Fordham University

Carlos E. Flores Terán

Understanding Historical Change: Modern Europe

April 2013

The 1914 European Outbreak

The growth of the power of Athens, and the

alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war

inevitable

Thucydides

By 1914, it was rather clear for European Powers that an

international conflict could put, almost inexorably, an end to

the armed peace. Despite the fact the Central Powers and the

Triple Entente had solved their international conflicts

diplomatically, the possibility of a war lurked beneath peace

advocacy. In addition, while the assassination of the Archduke

Franz Ferdinand, by Serbian nationalists, was the factual

trigger for the third Balkans War; it was the cumulated

European Power’s tensions, along with a militarized diplomacy,

that played the decisive role in the war escalation: From a

local war to a war that ultimately involved the vast majority

of the world.

Prior the Great War’s beginning, both the Balkan Wars and

the Moroccan Crisis did not only underline Europe’s

international tensions; also, they operated as windows in which

European Powers openly stated their readiness for a war. Thus,

it is possible to distinguish three stages of international

tension among European Powers. First, caused by severe

geopolitical tensions; second, caused by Germany’s preeminence

in military and industrial realms that was disrupting the

balance of power within continental Europe. Finally, the

alliance systems constituted the third stage of international

tensions. The latter was an assertion on how European Powers

envisioned a war among them, and how, of course, these nations

would react in the case of war.

According to David Stevenson, the first Moroccan Crisis

was the watershed that defined war diplomatic relations among

European Powers before 1914: “from 1905 onward military

measures became more extensive and more directed toward

compellence […] European diplomacy became more militarized”.1The latter assertion’s significance is twofold: On the hand, it

means that military mobilization accompanied diplomatic

measures to address international conflicts; a tentative

coercive diplomacy began to take shape after 1905. While in the

other, war readiness became a fundamental matter for the

political leaderships of European Powers. Henceforward, the

Triple Entente and the Central powers enlarged their armies

considerably and made significant technological developments to

improve their armies.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the role of

international tensions and militarization, as conditions of

possibility for the 1914 European breakdown. In order to

1 David Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914”, International Security 22: 1(Summer 1997), Accessed on April 28 2013, 128.

address these matters, we will delve on three stages of

international tension: 1) geopolitical conflicts 2) European

balance of power 3) the alliance system. Furthermore, we will

examine two stages of militarization: 1) coercive diplomacy 2)

the arms race.

1- International Tensions

1.1- Geopolitical ConflictThe State and space are the fundamental concepts that define

the meaning of Geopolitics. As Friederich Retzel acutely

asserted: Geopolitics represents an organic conjunction between

the political life of a state and its territory. 2 Broadly

speaking, the early twentieth century’s Geopolitics conceives

the State as a living political organism and its geographical

space as the condition sine qua-non-to the State’s organic

existence. 3

Geography, thus, became a subject of political

rationale. Furthermore, matters such as natural resources,

population, sea connections, and political as well as natural

boundaries not only provide the State with factual and rational

knowledge regarding its territory. They also acquired an

unprecedentedly political significance. Geopolitics, in

2 Cfr., Friederich Retzel, Political Geography.3 Charles B. Hagan, “Geopolitics”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 4, No.

4: Nov., 1942, p. 479.

consequence, became a guideline in foreign and domestic

policies.

To an important extent, the early twentieth century’s European

Geopolitics aimed for two objectives: To guarantee the State’s

political life, by securing its basic geographical space. And,

to expand the State’s territory. The latter implied an

assertion on the state’s political vitality, instead of a

statement of power.

The geopolitical crisis of 1914 predominantly took place

in two stages. First, French idea of a body politic: France

conceived the Alsace and Lorraine regions that not only

historically belonged to their nation; also, as key fundamental

regions to their vital space. Thus, re-integrating the latter

regions was an important objective for their foreign policies

measure. Second, the Dual Monarchy’s double geopolitical

interest and its consequences: In the one hand, the keen

interest on seizing the Balkans regions in order to establish a

military and geopolitical hegemony within that zone. While in

the other, the annexation of Bosnia represented a maneuverer to

restrain Serbian territorial expansion. Finally, Russia and

France threatened Germany’s vital space. Thus, before

1914,German General Staff had designed a military plan, taking

in account both Germany’s geopolitical conditions as well as

Russian slow mobility and France’s proximity, to address a

possible two-front war: The Schlieffen Plan. While this does

not constitute an international crisis itself, its geopolitical

international implications certainly played a decisive role in

the 1914 breakdown.

1.1.1- Franco-German TensionsWhile the end of the Franco-Prussian War, in 1871, meant

the beginning of forty years without a major military conflict,

hitherto the longest state of peace in European History. This

peace also set a number of conditions that later lead Europe

into the Great War.

Two main elements can be extracted as consequences at the end

of the Franco-Prussian War: 1) A new European Power arose from

the Prussian political and military leadership: The Second

Reich. 2) French Empire paid five billion francs4 and yielded

the territories of Alsace and Lorraine to emerging German

state. The first consequence affected the directly the

political organization of Europe and its balance of power. In

contrast, the Alsace and Lorraine annexation defined France’s

attitude towards Germany; creating constant tensions between

the latter nations. 5

The essence of the Franco-German tensions is

geopolitical: France saw its body politic—the national unit—

weakened by German seizing of Alsace and Lorraine; Sidney B.

Fay argues that France feeling deeply believed in the idea of a

strong and united nation.6 Thus, losing territory jeopardized the

French Nation-State’s political life. Moreover, the loss of a

part of France’s territory and the Germany’s military4 D.F. Flemming, The Origins of World War I, 51. 5 It is important to point out that the loss of Alsace and Lorraine had adeep impact on France: when the Great War was over, one of the conditionsof Versailles’ Treat was the restitution of Alsace and Lorraine as partof France’s territory.

6 Sidney B. Fay, the Origins of the World War (New York: The MacmillanCompany, 1966), 41.

occupation until the indemnity was fully paid produced in the

French people and its political leadership a resentment towards

Germany and an urge for revenge: “unspoken perhaps, but fixed

in the heart, that would persist and even grow in intensity in

later years. “7

French lost was quite significant terms of natural

boundaries and resources. In the first place, Germany had

pushed its frontier to the west, surpassing the Rhine as the

natural Franco-German border; this fact gained its significance

after 1871, when Germany military and industrial power outgrew

France. Moreover, the Alsace and Lorraine constituted a French

a safe territory; this is, a space in-between French Rhine

Border and the French vital space: the Île-de-France. Thus,

Germany’s position meant a geopolitical threat to France’s

existence, in the possibility of a war. 8

Moreover, with the losing of Alsace and Lorraine, France

lost important large new iron-ore deposits. 9 These deposits

provided Germany with 700 million tons of iron-ore, which

ultimately determined German rapid industrialization. 10

The German seizing of Alsace and Lorraine constituted to

the eyes of historian D. F. Fleming “the worst way of

establishing peace on the Franco-German frontier”11. According

to Fleming not only, this settlement was authoritarian towards

Alsace and Lorraine’s population, primarily because these two7 Ibid, 97.8 It is important to point out that the distance between Alsace-Lorraine and Paris is 357.6 mi. 9 E. J. Passant, A short history of Germany. 1815-1945, 10310 Gustav Stopler, Historia Económica de Alemania. Problemas yTendencias, 41. 11 Ibid, 53.

territories belonged to the French nation, even if they were

German speaking territories. In other words, while it may be

true that the Alsace and Lorraine’s population was German-

speaking, their political traditions and social practices had

been shaped in the French democratic way; thus, Germany’s

argument to occupy the latter region was not only invalid,

since it never truly belonged to the Germany. 12 It also shaped

the geopolitical tension that later triggered, as envisioned by

the German General Staff, war between France and Germany.

1.1.2- The Balkans 13

To some extent, The Balkans’14 geopolitical significance

arises from its sea connections: it provides a privileged

access to the Mediterranean, which may lead to a strategic sea

control; it connects the latter, through the Aegean and Black

Sea, with southeast Europe; it links by sea Europe with

Northern Europe. Additionally, it constitutes a space that

strategically links by sea and by land Continental Europe with

the Near East.

For David Stevenson: “First World War began over a local

war, launched by the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary against

12 Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of The World War, 4113 By 1914, The Balkans was composed by a several territories that werepart of Austria –Hungary, such as Croatia, Transylvania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a few independent states like Serbia, an independent since 1878, Albania and Montenegro. According to Spencer C. Tucker, Serbia was the “chief champion in the Balkans” this means that the latter had become an important power within the region.14 To avoid any misunderstands, we will refer here to The Balkans as the geographical space that mail considers the Balkan Peninsula; which its north natural boundary is delimited by the Danube-Sava-Kupa line, while its southern boundary its limited by both the Mediterranean and the Aegean seas.

Serbia. The local war lead almost instantaneously to a

confrontation between the two blocks”15 However, the main cause

for this local war is not entirely related to the assassination

of Franz Ferdinand but with Dual Monarchy’s expansion policy:

Austria-Hungary observed this as an opportunity to seize

political hegemony over the Balkans. Thus, in certain degree

what provoked the clash between the two blocks was the break of

a geopolitical balance within the Balkans. In other words, the

expansion policy lead by the Dual Monarchy since the 1908

created a geopolitical tension between the latter and Russia,

who had interests in the Balkans. Given this background, by

1914 a local war in the Balkans would easily affect the weak

state of peace within Europe; mainly caused by its geopolitical

significance.

As mentioned before, with the annexation of Bosnia-

Herzegovina to the Dual Monarchy in 1908, the conditions for a

future Balkan Crisis were set. By expanding her territory to

the Balkans, Austria-Hungary tried to achieve two goals: 1)

prevent Serbia from rising as a strong state within this

geographical space; specifically by denying the latter a sea

access and by enclosing Serbia with Austro-Hungarian

territories 2) Establishing an Austro-Hungarian preeminence

within the Balkans. 16 This attempted directly to the Ottoman

Empire’s regional hegemony as well as the Russian Empire’s

territorial expansions interests.

15 David Stevenson, “Austria-Hungary and Serbia” in The outbreak for the FirstWorld War. 1914 in perspective, 2. 16 Spencer C. Tucker, “The Background” in The Great War, 1.

Following the idea that territorial expansion was an

assertion on a State’s vitality; The Balkans, thus, appeared as

an opportunity to maintain the old Monarchy alive: if the

influence of Serbia as successful national state could be

diminished, the national movements within the Dual Monarchy

would be easily shut down.

Moreover, by 1914 the Austria-Hungary was a dying

Empire. Several internal crisis, the old fashioned ways of

ruling over her own territory, the failure to develop a strong

Nation-State from the oldest Monarchy in Europe and the

emergency of national movements within her territory had been

tearing apart the political foundations of the Monarchy since

the nineteenth century’s last decades. Therefore, a successful

territorial expansion meant an opportunity to prove other

European Powers and to herself, that the Dual-Monarchy was not

only still alive; that she was continental power as well.

In the other hand, The Balkans’ control was an imperative

goal for the Russian Empire territorial expansion purposes: it

gave Russia a direct sea exit—more importantly, it provided an

all-yearlong operative port17—to a main stream. In addition,

Serbia was a Russian close ally, based on certain cultural

similarities, such as the “Christian Orthodox religion and the

Cyrillic alphabet”. 18

Thus, the Balkans represented to Russia both a

geopolitical interests and a zone of influence. As the domestic

tensions in Russia grew, the urge for an effective expansion17 Since 1905, Russia was looking for an strategic port far, from innerspace, that did not limited its functions as a consequence of Russian weather. 18 Ídem.

towards the Balkans and northern Anatolia became imperative to

assert the Empire’s vitality.

In order to achieve the latter goal, the Russian Empire

must first terminate with the Ottoman presence and the Austro-

Hungarian preeminence in the Balkans. Consequently, she openly

supported the Balkan league to expel Ottoman Empire; then, in

1914 when the Dual Monarchy declared war against Serbia, Russia

was the first country from the Ally Block to back up Serbia and

declared the war against Austria-Hungary.

1.2 European balance of powerModern political thought has defined Balance of Power as

follows: “a particular distribution of power among the states

of the system so that no single state and no existing alliance

has an 'overwhelming' or 'preponderant' amount of power.” 19 It

is possible to derive two implications from the latter

statement: First, that within a specific geographical space,

where different Nation-States independently coexist and relate

to other; no State should accumulate a certain power capital

that will threat the fundamental basis of a Nation-State: its

sovereignty and its national interests. Second, that the

disruption of a Balance of power leads to a struggle for

19 Zinnes, D. A. “An analytical study of the balance power theories”, Journal of Peace Research (1967), 270-88.This

hegemony. 20 This will conduce to a Nation-State exerting its

will of power over the rest.

William B. Moul argues that a Nation-State’s power capital and

its capabilities that ultimately defined the balance of power

could only be measure in a war stage. 21 Furthermore, he argues

that in order to assess a Nation-State’s power capabilities at

a war stage: “(1) the means of destruction each holds and can

draw upon and ”22 must be taken in account.

For this paper’s purposes, we assert two geographical

spaces where two different balances of power organized

international relations: Europe and the rest of World.

Furthermore, we uphold that onward Napoleon’s utter defeat in

1815; there was equilibrium in the European balance of power.

While in the outside of continental Europe, the British Empire

operated as the unchallenged hegemonic power.

Using William B. Maul’s model to asses the power

capabilities of a Nation-State; we will argument how Germany

constituted a potential threat to the balance of power, at the

European stage and in the sea.

1.2.1 Means of destruction

The means of destruction that each state holds primarily

relate to material means. In other words, the amount of

20 Partha Chatterjee, “The Classical Balance of Power Theory”, Journal of Peace Research, 9:1(1972) 53-53. 21 William Brian Moul, “Balances of Power and the Escalation to War of Serious Disputes among the European Great Powers, 1815-1939: Some Evidence”, American Journal of Political Science, 32:2(May, 1988), 245.22 Idem.

industrial output used for warfare. Specifically, iron, steel

and coal outputs are essential for this gauge.

After 1871, Germany appeared as rising industrial power

within the European Concert. There are two fundamental reasons

to explain this development: First, the late industrialization

process allowed the emerging nation to rely exclusively on

brand new technology and modern techniques to bolster its

industries. Second, Germany used the new and almost untouched

iron-ore deposits to achieve a full industrialization process.23

We will assess German industrialization by focusing on

the steel, iron and coal outputs from 1871 to 1913.

In 1871 the coal miming in Germany produced almost 40

millions ton by year, whereas by 1880, the production reached

60 million ton. 24 Outputs like pig iron and steel also

considerably increased after 1871; for instance, by 1890 the

pig iron production reached 4 million, which is almost 50% more

than it was in 1880. Steel output in 1880 reached 1.5 million

ton, while in 1890 rose 3 million ton.

Furthermore, in the twentieth century’s dawn coal outputs

increased from 109 million in 1900 to 161 million ton. Coal

mining reached its peak in 1913 when the output rose 279

million ton. German pig iron and steel outputs not only kept

increasing during these years, to the point in which she

finally outgrew her continental rivals as well as the United

23 E. J. Passant, “The German Empire in Prosperity and Defeat” in A short history of Germany. 1815-1945, 103. 24 Ibid,105.

Kingdom’s outputs: In 1910, German pig iron outputs rose 14

million ton; while steel output reached 13 million ton. 25

Germany used her industrial growth to both develop her

army and to build powerful navy. After 1871, the emergent

nation presented her as a Military power. This created an

international tension: Germany threatened European equilibrium

as well as Britain’s hegemony in the sea.

Factually speaking, from 1908 to 1914 Germany built 17

dreadnoughts and 7 dreadnaught battle cruisers. Alongside the

latter war ships, Germany had been increasing her navy size

from 20,000 total ships in 1908; to 25,000 ships in 1912 and

finally to 30,000 ships in 1914.

According to Spencer C. Tucker, Germany’s economy in 1914

challenged both Britain and the United States in terms of

industrial power and production of steel. Therefore, it could

be argued that Germany represented a threat to the way the

relationship of power was organized: Industrialization did not

only lead to an economic growth, it also provided the material

foundations to Germany in order to build an army that

challenged, in terms of warfare, Britain as an hegemonic power.

Therefore, it is likely that European Powers and the British

Empire would seek to start a war in order to measure German

power capital. More importantly, the British Empire was

particularly keen on maintaining the power balance equilibrium

within continental Europe.

25 Ibid, 107.

1.3 System of Alliances

Given the constant international tensions in the

twentieth century’s turn, European nations sought to protect

themselves in case of war. Thus, a complex an alliance system

appeared. Primarily an alliance meant a military agreement

between two or more Nation-States for defensive purposes

Moreover, the alliance system aimed to maintain

relatively functional state of peace within Continental Europe.

While peace was a primary goal, avoiding an assessment of power

capabilities played an important part in the alliance system

development. To an important extent, if France or Russia

should fight a war, individually, against Germany; both French

and Russian power capabilities were going to be outweighed by

German power capabilities. Thus, an alliance appeared as the

only procedure to maintain power equilibrium within Europe.

The Triple Entente, formed by France, Russia and the

British Empire, had its roots in 1894. After France’s recovery

from the Franco-Prussian war, in economic and military terms,

the Third Republic was finally able to form an alliance for

“essential defensive purposes”.26 Despite Russia’s archaic

warfare and their old fashioned political forms, their

geographic position made her a perfect ally in case of a war.

To the German eyes, this alliance did not present a

threat to her power or to her geopolitical interests; in most

degrees, Germany was more powerful, wealthier and better

prepared for a war than her European counterparts. Although,

26 D.F. Flemming, “The Formation of the Triple Entente” in The Origins of World War I, p.73.

the possibility of having to fight a war in both Germany’s

frontiers did concern the General Staff as well as a direct

confrontation with Britain.

The German concerns truly augmented when Britain aligned

herself to the Franco-Russian alliance. Hitherto, Britain had

remained isolated from the European international scene.

However, when Britain’s geopolitical overseas interests were at

stake—For instance, the North African Mediterranean preeminent

position—the need for an alliance was imperative. In 1898

Britain and Russia became allies; later, in 1905, France and

Britain signed an alliance as well, giving birth to the Triple

Entente.27

Undoubtedly, one of the main goals to the Triple Entente

was preventing Germany from keep growing as an hegemonic power

within Europe as well as refraining German territorial

expansion towards strategic positions in Africa. The Moroccan

crisis is a clear example of how the Triple Entente operated in

order to refrain Germany’s intention to seize control over the

north of Africa. 28

In the other hand, the Central Powers block out of

Germany’s interest to come out from her political isolation

after 1871. Therefore, one of the main goals of Otto Von

Bismarck’s political agenda, after 1871, was to form an

alliance with other countries that shared the same autocratic-

rule as Germany. 29 Accordingly, Austria-Hungary appeared to be

27 Ibíd., p. 80-82. 28 David Stevenson, “Continental Equilibrium”, in Armaments and comming of War in Europe, p. 75. 29 E. J. Passant, “The German Empire in Prosperity and Defeat” in Ashort history of Germany. 1815-1945, p. 103.

a potential ally, primarily because of its political essence,

in spite of being of lacking German industrial and military

power. Both States came into a military agreement for defensive

purposes in 1882. In that very same year, Italy joined the

Central Powers block.

In opposition to the Triple Entente, where the three

nations appeared to be equal in terms of political stability

and military warfare; the Central’s Powers block were dependent

on Germany: both Austria-Hungary and Italy appeared as burdens

that Germany had to carry during the war.

An important element that determined the war escalation

in 1914 dwells in the alliance system very essence: its power

to compel. As Sidney B. Fay pointed out: In the crisis of

July, 1914, it was not, merely a question of Austria, Serbia

and the Balkans; it was a question, of the solidarity and

prestige of the two groups of Powers into which Europe had

become divided”.30 This is that European Powers felt an

imperative urge to support their allies’ military enterprises

as a way to preserve the alliance strength. For instance,

although Germany did not fully support the Austro-Hungarian

expansion policies, she felt compelled to support it. After

all, the Dual Monarchy’s proximity with Russia served German

purposes of avoiding a double-front war. 31

2- MilitarizationSi vis pacem, para bellum.

30 Sidney Bradshaw Fay, “The undelaying causes for the war” in The Origins of The World War, 27. 31 Idem.

Militarization process often refers to the moment where both

domestic and foreign affairs follow a military logic. To some

extent, militarization defined shaped European Powers’ domestic

and foreign measures prior 1914. Consequently, we will discuss

the factual implications of militarized diplomacy, which is

utterly related to a generalized situation in which Europeans

Powers shared a keen interest on war readiness.

According to David Stevenson, what defined the war escalation

in 1914 was the cumulative process of militarized measures to

address, provoke or contain international tensions. 32 Overall,

he observes a pro-militarization attitude among European

Powers, primarily caused by political rationality that aimed to

assert war capabilities in order to achieve diplomatic goals.

While these measures did aim to avoid further levels of war

escalation, they were intrinsically aggressive. Furthermore, as

the international tensions became more hostile, the militarized

measures became more aggressive.

D. Stevenson distinguishes two levels of militarized

measures, that accompanied diplomatic m accelerating war

preparations and actual military maneuvers, which ranged from

troops mobilization to naval movements.33

The Moroccan Crisis of 1905 represented the turning point for

international relations among European Powers. In spite of the

fact that the crisis was contained and solved diplomatically,

that did not refrain Germany from “recalling some reservists,

and revising mobilization procedures”. 34 Additionally, France32 David Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914”, International Security, 22: 1(Summer 1997), 127. 33 Idem. 34 Ibid, 130

reinforced the Franco-German border and Britain made important

naval movements in the Mediterranean. 35 Stevenson suggests that

the even if in the following international crisis, the

annexation of Bosnia in 190836 and the Agadir crisis in 1911,

there were important militarized measures,37 the vast majority

of them took place overseas or did not necessarily involved

European Powers.

The militarization process, however, kept growing at a

remarkable pace among European Powers. Not only political

leaderships turned their eyes to this measures; also, civilian

society openly started supporting militarized measures. Thus,

by the Second Balkan Crisis in 1912 it is possible to observe

the highest levels of militarized diplomacy on both sides. 38

Russia took the lead in 1912 in terms of military

movements, by deploying 150,00 men to her western borders; by

enlarging her Amy’s standing man number and by enforcing her

western Borders.39 While Russia claimed that these movements

were not directly related to the Balkan Crisis, the Central

Powers, particularly Austro-Hungary, regarded the latter as

clear statements of war readiness.

The fear of being unprepared for a possibly

confrontation versus Russia, which could result in a Austro-

Hungarian significant loss in the Balkans, made Dual Monarchy

35 Ibid, 12936 Serbia, adverting a possible war against the Dual Monarchy rapidlymobilized her troops and intensified her military alliance with Russia. 37 German Navy mobilized warships to Moroccan Shores; wile France deployed 150,000 men to Fez. 38 Ibid, 13539 Ibid, 141

accelerate her war preparations. Russian coercive diplomacy

lead, as well, to Austro Hungarian militarized measures.

Consequently, the Dual Monarchy increased her Galician

standing troops from 57,000 to 97,000 men. She also deployed

100,000 men to the Austro-Serbian border and increased her

naval presence in the Adriatic Sea. 40 France and England,

respectively, carried full seize naval and infantry exercises

and maneuvers as well.

As mentioned before, the growing militarized diplomacy

cannot be understood without correlating the later with the

European keen interest on war preparations. Contemporary

historiography defined this process as the arms race, which

factually implied that: “If one country increased its army,

built strategic railways and constructed new battleships, its

fearful neighbors were straightaway frightened into doing like

wise”41.

The extent of military mobilizations was utterly

determined by the European Powers’ army size; thus, from 1905

onwards we observe an important increase in the number of

possible combatants. For instance, by 1912, France had extended

the military service to three years, instead of two.42 Germany,

in the other hand, had by 1914 an army of 880,00 standing-man

ready for a war. 43 As Stevenson shows, the rest of European

40 Idem. 41 Sidney Bradshaw Fay, “The undelaying causes for the war” in TheOrigins of The World War, p. 39. 42 Ibíd., p. 40. 43 Spencer C. Tucker, “The Background” in The Great War, p. 17.

Powers had increased their army seize too by extending their

conscription class’ service. 44

It is possible to argue that there is a tight relation

between construction of great and the growth of nationalism as

collective belief and as a political discourse. Nationalism

allowed governments to drag more people into their army, by

creating the notion of a “National Duty” in joining the army.

Furthermore, inn order to improve their armies, European

countries introduced the modern technological devices to their

warfare. For instance: “The Germans brought poison gas to the

battlefield […] The British pioneered the caterpillared

armoured vehicle”.45 According to Spencer C. Tucker, Austria-

Hungary had spent 20% of her defense budget on improving her

navy; France had made an important technological improvement by

introducing the French 75mm field gun to her warfare, lastly

England made a notable improvement in her navy by introducing

the Dreadnought to her fleet in 1906. 46

The Second Balkan Crisis certainly represented a break

between from past international crisis and the soon to come

events. After 1912, diplomacy had turned, almost completely,

into military movements. European powers had immersed

themselves in a war dynamic that seemed unstoppable: The arms

race was at its peak after 1912, the Alliances seemed more

44 David Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914”, International Security, 22: 1(Summer 1997), passim 127-151 45 Eric Hobsbwam, “The Age of Total War” in The Age of extremities, p. 29.It is also important to point out that Eric Hobsbwam argues that theuse of technology to exterminate the enemy is the element thatdistinguishes the Great War from the past wars.46 Idem.

bounded to its purposes more than ever and the international

tensions sufficiently volatile to provoke a war.

Conclusion At the beginning of the present paper we proposed a

scheme to observe certain conditions and to assess its

relevance in the war escalation level. More particularly, we

aimed to establish a hierarchical organization of the latter

conditions: A condition that would permit the others, not as

consequences, but as an essential element to their existence.

By 1914, two aspects determined the later the course of

events: The alliance system and the geopolitical crisis in the

Balkans. The alliance system factually brought most European

nations to a general war: Austria-Hungary declared war Serbia

on the July 28th 1914, as Russia backed up Serbia and declared

war to the Dual Monarchy. Germany, who was compelled to act,

declared war first to Russia and then to France on August 3rd.

Following the Schleiffen Plan, Germany mobilized her army to

neutral nations Belgium and Luxembourg, in order to attack

France; accordingly, Britain declared war to Germany. Only a

week after Serbia and Austria Hungary started a local war,

Europe was a in a general state of war.

While it is true that the alliance system played a major

role in the way that a localized war turned into a generalized

European war, it does not fully explain why the Third Balkans

War was not contained as the past international crisis. Thus,

its significance as a condition in the war escalation is

important, although it is not determining.

Furthermore, we uphold that the emergency an alliance

system is part of a bigger international dynamic within Europe:

A crisis in the balance of power. Thus, the alliance system’s

emergency must be understood as an expression of an urge to

outweigh the other block’s power capabilities; which ultimately

implies that European Powers, particularly the Triple Entente,

aimed at refraining a nation from exerting its will of power

over the others.

In order to fully explain the extent of the balance of

power in the war escalation, we must observe modern European

development from a larger perspective. Europe, since the

Westphalia Peace functioned as a space where Nation-States

shared similar power capabilities. When Napoleon brought the

vast majority European’s states under his power, he destroyed

the old political foundations; but most importantly, he

disturbed the common equilibrium by exerting the French will of

power over other Nations. Therefore, it was in Europe’s and

Britain best interest to restore the old equilibrium. From a

political standpoint, he was disrupting the idea of sovereign

Nation-States that had functioned since Westphalia. In

addition, from a geopolitical standpoint, the unification of

central Europe meant a direct threat to Britain’s vital space.

Because of the Napoleonic experience, it is arguable that

European Powers saw German growth as a threat to their

sovereignty and their national interests.

It is an undeniable fact that Germany had been growing at

accelerated pace, since 1871; Moreover, it was clear by 1914

that she was the most industrialized nation within Europe.

Following our argumentation, this meant that she had sufficient

power capital to exert a potentially hegemony over Europe.

Undoubtedly, France and Britain were particularly keen in

limiting German’s growth and its power capabilities.

Furthermore, the urge to maintain the latter equilibrium,

also explains the European turn towards militarization: The

Triple Entente felt compelled to assert its war readiness, in

case Germany or her allies would push for a war. The Central

Block responded accordingly.

Two paradoxical dynamics clashed in 1914: Civilization

and Militarism. From 1871 to 1914, Europe experienced a moment

of great development. Throughout the Belle Époque European

Culture, Sciences and Arts flourished at one of the highest

point its History, accomplishing things like the development of

antibiotics by Louis Pasteur, the invention of the of early

cinema devices. Artists like Van Gogh, Matisse and Gauguin were

also products of this time.

Nevertheless, during this same period the conditions that

later conduced to the Great War were shaped. A belligerent

dynamic absorbed European political leaderships. In the one

hand, enlarging and technologically improving their armies

became a fundamental matter. While, the other hand, war was not

regarded as an extreme solution; instead, war appeared as the

only possible way to prevent a further disruption in the power

balance.

The power of balance was certainly threatened by German

growth. However, it was the alarm that this caused in Britain,

France and Russia what made this war inevitable: the fear of a

disruption significantly contributed to Europe’s

militarization, to a hostile alliance system and worsened the

international tensions among European Powers.

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