Israel’s GeopoliticalRelationship with the World

Steven E. Robnak February 2014

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Table of ContentsI. Introduction 3II. Historical Context Section 7

III. Literary Analysis 10-11IV. Personal Analysis 32-33V. Conclusion 40

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I.

How does Israel conduct and maintain its relations with

foreign countries? Who does it choose to conduct relations with,

and why does maintain the relationships it does with

controversial regimes such as Central American dictatorships,

Apartheid South Africa, or countries that abuse human rights such

as the China or Turkey? Though this looks like three separate

questions, geopolitically speaking all the questions are related,

and there are a few factors that determine why Israel conducts

relations the way it does.

To answer the first question, Israel maintains diplomatic

relations through the Defense and Foreign Ministries, and the

offices of the Prime Minister. Bellow the defense department are

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offices such as the military attachés, the “defense wall”

research and development on military projects, the arms industry,

unofficial attachés and security apparatuses such as Aman, Shin

Bet, Shabak, and Lekem. Under the Foreign Ministry , embassies

are maintained , with such positions as ambassadors, consolers,

and most attachés within an embassy ( or unofficial attachés such

as with China or India ( and South Africa) to name a few famous

examples). The Prime Ministers office maintains all covert

relations through the Mossad or any secret dignitary contacts

with states considered hostile to Israel or at war with Israel

( such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, African countries in the 1970 and

mid 80s).

To answer who it conducts relations with, the answer is it

tries to conduct relations with everyone. Though it may not have

formal relations with every country in the world, and Israel may

be in a state of war with many countries in the Arab world,

there is strong evidence to support a pattern of unofficial

representatives maintaing relations in these countries. Much like

the United States has an American interests office in Cuba,

Israel maintains a similar apparatus in most countries that

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either have no formal relations or refuse to recognize it(Such as

with Jordan before formal peace in 1992)(Rodman 45). Though

Israel attempts to conduct relations with everyone,

geopolitically speaking, Israel has an interesting pattern for

how it prioritizes its relations( see table bellow). I define it

into priority1/2/3( priority in the sense of friendliness). I

defined the priority system on a combination of what Israel says

it does to conduct foreign policy ( ie the Ben Gurion points on

Israeli grand strategy) and how Israel has acted over its entire

existence. It has priority one relations in the Middle Eastern

neighborhood that are not Arab ( ie Turkey, Iran Ethiopia,

Kurdish community, India, Lebanese Christian community)

prioritized relations with countries that have had hostile

stances with Arab nations ( historically France and the USA,

Turkey, Ethiopia, recently India), and friendly global/regional

powers ( Germany*, USA, U.K. France, and recently China India and

Russia). Priority one relations affect Israel’s position in the

Middle East and its power relationship with hostile neighbors,

and priority one relationships tend to last longer in the formal

setting. Priority two relations are mostly countries outside of

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the Middle Eastern sphere or not very dependent on Arab petroleum

or Arab petrodollars. These countries typically are third world

nations, not aligned with the Soviets, and sometimes

internationally isolated from the international community because

of human rights abuses or other major issues. Priority two

nations are also countries that can offer Israel something in

return ( such as research and development assistance, natural

resources Israel doesn’t have ( such as Oil or Uranium or rare

earth minerals) and countries cut off from international arms

markets. Priority three countries are countries generally seen as

hostile to Israel or were aligned with the Soviet block. They

maintain pro Arab relations ( or are Arab states), recognize

Palestine ( and maybe not Israel) and are usually unwilling to

maintain formal relations ( there are however unofficial or

secret relations). Many maintain secret relations for arms,

intelligence, or back channel communications ( ie Iran, China and

India, Saudi Arabia, and former Jordan). Priority three relations

are almost exclusively ran through an apparatus of the Defense

ministry or Mossad if formal relations do not exist( The Foreign

Ministry may have contacts posted in countries with no formal

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relations running interests offices or educational exchanges Aid

programs, etc, but in reality the Foreign Ministry is prioritized

bellow the Defense Ministry and the Prime Ministers office)(Moaz

486) .

Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3

Middle Eastern non Arab entities ( ie Christians, Kurds, Druze, Ethiopians, Turks, expat Jewish communities etc)

Third World Countries that do not rely on Arab Oilor Soviet Influence(Central America and some regions in Africa)

Countries that have relations with Arabs, pro Arab sentiment, Pro Palestine stances, or do not recognize the state of Israel ( Soviet Union, China, India)

Countries Hostile toMuslims or Arabs( orhave sour relations)( Turkey, European Countries India*, France*)

Countries with humanrights abuses or lowinternational approval ( Central America South Africaand some African States, China)

Countries that do not want formal relations, but are willing to buy arms or security assistance under thetable ( Uganda, China, India)

Friendly Global or regional Powers ( ieFrance and the USA, former South Africa)

Countries that are willing to work on research and development ( this relates to priority one but starts in this stage of relationship)

States that are at War with Israel

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1There is an interesting General pattern to Israeli

relationships that experts have not commented on. Though Moaz,

Suffot, Klieman, Baba, Dobrey, and all other experts focus on

Israel’s relationship to select regions of the world, the same

reasons and patterns for relationships occur on the global level.

Most countries Israel has had formal relationships with now did

not have formal relations with before 1955( in fact the same

pattern was existent before the existence of Israel) . Most

countries had clandestine relationships with Israel that were not

formal, and through secret dealings that were mutually beneficial

eventually led to formal relations with Israel. Most of these

secret dealings were arms transactions, and in the 50s and 60s

development assistance projects ( or in select cases like South

Africa, R&D, and strong defense establishment relationships).

Almost all secret relations are ran through sub offices of the

Defense Department or the Prime Ministers office2, and rarely

through the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry is left in the

1 Pages 38-39 explains the table above 2 The Mossad and the Defense department are known to send attachés normally sent by the foreign ministry ( ie an attaché for agricultural development, academic cooperation). They will hold these titles but really be working on other projects ( such as arms development in South Africa, research, or they are the arms dealer). (Hunter, Bahbah, Moaz, Rodman,)( Suransky 86 )

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dark on most things the Defense Ministry or the Mossad do ( the

embassies or interests offices are usually divided between the

Defense Department and the Foreign Ministry, this is referred to

as the defense wall in literature)(Moaz 452). Through the

clandestine relationships from the defense wall or Mossad, many

countries will go public with their intent to establish

normalized relations with Israel. At this point, the Foreign

Ministry and its sub offices will run more of what is expected of

“normal” or formal relations.

There is also a pattern with countries of the world

terminating formal relations with Israel and keeping the

clandestine relations with the Defense Ministry or the Mossad.

For example, countries in Africa, Asia, the Americas will

terminate contacts with the Foreign Ministry but maintain

connections in the Defense Ministry or the Mossad. Many of these

countries eventually reestablish formal relations with Israel

after a period of years( Central Africa roughly a decade,

Americas few years).

Lastly, Israel’s grand strategy/ foreign policy is not set

in stone. There are many instances when Israel goes against its

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set policies or grand strategy ( South Africa and China being

interesting examples). In this, Israel usually has to have very

strong incentive to ignore its grand strategy points ( such as

threat of war with a Great power, significant foreign aid/

assistance, or reasons that remain classified).

To understand Israel’s relations with the rest of the World,

one needs a brief history of Israel. Many of the Israel’s

relations are affected by geopolitical conflicts in the Middle

East, the Cold War, Israel’s arms industry, its rise as an R&D

power, and its impressive history of agricultural development and

foreign aid.

II.

Israel was founded as a nation in 1948 from the UN partition

Plan (UNSCOP). In this the UN drafted a resolution granting two

states in the Mandate of Palestine, one for Jews and the other

for Arabs. Israel fought a War with its Arab neighbors in 1948

and won. The defeat of the Arabs led to the toppling of many of

the regimes within a few years( deposition of Egyptian monarchy,

deposition of the Syrian regime, rise of the Baath Party).

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Though Israel was founded in 1948, many apparatuses in the

state had existed long before the founding of the State. Examples

of this are the Haganah and Irgun( which later became the IDF and

intelligence offices), the Jewish Agency and many other

International Zionist and Jewish organizations( the last two made

up the interim government, and persons involved at the start

became some of Israel’s first diplomates and government

leaders{such as Gola Meir}). The Jewish Agency and other

international Jewish organizations maintained relations with

other parts of the world for Zionist/Israeli interests before the

state was founded(Moaz 12). Haganah and Igrun also maintained

relations abroad ( mostly clandestine for arms acquisition and

busting the embargo on Israel at the time of its founding)(Secret

History of Mossad).

In this early part of History, very few countries formally

recognized or had formal relations with Israel. Other than some

European countries, Russia and the USA, and some members states

that drafted the partition plan, Israeli recognition and

relations were not formal until after the 1956 Suez Crisis.

Israel maintained clandestine relations with most parts of the

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world where Jews had populations at( which at the time was most

countries in the world)(Rodman 56).

1956 was interesting because Israel cooperated with the U.K.

and France in invading Egypt over the nationalization of the Suez

canal. This war was brief with Egypt loosing militarily, but

politically this was an Egyptian and Soviet victory. This war

ruined the reputation of the British and the French as global

super powers, promoted Arab hostility towards Israel, aligned the

Arabs with the Soviet block. This war was the first time anyone

in the world took Israel seriously as a country. This war also

cemented the patronage relationship with France until 1967.

From 1956-1967 Israel maintained very strong relations with

France, strong relations in Central America, cordial relations in

South America, and strong relations with African countries that

were not in Arab North Africa. Israel had very strained relations

with the Arabs and Soviet aligned nations. Relations with Anglo

countries were not terribly strong at this point.

1967 changed the worlds view of Israel. In 1967 Israel pre-

emptily attacked its Arab neighbors and more than tripled in

size. Winning the War, Israel occupied the Sinai , Gaza and West

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Bank, and the Golan Heights. This war changed the world outlook

on Israel. France abandoned Israel as a patron state. In the

process its relations with African countries strained. The 1967

war mostly turned nations away from Israel, but those nations

that didn’t turn against it were impressed. Israel fought this

war on its own with second hand western country weapons that it

had modified from its very young arms industry.

The 67 war left Israel without a principal arms dealer. The

US started to sell Israel weapons after this war, but there was

nothing significant coming from the Americans at this

point(Hallahmi 65). This was where the Arms industry became a

serious major industry in Israel. Israel had started to design

everything it needed for all services of the IDF, and construct

it in the country ( Army Navy and Air Force). Israel was also

able to export a lot of weapons to outside powers before the 1973

Yom Kippur War and test them in the War of Attrition. Israeli

arms at this time showed their technological superiority in a few

incidences with Egypt and the downing of a Soviet air squadron

with no losses to the Israelis(Moaz 55).

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The Yom Kippur War was the surprise Arab invasion of Israel.

Though Israel had won the war, it sustained heavy losses. The war

was expensive for Israel, and the prolonged mobilization and

military buildup after the war was more expensive(Senor 95).

Israel’s largest exports at the time were weapons, and most of

the countries budget was going to the defense ministry and the

military(Senor 97). This war caused many countries to break

formal relations with Israel( though in the Americas, South

Africa and the USA this strengthened the relationship) This war

started what is termed “the Pariah period” of Israeli foreign

affairs which lasts from this war to the initial Madrid Peace

Accords and the Oslo Accords.

This time period was rough for the state of Israel. Israel

had to combat hyper inflation during the 1980s and was involved

in the occupation of Lebanon. Foreign currency holdings were

mainly propped up by arms exports(Senor 100). By 1985, Israel had

dropped its hyperinflation from thousands of percent to 185%

(Jewishvirtuallibrary.org). Several factors helped Israel to

quickly recover from the recession. With the impending collapse

of the Soviet Union and the relaxed attitude of the USSR towards

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Israel, it opened the floodgates for immigrants to pour into

Israel. Israel absorbed over one million immigrants from the USSR

from the late 80s and early 90s, with most of them being trained

experts.

This flood of trained immigrants came to Israel and

developed a sophisticated and very advanced technology sector in

the Israeli economy. This wave of immigrants was significant in

the “start up nation” antic of Israel in the 90s. Also at the

time the Soviet Union collapsed. With the collapse of the Soviet

Union in 1991, most countries affiliated with the Soviet Union

were able to formally start relations with Israel. This was also

aided by Israel’s attempt at peace with the Palestinians with the

Madrid Conference and the Oslo accords.

In the 21st century, Israel is facing international

condemnation for stalled peace talks, settlement construction,

and conflict with the USA. While Israel is facing condemnation in

the West, and arguably approaching Apartheid South Africa

isolation( international boycotts), its relations with the East

in India and China are blossoming.

III

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With a basic history of Israel and some of its relations, we

can now look at specifics of Israel’s foreign relations. There

are many writings on regional relations of Israel, and a few on

Israel’s foreign policy as a whole. I am going to look at the

most interesting case studies from regions of the world. In this,

I am going to look at Central America, Africa, East Asia,

Israel’s policies, and some primary sources( diplomates who

wrote their personal accounts, sources using diplomatic cables,

etc). While I could look at Europe or the United States,

relations with these countries are abnormal to the patterns I am

going to discuss in the analysis section ( they recognized and

maintained constant relations with Israel since the start without

severing relations, and the cultural connection between history

and diaspora populations was strongest in The USA and Europe).

The literary review is going to follow an order based on

time of original relations, when formal relations were strongest,

and the importance within Israeli polices. For each region of the

world, I will give relevant historical background relevant to the

regions and the level of relations between the countries and

Israel before addressing the theories of the authors. For Latin

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America, I am going to review the most important case studies in

the region ( Particularly Central American countries such as

Guatemala and El Salvador, for South America Argentina). I will

be reviewing experts on the region studies, such as Hallahmi3,

Klieman , Dobrey, Fernandez , Bahbah, and Rubenberg. This section

will deal with Israeli policy in three regards, how arms

diplomacy relates to relations, the question of US proxy/puppet,

and the extension of Middle East policy into Latin America/ the

spider web theory4.

The following section will be about Israel’s relations in

Africa. While Hallahmi may be cited for referring to it, Klieman

uses Africa as an example for failure of Israel’s foreign aid

policy, both views were written before the Africa story was

finished. Carol writes a more modern up to date analysis of the

Israel-Africa relationship, and the phases it has gone through.

Carol focuses more on Central and East Africa. In this section, I

3 Benjamin Beit Hallahmi talks about all regions of the world , however by thepublication of his book in 1987, the sections on Africa and Asia would be incomplete, his analysis of Central and South America is so I will use his argument primarily in the Americas section, and reference elsewhere where relevant/accurate. 4 The Spider Web theory is a theory by Fernandez about how the Israel-Arab/Palestine conflict originates in Israel then spirals out to the rest of the world and interconnects with other parts of the world and issues in the hypothetical web.

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will also review Suransky’s analysis of the relationship between

Israel and South Africa. This relationship will tackle the arms

diplomacy approach, elements of the East vs. West argument ( Cold

War and former Colonial disputes) and the pariah relationship

( Israel and South Africa both being isolated and working

together)

The last region I will do a literature review of is East

Asia. In this section, I will be looking at Kumaraswamy and

Sufot. Though Kumaraswamy looks at India’s policy on Israel, he

had to write his book from the Israeli prospective since India

does not declassify its foreign relations documents or disclose

information on it. It is a very useful book to analyze since he

is looking at Israeli documents about the relations, thus telling

the side of the story pertinent to this paper. Suffot was a

member of the Israeli Foreign ministry and the original person

who represented Israel’s interests in China before formal

relations were established in the 1990s. Sufot’s work is a diary

of the process of maintaining and normalizing relations with

China, and the history of it, and his observations. In both of

these works, it is revealed how though there were no formal

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relations through the foreign ministry of Israel, there were

relations under the table in regards to defense contacts and R&D

cooperation.

Lastly, I am going to review Israel’s foreign policy and

strategic doctrine and what some people have written about it .

Moaz and Rodman both talk about Israel’s set policies for how

Israel is supposed to go about foreign policy and the defense of

Israel ( and how defense and foreign policy/diplomacy are

intertwined). I am also going to follow some of their rational as

to why over time Israel has followed it ( and why it has ignored

it or gone against it).

Israel’s relations in Latin America are unique in that they

had strong relations with these states and their leaders before

Israel was founded. An example of this was that “ Somoza acted as

a front for arms purchases for the pre state Zionist military

forces ( Haganah), he issued diplomatic passports for them, and

even signed the receipts for the arms transactions ( Hunter 137).

Peru, Uruguay and Guatemala were on the UNSCOP ( United Nations

Special Committee on Palestine). The UNSCOP was also divided into

several sub committees in which at least one Latin American

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member was a member. Historically speaking, Latin America was the

strongest support block in the UN for any UN topic on Israel

leading into the 1970s ( Kaufmann 157-160).

Latin America was the first block of countries to

unilaterally recognize Israel and the only region of the world to

do so in 1948(Kaufman 213). With universal recognition of Israel

in Latin America within a year of Israel’s independence, its not

surprising that economic and agricultural development assistance

was taking place in the Americas soon after. By 1960, the region

as a while was receiving Israeli agricultural assistance and

technological assistance ( BahBah 68). Other than agricultural

assistance programs, there were extensive programs for youth, and

educational exchange. In these programs, foreigners would be

brought to Israel for training or education, and the reverse

would happen where Israeli’s would come to these countries to

advise and train people in the country ( Amir 38).

These early programs in Latin America ( and other places in

the world which I will touch on) were instrumental in what comes

next in Israel’s relations with Latin America. Once Israel

developed an arms industry that had the capacity to export, the

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defense ministry used these programs as guises to establish

military relations, and conduct arms transactions and security

assistance (Hunter 98). By the 1970s , Israel was the regions

main arms supplier ( Hallahmi 77). Arms transactions were

generally kept relatively secret(especially for Guatemala, El

Salvador and Argentina). There was an incident in 1977 when

Barbados seized shipments of Israeli arms going to Guatemala

(another one in Florida New Orleans, and several other incidents)

, and the shipping manifest listed it as “general freight”

( Hunter 113)(Hallahmi 80). Israel had also set up security

training and assistance in these countries. For example, in

Guatemala and el Salvador, computer systems were built that kept

tabs on at least 80% of the populations and the Israeli’s

supported the death squads and organizing human rights atrocities

committed by the regimes in power ( Rubenberg 902)( Hunter 117)

(Hallahmi 77).

Following the 1980s and the 1990s when the process of

democratization was going on in the Americas, Israel’s role as an

arms dealer and security advisor diminished. Relations in the

region have strained in more recent times ( especially after

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failures in the Israel-Palestine peace process and the Mavi Mara

incident).

For those authors that write about Israel-Latin American

relations, there are a few theories as to why Israel maintains

these relations, even if they are controversial. There is an

argument that Israeli Foreign policy in the region is directly

mostly by its arms industry and the defense establishment. This

view is held by Bahbah and Klieman and Halahmi( he is mixed on

this view). The second most widely held argument is that Israel

is working as a proxy for US interests in the region ( it can act

where the US cannot). This argument is mostly supported by

Halahmi ( arms diplomacy follows the proxy role for Israel to the

USA and its interests). The last view is that Israel is neither

acting towards arms diplomacy nor as a proxy to the USA, but

rather is acting independently, and supporting US policy where

interests converge, and is more exporting its Middle Eastern

policy to Latin America ( similar thought to the spider web

theory brought up by Fernandez). 5

5 “The Chronicles of Israeli Involvement in Latin America” is more detailed about the arguments of the mentioned authors, I wanted to focus more on other parts of the world rather than reiterate Central American arguments of the past. ( Robnak 13-20) ( Note : this information is added to the back of this paper)

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The spiderweb theory is Fernandez’s idea that rather than

their being an east vs west style conflict within Central

America, or one of the simple arguments stated above, it is more

a spider web with more than two actors. The spider web is that

there are foreign actors acting against one another(such as

states like Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia), there are no state

actors ( such as the PLO Hamas, and Hezbollah) , and actors

within Latin America itself ( leftist movements, military,

economic actors, etc) ( Sanchez 5-6). All the actors intertwine

with one another, and trap other actors into the region ( such as

Israel, petro dollars, and support for different regimes such as

the Sandinistas by the Arab governments and Israel’s support for

the Contra and Samoza) (Fernandez 8-9). Fernandez points out that

the Central American and South American relationship in the 60s-

80s shows how widely the Israel-Arab conflict has spread, its not

just contained in the Middle East but manifesting all over the

world ( Fernandez 10-11).

The Israel Africa story is somewhat different from Latin

America, but the pattern of relations is similar. Israel’s

relations in Central and Eastern Africa started in the 1960s when

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the countries became independent of their colonial occupiers

( Carol 381). Most of Israel’s assistance to the region before

1967 was in agricultural development, training, advising, and

infrastructure development, the infamous youth education

programs, and security consulting ( Carol 382-384). The 1967 War

and the subsequent 1973 Yom Kippur war changed Israel’s

relationships in Central and Eastern Africa. The Arab countries

were more unified after the Six day war and the Yom Kippur war

against Israel, and petro dollars were flowing into Africa as

well as aid from the Soviet Union (Carol 382). Though Israel

received harsh criticism and formal relations were suspended or

cut back, until the 1990s, the defense establishment kept

contacts in African countries, and continued to arm and train

some of the militaries{this included regimes such as Imin’s , the

Derg government in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Kenya ( Carol 385).

Israel also secretly armed and upgraded military weapons in

regimes such as Mobutu’s regime in Zaire ( Suransky 77). This

trend in relations was generally reversed following the 1990s

with the Israel-Palestine peace plans and the fall of the Soviet

Union ( Carol 385-386). Post 1990s, Israel has managed to restore

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most relations in East and Central Africa to 1960s levels, and

foreign aid and developmental assistance has resumed in the open

( Carol 386).

Carol points out that Israel’s relations were directly

affected by Cold War relationships, Israel’s expansionist and

“colonizer” tendencies”, and its relations with France, the

United Staes, and South Africa( Carol 275). While many of the

African countries formally cut relations with the foreign

ministry ( and in the process cut agricultural aid and starved

their populations) , they maintained strong connections to Israel

in the defense ministry for arms(Carol 170, 388). It was the

defense ministries connection during the cold period that brought

these countries back in the late 80s and 90s to establish

relations ( also Israel publicly denouncing South Africa,

engaging Palestine, returning the Sinai , and the collapse of the

Soviet Union) ( Carol 381-389).

South Africa had a different time frame than the rest of

Africa for relations with Israel, but similar things occurred.

Before the Yom Kippur war, Israeli-South Africa relations were

generally sour. Israel was very vocal against apartheid

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( Suransky 33-34). Israeli leaders avoided being seen in public

with South African leaders and when invited to South Africa they

refused ( Suransky 32-33). Backdoor , the relations were

interesting at this time. South Africa was playing France to try

and get arms ,and South Africa was playing the Israel-French

relationship to keep Israel quiet on its harsh criticism

( Suransky 37). Also during this time, Israel was buying yellow

cake uranium from South Africa for its reactor in the

Negev(Suransky 42).

After the Six Day War, Israel’s relations with South Africa

warmed up significantly. Israel’s occupation of the Sani and war

with its neighbors impressed South Africa and helped it

economically. South Africa benefited from this since the Canal

was closed and all freight had to go around the horn, and South

Africa and Israel were in a similar situation of being isolated

in their regions of the world by hostile neighbors (Suransky 46-

47). By the 1970s, Israel’s relations with black Africa were

formally falling apart because the Arabs managed to swing OAU

countries into denouncing Israel for occupying African

land(Suransky 58). By 1972, Israel had stopped its rhetoric

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against South Africa in the UN and abstained from sanction votes

or condemnation against the Apartheid regime. In 1973 with the

Yom Kippur War, defense minister Botha of South Africa was one of

the first world leaders to show solidarity and support for Israel

in the war ( Suransky 70).

After the Yom Kippur war, military relations between South

Africa and Israel grew strong very quick. Immediately following

the war, South African chief of Staff Magnus Malan came to Israel

to see the after affects of the war ( Suransky 75). Also in 1974,

Shimon Peres held secreting meetings in Pretoria about weapons

sales to South Africa ( Suransky 80). My the late 70s and 80s,

this relationship expanded into R&D exchanges, more arms sales,

and South African funding of Israeli military development

( Suransky 81). By the late 1970s, the strong relations between

South Africa and Israel were not very secret and were out in the

open ( Suransky 89). At this time, there was significant exchange

of South Africans to Israel and Israelis to South Africa for

training, strategic cooperation, and security development

( Suransky 98-99). When Begin took office in Israel as prime

minister, Israel flagrantly ignored the UN arms embargo against

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South Africa ( at the time South Africa was the largest consumer

of Israeli arms) (Suransky 105-106). With Begin, the Israeli-

South Africa relationship grew stronger, and R&D and security

exchanges were as deep as nuclear cooperation and ICBM

development (Suransky 112-113). These relations were carried out

covertly under the office of Industrial and Research development

( the foreign ministry office) which was held behind the “defense

wall” of the Israeli embassy in South Afirca (Suransky 121)

By the mid 1980s, Israel and South Africa were very isolated

in the international community. Israel was occupying most of

Lebanon and had bombed the Osirk reactor in Iraq gathering

significant condemnation for that. To quote a letter from the

South African defense department to the Israeli one “ it is

comforting to know that South Africa does not stand alone in

facing criticism from the international community. Our respective

countries will have to withstand this in all its many

manifestations.” ( Suransky 145).

By 1986, the South Africa-Israel relationship started to

sour. International opinion for dealign with South Africa forced

Israel to keep its dealings more secret and less in the open.

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Israel was forced to secretly work with the Apartheid regime and

openly support black rights in South Africa and try to rework

relations in the rest of Africa ( Suransky 188-189). Israel had

to keep its relations with South Africa secret because the US

sanctions against south Africa had threats of cutting aid to

Israel within a congressional bill sanctioning South Africa

(Suramsky 189). At this time, the foreign ministry of Israel was

acting out against the Apartheid regime, but the defense ministry

and the intelligence community were very active in supporting it

(Suransky 192-193). Israeli ambassador to South Africa Brom is

quoted as saying “ We didn’t have one embassy in South Africa, we

had three, the first was the ambassadors turf and focused on

maintaining cordial ties with the NP government, the second was

run by Gur and focused on developing a relationship to the black

opposition, and the third was Bron’s defense mission”(Suransky

217-218). While there were the three functioning “embassies”,

each division kept the other in the dark as to what the other was

doing ( Suransky 219).

1994 brought the Israeli-South Africa relationship to a cold

relationship. In 1994, South Africa had ended apartheid. The

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black leadership under Nelson Mandela chose to cool relations

with the Israelis because they were arming and aiding in the

suppression of their movement(Suransky 241-242).

With South Africa, Suransky suggests a few reasons as to why

Israel decided to start its relations with South Africa, continue

them, have a schizophrenic relationship with South Africa, and do

what Israel did. South Africa had a large Jewish diaspora

population, and in the 40s-early 60s, the NP politics of the

Apartheid regime was sympathetic to Nazi fascist views, and

feared what they could do to the Jewish community, and maintained

some relations with South Africa ( Suransky 31). What really got

Israel’s attention to deal with South Africa against its public

moral outrage with Apartheid politics and policy was a

combination of Israel’s international isolation , convergence of

interests between the two countries, and how lucrative doing

business with South Africa could be( Suransky 88-130). South

Africa had a lot of money to spend, bountiful natural resources,

military and nuclear ambitions, and similar security problems as

Israel (Suransky 95). As Suransky points out, Israel was cut off

from the international community with nuclear fuel and strategic

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resources, and South Africa was cut off from the world in arms

and had no friends ( Suransky 123-127). What brought them closer

together was the fact that they shared a common enemy, the

international community not liking them, and they each had no

choice but to depend on each other ( Suransky 155).

Israel’s relations in India and China came much latter than

all other relations in the world. India established formal

relations in 1991, and China established them in 1992. The two

countries recognized the state of Israel in the 1950s ( Suffot,

Kumaraswamy), and Israel was one of the first countries in the

world to recognize the Communist government in China. (Suffot 6).

Israel’s relations with China and India since they were formally

established are abnormal in that Israel wasn’t as proactive in

keeping its relations with the two countries very secret. In

reading Kumaraswamy and Sufot, the primary sources (Sufot is a

primary source, Kumaraswamy uses interviews and diplomatic

cables) did not have to stay classified and more was willingly

leaked ( vs. Suransky who had the South African government

declassify its relations with South Africa)

31

While there were no formal relations between India and China

until the 1990s, there were significant military and intelligence

exchanges going on from the 1950s until formal relations were

established. China was buying Israeli equipment for some years

before formal relations since the Israelis were willing to sell

more advanced systems than the Soviets ( Suffot 17-18). For

India, the story was similar, where prime minister Nehru

maintained covert relations with Israel to buy arms( Kumaraswamy

80). The main reason why these countries held these relations in

the dark was to not piss off the Arabs or the Soviet Union, or

the Africans ( as many of the countries aligned more with the

Soviet block than the Western one) ( Kumaraswamy 122)(Sufot 9).

After formal relations were established, military

cooperation, intelligence exchanges, security cooperation

exchange of experts, and R&D ties grew very strong. For China,

these relations have been strained by the USA pressuring Israel

to not exchange weapons technology with the Chinese, or give it

to the Chinese when the Israeli’s are mad at the USA ( Sufot

111). With India, the pressure from the USA is less strenuous

because India keeps the US in the loop with its cooperation with

32

Israel ,( Kumaraswamy 264). Both countries also use their

relations with Israel to have sway in US decision making and

improve public relations with the USA ( Kumaraswamy 256)( Sufot

114).

We have seen on a regional level what Israel’s relations

look like, and likely a pattern I will discuss later. Now we will

look at Moaz and Rodman. Moaz and Rodman both talk about what

Israel formally declares as its foreign policy and defense

policy. In theory Israel is supposed to follow certain policies

and tenants in its decision making process for international

relations and its own defense.

Rodman looks at Israel’s published policies of defense and

why it makes relations the way it does( also known as the Ben

Gurion points). Israel is supposed to follow specific rules in

its defense and international rules. Rodman identifies these as

deterrence policy, geography policy, the manpower policy,

quantity vs quality policy, offensive maneuver warfare policy,

policy on conventional vs unconventional threats, self reliance

policy, the great power patronage policy, and the regional

partnership policy. The deterrence policy is that Israel should

33

maintain an active deterrence to prevent invasions from

neighbors( Rodman 2). This is done by Israel responding with

overwhelming force, to transgressions that will cross a “red

line” with its enemies(Rodman 2-4). The policy of conventional

vs. unconventional threats is how Israel is prepared for full-

scale war or low intensity conflict ( such as with Terrorists or

the PLO or border skirmishes) (Rodman 15). The geography policy

is that Israel must maintain defensible borders and an

advantageous geographic edge(Rodman 5-7). This relates to the

manpower, offensive policy, and the quality policy for Israel, in

that Israel does not have the manpower to fight the entire Arab

world for long, It doesn’t have the numbers or means for a

defensive war and must always take the offensive, there is no

room in Israel for defense, and they must rely on a more

professional and advanced military than its adversaries ( Rodman

5-21). Israel has a policy for foreign relations as well in

regards to its strategic doctrine in the Middle East, it must

have the support of a great power, and it must maintain

beneficial relations with non Arabs in the Middle Eastern theater

(Rodman 20-22). In this, Israel must maintain whatever relations

34

it can with Super Powers, it doesn’t matter which ones, as long

as one is willing to back it (Rodman 20). For regional partners,

Israel needs to focus on these relationships and quickly reverse

them if they go sour, or at least maintain some

relationship(Rodman 21). Rodman uses the example of the Israel-

Ethiopia relationship, and the Israel- Turkey relationship as

well as Israel assisting non national groups such as the Druze

and the Kurds ( Rodman 21-22). Israel has had advanced

cooperation with Turkey since the 1990s, and has always

maintained some relationship in East Africa in order to watch

what the Arabs are doing ( Rodman 21-23).

Rodman sees the US-Israel relationship as one where no other

option exists. The US is currently Israel’s closest relationship

to a super power, and with the convergence of interests in the

Middle East , they have remained partners( Rodman 68-71). Israel

ends up having to sacrifice its Foreign policy sovereignty to the

USA and its deterrence policy to the USA. Rodman lists the

examples of the Gulf War and the US paying off the Israeli’s not

to attack Iraq, and the US keeping Israel from attacking Iran

( Rodman 80-83).

35

For Israel, Rodman sees the Israel- Turkish and Israel-India

relationship as being less artificial. For Turkey, Israel is

willing to modify and supply Turkey with armaments most other

NATO countries are afraid to do ( Rodman 84-86). Turkey also

depends on Israel for intelligence on the Kurds, counter

insurgency advice, and Turkey has sour relations with its Arab

neighbors ( Rodman 86-87). The relationship has some conflicts

since Israel aids the Kurds, and has strong relations with

Greece, but other powers such as the US push Israel and Turkey to

further cooperate ( Rodman 88). The India and Israel relationship

is similar. With Islamic terrorism becoming a stronger threat to

India and India’s Middle Eastern friends being toppled and

India’s historically sour relationship with Pakistan being sour,

this has driven Israel and India to create very strong relations

very quickly since they share common concerns and enemies( Rodman

90-91).

Rodman also defines a policy for Israel’s arms exports.

Rodman lists five principal reasons for it, one being security,

the second being diplomacy, the third bieng economics, and the

fourth being technology, and the fifth being a relationship

36

between arms exports and diaspora Jews. For security, Rodman says

the arms industry and arms export is necessary since Israel has

always been a pariah state with no formal alliances, and without

a guaranteed arms dealer, Israel needs to fill the gap itself,

and to fund the program, Israel must find clients to export to

( Rodman 102-103). For Diplomacy, Rodman says that it has

generated goodwill towards Israel, it has waned Arab relations to

countries receiving the arms, and it brought it closer to America

since the US didn’t need to get its hands dirty ( Rodman 102).

Economically, the arms industry is very profitable, and it

employees a significant percentage of immigrants to Israel, as

well as preventing its own scientists and experts from leaving

Israel, in affect preventing a brain drain, and also has resulted

in more exports and growth in the civilian sector( Rodman 103).

Arms exports were also very beneficial to the technology industry

in Israel, and with an advanced technology industry, this has

strengthened Israel's relations with countries such as China ,

South Africa and Venezuela (Rodman 104). Israel has also used its

arms to acquire access to resources not available in ISrael such

as petroleum and uranium ( Rodman 104).

37

Rodman introduces a unique theory that arms export

relationships have followed where there is a large Jewish

diaspora population. In his theory, he states the examples of

Iran, Morocco, Ethiopia, South Africa, Latin America, and

Romania(Rodman 104-108). Israel also has a history in all of

these countries for trading arms for Jews ( Rodman 108). Two

examples of this are Argentina and the dirty war and the Iran

Contra Affair ( Rodman 106-108).

Moaz has some views that relate to Rodman and also raises

some points not formally addressed in Rodman. He states Israel’s

policy as being guided by a few principles. First, The Arab World

is hostile towards Israel, it would attempt to destroy is at any

given chance( Moaz 7). Second, the Arab enemy has more resources

to pool from, a larger population, more territory, and are better

networked than Israel in foreign affairs(Moaz 8). Third Israel

cannot rely on the international community, even its closest

friends and allies drop the ball when they are needed (Moaz 8).

Fourth, Israel’s geography is a constraint, its major population

centers can be attacked from hostile lands easily, Israel is

constrained, its airfare can’t even fully circle over parts of

38

Israel to land or practice maneuvers ( Moaz 9) Fifth, Israel has

to live behind an Iron Wall, in that Israel must outpace and out

perform its neighbors, and have higher living standards than the

arabs, and must be a nation at arms, with strong deterrence {such

as the Samson option}6 ( Moaz 11-12).

Some other major policies in Israel’s decision making is

that it must have major power support in a war (Moaz 14). This

also must be balanced with the policy of Israel choosing autonomy

over an alliance, Israel cannot sacrifice its sovereignty or

safety for an alliance with a foreign power( Moaz 15).

Settlements are a deterrent for borders, in that the settlements

show that Israel will defend its territory and this lessens the

geographical burden (Moaz 16).

Moaz brings up how these policies are sometimes followed,

sometimes ignored, or they are systematically followed or broken

by multiple facets of the government working at one time. He

points to examples of Israel cooperating with countries such as

Saudi Arabia, Islamic Iran, allowing Saddam to attack Israel in

6 Israel Nuclear Deterrence Policy

39

the Gulf War, and trading land back to the Arabs/ evacuating

settlers ( Moaz 26,125,237,460)

Moaz also offers some explanation as to why Israel’s

policies are sometimes not very well followed or how the Defense

ministry dominates most foreign affairs. He talks about how the

IDF and the Defense ministry receive a massive portion of the

State budget, and they have the manpower, structural

organization, and the higher level clearance to do what they want

and leave other ministries ( such as the foreign ministry and the

treasury) in the dark( Moaz 499, 518-519). The IDF and the

defense ministry are the only ministries within the Israeli

government that have the capacity to analysis a situation and

then allocate resources to act on it (Moaz 519). The defense

ministry also has a monopoly on intelligence ( unlike a normal

country, the Israeli military intelligence, Aman, reads foreign

news papers, and acquires low key intelligence unlike the foreign

ministry or a civilian research agency) and the defense ministry

only shares with the prime ministers office or the Mossad,

usually leaving the foreign ministry in the dark ( the foreign

minister and the foreign ministry need to hope people let them in

40

the loop) ( Moaz 515-525). Lastly, most of Israel’s decision

makers come from military backgrounds, the security

establishment, or are influenced by the arms industry. Almost

every prime minister of Israel was a general, head of an

intelligence agency, worked in the arms industry, or was part of

a pre Israel military organization ( the exception being Golda

Meir) (Moaz 520).

Latin America : Argument recap section

BahBah Klieman Halahmi Rubenberg

Pro Arms Argument

Latin America friendly to Arms sales, great place tosell them

Proxy to the United States

Not proxy or arms industry,but rather extension of Middle East policy ( otherwords spiderweb)

41

BahBah Klieman Halahmi Rubenberg

Brings up the proxy argument, avoids statingweather a proxy for not

Prevention of PLO and Arab penetration toregion was main reason

The arms industry was atool to ally with the countries and further US interests.

Israel naturally militarized, Military relations are more natural.

Started in Agricultural development, covertly movedto arms

Israel was nota proxy / convergence ofPolicy with USA

Latin America loved Israel because they ignored human rights issues

Only acted with US interests whenIsraeli interests converged, other wise flagrantly violated US foreign policyinterests( ie introduction of advanced weapons systems into region)

US influenced Israeli move into region

UN and international community support was helpful with relations to Latin America

Culture relation between Machismo and the Israeli way (Halahmi 65)

Israel’s actions in Latin America were used to try and avoid international isolation and pariah status

42

Hunter Fernandez Dobrey

Proxy sometimes, otherwise Israel acts on its own interests

Spider web theory : its not east vs west, Israel vs. America, Israel vs. Arab, but everyone vs. everyone in an intertwined web amongst everyone in the world

Israel is not actingwithin US interests ( its arming the military Junta during the Malvinas conflict)

Israel wants equal standing as the US in other parts of the world ( ie SouthAfrica).

Israel is acting in Latin America to prevent Arab actors from establishing a foothold, what happens in Latin America affects Israel in the MiddleEast

Israel doesn’t like the Argentine regime, but is trading arms and military advice for the safety of the Jews in Argentina (Dobrey 344)

Israel profits from its arms industry, and it keeps the economy afloat

The arms industry exporting to Latin America keeps Israelafloat and above theArabs

Begin has some old resentments with theBritish and sees theFalklands as a way to stick it to the English (Dobrey 357)

Pattern : In sequential order

1. Agricultural development, exchange of development experts,

youth programs, intellectual exchanges

2. Security exchanges, arms dealings, Intelligence collaboration

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3. Israel becomes heavily invested, pours weapons and advisors into countries, half hold titles from the foreign ministry but are really from the defense ministry

4. Cooling of relations , not as active in Central American affairs, returns to stages one and two

Africa : argument recap Carol Suransky

Central and Western Africa border Arab countries and are periphery countries where Israel needs prioritize relations

South Africa : Israel at first onlymaintains relations with Africa to protect the Jewish population there form Apartheid politics

Israel maintains strong relations until it becomes a “colonizer” with theSix day War

Six Day War brings Israel and South Africa together, bother are now isolated in their regions by Africans,and hate Arabs, and are opposed to Soviet and Communistinfluence

Though Israel loosesformal relations with most of these countries, it still maintains military relations and security cooperation

South Africa needs weapons, counter insurgency advice, R&D assistance, Israel needs money, resources and someone to sell armsto

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Carol Suransky

As Israel winds downon supporting South Africa and makes peace with Arabs, and fall of Soviet Union and Cold War Politics, African countries want to deal with Israel again

Right wing in Israelisolates Israel fromworld too much, South Africa international isolation starting to isolate Israel with it, brings attention to the Palestine issue, Israel starts Schizophrenic policyof aiding African states, African movements in South Africa, and secretlysupporting the Apartheid regime

Arabs may be able tooffer money to the Africans, but Israelcan offer expertise technology arms and things that Africansneeds, the Africans lack experts to implement petrol dollars so the corrupt governments just steal it

When the relationship ends, South Africa aligns with Arab States andPLO. Relations with Israel go cold. Relations in the rest of Africa go up.

Pattern : a = Africa b= South Africa1a. Israel sends agricultural assistance, creates youth programs,exchange of experts 1.b Israel starts relations in South Africa, some cooperation like above but more support within the Jewish community

45

2.a. Israel starts sending military advisors, arms, and security experts and intelligence exchanges in East Africa ( sends weaponsto Central Africa) 2b. Israel has secret diplomatic exchanges with South Africans, some talks on security and defence3a. Israel has a cool down with African nations, maintains arms deals, but formal relations and a. type relations break down3b. Israel starts 1a. type relations with South Africa, ( many are defense workers disguised as this) and more formal relations in defense cooperation 4b. Israel becomes friends with Apartheid South Africa, R&D cooperation, full exchange including nuclear and ballistic missile cooperation 5.a African countries warm up to Israel, start to return to 1.a relations and 2.a relations, formal relations restored5b. Cool down with South Africa, 4b relations over, 1.a and very minor military connections still in place

Asia Argument

Sufot Kumaraswamy

Israel and China held secret relations for some time ( defense people were running around China withouthim knowing really why at the time theywere there, Chinese told him before Israel did)

Israel and India didn’t have formal relations until 1991( like China Israelis were alwaysthere or had officesthere) Defense people selling arms to India in secret

China had defense relations before formal relations in 1992

Had defense relations before 1991

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Sufot Kumaraswamy

When formal relations in place, Israel had exchangesof advisors and experts, and agricultural assistance

Formal relations quickly followed with exchange of experts advisors, arms sales and agricultural assistance

China relationship got strong really quick, China wants to get closer to theUSA through Israel, Israel needs something to hold over the USA ( ie sharing technology with China)

India Israel relations got strongquick. India wants to get closer to theUSA using Israel, also wants to cooperate with the USA , Israel cooperates with Israel since both have common enemy

With the Cold War over, and the Arabs not as aligned to Soviet Ideology or eachother, and Israel making efforts to make peace with them and the PLO, China can openly maintain relations with Israel

Cold war alignments are over, India can venture away from Russian sphere , Arabs wont hate it if it has relations with Israel, Arabs are supporting terror within its borders, Israel becomes a natural ally

Pattern :Both China and India have secret relations with Israel until the 1990s

47

Once they formalize relations, both civilian types of assistance occur and military assistance Unlike other parts of the world, these nations have not had a chilling affect with their relations with Israel

Israel Strategic Doctrine/ Policies Rodman Moaz

Middle Eastern Affairs govern Israel relations ( periphery countries who are not Arab priority)

Domestic and Middle Eastern affairs govern Israel’s relations ( Intervene with Arab affairs)

Have the backing of a Super Power

Major power support in a war ( such as world power or support abroad) but no Formal Alliances , Israel goes it alone

Geopolitics of Middle East affect relations, deter theArabs, keep them outof Israel in anyway possible ( take the offensive)

Geopolitics of Middle East show world that Israel will defend itself and that it wont negotiate on its safety

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Rodman Moaz

Arms industry usefulfor preventing braindrain, good way to barter with the Diaspora communitiessafety , and is a means to maintain relations with the world

Foreign ministry is worthless, multiple actors in foreign affairs, none of them cooperate. Defense ministry is only part of government with resources to analyzeproblems and act to counter them. ( everyone who runs Israel minus Gold Meir is from a military or defense type background)

Analysis Now that we have seen what the experts have said on Israel’s

relations, now we can review the literature. There are some

overlapping patterns that take place all over the world ( such

has the order in which Israel institutes relations, how Israel

covers up relations, and arms proliferation) and some contrasts (

spider web vs. the east west argument). I am going to first offer

my views on what the experts say and then bring up my own views

and talk about patterns that none of the experts have linked to

the rest of the world.

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In Latin America, this region is unique in that the proxy

vs. arms diplomacy argument has contention. When comparing to the

rest of the world, Israel is not a proxy to the United States.

Hallahmi appears to be wrong with Israel being a proxy. Israel

was not a proxy in Africa ( the USA kept its distance from South

Africa and wanted Israel to stop arming it) and the USA didn’t

come up in Carol’s book ( Carol is an expert on US foreign

policy, if the US were interested in East and Central Africa and

wanted Israel to be a proxy, he would have likely said so).

All the authors talk about the arms diplomacy relationship

in someway ( all use a different term for it, all say it is

significant in relationships). Looking at the literature, I would

agree with Moaz, Rodman and everyone that Arms diplomacy is a

core tenant of Israeli foreign policy and how it maintains

relations with the world ( and how Israel uses its expertise in

arms and security to advance its interests). Most authors bring

up in someway that the arms relationship is usually covert, and

is usually a covert operation under the header of the exchange

programs, agricultural development, and science/ development

exchange programs. Each expert acts like its unique to the area

50

of the world they are researching, and that the foreign ministry

is kept in the dark about defense relationships, but this appears

to be common place. Moaz explains that the reason for this is

that the defense ministry is the only ministry with the ability

to analyze world affairs, create strategies and implement the

strategies, and the only people who can stop it ( the prime

minister) usually comes from that establishment and is more

inclined to it.

To relate to proxy argument, there is a division between the

East vs. West and Cold War politics of Israel’s relations, and

what Fernandez terms the spider web theory. I am inclined to

support the spider web theory over the east vs. west theory. The

China and India relationship shows how Israel can maintain

relations with Eastern powers under Soviet influence in a covert

fashion. For just coming out of the Cold War in 1991, Israel’s

relations with India, China and East Africa are far too strong to

recover from a total break in an East vs. West fashion, Carol

uses statistics to say that there is a stronger approval of

Israel in East Africa in the mid 90s vs. the pro Soviet and Arab

stances on world affairs ( Carol 386-387). I agree the Cold War

51

played a key role in Israel’s decision making and how the world

reacted to Israel’s Wars in 1967 and 1973, but Israel kept its

distance from the West ( France and European powers were siding

with the Arabs after 67 and not with Israel). The West was

divided on Israel, Israel wasn’t in the East, but it wasn’t in

the West camp either, this proved itself in the first gulf war

when Israel was a direct threat to maintaining the coalition in

Iraq. The spider web theory best explains Israel’s relations with

the World, and why the west would be divided in Israel’s affairs,

how it could maintain strong defense relations with members of

the east ( arms and military advising relations with countries

like China India Ethiopia, Tanzania Uganda etc). The spider web

relationship also shows how non state actors can affect Israel’s

foreign policy ( the PLO gaining influence in post Apartheid

South Africa, and their influence in post democratization Latin

America) and it explains how the Middle East strategic doctrine

became a global issue rather than one just taking place in the

Middle East( ie the Arab actors are making their presence known

in other parts of the world).

52

As for superpowers, Israel in theory has a policy for this,

but doesn’t always follow it. It attacked the Arabs without

France’s approval, and at the time Israel was not a patron of the

USA ( the USA told Israel it would not be opposed to the attack).

It barely had approval to defend itself in the 1973 war,

according to Suransky Israel had to threaten the nuclear option

to get the USA to send assistance. Israel also bombed the Osirik

reactor against US wishes( secretly most of the Arabs states

should actually support this). Israel has only recently followed

this policy in regards to not attacking Iran or engaging Iraq in

the Gulf War ( the US promised foreign aid for Israel to stay out

of these conflicts).

There is a clear devision in cohesion within Israeli foreign

policy. As Suransky points out, Moaz states, and everyone seems

to see a pattern, there is minimal cooperation within Israel on

interests. Suransky talks about Israel’s policies being

schizophrenic with the Foreign ministry doing its own thing, the

defense wall doing its own thing, and the ambassador doing his

own things. This appears to happen all over the world. In Latin

America, the foreign ministry appears to be clueless on what the

53

defense establishment is doing ( Moaz even states how the foreign

ministry is left in the dark) and Sufot who was the foreign

ministries contact in China before formal relations occurred

stated how he would run into Israelis in China working for the

defense establishment, and when he was ambassador to China, he

was unaware the defense minister was visiting the country in the

early 90s( he learned from the Chinese). There is a pattern that

the defense ministry would use foreign ministry titles for

defense workers and researchers when they went abroad. Suransky

quotes a South African news agency interviewing a marine

biologist who was part of a “scientific exchange” via the foreign

ministry and the guy didn’t know anything about marine biology

and was seen visiting the South African defense ministry(Suransky

289). Hunter Bahbah,and the Central American experts also report

a similar pattern in Central America.

In my analysis, I find that Israel tries to maintain

relations with everyone possible. While the Arabs are enemies, it

even maintains covert relations with them. Looking at the

Washington Institute and several articles from the Times and

other news papers, Israel has had military relations with Saudi

54

Arabia ( there was a covert airlift operation to help Saudi

Forces in Yemen during the Yemeni Civil War) ( al-monitor.com)

(Washingtoninstitute.org). Israel is also known to have had

secret relations with the Jordanians ( they were the original

party to warn Israel of the Yom Kippur War) and Israel helped the

Jordanians with containing black September and keeping Syria from

intervening in it. Israel may not have formal diplomatic

relations with every nation, but with most countries it at least

has under the table relationship, even with its enemies. Israel

uses its arms industry and its advanced military know how to

maintain relations and keep covert relations when formal

relations may cool.

Israel rarely cooperates on R&D with other nations unless

there is a very strong relationship between the countries. France

and South Africa were the first countries to cooperate with

Israel in R&D, followed by the USA. At present, R&D has become a

powerful tool in Israel’s foreign policy. Israel is using it to

strong arm the EU into negotiating on the settlements(Horizon

2020), and strong arming the US into supporting it by threatening

to develop stronger R&D relations with India and China hurting

55

their internal industries. At present, Tel Aviv University is

building a satellite institution in China, and China is doing

similar in Israel. Israel is also following a similar pattern

with India. Looking at Israel’s foreign policy and relations as

a whole, there is a noticeable shift towards the east with China

and India. This is following the South Africa pattern of

relations ( especially with China). China faces international

condemnation for occupying Tibet and suppressing its own people

and their rights. China is also isolating itself in the region by

setting up defensive air zones, claiming many East Asian Islands,

and confronting naval and air unites from all these countries in

the Pacific.

Looking at the Israel’s foreign relations as a whole, there

are patterns that exist that the experts point out in their

regions but exist on the global level. As mentioned, arms

diplomacy, the defense ministry running the show, covert

relations, agricultural development are all common across the

world. Another commonality is the order in which Israel uses in

relationship building. Israel tends to start relations with

defense industry contacts ( after the arms industry was built up)

56

and before it, the foreign ministry was used for development

programs and facilitated exchanges between countries ( ie experts

from Israel would go to the country and the country would send

people for training in Israel). Foreign ministry didn’t do a very

good job maintaining relations, and the defense ministry was able

to maintain relations in a covert manner by funneling guns

everywhere.

Another pattern is that even though relations with Israel

seem to have a pattern of hot and cold times. It is common for

Israeli relations on a global level to have strong connections

where advisors experts and arms are flowing into a country then a

cool down. Looking at Africa, the 60s and 70s were a cool down,

and the 90s were a warming. Relations with the USA warmed in the

1980s and are cooling in the 2010s. The Americas tend to have

cooler relations ( thought agricultural assistance and arms are

still flowing from Israel to Latin America) their formal

relations have cooled down. once arms relations peak and start to

decline, a hot relationship will go cold.

Israel tends to follow its established grand strategy

policies when there is no money attached or threat of war with a

57

major power. The US had to bribe Egypt and Israel in the 1970s to

come to the table and negotiate a peace deal in public( Carter

attached foreign aid to the peace deal). The USA bribed the

Israeli’s into not attacking Iraq when it was attacked in the

Gulf war. Israel tends to maintain a strong sense of autonomy, it

will dismiss a patron global power if it feels threatened to do

so ( such as with France in 1967). Relating this to the spider

web theory, Israel always appears to have a backup option to a

global power being a patron. Israel more than likely has nuclear

weapons, and Israel has satellite launch capabilities with the

Shivat launch system ( modified Jericho 2 missile). Israel has

recently finished development of the Jericho 3 missile, it is a

modified version of the Shivat launch system ( meaning Israel can

strike anywhere within 11,500km range)(missilethreat.com). This

means that Israel can strike almost anywhere in the world

( including the USA). Self reliance has been paramount to Israeli

interest. On top of Israel’s self reliance, Israel maintains many

cordial relations and a few close friends, but never a full

alliance. Israel rotates countries in and out of its close

friendship circle, and it is capable of doing it very quickly.

58

Earlier in the paper I made a label of priority 1,2,3 for

Israeli relations. Priority in this context means the level of

friendship with Israel ( ie how we would prioritize a friend).

World/regional powers, and the strategic partners are priority

one, followed by middle states who remotely support Israel,

accept assistance, and priority three are the covert relation

states without formal relations. In this system, countries can

move from priority 3 to priority one ( China is in the process

right now). In looking at Israel’s foreign relations, I had to

make a difficult decision on how to place super powers, R&D, and

human rights violations. I decided to put R&D and human rights

violations in the priority two category for a few reasons. One,

Israel’s support of human rights violations usually end up

shooting itself in the foot later( especially in South Africa,

this brought the Palestinian plight to the world stage in the 80s

and 90s, and sours relations). the priority two relationships

usually fall into priority three or move to priority one

relations ( there is a parallel pattern to what I said earlier

with arms diplomacy peaks and when relations heat up and cool

down, relates to the priority system as well). R&D is a priority

59

two relationship since its mostly used to strengthen a

relationship from priority two to priority one ( most countries

with priority one have this feature in some way). R&D and

intelligence sharing can also sink a country to priority three

( as with South Africa and Argentina). Super powers are usually a

priority one relationship for Israel since it seeks approval from

them to start wars ( or they have the ability to bribe or hold

Israel back from bombing countries like Iran or Iraq). I included

regional powers because India and South Africa are not important

in the UN, but Israel when its a priority 1 relationship keep

critiques to a minimum (Israelis are deployed in these countries,

with India Israel had military forces deployed in Mumbai 2008

within hours of the terrorist attack to assist in counter terror

operations) A priority two country and a priority three country

cannot exercise this power over Israel ( notice how Israel does

not critique the USA for the NSA, or openly destroy the Obama

administration for its controversial actions, where with South

Africa, Israelis would critique South Africa when the

relationship was hampered by human rights issues{ when South

Africa was its best friend, Israel didn’t critique it}).

60

V

In short, Israel maintains relations through the foreign

ministry, the defense ministry and the prime ministers office.

The foreign ministry is kept in the dark on most things, and the

real relations are through the defense ministry. Israel maintains

relations with friend and foes, formal relations with more

friendly countries, and covert relationships with countries that

are openly hostile towards it. It maintains relations with

questionable regimes for resources, funding, R&D , and lastly

because Israel is internationally isolated and can’t be picky

with friends, and human rights violations keep Israelis

employed , finance the Israeli government, and prevent brain

drain. Everything that happens in the world doesn’t happen just

within a regional context, but rather it follows the spider web

theory where everything is intertwined and its not coincidental

that there are patterns of Israel’s relations all over the world.

Israel has distinguishable patterns to how it conducts relations.

Looking at Israel’s relations over time, what is happening in

India and China at present is very similar in nature to what

happened in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, and the USA in

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the 1980s. Looking at these relationships and those in Latin

America and Africa, Israeli foreign policy shifts regional focus.

It has shifted from the third world, to the developed world in

90s( startup nation), and now to the East. Israel’s relationships

also follow distinct patterns that can be seen all over the

world, were relations typically start with agricultural

development ( or covertly with military assistance) and then heat

up to open relations with both civil and military aid, followed

by a cool down in relations with military relations being

maintained. While at present Israel may appear to be isolated and

facing boycotts over its settlement issues, pay attention to

China and India, they don’t say much about it, look at Australia

and Canada( lots of natural resources), they don’t say much

about it either. It may look like Israel is approaching a pariah

status, but Israel has always been a pariah state, in the moment

we are looking at a shift in Israel’s foreign policy, diplomatic

relations, and grand strategy.

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End note for Central America section / The Chronicles of Israeli Involvement in Latin America section :

The arms argument is mainly advanced by BahBah, Klieman, and Halahmi. Thebasis of their argument is that Israeli arms sales guided Israeliforeign policy. As BahBahstates, “Israel’s arms transfers to Latin America have not been subordinated to foreignpolicy goals. If anything, the traditional pattern of using arms sales to assist diplomacyhas been reversed, and diplomacy appears to be in the service of arms sales.” (BahBah71). BahBah proceeds to back up the argument with an impressive chart of Israeli armssales throughout Latin America. The countries Israel was most involved in, as BahBahnotes, bought more things from Israel and received more advisors/training. BahBah alsoargues that Israel became so heavily involved in the region because Latin America wasthe largest potential market for Israeli products. BahBah claims that friends in Europealready made their own weapons, the Soviet Block was off limits, and many third worldcountries relied on OPEC for oil and heeded OPEC pressure to isolate Israel. (BahBah

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86). Latin America is a region that has its own oil, so Middle Eastern countries do nothave as strong a sway with them as they do with many nations in Africa, and as a resultLatin America has been the region most friendly to Israel as evidenced by UN votes infavor of Israel (Kaufman, 160-163). Israel was naturally more able to develop sales inthis part of the world due to the factors described above. BahBahalso argues that it wasnecessary to have the youth programs and agricultural assistance programs. BahBahpoints out a connection between the US and Israel in the early 1960s in regards to theseprograms. She points out that after Castro took over Cuba, the USencouraged Israel to“implement civic action programs, primarily military-agriculturalprojects of the Nahaltype and paramilitary youth organizations to counter balance leftist influence” (BahBah90-91). BahBah points out that Israel had been selling arms and sponsoring programs in Latin America since the 1950s, but the US had a heavy influence in strengthening Israeli interest in the region. Kennedy had pushed Israel into the region, and Jimmy Carter cemented Israel in it. BahBah argues that Jimmy Carter’s administration had the greatest impact on Israel’s arms sales to Central America. The human rights policy enforced by the United States under Carter made some countries like Guatemala ignore theCongress and their demands and start dealing directly with Israel.Klieman agrees with Bahbah. Israel found a friendly place in Latin America for itsarms sales. Klieman makes the additional point that Israel was trying to save LatinAmerica from PLO and Arab diplomatic penetration. Arms diplomacy drew Israel toLatin America to prevent Middle Eastern influence. Klieman also brings up US

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involvement in Israel’s arms diplomacy, but argues that the “shift in American thinkingsince the Carter administration is much closer to Israel’s own policy towards theAmericas, and makes it easier for Israel to operate in the area” (Klieman 133). Kliemanargues that Israel was operating in its own interests but the US policies ended up workingfor the Israelis. “Both countries presently are engaged in a parallel effort to strengthenconservative forces in Central America through a combination of fostering economicdevelopment and assisting with security concerns” (Klienman 133).He proposes thatrather than a proxy, the US and Israel were operating on paralleltracks, with differentmotives but identical policy programs.Hallahmi stands out from the other authors of the arms argument. Hallahmi arguesthat Israel used its arms diplomacy to ally itself with the militaries in Latin America,essentially those who were running the countries at the time. Hallahmi saw the armsdiplomacy as Metz says in a clearer fashion as “a basis for future relations with countriesin the region” (Metz 258). He also discusses how Latin Americans view Israel. Pinochet,Romeo Lucas Garcia, D’Aubuisson, Stroessner, and Somoza were all friends of Israel,and more importantly, they admired Israel (Hallahmi 76). They admired Israel becausethe Israelis are practical, efficient, tough, and unencumbered byissues of human rights(Hallahmi 77). Israel has also won all of its wars, and Israelis exhibit a machismo thatLatin American militaries admire. Hallahmi points out that this machismo and provensuccess on the battlefield are why one Latin AmericanAmerican informant said “if money is no object, I recommend Israelis.”

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(Hallahmi 78). As this quote points out, Israeli arms are more expensive than their Soviet and American counterparts. Hallahmi argues that Israeli success and lack of disregard for human rights abuses are two of a few reasons why these regimes pay extra for these weapons compared to other options. BahBah also brings up the proxy argument, but acknowledges that therelationship between Israel and the United States is one that is very complicated. BahBah describes how in some countries Israel worked as a proxy/aid for US interests (Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador) and in other countries Israel worked against US interests (Argentina, Guatemala, Haiti, Somoza-controlled Nicaragua, to name a few). BahBah mentions in that Israel’s involvement in Argentina helped increase tensions that led Argentina and the U.K. to war. BahBah also mentions that some weapons sales such as the sale of Shafrir and Gabriel missiles, missiles used in the Falklands wars, were in violation of US foreign policy: “it had been noted that the introduction of highlysophisticated weapons systems to Latin America was in contradiction to U.S.policy” (Bah Bah 127).Hallahmi sees the Israeli role in Latin America as a proxy ratherthan actingindependently. Hallahmi quotes several Israeli government officials who agree that “inCentral America Israel is the ‘dirty work’ contractor for the US administration, and Israelis acting as an accomplice and arm of the United States” (Hallahmi 78). Hallahmi claimsthat the relationship is “more than only a convergence of interest” (Hallahmi 79). He alsopoints out that as of 1987, “Israel’s heyday in Central America is over. Israel is no longerneeded as a U.S. proxy” (Hallahmi 79). He points out that the US became more activeunder Reagan and the general retreat from the scene by Israel helps to support the notion that it played a proxy role for the United States. Hallahmi also argues that Israeli

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involvement in Guatemala in the role of advising and arming the military government asan example of a proxy. Rubenberg and Hunter offer a different perspective on the argument of proxy or arms diplomacy. Rubenbergbelieves Israel operated independently rather than as a proxy forthe United States. Rubenberg mainly uses Guatemala as an example for Israeli involvement in the area. Rubenberg argues that Israeli foreign policy is guided primarily by its Middle Eastern policies. Israel is a militarized country, so naturally it will take amilitaristic approach to foreign affairs. She argues that Israel’s arms diplomacy is not aprimary reason for its policy decisions, but rather a product of the society from which itemerged. She also argues that although there is congruence between US policy and Israeli policy, “Israeli policy isn’t always dictated on by the United States wishes” (Rubenberg 905). She acknowledges that the US tries to use Israel to further its own interests, but argues that Israeli policies are undertaken “with the specific intention of lessening its dependence on the United States and increasing its general foreign policy independence”(Rubenberg 905). Rubenberg connects Israel’s Middle East policies such as counter insurgency to how counter insurgency plays a critical role in the success of Latin Americandictatorships. Rubenberg also describes how the Israelis used their ability to do business in places the US couldn’t, such as Guatemala, to further their own ambitions elsewhere. She offers examples such as the bombing of the Osirak reactor inBaghdad, bombings in Beirut, the annexation of Golan Heights, the invasionof Lebanon, and the lack of US sanctions and nods of approval forthese wars as evidence (i.e. if Israel maintains US interests in Latin America, you will not have a problem with our actions closeto home) (Rubenberg 913). Rubenberg also describes how Israel’s business in Latin America helped to end its diplomatic isolation.Hunter has a rather scattershot idea of whether Israel is acting as a proxy orindependently. Hunter at points claims Israel is a proxy and at other times claims it acts in its own interest. Hunter eventuallysettles on what she terms a co-equal type of proxy,

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leaving this quote from an Israeli intelligence officer to explain it: “We are going to sayto the Americans, Don’t compete with us in South Africa, don’t compete with us in theCaribbean or in any other country where you can’t operate in the open. Let us do it. Yousell the ammunition and equipment by proxy, you will have your markets, and we willhave certain markets.”(Hunter 20). Her co-equal proxy argument assumes that Israel will act as a proxy where necessary, but Israel also wanted to be an equal to the United States and keep it away from Israel’s core interests.

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