the 1970s

African countries were not organised or associated into

blocks such as Monrovia and Casablanca, they were

nevertheless deeply divided between those, which were

Socialist, Marxist and “Capitalist”. The Socialist

countries such as Tanzania were heavily influenced by

the Social Democratic vision of the Scandinavian

countries, the Marxist and Capitalist countries were

effectively influenced by the Soviets and American led

Western visions of development respectively.

 

The Cold War thus affected both their internal model of

development and their external relations. In the face

of this powerful external force, the OAU became

powerless and inactive.

 

Secondly from 1960 to 1975 Africa, was, on the whole

doing well economically during this period.

 

During the 1960-75 period, Africa’s GDP rate was

4.5%;its export was 2.8% its agricultural growth was

1.6%; and its manufacturing grew at 6%. According to

Adedeji, “In retrospect, the period 1960-75 has,

tragically, turned out to be Africa’s golden

era!”(Adedeji 2002, p.6). 1[1]

 

But this “golden era” did not last long.

 

By the end of the 1970s decade and despite this

reasonable economic performance, there were clear signs

that Africa was facing serious economic crises. “What

is clear to most observers however is that the strong

optimism of 60s concerning economic development, slowly

gave way, first to hesitation, then to pessimism and by

the end of the 70s to a consensus of gloom” (Bujra, A.

1982, p.II).2[2]

 

Late in the 70s (1978) Adedeji had began to make his

gloomy predictions and warnings on Africa’s economic

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prospects – predictions which have proved to be

accurate. “Africa, more than the other Third World

Regions, is thus faced with a development crises of

great portent….. If past trends were to persist………the

African region as a whole will be worse off relatively

to the rest of the world at the end of this century

than it was in 1960”.3[3]

 

And three years later (1981), the World Bank was also

making similar predictions. Africa, the World Bank

states, was facing a “dim economic prospect” in the

1980s – virtually no growth in per capita income, if

you are an optimist, and a negative rate of growth (-

1.0% per year) if you are not.4[4]

 

It was under these circumstances that the OAU began to take

up the economic crises seriously and to develop an agenda on

economic development.

 

 Phase 2: OAU 1980 – 1990

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The 1980 decade has been described as the “lost

decade”. Africa was going through very serious economic

and political crises – negative growth, collapsing

economies, civil wars, collapsing states and state

structures etc. And, as we will see below, the so

called “international community” became very concerned

with the “unending crises”. This led to a belief which

came to be called “Afro-Pessimism”. Implicit in Afro-

Pessimism was the core idea that the African people –

their societies, cultures, mindset and structures – are

incapable of running their states and their economies

and therefore they will remain in a permanent state of

crises – stagnation and negative growth.

 

Afro-Pessimism was born outside Africa and the idea was

propagated both outside and inside Africa, by those who

had a vested interest in Africa remaining weak and

disorganised for a long time.

 

Most Africans however generally had a different view of

their crises – its causes, its continuation and the way

out of the crises. Most Africans acknowledged that

there were “internal” factors that had contributed to

the continuation of the crises to the present.

Nevertheless they place more emphases on the “external”

origin of their crises and particularly their inability

to get out of the crises.

 

The internal factors contributing to the African crises

have been well articulated by Prime Minister Meles

Zinawi of Ethiopia. He says:-

 

“African states have been given names such as

neopatrimonial, prebendial, vampire and various

other exotic names. The underlying fact is that

African states are systems of patronage and are

closely associated with rent-seeking activities.

Their external relationship is designed to generate

funds that oil this network of patronage. Their

trading system is designed to collect revenue to

oil the system. Much of the productive activity is

mired in a system of irrational licenses and

protection that is designed to augment the

possibilities of rent collection. Much of the

private sector in the continent is an active and

central element of this network of patronage and

rent-seeking activity.

 

A large part of the NGO community and civil society

organizations constitutes a parallel network of

patronage and rent-seeking activity that coincides

and diverges from the state network depending on

circumstances. Just as in the case of the state

network the NGO and civil society organizations

network is also oiled by funds and guidelines from

abroad. Leadership positions in such organizations

are used for personal enrichment and for the

establishment of patronage networks.

 

It is this structure that is fundamentally inimical

to the establishment of an effective and strong

state and not the imposition of the Washington

consensus from out- side. It is this structure

which inhibits the establishment of developmental

states in Africa that are able to adopt the

rational elements of the Neo-liberal paradigm to

their specific circumstances and design others to

supplement it.”5[5]

 

On the other hand, most Africans identify external

causes of their crises as follows: -

(a)colonialism had created the basic conditions of the

crises – dependant economies, distorted

structures, artificial boundaries/countries, divided

people, undeveloped human resource and weak

undemocratic state structures.

(b)the international commodity market, financial

system, the dominant role of the Western MNCs, and

the “five monopolies” enjoyed by the West (Amin,

1995, p.47)6[6], were, and still are extremely

formidable barriers which weak African governments –

individually or collectively – were and are unable

to overcome.

(c) given these conditions, in which the international

system continuously reinforced African countries

economic dependence, to maintain their distorted

structures, and to encourage the chaotic political

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systems inherited from the colonial states - given

this situation – African countries found it very

difficult to economically develop, create nation

states, and develop their human and natural

resources.

(d)the direct intervention by the Bretton Woods

institutions and the Donor countries in African

economies through SAPs, ostensibly to help Africans

overcome their crises, simply perpetuated the

unequal and exploitative relationship between Africa

and the global system.

 

According to the ECA, African Governments had three

options for facing “the anticipated crises”. Firstly to

increase “self reliance and self-sustainment” and more

effective measures for intra-African cooperation and

mutual help. These (measures) “would require vision and

statesmanship quite out of the ordinary”. “Another

option would take the form of a surreptitious surrender

of the economy in return for substantial foreign aid, a

temptation which might be impossible to resist”. “A

third option would be to wait and see and hope whilst

continuing with conventional measures which avoid

creating antagonism” (ECA, 1979-1980, p.6).7[7]

 

The OAU and in collaboration with the UNECA mobilised

African intellectual and political resources to discuss

the crises (above options) and come up with a vision

and a plan of action for getting Africa out of the

crises and towards a better future. This serious effort

led to the now famous Monrovia Declaration (1979), the

Lagos Plan of Action, and the Final Act of Lagos

(1980). These three documents contained respectively

(a) the most clearly articulated vision of Africa’s

future, (b) a practical plan of action on how to

achieve faster development towards that vision, and (c)

political decisions supporting the vision and the plan

of action as well as achieving effective economic

cooperation and integration.

 

Thus since 1980, all African initiatives (from the OAU

and from the ECA up to 1990), accepted the vision,

framework, strategies and principles enshrined in the

LPA.

7

 

The Monrovia Declaration (1979)

 

It provided the vision and scenario of Africa’s future.

The Africa of 2000/2020 will

(i)have a high degree of self sufficiency,

(ii) a democratic national development

(iii) will distribute wealth more equitably,

(iv) will have a strong African solidarity and will

carry more weight in world affairs” (OAU,1979,

p.30)8[8]

 

The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)

It provided the framework and strategies for

implementing development programmes. The LPA based its

strategies on some important principles which it

considered will lead to an alternative form of

development and will take Africa out of its crises.

These principles are: -

1.        Self reliance should be the basis of

development – at the national, sub-regional and

regional levels

8

2.        Equity in the distribution of wealth at the

national level is a fundamental objective of

development;

3.        Public sector is essential for development

and it should be expanded

4.        Outside capital is an unavoidable necessity

and it should be directed to those areas where

African capital is lacking or inadequate – such as

mining, energy and large scale projects;

5.        Inter-African economic cooperation and

integration is essential and should be effected as

soon as possible.

6.        Change in the international economic order

to favour Africa and Third World countries is

essential and Africa should continue to fight for

NIEO (New International Economic Order).

 

On the basis of these principles, the LPA gave primacy

to the development of Agriculture (first for food and

then for export), Industrialisation (to satisfy basic

needs), Mining Industries (to recover total and

permanent sovereignty over national resources,

establish mineral based industries), Human Resources,

and Science and Technology.

 

These principles and the Plan of Action – the detailed

Programme – were discussed extensively by Governments,

as well as by African intellectuals. The latter were

generally critical of the details in the Plan but

strongly supported the basic principles behind the LPA.9

[9]

 

The Final Act of Lagos (1980) and The Abuja Treaty

(1991)

The Heads of States and Governments of the OAU passed

this special Final Act aimed at achieving an African

Common Market by the year 2000. Clearly the issue of

economic cooperation and integration was so important

to the Governments that they felt the need to pass a

special and separate Act.

Furthermore, this led them to transform, within ten

years, the Final Act of Lagos to the Abuja Treaty

Establishing the African Economic Community in 1991.

The treaty lays down in details the process for

9

achieving the Economic Community in successive stages

over a period of 34 years. It also affirmed adherence

of the earlier principles enshrined in the LPA .

 

In addition to the above actions of the OAU in the area

of economic development, it adopted, during the 1980s,

three other important Programmes in this area. These

are: -

1. OAU: Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic

Recovery, 1986-1990: Addis Ababa, July 1985

2. The African Alternative Framework to Structural

Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic

Transformation (AAF-SAP) – UNECA, Addis Ababa, 1989

 

The AAF-SAP was strongly opposed and often roundly

condemned by experts of the WB/IMF as well as those of

Donor community in general. A popular version of The

AAF-SAP was produced – first printing was 20,000

copies. Despite this effort and the strong support the

document received from both governments and African

intellectuals, the AAF-SAP was marginalized and

eventually followed the fate of previous African

initiatives.

3. The African Charter for Popular Participation in

Development and Transformation, Arusha, 1990

 

External Reaction to the OAU Programmes on Economic

Development

The decade of the 1980s saw a very vigorous formal

intervention by Western powers in the economic

strategies and policies of African countries. This was

in response to the OAU’s robust Programme on economic

development. The intervention was done mainly through

the WB/IMF, through the use, by the Donors of Aid and

Debt as instruments of leverage. This intervention

started immediately after the adoption of the Lagos

Plan of Action.

 

The World Bank’s Berge Report: 1981

The Berg Report as it came to be known, was definitely

a response to the LPA and its aim was to provide an

intellectual basis for the intervention of the WB to

initiate adjustment programmes to African economies

ostensibly in order to take the countries out of the

crises and to lead them to accelerated development.

These programmes came to be known as “Structural

Adjustment Programmes” or SAPs.

 

According to Bujra (1982), the Berg Report (a) does not

address itself to most of the crucial issues spelt out

in details in the LPA;(b) while the Report advocates

increased investment (foreign and local) and a

reduction in the public sector, the LPA advocates

expansion of the public sector; (c) important areas of

development (industrialisation, control and use of

mineral resources, and economic cooperation and

integration) are given scant and peripheral attention

in the Report. Indeed the issue of economic cooperation

is not mentioned at all in this Report. Yet these

issues are of central concern in the LPA.

 

Despite the shortcoming of the Berg Report, in relation

to the LPA, the WB/IMF began in earnest to implement

their Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in

African countries immediately after the Berg Report.

 

The World Bank and IMF have been informed, in no

uncertain terms, by both government officials and

African researchers of the inappropriate assumptions

behind the SAPs and of the negative impact of SAPs on

African countries. In 1987 and 1988, the Economic

Development Institute of the World Bank organised five

senior policy seminars on structural adjustment in

Africa. Participants of the seminars were composed of

ministers, governors, permanent secretaries, senior

advisors and a significant number of senior technical

staff of central banks and the core ministries of

finance and planning as well as spending ministries

such as agriculture and industry. Twenty seven

countries participated in the seminars. The strong and

critical voice of the participants of the above seminar

was expressed in a very polite and diplomatic language

of the Bank in one of its Reports (EDI Policy Seminar

Report No.18, Washington, 1989). The critique of

African participants in these Seminars are couched as

main observations and lessons emerging from the

seminars. These are: -

 

1.Most participants perceived adjustment programs as

imposed from outside;

2.Adjustment must be seen in a broader context as

involving medium and longer –term policies in

addition to immediate (stabilisation) measures;

3.Basic Social services must be protected;

4.Current adjustment programs have yet to

successfully reconcile demand management with

supply-enhancing measures;

5.The promotion of sub-regional or regional trade and

coordination of development plans and strategies –

a main objective of the LPA –have not received the

attention they deserve;

6.Significant social cost are associated with

adjustment;

7.To be sustainable, an adjustment program must be

nationally designed and /or designed to fit local

conditions;

8.For many reasons – including the weak bargaining

positions of African governments and their lack of

indigenous capacity for policy formulation –

international organizations currently set the

agenda for policy reforms. This had a number of

unfortunate consequences;

9.A long-term strategy based on export-led growth and

the liberalization of foreign trade has few

adherents;

10. The current African crises, to a considerable

degree, has its origins in the international

economic environment;

11. Negotiations can be better handled to reduce

the tension between conditionality and national

sovereignty;

12. Multilateral institutions should accept greater

responsibility for failed programs10[10].

 

In spite of the above critique SAPs have continued to

be implemented, with slight technical modifications

here and there. The serious and negative impacts of the

SAPs are now well known and the strong reactions of

African officials and intellectuals against SAPs are

also well known. The most important formal response to

the SAPs was the ECA’s African Alternative Framework to

Structural Adjustment Programme (AAF-SAPS) in 1989. And

amongst the many sharp and serious critique of SAPs

from African intellectuals (starting from its genesis

10

with the Berg Report), is Thandika Mkandawire’s edited

book “Our Continent our Future” (1999).

 

By the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the

external’s perspective and strategy for development had

become the dominant, if not the only one directing

development policies and programmes in almost all

African countries. Indeed the practical power of the

WB/IMF and the Donor community (collectively often

referred to as the international community) to

intervene and direct detailed plans, programmes and

actual decision making of African governments had

become established and accepted in government circles.

 

In the meantime in 1989, the WB came out with another

report – the Long Term Perspective Studies (LTPS) in

which it proposed a global coalition of Donors and

Africans to effectively direct the intellectual

framework and strategies of long term development in

Africa. The Global Coalition for Africa was thus

established as an organisation – an institution – which

is still operating until today. However soon, in the

1990s, the international community began to intensify

their coordination at many levels – without the

participation of Africans. The WB/IMF, the EU, the DAC,

individual Donor countries, the Paris and London Clubs

etc. their strategies and policies with regards to

loans, debt, aid, trade, technical assistance etc.

became increasingly highly coordinated and standardized

insisted on African governments to accept essentially

the same conditionalities. These conditionalities now

turned out to be those of SAPs (revised and elaborated)

as well as political conditionality of Good Governance.

The latter conditionality was also adopted by the UN

System as a whole – but particularly the UNDP.

 

Thus during the 1990s and the new millennium, African

economic and political development was being

diplomatically but firmly guided by the “international

community”. At the more formal level of treaties, the

EU continued with its Lome, now Cotonou Conventions

(renewed/renegotiated every several years) which guided

the unequal trade relations between African countries

and the EU countries. More recently the Americans came

with their own Programme – Africa Growth and

Opportunity Act (AGOA). And more interestingly, the

British and French (the two largest and most powerful

former colonial powers) recently decided to synchronise

and coordinate in details their African policies to the

extent that their African Ambassadors hold joint

meetings annually/biannually?

 

And once again, in the year 2000, the WB in association

with its partners (mainly from amongst the

“international community”) came up with yet another

document – this time in the form of a book – “Can

Africa Reclaim the 21st Century?”11[11] This book

essentially articulates the long term strategies of

African development from the perspective of the WB and

the rest of the Donor community. It is expected to

provide the intellectual inspiration to African policy

makers when they formulate their development

strategies.

 

And indeed according to the recent CODESRIA-TWN

Africa’s Declaration,12[12] NEPAD, the latest African

vision and initiative for African Development, derives

11

12

its intellectual inspiration and its strategies for

African development from the above World Bank book “Can

Africa Reclaim the 21st Century?” Similar arguments and

statements were made in another conference of African

scholars held in Nairobi at about the same time (26-29

April, 2002)13[13].

 

Phase 3: OAU 1990 to 2002

It is clear that internal and external vision for

African development have existed since the early years

of independence. These visions differ fundamentally

with regards to their development strategies. However

the present dominance of the external vision on African

development, simply reflects the reality – that of the

weakness of Africa and the strength and power of the

“externals”. The externals are the Western powers which

drive the asymmetrical global system.

 

But inspite of this dominance of the western powers on

the African development, the OAU continued to protests

and pass important resolutions. The resolutions and

programmes of the 1980s, and those passed in the 1990s,

13

had no effect in improving the economic situation of

Africa. Indeed the OAU had to change direction and to

focus more on political and humanitarian issues.

 

According to the former Secretary General of the OAU

(1989 –2001), the OAU had to change direction from 1990

onwards because of the changing African and

international environment. “At the beginning of the

1990s, the agenda for action in realizing our vision

had to assume a new orientation. The end of the

liberation struggle compelled us to direct all efforts

at tackling the task of socio-economic development

particularly in the aftermath of the devastating crisis

of what has been described as the Lost Decade of the

1980s. Compounding that, was the imperative necessity

to cope with the fundamental changes taking place in

the world and the end of the Cold War, as well as the

emergence of the process of globalization with its

various opportunities and threats”14[14].

 

The strategies and policies for economic development of

African countries, even the economic management of some

14

countries, had been taken over by the WB/IMF

institutions since the 1980s. And this continued in the

1990s. And as stated above, all the OAU Programmes to

arrest the deteriorating economic situation of African

countries, had no effect whatsoever. The economies of

African countries continued to deteriorate under the

auspices and management of the Western powers. 

The OAU therefore had no option but to focus more on

political and humanitarian issues.

The OAU is said to have made important contribution to

Africa’s development by pursuing a new agenda. These

are six areas which the OAU is said to have been

successful: -

1.      The Abuja Treaty (1990).

This is an important Treaty with a road map on how

to achieve the African Economic Community (AEC)

through the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

Some progress has been made by the RECs, but

serious problems still remain internally within the

RECs and in their relations with the OAU – and now

with the AU.

2.      The Creation, within the OAU, of the

Mechanism for the Prevention, Management and

Resolution of Conflicts (1990)

This was an important move on the part of the OAU.

But there are serious doubts as to the political

ability and capacity of the Mechanism to resolve

let alone prevent conflicts in the continent. The

most horrendous event of the 1990s in Africa was

the Rwanda genocide of 1994. The OAU courageously

tried to resolve the conflict through the Arusha

process of negotiations. But these failed and

after the genocide, the OAU did not even discuss

its own report on what needs to be done to stop

such events, a report which was prepared by an

international Panel of highly respected persons

approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and

Government.

3.      Inculcation of a Culture of Democracy – non-

recognition of undemocratic change of government,

and monitoring of elections;

The decision not to recognize undemocratic change

of governments is an important step forward;

Similarly the monitoring of elections. But the

“international community” i.e. Western powers gives

more value to the judgment of its own monitors than

that of the OAU, for example on Zimbabwe. And the

Madagascar’s example shows that the US and the EU

can recognize a government which the OAU have

refused to recognize because OAU considers the

government illegitimate.

4.      Enhancing the status of the OAU continentally

and internationally.

There is no doubt that compared with 1970s, and

1980s, the OAU’s status has now been enhanced –

both in Africa and internationally. However, it is

not clear how this enhancement of status can bring

about what practical benefits to African countries

and people. Can the OAU bring resources to resolve

conflicts? Can the OAU ask the WB to change its

interventions policies in African countries?

5.      Breaking the silence on HIV/AIDS and making

governments develop programmes to cope with this

pandemic.

There is no doubt that this is an important and

very positive initiative. But like the question of

refugees, most of the work is done by external

agencies independent of the OAU.

6.      Initiating the African Union Process – from

Sirte 1999 to Durban in 2002.

This is by far is the most significant initiative

taken by The Great Leader Brother Mu’ammar Al

Gaddafi. And the OAU – both the Secretariat and the

Heads of States – supported the important moves by

Gaddafi to bring about the AU to a successful end.

This has been most encouraging.

 

These are important achievements made by an

organization which had descended to the level of being

called a “a talking Club”. The OAU is famous for a

modus operandi described as “a common denominator

approach catering for the weakest and undemocratic

members”. It is not well known for having space which

would allow its leadership to use creatively and to

push for a robust political and economic agenda.

Despite this systemic constraint in the OAU, and my

simple reservations apart, the OAU can be said to have

made a resaonble contribution to Africa’s development.

 

At the closing of the 1990 decade, and the third term

of Dr.Salim as Secretary General, four major African

initiatives occupied the OAU. These are: -

1.The process of establishing the AU – started in

1999. The AU has now been inaugurated and a brief

discussion on it will follow below.

2.The Conference on Security, Stability,

Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA)

was incorporated into the OAU as a special

Programme (2000)

3.The NEPAD initiative which was also taken up as a

special Programme of the OAU/AU in Lusaka, 2001.

4.The OAU initiatives to involve and work with

civil society organizations – two major

conferences to develop methods of cooperation

(2000 and 2001).

 

These are important and creative initiatives and

processes. However relationship between the AU and the

two Inter-governmental organizations has yet to be

clarified. This is an important issue facing the AU.

 

In a sense the OAU left a full plate for the AU – a

plate full of powerful and significant issues which if

positively and creatively handled, could propel the

African Union into a powerful continental organisation.

 

The OAU is now no more. This preliminary and brief

evaluation is therefore appropriate, even though it is

only three months since the OAU legally stopped being

an organisation.

 

The OAU Charter had noble objectives – of achieving

political unity, of raising the standard of living of

the African people, of having peace and security

amongst African states, of raising the dignity and

status of the African people internationally etc. Has

any of these aspirations and objectives been achieved?

The answer is clearly No, despite the stated

achievements of the OAU during the last decade of the

twentieth Century. Economically, Africa is poorer than

it was at the time when the OAU was founded.

Politically, only a few countries have escaped the

ravages of internal armed conflicts and serious

political tension and confrontations. And the picture

is depressingly the same in other areas such health,

education etc. As concerning the all important economic

co-operation and integration, some modest progress has

been made, but the road ahead is still long and

difficult. We must therefore ask a simple but important

question. Why is Africa worse off now than when the OAU

was founded despite all the resolutions and programme

adopted by the OAU. The simple answer is that the

resolutions and Programme of the OAU were not

implemented at the country/national level. But this

begs the question. Why do Heads of states sign up to

radical development approaches at the OAU level but

fail to implement these approaches at the national

level? The answer to this question is complex but

here are some brief explanations: -

 

(i)                 During the first 15 years of

independence there was a strong presence of

former colonials powers in African countries –

technical personnel, aid and strong political

links between the former colonial governments

and the African political leadership. The

influence of the Metropolitan governments on

African countries and their economic policies

in particular, was essentially direct.

(ii)               Secondly, in the 1960s the

economies of African countries were doing well.

They generally had healthy foreign currency

reserve. The emerging class of African business

men which was accumulating wealth through the

use of state institutions, was very optimistic

about the future and therefore favoured

continuity of policies recommended by colonial

advisors and continuity of same economic

structure without radical change. Where some

governments (eg. Tanzania) tried some form of

radical approach to development and therefore

tried to change the existing economic structure

through nationalisation and diversifying its

external economic links, there was immediate

strong media attack, diplomatic isolation, and

economic pressure to stop such “move to the

left” – moves which essentially disrupted the

economy. This happened in Tanzania, Guinea

Conakry, Ghana (under Nkurumah), then Congo

Kinshasa (under Lumumba), Benin, Somalia,

Uganda (under Obote I) etc.

(iii)             The second half of the 1970s saw

the economic crises intensifying all over the

continent. There were serious rumblings amongst

the populations and especially the military. In

fact the military did take power in many

countries which led to worsening of the

economic and political crises in those

countries. The OAU therefore began to take up

economic development as part of its mandate and

soon initiated discussion on development

issues. Similarly the UNECA began to be more

active than before. All this took place in the

context of a strong ideological debate of the

1970s regarding alternative paths to

development and which was taking place in all

African countries. Hence the OAU resolutions

and Programmes on development absorbed some

basic ideas from the ongoing international and

national discussion, ideas which tended to

reinforce the strong continental nationalism

which is at the root of the OAU’s very

existence. Hence the OAU language and

perspective of development contained strong

nationalist language and easily leaned towards

alternatives to the existing approaches.

(iv)             The political leaders themselves

found it easier to accept such alternative

approaches to development because they also saw

on the ground in their countries the drawback

of the approach inherited from the colonial

powers.

(v)               Yet at the country level, most of

the political leaders found it extremely

difficult to debunk or reject existing economic

policies. This is because (a) the cost of

disruption would be too great, (b) the power of

the emerging indigenous economic elite within

the political and administrative structure was

very strong and favoured continuity of existing

policies, including shortages and other

economic difficulties from which some groups

amongst the elite gained economically; and (c)

the power and influence of the “externals” for

continuity, was also very strong; the

external’s power derive from their threat of

disrupting the economies of the countries and

in their alliance with the local groups which

wanted continuity. Hence it was easier for

Heads of State to continue the inherited

economic policies and strategies at the country

level while at the same time talking and

approving radical and alternative economic

strategies and policies at the OAU level.

Schizophrenia became a standard political

behaviour of political leaders – between their

countries and the OAU.

(vi)             Given this situation, the more the crises

deepened in African countries, the more the

countries became indebted, the easier it was

for the externals to ensure that the

traditional economic strategies and policies

inherited from the colonial period continued

and expanded. Indeed as the crises deepened,

and African countries became very week, the

externals had a unique opportunity to intervene

strongly at the country level. They

essentially directed country economic

strategies and policies and often literally

managed and administered key institutions of

the economies. This happened during the 1980s

and some would say continues to the present –

at least in many of the small countries.

(vii)          However this strong interventionist role of

the “externals” had to have an ideological and

intellectual basis. And this was essentially

provided by the WB and IMF through their

various strategic reports (at the country

level) and intellectuals output in major

publications on Africa – such as the Berg Report

(1981), the Long Term Perspective Studies (1989), Adjustment

in Africa (1994) and more recently, Can Africa Reclaim

the 21st Century (2000).

(viii)        It is necessary at this point to state (even

at the cost of repetition) that there is a

fundamental difference between all the pre-

NEPAD African Initiatives (especially since the

Monrovia/LPA –1979/80) and the NEPAD of

2001/2002. The difference is that all pre-NEPAD

African initiatives had, at the core of their

Plans/Agendas the LPA principles, which are

absent in NEPAD:-

 

From the perspectives of the WB/IMF and the Donor

community, these principles obviously make African

initiatives radical and “ideological” – i.e. leftist.

More importantly, if African countries followed these

principles in their economic policies, they would make

African economies difficult to exploit and to bring

under the hegemony of those countries driving

globalisations. Hence the opposition of the “externals”

to the African initiatives. And since NEPAD has dropped

these principles, it is therefore not surprising that

the G8 have welcomed NEPAD with open arms and have so

far given it moral support.

 

(ix)             Finally, and needless to say, the

African people and indeed even the people of

the so-called international community, are

nowhere to be seen in this struggle for the

development soul of the African continent.

 

Explanations apart, is there any possible way out

of the political crises? The following has been

suggested by many African researches:-

 

·        A change to a clean and effective

developmental state. This might be brought

about in some states by the Peer Review

mechanism suggested by the NePAD Framework.

However the mechanism should come firmly under

the AU.

·        Stronger effort in negotiating changes

in the global trading and financial system

which would be favourable to Africa.

·        Reorient economic strategies and

policies towards self-reliance by promoting

agriculture, industry and services including

health and education.

 

It is envisaged that the AU will be different from

the OAU. This because it is argued that (a) African

leaders are now more committed to exploit the

global system more effectively through concerted

action – mainly through the AU’s NEPAD Programme,

and (b) the AU will involve civil society in its

decision making and operations, and therefore will

be stronger thus enabling Africans to negotiate

more effectively with the global institutions such

as the WTO, Cotonou, AGOA etc. However to reduce

the power of the “international community” at the

country level and those driving globalisations at

the global level, it will be necessary to have an

effective a clean developmental state (as Meles

has argued) and a strong and capable AU. While

NEPAD might eventually lead to most African states

having a clean developmental state, a strong AU

needs the collective will of all member state to

transcend the weaknesses of the OAU. This brings us

to the AU.

 

The African Union: Prospects and constraints

 

The creation of the African Union in Sirte (Libya) in

1999, the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the

African Union in Lome July 200015[15] and the

inauguration of the AU in Durban, July 2002 were

15

important milestone in the process of creating

political continental unity and the African Economic

Community. It was a major achievement of the African

leaders and a triumph for Pan-Africanism. The AU is

expected to be a much stronger organisation than the

OAU.

 

Amongst the new principles of the Union are – the right

of the Union to intervene in a Member State, respect

for democratic principles, human rights and good

governance, promotion of social justice and promotion

of gender equality. Its development focus are similar

to those of the LPA.

 

But the AU has been described as an “aspirational

union”. It does not have solid common factors or forces

on which it can be built, unlike the EU or ASIEN. Both

the EU and ASIEN were created during the cold war in

the face of threats to their security from outside.

This is not the case with Africa. The EU members were

highly industrialised and their industrialist wanted a

larger and expanded market. Furthermore, the EU was

driven by a few powerful core countries – France and

Germany. The ASIEN was formed by like minded strong

states which felt threatened either by the Communists

or by secessionism. They therefore focussed on security

and stability in order to eliminate armed conflicts

between member states and to promote economic policies

based on capitalist economies. African countries are

not being threatened from outside nor do they have

industrial economies which need larger markets. Their

economies are essentially all similar - exporting raw

material. Unlike the ASIEN countries, they do not have

a strong entrepreneurial class capable of strong open

competition. While the EU and ASIEN started with

smaller number of countries with the possibilities of

others joining them, the African Union started with all

African countries as members of the Union. Thus, the

most important driving force of the AU is the

aspiration of the people and their leaders for a common

identity and unification. Hence the reference to an

“aspirational union”.

 

The AU process has been very fast. It was consummated

within three short years – from Sirte in 1999 to Durban

in July 2002. The OAU had one year to prepare for the

“transition” from the OAU to the AU, and the Au

Commission has one year “interim” period to set up the

core organs of the AU and to develop its Programme. The

AU is thus facing very serious challenges immediately

while establishing its organs, and also in the longer

term.

 

The immediate challenges facing the AU are as follows: -

 

1.      Appropriate human resources to establish a

solid and efficient Commission which would have

the professional and intellectual capacity to

prepare, manage and implement relevant

Programmes;

2.      The establishment of all the core Organs of

the AU is an enormous task which needs more time

than the one year interim period given to the

Interim Commission.

3.      The Commission urgently needs the necessary

financial resources to establish its various

organs and to operationalise them. It is not

clear where the considerable financial resources

needed will come from; neither is it clear how

the professional, highly skilled and capable

manpower will be obtained and from where. The

need for capable leadership and competent

institutions is urgent and very important if the

AU is to start on a better footing than the OAU.

 

The longer term issues are numerous and complex. Here

are some of the most important which need sound but

immediate attention: -

4.      The relationship between the AU and the

RECs is key to any move in economic cooperation

and eventual economic integration; the role of

the RECs must be clarified, internal cohesion

established and relationship between the RECs on

the one hand and between them and the AU, must be

thought through and properly established;

5.      Relationship between NEPAD and CSSDCA must

be ironed out especially over the issue of peace,

stability and conflict resolution. And the all

important issue of how these two important inter-

governmental organisation will work within the

AU, since each has established its own

Secretariat and organisational structure.

6.      The relationship between the different

organs of the AU is not clear – especially

between people’s organs –Parliament, Economic,

Social and Cultural Council, Court of Justice on

the one hand and the state dominated organs – the

Assembly, the Executive Council, and the

Permanent Representative Committee.

7.      At the decision-making and operational

level, the relationship between the Commission,

The Executive Council and the Permanent

Representative Committee will be crucial. If this

relationship is not fully clarified, the

operation of the Union will be ineffective and

often paralysed.

8.      While all members of the Union have equal

status and rights, it is obvious that they are

not. The larger and more powerful countries would

eventually want to establish some form of

hegemony and play leading role in various

spheres. How will this work out in the Union?

9.      The NEPAD Programme, once it begins to be

operational, will inevitably create hierarchy

amongst countries – fast and slow track countries

– based on their performance in the Peer Review

mechanism. What will be the implication of such

hierarchy – countries in two different tracks!

 

The AU is barely three months old. The Interim

Commission has started its work in earnest. Much

will depend on the speed, the way and the quality

of the organs established by the Interim

Commission. Much will also depend on the reaction

of the Union Assembly to the Commission’s work and

to the speed in which they establish functioning

people’s organs – the PAP, the ECOSOC, the Court of

Justice – and how effective the people’s role will

be. At this point in time we are at the level of

speculation and expectation. Let us therefore hope

for the best!