The United Nations and East Timor: from self-determination to state-building

The United Nations and East Timor: FromSelf-Determination to State-Building

IAN MARTIN and ALEXANDERMAYER-RIECKH

Following an overview of the historical context, this essay analyses the four peaceoperations mandated by the Security Council in East Timor between 1999 and2004, and the role of regional actors in these processes. The essay contendsthat the record of the overall performance of the UN is mixed, and discussesthree lessons to be learned from the operations in East Timor: the planningcapacities of the UN Secretariat should be strengthened; the UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) needs to develop its expertise in peace-building; and peacebuilding missions would benefit from greater involvement ofregional experts.

The UN’s most extensive involvement in peace operations in Asia and thePacific has been in one of its smallest and poorest territories – now theindependent nation of Timor-Leste. The involvement has had severalphases. It began with the declaration by the UN General Assembly in1960 that East Timor, along with other territories under Portugueseadministration, was a non-self-governing territory. Fifteen years later,when Portugal’s decolonization was overtaken by Indonesia’s seizure ofthe territory, the invasion of December 1975 was condemned by theSecurity Council and the General Assembly. East Timor was on theGeneral Assembly agenda for 24 years before agreement was reachedbetween Portugal and Indonesia on a process of self-determination.1

Then followed the mandating of the 1999 UN Mission in East Timor(UNAMET) to carry out a self-determination ballot, termed the EastTimor Popular Consultation. When the overwhelming vote for indepen-dence on 30 August 1999 was followed by an orgy of violence againstpeople and property by pro-Indonesian militia and the Indonesianarmy, Indonesia was pressured to consent to an Australian-led, UN-mandated, multinational force, the International Force for East Timor(INTERFET), to restore order. The Security Council then mandated theUN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), to administerthe territory pending elections and the installation of a sovereign indepen-

International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.1, Spring 2005, pp.125–145ISSN 1353-3312 print=1743-906X onlineDOI:10.1080=1353331042000286595 # 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

dent government. When this government was installed on 20 May 2002,the UN remained to assist it in the form of the UN Mission of Support inEast Timor (UNMISET).

This essay summarizes how the successive UN mandates came about,how they were implemented, and what role Asian countries played ineach context. Although it focuses on the activities of the UnitedNations, credit for Timor-Leste becoming an independent, democraticstate should go first and foremost to the East Timorese people and theirleaders for their courage and determination, and their readiness tosuffer tremendous hardship.

From the Years of Non-intervention to the 5 May 1999 Agreements

From 1975 to 1981 the General Assembly passed annual resolutions reaf-firming the inalienable right of the East Timorese to self-determinationand expressing concern at the suffering – which was indeed extreme –of the civilian population.2 Then in 1982 the Assembly mandated theSecretary-General to begin a diplomatic effort to help find a solution tothe problem. Thereafter, while the question of East Timor remained onthe Assembly’s agenda, consideration of the item was deferred eachyear on the basis of the progress report submitted by the Secretary-General on his good offices. There continued to be annual discussion ofEast Timor in the Decolonization Committee, and amassacre by the Indo-nesian army inNovember 1991 stirred the Commission onHuman Rightsinto some activity. Asian governments had mostly supported Indonesia’sefforts to remove the item from the General Assembly agenda and soughtto protect Indonesia from criticism in the Commission on Human Rights.

The direct discussions between Indonesia and Portugal – but not theEast Timorese – which then took place under the auspices of theSecretary-General saw little progress for well over a decade. Soon afterhe took office, Secretary-General Kofi Annan decided to attempt to revi-talize the tripartite process, appointing Ambassador Jamsheed Marker ofPakistan as his Personal Representative, and the UN role became increas-ingly proactive. But it was the momentous political changes which beganto take place in Indonesia with the fall of President Suharto in May 1998which opened the way for significant progress on the diplomatic front.3

Suharto’s interim successor, President B.J. Habibie, first stated that hewas prepared to offer East Timor a wide-ranging autonomy. But while forIndonesia this special autonomy would be the final dispensation, Portugalwas willing to consider it only as an interim or transitional arrangementpending the eventual exercise by the East Timorese of their right to self-determination. As the mood of growing political freedom in Indonesia

126 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

was reflected in increasingly open East Timorese pro-independence acti-vism, Australia, the UN and others pressedHabibie to recognize that auto-nomy without an eventual act of self-determination could not achieve afinal settlement.While they and the East Timorese envisaged a transitionalperiod of several years, Habibie suddenly announced, on 29 January1999, that if the East Timorese did not accept the offer of autonomy hewould recommend separation of the territory from Indonesia.

This provided the basis for the tripartite negotiations to reach agree-ment, on 5May 1999, on a ‘popular consultation’ in East Timor to decidebetween autonomy and independence.4 Indonesia remained allergic tothe term referendum, but it was to be a one-person, one-vote ballot, con-ducted by the UN. The most difficult part of the negotiations was thesecurity arrangements for the consultation, which caused the UN increas-ing concern as pro-Indonesian militia established throughout East Timorby the Indonesian army went on the rampage against supporters of inde-pendence. Indonesia insisted on retaining responsibility for security, butagreed that this would be the responsibility of the Indonesian police,rather than the army, and that they would be advised by a small groupof UN police. The UN tried to insist upon the disarmament of all parami-litary groups and militia, together with the withdrawal of some Indone-sian forces and restrictions on the movement of others, matched bysimilar restraint by Falintil, the pro-independence guerrillas. But Indone-sia evaded clear commitments on these crucial issues.5

It was only after the 5 May Agreements were reached that discussionof East Timor opened up again in an intergovernmental forum, asthe Security Council proceeded to mandate UNAMET to conductthe ballot. The preceding negotiations had taken place in the closed tri-partite talks, and only a few governments – most notably Australia andthe United States – had been closely involved in supportive diplomacy.Since the UN role was requested by the Indonesian government, it wasinitially uncontroversial. The UN established a Support Group for EastTimor of over 30 member states, many of them Asian, to be briefedperiodically by Ambassador Marker and the Secretariat. A self-styled‘Core Group’ of five of the most closely engaged countries began tomeet to coordinate their support to the UN role: Australia, Japan, NewZealand, the UK and the United States.

The Popular Consultation: The Role of UNAMET

UNAMET faced a formidable challenge in carrying out its basic task ofregistering East Timorese voters and organizing a well-conductedballot, to be held on 8 August, in what many regarded as an unrealistic

THE UNITED NATIONS AND EAST TIMOR 127

timescale. This had been insisted upon by Indonesia: followingnationwide elections on 7 June, the new People’s Consultative Assemblywas expected to convene at the end of August, and Habibie wished to beready to present to it the outcome of the consultation. Rapid deploymentof UNAMET’s personnel was thus required, not only for the electoralpreparations, but also in the hope that the international presence wouldhave a positive impact on the security situation. UNAMET soonbecame aware that the militia violence of recent months had resultedin extensive internal displacement, as pro-independence villages hadbeen destroyed and their populations had fled to the interior.

The opening of registration was twice delayed. The first delay of threeweeks occurred because UNAMET could not be ready by the date of 22June required by the original timetable and because the security situationpatently did not conform to the requirements laid down by the Secretary-General. By the time of the second brief postponement, UNAMET wasready but its offices and staff had themselves been subjected to militiaattacks. Under heavy international pressure, Habibie ordered hisministers – including the Defence Minister and army chief GeneralWiranto – to East Timor to address the situation before registrationopened on 16 July.

The Secretary-General was never able ‘to ascertain, based on theobjective evaluation of the UN mission, that the necessary securitysituation exists for the peaceful implementation of the consultationprocess’, as required by the agreements before the start of registration.6

But the East Timorese were undeterred. Despite extensive continuing inti-midation, they turned out to register in numbers exceeding the UN’sexpectations, and by the end of the period even the great majority ofthe internally displaced did so, with around 450,000 registered (includingsome 13,000 at external centres outside East Timor).

This was far from the end of the security issue, however. TheAgreements required an equal opportunity for pro-independence andpro-autonomy supporters to disseminate their views. Indonesian govern-ment officials, police and army were to remain neutral, and the use ofpublic funds and government resources or recourse to pressure of officewere prohibited. In fact, massive government funds and resources werechannelled to the pro-autonomy groups, and indeed to the militia. Thebroad front of pro-independence parties, the CNRT (National Councilof Timorese Resistance), many of whose leaders had been forced intohiding by the violence which preceded UNAMET’s arrival, was onlywith difficulty able to reopen or open offices, and most of these had tobe closed again as the militia engaged in a series of attacks against themand against pro-independence students in the later stages of the campaign.


The date of the ballot itself was postponed by only 22 days, to 30August, and the electoral arrangements were ready – and positivelyassessed by the independent Electoral Commission appointed by theSecretary-General and by the large numbers of international observerswho had arrived in East Timor. But it was uncertain whether the securitysituation would or should allow it to go ahead. Voters had been displacedagain by the resurgence of militia violence, and yet greater violence wasthreatened on or after polling day. The reasons not to go forward wereunassailable in terms of Indonesia’s breaches of the agreements, andthis might have been politically the safer course of action for the UN:the UN had already allowed itself to be successfully manipulated by Indo-nesia in one scandalously bogus act of supposed self-determination inWest Irian in 1969, and could not afford to be party to a corruptedoutcome in East Timor.7 But the window of opportunity might close,with Habibie unlikely to retain the presidency and many in Jakartaready to take any opportunity to abort a process they had neversupported. The UN consulted with the CNRT throughout, and couldnot have proceeded against its wishes. Its leader Xanana Gusmao wasclear-sighted in his understanding of the risk and his mistrust of the Indo-nesian army, but he was also convinced that the East Timorese woulddefy intimidation to vote as they wished. The East Timorese had dis-played the strength of their own commitment to the popular consultationin their determination to register, and seemed thereby to have conferredupon the UN a moral responsibility to share the risk they themselves werewilling to take.

The UN and others had been undertaking numerous efforts to head offor limit the threatened violence. The East Timorese bishops convened apeace and reconciliation meeting with leading East Timorese from bothsides at the end of June. Thereafter the UN convened two smaller meet-ings which resulted in agreement that an East Timorese ConsultativeCommission would be launched the day after the ballot, with equal rep-resentation of pro-autonomy and pro-independence leaders whatever theoutcome, to help steer East Timor through post-ballot turbulence.UNAMET was also active in promoting communication between Falintil(the armed wing of the East Timorese resistance), the Indonesian armyand the pro-Indonesian militia, aimed at a mutual laying-down ofarms. Meanwhile bilateral pressure was applied by governments directlyto the Indonesian political and military leadership, seeking to containcurrent violence and to make it conscious of the cost to Indonesia’s inter-national relations were violence to intensify. Pressure was exerted, too, bythe Secretary-General, personally and through his representatives, and bythe Security Council in repeated statements and periodic summonses to


the Indonesian Permanent Representative to hear the Council’s concern.The UN and the diplomatic community believed – mistakenly as it turnedout – that this would lead the Indonesian government to check the vio-lence that would undoubtedly follow the expected vote for independence.The international community heaved a collective sigh of relief as the 30August poll was largely peaceful, with an extraordinary 98.6 per centof those registered casting their votes.

UNAMET had accomplished its electoral task in less than four monthsfrom the agreements, and only three weeks behind schedule. Its inter-national staffing totalled a little over 1,000, far below the numbers thatwere to follow in UNTAET. But their speed of deployment had beenimpressive, and particular credit was due to the UN Volunteersprogramme, which fielded the largest component, the district electoral offi-cers. The quality of staffing benefited from the fact that UNAMET was thefirst of the UN’s major missions launched in 1999 and was understood toface a difficult task and tight timetable. Electoral and public informationstaff with proven records from other missions were rapidly gatheredtogether. Equally important was the direct selection by the UNDepartmentof Political Affairs (UNDPA) of political officers with particular knowledgeof Indonesia and East Timor, and appropriate language skills.

The speed of the logistical deployment was made possible by the useof a trust fund that received immediate voluntary contributions. Thismeant that financial commitments did not have to await the authorizationof assessed contributions, and in-kind contributions from Australia over-came some potential procurement bottlenecks. Also, the UN’s logisticsbase in Italy had a substantial proportion of the necessary equipmentimmediately available for UNAMET. It remains to be seen whether asa result of implementation of recommendations of the Brahimi Report,such speed of deployment can become the norm.8

Asian countries were well represented within UNAMET. Bangladesh,Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic ofKorea and Thailand, as well as Australia and New Zealand, wererepresented among the 270 civilian police, while Bangladesh, Malaysiaand Thailand, as well as Australia and New Zealand, contributed tothe contingent of 50 military liaison officers. Many Asians were amongthe UN volunteers who served as district electoral officers: only Indiawas unwilling to release officials for a ballot on self-determination.Asian NGOs were also a strong presence among the international obser-vers. The dispatch of senior police officers had been closely debated inTokyo, as it marked the first return to UN peacekeeping since thekilling of a Japanese police officer in Cambodia in 1993. Japan was alsoamajor contributor to the voluntary funding of UNAMET, was amember


of the Core Group, and was diplomatically active in Jakarta, where itcarried the weight of Indonesia’s largest investor and trading partner.In the Security Council, by contrast, Asian andMuslim solidarity contrib-uted to weakening the pressure applied to Indonesia when evidencemounted of its failure to fulfil commitments on security and neutrality.

International Intervention After the Ballot: The Role of INTERFET

The announcement on 4 September 1999 that 78.5 per cent of the EastTimorese had voted for independence became the signal for pro-Indone-sian militia and the Indonesian army to launch a destructive rampagethroughout East Timor. As the scale of this violence became clear, thefirst diplomatic efforts were aimed at inducing Indonesia to rein it in.Member states varied in how quickly they reached the conclusion thatthis was not going to happen, but eventually coalesced around a jointcampaign to obtain Indonesian agreement to international intervention.Although the UN had planned for a blue-beret peacekeeping forceto take over from Indonesia after a gradual and peaceful withdrawal,it was quickly apparent that the only effective means of rapid interven-tion would be a UN-mandated ‘coalition of the willing’, which Australiawas willing to lead. Neither Australia nor any other country would inter-vene without Indonesian consent, or without authorization by the Secur-ity Council, where the support of China and Russia as well as of severalnon-permanent members would itself undoubtedly depend uponIndonesian acquiescence.

Between the ballot result and Habibie’s request to the UN for inter-vention on 12 September, an extraordinary crescendo of diplomaticpressure was applied against the government. It was led by the intensepersonal diplomacy of Kofi Annan, in close partnership with PrimeMinister John Howard of Australia. The Security Council adoptedthe Secretariat’s proposal of a Council mission to Jakarta and to EastTimor, where UNAMET was besieged in its Dili compound after thekilling of several of its East Timorese staff and attacks on internationals.This key UN initiative contributed to the dual purposes of persuadingIndonesia to accept international intervention and obtaining consensusin the Security Council. The United States joined in the pressure on Indo-nesia; and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund issuedunprecedented warnings to the economically vulnerable government.Fortuitously, the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’meeting was scheduled to take place in New Zealand from 9 September.In general, APEC has strongly resisted moving its agenda beyond strictlyeconomic issues, but Canada pressed successfully for a Special Ministerial


Meeting on East Timor to be held alongside the APEC meeting proper.Indonesia might have expected its Asian allies to absent themselvesfrom it, but nearly all participated in a strong demonstration of sharedregional concern. This was evident too in the statements of Asianmember states when the Security Council held an open meeting on 11September, and in their willingness to participate in a coalition shouldIndonesia consent.

Indonesia was strongly opposed to Australian leadership of aninternational force, wanting as much Asian participation as possibleand a force commander from an ASEAN country. Australia, however,considered it essential to have command of a force to which it wouldmake the largest contribution. Annan informed Indonesia that Australiawould command the force, though this might change in a later phase, buthe and Howard were working to maximize Asian participation. Thailandagreed to provide a contingent and the deputy force commander;Malaysia scaled down its participation when that post was earmarked,but the Philippines and the Republic of Korea confirmed majorcommitments. Singapore would send a medical company and Fiji alsobecame a troop contributor. The practice of coalition participantsbearing the costs themselves could have limited the force, but the trustfund, with Japan as the largest contributor, facilitated its establishment.

INTERFET, headed by Australian Maj.-Gen. Peter Cosgrove,established its presence in Dili on 20 September, and was ultimatelysuccessful in restoring security for the East Timorese. It succeeded inavoiding lethal clashes with Indonesian troops, though it was unable toprevent some killings and a final burst of property destruction by thewithdrawing Indonesians and their militia allies.9 Under its mandate,INTERFETwas to protect and support UNAMET until its tired remnantscould be safely redeployed. UNAMET’s knowledge of the territory wasvaluable to INTERFET and to the humanitarian operation now under-way, coordinated by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitar-ian Affairs (OCHA). Some of the UNAMET volunteers, originallyelectoral staff, became the first international officials to work with theCNRT to address the most immediate needs of a territory in which alladministration and most services had collapsed.

The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor: UNTAET

The 5May Agreements provided for a post-ballot UN role. If the vote wasagainst autonomy, authority would be transferred to the UN whichwould initiate a process of transition to independence. Throughout theUNAMET period, the rejection of the autonomy proposal and violence


after the ballot appeared increasingly likely. Political sensitivities towardsIndonesia and overstretched capacities at the UN Secretariat constrained,however, any meaningful planning and preparations for transition toindependence. Despite UNAMET’s pleas for maximum strengtheningof its uniformed components for the immediate aftermath of the ballot,only limited increases in the numbers of unarmed police and militaryliaison officers had been agreed with Indonesia, and no strengthening oftheir mandate (which remained strictly advisory). Moreover, the SecurityCouncil only authorized these increases when it was too late for them tobe in place by polling day. In any event they would not have been ableto affect the situation significantly. Humanitarian planning was alsoinadequate, despite UNAMET’s warnings. The UN was preparedneither to respond to the violence and devastation that followed theballot, nor for the need to rapidly establish a transitional administration.The planning team set up by the UNDPKO after the ballot was under-staffed and operated under tight time constraints.10 East Timorese invol-vement in the planning was marginalized, and other potentialcontributors to the process, in particular the UNDPA and the WorldBank, were only tangentially involved.

Security Council resolution 1272 (25 October) effectively entrustedUNTAET with the full administrative powers of a state, a robust peace-keeping role, the coordination of humanitarian assistance and economicdevelopment, and preparation for self-government.11 However, themandate left several key questions unanswered, including the roadmapleading to self-government, the relationship of the governance andpublic administration component to the future East Timorese govern-ment, and the mechanisms for consultation with the East Timorese.

UNTAET was structured into three components: military peacekeep-ing, governance and public administration, and humanitarian assistanceand emergency rehabilitation. They were integrated into a singleoperation, and Sergio Vieira de Mello, Special Representative of theSecretary-General, Transitional Administrator, and coordinator of UNagencies, funds and programmes in East Timor, had unprecedented auth-ority. The initial maximum authorized strength of UNTAET was 9,150military, 1,640 police, 1,670 international civilian personnel (including486 UN volunteers) and 1,905 East Timorese staff (mainly in administra-tive support functions). While UNTAET was a highly complex anddifficult undertaking, the UN in East Timor did not have to deal withthe additional complications of coordinating different regionalorganizations, as in Kosovo for example.

UNTAET faced enormous challenges when it came into being inOctober 1999. Many East Timorese were mourning the loss of their


relatives who died during the violence that followed the ballot, mostpeople were displaced, over a quarter of the population had fled orwere forced to flee the country, about 70 per cent of public buildingsand private housing had been destroyed, and all public administrationactivities had collapsed. As East Timor had not been an independentcountry, most state-level functions had to be built from scratch. At thesame time, security had been quickly restored by INTERFET, EastTimor was free of serious internal conflict and there was broad supportfor UNTAET from the East Timorese population and leadership. ButUNTAET got off to a slow start, as the UN’s complex recruitmentprocedures and the Secretariat’s understaffed personnel sections, underincreasing pressure from other new or expanding missions, failed to expe-dite the recruitment of well-qualified international staff. By the end ofJanuary 2000, only 351 international civilian staff had arrived. Thisput an unreasonable burden on the few staff in the mission and contrib-uted to UNTAET’s loss of credibility during its first months of operation.

UNTAET’s security responsibilities were: to provide external securitythrough its peacekeeping force; to maintain law and order with the UNpolice; to disarm and demobilize armed groups; to develop a defence fra-mework; and to set up an East Timorese police service. INTERFET’spresence gave the UN an adequate period to prepare and deploy a peace-keeping force, with several key contingents merely changing berets. Afterthe transfer of military responsibility to UNTAET in February 2000, thepeacekeeping force maintained security effectively and deterred militiaincursions from West Timor.12 Its peacekeeping record was notmatched, however, by its performance in other security-related areas.In particular in the early period, the performance of the UN police inexecutive policing was affected by slow recruitment and the mixedquality of the officers, insufficient induction training, and an inadequateunderstanding of the cultural context. The performance improved to acertain degree in the course of the operation.

Uncertainty about the status of Falintil – was it an illegal armed groupto be disarmed or the nucleus of a defence force? – and ambiguity overthe role of UNTAET in security sector reform delayed decisions aboutFalintil’s future, demobilization and defence force development. Facinggrowing Falintil discontent, fuelled by poor living conditions and anuncertain future, UNTAET belatedly developed a security sector strategyand decided to establish the East Timor Defence Force (FDTL), withmembers of Falintil as its core.13 Those not recruited were to be demobi-lized through the Falintil Reintegration Assistance Programme (FRAP).Reintegration was generally successful, but the selection process forboth the FDTL and the FRAP created resentment among those who


were excluded, contributing to a number of security incidents involvingformer Falintil members.

The development of the East Timor Police Service (ETPS) got off to aslow start, partly because no UNTAET staff members were initiallyassigned to this task. Early efforts focused on training individual EastTimorese police officers, while the institutional development of thepolice service was neglected. The establishment of a regulatory frame-work, organizational structure, institutional safeguards to protecthuman rights and provide civilian oversight, infrastructure, funding andthe provision of equipment did not receive adequate attention. As withthe defence force, the ETPS selection process remained amatter of contro-versy in independent Timor-Leste, in particular with regard to the recruit-ment of East Timorese who had served in the Indonesian police.

At independence on 20 May 2002, neither the ETPS nor the FDTLwere ready to take over full responsibility for public security and externaldefence. The institutions responsible for civilian oversight and support ofthe security sector, in particular the ministries responsible for the policeand defence force, the parliamentary committee for security and nationaldefence, and the office of the National Security Advisor, remained under-developed and weak.

Although UNTAET’s humanitarian operation confronted problemsfollowing the post-ballot violence, in particular the lack of preparations,the remoteness and difficult terrain of East Timor, it was generally effec-tive and successful during the first critical months.14 There was a rapidreturn of the displaced population, few serious incidents in the returneereintegration process, and no deaths related to epidemics or starvation.The humanitarian operation benefited from a generally favourablesecurity environment. Overall coordination at central and district levelsweakened, however, after the withdrawal of OCHA and the handoverto UNTAET’s humanitarian and emergency relief component in April2000. The successful humanitarian intervention was not paralleledfrom the outset by an effective strategic planning exercise for economicdevelopment. Long-term development and capacity-building objectiveswere neglected at the start and led to weaker results in generatingeconomic recovery and building up public administration.

Of the 250,000 East Timorese refugees in West Timor, over 125,000had repatriated by the end of 1999, some at significant risk to themselves.Intimidation by the militias distinctly slowed the pace of returnsduring the course of 2000, and the UN and the broader internationalcommunity were criticized for failing to pressure Indonesia to disbandthe militias: by the end of UNTAET some 30–40,000 refugees remainedin West Timor.


UNTAET’s governance mandate was of unprecedented breadth. Alllegislative and executive powers were concentrated in the TransitionalAdministrator – though East Timorese participation was to be providedthrough unspecified ‘mechanisms for dialogue’. The political environ-ment in East Timor was favourable and UNTAET enjoyed a high levelof popular support. UNTAET faced, however, several serious challenges.The mandate provided little guidance: the path to independence was notspelled out, a political timetable had not been provided, and the nature ofEast Timorese participation had not been defined. The lack of prepa-ration, slow recruitment and uneven quality of international staff, theimmediate challenges facing security, humanitarian assistance and emer-gency rehabilitation, and the ill-defined relationship to its East Timoreseinterlocutors, in particular the CNRT, meant that UNTAET was slowand tentative in developing and implementing a strategy for political tran-sition. As a result, the timescale for the transition process was short, civiceducation was limited, and new political parties had little time to estab-lish themselves. While the Constituent Assembly elections in August 2001and the presidential elections in April 2002 were well organized and tookplace without significant security-related incidents, separate parliamen-tary elections were virtually impossible during UNTAET’s mandate.The constitutional process was rushed and the political institutionswere relatively weak at the time of independence. While UNTAETsecured independence in a short period, its contribution to sustainableself-government and a democratic political environment was limited.15

In part, these shortcomings resulted from confusions arising overUNTAET’s dual role as the transitional administration and as amission tasked with preparing East Timor for democratic self-govern-ment. As a transitional administration, it had to conduct peacekeeping,humanitarian assistance and public services. Its primary constituencywas the UN Secretariat and the Security Council to which it was de jureaccountable. In its state-building, it had to construct a self-sustainableEast Timorese government and public administration, and oversee thetransition to independence. Its primary constituency in this role wasthe East Timorese people and leadership to whom UNTAET was atleast de facto accountable. The tension between the ‘logic of peacekeep-ing’ and the ‘logic of development’ remained a persistent predicamentthroughout UNTAET’s existence.16

In its role as the de facto government of East Timor, UNTAETinteracted with regional governments, in particular with neighbouringIndonesia and Australia. From the start, the East Timorese leadershipengaged in foreign relations through the CNRT and then through thetwo transitional governments. In October 2001, Jose Ramos-Horta was


sworn in as Minister for Foreign Affairs. UNTAET conducted nego-tiations with Australia on the Timor Sea treaty on behalf of East Timorand with senior East Timorese representation. Under the leadership ofthe then CNRT President, Xanana Gusmao, significant steps weretaken in normalizing the relationship with Indonesia. However, nego-tiations on a range of issues including the demarcation of the borderwere not concluded during UNTAET’s term, and its authority to rep-resent East Timor externally was limited, despite the extraordinarilybroad legal powers available to it.

The same problems that affected the process of political transitionalso undermined the establishment of a sustainable and effective publicadministration. This was undercut by the lack of early planning, failureto develop a coherent strategy, pressure to deliver short-term results,slow recruitment and uneven quality of international staff, UNTAET’sambiguous relationship to the CNRT and the World Bank, inadequatecivil service recruitment and training, and late ‘Timorization’. Theabsence of a common understanding of capacity and institution-building,and the diverse approaches taken by different departments led to variableperformance. Some sectors, such as health, did much better than others,such as power.17 While most of the key public institutions were estab-lished, some important institutions were not in place, or were incompleteand weak when UNTAET concluded. The basic infrastructure of a func-tioning civil service – clear operating procedures, regulatory frameworksand essential office systems – was not set up, undermining the post-independence efficiency and effectiveness of public administration.

The development of the administration of justice was seriouslyinadequate in the transition period, despite being considered a priorityby the 1999 Joint Assessment Mission led by the World Bank, withEast Timorese and UN participation. UNTAET’s approach was piece-meal; there was no coordinated or comprehensive strategy to developthe rule of law sector, and funding was inconsistent and inadequate.The failure to develop a sustainable and effective administration ofjustice had negative repercussions on Timor-Leste’s subsequent develop-ment. The failure to design a coordinated strategy for the interdependentdevelopment and reform of the entire rule of law sector – police,courts, prisons, public prosecutors, the private legal profession, justiceministry, legislature and the body of laws – is an oft-repeated but bynow inexcusable mistake in post-conflict peacebuilding.18

The creation of UNTAET was preceded not merely by the violence ofSeptember 1999 but by a 24-year history of human rights abuse, withensuing demands that the perpetrators be brought to justice. TheSecretary-General insisted that those responsible for serious crimes


following the ballot be held accountable.19 The Commission on HumanRights established a commission of inquiry, which concluded that theUnited Nations had a special responsibility to bring justice in responseto the human rights abuses during 1999.20 There was, however, littleclarity about how UNTAET should deal with the issue. Some East Timor-ese initially called for the establishment of an ad hoc international crim-inal tribunal. Yet the vulnerability of the political situation in Indonesia, ageneral unwillingness to confront the Indonesian government, as wellas a growing reluctance by the Security Council to revisit the model ofan ad hoc international criminal tribunal, meant that however remoteIndonesia’s intention or ability to provide justice using its own judicialsystem, the international community was not prepared to declare thisto be the case. The Commission on Human Rights affirmed thatprimary responsibility for bringing perpetrators to justice rested withthe national judicial systems.21 Consequently, instead of one inter-national tribunal, two separate domestic jurisdictions – a weak, disinter-ested Indonesian and a future East Timorese one – were responsible forthe investigation and prosecution of those crimes. This provedinadequate, especially the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Court in Indonesia,where those with the greatest degree of responsibility live. Not only werethe trials before the Ad Hoc Court an overall failure, the Indonesian auth-orities also failed to provide assistance to the investigation and prosecu-tion of serious crimes in East Timor.22

In contrast to its approach to the administration of justice in general,UNTAET relied to a much greater extent on international involvement indealing with serious crimes, due to political sensitivities, lack of EastTimorese expertise and the UN’s specific responsibility to bring tojustice those responsible for the violence in 1999.23 A Serious CrimesInvestigation Unit comprising international civilian and police investi-gators was established in April 2000. Two months later, a specializedprosecution unit for serious crimes was created. From the beginning,the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit was plagued with staffing andmanagement problems, and progress in the investigations was slow. Inthe second half of 2001, the investigation and the prosecution teamswere formally integrated, thereby improving the quality of investigations.UNTAET created special panels for serious crimes at the Dili DistrictCourt in June 2000. They remained part of the newly establishedregular court system and comprised international and East Timoresejudges. Recruitment delays and management problems prevented morethan one panel from functioning. The judges had no prior experience ininternational criminal law and lacked administrative support. Inadequateresources remained a major issue, especially the insufficient number of


qualified interpreters. Initially no international legal representation wasprovided, and adequate defence for those accused of serious crimesremained a problem for the entire UNTAET period.

Following a decision of the CNRT and with the support of theUNTAET Human Rights Unit, a Commission for Reception, Truth andReconciliation was established in July 2001 and commenced workingshortly after independence. Headed by seven East Timorese Commis-sioners, it has three distinct functions: to seek truth about human rightsviolations between 1974 and 1999, to facilitate community reconcilia-tion, and to report to the government on its work. It is intended tocomplement serious crimes prosecutions, not to replace them.24

Regional countries generally played a positive role within UNTAETproviding military, police and civilian personnel and resources. FollowingINTERFET’s departure, Australia continued to provide the largest mili-tary contingent to the military component, and many countries in theregion contributed military personnel, including Japan (see KatsumiIshizuka’s article in this volume). Force commanders were from Thailandand the Philippines, but although Southeast Asian nationals also heldsenior civilian positions, UNTAET was criticized for being an ‘Easternmission with a Western face’.25 Asian, and also Lusophone, countrieswere underrepresented among UNTAET’s civilian staff, though theimbalance reflected general recruitment limitations rather thanrecruitment policy.

Independence and After: The Mandate and Beginnings of UNMISET

In preparing for the period after independence, UNTAET faced a doubletask. It had to plan for a future international presence and prepare fortransition to an independent East Timorese government. Planning for aUN successor mission began early. While an Integrated Mission TaskForce was established in New York, the bulk of the planning wasconducted in East Timor. In his January 2001 report to the SecurityCouncil, the Secretary-General stated that an independent East Timorwould require not only substantial international support in the areas ofpeacekeeping and police, but also international civilian advisors invarious functions of public administration. The member states requiredconsiderable persuasion to overcome their resistance to funding such‘developmental’ activities from the assessed peacekeeping budget. Ulti-mately, the Security Council agreed to 100 posts that were considered‘critical for the viability of the public administration and the stability ofEast Timor’.26 This was far too inadequate to support a fragile EastTimor administration, especially as, by early 2003, bilateral support by


donors funded fewer than half of the additional 200 posts UNTAET haddetermined were critical to support poverty reduction and development.

Detailed and comprehensive planning continued during the remainderof UNTAET’s term, enabling the Secretary-General to include a detailedimplementation plan in his final report to the Security Council on 17 April2002. The Security Council endorsed the plan in its resolution establish-ing UNMISET. It consisted of three programmes, each specifying objec-tives, timelines, resource requirements, benchmarks and handoverarrangements. UNMISET would initially retain responsibility for exter-nal defence and public security in a sovereign East Timor, handing overgradually to the East Timorese defence force and police as they reachedoperational capacity. The East Timorese leadership only reluctantlyagreed not to insist upon immediate authority over the police.

Less attention was paid to the transition to an independent govern-ment. A transition team was established in August 2001. At times, com-munication between East Timorese and international members of theteam was tenuous, though demands on the members grew steadily asthe date of independence drew nearer. The team failed to accomplishtasks relating to the transfer of residual functions from UNTAET andthe creation of new bodies, such as civilian oversight of the police andlegal policy development.

The mandating of UNMISET came late, on 17 May, only three daysprior to its establishment, which made it difficult to manage a seamlesstransition, particularly in terms of recruitment. Similarly, KamaleshSharma was designated as the new Special Representative of theSecretary-General only six weeks before independence, which did notallow him to participate in the planning. He arrived in the mission areaonly two days before the handover.

The government of Timor-Leste faced daunting challenges. UNTAET’sshortcomings affected the functioning of the entire public sector. Theadministration of justice was barely operational. In the security sector, con-troversies over the selection procedures for the defence force and the policeservice continued; rioting and excessive force by the police in Dili on 4December 2002 revealed significant shortcomings in both the internationaland East Timorese police components and in the operation of their unifiedcommand structure. Reports of militia infiltrations also led the EastTimorese to question the efficiency of the peacekeeping force.

Three Lessons

Overall, the UN’s performance was mixed. Many lessons are to belearned in the various fields of the UN’s involvement, and a number of


assessments both within the UN and by other organizations have beenconducted since UNTAET’s departure.27 In the context of Asian securityand peace operations, three areas should be highlighted: peace operationplanning and preparations, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the roleof regional actors.

Planning and Preparations

The quality and effectiveness of the UN’s planning and preparations forpeace operation activities varied over the course of its involvement inEast Timor. The tight schedule between the 5 May 1999 Agreementsand the August ballot meant that there was little time to prepare forUNAMET, deploy the peace operation and organize the ballot. Thespeed of staff deployment was nevertheless impressive. The UN’s logisticsbase in Italy had the necessary equipment immediately available. The useof a voluntary trust fund and in-kind contributions from Australia helpedto overcome procurement shortages. UNAMET also benefited from beingfirst in the surge of missions in 1999. However, in response to the post-ballot violence, it was quickly apparent that it would take too long toassemble and deploy a peacekeeping force under UN command. Theuse of a Security Council-authorized multinational force proved to beparticularly effective. Between the arrival of the first INTERFET troopsfive days after the Security Council mandate of 15 September and earlyNovember, security had generally been restored throughout the entireterritory.

Overall planning for independence was cursory. The limitedcapacities of the UN Secretariat were fully stretched in the second halfof 1999, as backup for UNAMET absorbed most available resourcesand several peace operations were launched or restructured, in Kosovo,for example. Political sensitivities towards Indonesia prevented anysignificant ‘worst-case scenario’ planning, which might have led to thepre-positioning of resources. After the ballot, planning for a UN transi-tional administration faced extreme time constraints. East Timoreseinvolvement in the planning was marginal and other international organi-zations were only tangentially involved. These planning and preparationdeficits meant that UNTAET worked under extremely adverse conditionsduring its first months.

By contrast, planning for UNMISET began early and resulted in thedevelopment of a detailed and comprehensive mandate implementationplan, which was endorsed by the Security Council without significantchanges. Preparations for the transition from the UN transitionaladministration to an independent East Timorese government were,


however, inadequate, and the government faced tremendous challenges atindependence.

The UN Secretariat’s planning capacity should be further strength-ened, particularly when it has to operate in politically sensitive circum-stances. Political consultations and negotiations should be clearlyseparated from the responsibilities for strategic planning and operationalpreparations. Outsourcing planning functions to specialized non-UNorganizations should be considered.

Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

By its nature, peacebuilding, especially where it involves the constructionof a new state, is a highly complex undertaking and expertise is limited.While the peace operations in East Timor did generally well in the areasof electoral assistance, traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian assistanceand emergency rehabilitation, UNTAET consistently faced problems ininstitution building and governance tasks. UNTAET often applied atraditional peacekeeping logic to address peacebuilding tasks. Peace-building, however, requires a rather different set of strategies, methods,resources and skills:

. Peacekeeping is an activity; peacebuilding a project.

. Peacekeeping is operational, technical and focuses on quickresults; peacebuilding is based on long-term planning and strategicmanagement, and seeks sustainable outcomes.

. Peacekeeping requires direct and outside intervention; peacebuildingdevelops local capacity.

. Peacekeeping is guided by impartiality and equidistance fromcontending parties; peacebuilding requires an in-depth understandingof the socio-political situation, is participatory and actively engageslocal stakeholders.

This characterization may be oversimplified; nevertheless it indicateswhy a department established primarily to conduct military peacekeepingstruggles to supervise peacebuilding. As the UNDPKO seems certain tocontinue to be involved in peacebuilding, its capacity to do so must bereinforced, in particular its political analysis, institution building,capacity development and project management capacities. In addition,other UN agencies, funds and programmes should be more involvedin peacebuilding activities and given distinct responsibilities even whenthe UNDPKO serves as the lead agency in an operation. Outsourcinginstitution-building activities to specialized non-UN organizationsshould be seriously considered.


Role of Regional Actors

While Asian countries were generally reluctant to put political pressureon Indonesia prior to the ballot, their contribution to the peace opera-tions was positive and significant. They contributed major military con-tingents to all the missions and were generally well represented amongthe police staff. Civilian staff from Asian and Lusophone countrieswere, however, underrepresented in UNTAET because of difficulties inattracting staff members from these countries.

To a significant extent, also, UNTAET’s performance suffered from ashortage of ‘peacebuilders’ with appropriate experience and/or under-standing of the cultural and historical context, with the latter givenlittle weight in recruitment. UNTAET made several experiments withspecialized national contingents to address these shortcomings, withvaried results. The Australian technical input into the Department ofFinance’s Budget Office has generally been assessed positively. The exper-iment with a Philippines UN police contingent in Baucau received mixedreviews. Shortcomings in understanding East Timor’s situation couldhave been addressed by more training in the socio-historical situation,and by recruiting more staff from countries with similar cultural orlinguistic backgrounds.

A principal advantage of UN operations over regional interventions istheir universal legitimacy. Regional actors need also to consider nationalinterests which may affect the assistance they provide. On the other hand,peace operations require regional knowledge and understanding of localcontexts, particularly when the mandate includes peacebuilding responsi-bilities. UN peace operations would clearly benefit from a more extensiveuse of regional expertise in peacebuilding activities.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The views expressed in this essay are solely those of the authors and donot represent the official views of the United Nations. Ian Martin isresponsible for the first three sections of this essay, which draw uponhis Self-Determination in East Timor: the United Nations, the Ballotand International Intervention (International Peace Academy OccasionalPaper, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). Alexander Mayer-Rieckh isresponsible for the sections on UNTAET and UNMISET.

NOTES

1. For a detailed account of the events in 1975, see Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalismand Colonialism, St. Lucia: Queensland University Press, 1978. For a comprehensive


review of East Timor’s history and resistance struggle, see James Dunn, East Timor: ARough Passage to Independence, NSW: Longueville, 4th edn, 2004; John G. Taylor,East Timor: the Price of Freedom, London: Zed Books, 1999.

2. For an account of the resistance movement from its leader’s perspective, see SarahNiner (ed.), To Resist Is to Win: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusmao, Richmond(Aus): Aurora Books, 2000.

3. For details, see Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliverance. The Inside Story ofEast Timor’s Fight for Freedom, Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2002. See alsothe main negotiator’s own account, Jamsheed Marker, East Timor: A Memoir of theNegotiations for Independence, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003.

4. For the text of the agreement, see ‘Question of East Timor. Report of the SecretaryGeneral’, UN Doc A/53/951-S/1999/513 (5 May 1999).

5. On the security aspect of the negotiations, see Tamrat Samuel, ‘East Timor: The Path toSelf-Determination’, in Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester (eds), FromPromise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Con-flict, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp.197–230.

6. ‘Question of East Timor’ (note 4 above), para.4.7. See John Saltford, The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua:

The Anatomy of Betrayal, 1962–1969, London: Routledge Curzon, 2003.8. See ‘Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All

Their Aspects: Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations’, UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000/809 (21 Aug. 2000).

9. On INTERFET’s intervention see Bob Breen, Mission Accomplished: The AustralianDefence Force Participation in the International Force, East Timor, Sydney: Allen &Unwin, 2001.

10. As UNTAETwas to include a large military peacekeeping component, lead responsibil-ity for the mission passed from the UNDPA to the UNDPKO.

11. Security Council Resolution 1272, UN Doc S/RES/1272 (1999).12. On the peacekeeping force and the security sector, see Mike G. Smith, Peacekeeping in

East Timor: The Path to Independence, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002.13. Centre for Defence Studies, Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security

Sector Reform for East Timor, London: King’s College, 2000.14. On the humanitarian operation, see Chris Hurford and Margareta Wahlstrohm,

OCHA and the East Timor Crisis, 1999: An Independent Study for OCHA,New York: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2001.

15. For the debate, see Astri Suhrke, ‘Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders: Dilemmas of theUN in East Timor’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.8, No.4, Winter 2001, pp.1–20;Jarat Chopra, ‘Building State Failure in East Timor’, Development and Change,Vol.33, No.5, 2000, pp.979–1000; Simon Chesterman, East Timor in Transition:From Conflict Prevention to State-Building, New York: International PeaceAcademy, 2001.

16. See Joel C. Beauvais, ‘Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in EastTimor’, New York University Journal of International Law & Policy, Vol.33, No.4,2001, pp.74–89; Astri Suhrke, ‘Reason and Reconstruction: the Multiple Logics ofUNTAET’, 2001 (unpublished manuscript).

17. On the World Bank and international efforts to build an East Timorese public admin-istration, see Sarah Cliffe and Klaus Rohland, ‘East Timor’s Reconstruction: Successes,Problems and Trade-Offs’, CPR Working Paper No. 2, Washington, DC: World Bank,Nov. 2002.

18. On administration of justice, see Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, ‘Collapse and Reconstructionof a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor’, Amer-ican Journal of International Law, Vol.95, 2001, p.46; Sidney Jones, ‘East Timor: TheTroubled Path to Independence’, in Alice Henkin (ed.), Honoring Human Rights UnderInternational Mandates: Lessons from Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, Washington,DC: The Aspen Institute, 2003, pp.115–46; Suzannah Linton, ‘Rising from the


Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Justice System in East Timor’, Melbourne UniversityLaw Review, Vol.25, 2001, pp.122–80.

19. ‘Question of East Timor’ (see n.4 above), para.42.20. ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-

General’, UN Doc A/54/726-S/2000/59 (31 Jan. 2000), para.47.21. ‘Resolution of the Commission on Human Rights’, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1999/S-4/1

(27 Sept. 1999), para.4.22. See Amnesty International, ‘Indonesia and Timor-Leste: International responsibility for

justice’, AI Index ASA 03/001/2003, accessed at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA030012003. See also International Center for Transitional Justice, Intendedto Fail. The Trials Before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta, New York:ICTJ, 2003, accessed at: www.ictj.org/asia/easttimor.asp.

23. On the serious crimes process see items in n.18 above. See also Suzannah Linton, ‘Cam-bodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice’, CriminalLaw Forum, Vol.12, 2001, 185–246; Suzannah Linton, ‘New Approaches to Inter-national Justice in Cambodia and East Timor’, Review of the International Committeeof the Red Cross, Vol.84, No.845, 2002, pp.93–119; and Judicial System MonitoringProgramme, ‘Justice in Practice: Human Rights in Court Administration’, Nov. 2001,accessed at www.jsmp.minihub.org/resources.

24. Information on the commission and its proceedings is at: www.easttimor-reconciliatio-n.org.

25. Mergawati Zulfakar, ‘Malaysian Quits as UNTAET Chief-of-Staff’, Kuala LumpurStar, 9 Jan. 2002, accessed at: globalpolicy.org/security/issues/etimor/2002/0109resign.htm.

26. ‘Security Council Resolution 1410’, UN Doc S/RES/1410 (2002), para.2(a).27. Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Center, Conference on the UN in East Timor: Lessons

Learned, Montreal, 16 May 2002; UNITAR–IPS–JIIA, Conference on UNTAET:Debriefing and Lessons, United Nations University, Tokyo, 16–18 Sept. 2002; Inter-national Peace Academy, ‘You, the People: Transitional Administration, State-Buildingand the United Nations, Conference Report, New York: IPA, 18–19 October 2002’,accessed at www.ipacademy.org; and King’s College London,A Review of Peace Oper-ations: A Case for Change, London: King’s College, 2003, pp.215–324, also atipi.sspp.kcl.ac.uk/peaceoperationsreview.


The United Nations and East Timor: from self-determination to state-building

Documents

Transcript of The United Nations and East Timor: from self-determination to state-building