Author: Isidora StakićEditor: Predrag Petrović

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy

THREATS AND PRESSURESFACED BY ACTIVISTSAND INDEPENDENTJOURNALISTSIN SERBIA

CASE STUDY:

This case study is the result of a joint effort by the Centre for Research Transparency and Accountability (CRTA), the National Coalition for Decentralization (NKD), the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and Partners for Democratic Change Serbia, which aims to foster greater citizen participation in decision-making through the Citizens Have Power (Građani imaju moć) project, supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The views expressed in this case study are exclusively those of the author and the interviewees and do not reflect the views of USAID.

CASE STUDY:THREATS AND PRESSURES FACED BY ACTIVISTS AND INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS IN SERBIA

Publisher:Belgrade Centre for Security PolicyĐure Jakšića 6/5, BelgradeTel: 011 3287 226Email: office@bezbednost.orgwww.bezbednost.org

Author: Isidora StakićEditor: Predrag PetrovićDesign and Layout: BTP StudioISBN 978-86-6237-179-9Belgrade, May 2019

The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy would like to thank all respondents for their time and willingness to share their experiences.

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Contents1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 6

2. Methodology and Sampling ................................................................................................................... 6

3. Types of Threats and Pressures ............................................................................................................... 7

3.1. Direct Threats to Physical Safety ....................................................................................................... 7

3.2. Surveillance ...................................................................................................................................... 8

3.3. Threats to Livelihood and Financial Viability .................................................................................... 9

3.4. Defamation Campaigns ................................................................................................................... 10

3.5. Attempts at Co-option .................................................................................................................... 11

3.6. Other Threats and Pressures .......................................................................................................... 12

4. Activists’ Experiences with State Actors ................................................................................................ 13

4.1. Police .............................................................................................................................................. 13

4.2. The Security Information Agency (BIA) ........................................................................................... 14

4.3. Inspections ...................................................................................................................................... 15

4.4. Other State Institutions .................................................................................................................. 16

5. Protection Measures and Forms of Assistance ...................................................................................... 17

6. Conclusion – Local Level State Capture ................................................................................................. 18

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1. IntroductionThe Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and individual employees of the centre, have in recent years been targeted by attacks and threats on several occasions.1 In this the BCSP is not alone, activists, non-governmental organisations and independent journalists in Serbia are continually exposed to threats and pressures and, not infrequently, physical attacks. This is borne out by research conducted in the sum-mer of 2018 by the BCSP, in cooperation with its partners,2 in 19 municipalities across Serbia. The aim of that study was to determine the circumstances and constraints that affect participation by citizens, groups and organisations in the defence democracy and resolving publically significant issues through collective action at the local and national levels. One of the topics raised during the fieldwork – especially during in-dividual interviews with active citizens – was the safety of activists and independent journalists, including the conduct of the security services towards them. In conversation with our researchers, a large number of the respondents highlighted the fact that they face security threats and/or pressures pertaining to their activism. Most of them did not receive the kind of protection from security institutions that they expected – i.e. the kind of protection they needed. Based on the above, the BCSP identified the need for more in-depth research on this topic.

2. Methodology and SamplingThis case study is based on data gathered during fieldwork conducted by the BCSP in 19 municipalities in Serbia from early February to late April 2019.3 The research focused on municipalities outside Belgrade, as the threats and pressures faced by activists and journalists beyond Belgrade are less well-known publi-cally. The research comprised 29 in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Of the 34 interviewees, 23 were activists and 11 journalists. The sample encompassed activists working for non-governmental organisati-ons, as well as those who engage in activism occasionally and independently of their full-time occupation. The sample comprised 26 men and 8 women. In addition to the interviews in various municipalities across Serbia, two focus groups were held in Belgrade. Both focus groups were attended by the same respon-dents – 17 of them, of which 15 were activists and two journalists, 12 were men and 5 were women, 6 were from Belgrade and 11 from various other towns (Gornji Milanovac, Kragujevac, Leskovac, Loznica, Niš, Novi Sad, Priboj and Valjevo). The sample for this study – more precisely, the respondents themselves – were selected on the basis of previous research conducted last year on the topic of citizen activism, as well as on the recommendation of our network of associates from across Serbia.

1 See, for example: BCSP Press Release (2017) “Attacks on BCSP are intensifying”: http://www.bezbednost.org/Press-re-leases/6559/Attacks-on-BCSP-are-intensifying.shtml; BCSP Press Release (2018) “Another cycle of threats to BCSP”: http://www.bezbednost.org/Press-releases/6959/Another-cycle-of-threats-to-BCSP.shtml; Danas Online (2018) “Obijen stan izvršnog direktora Beogradskog centra za bezbednosnu politiku” (“Break-in at the BCSP Executive Director’s Apar-tment”): https://www.danas.rs/drustvo/obijen-stan-izvrsnog-direktora-beogradskog-centra-za-bezbednosnu-politiku/; Sonja Stojanović Gajić (2018) “Pet bauka o delovanju BCBP-a” (“Five Myths About the Work of the BCSP”), Peščanik: https://pescanik.net/pet-bauka-o-delovanju-bcbp-a/.

2 The Centre for Research Transparency and Accountability (CRTA), the National Coalition for Decentralization (NKD) and Partners for Democratic Change Serbia.

3 The municipalities were: Babušnica, Bela Crkva, Inđija, Kraljevo, Kruševac, Leskovac, Loznica, Niš, Novi Pazar, Novi Sad, Petrovac na Mlavi, Sombor, Subotica, Šabac, Valjevo, Vranje, Vrbas, Vršac and Zrenjanin.

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3. Types of Threats and PressuresThe respondents have faced various types of threats and pressures in their activism and engagement, whi-ch seeks to resolve social problems at the local and national level. The threats and pressures themselves differ according to how direct or explicit they are, according to their source, the channel through which they are communicated and according to what or whom they are directed against. For the sake of clarity, in this case study we have divided them up into a number of categories, according to the content of the threat or pressure.

3.1 Direct Threats to Physical SafetyThe Serbian public are already aware that the physical safety of journalists and activists who are critical of the current government is under threat. The most recent example is the case in which the house of Milan Jovanović, a journalist who wrote about financial misconduct in the Grocka municipality, was burned to the ground.4 For Serbian investigative reporters, as well as for NGO activists – especially those working in human rights – death threats have become commonplace.5 A number of the activists and journalists inter-viewed for this case study have been subjected to the threat of physical violence, including death threats. The motives for such threats vary: from investigations of corruption perpetrated by local politicians to supporting policies on Kosovo that deviate from the official nationalist line. For example, a journalist from Novi Sad stated that he receives threats continually but that they come “in waves” – the number of thre-ats rises sharply whenever his name is in the public eye. This happens most often when representatives of the ruling parties publically name him, be it during sessions of the National Assembly or in the media. They most often label him as a “separatist”. Attaching labels to dissenters is practiced mostly by local-level politicians or party officials but is, in some cases, also practiced by those in more elevated positions.

“I was mentioned by Aleksandar Martinović, then Marjan Rističević showed my picture around, saying I’m

a member of Đilas’ gang. Then I made it onto the Dnevnik 2 [news programme] and I was the first item

on Dnevnik [national news programme], when I was directly named by President Vučić in response to an

obviously pre-planned question by a journalist, when the journalist asked what he thinks of my statement that

after his administration Serbia will be scorched earth – and which was taken out of context.”

This respondent receives threats mostly via social media and points out that recently he has received “18 classic death threats”, all of which he reported to the relevant authorities – the police and the prosecutor’s office. Some of these threats come from profiles for which he “can say with certainty they’re fake”, while it seems that some come from real people using their full name.

“Those are people that are around us, spreading pathological hatred. I’m sure they’ve never met me, heard

me, nor spoken to me. They probably haven’t even read what I write, somebody just told them who I am and

they aimed their rage at me.”

A journalist from Leskovac says that she has received threats of violence both via text message and email. According to her, the messages are in most cases motivated by articles her website publishes on the topic

4 Radio Slobodna Evropa: MUP Srbije: Namerno zapaljena kuća novinara (Serbian Police: Journalists House Deliberately Torched), 13/12/2018. Accessed at: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/29654458.html

5 Frequent death threats have been directed at the Women in Black and journalists working for BIRN, KRIK, CINS, etc.

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of Kosovo. Just as with the previous respondent, she says that she has been labelled – in her case, as a “traitor”, as someone working for the “Albanian side” and similar.

On the other hand, a journalist from Sombor says that he does not receive death threats but that he is faced with numerous pressures. For example, he receives seemingly friendly warnings about places he sho-uld not go to. Some of the respondents – for example, an activist with the Local Front (Lokalni front) from Kraljevo – have experienced property damage, specifically in this case, the scratching of their car bonnet. In addition to this, he has received threats via Facebook and says, “there is always concern about what will happen next and whether it will affect my children.”

It should be noted that some of the respondents have pointed out that the threats they received “before” – referring to the 1990s and the period under the reign of Slobodan Milošević6 – were more open and direct, while nowadays they are less direct but much more perfidious. Members of the Joint Movement of Free Residents (Udruženi pokret slobodnih stanara – UPSS) state:

“There are no more direct threats like there were under the regime from 20 years ago, which were much

‘braver’ – they came up to you and said don’t talk, we’ll beat you up/break you. These are much more subtle

and say: you sing too much – rein your tongue in. And whenever anything happened, back then, some incident,

murder, beating – it always happened to the person with the ‘loose tongue’ and not his family, children, house

or work.”

“These days they aren’t subtler, they’re more duplicitous. […] They’re even too scared to make a direct threat,

they don’t threaten, they harass and intimidate, but that harassment and intimidation yields results over time.

[…] It’s frightening when someone says, ‘you have children at university, be careful’, or, ‘your kid is about to

start school’. Also, they say, ‘what you’re doing isn’t smart’”.

In addition to the Milošević era, it should be noted that threats were also common after 2000, when the Democratic Party and its coalition partners were in power. An activist from Zrenjanin says that wor-kers who actively opposed privatisation during this period were exposed to various kinds of attacks and pressures, some of which were very direct threats to their physical safety – for example, rocks thrown through windows, cars set alight, etc. Our interlocutor points out that, though they were reported to the police, these attacks were never processed and that the victims never received any information from the police about their cases. He reports that the leader of the workers and minority shareholders of the Jugo-remedija pharmaceuticals factory, who managed to bring about the annulment of the company’s illegal privatisation, was arrested for abuse of office and held in detention for almost two months. According to our interlocutor, the charges were never substantiated and the goal of the detention was to destroy Jugo-remedija as a viable enterprise managed by its workers, in order to send the false message that without privatisation factories cannot survive and continue to operate.

A journalist from Sombor also states that pressure was exerted on journalists during the time when Demo-cratic Party was in power but adds that the novelty introduced by the current administration are so-called “bots” – members from the bottom of the party hierarchy who are paid to spread the views of the ruling party, mostly via online platforms. Even though bots also existed under the previous government, our in-

6 Slobodan Milošević was in power from May 1989 to October 2000. After the 5th of October overthrow of this regime, a coalition of parties grouped around the Democratic Party came to power. The coalition led by the Serbian Progressive Party came to power after the 2012 elections and is still in power today.

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terlocutor explains: “when it comes to bots, what’s happening now can’t be compared with anything. The number of bots, and they recognise me on the street. The level of their aggression here is high.”

3.2. SurveillanceMany of the respondents assert that they have at some point been physically followed. Some of them make the claim confidently, while others merely suspect that they were being followed, for example, on the street or in a café. A few of the respondents have noticed the same cars, with the same occupants, parked in front of their homes or offices. Many of them have noticed people photographing them in cafés. Also, some of the respondents have noticed that when they are out in public there frequently seem to be local SNS party members in the vicinity. One of the respondents discussed the topic of being tailed with a colleague:

“He told me that that is the lowest level, when they want you to know you’re being followed. They’re not

following you to follow you but to intimidate you. If it was a proper operation, you wouldn’t even see them.”

A second respondent stated:

“I am sure they followed me, I have evidence. During the Against Dictatorship protest they regularly followed

me. They would show up near me at the protest. A van would constantly be parked in front of my house.”

A respondent from Južne vesti relates how this online news outlet’s editor in chief was filmed from a car in the centre of Niš. The incident was reported to the relevant authorities but, even though the editor in chief provided the police with a photograph of the car in question, the investigation of the incident was very slow.

Almost all of our respondents are sure that their electronic communications are monitored, even though most say they have no concrete evidence for this. They base their assertions on interference noticed during conversations on mobile phones or even “crystal clear signal when others have poor signal.” Also, some of the respondents say their phone batteries empty unusually quickly and that their phones get “hot”.

As one of our interlocutors states:

“We knew we were being bugged and we staged a conversation and agreed a meeting at a certain place, then

we observed the place from cover. We saw three individuals as they roamed around for around 25 minutes at

the time of our supposed meeting.”

3.3. Threats to Livelihood and Financial ViabilityIn addition to threats to their physical safety, many activists and journalists also face threats that affect their livelihood or the financial vitality of their organisations. As they assert, these threats are “subtler” and are, in the opinion of many interviewees, one of the main characteristics of the current government. Our respondent from an organisation working on sustainable development and climate change relates his experience from protests against the construction of mini-hydropower plants (MHP) and the kind of pressures that are endured by local activists:

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“Over there people depend on that company [Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS)]. They are sent there to get jobs and

then they receive threats. […] There are subsidiaries of EPS run by party officials. They make money directly

from the works: selling concrete, installing drainage, diverting the flow of streams… Payment is cash in hand

and that’s where the direct danger lies.”

Members of UPSS from Niš explain that the most common form of pressure exerted on activists comes in the form of threats and intimidation regarding their job security. They point out that this is a difference between the current government and the Milošević era when threats were more explicit and usually inc-luded physical violence. A UPSS activist states: “Our members are constantly pressured, threatened with losing their job, threatened that their children will lose the right to work when their contract runs out, threatened with eviction.”

Another mechanism that, according to our respondents, the current government often uses is blackmail and coercion. For example, one of our interviewees relates the story of a colleague, also an activist, who worked in the department for issuing construction permits and who refused to issue permits in two cases where there were clear violations of regulations. After that he was transferred to a different position with a lower salary. Our interviewee claims that this is a mechanism is widely used by the current government – had his colleague consented to issue the permits, the fact that he had broken the law would be used against him as leverage, forcing him into further violations, on their orders.

Local Front activists from Valjevo spoke about the combination of threats and promises made to citizens by the local government, ruled by the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka – SNS). As an example, they cited a case in which local citizens wanted to organise a press conference in order to com-plain about an unsurfaced road.

“The head of the Department for Infrastructure and the former director of the heating plant, the mayor’s chief

of staff, went to the village and went from house to house threatening people. They threatened them not to

show up [at the protest]. I mean, these are threats mixed in with promises. If any of the members of the local

community in Loznica show up in front of the town hall with those complaints, they’ll never get those roads,

nor the street lighting. If they don’t show up, they’ll sort all of that out for them in 15-20 days and put up the

street lighting.”

Another form of financial pressuring is the rigging of tender procedures for the application for funds from local budgets. Non-governmental organisations and local media that are critical of the authorities gene-rally cannot access funds from the budget or are otherwise awarded the lowest possible amounts – so that they cannot claim the procedure is rigged. A journalist from Leskovac explains that the mayor of the town decides who will be awarded public funds (even though there is a clear tender procedure). She adds that her news outlet receives a smaller amount each year and this is confirmed by the editor of the Kolubarske.rs news outlet from Valjevo. She says:

“I heard that before the commission was in session, a list was made in the mayor’s office outlining who will

get money and how much. I wasn’t supposed to get anything but then they decided to give me the minimum

amount, as they said, to humiliate me.”

In addition to manipulating public funds intended for the subsidising of the media, local authorities exert pressure on advertisers, private companies, also with the aim of stymying the efforts of dissenting media.

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3.4 Defamation CampaignsSeveral activists and journalists have been targeted by defamation campaigns conducted through the me-dia. The aforementioned Kolubarke.rs editor recounts how the local authorities in Valjevo created Kolu-barski.info, a website with a very similar address to the one she edits. Kolubarski.info runs a continuous campaign against her, posting untrue stories.

“Kolubarski.info started a year ago and they have a pile of texts about me, just like Radio Valjevo. The highlight

was a survey – they asked people about me on the street, and they said I was illiterate, uneducated, sick,

frustrated, that I am a bad mother, etc. That was in 2017, I sued Radio Valjevo and the author. He didn’t show

up to any of the court dates. Then in 2018, Kolubarski.info wrote a series of untruths about me, mostly calling

me ‘yellow’.7”

Similar public “mud-slinging” campaigns were experienced by other respondents, for example by an acti-vist and journalist from Novi Sad.

“The Pečat newspaper wrote that I’m working with the CIA and the Vatican and that I’m disrupting the

constitutional order. They had a problem with the fact that the protests [Against Dictatorship] began in Novi

Sad. I was present there but everything happened spontaneously. They saw my name. They googled me,

saw that I was a moderator on a panel for the Youth Initiative for Human Rights. They tied that all together

and announced that I was on Soros’ payroll and linked to the CIA. It went round on some forums and even

appeared in the printed edition.”

According to one of the interviewees, the campaign against him and the organisation for which he works was led by the Kurir daily on the orders of people from the intelligence services. “They smeared the network we work with, they wrote that we trade in electricity, that we’re enemies of the state,” he explains. A jo-urnalist from Inđija, who together with a colleague runs the Inđija Cafe news website, also experienced public defamation and disparagement by local government representatives. In her case, a photograph of her in which she was carrying a bag containing a bottle of beer was published on the official Municipality of Inđija Facebook page. This was followed by comments – on the same page – in which various Facebook users called her a “junkie”, “whore” and “transvestite”. Among the comments was a Municipality of Inđija council member who took part in the insults and vilification using his real full name. The whole incident was set off by her criticising irregularities pertaining to the resurfacing of roads in Inđija.

3.5 Attempts at Co-optionOne way of silencing critical voices is co-opting them into governing structures or, simply, promising vario-us services, privileges and material benefits in return for desisting with activism and criticism. Several of our interviewees have encountered this form of pressure. For example, as explained by a journalist from Valjevo:

“The mayor’s friend organised a festival in Divčibare, for which he received half a million from the previous

government. I published an article in which I didn’t criticise the event – even though it was a fiasco. Three

days later I got a call from the head of the city administration who told me the mayor wants to pay me 20,000

7 “Yellow” is Serbian slang for a supporter or a member of the Democratic Party.

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dinars for the article. Later I was called by the deputy mayor who told me to say if I wanted a larger sum. I

turned it down and that’s when I began to get more interested in budgetary issues.”

A journalist from Inđija recounts how she was presented with the demand to join SNS. She explains:

“In 2016, when the government in Inđija changed, I was told that – I was working at a television station at the

time – that I should become a member of SNS or that I won’t be needed anymore. That’s when I said goodbye

because I don’t want that. A journalist shouldn’t me a member of any party.”

An activist and journalist from Novi Sad told us:

“A member of my family got his job through SNS and told me to stop writing, not to expose myself too much.

A couple of my relatives would find me well-paid jobs, abroad. I would get offers of paid holidays during the

protests.”

The same interviewee experienced another strange situation that could be interpreted as an attempt at co-option:

“I took a BlaBlaCar from Novi Sad to Jagodina and in Belgrade I was joined on the ride by a girl who works

for the security services. I told her I was a journalist, she had recognised me and told me that as a journalist I

could have a promising career in the military security service where she works.”

3.6 Other Threats and PressuresThe repertoire of threats and pressures employed by government representatives is not limited to the five categories described above – in this section we will briefly outline the threats and pressures encountered less frequently by our interviewees but which unquestionably remain equally relevant and serious. For example, representatives of the UPSS from Niš experienced pressure in terms of being denied the use of public spaces, specifically the premises of the local community and the Regional Centre in Niš.

“We were denied use of the local community centre, through the decision that there simply weren’t enough

funds for the local community and that the centre had to close down, even though activities were organised in

the local community. We once managed to use the premises of the Regional Centre, after which we received

a call from a lady at the Regional Centre who told us she’d received threats, that if we use the premises again

she’d be fired. She asked us not to organise anything there again.”

The journalist from Vranje had a somewhat similar experience:

“It seems to me there’s no more intelligent form of pressure than removing a journalist from the public eye,

refusing to allow them to attend public events. They have established a method of not inviting you to press

conferences, not inviting you to events. When I say ‘they’, I mean the local SNS chapter, publically-owned

companies, public institutions, all public bodies in which they are in power.”

Another form of pressure are unfounded reports of violent behaviour. An activist from the village of Ra-kita (in the Babušnica municipality) campaigning against MHPs relates how companies building MHPs use private security firms and, according to him, their employees can be violent and aggressive. As he explains, the most aggressive are those without uniforms or other visible insignia and he emphasises that

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this aggressive and violent behaviour sometimes takes place in the presence of the police. He also has information indicating that some of these security company employees are former policemen. Moreover, attacks by activists against these security personnel or the construction sites themselves are fabricated and charges are filed:

“Private security company personnel are the worst behaved, they invent an injury, find a witness and someone

is convicted (a two-year suspended sentence) for hitting someone with their crutches – if you can believe it.

The police were even there and saw the whole thing.”

Other activists have also faced false charges of violent behaviour. The Roof Overhead (Krov nad glavom) organisation opposes forced evictions and organises operations to physically block bailiffs attempting to remove citizens from their homes. A Roof Overhead activist relates what happened during one of these operations:

“The police showed up on the second day in response to a call, somebody allegedly reported being threatened.

They detained an activist and in the car the policeman told him they would fake an attack on an officer of the

law and that he’d rip his own shirt as proof.”

Another interviewee, a journalist from Novi Sad, has also faced threats of false charges. In her case it was a lawsuit for defamation. The threat was preceded by intimidation and attempts to frighten her. On the or-ders of the president of the municipality of Kula (then the deputy president), local SNS activists visited the mother of our interviewee, told her that her daughter was “drugged up and drunk” when she interviewed the municipal president and openly threatened that nobody from her family would ever get a job in Kula. Later they threatened her with a defamation suit if she published an article on the sports hall in Kula that had not been renovated for decades and that presented a danger to the children that used it.

4. Activists’ Experiences with State Actors4.1 PoliceOur respondents’ experiences with the police vary. Some point out that low ranking police officers are usually polite but that many are clear on the fact that they do not have decision-making powers. In other words, the outcome of cases does not depend on them. This speaks to the fact that the conduct of the police is politicised – or rather, that it is directed by party officials. That police conduct is politicised is also supported by the fact that local functionaries sometimes openly reveal that they can access information about police investigations. For example, a Local Front activist from Kraljevo spoke to the Head of the Raška District, an SNS functionary, about destruction of property he had suffered: “The Head [of the Raš-ka District] said that he can definitely find out who did it and that he would immediately call the Chief of Police.”

The same respondent explains his view that the police conduct themselves differently when it comes to people known in the media. He concludes this on the basis of his own experience – before he became pu-blically known he states, “the police would not address me formally. When I had been on television, then they would call to check with the public prosecutor even for little things.” He adds: “It’s because they’re afraid of the publicity.”

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Some activists received help from the police in organising protests. For example, a member of UPSS reco-unts:

“UPSS has organised several tens of protests. I participated in the organisation of the Niš airport protests, I

was in charge of scheduling. That usually went smoothly. In fact, we had excellent cooperation with the police,

they were very helpful. There were no problems with the organisation of these protests.”

However, the same respondent does say that UPSS had problems with the communal police, which pre-vented them from leafleting and turned off the street lighting on the square where they congregated during a visit to Niš by Aleksandar Vučić. On the other hand, his colleague from the organisation says he is pleased to see that police officers are embittered and angry, which he interprets as dissatisfaction with the current regime:

“A couple of weeks ago the police pulled me over in Prokuplje, four of them. Because they saw my stickers, one

of them started saying, ‘I’m not getting killed by shelling – if there’s a war, I’m off to jail, I’m no fool.’ He said

it in front of three of his colleagues, I figure they all feel like that.”

Even so, not all direct interactions with the police are positive. A few activists encountered impoliteness and aggression from police officers, some of whom exceeded their powers and even issued veiled threats. For example, during a protest in Novi Sad, the police IDed and searched activists who unfurled a banner from the top of a building and prevented them from leaving. Our interlocutor, a journalist from Novi Sad recorded the incident and a police officer told her: “Go on, publish that if you dare,” to which she respon-ded: “Okay, in about an hour,” and she published the footage in spite of the attempted intimidation.

An activist from Roof Overhead suggests that the police officers who attend their operations are not only impolite but often violent. He recounts:

“During a large operation to resist the eviction of migrants in Ustanička [street], forty police officers showed

up to our fifty activists – they verbally intimidated activists and around fifteen activists were arrested and

taken to the Zvezdara police station for ‘hindering police officials in the conduct of their duties.’ Meanwhile,

they lied about which station they were being taken to.”

Referring to the police, the same respondent adds: “They take your details and we don’t know when or for what we’ll get a summons – that is, when they’ll initiate proceedings. It’s a way of putting pressure on what we do.”

The activist from Rakita, campaigning against MHPs, relates how a private security firm accused them of planting a bomb at the construction site, for which the police made him take a lie detector test. During the test, police officers insinuated that activists campaigning against MHPs in Rakita are financed by the Dveri party. Additionally, this activist was fined by the police for improperly parking his car in an unmarked space by a country lane. According to him, the parked car could not have inconvenienced anyone and that the ticket was just a show of power.

Some activists point out that police conduct is different for those protesting against the current govern-ment and, for example, for extreme right-wing groups. While activists get IDed and often verbally hara-ssed, intimidated or arrested, a few of the interviewees have noticed a marked tolerance by the police when dealing with extreme right-wing groups. One of the interviewees states that the extreme right-wing

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groups in his town are controlled by the “authorities and [security] services”. The police are similarly to-lerant towards, for example, private security and other (violent) groups engaged by private companies, which some of our respondents refer to as “private armies”. This indicates links between the state and right-wing groups, as well as with big business. A Roof Overhead activist says:

“[…] in the same way they used sledgehammers to demolish the house of a Roma family. We insisted that the

police offer them some basic protection, the police station is a minute away, but they were late or they ignored

the call. Even when we show up to offer resistance, they arrest us and the thugs because they get annoyed and

say, “What are you doing here? What are you filming?”

Talking about private security firms, a Local Front activist from Kraljevo points out the following:

“Those murky structures are most often linked to the parallel system of party security that’s being established

and you can’t work out how it’s organised. We don’t know how they make those mini-armies that they have in

gyms and that are legalised through private security agencies.”

Some activists’ interactions with the police have not been outwardly unpleasant but the circumstances in which they took place mean that they can be interpreted as a form of pressure. For example, during the 2017 Against Dictatorship protests, the Vojvodina Citizens Centre (Vojvođanski građanski centar) organi-sed for a few people to travel from Novi Sad to the protest in Belgrade. On the eve of their departure, at around 10pm, police officers, one of whom was out of uniform, paid a late visit to the centre’s offices. By chance an activist was in the office at the time and the police requested information about the organised departure. According to our respondent from this organisation, the police were polite but the time and circumstances of their visit leave room for it to be interpreted as a form of pressure or intimidation.

4.2 The Security Information Agency (BIA)A few of our interviewees have experienced contact with representatives of the BIA, some directly, others indirectly. Direct contact would involve the conversation being initiated by the BIA representative. Only in a few cases did BIA representatives show identification when making contact, while in most cases the interviewees simply assume – or are convinced – that they spoke to BIA representatives. Indirect contact would involve being followed or bugged – for which the respondents do not have irrefutable proof but suspect that the BIA was involved.

The interviewee from Južne vesti says that the BIA show the most interest in contacts between non-go-vernmental organisations and “foreigners”. A few activists from towns outside of Belgrade have been contacted by the BIA regarding organised trips to Belgrade to participate in protests there. They wanted to gather as much information as possible and usually claimed that this was done with the safety of the activists in mind.

An activist from Subotica recounts how the BIA went through the finances of his organisation but found no irregularities. He also says that BIA representatives are employed in fictitious jobs at public companies, specifically EPS (Elektroprivreda Srbije).

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“We submitted a petition to EPS [opposing the construction of an MHP] and that’s when we first became

aware of the representatives of the security services in EPS: directors, etc. There are more than 20 employees,

they have fictitious positions and they are the spooks. They called a colleague and presented themselves as

DB [Državna bezbednost – State Security]. That’s a colleague who was fired from EPS and now works in a

different company and continues to get threats.”

He also claims that his associates – activists campaigning against MHPs – receive direct threats from peo-ple working in the intelligence services:

“Our friends were called in by the DB for questioning and received direct threats. […] Near the EPS building a

man threatened to beat me up, warned me not to go to Drvno.”

Some respondents emphasise that they do not have a problem with the existence of security services and that the problem is the abuse of these services by the regime. A journalist and activist from Novi Sad told us:

“Sometimes people address me by my full name on the street. They say see you, etc. I’m sure they’re people

working for the state. [Do you see that as harassment?] In principle, yes, but I don’t take it that seriously. If

things were different I would be glad for people in plainclothes to be there at high-risk gatherings but I don’t

have any faith in the state.”

4.3. InspectionsInspections or audits of non-governmental organisations are, in principle, legal. However, the manner in which they are conducted indicates that these inspections have become politicised and that they are used as a mechanism to hinder the work of certain organisations. The interviewee from Južne vesti told us that, during an audit, the inspectors told him they are there on orders and that he found out about the audit informally from acquaintances at the town hall. Inspections of non-governmental organisations can last a very long time – months even – and are sometimes repeated even though no irregularities were identified. According to this same respondent, the inspections are conducted in accordance with the Law on the Pre-vention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and, as such, the government can use them to show the international community that this law is being implemented. However, our respondents agree that these audits of non-governmental organisations are intended to intimidate and hinder their work:

“Generally in our society there is a feeling that you’ve done something wrong when dealing with the tax

authorities. There’s always something. Maybe you didn’t fill out a form. You just feel guilty somehow. You feel

subdued and most people who find themselves in that situation would rather not rock the boat.”

Furthermore, the interviewee from Južne vesti adds that one inspector was particularly problematic and did not hide their intention to uncover financial irregularity at any cost. More seriously, he visited orga-nisations with which Južne vesti cooperate and “threatened” them with audits if they do not admit to financial transgressions.

The fact that these inspections are themselves legal makes it all the more difficult to prevent their misuse as a means to stifle the non-governmental sector.

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“Many ambassadors have been and gone and now they ask what’s the problem and we try to explain it and

they say: the tax inspectors review us and our embassy too. It’s hard to explain that it’s a mechanism for

exerting pressure,” explains the interviewee from Južne vesti.

4.4. Other State InstitutionsRegarding the safety of journalists, in 2017 a Permanent Working Group for Journalist Security was formed and comprises journalists and representatives of media associations, on the one hand, and representati-ves of the police and prosecutors, on the other. This working group was conceived as a mechanism that would make it easier to report and process threats to journalists but, as asserted by our interviewee, a journalist from Novi Sad, the processing of reports continues to be a serious problem.

“As a member of the Permanent Working Group I cannot even access information on my own case. Everything

moves very slowly and is very confusing. […] The crux of the matter is that the prosecutor’s office claims to

have problems with court proceedings. If they want to process a death threat, their case falls apart in court

due to the court’s definition of a death threat. We have had court proceedings where someone saying that you

should be killed is not considered a death threat but a speculative opinion. […] We joked about it but it these

are institutional problems.”

In his view, the inadequate processing of death threats against journalists is in part a consequence of the weak legal framework and the inefficient judiciary but is ultimately mostly due to a lack of political will. The best evidence for this is, as he says, the fact that threats against those in power are processed promptly. The interviewee also says that he knows of cases where the prosecution made deals with those who issued threats against journalists, handing them suspended sentences in return for guilty pleas.

An activist from Vrbas recounts how he initiated several private criminal proceedings – against unidenti-fied individuals because of defamation posted online and against a manager at a public company for abuse of office. The charges were brought through the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Vrbas, as well as through the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Novi Sad. He speaks to the fact that institutions declared themselves not to be responsible and that documents were repeatedly returned to him for small technical errors. In the end, he says he “ran out of energy”. On the other hand, as reported by an anti-MHP activist from the village of Rakita, activists from the village are frequently brought up on charges for misdemeanours and criminal acts that, as he claims, are falsified or rigged. “Here everyone has been charged a few times,” explains the activist from Rakita. In cases where charges are brought against activists, the judiciary is more effective, he explains.

In addition to judicial bodies, almost all activists have some experience with local government instituti-ons or with representatives of the municipalities in which they live. The capture of the state by the ruling party is particularly evident at the level of local institutions. Party officials who work in local institutions usually put the interests of their party – or those of other private actors with links to the party – before the interests of the citizens. This is confirmed by all of those interviewed in the course of this research. Even though they do not represent government institutions, it is important to mention SNS party delegates and coordinators here as some of the activists have spoken about them. As reported by one respondent:

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“SNS delegates have more power than the president of the municipality. Everything is done on their orders.

The president of the municipality cannot ignore their orders without provoking the displeasure of the party

leadership.”

According to the same interviewee, SNS delegates sometimes come from “outside”, from nearby villages or the closest large town. They are the ones who liaise between the party headquarters and local officials and who are in charge of maintaining “discipline”.

In smaller places, local authorities issue threats via intermediaries. The journalist from Valjevo explains:

“I don’t receive concrete pressures one to one, with someone calling me directly. […] But I do hear about

threats from the city administration: that they’ll turn off the tap, send inspectors round, that they’ll silence me,

actually that they’ll find a way of closing my mouth. […] People who are in SNS tell me about the threats, and

not just one person but two, three people. They’re friends. I’ve lived here my whole life. We know each other.”

5. Protection Measures and Forms of Assistance Only a few of the respondents employ physical security measures at their premises. For example, the offices of the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina (Nezavisno društvo novinara Vojvodine – NDNV) are – after several burglaries over the last five or six years – now secured by a metal gate. Our interviewee sees those break-ins as attempts at intimidation, particularly considering the fact that the burglars never took anything (with the exception of one monitor).

“We have a door that’s quite easy to break through but then there’s a little passage and a metal gate. That

would be tough to break through – it is possible but it would take time. They succeeded once, long ago. It was

in the old offices and we didn’t have the gate. They stole a monitor. The aim wasn’t to steal anything, it was

some kind of intimidation.”

When it comes to being physically followed or to eavesdropping, our interlocutors take precautionary measures such as, for example, sitting in noisy cafés where it is hard to hear what someone is saying at the next table; arranging meetings outside, where there is no danger of the room being bugged; informing friends and family about their plans and whereabouts so they are more likely to notice something out of the ordinary; carrying “pepper spray”; and so forth.

Regarding electronic communication, most respondents use the “more secure” applications, such as Si-gnal and Telegram. However, they are all sceptical about the security of electronic communication and believe that today there are no completely secure channels. However, some activists, primarily those working for larger organisations, do take measures to increase their digital security. It is worth noting that most respondents emphasise how important it is that prudence does not cross over into paranoia. Most try not to attach too much importance to potential dangers because paying too much attention to the dangers would mean that the intimidation is working.

When asked what activists and journalists lack or what they think they need in order to better protect themselves from risks and pressures, our interviewees agreed on a number of things.

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First, most are in need of free legal aid. This does not apply to all as journalists and activists from the larger organisations already have legal representatives. Free legal aid is, however, particularly important for the smaller organisations with limited financial means, as well as for grassroots activists who cannot afford to pay the fees of lawyers.

Second, some activists feel that they would benefit from training on the powers of security institutions because, as they report, most activists do not have a good understanding of their rights with respect to the security sector. An activist from Belgrade explains:

“Most of us do not have a legal background, we don’t know what we’re legally allowed to do and what the

other side is allowed to do. […] People are unsure when they go out on an operation because they don’t know

what is permitted. If we had materials that clearly stated what we can and cannot do and how, that would be

a step in the right direction, security-wise.”

Third, all of our interlocutors agree that media exposure and public awareness are crucial for security. A journalist from Leskovac explains: “The best protection from threats is the protection of the public eye, for things to be out in the open and heard more clearly.”

Fourth, in terms of public awareness, our respondents highlight the need for better mutual solidarity and unity amongst activists and independent journalists. Bearing in mind the difficulty of gaining access to mainstream media, most are of the opinion that the only way for dissenting voices to be heard is thro-ugh networking, solidarity and pooling struggles. An activist and journalist from Novi Sad suggests the following:

“I think it would be good to form some kind of group for the security of activists and journalists, why not? We

need someone who will send out joint press releases, [messages of] solidarity, legal aid is also important – this

group could provide that. A joint press release would be excellent. When, for example, the Sava Embankment

[Savski nasip] issues a press release it’s a minor thing but when you have a larger organisation, then it carries

more weight. It’s important who the press release is from and their integrity.”

6. Conclusion – Local Level State Capture The findings of this study confirm some conclusions that have already been made by existing studies8 – that the room for manoeuvre available activists, NGOs and independent journalists in Serbia is narrowing while trends of state capture are becoming increasingly evident. Data gathered through our fieldwork suggest that the pressures on activists and journalists are even more pronounced in smaller, “local” com-munities than in Belgrade or for larger organisations. In smaller communities, as many of our respondents have highlighted, “everyone knows everyone else.”9 In other words, interaction between people is me-diated less by institutions and impersonal mechanisms and is more dependent on personal relationships and contacts. This problem is more pronounced in communities where local power is concentrated in the

8 See, for example: Pejić, Jelena and Stojanović Gajić, Sonja (2018) Why do we Need the Priebe Report as Well: How to Reverse the Trend of State Capture in the Western Balkans? Belgrade: PrEUgovor; Popović, Dragan (2018) Udruženja građanja: Sužavanje prostora za delovanje, Srbija 2014-2018. Belgrade: Civil Initiatives; Matić Jovanka (2018) Kontrola i sloboda medija: Svedočenja novinara. Belgrade: Slavko Ćuruvija Foundation.

9 This view is shared by respondents from the larger towns, such as Niš.

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hands of a single individual – a ruling party official – who acts in their own and/or their party’s interests and has the power to make decisions about all aspects of social and political life. This model of governan-ce is present in many communities across Serbia, which indicates a kind of feudalisation of the state and society – local power-holders have unlimited power in their “fiefdoms” as long as they remain loyal to the “supreme ruler”.

On the other hand, the fact that everyone knows everyone else in small communities does on occasi-on prevent local functionaries from threatening or pressurising activists who they may know personally from other contexts. Our research shows that in these cases, SNS delegates arrive on the scene and liaise between the party headquarters and the local level. As was mentioned by some of our interviewees, local party members are themselves often under pressure from party delegates and coordinators.

Activists and journalists are exposed to threats and pressures for various reasons that can be divided into three categories. In the first category are those who report violations of the law by individual office-hol-ders but also by private entities (firms and companies) that have links with those in power and are, as such, part of the governing structures. This involves uncovering corruption and various abuses of office as defined by the law. In the second category are those activists who report on the corruptedness of the system itself – who point out the practices that are not always illegal but that favour private interests at the expense of the public good. Typical examples are workers’ struggles against privatisation, campaigns against the construction of MHPs, resistance against forced evictions and similar. In the third category are those who oppose the still official nationalist bent of the public discourse. This includes activists and journalists who work on the topic of Kosovo in a manner that deviates from official government policy on Kosovo, as well as those working on war crimes and transitional justice. At first glance, it seems that activism against nationalism can have little in common with activism against corruption and the misuse of public goods, however, corrupt elites largely owe their positions of power precisely to their exploitation of nationalist sentiment and the fostering of hatred and intolerance.

One of the main findings of the study has been that pressures faced by activists and journalists are, on the whole, subtle, indirect, obscured and frequently presented as quasi-friendly warnings or otherwise take the form of promises and offers. In other words, there are fewer open threats and more pressures that are harder to clearly identify and properly attribute to specific actors. As one of our interlocutors summarised: “[…] they don’t threaten, they harass and intimidate, but that harassment and intimidation yields results over time.” This means that the current government has perfected mechanisms for pressuring activists and journalists to the point that those pressures have become “elusive” for the legal system. In many ca-ses, they are not even obviously and unequivocally illegal, which is one of the basic traits of the captured state.

When it comes to institutions that should protect the security of all citizens – including activists and inde-pendent journalists – our research suggests that these institutions do not perform their function in a sat-isfactory manner. Most of our respondents lack confidence in institutions such as the police, the prosecu-tor’s office, the BIA, etc. Only a small number of those on the receiving end of threats or pressures turn to institutions and those that do usually do not do it for protection but to officially document what happened to them. Generally, none of our respondents believes that institutions will protect them. Certainly, each of the activists has had some positive experience with individuals working for these institutions – with police

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officers, municipal employees and so forth. Viewed structurally, however, these institutions do not serve the public, they serve the party and other private interests.

Another important research finding was the existence of an interplay between the ruling party, criminal groups, right-wing groups, private companies, private security firms and similar. As pointed out by one in-terviewee: “We don’t know the difference between security services, party activists and private security,” in the sense that it is often unclear in what capacity a specific individual is taking action. This interplay – in addition to indicating the privatisation of the state – has the effect of creating an atmosphere of in-security and fear because citizens do not know what their rights are in relation to certain actors nor what legal powers these actors have. Moreover, links between the institutions, the ruling party and right-wing groups indicate that the current government does not see their ideology as a reason not to use them and to cooperate with them in combating critics of the regime, who are usually also critical of nationalism and the extreme right.

Threats and pressures that are not directed at the individual activist or journalist but at their family fre-quently result in an abandonment of activism and withdrawal into the private sphere. Most of our respon-dents said that they do not fear for themselves and that threats directed only at them were not enough to scare them into giving up their fight. However, most saw threats that included members of their families as a limit beyond which they dare not go. It is important to mention that threats directed against female activists and journalists are mostly sexist and misogynist. Our respondents agree that all activists and journalists in Serbia who are critical of the government would benefit from more solidarity, more media exposure and free legal aid.