233Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

GABRIEL BEN-DOR is a professor of political science and the Director of the NationalSecurity Studies Program at the University of Haifa. A past Rector of the University andPresident of the Israel Political Science Association, he has published numerous works onMiddle East politics, civil-military relations, conflict resolution, and ethnic politics, mostrecently dealing with minorities in the Arab world and Israeli national security.

AMI PEDAHZUR is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Haifa.His recent publications deal with political extremism in Israel, political violence, andpolitical parties.

BADI HASISI is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology. His main fields of interest are minoritiesand ethnic relations, the sociology of law, and civil-military relations.

Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 28, No. 2, Winter 2002, pp. 233–255.

Israel’s National SecurityDoctrine under Strain:

The Crisis of the Reserve Army

GABRIEL BEN-DOR, AMI PEDAHZUR, AND BADI HASISI

The Israeli doctrine of national security was founded on a number ofexplicit assumptions. One of these was Israel’s difficulty in keeping

up with the unlimited manpower available to the much larger Arabcountries surrounding and threatening Israel. Another assumption wasthat the way to counter this difficulty was to establish and maintain anation-in-arms, which would also contribute to several important nationalgoals. One goal was the “ingathering of the exiles,” referring to theintegration of large numbers of new immigrants from vastly differentbackgrounds in all significant respects (culture, politics, social norms) intoIsraeli society. Another important goal was civic education to teach thepublic the values of democracy and patriotism in the framework ofenormous diversity in Israeli society caused by mass immigration.

Discussion of relations between the military and society in Israel hasaccompanied social and political science for many years.1 Today, in thenew millennium, the most salient topic is the crisis in this relationship2

and, in particular, the weakening of the country’s reserve army.3

Israel’s Reserve Army

A “nation-in-arms” means universal conscription for both men andwomen, with appropriate official exemptions accorded to minorities

234 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 2002

(e.g., Arab citizens are exempt from compulsory service) and certainreligious sectors of the majority Jewish population (e.g., ultra-OrthodoxJewish men at religious academies and religious women in general,except for those who volunteer for national service). This universalityhas been a matter of faith in the Israeli national ethos.

A corollary of this set of assumptions has been the extension of theconcept of universality to the reserve service. Because military person-nel shortages could never be resolved (at least not in the sense ofovercoming the quantitative superiority of the Arabs), it was necessaryto keep the citizens’ army active far beyond the bounds of the compul-sory army service (three years for men and two for women).

The Israeli army has three main organizational frameworks: theconscript army (ages 18-21), based on the principle of compulsory andalmost universal military service; the reserve army; and a professionalarmy. The Israeli reserve system was designed as a synthesis of twomodels: the Swiss reserve system, and the pre-State Jewish militaryunits of the Haganah-Chish. Reserve soldiers serve in combat, logistic,and service units. Reserve combat units focus on the training of soldiersand the maintenance of their combat skills. In effect, 65 percent ofcombat units in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are reserve units. AnIsraeli Jewish male serves in the reserve system from the end of hisconscript service until he is approximately 51 years old. In principle,and by law, all eligible men are summoned to the reserves once a yearfor a period that averages 36 days for soldiers and 42 days for officers.4

Combat soldiers are transferred at the age of 35 from front-line units tologistic units off the battlefield. During emergency periods, such as ina state of war, Israeli reservists may spend several months in service. Onaverage, an Israeli (Jewish) male devotes five to six years of his life tomilitary service.5

The structure of the large Israeli reserve army (the vast majority ofthe adult population, in which soldiers carry out military missions on aregular basis and are a crucial army component in times of war) is ratherdifferent from reserve systems elsewhere. For example, in the U.S., inaddition to the professional defense forces, National Guard reserves aswell as other sectors of the army15 are based on volunteers. Since theVietnam War, the Army's active component has decreased, while thereserve component has increased. The growth of the reserve componenthas been disproportionate among combat-support units in order to assistthe active component in much of its diminished combat-support duties.In 1988, 43 percent of all combat service support was provided by theArmy Reserve and 24 percent by the Army National Guard, compared

235Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

to 33 percent provided by the active component.6 Reservists activelytrain for one weekend per month (average pay $200 per month) and canbe mobilized at short notice in the event of a national emergency to servefor up to six months as round-out brigades with the active force (in someoccupations, e.g., medical and minesweeping, reserves are the onlyunits available to carry out required support tasks). Reserves are alsorequired to serve in active duty training for two weeks per year.7

In Canada as well, serving in the reserves is not mandatory butvoluntary. Members of the reserve forces are expected to attend regulartraining sessions during a nine-month training season with two weeks ofconcentrated exercises in the summer. Otherwise, the members’ respon-sibilities are few: there is no formal period of engagement and membersmay leave when they choose.8

The extensive role of the military in the life of every Israeli, incomparison to other societies, led to the creation of a large pool ofexperienced and trained soldiers who could be quickly mobilized duringa crisis, such as an outright enemy attack. In such an emergency, thereserve army constitutes the largest part of the military force at thecommand of the Israeli General Staff.

According to Yoram Perry, the IDF has been suffering from anegative balance in the size of its reserve force for several years. In otherwords, the number of soldiers leaving the reserve army early hasincreased faster than the proportion of new soldiers recruited to theconscript (compulsory draft) army. A study conducted by the IDFrevealed that, if given a choice, most reserve soldiers would never reportfor duty. This finding stands in sharp contrast to a similar studyconducted more than twenty-five years ago (1974) showing only a 20percent unwillingness to serve. A survey conducted towards the end ofthe 1990s demonstrated that, of 11 potential reserve soldiers, only 2actually reported for duty.9

Concerning the motivation of reserve soldiers and the dwindlingmanpower of the IDF, it should be noted that the situation is alsoinfluenced by an additional, intervening variable, namely, the organiza-tional reshuffling of the army. Over the years, the IDF has naturallyundergone many changes aimed at increasing its efficiency. The motto,“small but smart,” coined by Chief-of-Staff Dan Shomron in the 1980s,implied that fewer citizens were being called for military service. TheIDF chose to emphasize organizational efficiency with a programdesigned to reduce the burden of reserve duty.10 Hence, the reduction insuch duty accommodated feelings expressed by reserve soldiers andtried to alleviate the crisis in the motivation to serve.

236 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 2002

These developments of the last twenty years pose a number ofquestions, among them essential issues pertaining to the perception ofIsraeli national security. A crucial component of this perception iswhether, in the case of emergency or war, the conscript and professionalarmies would be able to command the front lines of battle and hold backan enemy advance for the time needed (about 48 hours) to deploy thehundreds of thousands of reserve soldiers constituting the main force ofthe army.11 A recent concern is whether Israel still has a large enoughreserve army for the actual defense of its borders in an emergency.

The aim of the present study is to examine the level of motivation ofIsraeli men to serve in the reserve army, using a quantitative method toidentify and evaluate the relative strength of the factors affecting thatmotivation.

The use of quantitative methods is not new in research dealing inrelations between the Israeli army and society. To date, however, moststudies on the subject were conducted by the Behavioral ScienceDepartment of the IDF (MAMDA) and were oriented toward theimplementation of operational programs. Furthermore, most of the datacollected were not presented to the general public. Quantitative studiesinvestigating motivation to serve in the Israeli army have also beenconducted by external independent researchers,12 but most sampledpopulations of candidates for the security services (MALSHAVIM) inhigh schools.13 Others were conducted among newly recruited con-scripts to the army. However, as noted by Linn, it is difficult to comparethe motivation of an enthusiastic 18-year-old taking part in militaryaction with that of a reserve soldier with long years of service behindhim.14 The unique feature of our study is its target population and thepossibility of obtaining an accurate and up-to-date perspective.

Review of the Literature: Factors Affecting the Motivationto Serve in the Reserve Army

Most research on the motivation to serve in reserve forces is foundin the literature dealing with the U.S. army.15 The Israeli reserve armyis virtually unique in its individual participation and the heavy demandsmade upon its soldiers, and analogies with U.S. theoretical explanationsfor the motivation to serve or soldier retention in the reserves areimportant but should be approached with caution. Thus, we first offer anexplanatory model based on previous studies conducted on voluntaryreserve forces and then we submit another level of explanation relevantto large, compulsory reserve army forces. The underlying assumption

237Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

for this is that, while compulsory reserve forces are affected by prob-lems that are equally pertinent to voluntary reserve forces, the explana-tions for motivational problems in large, compulsory reserve armies canalso be derived from broader social conditions.

According to Perry, Griffith, and White, research perspectives onattrition in army reserves can be divided into the following: individuallevel approaches; institutional/organizational approaches; and the compet-ing commitments approach.16 As noted above, we propose to complementthe analysis with another approach, i.e., the social conditions perspective.

Individual Level Approach

This approach stresses personal characteristics associated with highretention and, operationally, would suggest screening the applicant poolfor individuals with such qualities. Grissmer and Kirby found, forexample, that lower educational levels and lower aptitude were amongthe strongest predictors of army reservists dropping out before the endof their introductory training. Recruits who were white, older, andfemale were also observed to have higher attrition rates.17 Other studiesdemonstrate that younger unmarried reservists were less likely toremain long-term in the army than older or married reservists.18

The individual level approach may also indicate economic incen-tives in recruiting and retaining personnel in the reserve forces becauseit assumes a rational actor who behaves according to the principles ofcosts and benefits of job alternatives. For example, Lakhani’s “moon-lighting theory” proposes that the individual’s decision to enlist in thereserves is based on general financial comparisons with benefits offeredby civilian jobs.19 Economic considerations have become an importantfactor for many Israeli reservists as well. Indeed, the state pays thereserve soldier a salary equivalent to his civilian earnings. However,people who tend to do well in the civilian sector and hold attitudes thatfavor the values of the competitive civilian job market would be lessinclined to serve in the more rigorous reserve duty.

The Institutional-Organizational Approach

This focuses on military organizational or institutional policies, andpractices that might affect the expectations, satisfactions, and motiva-tions of service members after they join the reserves, with implicationsthat are highly relevant for both voluntary and compulsory reserveforces. Hypotheses based on this approach draw from soldiers’ experi-

238 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 2002

ences inside the army reserve unit. Factors affecting attrition includeattachment to the unit, trust and confidence in officers, and viewing unitcommanders as helpful.20 Incentives reinforcing motivation to remainin the forces are quality of supervision and job satisfaction. Thisapproach corresponds with civilian literature that finds strong linkagesbetween job characteristics and job retention. Several surveys con-ducted in the U.S. on the reserves show that reserve service is mostimportant in members’ decisions to continue in the military.21

To apply this approach to the Israeli reserve forces, we chose toaccount for two factors: the level of the soldier’s commitment to themembers of his unit and his satisfaction with his treatment by armyauthorities. Choice of these measures stemmed from research indicatingthat an important key in maintaining a high level of motivation to reportfor reserve duty is whether the soldier belongs to an organic combat unit(i.e., serving with the same soldiers) or not. Over the years, such a unitbecomes a kind of extended family, and the reserve soldier knows thatif he evades service, his close friends will be affected.22 Reserve dutyin the framework of an organic combat unit creates a deep sense of“community of experience,” that is, a strong sense of dependency by thesoldier on his comrades. According to research investigating mobilizedreservists for Operation Desert Storm, the nature of the contacts be-tween the soldier, his commanders, and the army authorities alsoconstitutes a key factor explaining motivational level,23 and are congru-ent with organizational behavior research (research dealing with theconcept of OCB, organizational citizenship behavior).24 OCB researchdemonstrates that an employee’s (or soldier’s) degree of satisfaction isconnected to the responsiveness of officials and his direct manager(commander, in the army context) to his personal problems.25 A soldierwho belongs to an organic framework is usually in constant contact withcommanders who have known him for many years, and who will take hispersonal situation into account if necessary. Moreover, if there is aproblem outside the framework of the unit, the senior commander willrepresent the soldier and adopt a stronger position for him vis-à-vis thearmy authorities. Thus, it can be assumed that soldiers who serve in anorganic unit will express higher levels of motivation than counterpartswho are assigned to a different unit at every call-up.

The Competing Commitments Approach

This perspective regards reserve service as secondary to the primarycommitments of the individual’s civilian job and family responsibili-

239Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

ties. Thus, there is potential for conflict between the demands of the firstand second jobs. More often than not, the primary job is the moresignificant provider and if reserve duties conflict with the primarycivilian job, reservists are more likely to give up army service. However,the focus of this approach is not only limited to the conflicting demandsbetween the primary working place and reserve service, but includesother conflicting commitments (e.g., as a spouse, family member, etc.).There is a high probability that many life changes will occur during therelatively lengthy period of enlistment, thus leaving the way clear forpotential role conflicts. Research conducted in the U.S. indicates thatboth spouse and employer conflicts were major reasons for discontinu-ing reserve military service.26

In the Israeli case as well, competing commitments, especiallyduring periods of military hostilities—wars, postwar periods, and eventhe period of the Palestinian Intifada uprising (1987-1993)—are keyfactors. The main burden thus falls on combat soldiers who are the mostessential, and consequently it is the reservists who become more disen-chanted with their duty. Reserve soldiers serving in rear units are calledup for much shorter periods of service—decisions made by the armyabout frequency or length of duty are determined purely according tomilitary needs, and fairness does not figure in. This problem becamecritical in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.27 The effect of an extendedreserve service consequent to the prolonged war was felt in all areas ofcivilian life: academic studies, the workplace, and the family. This ledto disgruntlement and a sense of discrimination among those called upfor longer periods, most of whom were front-line combat soldiers.28 Forthis reason, it was precisely the most active combat soldiers that sufferedfrom a lack of consideration on the part of the army authorities, and asignificant repercussion was the decline in their motivation.

The above three approaches and their respective perspectives on themotivation to serve in the reserves are derived primarily from theexperience of American armed forces and have been found, in variousdegrees, to be applicable to the Israeli case. At this juncture, however,we would like to offer one last category of explanation that is especiallyrelevant to the structure of a compulsory military service and the ethosof a “nation-in-arms.”

The Social Conditions Approach

This approach, which is moderately associated with “patriotismtheories,”29 has dominated Israeli research for many years. In general,

240 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 2002

local discourse has centered on the notion of nation-building anddefense. Here the main factor influencing the willingness of the citizento serve in the reserve army is related to his commitment to thecollective.30 The more threatening the perception of the security situa-tion, the stronger the identification with the collective and the greaterthe individual’s willingness to protect it.31 In addition, the more acitizen identifies with the collective’s core values, the greater hiswillingness to serve in combat units.32 As the process of nation-buildinghas progressed, other factors have gradually replaced feelings of com-mitment to the collective in terms of motivation to serve. Moreover,according to Ben-Dor, during the course of years, Israeli society hasbecome engaged in a search for “normality.” This is due not only to thepeace process and subsidence of the siege mentality that prevailed untilrecently but also to essential changes that have taken place in the socialsphere.33 Following processes of globalization, Israel has graduallybecome part of the Western world and has been exposed to the samesocial processes affecting many other Western countries. Translat-ing these processes into operative terms, we find that Israeli societyis characterized by a strong belief in its official national institutionsbut, at the same time, has become suspicious of political organiza-tions, especially political parties.34 Cynicism about professionalpoliticians is strong35 and, very much like the U.S., the level of “socialcapital” (i.e., interpersonal trust in society) has receded. Putnammaintains that low levels of social capital are highly associated withlow levels of civic participation, religious participation, and socialconnections in the workplace.36 Thus, we infer that low levels of socialcapital will also be associated with low motivation to serve in the reserveforces.

A second pertinent factor related to the motivation to serve in themilitary appears to be the various facets of neo-nationalism. Accordingto Yoram Perry, this type of motivation is currently related to themessuch as religious beliefs, nationalism, and attitudes of hatred andrevenge toward Arabs.37 Therefore, in comparison to the socialist andsecular views on which the State of Israel was instituted, it can bededuced that the position of the army in society and the way it isperceived by its citizens has changed. According to this approach, thechanged nature of the motivation to serve will be associated differen-tially with demographic and political characteristics. A populationsector that defines itself as nationalistic will be characterized by a highmotivation to serve. More dovish sectors will be less motivated. Thisproposition has been confirmed in a number of studies.38

241Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

Research Hypotheses

Individual Level Approaches. H1: SES is directly correlated withthe motivation to serve in the reserves; H2: Incentives offered to therespondent by the civilian market will lower his motivation to serve.

Institutional Organizational Approach. H3: High levels of commit-ment to the military community will be positively associated with themotivation to serve; H4: A positive relation will be found between apositive attitude on the part of the organization and the level of motiva-tion.

Competing Commitments Approach. H5: Competing commitmentswill be negatively associated with the motivation to serve.

Social Conditions Approach. H6: High levels of commitment of aperson to his country and nation will be positively associated with themotivation to serve; H7: High levels of social capital will be positivelyassociated with the motivation to serve; H8: The most likely approachto explaining motivation or lack of motivation to serve in the reserveswould be the social condition approach. At the same time, we intend toexamine the validity of this approach in addition to the other explana-tions.

Method

Research Population

Random telephone sampling was conducted over a period of twoweeks in the month of February 2000. The target population was Jewishmales presently enlisted in the reserves or who had served in the reserveforces in the past. The survey included 501 Jewish men of militaryservice age who belonged presently, or had in the past, to the reserveforces (age range: 25-50);39 refusal rate was 30 percent. The survey waspresented to respondents as an academic study on social issues and wasconducted by a private company (Al-Midan-Machshov—public opin-ion studies). The percentage of religious men in the sample (20%) iscongruent with the distribution of secular and religious Jews in theIsraeli population at large, and therefore the sample was assumed to berepresentative.

Data on service in the IDF revealed that 13.8 percent of the respon-dents had never served in the reserves, 17.8 percent had been dischargedfrom the army, and 8.2 percent of those registered had not served evenone day during the past year. Thus, in relation to the total sample, the

242 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 2002

percentage of Israeli men who do not do reserve duty is 43.7 percent. Aninteresting trend that emerges from the survey, conforming with exist-ing evaluations, is that most of those who managed to get dischargedfrom the reserve system did so in recent years (93% in the past 10 years).It also appears that this is an increasing tendency: 60 percent of thosedischarged in the past decade were released in the past 5 years. Amongthose who still perform reserve duty, 60 percent serve in combat unitsand 40 percent serve in rear units.

These trends correspond not only with motivation problems, to bediscussed later, but with demographic and policy changes as well. Forexample, the young male population (ages 18-21) in Israel has increasedby 25 percent since the 1980s, resulting in a greater number of soldiersserving in the conscript army. Due to this increase, the need forreservists has somewhat decreased and the massive immigration ofnearly one million Jews from the former Soviet Republics in the 1990shas only enhanced this change.40 Moreover, the shift of budgets from thereserve system to the professional army under the IDF’s more recent“slimmer and smarter” policy has also inspired a more liberal policy ofdischarges.41

Measures

Dependent variable. Our study focuses on the phenomenon ofmotivation to serve in the reserve army. This phenomenon was mea-sured using a 7-item scale: “I feel much personal satisfaction duringreserve service”; “I am willing to devote more time or effort than thatwhich is demanded of me”; “I prefer combat service to administrativeservice”; “I am ready to approach the mental health officer or the‘incompatibility committee’ in order to be discharged from reserve dutyor to do easier service” (reversed item); “When I get a call-up, I usuallyapproach the liaison officer with a request to cancel or postpone it”(reversed item); “I would like to continue to serve in the reserves”; and“If there were no risk of imprisonment, I would not report for reserveduty” (reversed item).

In order to avoid a possible bias, four of the seven items werepresented as positive statements and three as negative ones that werelater reversed. Subjects were required to respond to each of the ques-tions on a 10-point scale (1 = total rejection of the statement and 10 =total agreement with the statement).42

Statements were examined by factor analysis as well as a correlationmatrix (see Table 2) in order to verify that the variables fit into one

243Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

category and to ensure that their combination into one variable wasstatistically sound. Results showed that the variables fit into one cat-egory: the combined measure showed a fair level of reliability of .71.43

Independent Variables

Individual level variables. In order to look at the explanatorycapabilities of this approach, we used two types of variables. For the firsthypothesis (H1: measuring the effect of personal characteristics), weused two SES measures, as follows: education (4-point scale 1 =primary; 2 = secondary; 3 = post-secondary; 4 = academic); and income(6-point weighted salary scale, ranging from the lowest percentile ofincome in Israel up to the highest percentile). For hypothesis H2(affinity toward the civilian market and its values), we used the follow-ing statements: “Success in the civilian sector impresses me more thansuccess in the public sector”; and “At the end of the day, a high salaryis more important than a person’s contribution to the workplace.” Theresulting reliability was .63.

The institutional-organizational variables. Here again we used twoseparate variables. For hypothesis H3 (individual commitment to thearmy unit), we used the following statements: “My reserve unit is likean extended family for me”; “I maintain regular ties with my friendsfrom the unit even outside reserve duty”; “When I am on reserve duty,I will give up a Sabbath leave if a friend from the unit needs it more thanI do”; “In my view, reserve duty with my friends constitutes a positivechange in my life routine.” The resultant reliability was .61.

The independent variable for hypothesis H4 (responsiveness to thepersonal needs of the soldier), was composed of the following state-ments: “My reserve duty liaison officer takes my personal needs intoaccount”; and “I feel that my commanders are sympathetic when I havea personal problem preventing me from reporting for reserve duty.” Thereliability achieved here was .57.

The competing commitments approach. The variable measuring theconflict between reserve duty and civilian life (hypothesis H5) wascomposed of the following two statements: “Reserve service is too long,both from the point of view of the number of days of service per year andfrom the point of view of the age of release”; and “Reserve duty has aharmful effect on my civilian life, work, studies, and family.” Reliabil-ity here was .71.

The social conditions approach. In the early stage of research, weintended to divide the social condition approach into two main catego-

244 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 2002

ries based on hypotheses H6 (commitment to the collective core values)and H7 (effect of social capital). In order to look into hypothesis H6, weused a combined scale of patriotism and nationalism. However, thefactor analysis procedure showed that patriotic attitudes and nationalis-tic ones do not fit into one category. Hence, patriotic attitudes weremeasured by a single item: “I define myself as Zionist.” This itemrepresents patriotism and belief in the values of the State of Israel in theirpresent form. The nationalistic variable was based on the following fivestatements: “I believe that, despite the peace process, there is still anexistential danger to the State of Israel”; “I oppose full withdrawal fromthe Golan Heights in return for peace with Syria”; “Israeli Arabs are adanger to state security”; “The Israeli government should encourageemigration of Arabs from Israel”; and “I oppose the evacuation ofsettlements in Judeah, Samaria, and Gaza in the framework of the peaceprocess with the Palestinians.” The reliability yielded by this variablewas .75.

The last variable relating to hypothesis H7 (social capital) was mea-sured as a single item: “Usually, it is not worth believing people becausethey will try to exploit me if they have the chance” (reversed item).

Military background variables. These included rank, type of mili-tary service (1 = administrative; 2 = combat), and nature of reserve unit(1 = organic—service with the same people every time; and 2 = non-organic—serving with different people every time).

The control variables gathered for this study were: marital status (1= single; 2 = married; 3 = divorced; 4 = widowed), number of children,religiosity (1 = secular; 2 = traditional; 3 = orthodox; 4 = ultra-orthodox); and place of birth (1 = North Africa/Middle East; 2 =Western-Europe/America; 3 = Eastern Europe; 4 = Israel).

Results

Table 1, which presents the distribution of responses for the depen-dent variable, sheds light on the phenomenon of the motivation to servein the IDF reserves. Prior to the aggregation of the different scales, itshould be noted that the distribution of the responses to most items in thetable is characterized by a deep polarization—in the majority of thecases more than 50 percent of the responses are located on one of thescales’ poles. This finding reinforces the deep cleavage structure ofIsraeli society and sheds light on the strain that the national securitydoctrine in Israel has to cope with. The implications of these findings arediscussed later.

245Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

One of the most salient findings is that many of the respondents areno longer willing to serve in the reserves (47.5%, based on an aggrega-tion of categories 1 to 5). In most cases (37%), soldiers are deterred fromevading reserve duty because of the penalty of imprisonment. This doesnot interfere with licit attempts to be discharged from service. Table 3shows that 28 percent of the respondents try to avoid reserve duty whenthey are called up (by presenting various excuses to the liaison officerand commanders). Another surprising finding is that 27.5 percent of therespondents were willing to consider applying to a mental health officerand be labeled as exempt from reserve duty on the basis of mentalincompetence. The fact that over one-quarter of the respondents re-sponded positively to this question is especially surprising in the Israelicontext, where such a label carries a strong social stigma (this potentialmark on one’s record may also have an effect on decisions made byvarious authorities: for example, the renewal of a firearm or drivinglicense, and employment in the public sector security system). Anotherinteresting finding concerned the soldier’s level of satisfaction in thereserves and his willingness to invest time and effort beyond theminimum expected of him. Only 45 percent of the respondents claimed

Table 1

Percentage of Statements that Indicate Motivation to Serve

* In the cases of reversed items, 10 = total disagreement with the statement.

s

246 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 2002

they felt satisfaction during their service, and only 42 percent reportedthey would take the initiative or contribute beyond the minimum timeand effort demanded.

Table 2 presents the research variables, means, standard deviations,correlations (Pearson’s r), and Alpha Cronbach reliability coefficients.The reliability measures of each of the grouped variables show that inmost cases, reliability was high and, therefore, all of these variablescould be used. Moreover, as already mentioned, the results of the factoranalysis showed that the variables could be ascribed to the categoriespresented in the Table 2. Since none of the correlations among thevariables exceed the level of .45, the possibility of multicolinearity or“concept redundancy,” as referred to by Cohen and Cohen, is signifi-cantly low.44

The correlation matrix indicates a positive relation between level ofincome, level of education, and the motivation to serve (r = .12* [p < .05]and r = .18** [p < .01], respectively). These findings support our firsthypothesis, H1. As for H2, here the findings are even more pronounced.The correlation between affinity toward the civilian market and itsvalues and the motivation to serve was found to be significant andnegative (r = -.25**).

As for strong community ties in the military framework (H3), wefound that these were positively correlated with the dependent variable(r = .26**). In order to lend further support to this hypothesis, weinquired whether serving in a combat unit has an influence on thesubject’s level of motivation. We found that this is highly associatedboth with community attitudes as well as motivation (r = .24** and r =.23** respectively). In other words, soldiers who serve in rear unitsexpressed lower motivation in comparison with soldiers serving incombat units. Thus, a high level of community behavior in the frame-work of the unit was positively related to the motivation to serve. Thesecond hypothesis stemming from the institutional/organizational ap-proach (H4) was also confirmed (r = .23**), that is, a high responsive-ness on the part of the military system toward the soldier’s problems wasassociated with high motivation.

The hypothesis deriving from the social conditions approach (H5) wasalso supported: High tension between military and civilian obligations wasfound to be negatively associated with motivation to serve (r = -.21**).

With regard to the social conditions approach, the correlationmatrices show a positive relation between patriotism attitudes andmotivation to serve (r = .16**). On the other hand, there is a negativerelation between nationalistic attitudes and motivation (r = -.15**). This

247Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

differential association between patriotic attitudes and nationalisticattitudes and willingness to serve shows that H6 is only partiallysupported. This result will be later discussed in greater detail. Hypoth-esis H7, which was also deduced from the social conditions explanation,is supported in full by the findings. High levels of social capital werepositively associated with the motivation to serve (r = .20**).

Table 3 presents the findings of a multiple regression analysisconducted on the motivation variable. The regression includes foursteps, where in each step another cluster of variables was added accord-ing to the relevant approach. This procedure allowed us to look into theeffect of each variable as well as the contribution of each cluster to theexplanation of the dependent motivation variable. Throughout all theprocedures, one background variable, administrative vs. combat ser-vice, was found to be significant and thus was included in all models.

Step 1 focused on the individual level approach. This demonstratedthat the two variables associated with the individual level approach werefound to be significant in explaining motivation to serve in the reserves(education_ = .19*, and affinity toward the civil market _ = -.22**). Theexplained variance of the model was 13 percent. These findings further

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities, and Intercorrelationsamong Research Variables (reliabilities in parentheses)

N = 500; *p < .05; **p < .01

:

:

:

:

248 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 2002

confirm H1 and H2. In step 2, we added the variables cluster of theinstitutional/organizational approach. Again, the two independent vari-ables, commitment to the unit and responsiveness to the soldier’spersonal needs, were found to be significant (_ = .15** and _ = .16**)and thus supported H3 and H4. These variables added 6 percent to theexplained variance. In step 3, the competing commitments cluster wasadded. Although significant (_ = -.16**), the variable of the tensionbetween competing military and civilian duties increased the explainedvariance by only 3 percent, which, at this point, stood at 22 percent. Inthe last step, we included the social condition approach variables. Thepatriotism variable contributed to an increase in level of motivation(_ = .12*), i.e., respondents who expressed Zionist and patriotic atti-tudes were highly motivated to serve. With regard to the nationalismvariable, we obtained a paradoxical result: This variable contributed toa decrease in the motivation to serve (_ = -.11*). In other words,respondents who expressed hostile attitudes to the Arab population andcynicism with regard to the peace process were low on motivation to

Table 3

Linear Regression Analysis (B coefficients and StandardizedCoefficients[_]) Comparing Models of Motivation to Serve(Tests in Parentheses)

N = 500; *p < .05; **p < .01

Not significant in the model: income, marital status, religiosity, place of birth, rank, natureof service unit.

249Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

serve in the reserve army. The contribution of this variable to theexplained variance was 6 percent. The total explained variance after thelast step stood at 28 percent. Hence, all of our research hypotheses,excluding H6, were supported. As for H8, which aimed at comparing theexplanatory strengths of the four approaches, we can conclude that bycomparing the contribution of each to the explained variance, individuallevel approaches are the most significant in predicting motivation toserve. The contribution of both the institutional/organizational and thesocial condition approaches was fairly similar, while the competingcommitments approach’s contribution was the least significant. Hence,H8 was partially rejected. The compulsory nature of the Israeli reservesindeed has an effect, yet, as in other reserve forces, the approaches withthe highest explanatory potential for motivation to serve are the indi-vidual level approaches.

Discussion and Conclusions

Two levels of conclusions emerge from the findings. The first isassociated with the theoretical implications of the motivation to serve inthe reserve forces. The second is relevant to the Israeli national securitydoctrine.

Theoretically, the results somewhat contradicted our initial expec-tation of discovering differences between the motivation to serve involuntary reserve forces and compulsory ones. Our findings supportprevious studies that were conducted in the U.S.45

Like U.S. research, our results indicated that individual level as wellas organizational and institutional variables are the best predictors ofmotivation to serve in the compulsory reserve Israeli army, while thecompeting commitment approach had lower explanatory capabilities.

Data related to the individual level approaches indicate that a personwhose economic status is insecure will place his own welfare and thatof his family first on his scale of priorities and only afterwards theconcerns of the collective. This differs from U.S. results in indicatingthat low levels of income and education predict enlistment in thereserves.46 The reason for the difference between the Israeli and U.S.examples evolves from the fact that in the U.S., service in the reserveforces may improve the economic status of a family and therefore willmotivate less educated and less affluent people to serve. In Israel, on theother hand, reserve duty may harm the chances of an unemployed personto integrate into the labor market and may cause severe losses to self-employed citizens. Another important point is that in Israel the payment

250 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 2002

for reserve service is equal to the salary of this same person in thecivilian market. Thus, only those who are educated and enjoy economicstability and wealth may serve without economic concerns.

The next explanation, also derived from the individual level ap-proach, is related to the assumption that respondents who see the civilianeconomic market as attractive will be identified by low motivation toserve in the reserves. Indeed, we found that individualistic attitudestoward economic matters were negatively associated with motivation toserve. A similar result was found by Lakhani, who studied reenlistmentintentions.47

Explanations stemming from the institutional organizational ap-proach were somewhat less significant. The first explanation, involvingcommitment to the community or, in this case, the army unit, had astrong bearing on motivation to serve. The military framework convertsthe reserve unit from a secondary to a primary group. As in the U.S.Reserve Army,48 Israeli soldiers exhibiting a high level of commitmentto their unit had significantly higher levels of motivation to continue toserve than others.

Findings related to the organizational explanation (the relationbetween subject degree of satisfaction with commander and armyadministration responsiveness) confirmed the assumption that the sol-dier who is treated with understanding and sympathy will tend torespond in like manner. Again, this result confirmed Perry, Griffith andWhite’s findings regarding the U.S. Army.

The competing commitments approach, although significant, wasthe least influential in predicting motivation to serve. Results of thisstudy indicate that the higher the tension between the reserve soldier’smilitary and civilian commitments (work, academic studies, and familyobligations), the lower the motivation to serve. Most studies conductedin the U.S. had similar results.

Data related to the social conditions approach, which was the mostrelativistic approach, i.e., concerned mainly with the Israeli context,contradicted the claim that nationalistic attitudes will be associated withhigh levels of motivation to serve in the reserves.49 This study found thatsuch attitudes are negatively related to motivation. The explanationstems from the strong association between the nationalistic variable andthe socioeconomic one (especially in terms of education). The socialgroup characterized by nationalistic attitudes is a peripheral group in theJewish population in Israel. Low motivation in this group, despite itsenmity towards the Arab population and its lack of faith in the peaceprocess, is embedded in the multidimensional concept of peripheralism.

251Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

A citizen who feels rejected by the core of society will exhibit feelingsof deprivation by the center and a lower interest in national causes. Thisexplanation is supported by the finding that respondents who expressedpatriotic attitudes associated with the political center, such as unequivo-cal support of the Zionist idea, also exhibited a high motivation to serve.Lakahni and Fugita’s study on Reserve Guard retention further rein-forces the connection between patriotism and motivation to serve.

The explanatory power of social capital was found to be even higherthan the aforementioned variables. Israeli society is an immigrantsociety and traditionally social cohesion between its various groups wasbased on adherence to nationalistic ideas and a strong sense of mutualcommitment due to the enduring security threat. The gradual transitionfrom a state of war to an era of peace brought to the surface internalsocial conflicts (ethnic, religious, class, national) previously overshad-owed by security concerns.50 Developments over the years show thatthe widening of social rifts has led to the division of Israeli society intoseparate and hostile sectors.51 This situation provides fertile ground forthe abandonment of national ideas and causes—among them, armyservice—in favor of particularistic interests.

To sum up the theoretical perspective, although voluntary andcompulsory reserve forces are different in many respects, this studyindicates that, to a large extent, the factors that predict motivation tovolunteer for reserve service are consistent with the explanation of theirmotivation to serve in compulsory service. However, further compara-tive research is needed in order to establish a wide-ranging theory forunderstanding the causes of retention and abandonment of reservearmies.

As for the implications of this study on the Israeli national securitydoctrine, it reinforces the conclusions drawn by scholars of Israelisociety in recent years: Israelis are less concerned today with collectivecommitments that entail sacrifices from its citizens. They are moreconcerned with personal and familial fulfillment, and thus have a muchlower level of motivation in general to undertake objectives, such asmilitary service, willingly, which can no longer be taken for granted.Their cooperation must be gained by effort on the part of the leaders ofthe country and of the military themselves, which must work muchharder if it wishes to maintain the loyalty of citizens serving in its forces.In particular, three proposals for reformation are submitted: (1) Thereshould be a more equitable distribution of the burden of service and anattempt to refrain from discriminating against those serving in combatunits; (2) More attention must be paid to the needs of the individual

252 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 2002

serving in the reserves, and especially to his economic needs while inservice; (3) Reserve soldiers should be placed in permanent organicunits where their social environment is stable and supportive and theirservice meaningful, instead of making them feel that they are wastingtheir time.

Should the leaders of the country and military fail to implement thereforms needed to strengthen the sense of positive patriotism in therelevant population, it will become essential to revise the entire doctrineof national security because of the increasing qualitative and quantita-tive erosion of the reserve army. The army will become smaller not onlyout of choice, but also from constant erosion of service in the reserves.Should the latter continue, the reserve army will no longer constitute areliable pillar of military strength and will be unable to make a decisivedifference in the outcome of possible future military confrontations.

Limitations of the Research

Strictly speaking, discussion of the status of the Israeli reserve armyshould be based on a more historical analysis of trends. However, todate, and contrary to the U.S. example, most of the data on militarymanpower and levels of motivation are available only to the variousinspection departments of the IDF and thus hidden from the public eye.Given this case, and despite sporadic publications in the press,52 it is verydifficult to find data on Israel’s reserve army. This study, the first of its kind,is based on respondent self-reports obtained by a telephone survey andcarries the potential for bias because of the risk of lack of confirmation.

Another limitation concerns the tools for measuring rates of motiva-tion and its causes. The differences between the U.S. and Israeli reserveforces made it necessary to adapt and apply established U.S. measuresto the case of Israel. Although we found interesting comparisonsbetween the two armies, this adjustment of measurements calls forcaution when attempting to reach conclusive generalizations.

Notes

1. Yoram Perry, “Is the Israeli Society a Militarist Society?” (in Hebrew) Zmanim 56(1996): 94-112.

2. Gabriel Ben-Dor, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in the Mid-1990s,” (in Hebrew)in Independence the First 50 Years, ed. Anita Shapira (Jerusalem: Zalman ShazarCenter, 1998), 471-486; Moshe Lissak, “Uniqueness and Normalization in MilitaryGovernment Relations in Israel,” in Basic Issues in Israeli Democracy, ed. Raphael

253Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

Cohen-Almagor (Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Poalim Publishing House, 1999), 227-245; YoramPerry, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in a Crisis,” (in Hebrew) Megamot 39, 4(1999): 375-399; Stuart A. Cohen, “The Peace Process and Its Impact on the Devel-opment of a ‘Slimmer and Smarter’ Israel Defense Force,” Israel Affairs 1, 4 (1999):1-21.

3. Ruth Linn, “Patterns of Crisis among Israeli Reserve Soldiers,” The Jewish Journalof Sociology 39, 1 and 2: 24-45.

4. These figures are based on the Israeli army official plan for 2001. Amos Harel,“Officers will serve 42 days in the reserves,” Haaretz, 8 February 2001.

5. Sara Helman, “Militarism and the Construction of the Life-World of Israeli Males,”in The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society, eds. Edna Lomsky-Feder and EyalBen-Ari (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 196.

6. Shelley Perry, James Griffith, and Terry White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Sol-diers in the All-Volunteer Army Reserve,” Armed Forces & Society 18 (Fall 1991):111-133.

7. Hyder Lakhani, “Reenlistment Intentions of Citizen Soldiers in the U.S. Army,”Armed Forces & Society 22 (Fall, 1995): 117-130.

8. Terence C. Willett, “The Reserve Forces of Canada,” Armed Forces & Society 16(Fall 1989): 59-76.

9. Perry, “Civil Military Relations in a Crisis,” 392-393.

10. Perry, “Civil Military Relations in a Crisis,” 390; Cohen, “‘Slimmer and Smarter’Israel Defense Force,” 3.

11. Ben-Dor, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in the Mid-1990s,” 472.

12. See, for example, Reuven Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (Westport, CT:Greenwood Press, 1986).

13. Linn, “Patterns of Crisis.”

14. Linn “Patterns of Crisis,” 33.

15. Shelley Perry, James Griffith, and Terry White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Sol-diers,” 11-133; Sheila Nataraj Kirby and Scott Naftel, “The Impact of Deploymenton the Retention of Military Reservists,” Armed Forces & Society 26 (Winter 2000):259-284; James Griffith and Shelley Perry, “Wanting to Soldier: Enlistment Motiva-tions of Army Reserve Recruits Before and After Operation Desert Storm,” MilitaryPsychology 5 (1993): 127-139; Hyder Lakhani and Stephen S. Fugita, “ReserveGuard Retention: Moonlighting or Patriotism,” Military Psychology 5 (1993): 113-125; Hyder Lakhani “Reenlistment Intention of Citizen Soldiers in the U.S. Army,”Armed Forces & Society 22 (1995): 117-130.

16. Perry, Griffith, and White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers,” 113.

17. D. W. Grissmer and S. N. Kirby, Changing Patterns of Nonprior Service Attrition inthe Army National Guard and Army Reserve (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, R-3626-RA, 1988).

254 Armed Forces & Society/Winter 2002

18. Perry, Griffith, and White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers,” 113.

19. Lakhani, “Reenlistment Intention of Citizen Soldiers.”

20. Perry, Griffith, and White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers.”

21. Peter W. Hom, Ralph J. Kateberg, and Charles L. Hulin, The Prediction of EmployeeTurnover in a Part-Time Military Organization (Arlington, VA: Organizational Ef-fectiveness Research Program, Office of Naval Research, 1978).

22. Linn, “Patterns of Crisis,” 25.

23. B. C. Harris, T. W. Elig, and L. W. Oliver, eds., 1991 Survey of Mobilized Reserv-ists: Attitudes and Experiences During Operation Desert Storm ( Alexandria, VA:U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1992).

24. C. A. Smith, D. W. Ogran, and J. P. Near, “Organizational Citizenship Behavior: ItsNature and Antecedents,” Journal of Applied Psychology 68 (1983): 653-663.

25. Eran Vigoda, “Are You Being Served? The Responsiveness of Public Administrationto Citizens’ Demands: An Empirical Examination in Israel,” Public Administration78, 1 (2000): 165-191.

26. Perry, Griffith, and White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers,” 115.

27. Linn, “Patterns of Crisis”; Horowitz and Kimmerling, “Some Social Implications,”271-272.

28. Lissak, “Uniqueness and Normalization,” 231; Linn, “Patterns of Crisis.”

29. Lakhani and Fugita, “Reserve Guard Retention: Moonlighting or Patriotism.”

30. Uri Ben-Eliezer, The Making of Israeli Militarism. (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1998).

31. Dan Horowitz, “The Israel Defense Forces: A Civilianized Military in a PartiallyMilitarized Society,” in Soldiers Peasants and Bureaucrats, eds, Roman Kolkowitzand Andrzej Korbonski (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 77-106.

32. Dan Horowitz and Baruch Kimmerling, “Some Social Implications of Military Ser-vice and the Reserves System in Israel,” European Journal of Sociology 15, 2 (1974):271-272; Linn, “Patterns of Crisis,” 24; Ben-Eliezer, The Making of Israeli Milita-rism; Horowitz, “The Israel Defense Forces,” in Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureau-crats.

33. Ben-Dor, “Civil Military Relations in Israel in the Mid-1990s.”

34. Yochanan Peres and Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, Between Consent and Dissent: De-mocracy and Peace in the Israeli Mind (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute,1998).

35. Aaron Cohen and Eran Vigoda, “An Empirical Assessment of the Relationship be-tween General Citizenship and Work Outcomes,” Public Administration Quarterly21, 4 (1998): 401-431.

36. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Commu-nity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).

255Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi

37. Perry, “Civil Military Relations in a Crisis,” 395

38. Ofra Meisels and Reuven Gal, Hatred Towards Arabs among High School Students,(Zikhron Yaacov: The Center for Military Studies, 1989) (in Hebrew); Ofra Meisels,Reuven Gal, and Eli Fishhof, General Perceptions and Positions of High SchoolStudents Toward the Peace Process, Security and Social Issues (in Hebrew), (ZikhronYaacov: The Center for Military Studies, 1995).

39. In Israel, a sample of 500 respondents represents the country’s Jewish population,which stood at 4,883,300 in 1998 with a statistical error of 4 percent. In this study,which focused only on Jewish men (2,302,500), the sample error was reduced to lessthan 3 percent.

40. Perry, “Civil Military Relations in a Crisis,” 389.

41. Stuart A. Cohen “Military Service in Israel: No Longer a Cohesive Force?” TheJewish Journal of Sociology 39, 1-2 (1997): 5-23.

42. This scale was also used for questions measuring the independent variables.

43. The seven questions represented one factor; every single item was above 0.5. Thetotal explained variance was 53.19 percent.

44. J. Cohen and P. Cohen, Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analyses for Be-havioral Sciences, 2nd ed. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1983).

45. Perry, Griffith, and White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers”; Griffith andPerry, “Wanting to Soldier: Enlistment Motivations of Army Reserve Recruits be-fore and after Operation Desert Storm,” 127-139; Lakhani and Fugita, “ReserveGuard Retention: Moonlighting or Patriotism,” 113-125; Hyder Lakhani “Reenlist-ment Intention of Citizen Soldiers.”

46. Griffith and Perry, “Wanting to Soldier”; Lakhani “Reenlistment Intention of CitizenSoldiers.”

47. Lakhani “Reenlistment Intention of Citizen Soldiers.”

48. Perry, Griffith, and White, “Retention of Junior Enlisted Soldiers.”

49. Perry, “Civil Military Relations in a Crisis.”

50. Sammy, Smooha, “The Status Quo Option,” in Seven Roads: Theoretical Options forthe Status of the Arabs in Israel, ed. Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, As’ad Ghanem, and IlanPappe’ (Givat Haviva: The Institute for Peace Research, 1999), 243.

51. Gad Yatziv, The Sectorial Society (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1999); BaruchKimmerling, “Elections as an Arena for Struggle over Collective Identities” in TheElections in Israel—1996, (in Hebrew), ed. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (Jerusa-lem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 1999), 35-56.

52. Perry, “Civil Military Relations in a Crisis,” 393.