The US geopolitical code and its global objectives during the first term of George W. Bush's...

Pensee Journal Vol 76, No. 3;Mar 2014

178 [email protected]

The US geopolitical code and its global objectives during the first

term of George W. Bush’s presidency

Saied Naji (Corresponding author)

Governor of Baharestan County, Tehran, Iran

[email protected]

Jayum A. Jawan

Faculty of Human Ecology, Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM)

43400, Serdang, Selangor, Malaysia

[email protected]

Fakhreddin Soltani

Faculty of Human Ecology, Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM)

43400, Serdang, Selangor, Malaysia

[email protected]

Abstract

This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the geopolitical code and global objectives of the United

States in the context of its efforts of preserve its world leadership position in the post-Cold War era. To

examine this relationship, the first term of George W. Bush’s presidency has been selected as a notable period

during which the US geopolitical code and that country’s actions, in particular prosecution of the Iraq War,

were redefined. Modelski’s long cycles are applied to analyze the US geopolitical position within the

international system, as well as to understand more about its desire to continue its world leadership.

Geo-economics as a recent concept is also used to help analyze the US geopolitical code and the intentions

behind its foreign policy. The resultant analysis suggests the US geopolitical culture, and as a result that

state’s geopolitical code, prescribes the necessity for the US to project the Iraq War and control the Persian

Gulf in order to continue its world leadership position. It would be done by defining a global threat and also

implementing a worldwide response to that threat, and thus, the ‘War on terror’.

Keywords: Long Cycles of world leadership, Geo-economics, US geopolitical code, US world leadership,

George W. Bush’s presidency, Iraq War

1. Introduction

There are various views concerning the rise and fall of great powers in history, which are called theories of

hegemonic cycles or long cycles of global politics. These has also introduced as ‘theories of hegemonic

transition and stability’ (Nye, 1990). These theories emphasize the role of military or economic power or a

combination of both in the entrenchment of long cycles of world powers, as well as phasing of these long

periods and role of wars in relation to the rise and decline of world powers. Basically, in this respect, there is a

general view that “the relative strengths of the leading nations in world affairs never remain constant,

principally because of the uneven rate of growth among different societies and of the technological and

organizational breakthroughs which bring a greater advantage to one society to another” (Kennedy, 1989, p.

xv).

By and large, hegemonic/long cycles are recognised as a result of the emergence of the modern world-system

during the century, which, according to Taylor (1994), became known as the ‘long sixteenth century’, from



1450 to 1640. Defining such cycles, there is a view that global wars have brought about the formation of some

powerful countries as world leaders, whose influence over a long period at the global level has been labelled

as ‘long cycles’. It seems to have coincided with the start of a global system around the year 1500, and then

proceeded to develop in a cyclical manner until the fifth cycle, which we are currently experiencing

(Modelski, 1978). In this respect, obviously, Modelski’s model introduces the fifth long cycle as the United

States’ long cycle, which started in 1914 with a global war and has continued until the present time. He

regards a period of about a century for each cycle, including four distinctive phases of global war, world

power, delegitimation, and deconcentration. From this view, the US long cycle is passing its fourth phase in

its long world leadership cycle and the world, cyclically, will experience a new condition with a new cycle.

Since this study seeks to explain the US geopolitical code and its relation to the US desire to preserve its

world leadership, considering this model can help to better understand this relationship and reveal the US

geopolitical assumption behind its foreign policy, in particular about the Iraq War. By focusing on President

George W. Bush’s first term, the study looks at a notable period in US post-Cold War actions, which, as

Hakki (2004) noted, coincided with the first major war in the 21st century. In this respect, Modelski’s model

can be useful because it basically, emphasizes wars as basic incidents in the emergence of any world leader.

From this perspective, the military power, particularly naval power, has been defined as the main

characteristic for any world leader in every long cycle. It is important to note that in the first term of Bush’s

presidency, militarization and launching wars were defined as practical agendas for the US foreign policy. As

such, Modelski’s model has been deemed as the most appropriate to analyze the US geopolitical code and the

US global objectives.

On the other hand, it is important to recognize the Post-Cold War developments to examine the relationship

between the US geopolitical code and the US world leadership. In this respect and to analyze the US military

intervention in the Persian Gulf and its relation to the US global objectives at that time, the recent concept of

geo-economics will be used because it could explain the significance of the changing nature of the resource of

power from the military to economic. It would also be able to correlate the US geopolitical practices with its

world leadership and its geopolitical code. To do this, use is made of US presidential speeches as the main

references together with some government documents referring to the importance of the US political leaders’

assumptions, and in particular those which have been delivered as the ‘State of the Union Address’ in

forming US foreign policy. In this respect, coding of data is carried out, while some themes will also be used

to analyze data using a qualitative content analysis method (Burnham, Lutz, Grand, & Layton-Henry, 2008;

Creswell, 2008; Merriam, 1989).

2. The US world leadership; a sustained geopolitical assumption

To analyze relationship between the US geopolitical code and the US world leadership, as well as their

relation to the geopolitical practices of the United States in particular during first term of Bush administration,

it is initially necessary considering some significant subjects simultaneously, which have influenced on

defining the US geopolitical code. These could include the US geopolitical culture and its emphasis on the US

world leadership; the neoconservatives’ thoughts and the US world leadership; the American values and world

leadership from the Bush’s perspective; the September 11 attacks; geoeconomic factors in the post-Cold War

geopolitical developments; and the US decline of power in its long cycle of world leadership, so that the

United States has needed to preserve and promote its global position to continue its world leadership.

2.1 ‘American geopolitical culture’; the US world leadership for a global mission

First of all, to analyze geopolitical assumptions of the George W. Bush administration in relation to the US

world leadership, it could be helpful adapting both regionalism (America as an exceptional sphere) and

universalism (America as the world), which have been defined by O’Tuathail (2003) as two significant

divisions of American geopolitical culture. This relates to that distinctive cultural logic with its roots in the

geography and history of America. This kind of culture views America as a ‘holy land’ and as Americans

being “chosen by God” and charged with a special mission. This was seen as nothing less than to expand and

protect democracy, freedom and other American values around the world, in other words what is definable in

the framework of ‘Manifest Destiny’. This mission in fact has its roots in American fundamental beliefs and it



is what has also been articulated by President Bush; “America is a nation with a mission, and that mission

comes from our most basic beliefs” (G. W Bush, 2004).

Based on these basic beliefs, indeed, Americans, from the beginning of their national life, have had a mission

to lead humankind, and the expansion of freedom and social justice (Hook & Spainer, 2004). From this

perspective, Americans have also been defined as a superior people who live in a place that is itself superior.

Agnew (1983) notes that: “the political definition of the United States has been viewed in exceptionalist terms

as the outcome of a unique, often providential place ‘under the sun’...”(p. 154). From this viewpoint, the

United States is also ‘the land of the free’ where liberty is achievable. That place is considered an exception in

the world due to its liberal people, values and unique geographical location. This leads to the Exceptionalism

interpretation that “stresses the view that the United States is Unique, that its history is to a large degree not

compatible with that of other nations” (Perkins, 1995, p. 232). Based on this idea, America is a new

discovered place, an empty and pristine place, which was called a ‘New World’ by President Reagan (Reagan,

1988). This ‘New world’ is placed in opposition the ‘Old world’ or Europe, which would be considered as

‘Other’ and ‘Outside’. In this way, Bush and all American people as ‘chosen people’ were ‘self’ and

American territory was ‘inside’, what nowadays are arguable as geopolitical discourses. This situation shapes

a ‘free state’ that is not only liberated of the constraints of the ‘Old World’, but also encourages supporting

‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ all over the world. Such assumptions formed American political culture, which

can still be found in the expression of contemporary US foreign policy (O' Tuathail & Agnew, 1992) such as

with the Bush administration policy. In this respect, President Bush in his state of the union address stressed

that: “Americans are a resolute people, who have risen to every test of our time... Americans are a free people

who know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not

America’s gift to the world; it is God’s gift to humanity” (G. W. Bush, 2003d). He defined American values,

freedom and “the strength of the American character” as why Americans “all treasure America” (G. W. Bush,

2001c).

2.2 Bush and the American values; a justification for actions

The first paragraph of the US national security strategy (NSS) refers to a global massage with reference to the

end of great struggles between liberty and totalitarianism in the Cold War era and necessity of protecting and

extending the values of freedom against their enemies across the world (NSS, 2002). These American values

were determined as the answer to the new challenge of the post-Cold War (Black, 2008). Indeed, these values,

in Bush view, are the sources of America’s greatness. He views America as the freedom’s home and defender

(2004d). Delivering his speech to start the Iraq War, President Bush placed a stress on freedom, saying: “we

will defend our freedom. We will bring freedom to others and we will prevail” (G. W. Bush, 2003b). Moreover,

he later deemed “the triumph of democracy in Iraq” as “a grave setback for international terrorism” (G. W.

Bush, 2003c). Indeed, democratisation and democracy promotion were also important elements beside other

American values, which were stated in the Bush doctrine and introduced particularly as a significant goal in

invading Iraq; “we will actively work to bring the hope of democracy” (NSS, 2002). After the Iraq war,

however, Bush declared the US commitment to democracy (G. W. Bush, 2004c) and it was what had its roots

in his neo-conservative advisors’ views. In this respect, democracy promotion became an important

justification for invading Iraq, and clearly Iraq was considered the first step to democratisation of the whole

Middle East (Schmidt & Williams, 2008).

To Bush, Success of a free Iraq would be watched throughout the Middle East and Millions would see that

“freedom, equality and material progress are possible at the heart of the Middle East”. Leaders would face

“that free institutions and open societies are the only path to long-term national success and dignity”. For him,

a free Iraq at the Middle East would be “a watershed event in the global democratic revolution”. He said that

“The democratic hopes we see growing in the Middle East are growing everywhere”, and indeed, Iraq and

Afghanistan would be “a model for the broader Middle East” (G. W. Bush, 2003a; 2003; 2004a). This

behaviour recalls Wilsonianism as an old geopolitical tradition in the US, but as Mearsheimer (2005)

mentioned it was “Wilsonianism with teeth”, so that “the theory [of the Bush doctrine] has an idealist strand

and a power strand: Wilsonianism provides the idealism, and an emphasis on military power provides the

teeth” (p. 1). In this respect, Bush and his neoconservative administration claimed that they “will work



actively to bring the hope of democracy...to every corner of the world”. They set out the US goal to “expand

the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy” (NSS, 2002). It

indicates that, although it started from Iraq, the US effort was to access different places worldwide. Bush had

aimed global and established a relationship between American ideology and US world leadership as a

responsible power. He, in a rapidly changing world, viewed the US future dependent to the US world

leadership and believed that at that time the American leadership was indispensable. He also linked US

leadership to momentum of freedom in the world, as well as having a exclusive responsibility to do the hard

work of freedom (1991b; 2004d). His purposes have been presented in the framework of peace, freedom and

democracy for the world; freedom from oppression as well as choosing of governments by people freely.

From this view the United States is seen as a benevolent leader who is responsible for global peace and

freedom as well as solution of the global problems. In this respect, a leader bears the burdens for the benefit

of all countries rather than its national self-interest (Flint, 2006). To do this, the world leadership needs to be

strongest.

Bush in his first state of the union address in 2001 stated: “A strong America is the world’s best hope for

peace and freedom...freedom is exported every day...we will work with our allies and friends to be a force for

good and a champion of freedom. We will work for markets, free trade, and freedom from oppression” (G. W.

Bush, 2001a). It has been emphasized also in the US National Security Strategy published in 2002: “the

United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will

actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the

world...freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity... today, humanity holds in its hands the

opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to

lead in this great mission” (NSS, 2002). It has conformity with the first phase in Modelski’s model, where one

country has an ideological message for other countries, although it is nearly placed within fourth phase from

its long cycle. These ideas along with material capacity enable the most powerful country to impose a global

order. Such country is called world leader, which offers to the world an ‘innovation’, includes institutions,

ideas and practices to offer the geopolitical agenda (Flint, 2006).

In this respect and with consideration of these global aims, although the US geopolitical code in the Bush’s

presidency had been introduced as regionalist (Flint, Adduci, Chen, & Chi, 2009), it seems that early during

the first year of Bush’s presidency and before the 11th September attacks, the Bush administration did not

have a regionalist orientation and its geopolitical code had been tied to globalism. It could, of course, have

been a result of lacking a clear geopolitical code because of global developments and the end of the Cold War

era. But by and large, and as necessity for the US as sole remaining superpower from the old geopolitical

order, it was projected in a ‘Noblesse oblige’ paradigm, expanding peace, freedom and democracy around

the world and reconstructing the new world according its desires, and this was effectively a promotion of its

world leadership. This kind of global orientation to expanding values was related to the reality that individual

freedom, democracy and fighting to defend the American way of life are indeed three realities of the US

world leadership (Flint, 2006).

2.3 Neocons and US geopolitical code; Militarism and US world leadership

Undoubtedly, the United States is greatest military power across the world. With regard to the implications of

the massive US military capability, there are many similar scenarios cited in academic manuscripts, from

world systems and hegemonic cycles’ analysis to various discussions about world leadership and other

geopolitical discourses (Agnew, 2003; Flint & Falah, 2004; Ikenberry, 2002; Modelski & Thompson, 1999; O'

Tuathail, 2003; Taylor, 2004; Wallerstein, 1993). In this respect, emphasising the continental, maritime and

aerial power in the theories of Mahan (1840-1914), Mackinder (1861-1947), Spykman (1893-1943), Seversky

(1894-1974) and others has confirmed the importance of military power to control geostrategic and

geopolitical realms and to conduct grand strategies. In the United States of America, the geopolitical ideas of

Mahan and Spykman have obviously influenced US policies in different presidencies. Mahan’s idea

concerning the superior position of sea power was adopted by President Roosevelt and became a key factor

in expanding US naval forces (Karsten, 1971). The Rimland of Spykman was also similar to, and even a

basis for, US containment policy in the late of 1940s (Dalby, 1990). This is an essential pillar capturing



military primacy beside other capabilities to create and continue a world power. As such, the emergence of the

United States as a world leader after the Second World War was a product of its economic and military

capabilities. The Modelski’s model, in particular, emphasises military ability, in particular naval might, as a

necessity for world leadership, because in this model long cycles are generated by global wars. It even defines

sea power as a superior power and every world leader needs to control oceans for global reach to preserve its

leadership position (Modelski, 1978, 1987b).

Maintaining the superiority of US military power has always been an essential plan for all US administrations

so it has, more or less, been applied as an important instrument to pursue US foreign policy. Indeed, there has

always been a permanent coherence among US geopolitical codes, its military capacities and its world

leadership. The Bush administration, among others, is widely recognised as an administration which had the

greatest tendencies to expand militarisation. It was a consequence of the close connection between militarism

and conservative ideas, with a wide range of influences joining together to shape the neoconservative camp.

Figures such as Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld were the contemporary consultants of neoconservative foreign

policy, who later practiced as ‘a war cabinet’ at top level in the US government. In fact, the influence of the

neoconservative vision on American foreign policy formed the content of the Bush doctrine and encouraged

the use of army force to change the regime in Iraq. For this reason, it is suggested that “the Bush doctrine is,

essentially, a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy”, and it reveals a strong relation between

neo-conservatism vision and a militarisation thought, which revealed itself strongly during the George W.

Bush administration (Krauthammer, 2005).

Neoconservatives in fact were displeased with the consequences of the first Persian Gulf War in 1991 and

formed a lobbying campaign to impose the use of US military forces to remove Saddam from power in Iraq.

They comprised neoconservatives such as Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney, who later became

influential members of the Bush cabinet (Schmidt & Williams, 2008). They believed the first Persian Gulf

War was an inconclusive war and that the Clinton administration had wasted eight years (1993-2001). On this

view Bush said: “little more than a decade ago, the Cold War thawed end, with the leadership of Presidents

Reagan and Bush, that wall came down. But instead of seizing this moment, the Clinton/Gore administration

has squandered it. We have seen a steady erosion of American power and an unsteady exercise of American

influence” (G. W. Bush, 2000). At that time and before coming to office as the US president, Bush emphasized

redefining war on US terms as the best way to keep peace (1999), and began criticizing the Clinton

administration, stressing the weaknesses of the US military to do its duty; “Our military is low on parts, pay

and morale. If called on by the commander-in-chief today, two entire divisions of the Army would have to

report...Not ready for duty, sir”, Bush said in California on August 3, 2000 (2000). Elected in 2000, he

continued to stress the need and importance of strengthening the US military power and declared that US

military had an essential and new mission, and the first priority for the United States was to speed the

transformation of the US military (2001). Bush declared in 2004 that “When Dick Cheney and I came to

Washington; we found a military that was under-funded and under- appreciated. So we increased the defense

budget to give our men and women the tools and training they need to win the war on terror”. “We gave our

Armed Forces the resources and respect they deserve” (2004b, 2004d).

Neoconservatives emphasised the primacy of military power as an essential element to achieve the great

purpose on a global scale. From this view, it would enable US to get access global reach as a world leader.

That issue explicitly referred to the United States’ world leadership, as Bush said: “The world needs

America’s strength and leadership, and America’s armed forces need better equipment, better training, and

better pay” (G. W. Bush, 2000). President Bush also in his speech at West Point on June 1, 2002 said: “in the

world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act”. He continued

“our security will require...a military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of

the world” (G. W. Bush, 2002a). It indicates paying attention to primacy of military power on the global scale

and in responding to a global threat. Further, Bush had also stressed that America is “stronger than ever” and

they “will prove it to the world” (G. W. Bush, 2001c).

This suggested that, on the one hand “the terrorist attacks demonstrated contempt for America and its military

might” (O' Tuathail, 2003, p. 861), and on the other hand, neoconservatives deemed ‘American omnipotence



and leadership’ a crucial element in establishing peace and order in the world (Schmidt & Williams, 2008),

and both issues encouraged militaristic orientations. In this context, history has shown how the world

leadership has always been accessible for those countries which have had a military supremacy alongside

other capabilities. In fact, it has been claimed that “a state comes to dominate an era by riding a wave of rising

technological innovation, economic growth, and military power” (Ikenberry, 1996, p. 389).

From this point of view, Bush in his report stressed that, “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade

potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the

United States” (NSS, 2002, p. 30). On that basis, President Bush predicted an unprecedented increasing of the

military budget, as he affirmed in his 2002 State of the Union: “My budget includes the largest increase in

defense spending in two decades” (G. W. Bush, 2002b). An analysis indicates the annual average defense

budget had been increased from $ 516.7 billion under President Reagan to $ 582.4 billion in the Bush

presidency. Based on this data these averages have been respectively $452.7 and $380.3 billion in G.H.W.

Bush and Clinton’s presidencies (PDA, 2010). This view influenced the Bush administration’s underlying

primacy of the US military and its ability to act alone over foreign policy, which is termed unilateralism. This

thinking became an important element in the Bush doctrine and subsequently the US unilateral reaction in the

Iraq War (Schmidt & Williams, 2008).

On the other hand, it should not to be forgotten that the Jacksonian tradition is an important part of American

geopolitical culture, affected during the Bush administration, because from the other side a set of terrorist

attacks targeted America culturally and corporally, so in this situation people’s affects must be answered. In

this culture, the United States is encouraged to be strong militarily and to fight preventive wars (O'Tuathail,

2003). From this perspective, disrespect for the United States must be redressed with a powerful response.

Moreover, it is a reality that both Republican and Democratic thinkers are interested in pursuing US primacy

and its highest power position globally, and to maintain this position permanently. They have a tendency to

use US power to pursue varieties of positive objectives all over the world. Neoconservatives within the

Republican Party were pioneers of this way (Posen, 2007). They believe US military power should be used to

reorder the international system, towards the order the world had lost with end of the cold war era. Bush

indeed created the most powerful military force to achieve this objective (Schmidt & Williams, 2008).

It shows the importance of military capability to gain world leadership and to reconstruct a new world order.

Both the world-systems and long cycles approaches even confirm the importance of military power for

continuing economic leadership, organizing the global institutions and accessing resources and world

markets(O' Loughlin & Wusten, 1993). Based on this belief, neoconservatives embraced the notion that

after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US is the sole superpower, and preserving its world leadership

position is a great purpose. It was what was reflected in the National Security Strategy, as Bush Doctrine, and

implicated the US leadership; Sentences such as, “In leading the campaign against terrorism...” or “In

exercising our leadership...” and “Effective coalition leadership requires...” (NSS, 2002). In addition, the

United States needed to perpetuate its leadership particularly after the end of the Cold War, and in this respect

it needed to keep its high military capacity because it is important for world leadership to have the capacity to

respond to challenges everywhere around the world; and indeed global access is a significant element for

world leader (Flint, 2006). In the case of the Bush administration and according to the US geopolitical code,

there was an urge to respond to global terrorism as threats to the US and its friends in different geographical

regions around the world, although it started in Afghanistan and was stopped in Iraq.

3. Continuation of the US world leadership after a decline phase

The years around 1970 have been defined as the beginning years of the US decline of power, which has been

marked by some important incidents such as the world revolution, oil crisis, end of Vietnam War, end of dollar

convertibility, economic inflation, increasing the growth rate in Japan and Europe, recognizing a new ‘multi

polarity’ in world affairs, among others (Agnew, 1993; Black, 2008; Modelski, 1987b; Taylor & Flint, 2000;

Wallerstein, 2003). This, according to Modelski’s model, happened after a ‘world power’ phase which began

in the early years of the 1940s and at a time when the US was economically, politically and militarily

dominant and continues to date. This refers to the United States’ long cycle of world leadership, which

started from 1914 with the beginning of World Wars and continues to date. From this view, the United States



is facing its ‘delegitimation of power’ phase and passing its fourth phase, namely that of ‘deconcentration of

power’ (Modelski, 1987b). When we consider this cycle, it can help to understand and analyze the US

practices regarding its attempts to preserve its world leadership position in the context of global rivalries. In

this respect, it is perceivable that the US is attempting to re-legitimize its global position by redefining a new

global agenda and courting the acceptance of most of the world’s elites, which would then guarantee

continuation of its world leadership in a new ‘long cycle’. In fact, referring to the geopolitics of Modelski’s

model the pertinent question is “if Britain can have two cycles, why not the United States?” (Flint & Taylor,

2007, p. 49). This can be related to the global geopolitical codes which are definable only by great powers like

the United States. Such global codes are imposed on other countries and a new geopolitical world order will

be formed by fitting different geopolitical codes.

It is interesting to note that with the end of the Cold War era the containment policy which had been viewed as

the US geopolitical code during that time, lost its credibility and the United States needed to redefine a new

geopolitical code to confront a new uncertain geopolitical world. Obviously, it had to include what Flint (2006)

referred to as securing the continuation of US world leadership. This was viewed in the National Security

Strategy of the United States as the Bush Doctrine, as well as a significant document to demonstrate the US

geopolitical code.

4. A geopolitical opportunity; redefining Geopolitical code for a global objective

The US geopolitical code was obviously redefined after the September 11th 2001 attacks, and these attacks

were seen as a serious threat to American values and principles. These events provided a geopolitical

opportunity for the Bush administration to redefine the US geopolitical code. In this respect, and for defining

threats to US interests, Bush considered terrorists a threat and also called them the enemies of freedom, saying:

“enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country... they hate our freedoms-our freedom of

religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote...” (G. W. Bush, 2001b). In his speech he also linked

American freedom to the world’s freedom and stressed that “what is at stake is not just American’s freedom.

This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight” (2001b). He indeed considered US values for the whole

world, and equalled threats to US interests with a threat to freedom across the world. That was similar to what

had been defined by President Truman in the 1950s, and was what ultimately led to defining the containment

policy as a US geopolitical code.

Redefining the geopolitical code, however, while there are public and academic critics of the Bush

administration’s practice of facing these terrorist attacks, particularly in pursuing war in Iraq, and who

consider it as ‘the triumph of effect on intellect’ (O' Tuathail, 2003), it seems these events have helped

America’s political agency to reconstruct the US geopolitical code and to define it as ‘the War on Terrorism’

(Flint, 2006). In fact, it was what the US needed to confront the new condition in the new era in order to

sustain its world leadership position in the new geopolitical world order. From this viewpoint also American

values in the United States and worldwide were introduced as US interests. That could be a part of the

geopolitical agenda for other countries around the world, in which order would be imposed on the world by a

global leader. This is what was considered to be one of the main principles for producing long cycles

(Modelski, 1978, 1987b). It seems that the war on terror, introduced as a global geopolitical code included a

global agenda for the entire world, which was issued by the world leader regarding war against terrorists

everywhere and protecting freedom as well. From this view it was in reality the US attempt to reconstruct a

new geopolitical order with its leadership.

In the new geopolitical code, all terrorist groups across the world were viewed as a challenge and threat,

which needed an adequate response, and also a justification for that response. Based on these assumptions,

apparently the Afghanistan War and Iraq war respectively, were the US response to these threats. This view

also emphasised the distinction between friends and adversaries as ‘self’ and ‘others’. Those geopolitical

assumptions would place a stress on ‘with us, or with the terrorists’. Bush, distinctly, declared that “in this

conflict, there is no neutral ground” (G. W. Bush, 2001d), and in the war on terror, “nations are either with us

or against us” (G. W. Bush, 2002c). “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you

are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or

support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime” (G. W. Bush, 2001b).



It indeed divided friends of US values and its enemies globally. As was mentioned above, a similar US

foreign policy stance was held in the early of 1950s, a policy documented by the Truman administration,

called the ‘Truman doctrine’, and it defined US geopolitical code at that time. Similar to the Bush idea, it

emphasised the free world. It mentioned “the assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context

of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere”(NSC-68,

1950, IV.A). From the perspective of Modelski’s model, it was done in order to define a new global agenda, as

well as to create a coalition along with an international organization essential for being a world leader.

4.1 Bush and the US geopolitical code; a regionalist orientation

In the Bush administration similar to Truman presidency, the US geopolitical code had regionalist orientation.

In this respect, documents indicate that although the agenda was globalist, such code emphasised specific

geographical regions and countries (Flint et al., 2009). Based on this approach, indeed, the ‘rogue states’

were termed (NSS, 2002), and President Bush obviously defined the term ‘Axis of Evil’. He said, “States

like … [Iraq] and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the

world...they could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States”. In this context, it is important

to note that the axis of evil and terrorist groups have been placed against world peace and civilization; “ this is

a regime [Iraq] that has something to hide from the civilized world” (G. W. Bush, 2002b). In fact, in another

interpretation from the ‘clash of civilization’ (Huntington, 1993), he placed the civilized world lead by US

leadership against an uncivilized world and defined a global war between two different fronts. According to

Bush at that time, civilization with all its modern essence was threatened by uncivilized groups. Clearly

according to Bush, the civilized world includes all countries, institutions and firms that have adopted

American values and culture, a world which contains the United States and its allies. Viewed this way, it was

defining the United States as a leader of the civilized world against a few rogue states and non-state terrorists

groups, and here it could be revealed a close relationship between the US geopolitical code and its desire to

continue the US world leadership. It also attempts to introduce the United States as a benevolent leader. In this

regard, these values and ideology offered by a world power are viewed as its national interests but not limited

to its national territory, and its efforts, including even fighting for these interests, is considered a self-defense.

As Flint and Falah (2004) noted, Self-defense for such world powers “is not so much defense of national

borders, but defense of national interests that are extra-territorial or located within other and ‘othered’

sovereign spaces” (p. 1380).

In sum, studying the first term of the George W. Bush’s presidency, as was explained, shows how the US

geopolitical code, regardless of its regionalist or globalist orientation, has been defined in order to attain US

global aims. Such geopolitical code has linked global agenda with regional practices. In this sense and in the

context of the American geopolitical culture, defining its national interests, threats and enemies, responding to

those threats and even justification for those responses, all have been portrayed on the global canvas and

demonstrate the scale of the US geopolitical code is truly global. This is a unique trait only shown by

powerful countries aiming for world leadership as a global purpose, and why efforts by other countries to

define its geopolitical code in the global scale is considered a challenge for world leadership (Flint, 2006). In

this regard, cultural dominance is crucial and as stated, stressing the cultural representations by the Bush

administration particularly about world freedom and peace, a ‘Noblesse oblige’ paradigm, would be able,

domestically and internationally, to justify US foreign policy and its practice, even to pursue war. This kind of

domination would bolster legitimacy, especially since the United States had faced a decline from about 1970.

Those justifications were pre-requisites to pursue its global aims of promoting its global position in the new

era and reconstructing a post-Cold War geopolitical world order.

5. ‘Unilateralism’ versus ‘a geopolitical opportunity’

It is significant to consider that there has been a specific responsibility for the United States as the only

remaining superpower to pass from the Cold war geopolitical world order to another. This responsibility on

the global scale can be discussed in the context of the US desire, as a powerful state, to preserve its high

position in the new era and in competition with other great powers. A requirement for every state that wants

to be a world leader is the need “to project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective

ordering of politics” (Ikenberry, 1996, p. 388). It refers to a global system in each long cycle in which a



victorious world power in a global war would attempt to construct it. Since the US is the only powerful state

with the capability to undertake this responsibility, the Modelski model suggests that the next long cycle

would belong to that country (Flint, 2006). However, it is important to note how the US is cementing its

legitimacy to continue its world leadership position in a new ‘long cycle’.

From this view, US world leadership should be considered as a linked component to US geopolitical codes

due to its leadership capacities, in particular, in Post-Cold war circumstances. On the basis of this situation at

that time and after 9/11 there was a unique opportunity for the Bush administration to reconstruct and

guarantee US leadership through acting to disseminate its ideas and values as its world responsibility. But as

mentioned, it coincided with developments in the geopolitical world order context, and one of the most

important requirements to gain the highest position in the world is an ability of managing international

institutions. This relates to a world power’s legitimacy, and that was a critical gap in the Bush administration’s

foreign policy in the global context. Basically, every powerful state, beside material capability and ideas,

needs an ability to organize international institutions (Cox, 1981). Indeed, world power needs political,

economic and military institutions to respond to challenges and challengers, and the power based on

collective power is more important and cheaper than power based on coercion. So it is essential for such

world powers to enjoy international legitimacy (Flint & Falah, 2004). To illustrate, it implies that establishing

a political order needs both world leadership as architect and institution (Ikenberry, 1996).

In this respect what has been seen in the case of Iraq, marked an uneven incongruity between US domestic

desire and its international position. This is very close to what Taylor (1993) and Agnew (1993) have said

about America’s impasse and an incompatibility between US domestic prosperity and its world leadership. In

contrast to supporting America’s internal society, invading Iraq stimulated critics from the United States’

academic society as well as from the wider international community. Mearsheimer (2005) believes that

“almost all realists in the United States-except for Henry Kissinger- opposed the war against Iraq” (p. 1).

Fukuyama (2004) , from the other side, refereed to the Islamic world as disliking the US due to is actions. The

lack of legitimacy in the US military action against Iraq, in particular, created a deep gap between the Bush

administration and international institutions, namely the UN. This war was questionable, concerning the lack

of a logical relationship between terrorism and the Iraq government, and for this reason it attracted slight

support from the United Nations Security Council. According to O’Tuathail (2003) “the geopolitical discourse

of the Bush administration, the veracity of its claims, and the legitimacy of its actions were widely questioned

and challenged. Millions of people across the world protested the imminent war with Iraq in the early month

of 2003”(p. 857).

Perhaps unilateralism as an element of the Bush doctrine was a product of neoconservative thinking, which

took the view that due to military ability, the United States as a unipolar power did not need to act

multilaterally and thus they did not perceive this to be an important obstacle to obtain UN Security Council

support to use force against Iraq. This was compatible with this realist position that views the UN an

ephemeral organization to be used when it is useful and ignored when it does not serve the national interests

(Taylor, 2004). They criticised the multilateral policy of the Clinton administration as well as rejected some

international agreements such as Kyoto and the International Criminal Court (Schmidt & Williams, 2008).

Indeed the Bush administration “largely abandoned for an aggressive militarism the multilateral

institutionalism that (it is important to note) US governments had largely invented and put into place after

World War II” (Agnew, 2003, p. 873). This policy had a close connection to the other element of Bush

doctrine namely the preemptive war, which was considered in the US geopolitical code as a response to

threats or terrorism. It has clearly been clarified in the National Security Strategy of the United States of

America; “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community,

we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively

against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country” (NSS, 2002, p.

6).

In his 2002 ‘State of the Union’ address, Bush had also considered action based on the US national security,

although several of his speeches mentioned cooperation with American coalition partners, which ultimately

failed to gain international legitimacy. This is another significant point about world leadership - this ability of



coalition forming - and what Modelski (1987b) terms ‘Mobilization’. In this context, Bush said that “We

will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and

expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction... And all nations should know: America will do

what is necessary to ensure our Nation's security” (G. W. Bush, 2002b). Similar to this statement, he stated in

his 2004 state of the union address that “America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of

our country” (G. W. Bush, 2004e), although he had also referred to US attempts to attract international support

for US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and claimed gaining much support. In the case of Iraq, Bush talked

about the US’s many international partners, while during the foremost battle operations, “there were

approximately 45000 British personal, 2000 Australians and about 200 poles in addition to the 235000

American forces” only (Davis, 2006, p. 163). From this view, since world leadership includes more than

military and economic coercion, and but also stresses consent and active cooperation, the lack of legitimacy

for US military action against Iraq due to its unilateral action resulted in its inability to gain the highest global

position even as a world leader. Consequently, the United States faced significant challenges from other great

powers even within its coalition in confronting some regional and international problems. Anyhow, acting

unilaterally particularly in the case of the Iraq war, there is this view that it at least indicates the

administration’s desire to become an imperial power, which was “a seductive fantasy of control in a world”

(O'Tuathail, 2003, p. 868).

However, there is this important question of why the United States, despite of lacking a noticeable

international consensus about invading Iraq, proceeded to act unilaterally, even though it was not required to

do so to continue and maintain its world leadership position. In addition, it is important to understand why,

amongst those countries labelled as the “Axis of evil”, only Iraq was selected, while North Korea, which was

seriously attempting to proliferate WMD, was left alone. Perhaps, the answer lies in the US geopolitical

code and its global objectives, using the recent concept of geo-economics and its relation to the Persian Gulf

oil.

6. Geo-economics of oil, Iraq War and the US world leadership

To discuss this issue in proper perspective, it is necessary to consider two important aspects. First, this is

related to the post-Cold War geopolitical developments. In this context, these developments include the global

rivalries amongst great powers, and changing the nature of power in favour of importance of economic factors

posed in the framework of geo-economics. And second, the importance of the Persian Gulf oil and its role in

determining the US geopolitical code, particularly since the Second World War to date, as well as its crucial

role in global rivalries to gain the world leadership.

6.1 The post-Cold War developments and rivalries for world leadership

With the end of the Cold War, the United States remained the sole superpower from the Cold War geopolitical

world order, but the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of a few great powers as rivals

who challenged the US world leadership. In fact, that serious threat which had caused the formation of the

coalition under the leadership of the United States was eliminated, and there was no longer the pretext or

‘political power’ to intimidate allies by the US (Wallerstein, 2003). In this respect, the long cycle of US

world leadership has entered its fourth phase and promised ending the current US world leadership which has

been introduced as fifth long cycle of world politics (Modelski, 1987b).

Obviously, powerful actors such as Russia, China, Japan, European community, and even India, are posed as

great powers (Cohen, 1991; Huntington, 1999; Ikenberry, 1996; Nye, 2002; Taylor, 2004; Wallerstein, 2003),

capable of challenging the US world leadership, as well as being contenders of leadership in the new era. In

addition, at this time of uncertainty, some regional states like Iran and non-state groups like Al-Qaeda have

attempted to challenge the US leadership as well. Indeed, the United States experienced a geopolitically

disordered era which could be called a ‘geopolitical transition period’ (Nijman, 1993; Taylor, 1992). The

United States as a world leader has attempted to preserve its world leadership and continue its global position

through reconstruction of a new desirable geopolitical world order and formation of its second long cycle. It

needed using different aspects of its power to show its superiority to other states. Perhaps, that is why some

believe that the United States had to go to war because it had to show its power (Wallerstein, 2003).



6.2 Changing nature and source of power

On the other hand, after the Cold War, the world faced a change in the nature and source of power with the

superiority of education, technology, and economic factors as new geopolitical attributes of power (Agnew &

Corbridge, 1995). This, in fact, refers to developments in indicators of the world’s leadership power, as

economic and geo-economic power replaced military might. This type of change, following the extinction

of ideological rivalries, appeared at the beginning of the new era, and has continued to date. That basically

emphasized changing the grammar of war, so that from this view, wars would occur but fought with the

grammar of commerce (Luttwak, 1990). In this view, behind every conflict there would be an economic

rationale. With this shift, economic power, is now an important characteristic of international relations (Klare,

2001). From this standpoint, relative success in the international system would depend on economic growth

more than conventional geopolitical attributes of power (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995; Mercille, 2008). In fact,

the traditional concept of power, based on military abilities, would be influenced by this new concept of

power and in this way geo-economic regions would become more important.

In this respect, it is interesting to note that according to Modelski’s model, the world should embrace a global

war after the fourth phase which we are now living in. To Modelski, not all future global wars will be military,

but they could be fought by using political and economic weapons (Modelski, 1987a; O'Loughlin & Wusten,

1993). Indeed, it clearly refers to changing the weapons of conflict and this is similar to what has been stated

in the concept of geo-economics. Therefore, the geo-economic areas also would be very important and

controlling these areas would be crucial for great powers, especially, for contenders of world leadership.

6.3 The Persian Gulf area; a geo-economic pivot

Based on this important change and the growing importance of geo-economics, energy resources of oil and

natural gas play an important role in forming the structure of global relations. In this respect, those regions

such as the Persian Gulf that possess greater energy sources would become more important, and it seems that

any powerful country that can control these resources and their transfer routes will be able to control the

global economy and the world (Harvey, 2003; Mercille, 2010; Mojtahedzadeh, 2002). Obviously, one of the

most important regions in the world which possesses massive reserves of oil and natural gas is the Persian

Gulf region, which has experienced so many competitions among great powers and consumers especially the

United States, European community, Japan, and China to access to these energy resources (Klare, 2001).

Perhaps that is why although some important events such as the September 11 attacks had extensive

influences on the formation of US foreign policy and practical geopolitics of this state. There are some who

view the military intervention of the US in the Middle East region as a crucial step in protecting the source of

energy flow that powers the industries of many industrial countries (Peters, 2004;Billon, 2004; Klare, 2001),

as well as to maintain and promote its world leadership position (Iseri, 2009). It should be remembered that,

the Persian Gulf region holds approximately 65% of the world’s oil reserves (OPEC, 2008; Sen & Babali,

2007) and more than 37% of proven natural gas reserves (OPEC, 2008). It is also of great significance to

realize that this region will provide about 52% of world production by year 2030 (Sen & Babali, 2007).

It is also important to note that, the most powerful countries in the world are also the most important oil

consumers. The major consumers are the USA, European Union (EU) and Asia-Pacific (China, India and

Japan), whose demands for and dependence to oil continue to grow. It has been anticipated that dependence of

the Asia-Pacific region on oil will rise to 78% in 2030. It is also anticipated that the European Union will

import 90% of its total oil requirements in 2030 (Sen & Babali, 2007). While the US National Energy policy

declared that “by 2020, Gulf oil producers are projected to supply between 54 and 67% of the world’s oil”

(NEP, 2001). For this reason and because of the crucial role of the Persian Gulf oil in global rivalries, and its

importance to the US oil requirements, this area is of vital interest to the US (Carter, 1980; NEP, 2001). This

view and the necessity to protect this vital interest led to the establishment of the United States Central

Command (CENTCOM) and this military force has been strengthened until the present time. The Iraq War, in

this regard, was also viewed as a continuation of the Carter Doctrine (Klare, 2006), and the Persia Gulf area

was introduced as a ‘geo-economic pivot” , vital for the United States and global economic health (Morrissey,

2008). Concerning importance of this area in US foreign policy, it is sufficient to say that the most notable

American policy immediately after the Cold War was also toward this area, particularly the Gulf War (Nijman,



1993). At that time and during the Gulf War President G.H.W. Bush also declared the United States’ concerns

about oil reserves of Kuwait as one important objective for going to war (G. H. W. Bush, 1991a).

President George W. Bush, however, viewed Iraq as a country with “great potential wealth” and believed that

“A brutal dictator... will not be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the United States” (G. W.

Bush, 2003d). It also was said by Wolfowitz, US Deputy Defense Secretary: “Look, the Primarily difference -

to put it a little too simply - between North Korea and Iraq is that we had virtually no economic options with

Iraq because the country floats on a sea of oil” (Wolfowitz, 2003).

On the other hand, however, controlling this area by the United State entailed the necessity to control sea

paths and naval trade routes, as stressed by Modelski’s model for every world power. It provides the world

leader’s global reach and stresses the priority of naval power. From this view, controlling the Persian Gulf is

main part of controlling naval oil flow routes which would result in the domination of the United States over

the global economy as well as other industrial states and great powers. This, in fact, provides control of what

Harvey (2003) called ‘the global oil spigot’. According to him, it would increase the United States’

“effective control over the global economy for the next fifty years” (p. 25). Using oil resources as a leverage

to gain economic and political ends is rooted in the US policy toward the Middle East region. George Kennan,

in 1949, had referred to control of Japan’s oil imports, which would mean ‘veto power’ over Japan’s military

and industrial policies (Mercille, 2010). In this respect also, Defense Secretary of the Truman administration

had noted that, “whoever sits on the valve of Middle East oil may control the destiny of Europe” (Mercille,

2010). These geopolitical circumstances caused the formation of this geopolitical assumption that “whoever

controls the Middle East controls the global oil spigot and whoever controls the global oil spigot can control

the global economy, at least for the near future” (Harvey, 2003, p. 19).

Here, the geo-economics of oil would act as a politico-economic weapon, which would serve to straighten the

US world leadership. In this way, the United States could be ready to confront a new likely kind of global war

at the end of its long cycle by using the geo-economics of oil through controlling the geo-economic pivot of

the Persian Gulf. In practice, to continue its world leadership, the United States has needed to control the

global economy and subsequently other great powers. To do this, controlling the sea trade paths, the Persian

Gulf area as a region with massive energy reservoirs, and presenting its preemptive military power also would

be needed. In this respect, it has been defined as a principle to have a superior military power, which is seen in

the US geopolitical code and has been reflected in the Bush doctrine (NSS, 2002) as a result of neocons’

thoughts within the Bush administration. The geo-economics of controlling oil along with economic and

military superiority would help impose the US geopolitical agenda and its ideas on other states, which could

lead to formation of a desirable geopolitical world order led by the US. In this way, the continuation of world

leadership would be assured in a new long cycle for the United States.

7. Conclusion

Examining Bush’s speeches and some official documents during his first term together with related analysis

suggests a close connection between the US geopolitical code and American world leadership as desired by

the US leadership. Initially, it refers to the structure of American geopolitical culture and recognizes the

impact of American values and their specific geographical-historical influences over US political behavior.

This culture sees the US as an exceptional sphere and a ‘holy land’ with ‘chosen people’, placed beyond the

seas with a geographical distance from the old world and having formed an ‘inside’ against ‘outside’. This

place has always had a mission to spread and defend freedom, democracy and peace globally, and this mission

prescribes a predominance of US power in different cultural, economic and in particular military contexts, in

order to project world leadership in different geographical areas. This presence is justified via assuming

global responsibility as the superior power, although it is related to both US interests and its national security.

From this viewpoint, it means defending US values across the world provides security for the American

homeland. This could be a reason for war against terrorism and it seems to have had a strong connection with

changing the US geopolitical code and adopting the regionalism orientation in the US foreign policy. It was

actually a crucial decision, and was directly related to post-cold war circumstances; it was also done in order

to support US efforts to reconstruct the new geopolitical world order, which would convey the impression of



America as the only remaining superpower surviving from the previous geopolitical world order. From

Modelski’s model perspective, the United States has attempted to preserve its world leadership and maintain

the status quo for the next long cycle. To do this, the US needed to define a new geopolitical global agenda

and impose it on other states to promote its legitimacy. US political leaders then set out to define American

interests, potential threats and who were its enemies, providing a suitable response to those threats as well as a

justification for actions to redefine its geopolitical code.

The September 11th attacks created an opportunity to define these components of US geopolitical code and a

global agenda, so that terrorism and all supporter countries were introduced as a threat or ‘others’ against the

US, while its allies were seen as friends or ‘self’. Using force and war to spread democracy as ‘war on

terrorism’, or what was referred to as ‘wilsonianism with teeth’, was chosen as a suitable response to threats.

Such a code was designed in light of the US desire to keep its world leadership and to continue its world

leadership. In this respect, global terrorism was defined as the main threat, and so it needed a global response

and so this could justify the US presence around the world. It became a new global agenda combating with

world terrorism. Defending American values and freedom for the entire world, as a part of American

geopolitical culture, was defined as a necessity and could also justify US global actions. Given its global

presence, the US government needed to continually reinforce US military capability.

Indeed, the US geopolitical code prescribed America’s global actions in order to maintain and strengthen a

strong US world leadership. Accordingly, such a code, although the agenda was global, was aimed at specific

geographical regions such as Iraq and the Persian Gulf. From the geo-economics perspective, this was

pursued through launching the Iraq War and caused the continuation of the US military presence in the

Persian Gulf, which possesses the most important world oil reservoirs. Controlling this geo-economic pivot

would help to control oil flows to the industrial countries, and subsequently, control the other major

consumers’ behaviors, which have been major powers as well. This, together with the US preeminent military

and economic power would provide continuation of US world leadership for the next long cycle through

enforcement of the US global agenda and ideas, which could also lead to construct a new desirable

geopolitical world order.

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