The South Atlantic Quarterly 110:1, Winter 2011DOI 10.1215/00382876-1275788�© 2011 Duke University Press

A G A I N S T the D A Y

Julian Reid

The Vulnerable Subject of Liberal War

How we understand the nature of the subject that wages war has fun-damental implications for how we understand the subject of the struggle against war. The subject of liberal war does not � ght simply in order to destroy another subject but to produce subjects who will in turn reproduce the order for which such war is waged. Thus the problem of how to resist liberal war has to entail the question of how to resist the forms of subjec-tivity its wars produce. If we do not formulate the problem of subjectivity correctly, then the problem of resistance will be badly formulated as well. In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In Frames of War, Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to conceive not only its own violence as righteous but its own destructibility as “unthinkable.”1 She writes: “The notion of the subject produced by the recent wars conducted by the US, including its torture operations, is one in which the US subject seeks to produce itself as impermeable, to de� ne itself as protected permanently against incursion and as radically invulner-able to attack” (47). The U.S. desire for a condition of radical invulnerability is not a malaise that we can explain away simply on account of its military power, because it is, Butler argues, a symptom of the deeply embedded belief in security that has shaped modern discourses on subjectivity tout court. Exemplifying the biophilosophical tradition of thought that seeks to tear “the subject from the terrain of the cogito and consciousness” and “root it in life,”2 Butler’s ambition is to underscore the embodied nature of the subject and, more to the point, the living of the life that embodiment entails. The subject is a thing that lives, indeed, which must live, in order

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In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the correctly, then the problem of resistance will be badly formulated as well. In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In

, Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In

destroy another subject but to produce subjects who will in turn reproduce the order for which such war is waged. Thus the problem of how to resist liberal war has to entail the question of how to resist the forms of subjec-tivity its wars produce. If we do not formulate the problem of subjectivity correctly, then the problem of resistance will be badly formulated as well. In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In

, Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to conceive not only its own violence as righteous but its own destructibility

tivity its wars produce. If we do not formulate the problem of subjectivity correctly, then the problem of resistance will be badly formulated as well. In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the

conceive not only its own violence as righteous but its own destructibility conceive not only its own violence as righteous but its own destructibility conceive not only its own violence as righteous but its own destructibility conceive not only its own violence as righteous but its own destructibility , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to

conceive not only its own violence as righteous but its own destructibility , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to

conceive not only its own violence as righteous but its own destructibility , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to

last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to

last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In , Judith Butler argues that the United States is a subject produced to

last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the last decade, what kind of subject do we see being produced? In In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the In an examination of the wars waged by the United States over the

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Reid • The Vulnerable Subject of Liberal War�773

to be and, in living, is a thing that must die and therefore can never aspire to the kinds of security promised to it by the false prophets of Western metaphysics. Security, once considered in light of the subject’s � nitude, must be dismissed as hyperbolic fantasy. Basic to the life of the subject is not its capacity to achieve security but its radical vulnerability. As Butler states, “There are no conditions that can fully ‘solve’ the problem of human precariousness. Bodies come into being and cease to be: as physically per-sistent organisms, they are subject to incursions and to illnesses that jeop-ardize the possibility of persisting at all. These are necessary features of bodies—they cannot ‘be’ thought without their � nitude, and they depend on what is ‘outside themselves’ to be sustained—features that pertain to the phenomenological structure of bodily life” (29–30). Recognizing the vul-nerability of the subject must mean, Butler argues, not just establishing a di� erent way of theorizing subjectivity but establishing a di� erent politics, one that emerges from the recognition of our vulnerability. Establishing such a politics of vulnerability is a task Butler ascribes to “the Left” because the pathological belief in security is as much a problem for the Left, she argues, as it is for the United States. Leftist movements concerned with protecting sexual minorities now oppose the expansion of rights of protection to immigrant minorities and give support to state vio-lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the necessity of a “new bodily ontology” (2), underscoring vulnerability, for the development of a new form of leftist political subjectivity. The Left needs to understand vulnerability as “a shared condition” and to develop coalitions between di� erent vulnerable subjects to struggle against the violence by which populations are di� erentially deprived of the basic resources needed to minimize their vulnerability, she argues (32). Butler’s plea for the extension of protection to vulnerable groups not recognized as such is appealing. As she states, “Part of the very problem of contemporary political life is that not everyone counts as a subject. . . . What is at stake are communities not quite recognized as such, subjects who are living, but not yet regarded as ‘lives’” (31–32). The determination of the di� erences between life deemed worthy of protection and life that can be destroyed is a problem of how we “apprehend a life” as such (2). That prob-lem is doubly epistemological and ontological, being of “the frames through which we apprehend or, indeed, fail to apprehend the lives of others as lost or injured” as well as ontological “since the question at issue is: what is a

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lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-rights of protection to immigrant minorities and give support to state vio-lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality

Establishing such a politics of vulnerability is a task Butler ascribes to “the Left” because the pathological belief in security is as much a problem for the Left, she argues, as it is for the United States. Leftist movements concerned with protecting sexual minorities now oppose the expansion of rights of protection to immigrant minorities and give support to state vio-lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the necessity of a “new bodily ontology” (2), underscoring vulnerability, for the

concerned with protecting sexual minorities now oppose the expansion of rights of protection to immigrant minorities and give support to state vio-lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-

necessity of a “new bodily ontology” (2), underscoring vulnerability, for the necessity of a “new bodily ontology” (2), underscoring vulnerability, for the necessity of a “new bodily ontology” (2), underscoring vulnerability, for the necessity of a “new bodily ontology” (2), underscoring vulnerability, for the of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the necessity of a “new bodily ontology” (2), underscoring vulnerability, for the of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality of vulnerability to the subject (13). In light of this, Butler argues for the lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-lence indicates the failure of the Left to have recognized the fundamentality lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-rights of protection to immigrant minorities and give support to state vio-lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-rights of protection to immigrant minorities and give support to state vio-lence against vulnerable populations on behalf of their causes. Such vio-

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774�The South Atlantic Quarterly • Against the Day • Summer 2011

life?” (1). And given that “the ‘being’ of life is itself constituted through selective means,” Butler is right that “as a result, we cannot refer to this ‘being’ outside of the operations of power, and so must we make more pre-cise the speci� c mechanisms of power through which life is produced” (1). The name that Michel Foucault gives to the mechanisms of power and the selective means that produce life today is, of course, biopower.3 Indeed, if we want to understand how wars today are waged in destruction of life, it is helpful to understand them through the lens of his concept of biopolitics.4As Butler argues, this requires questioning the discourses underwriting war today, most especially the claims concerning what counts as human life as such and what forms of life that are said to be dangerous to humanity. I agree with much of this, but there are some fundamental problems regard-ing the counterontological shift to vulnerability that Butler proposes for a leftist resistance to war today, which I wish to draw out here. Let us start with Butler’s claims concerning the ontological “fact” of vulnerability (23). One primary lesson that Foucault teaches us is the dan-ger to be had in practicing philosophy by way of what he called “an impera-tive discourse.”5 Rather than engaging in a philosophy that glibly attempts to pronounce the facts or truth about life, it is necessary to analyze the “knowledge e� ects” produced by the imperative discourses that support the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of what life is and what conditions will enable it. Every imperative discourse on life, no matter its content, entails such implications. This is why we must, if we are to do justice to Foucault, practice circumspection when examining claims about the reality or facts said to concern life. Impera-tive discourses are never grounded in facts, no matter how much they may make recourse to “the facts.” The “fact” of “vulnerability” is no di� erent. It is an element within a discourse every bit as aesthetic as discourses that presuppose the possibility of security and on account of which Butler cri-tiques for their inauthenticity. This error owes to the debased ways in which Butler and others have engaged Foucault’s biopolitics. Life, as Foucault argues repeatedly, is not an ontological category. Rather than embracing Butler’s argument for the ontological fundamentality of vulnerability for the life of the subject, it befalls us to consider what the implications are for life when vulnerability is thus rei� ed. What forms of life will a vulner-able subject discount as unworthy and indeed declare permissible to kill in order to defend the sanctity of its own account of life as vulnerable?

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the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to “knowledge e� ects” produced by the imperative discourses that support the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather

vulnerability (23). One primary lesson that Foucault teaches us is the dan-ger to be had in practicing philosophy by way of what he called “an impera-

Rather than engaging in a philosophy that glibly attempts facts or truth about life, it is necessary to analyze the

“knowledge e� ects” produced by the imperative discourses that support the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of what life is and what conditions will enable it. Every imperative discourse

facts or truth about life, it is necessary to analyze the “knowledge e� ects” produced by the imperative discourses that support the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to

what life is and what conditions will enable it. Every imperative discourse what life is and what conditions will enable it. Every imperative discourse what life is and what conditions will enable it. Every imperative discourse what life is and what conditions will enable it. Every imperative discourse than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of what life is and what conditions will enable it. Every imperative discourse than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather than pronouncing truths about life, Foucault examines the implications of analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to analyze how di� erent forms of life are evaluated as worth living. Rather the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to “knowledge e� ects” produced by the imperative discourses that support the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to “knowledge e� ects” produced by the imperative discourses that support the regimes of truth through which life is determined as life as well as to

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Reid • The Vulnerable Subject of Liberal War�775

This is not an abstract question. Whatever we may think about the veracity of Butler’s theory of vulnerability as predicate of life and precondi-tion for subjectivity, it is necessary to note the degree to which this way of thinking about subjectivity is contemporaneous not with an incipient new leftism but with the dominant episteme and regime of power relations that the Left today has to combat. The ontology of the social underlying But-ler’s account of vulnerability is deeply liberal. Vulnerability “implies living socially, that is, the fact that one’s life is always in some sense in the hands of the other. It implies exposure both to those we know and to those we do not know; a dependency on people we know, or barely know, or know not at all” (14). Such a problematization of the vulnerability of the subject on account of its exposure to an unknowable social domain of potential vio-lence and harm partakes of a tradition of thinking that extends back to the foundations of liberalism in the seventeenth century, most signi� cantly to the work of Thomas Hobbes. This tradition is the primary foundation on which the liberal state has legitimated itself from the origins of moder-nity. The subject’s vulnerability, based on exposure to an unknown and dangerous domain of relations, instantiates the very demand for protec-tion on which liberal governance depends for its legitimation in relation to the subject. Late in his career, Foucault traced the development of the political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the social.6 This unknowability provoked a will to know, which was incited by the state’s desire to secure the life of its subjects against the vulnerabilities entailed in social living—not simply, of course, on account of some benevo-lent interest in human well- being but in order to render the state itself more stable and less vulnerable to the costs that arise from social insecu-rity. Thus, rather than following Butler and embracing another reiteration of liberalism’s understanding of the dangers posed to the subject’s vulner-able life by the unknowability of the social, we can better pose the questions of why, when, and how it was that the life of the subject came to be so con-ceived. We then � nd that we can locate Butler within the very tradition that the Left today is forced to think against. Within the liberal tradition, the trope of the vulnerable subject has undergone shifts and turns. Whereas in the seventeenth century the vul-nerability of the subject was said to arise from its exposure to unknowable and dangerous social relations, by the eighteenth century that vulnerability was conceptualized as owing to its dependency on what was termed nature.

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political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his to the subject. Late in his career, Foucault traced the development of the political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality

on which the liberal state has legitimated itself from the origins of moder-nity. The subject’s vulnerability, based on exposure to an unknown and dangerous domain of relations, instantiates the very demand for protec-tion on which liberal governance depends for its legitimation in relation to the subject. Late in his career, Foucault traced the development of the political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the

This unknowability provoked a will to know, which was incited by

tion on which liberal governance depends for its legitimation in relation to the subject. Late in his career, Foucault traced the development of the political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his

This unknowability provoked a will to know, which was incited by This unknowability provoked a will to know, which was incited by This unknowability provoked a will to know, which was incited by This unknowability provoked a will to know, which was incited by grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the

This unknowability provoked a will to know, which was incited by grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality grew in accordance with a problematization of the unknowability of the 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he traced how that rationality political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his to the subject. Late in his career, Foucault traced the development of the political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his to the subject. Late in his career, Foucault traced the development of the political rationality of liberalism within the European state form. In his

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776�The South Atlantic Quarterly • Against the Day • Summer 2011

In his 1979 lecture series, Foucault described how liberalism refabricated its understanding of the vulnerable subject in such terms. Writing in the eighteenth century, Nicolas de Condorcet, for example, developed the idea of a subject who is vulnerable because his interests are “dependent on an in� nite number of things . . . on accidents of nature about which he can do nothing and which he cannot foresee . . . a course of the world that out-strips him and eludes him in every respect” such that “each [subject] is dependent on an uncontrollable, unspeci� ed whole of the ° ow of things and the world.”7 Such claims as to the radical vulnerability of the subject to nature were, as Foucault reveals, central to the force with which liberalism was able to transform the model of European state sovereignty. They were the basis on which the liberal prohibition on governmental intervention within the economy arose and found its legitimacy. The claims that nature will always elude us and that if we attempt to control it we will “only ever see chimeras” are the fabricated truths on which the principal subject of liberal political economy, Homo economicus, proclaimed the impossibility of a sovereign point of view over the totality of the state.8 Homo economicus claimed: “You must not attempt to establish sovereignty over the accidents of nature, because you cannot achieve such a state, and you cannot because you are powerless in the face of it, and why are you powerless? Because you do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and “facts” that Homo economicus wielded against the subject that believed it could achieve security by resolving its vulnerability to the accidental nature of the world, which it would have otherwise faced. Not only is this the curse that the subject of liberal economy throws at the sovereign that would seek to overcome its condition of vulnerability, but it is the very kernel of the concept of economy itself. For what is econ-omy when we examine it more closely than the name of the nature of the subject itself, Homo economicus? Commonly, of course, if we look at classi-cal accounts of economy, we � nd it identi� ed with forms of activity involv-ing an “optimal allocation of scarce resources to alternative ends.”9 In that sense, to be an economic subject is to be concerned with increasing life chances while having scarce resources. But as Foucault’s interrogation of the biopolitics of the liberal subject reveals, to be Homo economicus is not simply to be a subject interested in increasing the utility of its biomaterial resources but more fundamentally a subject in possession of a biomate-rial nature. It is to be a subject that produces itself as a being that lives—indeed, that must live in order to be—and that in its � nitude cannot aspire

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do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how you are powerless in the face of it, and why are you powerless? Because you do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and

, proclaimed the impossibility of a sovereign point of view over the totality of the state.claimed: “You must not attempt to establish sovereignty over the accidents of nature, because you cannot achieve such a state, and you cannot because you are powerless in the face of it, and why are you powerless? Because you do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and

Homo economicuscould achieve security by resolving its vulnerability to the accidental nature

of nature, because you cannot achieve such a state, and you cannot because you are powerless in the face of it, and why are you powerless? Because you do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how

could achieve security by resolving its vulnerability to the accidental nature could achieve security by resolving its vulnerability to the accidental nature could achieve security by resolving its vulnerability to the accidental nature could achieve security by resolving its vulnerability to the accidental nature Homo economicus wielded against the subject that believed it

could achieve security by resolving its vulnerability to the accidental nature wielded against the subject that believed it wielded against the subject that believed it wielded against the subject that believed it wielded against the subject that believed it wielded against the subject that believed it wielded against the subject that believed it

to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and wielded against the subject that believed it

to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and wielded against the subject that believed it

to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and wielded against the subject that believed it

to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how to because you cannot know how to.” These were the “imperatives” and do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how you are powerless in the face of it, and why are you powerless? Because you do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how you are powerless in the face of it, and why are you powerless? Because you do not know how to establish such a sovereignty, and you do not know how

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to achieve security but can only live out its vulnerability to the accidental nature of the world it inhabits. It is to be a subject that refuses the authority of powers that claim to act on its behalf and to secure life for it and to be a subject that proclaims its own superior capacity not to seek security from its vulnerability but to live in open relation with it, prospering from it through the renewed practice of an entrepreneurial resilience to its resil-ience to its destructiveness. The history of the Left has, of course, been de� ned signi� cantly by the struggle with precisely this “imperative discourse,” the subject that speaks it, and the account of the world it presumes. A central problem of the Left is how to speak back to this curse against the proposition of a power that a� ords protection from the contingencies of the world and o� ers some transcendence of such contingencies. How does Butler’s attempt to resitu-ate the politics of the Left around the “apprehension of a common human vulnerability” � gure within that history of struggle?10 Of course, Butler, unlike card- carrying liberals, does not preach the value of the economic prosperity that arises from leaving the vulnerable to their own devices. Her project is to extend protection to populations otherwise deprived of it (31). But can that be achieved by claiming the illusion of security and the onto-logical fact of vulnerability? I don’t think so. If anything, Butler’s argu-ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the hubristic fantasy of a subject that can transcend its vulnerabilities, destroy their sources, and free itself from them. This subject does not just live in relations of subjection to the conditions on which it depends but seeks to escape its dependence. In contrast, Butler preaches the myth of a sub-ject that cannot escape its milieu and can only ever depend on its environ-mental sources of life support. Indeed, the Butlerian subject is precisely one that lives its life terminally, and for political purposes comatosely, on “life support.” This is a mode of apprehending the life of the subject that assumes its incapacity—the subject’s life, as she says, is de� ned by its vul-nerability to injury, loss, destruction, and neglect (31). In contrast, the Left today requires a subject capable of going to war with the very discourse of the reduction of life to biological dependence. This is the episteme and account of subjectivity on which contemporary power relations revolve. Rather than accepting vulnerability as an ontological aspect of sub-jectivity, we should grasp how the concept of vulnerability functions today within governing regimes’ strategies of subjecti� cation. We are not simply

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ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity logical fact of vulnerability? I don’t think so. If anything, Butler’s argu-ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-

unlike card- carrying liberals, does not preach the value of the economic prosperity that arises from leaving the vulnerable to their own devices. Her project is to extend protection to populations otherwise deprived of it (31). But can that be achieved by claiming the illusion of security and the onto-logical fact of vulnerability? I don’t think so. If anything, Butler’s argu-ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the hubristic fantasy of a subject that can transcend its vulnerabilities, destroy

But can that be achieved by claiming the illusion of security and the onto-logical fact of vulnerability? I don’t think so. If anything, Butler’s argu-ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity

hubristic fantasy of a subject that can transcend its vulnerabilities, destroy hubristic fantasy of a subject that can transcend its vulnerabilities, destroy hubristic fantasy of a subject that can transcend its vulnerabilities, destroy hubristic fantasy of a subject that can transcend its vulnerabilities, destroy eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the hubristic fantasy of a subject that can transcend its vulnerabilities, destroy eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-eral war. The future of the Left depends, I believe, on a reinvestment in the becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity becomes indistinguishable from liberalism, making it di¶ cult to resist lib-ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity logical fact of vulnerability? I don’t think so. If anything, Butler’s argu-ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity logical fact of vulnerability? I don’t think so. If anything, Butler’s argu-ment debases the leftist imaginary, such that its conception of subjectivity

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778�The South Atlantic Quarterly • Against the Day • Summer 2011

vulnerable—we are called on to demonstrate ourselves as being vulner-able, individually and collectively. Even if we take a cursory look at a docu-ment as central to the discursive foundations of global liberal governance as the “United Nations Millennium Declaration,” we discover that “the vul-nerable” are precisely the population on whose interpellation the major institution of that police order depends for its authority.11 Butler does not address this element of the discourse of vulnerability, and she fails even to treat the concept as discursive, instead asserting it as crude “fact.” How can vulnerability be a su¶ cient condition on which to base a politics of contes-tation to the “mechanisms of power” (1) through which human lives are framed today, when it is the � rst presupposition of liberalism, the tradition of thought and governance to which these mechanisms of power owe their origin? How can vulnerability be conceived as the foundation for a counter-liberal theory of subjectivity, when it is the � rst presupposition of liberal biopolitics and its biologized subject? Captured as she is within the biopolitical limits of liberal discourse, Butler produces an account of a subject dependent on a milieu without which it cannot survive and whose powers of protection it must continually strive to maintain. Thus it is akin to the subject of psychoanalysis, de� ned by that which it lacks, immersed in objects with which it must maintain contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for politics of the subject.12 In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub-ject today is to rediscover the subject’s other side, which entails the ways by which it decides what it wants, asserts what it possesses, and celebrates what it is able to do. I call this the hubristic dimension of the subject. Today we might observe that hubristic is the subject who acts against the mon-archy of life, challenging the subject’s reduction to a status of dependency on things outside the self, sacri� cing that on which he or she has hitherto depended, taking what he or she wants, and celebrating autonomy. For it is not, as Butler asserts, that we are by necessity dependent on any life sup-port, but to be more than merely vulnerable subjects, we have to able to free ourselves from such support. The problem of vulnerability is not ontologi-cal but epistemological, subjective not universal. Every account of subjectivity entails its own account of violence and cannot avoid ri¶ ng on the questions of who it is desirable to kill and how. Does the age- old problem of political violence get any better if we invest in vulnerability rather than hubris as the foundation for political subjec-tivity? No. Vulnerability breeds its own violence, and Butler is not shy about

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contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not by that which it lacks, immersed in objects with which it must maintain contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for

Captured as she is within the biopolitical limits of liberal discourse, Butler produces an account of a subject dependent on a milieu without which it cannot survive and whose powers of protection it must continually strive to maintain. Thus it is akin to the subject of psychoanalysis, de� ned by that which it lacks, immersed in objects with which it must maintain contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for politics of the subject.12 In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub-ject today is to rediscover the subject’s other side, which entails the ways

strive to maintain. Thus it is akin to the subject of psychoanalysis, de� ned by that which it lacks, immersed in objects with which it must maintain contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not

ject today is to rediscover the subject’s other side, which entails the ways ject today is to rediscover the subject’s other side, which entails the ways ject today is to rediscover the subject’s other side, which entails the ways ject today is to rediscover the subject’s other side, which entails the ways In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub-

ject today is to rediscover the subject’s other side, which entails the ways In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub- In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub- In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub- In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub- In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub- In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub-

encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub-

encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub-

encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for In contrast, the task of a leftist theory of the sub-

encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not encompass the entirety of subjectivity nor merely the life or capacity for contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not by that which it lacks, immersed in objects with which it must maintain contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not by that which it lacks, immersed in objects with which it must maintain contact. Of course, dependency is an aspect of subjectivity, but it does not

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Reid • The Vulnerable Subject of Liberal War�779

endorsing forms of political and indeed state- led violence, for example, in situations of imminently declared “genocide” to protect “the vulnerable” (37). But the weakness of stressing our shared vulnerability in order to resist the violence of the United States owes as much to Butler’s diagnosis of the nature of subjectivity being produced by those wars. On this prob-lem, Butler follows a well- trodden path of misperceiving U.S. foreign policy as an expression of an “arrogant politics” born out of its supposedly classi-cal imperialist ambition. As she argues, the subject produced by these wars believes in the possibility of it becoming impermeable, permanently pro-tected, and radically invulnerable (47). Is this true? When we examine the discourses underpinning the legitimation of the reassertion of the sover-eign power of the United States to wage war since the declaration of its “war on terror,” what do we see? A sovereign subject convinced of its eventual indestructibility? Or a vulnerable subject preoccupied with its own weak-nesses? A subject that conceives of itself deploying violence strategically with a view to achieving a “permanent” condition of security? Or one that no longer believes in the possibility of such security and is committed to a policy of an endless war? Of course it is the latter. We have to look only at the hysterical dis-course within the United States around the “vulnerability” of the “national infrastructure.”13 In the United States, infrastructure is de� ned as the “vari-ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become organized around the protection of the conditions for “quality of life.”14A startling likeness is found between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s account of U.S. vulnerability to “terrorism” and Butler’s demand that we reconceive political obligation as the obligation “to the conditions that make life possible” because “there can be no sustained life without those sustaining conditions, and those conditions are both our political responsibility and the matter of our most vexed ethical decisions” (23). This discursive interface reveals the lie on which rests her representation of the subjectivity whose violence she contests. The primary vulnerable subject today is the United States, whose violence comes from its own biopoliti-cized self- understanding as an entity whose survival and capacity to care for life globally is at stake in a war with an enemy dedicated to the destruction of life- promoting conditions.15 So where can the Left go from here? Now that we have laid to rest the issue of the potential of Butler’s account of vulnerability for the theo-rization of future politics, it befalls us to reestablish the preconditions of

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In the United States, infrastructure is de� ned as the “vari-course within the United States around the “vulnerability” of the “national

In the United States, infrastructure is de� ned as the “vari-ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively

with a view to achieving a “permanent” condition of security? Or one that no longer believes in the possibility of such security and is committed to a

Of course it is the latter. We have to look only at the hysterical dis-course within the United States around the “vulnerability” of the “national

In the United States, infrastructure is de� ned as the “vari-ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become organized around the protection of the conditions for “quality of life.”

Of course it is the latter. We have to look only at the hysterical dis-course within the United States around the “vulnerability” of the “national

In the United States, infrastructure is de� ned as the “vari-

organized around the protection of the conditions for “quality of life.”organized around the protection of the conditions for “quality of life.”organized around the protection of the conditions for “quality of life.”organized around the protection of the conditions for “quality of life.”together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become organized around the protection of the conditions for “quality of life.”together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively together to sustain . . . quality of life,” and the U.S. war on terror has become ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively

In the United States, infrastructure is de� ned as the “vari-ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively

In the United States, infrastructure is de� ned as the “vari-ous human, cyber, and physical components that must work e� ectively

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In the United States, infrastructure is de� ned as the “vari-course within the United States around the “vulnerability” of the “national

In the United States, infrastructure is de� ned as the “vari-

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780�The South Atlantic Quarterly • Against the Day • Summer 2011

a leftist account of subjectivity. The major task facing the Left today is that of reconceptualizing the subject so that it may free itself from hegemonic and stultifying accounts of its being that revolve around the fears of what can be done to its biological properties and capacities—the reduction, in other words, of political subjectivity to biopolitical subjectivity, and that of the human to the biohuman.16 Conceiving subjectivity as such is peculiar to the regimes of subjecti� cation that the Left today is pressed to combat. A politics to supersede the conditions of liberal modernity requires a sub-ject capable of thinking within an idiom of what Félix Guattari once named “incorporeal species.”17 Incorporeal species live but do not die. They can be forgotten or lost, cease to exist, but die as such they cannot. The political is one such species. The future of the political subject will not depend on his or her life as such but on the deeds and bonds of which the subject is capable, some of which will compromise his or her mere life and the very livability of his or her subjectivity. Political subjects do not merely depend on their milieus or desire the sustainability of the conditions for living the lives they do; rather, they resist those conditions and at times overcome them and transform them into what they were not, thereby establishing new conditions for life. Hubris is the constitutive power through which political subjects come into existence, amid the fantasy of the possibility of another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human capacity.

Notes

1 Judith Butler, Frames of War (London: Verso, 2009), 47; hereafter cited parenthetically by page number.

2 Giorgio Agamben, “Absolute Immanence,” in Potentialities, trans. Daniel Heller- Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 221.

3 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 1990).

4 Julian Reid, “Politicizing Connectivity: Beyond the Biopolitics of Information Tech-nology in International Relations,” Cambridge Review of International A� airs 22.4 (2009): 607–23; Julian Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity and the Defence of Logistical Societies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); and Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live (London: Routledge, 2009).

5 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3.

6 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population.

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another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of political subjects come into existence, amid the fantasy of the possibility of another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human

on their milieus or desire the sustainability of the conditions for living the lives they do; rather, they resist those conditions and at times overcome them and transform them into what they were not, thereby establishing new conditions for life. Hubris is the constitutive power through which political subjects come into existence, amid the fantasy of the possibility of another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human

new conditions for life. Hubris is the constitutive power through which political subjects come into existence, amid the fantasy of the possibility of another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of fantasy but to underline the claim that illusion is the fundamentally human another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of political subjects come into existence, amid the fantasy of the possibility of another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of political subjects come into existence, amid the fantasy of the possibility of another life, another existence. This is not to deny the illusional quality of

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7 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 277.

8 Ibid., 281–82. 9 Ibid., 268. 10 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso,

2006), 204. 11 “As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world’s people, especially the most vul-

nerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs”. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 55/2, “United Nations Millennium Dec-laration”, September 8, 2000, www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm.

12 Peter Sloterdijk, Rage and Time: A Psychopolitical Investigation, trans. Mario Wenning (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 13–19.

13 Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War, 127–46. 14 Department of Homeland Security, The National Plan for Research and Development in

Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2004, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dhs/nat_plan_rnd_crit_infra.pdf (accessed February 28, 2011).

15 Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror. 16 Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War, 147–56. 17 Félix Guattari, The Three Ecologies, trans. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton (London: Athlone,

2000), 43–44.

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, trans. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton (London: Athlone,

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