A Liberal Peace in Asia?

BENJAMIN E. GOLDSMITH Lecturer

Discipline of Politics University of Newcastle

NSW 2308 Australia benjamin.goldsmith@newcastle.edu.au

Tel: +612 4921 5072 Abstract: Drawing on recent liberal peace and Asian security research, this article assesses

the relevance of prominent ‘Kantian’ hypotheses for understanding the international politics

of Asia. While there is some evidence that the dynamics of war and peace are different in

Asia than in other parts of the world, this does not mean that liberal theories are irrelevant.

There is at best weak support for the pacific effects of democracy or international institutions

in Asia. But liberal expectations, and those of some Asia analysts, about the importance of

economic interdependence for reducing conflict in Asia are robustly confirmed. This result

obtains even with a control for the simultaneous trade-dampening effect of conflict using

structural equations. But the strong intra-Asian effect of trade interdependence does not

translate into a robust pacific effect between Asian states and those outside the region. A

more nuanced picture emerges; the democratic peace appears most relevant for interactions

between Asian states and the rest of the world. The findings show that analysts can rely

neither on beliefs that Asia is sui generis nor on purely realist models as guides to Asian

security issues. Kantian and realist theories are both relevant. The results also indicate that

some common assumptions of analysts, especially regarding the importance of alliances and

institutions, are not in accord with the regularities of conflict and peace in Asia. (224 words)

This is the pre-publication version of: Goldsmith, Benjamin E. (2007). A Liberal Peace in Asia? Journal of Peace Research, 44(1), 5-27.

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Introduction

Do the Liberal Peace propositions apply to Asia? A large number of quantitative studies show

that three ‘Kantian’ variables, democracy, international organizations and law, and

international economic interdependence, are strongly and causally associated with peaceful

interstate relations. The effects of these variables, with roots in liberal philosophy (e.g., Kant,

1999 [1795]), are assumed to be universal, and studies typically include pooled data for all

states in the international system (e.g., Oneal & Russett, 1999; Cederman & Rao, 2001;

Russett & Oneal, 2001; Cornwell & Colaresi, 2002; Gartzke, Li, & Boehmer, 2001; Jungblut

& Stoll, 2002; Oneal, Russett, & Berbaum, 2003). But other recent quantitative research on

the sources of international conflict and war clearly shows regional differences in both the

level of militarized conflict, and its roots (Lemke, 2002; Gleditsch, 2002a). Some authors

have also applied these findings to examine regional variations in variables relevant to the

liberal peace propositions, and found important regional differences (Goldsmith,

forthcoming; Henderson, 2004). Such research builds on a number of other works exploring

the possibility of significant regional variations in the causes and patterns of conflict and

other aspects of international relations (e.g., Ayoob, 1995; Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Holsti,

1996; Kacowicz, 1998; Solingen, 1998).

Concurrently, but largely in isolation from these areas of broad theory and

quantitative research, experts in the international relations of Asia and the Asia-Pacific area

there have debated whether Asian international relations are qualitatively different from those

in other parts of the world, and thus inappropriate for study in the framework of general

theories (e.g., Acharya, 2003; Kang 2003). Analysts have also argued about which factors are

more or less conducive to peace or conflict in the region, both during and after the Cold War.

These studies have mainly used small samples of case-study evidence or logical arguments

backed up by supporting anecdotes. Recently this debate has turned to a discussion of the

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relative weight of international institutions and international trade, on the one hand, and

power balances and major power proclivities on the other (e.g., Berger, 2000: 416-20;

Friedberg, 1993/94: 15-21). These factors have clear theoretical links to the liberal and realist

schools of international relations, as many Asia-focused analysts recognize.

This article rests at the intersection of these two avenues of research. By using large-

sample quantitative evidence I attempt to introduce a degree of theoretically-based control of

confounding factors not common in studies drawing on small samples or detailed accounts of

a few events. By focusing on one region of the world, I attempt to draw on the arguments and

evidence presented by specialists in the international politics of that region to produce a more

contextually informed study. This approach allows me to begin to test competing hypotheses

as they relate to Asian states, and also to examine specific Asian international governmental

organizations (IGOs). The results have implications for general understandings of

international conflict as well.

Debates on Asian Security

Even the definition or boundaries of ‘Asia’ is a topic of debate. Defining ‘Asia’ is of course

not a simple task, and no definition has achieved a consensus (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002:

601-602). In this study I use a broad definition, both for practical and conceptual reasons.

Practically, the more states included in my sample, the more reliable my statistical results

analyzing rare events are likely to be. Using a broad definition is also a conservative strategy

if, as is the case here, the universality or generality of hypotheses is challenged. A narrow

sample might include specific, but unmeasured, factors that affect a relatively small number

of states, but nevertheless have a significant impact in a small, geographically limited sample.

In such a sample, generally valid effects might be overshadowed by anomalous influences or

omitted variable bias. If supposedly universal theories like the liberal peace propositions

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show no significant effects in a broader category of states, however, such claims of

universality should be seriously questioned.

The more conceptual reason for including a broad area under the heading of ‘Asia’ is

that security issues across the wide geographical space stretching approximately from India to

Japan, and North Korea to Australia, do seem to be linked. I follow the logic of a number of

analysts on this count. Acharya (2003: 150-151; see also Friedberg, 1994/94: 15), for

example, argues that there is a ‘nexus’ of security relations involving South Asia, Southeast

Asia, and China. He focuses on the balancing dynamics between China and India, which

necessarily entangle Southeast Asian states. Given Australia’s important role in Southeast

Asian security issues, Oceania also logically falls within a broad definition of Asia.1 Since the

fall of the USSR, the states of Central Asia have increased their contacts with neighbors such

as China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Therefore I include these states in the study as well after

they achieve independence from the Soviet Union. Accordingly, in this paper I have defined

‘Asia’ as all states of South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Oceania, and Central Asia

(from 1991).2

Moving beyond the question of defining Asia, debates over Asian security issues can

be roughly categorized as focusing on whether power dynamics prevail, meaning that conflict

can be avoided mainly through deterrence, balancing, and alliances, or whether economic

interdependence and international institutions substantially mitigate conflict among Asian

states. The first of these schools of thought clearly is connected to realist theories of

1. Of course not all analysts of Asian security cited here use the same definition as I do; nor do they necessarily

agree with each other when they make their geographical assumptions explicit. Oceania is perhaps the most

controversial group of states to include. I have also run the analyses excluding all states of Oceania. The results

are very similar for Asian dyads in both the 1950-75 and 1976-2000 periods, and none of the conclusions

changes. 2. All sovereign states as categorized by the Correlates of War (COW) project in these geographic areas are

included. These are all states with country codes from 700 to 990, or all states for which region = 4.

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international relations, while the latter has liberal (and sometimes constructivist) roots. Few

analysts focus on the role of democracy in the region.

Competing expectations

A review of Asian security debates points to a number of specific expectations, sometimes

contradictory, about the roots of peace and conflict. One fundamental expectation of some

analysts (e.g., Kang, 2003; Katzenstein, 2000) is that the international politics of Asia are

‘different’ from those in other parts of the world, especially ‘the West.’ Culture and history

combine in a path-dependent process of interaction among states in a given region to create

sui generis and empirically meaningful patterns of behavior and conflict. This contradicts the

assumption of international relations generalists who commonly use pooled data for all states

to test general hypotheses. If the effects of important influences on peace and conflict can be

shown to differ significantly in Asia, this will support the arguments for an Asian difference.

A related but more nuanced expectation based on constructivist or culturally-based

normative arguments is that Asian states’ relations with other Asian states will somehow

qualitatively differ from relations between Asian and non-Asian states. Such expectations

follow from arguments based on shared ‘Asian values’ which inform foreign policy and

create expectations about the proper norms of behavior within Asian dyads. Several authors

point to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ ‘ASEAN way’ involving informal but

substantive consultations among leaders, and placing a high value on both peaceful conflict

resolution and strict respect for non-interference in internal affairs, as an example of such a

set of norms (e.g., Acharya, 1991; Kivimäki, 2001).

Among those specialists taking a realist perspective, Friedberg (1993/94) argues that

territorial disputes and security dilemmas among contiguous states and great powers are the

greatest threats to Asian security, while power balancing and alliances are the keys to

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stability. Huxley (1998: 90) similarly dismisses the importance of ‘regional institutions and

economic interdependence’ and argues that ‘relative military power’ is much more important

to Asian security. Tow & Gray (1995) argue that power balancing in Asia is they key to

stability, with regional security regimes not yet likely to be effective. Kang (2003) argues that

power hierarchy induces bandwagoning behavior, and thus stability, rather than balancing

due to Asian cultural and historical characteristics. Although they may differ on specific

issues or the relative importance of one relationship or another, authors in this school agree

on the importance of factors of military power, and the relative unimportance of institutions,

economic links, or regime type.

On the other side of the debate, liberal and constructivist authors mainly focus on

multilateral institutions (Acharya, 1991; Chiang, 2000; Kivimäki, 2001; Scalapino, 2001).

The common strand to these studies is the idea that international organizations in Asia are

indeed effective constraints on conflict, even though they often lack the strong

institutionalization of Western-style organizations such as the European Union or NATO.

Thus Kivimäki (2001: 5) locates the cause of a ‘long peace’ in Southeast Asia in the norms

and ‘intersubjective consensus’ forged by ASEAN. Acharya (1991: 176) sees ‘tentative

success’ for ASEAN as a security community, in spite of the organization’s reliance on

consensual and informal decision making. According to Chiang’s (2000: 177) study of the

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the ‘APEC way’ owes its effectiveness to the

‘non-institutionalized cooperation regime’ embodied in the organization.

And a relatively few authors consider in detail a broader range of factors including

economic interdependence (Acharya, 2003; Berger, 2000; Katzenstein, 2000) and democratic

governance (Berger, 2000; Chan, 1995). For example, Berger (2000: 417) argues that Asian

states’ ‘intra-regional interdependence… has pushed up considerably the costs of military

conflict,’ making such conflict less likely. Chan (1995: 64) argues for a ‘pacifying effect’ of

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greater levels of democracy in Asia, along the lines of the general democratic peace literature,

even if democratization may cause some political instability.

All analysts seem to agree that some power-related ‘realist’ factors will have

continuing relevance in Asia. Liberal peace theorists also expect that power-related factors

will retain importance for conflict (e.g., Oneal & Russett, 2004). Acharya (1991) comes

closest to questioning this assumption by asserting that relations between ASEAN states

increasingly resemble those of a security community.

While both liberals and realists recognize the relevance of power in Asia, only liberals

hold the expectation that international organizations and economic interdependence have

much significance. And even among liberal and constructivist Asia analysts, few expect that

regime type (e.g., democracy) will have much of an effect. But proponents of the liberal

peace propositions as general effects in international relations have allowed for no such

regional exceptions.

The remainder of this article is devoted to testing these various expectations and

drawing conclusions about the causes of conflict and peace in Asia, and the relevance of

liberal theory to the region.

Data and Methods

The unit of analysis for this study is the dyad-year, using all dyads (pairs of states) in the

international system, the Asian subsystem, or mixed Asian/non-Asian dyads. The time frame

is 1950-2000, a period which commences after the revolution in China (1949) and the

independence of India (1947) and Indonesia (1949). This seems to be the earliest date from

which the Asian regional subsystem can be considered stable in terms of major members,

although some important states such as Malaysia gained independence later, and Japan

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regained full sovereignty only in 1952. The time period covers both the cold war and post-

cold war eras; available data for several indicators end in 2000.

The data are assembled from several sources as described in the appendix. The choice

of independent and dependent variables, and data sources, is guided mainly by the models

commonly used in liberal peace research, which include a number of ‘liberal’ and ‘realist’

factors (e.g., Russett & Oneal, 2001). Two chronological sub-sets of the data (1950-75, 1976-

2000) are also chosen based on the Asian context. Before 1975, it is often argued that cold-

war tensions were high in Asia, culminating in the Vietnam War; after 1975, these tensions

lessened, possibly affecting relations with outside powers such as the USSR and the US, and

also among Asian states (e.g., Alagappa, 2003). If there are different dynamics for these

different periods, then it will be important to examine them separately to avoid heterogeneity

in the modeled effects.3

In general, while presenting some results for pooled models with interaction effects, I

examine the relevant sub-sets of the data directly, producing more homogenous samples

(Achen, 2002). While such models do not allow within-sample comparison to effects in the

rest of the world, they do facilitate straightforward and meaningful assessment of the

magnitude and statistical significance of effects, including comparison of marginal effects for

all realist and liberal variables. I therefore use interaction terms for detecting significant

differences between Asia and the rest of the world regarding the three liberal variables

(Friedrich, 1982: 820), but use sub-samples of particular interest for examining the

substantive and statistical significance of all variables.4

3. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach. 4. Berry (1999) discusses potential additional complications for interpretation and hypothesis testing when

interaction terms are included in probit and other models with dichotomous dependent variables. Tests using

Stata’s lincom command for the liberal variables/interaction terms in models 3, 4, 6, and 7 indicate that the

linear combinations of these variables are generally consistent in terms of sign and (in)significance with the

models including only Asian dyads (Table III). IGOs do achieve a weaker but significant effect on Fatal MIDs

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The core statistical method employed is probit analysis, appropriate for the

dichotomous dependent variable. A simultaneous equations model is used to control for the

bi-directional relationship between international trade flows and conflict (Goenner, 2004;

Keshk, Pollins, & Reuveny 2004; Kim & Rousseau 2005). In particular, a two-stage probit

least squares (2SPLS) design developed by Keshk (2003) is implemented. This method is

based on Maddala’s (1983) suggestions for modeling simultaneity between two endogenous

variables when one is dichotomous and the other continuous. Instruments (predicted values)

for each endogenous variable are created in the first stage models regressing them on all

exogenous variables, then these are substituted into the second stage structural equations.

Corrected standard errors are then produced, adjusting for the fact that instruments were used

when the variance of the actual values is of interest (Keshk 2003: 159-161).5 Although the

focus here is on the factors affecting international conflict, representative results for models

of Total Trade (dyadic trade flows) are presented in the appendix (Table A2).

The basic liberal peace (probit) equation to be estimated is:

Conflict = E����E��log(Total Trade) ��E� Lower Democracy + E��log(Trade Dependence) +

E��log(IGO Memberships) + E��Minor Power Dyad + E� sqrt(Parity) + E��Colonial Contiguity

+ E��Contiguity + E��log(Distance) + E���ConflictW��������� � � � �� (1)

and War in Asia, 1950-2000, based on lincom results for Models 3 and 4, which contrasts with the insignificant

results in Model 11. However, my argument is only that the effect is weaker in Asia, not necessarily

insignificant. And with the theoretically appropriate temporal division at 1975, no significant effects for IGOs in

Asia emerge either with or without the use of interaction terms (Tables II and III). For the reasons stated in the

text, my preference is to rely on the results from the more homogenous sub-sample of the data (Asian dyads

only). I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing this issue to my attention. 5. I do not report model statistics such as the likelihood ratio chi-square test because there is no procedure yet

developed to account for the variation in the terms used to create the instruments (personal communication with

Omar Keshk, 9 November 2005). However, there is no indication of a problem with the models given the

statistics available: the LR chi-square ranges from over 6000 in models from Table I to over 150 in models from

Tables III and IV, all highly significant (p<0.0000).

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In addition, a basic Total Trade (least squares) equation is estimated, regressing Total Trade

on conflict, regime type, economic size, and a lagged dependent variable. This is a simplified

version of the gravity model used by Keshk, Pollins, & Reuveny (2004).

log(Total Trade) = E����E��Conflict�+ E� log(PolityA) ��E� log(PolityB) + E��log(GDPA) ��E�

log(GDPB) +E��log(Distance) + E� log(Total TradeW��)� � � � � (2)

I begin by examining effects on three levels of conflict in the global pooled data set

for all dyads in the international system, 1950-2000, including interaction effects for the three

liberal variables and a dummy variable for Asian dyads (Braumoeller, 2004). I also run

interaction models and models for all Asian dyads with a break at 1975, and I estimate

models including dummy variables for joint membership in three specific international

organizations: ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),

and APEC. In addition, I run the model for mixed dyads - those including one Asian and one

non-Asian state - to examine patterns in relations between Asia and the rest of the world.

In the appendix I present details of the data used, and a table of summary statistics

(Table A1). These reveal some patterns suggesting differences in conflict dynamics between

Asia and other parts of the world. Asia has roughly five times as many conflict-years (all

militarized interstate disputes or MIDs), eight times as many fatal-dispute years (a MID

involving at least one death), and ten times as many war-years (a MID involving at least 1000

deaths) as the global average. Obviously these are substantial differences in conflict levels.

Regarding the liberal Kantian variables, Asia does not differ markedly in levels of

democracy or IGO membership, but Asian dyads do have much higher volumes of trade and

levels of trade dependence – more than double the global average for both.

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Power-oriented variables do not contain notable differences between Asian dyads and

the overall average, with the exception of contiguity and distance. Obviously, in a data set of

all dyads in the international system, a sub-set of regionally proximate dyads will be much

more likely to share borders and be closer. But alliances deserve special mention here. As

commonly measured (including mutual defense pacts, ententes, and neutrality pacts) there is

considerable difference between the frequency of alliance ties in Asia (.02) and that in the

world overall (.07). Consistent with this, in all models attempted, this variable never

approached statistical significance among Asian or Mixed dyads. Therefore it is dropped

from the analysis and not presented in the tables. The reason for this fairly robust evidence of

irrelevance to conflict in Asia may lie in the fact that the strongest form of alliance, a mutual

defense pact, is even more rare in Asia compared to the rest of the world (.004 for Asia, .063

overall). Models run with a dummy variable for mutual defense pacts usually failed due to

their extreme rarity, even for mixed dyads. Alliances clearly cannot be considered to have an

important impact on conflict either within Asia or between Asia and the rest of the world,

when other factors are controlled.6

The summary statistics indicate that Asia is an especially conflictual region, but do

not shed much light on the likely sources of this conflict. Simple proximity of course makes

conflict more likely (or possible). Higher volumes of economic interaction might increase the

chances of disagreements which could escalate to militarized conflict (e.g., Waltz, 1979). As

far as the conflict-dampening Kantian factors, perhaps most surprising is the high level of

economic interdependence – this would be expected to cause a reduction in conflict. And

lower levels of democracy and international organization membership are consistent with

greater conflict, but Asia demonstrates average levels on these variables.

6. Indeed, a number of general studies of conflict have not uncovered a robust, consistent relationship (e.g.,

Gibler & Vasquez, 1998; Gibler, 2000; Keshk, Pollins, & Reuveny, 2004; Kim & Rousseau, 2005; Maoz, 2000).

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Multivariate Analysis

This section uses multivariate analysis to assess the role of each factor, controlling for the

others. The analysis first examines each of the ‘Kantian’ variables in detail, then turns to a

briefer examination of power-related factors. It is important to emphasize that the liberal

peace literature, especially the work of Oneal and Russett and their various co-authors, shows

fairly robust support for each Kantian expectation: democracy, trade, and international

organizations have significant negative associations with conflict and war. This is clearly so

for the data used here as well, when considered in aggregate over the period 1950-2000. The

variables Lower Democracy, Trade Dependence, and IGO Memberships are negative and

significant across all three measures of international conflict, with and without controls for

separate effects in Asia (Table I, Models 1-4). When Asia interaction terms are included, the

lower-order effects of the three liberal variables simply represent the effects when Asia=0, in

other words for all dyads in which at least one state is not in Asia (Brambor, Clark, &

Golden, 2005). In the analysis below, my focus will be on how well the relationships hold up

in the Asian context (when Asia=1, and for mixed dyads). I now turn to a detailed analysis of

the effects of each of the liberal variables in Asia, beginning with IGOs.

Table I in here

International Organizations

International organizations are a liberal factor which seems to have a weaker effect in Asia

than in other parts of the world. The insignificant but consistently positive coefficients for the

Asia-IGO interaction terms in Models 2-4 suggest this difference for 1950-2000. However,

when separating the data into the pre- and post-1975 periods, a somewhat different pattern

emerges. The interaction-effects models (Table II, Models 5-10) indicate a significant

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difference in the effect of IGOs in Asia, with significant positive effects larger than (for All

MIDs, Model 5) or nearly as large as (Models 6 and 7) the negative ‘baseline’ (Friedrich

1982: 805) effect in the period 1950-1975.7 The results are less consistent or easily

interpreted for the period 1976-2000 (Models 7-10), but there appears to be either no

significant difference or a significant negative effect in Asia (War). Because there is no

readily apparent theoretical reason to divide the global data at 1975, the implications of these

interaction effects and the difference between coefficients when Asia=0 and Asia=1 is not

entirely clear.

Table II in here

As mentioned, an alternative strategy is to examine the sub-set of the data at question

directly. Table III tests the effects of the liberal (and realist) variables in Asia by including

only Asian dyads. The weakness of the effect of IGO Memberships is confirmed by the

insignificance of any coefficient for IGOs in Models 11-17. While it appears that there was

some negative impact on conflict in the earlier period, the post-Vietnam period actually

shows a (still insignificant) positive relationship. The substantive (marginal) effects of a

standard deviation increase in IGO memberships are similarly small for the earlier period,

relative to the size of the linear prediction of conflict, and very small for both periods relative

to the other liberal variables (and all realist variables) (Table VI). Overall, IGOs seem to

matter little for war and peace in Asia.

7. The effect of the interaction terms should be understood as the sum of the lower-order coefficient (in this case,

IGO Memberships) and the interaction term’s coefficient (IGO Memberships*Asia). If these are of different

sign, of course, the larger absolute value will determine the direction of the effect (Brambor, Clark, & Golden,

2005).

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Table III in here

When we examine three specific organizations in Asia, the evidence is only slightly

more encouraging. ASEAN was founded in 1967 and encompasses Southeast Asia. SAARC,

founded in 1985, includes the states of South Asia. And APEC, founded in 1989, includes

East Asia (north and south) and Oceania, as well as some non-Asian states of the Pacific

Rim.8 Analysts usually consider ASEAN an archetypical example of the distinctive nature

and potential effectiveness of Asian international institutions. APEC is also seen as weakly

institutionalized but moderately effective. SAARC does not have a reputation as very

effective in reducing conflict (e.g., Jetly, 2003). However, Bearce (2003) has shown that even

apparently ineffective and economically-focused regional organizations can have a

significant impact on conflict.

In Table IV, the evidence for both SAARC and APEC is that, if anything, they

actually facilitate conflict (perhaps a selection effect). It does appear that ASEAN

membership reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict in both periods, however only if all

kinds of disputes are aggregated (Table IV, Models 18 and 20). In these multivariate tests,

there is no statistically reliable effect on fatal disputes and the coefficient is positive for the

later period (Models 19 and 22; a model for Fatal MIDs, 1950-75, failed due to collinearity

for ASEAN, and the other two IGOs did not yet exist). Taking a closer look, there is some

bivariate evidence that ASEAN has a significant role in preventing Fatal MIDs. Indeed, there

8. ASEAN includes dyads for (from 1967) Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, (from 1984)

Brunei, (from 1995) Vietnam, (from 1997) Laos, Myanmar, (from 1999) Cambodia (the ASEAN variable was

corrected from the original data source because it included Sri Lanka but excluded Singapore and Indonesia).

SAARC includes dyads from 1985 for India, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

APEC includes dyads for (from 1989) Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea,

Malaysia, New Zealand, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United States, (from 1991) People’s Republic of

China, Taiwan, (from 1993) Mexico, Papua New Guinea, (from 1994) Chile, (from 1998) Peru, Russian

Federation, Vietnam.

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have been only 2 such conflict years between ASEAN members (Vietnam-Thailand 1995;

Myanmar-Thailand 1999; of 505 dyad-years), while there were 57 conflict years among the

relevant South-East Asian states before they joined the organization (886 dyad-years). There

can be no doubt that this is a significant bivariate difference (Fisher’s exact test = 0.000),

even if the multivariate results on such rare events remain inconclusive.

One realist author has termed Asian international institutions a ‘thin gruel’ with little

effect on conflict (Friedberg, 1993/94: 22), while others have disputed this characterization,

arguing that Asian institutions are different, but moderately effective (Acharya, 1991, 2003;

Chiang 2000). The results here may help clarify this debate. While it does not seem that the

institutional ‘gruel’ is much thinner in Asia (Table A1)9, it does appear that joint IGO

membership among Asian states is comprised of a ‘mixed bag’ of institutions, some (perhaps

very few) apparently effective in their impact on conflict, but others apparently ineffective or

even counter-productive.

Table IV in here

Democracy

There are 32 Asian states in the data that are full-fledged democracies (Polity score of +7 or

higher) for at least one year. These include countries with relatively brief periods as

‘democracies’ such as Bangladesh (1972-1973) and Indonesia (1999-2000), as well as those

that are consistently democratic for most or all of the period such as Japan and India. There

are a total of 1,195 fully democratic dyad-years in Asia. Of the 108 jointly democratic dyads,

40 (37%) enjoy at least 10 years of joint democracy. Among these are, for example Japan-

9. This is also true for periods 1950-75 and 1976-2000. In the earlier period, the average joint IGO Membership

for Asian dyads was 13.3, for all dyads, 16.5; after 1975, the average in Asia was 16.6, for all dyads, 23.5.

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Philippines, India-Pakistan, India-Myanmar (Burma)10, India-Sri Lanka, India-Malaysia, and

Australia-Papua New Guinea.

So, while Asia is not as democratic as Western Europe or North America, this does

not mean that ‘democratic peace’ hypotheses are simply irrelevant. Rather, all other things

being equal (or controlled), democratic dyads should still be significantly associated with

reduced conflict (and their absence should correspond to greater conflict). However, there is

not much evidence that this is so in Asia.

As was true for IGOs, this Kantian variable does not exhibit a significant difference in

its effect in Asia, relative to the rest of the world, during 1950-2000 (Table I, Models 2-4).

While there is no significant difference for the interaction of Asia and joint democracy, the

coefficients for the Lower Democracy*Asia variable at each level of conflict are positive and

of nearly equal magnitude to the baseline negative effect of Lower Democracy. They also do

approach conventional levels of statistical significance, implying that the substantive pacific

effect of joint democracy might be very low in Asia. However, similar to the effect of IGOs,

different patterns emerge for 1950-75 and 1976-2000. The interaction terms are insignificant

and inconsistent (positive for All MIDs, negative for Fatal MIDs and War [Table II, Models

5-7]) in the earlier period and positive, and (for Fatal MIDs and War [Table II, Models 8-10])

significant and larger than the Lower Democracy coefficients in absolute value in the later

period.

When only Asian dyads are examined, these patterns persist, but with one exception

are insignificant. For the entire period (Table III, Model 11), the effect on fatal conflict is

indeed negative but very small (-0.00000147) and statistically invisible. However, this masks

a pattern of a negative influence on fatal conflict and war until 1975, and then a positive

influence in the post-Vietnam era (as was the case for IGOs). While most of these effects are 10. Burma achieves a score of ‘+8’ in the Polity IV scale for the period 1947-1961. This corresponds to the

period from independence until Ne Win’s military coup in 1962.

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statistically insignificant, it appears that joint democracy makes war between Asian states

significantly more likely in the 1976-2000 period (Model 17).

While significant effects on such rare events as wars need to be interpreted with

caution, of the 14 dyad-years of war in this period in Asia, seven are accounted for by the

India-Pakistan conflict, 1993-99 (the other wars in the data are China-Vietnam [1978-79,

1986-87] and Cambodia-Vietnam [1977-79]). India is consistently democratic, with a Polity

rating of +8 for 1993-94 and +9 for 1995-99. Pakistan is also consistently democratic for

most of the period of conflict (+8, 1993-96; +7, 1997-98), however it falls dramatically to a

Polity rating of -6 in 1999. It is important to note that General Musharraf’s coup ousting the

elected Sharif government did not occur until October of 1999, while the worst fighting of the

Kargil Crisis began in May 1999. So, while Pakistan is not coded as a democracy for that

year, a strong argument can be made that this conflict, up to and including the Kargil Crisis,

might be coded as a war between two democracies. While the significant effect is driven by a

single dyad’s conflict, it is not obvious that this conflict is anomalous or miscoded – and it is

certainly an important issue in Asian security (and globally, given that these are nuclear

powers) that we would want our models to account for. Good news for the model’s

usefulness, perhaps, but certainly counter to liberal expectations!

For the more common Fatal MIDs category, the substantive effect of a one standard

deviation move in the Lower Democracy score for both 1950-75 and 1976-2000 is

considerably greater (but in the same directions) as that for IGOs, but still small compared to

other variables (Table VI). Thus it is not possible to entirely rule out either the significance or

the magnitude of democracy as an influence on conflict in Asia. However, obviously, it is not

the simple pacific effect that liberal theorists would expect. The relatively weak evidence that

does exist, points to an inconsistent (and thus complex) effect, and one that could be

dangerous. Asian democracies – free from cold-war constraints and risks – might be more

18

dangerous than other regime types in the present period! But, even if so, substantively this

appears to make only a small difference to the likelihood of conflict.

Trade Interdependence

Both Total Trade and Trade Dependence are considerably higher among Asian dyads than the

global average. Those analysts who have argued that this high degree of trade

interdependence is good for peace in Asia appear to be vindicated by the results here in that

Trade Dependence is robustly associated with lower conflict. Trade Dependence is the central

economic variable of interest for liberal analysts, but it is also of note that we find little

consistent or significant effect of Total Trade on Fatal MIDs or War in Asia in either period

(Table III, Models 13, 14, 16 and 17). This contradicts some realist expectations that trade

may facilitate conflict by increasing the frequency and intensity of interactions. There is no

evidence of this effect at more serious levels of conflict.

Interaction effects for Trade Dependence*Asia are the most likely of the liberal

variables to produce significant coefficients, and these are interestingly consistently positive

for All MIDs but negative for Fatal MIDs and War in almost all models in Tables I and II

(except for the insignificant positive effect in Model 6). And the effect of Trade Dependence

when only Asian dyads are analyzed is consistent across both time periods for all levels of

conflict (Table III, Models 11-17). The effects are highly significant on All MIDs and Fatal

MIDs, 1976-2000 (Models 15 and 16), but approach significance overall and in the previous

period as well (Models 11, 12, and 14). Among the three liberal factors, this is the one clear

and robust effect found in Asia: trade interdependence is associated with peace, especially

when peace is defined as the absence of deadly conflict, apparently to a greater degree than in

the rest of the world. The substantive effect of a standard deviation change in the variable is

19

much larger than that of the other liberal factors, as well, especially in the post-Vietnam War

era (Table VI).

Although globally this effect has been questioned and shown to be contingent on

other factors (e.g., Barbieri, 1996; Hegre, 2000; Mansfield & Pollins, 2001), in Asia overall

the liberal expectation of pacific ‘trading states’ (Rosecrance 1986) finds strong support,

consistent with the region’s high levels of trade and reputation for a focus on economic

welfare as a source of regime legitimacy (the ‘developmental state’). This result is especially

robust because the simultaneous trade-reducing effects of conflict itself are controlled by the

structural model used (Table A2).

Mixed Dyads

When Asian states interact with the rest of the world, one might expect liberal peace effects

to be more similar to those found globally. There is some evidence of this, although not as

robust as liberals might anticipate. Over the entire period 1950-2000, Lower Democracy has

a significant negative impact on Fatal MIDs (Table V, Model 23). However, neither of the

other two liberal factors is significant, and Trade Dependence has positive sign (as does

APEC membership).

Table V in here

If Asian security dynamics differed before and after 1975, then it would make sense

to examine Asian relations with outside states in these two periods separately as well. When

this is done, the effect of Lower Democracy remains negative (but not significant), while the

other variables are less consistent. Trade Dependence is positively associated with fatal

conflict in 1950-75, but negatively so in 1976-2000, in neither case reaching conventional

20

levels of significance. The opposite pattern emerges for the effect of joint IGO memberships:

there is a significant pacific effect on fatal disputes until 1975, but no effect (z=.05) in the

later period (Models 24 and 25).

While the evidence is decidedly mixed, the weight of the results does seem somewhat

in favor of liberal expectations. The strongest result is for Lower Democracy, supporting the

democratic peace effect in Asia’s relations with outside states. Importantly for the issues

addressed in this paper, it is clear that Asian/non-Asian dyads exhibit different dynamics than

purely Asian dyads as examined above. Trade is perhaps least important for these mixed

dyads, and its substantive effect is also small over the 50-year period (Table VI).

Table VI in here

Measurement Issues

A final point regarding the Kantian variables is that the results for Asia may point to

specification and measurement issues. It seems likely that it is necessary to distinguish

between different types of international organizations rather than simply treating each joint

membership as having an equal marginal impact on conflict. Russett & Oneal (2001) and

Pevehouse (2002) make similar points. My examination of specific organizations in the Asian

context reinforces this because of the differing and sometimes significant effects they have

(Tables IV and V).

The results for regime type also raise questions about the operationalization of the

theoretical concept of ‘joint democracy’. In Asia, at least, it could be that the scale based on a

dyad’s lower democracy score is inadequate. It is possible that the linear, monotonic effect

assumed does not extend to lower values on the scale. The issue of operationalization of

regime type has been addressed by others (recently, Lai & Reiter 2000; Oneal & Russett

21

2004; Peceny, Beer, & Sanchez-Terry 2002). Exploring this issue in detail is not possible in

this article,11 but the results add some weight to the argument that a more theoretically-driven

measure of dyad-level regime type may be needed.

Table VII in here

As an experiment, I substitute a Joint Democracy dummy variable (coded ‘1’ if both

states have a Polity score of +7 or greater) for the Lower Democracy score. This, I believe,

better captures the categorical nature of a common understanding of democratic peace:

‘democracies do not fight each other.’ Note that the Lower Democracy variable assumes

more than this: less authoritarian dyads are also more pacific, with the effect consistently

linear as Lower Democracy rises.12 The results in Table VII do not conform with liberal

expectations because they still show that joint democracy defined categorically switches sign

for the period 1976-2000. But they do provide some support for this operationalization

because each coefficient is much closer to standard levels of significance, compared with

Models 13 and 16 (Table III), in spite of the fact that this is a much less nuanced measure and

thus variance is lost. So while the conclusions above are supported, even strengthened, there

is reason to suspect that Lower Democracy is not the optimal operationalization for testing

the democratic peace, especially in regions with relatively few fully democratic dyad-years.

Realism

It appears that the continuing focus of many, if not all, specialists in international relations of

Asia on power factors, especially security dilemmas and power hierarchies, is justified. But

11. But see Goldsmith, forthcoming and Goldsmith, Chalup, & Quinlan 2005. 12. The ‘weak-link’ Lower Democracy measure is also correlated with political similarity (Goldsmith, Chalup, &

Quinlan, 2005).

22

just as in other parts of the world, it is not power balances at the dyadic level which tend to

reduce conflict, but the asymmetric distribution of power, as reflected in the positive and

almost always significant coefficients for power parity13 among Asian and mixed dyads

(Tables III-V) and the fairly large substantive effects on conflict (Table VI). Also, as is the

case globally, major powers tend to be more conflictual, so the Minor Power Dyad variable is

also almost always negative and significant, with a large substantive effect on the likelihood

of conflict in Asia and for mixed dyads (Tables III-VI). Contiguity and Distance (and to a

lesser extent Colonial Contiguity where relevant) are also almost always significant in the

predicted directions and the substantive effect is large (Tables III-VI), as would be expected

if states were vulnerable to security dilemma dynamics based simply on the capacities of their

militaries to reach each other. The robustness and consistency of these power-oriented factors

in the Asian context is clearly important, especially in contrast to the liberal factors.

However, as others have noted (e.g., Oneal & Russett, 2004), knowledge of the

importance of these robust factors does not usually take us very far in understanding what

choices states can make to enhance the stability of the region. Relative power resources and

major power status are rarely subject to short-term manipulation by political leaders. Distance

and contiguity, of course, even less so. And the realist factor that is perhaps most under

leaders’ control, alliances, is only potentially important to Asian security. The variable

measuring mutual defense pacts drops out of all equations for Asian dyads because there are

so few such alliances between Asian states; but the more common types of alliances have no

effects for purely Asian or mixed dyads, and so are dropped (as noted above). The focus of

this article is largely on the relevance of liberal factors for Asia, but that should not be taken

as an argument that realist dynamics are irrelevant. Power still matters in Asia, but realist

prescriptions for reducing conflict do not seem the most promising. 13. More precisely, this is consistent with the power transition perspective (Lemke, 2002; Organski, 1958) rather

than classical or neo-realism.

23

Conclusions

Is there evidence of a liberal peace in Asia? The findings here argue that yes, there is a liberal

peace based primarily on economic interdependence. The results on this count are fairly

robust and the method used introduces an important control for simultaneity. One clear policy

implication here is for appreciation of the role and potential effects of intra-Asian trade

among tense dyads, for example between Japan and China, North and South Korea, China

and South-East Asia, and India and Pakistan. There is less certain evidence that joint

democracy is a force for peace in Asia – indeed in recent decades it appears to be a cause of

conflict, if there is any effect at all. And the evidence regarding international organizations

appears at least as weak. Overall the effects of IGOs are inconsistent, insignificant, and

substantively small; but ASEAN may reduce overall belligerence, and even fatal conflict. For

both democracy and IGOs, it appears that more robust results, if they are possible, may

depend on the development of more nuanced and theoretically appropriate indicators.

Realist, power-oriented factors still matter in Asia, but those authors who argue that

liberalism is irrelevant, especially regarding interdependence, are missing important parts of

the security equation in the region. While liberal expectations cannot be simplistically

transferred to the Asian context, neither are they irrelevant. So this study would suggest a

nuanced approach, understanding that Asia is to some extent different, but nevertheless

within the reach of general theories.

Analysts are also possibly missing important implications regarding relations between

Asian states and outside powers. Here economic interdependence clearly does not have the

same effect as among Asian states. Although the results are not highly robust, it appears that

joint democracy is more important for understanding (and reducing) conflict in this context.

This has potential implications for U.S. and European relations with China, for example.

24

Expanding trade relations and enmeshing China in a web of international institutions might

not have important security externalities. Democracy in India, and democratization in

Indonesia, for example, might also be more important than commonly thought. But these are

specific cases that require closer examination in the light of the general findings presented

here.

This article contributes to debates on Asian security issues by showing that the liberal

peace does apply to Asia, with qualifications, in contrast to expectations of many analysts.

Those who argue that conflict and security in Asia can be understood purely in realist terms

must make room at least for the effects of economic interdependence in their analyses. But

the article also contributes to broader understanding of international relations by

demonstrating that regional context, even in a very large and diverse region, matters. This

supports the case for more nuanced theory, better specified models of conflict, and for clearer

attention to the quality and appropriateness of indicators used in pooled global models.

Appendix

Data details

The dependent variables are measured by data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) from

the COW project (Sarkees, Wayman, & Singer, 2003).14 Data on all disputes (All MIDs),15

fatal disputes involving at least one death (Fatal MIDs), and interstate war involving at least

1,000 battle deaths (War) are used. A dummy variable for each is created.

Newly available data were used for each of the three ‘Kantian’ independent variables.

Substantially updated and corrected data from the Polity project, version IV, provide the

indicator for regime type (Marshall & Gurr, 2001). I use the standard index which combines

14. All COW data are obtained from the data files included with EUGene software version 3.04 (Bennett & Stam

2000). 15. Variable names as used in the text and tables are given in parentheses.

25

autocracy and democracy scores to create a scale ranging from -10 (fully autocratic) to +10

(fully democratic). The lower Polity score of the two dyad members measures the degree of

democracy for the dyad (Lower Democracy), following the ‘weak link’ approach (Russett &

Oneal, 2001: 99).

Trade interdependence is measured using Gleditsch’s (2002b) updated dataset,

version 4.1. This corrects for missing data and covers the period 1948-2000. Results using

version 4.1 proved different from results using version 4.0. Trade dependence is measured

using the lower score, within each dyad, of total dyadic trade over each state’s GDP (Trade

Dependence). This indicates the degree of dependence on the trading relationship for the least

dependent member of the dyad (and therefore also relies on the ‘weak link’ logic). The

amount of trade between a dyad (Total Trade) is simply total dyadic trade (measured as the

sum of country A’s imports from and exports to country B). Gleditsch’s figures in current

U.S. dollars are used.

Membership in international organizations is based on data collected by Pevehouse,

Nordstrom, & Warnke (2003). Total shared memberships were summed for each dyad (IGO

Memberships). Since the data provided only contain observations at five-year intervals before

1965, values are filled in until 1965 by projecting summed memberships forward for 4 years.

For example, the values for each dyad’s shared IGO Memberships in 1950 are also used for

the years 1951-1954; the values for 1955 are then also used for 1956-59, etc. I also use

dummy-variable indicators of shared membership in specific organizations in some analyses,

and these are coded ‘1’ if both states in a dyad are members in a given year, ‘0’ otherwise.

The COW indicator for major power status, based mainly on historians’ evaluations,

was used to determine whether a dyad contains only minor powers (Minor Power Dyad). A

measure of contiguity is included as a dummy variable coded ‘1’ if states share a land border

or are separated by up to 24 miles of water, ‘0’ otherwise (Contiguity). A similar dummy

26

variable is created for colonial contiguity, if the colonial territory of one or both states meets

these criteria (Colonial Contiguity). The composite index of national capabilities (CINC) was

used to gauge power parity, taking the quotient of the smaller value over the larger, so that a

dyad with perfect parity would score ‘1’, while complete asymmetry would score ‘0’ (Parity).

The distance indicator measures the distance in miles between the capital cities of the states

in the dyad (Distance). Transformations using natural logs (adding 1 if 0 is the lowest value)

or square roots, as indicated, are used to avoid skewed distributions of the data. The logged

value for Trade Dependence makes only a slight improvement (skewness is reduced from

27.80795 to 26.12461 and kurtosis is reduced from 1322.746 to 1160.644), but the

correlation between the logged and unlogged variables is .9997 and the results are virtually

identical using either.

Table A1 in here

Results for the equation used to obtain Total Trade instruments are not central to the

argument of this paper, but of course are of substantive interest. Here I present representative

least squares results, with instruments for Fatal MIDs, to demonstrate the appropriateness of

the specification of the Total Trade equation (2).

Table A2 in here

27

Table I. Liberal, Realist, and Regional Factors in Conflict, All Dyads, 1950-2000Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Fatal MIDs All MIDs Fatal MIDs WarsE z E z E z E z

log(Total Trade)instrument 0.050 4.92 0.071 10.94 0.045 4.36 0.054 3.25

Lower Democracy -0.018 -4.32 -0.011 -4.46 -0.019 -4.33 -0.036 -3.55Lower Democracy*Asia 0.010 1.26 0.015 1.24 0.035 1.77log(Trade Dependence) -104.663 -7.00 -59.588 -11.98 -90.521 -5.97 -79.738 -2.58log(Trade Dependence)*Asia 52.128 9.32 -49.382 -1.11 -566.579 -2.68IGO Memberships -0.206 -10.23 -0.075 -3.20 -0.190 -7.76 -0.221 -6.69IGO Memberships*Asia 0.058 1.41 0.053 1.23 0.061 1.07Asia 0.078 0.54 0.272 1.68 0.556 2.43Minor Power Dyad -0.631 -12.63 -0.603 -17.04 -0.636 -12.57 -0.674 -8.62sqrt(Parity) 0.485 7.07 0.334 6.64 0.500 7.25 0.640 5.95Colonial Contiguity 0.372 3.30 0.770 12.77 0.361 3.18 0.040 0.18Contiguity 0.615 12.51 0.969 28.72 0.576 11.64 0.228 2.67log(Distance) -0.265 -13.64 -0.253 -18.02 -0.260 -13.08 -0.216 -6.84

Dependent Variablet-1 2.687 54.70 1.271 30.85 2.648 53.50 3.358 43.62

Constant -0.356 -1.91 -0.652 -4.36 -0.480 -2.41 -1.183 -3.75

N 403092 403626 403092 403626

Bold font indicates p<=.05.

28

Table II. Liberal, Realist, and R

egional Factors in Conflict, A

ll Dyads, B

efore and After 1975

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

1950-751950-75

1950-751976-2000

1976-20001976-2000

All MID

sFatal M

IDs

War

All MID

sFatal M

IDs

War

Ez

Ez

Ez

Ez

Ez

Ez

log(Total Trade)instrument

0.0513.90

-0.018-0.94

-0.036-1.10

0.08010.07

0.0785.90

0.1044.34

Lower D

emocracy

-0.019-3.75

-0.003-0.38

-0.001-0.09

-0.009-3.18

-0.032-5.94

-0.071-5.38

Lower D

emocracy*Asia

0.0221.65

-0.005-0.24

-0.007-0.21

0.0060.65

0.0372.20

0.1133.84

log(Trade Dependence)

-62.744-5.86

-63.499-2.87

-72.899-1.60

-57.654-10.26

-129.861-5.79

-147.359-2.73

log(Trade Dependence)*Asia

63.0125.57

33.3241.02

-366.010-1.66

46.3376.98

-333.811-1.85

-2076.107-1.12

IGO

Mem

berships-0.096

-3.03-0.278

-8.85-0.329

-7.63-0.038

-0.890.054

0.830.526

3.49IG

O M

emberships*Asia

0.1682.84

0.2574.56

0.3124.41

0.0360.46

-0.042-0.32

-0.626-2.35

Asia0.002

0.01-0.136

-0.63-0.058

-0.180.052

0.190.554

1.222.928

3.24M

inor Power D

yad-0.695

-12.21-1.020

-12.82-1.179

-9.74-0.566

-12.20-0.321

-4.29-0.178

-1.33sqrt(P

arity)0.291

3.510.763

6.771.020

5.810.365

5.660.334

3.630.358

2.25C

olonial Contiguity

0.82811.73

0.2361.78

-0.144-0.55

0.6034.50

0.5361.98

Contiguity

0.95817.69

0.5867.66

0.1951.54

0.97322.50

0.6149.35

0.3612.90

log(Distance)

-0.243-10.79

-0.258-8.19

-0.238-5.14

-0.265-14.50

-0.262-9.91

-0.145-2.82

Dependent Variable

t-11.323

20.872.613

37.363.087

31.491.215

22.242.533

35.153.326

25.11

Constant

-0.612-2.69

0.0030.01

-0.277-0.60

-0.744-3.28

-1.554-4.59

-4.837-6.27

N144626

144400144626

259000258692

259000

Bold font indicates p<=.05. Blank cells inidicate variables dropped due to collinearity.

29

Table III. Liberal and Realist Factors in C

onflict, Asian D

yads, Before and A

fter 1975M

odel 11M

odel 12M

odel 13M

odel 14M

odel 15M

odel 16M

odel 171950-2000

1950-19751950-1975

1950-19751976-2000

1976-20001976-2000

Fatal MID

sA

ll MID

sFatal M

IDs

Wars

All MID

sFatal M

IDs

Wars

Ez

Ez

Ez

Ez

Ez

Ez

Ez

log(Total Trade)instrument

-0.033-1.30

0.0782.72

-0.017-0.45

0.0200.26

0.0482.43

0.0521.08

-0.106-0.88

Lower D

emocracy

-0.0000.00

0.0040.30

-0.013-0.66

-0.017-0.53

0.0050.52

0.0221.10

0.0922.06

log(Trade Dependence)

-55.657-1.34

-5.917-1.05

-17.805-0.59

-503.081-1.63

-12.998-2.93

-551.097-2.53

-595.816-0.37

IGO

Mem

berships-0.073

-1.760.073

1.36-0.022

-0.45-0.029

-0.500.051

0.770.026

0.200.021

0.06M

inor Pow

er Dyad

-0.672-5.33

-0.758-4.80

-0.791-4.75

-0.935-4.28

-0.671-5.37

-0.284-1.13

-1.364-2.50

sqrt(Parity)0.654

3.630.630

2.870.692

2.790.907

2.840.685

3.580.884

2.570.285

0.22C

olonial Contiguity

0.0620.21

0.6122.92

-0.150-0.45

-0.395-0.73

Contiguity

0.3983.45

0.6344.80

0.2651.66

-0.088-0.41

0.7476.84

0.7383.54

log(Distance)

-0.242-4.16

-0.547-7.13

-0.139-1.84

-0.097-1.09

-0.502-7.56

-0.575-4.51

-0.777-2.52

Dependent Variable

t-12.825

29.091.114

8.662.907

23.933.224

20.940.833

6.462.030

11.003.618

7.60

Constant

-0.347-0.66

1.5702.37

-1.116-1.64

-1.528-1.93

1.0681.83

0.9750.90

3.5581.28

N14882

58525760

58529160

91229160

Bold font indicates p<=.05. B

lank cells inidicate variables dropped due to collinearity.

30

Table IV. Liberal, Realist, and Regional IGO Factors in Conflict, Asian DyadsModel 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22

1950-2000 1950-2000 1950-1975 1976-2000 1976-2000All MIDs Fatal MIDs All MIDs All MIDs Fatal MIDsE z E z E z E z E z

log(Total Trade)instrument 0.041 2.47 -0.037 -1.43 0.090 3.13 0.036 1.64 0.049 1.01

Lower Democracy 0.003 0.39 -0.003 -0.26 0.004 0.31 -0.003 -0.32 0.021 0.98log(Trade Dependence) -5.722 -1.60 -42.350 -1.07 -1.877 -0.33 -10.904 -2.29 -574.174 -2.27IGO Memberships 0.028 0.74 -0.077 -1.83 0.091 1.66 0.060 0.86 0.013 0.10ASEAN -0.501 -2.82 -0.150 -0.43 -1.078 -2.52 -0.371 -1.86 0.167 0.41SAARC 0.108 0.62 0.391 1.69 0.259 1.29 0.070 0.22APEC 0.179 1.22 0.359 2.19Minor Power Dyad -0.613 -6.23 -0.696 -5.43 -0.739 -4.62 -0.611 -4.65 -0.298 -1.16sqrt(Parity) 0.670 4.68 0.703 3.84 0.689 3.11 0.775 3.90 0.887 2.50Colonial Contiguity 0.702 3.59 0.048 0.16 0.577 2.75Contiguity 0.773 9.00 0.402 3.50 0.705 5.21 0.828 7.21 0.743 3.53log(Distance) -0.492 -10.13 -0.234 -4.02 -0.544 -7.05 -0.477 -7.15 -0.574 -4.46

Dependent Variablet-1 0.970 10.83 2.816 28.95 1.070 8.24 0.786 6.04 2.025 10.96

Constant 1.091 2.57 -0.434 -0.83 1.432 2.14 0.711 1.18 1.008 0.91

N 15012 14882 5852 9160 9122

Bold font indicates p<=.05. Blank cells inidicate variables dropped due to collinearity.

31

Table V. Liberal and Realist Factors in Conflict, Mixed DyadsModel 23 Model 24 Model 25

1950-2000 1950-1975 1976-2000All MIDs Fatal MIDs Fatal MIDsE z E z E z

log(Total Trade)instrument 0.024 1.18 -0.034 -0.70 0.060 1.08

Lower Democracy -0.035 -3.18 -0.014 -0.51 -0.035 -1.35log(Trade Dependence) 10.776 0.72 38.865 1.40 -234.068 -0.95IGO Memberships -0.051 -1.06 -0.353 -6.44 0.010 0.05APEC 0.118 0.36Minor Power Dyad -0.939 -9.21 -1.370 -7.30 -0.678 -3.01sqrt(Parity) 0.627 4.07 0.998 3.43 0.460 1.36Colonial Contiguity 1.080 7.24 0.549 1.81Contiguity 0.977 7.16 0.069 0.20 0.356 0.97log(Distance) -0.185 -2.17 0.049 0.27 -0.367 -2.34

Dependent Variablet-1 1.890 14.80 2.881 19.32 3.469 13.41

Constant -1.418 -1.83 -2.599 -1.61 -0.514 -0.34

N 127574 47089 80430

Bold font indicates p<=.05.

32

Table VI. Liberal and Realist Factors, Marginal Effects on Fatal ConflictAll Dyads Asian Dyads Asian Dyads Mixed Dyads

1950-2000 1950-75 1976-2000 1950-2000dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx

log(Total Trade)instrument 0.00008 -0.00037 0.00016 0.00000Lower Democracy -0.00009 -0.00079 0.00014 -0.00002log(Trade Dependence) -0.00019 -0.00125 -0.00297 0.00000IGO Memberships -0.00011 -0.00028 0.00002 -0.00004Minor Power Dyad -0.00176 -0.02743 -0.00053 -0.00215sqrt(Parity) 0.00011 0.00218 0.00028 0.00004Colonial Contiguity 0.00062 -0.00147 0.00037Contiguity 0.00166 0.00450 0.00325 0.00003log(Distance) -0.00017 -0.00125 -0.00048 -0.00002Dependent Variablet-1 0.00876 0.10525 0.00647 0.00603

Y (linear prediction) 0.00022 0.00402 0.00030 0.00004Based on Model 1 Model 13 Model 16 Model 23a

Effect of 1 standard deviation positive movement in each variable (or movement from 0 to 1 for dummy varaibles), all other variables held at their medians. a. Model 23 run without APEC dummy for comparison.

33

Table VII. Alternative Regime Type Measure, Asian DyadsModel 26 Model 27

1950-1975 1976-2000Fatal MIDs Fatal MIDs

E z E zlog(Total Trade)instrument -0.015 -0.39 0.050 1.05

Joint Democracy -1.191 -1.64 0.691 1.91log(Trade Dependence) -18.407 -0.59 -528.893 -2.51IGO Memberships -0.023 -0.49 0.034 0.28Minor Power Dyad -0.786 -4.88 -0.255 -1.05sqrt(Parity) 0.678 2.71 0.843 2.51Colonial Contiguity -0.163 -0.48Contiguity 0.278 1.74 0.727 3.52log(Distance) -0.137 -1.82 -0.575 -4.52

Dependent Variablet-1 2.925 23.87 2.022 10.90

Constant -1.037 -1.62 0.802 0.77

N 5760 9122

Bold font indicates p<=.05. Blank cells inidicate variables dropped due to collinearity.

34

Table A1. Summary statistics, 1950-2000N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

All MIDs All Dyads 527894 0.0028 0.0529 0 1Asia 20573 0.0147 0.1203 0 1

Fatal MIDs All Dyads 527537 0.0018 0.0424 0 1Asia 20484 0.0140 0.1173 0 1

War All Dyads 527894 0.0007 0.0271 0 1Asia 20573 0.0073 0.0854 0 1

Lower Democracy All Dyads 421061 -4.3621 5.8121 -10 10Asia 15454 -4.4682 5.4709 -10 10

Joint Democracy All Dyads 421061 0.1013 0.3017 0 1Asia 15454 0.0773 0.2671 0 1

Total Trade All Dyads 572253 143.74 2299.37 0 403807Asia 19537 418.06 2936.36 0 120116

Trade Dependence All Dyads 572101 0.0004 0.0023 0 0.214397Asia 19537 0.0009 0.0055 0 0.157894

IGO Memberships All Dyads 520566 21.50 11.45 0 107Asia 20346 17.84 12.16 0 66

Minor Power Dyad All Dyads 527894 0.9270 0.2601 0 1Asia 20573 0.9147 0.2793 0 1

Parity All Dyads 527515 0.2429 0.2676 0 0.999906Asia 20552 0.2172 0.2606 0 0.999345

Colonial Contiguity All Dyads 527894 0.0033 0.0573 0 1Asia 20573 0.0030 0.0544 0 1

Contiguity All Dyads 527894 0.0232 0.1505 0 1Asia 20573 0.0849 0.2787 0 1

Distance All Dyads 527894 4808.86 2740.07 5 12347Asia 20573 3106.07 1980.99 121 9139

Alliances All Dyads 527894 0.0701 0.2554 0 1Asia 20573 0.0212 0.1440 0 1

35

Table A2. Factors in Total Trade (total dyadic trade, log) All Dyads Asian Dyads Asian Dyads

1950-2000 1950-1975 1976-2000E t E t E t

Fatal MIDinstrument -0.052 -15.18 -0.051 -4.38 -0.022 -1.58

PolityA 0.005 3.58 -0.009 -1.06 0.006 0.64

PolityB 0.007 5.49 0.036 3.48 0.014 1.56

GDPA 0.035 45.60 0.050 8.86 0.057 11.84

GDPB 0.031 42.98 0.042 7.74 0.040 8.26

log(Distance) -0.062 -35.54 -0.038 -3.48 -0.059 -3.51

log(Total Trade)t-1 0.950 1251.28 0.952 181.80 0.951 248.35

Constant -0.658 -34.48 -1.263 -9.32 -1.177 -9.51

N 403092 5760 9122Simultaneous with Model 1 Model 13 Model 16Bold font indicates p<=.05.

36

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