"The Unique Role of “Constructive Alternativism” in the Creation of Useful Philosophical...

VOL. III No. 1 2006

C O N T E N T

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

PATRICIO BRICKLE, Heidegger and Zubiri: A New Foundation for Politology.. . .ERIC GILDER, The Unique Role of “ConstructiveAlternativism” in the Creationof Philosophical Knowledge .............................................................................

ADELA DELIU, International Relations and the Present Ethics of Power ...........ANDRÉ TOSEL, The Globalization as Philosophical Object ...............................

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

HENRIETAANIªOARA ªERBAN, The Educated Women in the Public Eye .....RODICA IAMANDI, The “Cult of Personality”..........................................................

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES

DANIELA IONESCU, Romania and the Common Agricultural Policy ................ZHU GUICHANG, A Comparasion of the European Model and the PolicyASEAN Way: Is there a third way of regionalism for the East Asiancooperation?.......................................................................................................

LUCIAN JORA, The History and the Policy of Reconciliation ............................ANA BAZAC, The Russian Energy and Europe. Perspectives ............................STANISLAV SECRIERU, Russia’s Foreign Policy under Putin: “The CIS Project”Renewed ............................................................................................................

ISPRI’s ACADEMIC LIFE ....................................................................................

BOOK REVIEWS...................................................................................................

THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS................................................................................

ROMANIAN REVIEW OF POLITICALSCIENCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., III, 1, p. 1–190, Bucharest, 2006.

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TOME III No. 1 2006

S O M M A I R E

PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE

PATRICIO BRICKLE, Heidegger et Zubiri: une nouvelle institution pour lapolitologie ..........................................................................................................

ERIC GILDER, L’“Alternativisme Constructif” dans la création de la conaissancephilosophique ....................................................................................................

ADELA DELIU, Les relations internationales et l’éthique actuelle du pouvoir....ANDRÉ TOSEL, La mondialisation comme object philosophique? .....................

SOCIOLOGIE POLITIQUE

HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, Les femmes bien élevé dans la perceptionpublique .............................................................................................................

RODICA IAMANDI, “Le cult de la personalité” dans la Roumanie ....................

RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET ÉTUDES EUROPÉEN

DANIELA IONESCU, La Roumanie et la Politique Agricole Commune .............ZHU GUICHANG, Une comparasion du modèle européen et du voie ASEAN ...LUCIAN JORA, L’histoire et la politique de la reconciliation .............................ANA BAZAC, L’energie (russe), l’Europe et les perspectives ..............................STANISLAV SECRIERU, La politique étrangère du Russie sous Putin:le “projet CIS” ...................................................................................................

LA VIE ACADEMIQUE DE L’ISPRI ...................................................................

NOTES DE LECTURE ..........................................................................................

EVENEMENTS ACADEMIQUES ........................................................................

REVUE ROUMAINE DE SCIENCESPOLITIQUES ET RELATIONS

INTERNATIONALES


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HEIDEGGER Y ZUBIRI: REFUNDACION DE LA POLITOLOGIA1

PATRICIO BRICKLE

Las siguientes consideraciones sólo intentan plantear un problema sobre elcual hoy día abunda una infinita literatura liviana y sobre el cual, asimismo, nonos hemos detenido a pensar. El problema es averiguar si es posible desarrollaruna “política” a la luz de los nuevos hallazgos filosóficos, más concretamente quépodrían aportar las filosofías de esos dos gigantes del pensamiento como los sonHeidegger2 y Zubiri. Hay una tesis que quisiera sostener desde el inicio de esteensayo y es que no es posible hacer ciencia política si no se sabe filosofía políticay, del mismo modo, no se puede hacer filosofía política si no se sabe filosofía.

Grandes filósofos no ha habido en la historia de la filosofía más de una decena.Parménides, Heráclito, Platón, Aristóteles, San Agustín, Santo Tomás de Aquino,Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger,Wittgenstein y Zubiri. Perdóneseme que sea tan cortante y si he pecado de algunaimportante omisión, pero la historia de la filosofía está constituida fundamentalmentepor estas figuras que marcaron una pauta en la reflexión filosófica. Claro está,ha habido muchos otros grandes filósofos, pero no hay duda alguna de que encada uno de los nombrados se constituyó y concentró todo el saber de sumomento y, por sobre todo, produjeron un vuelco en la historia de la filosofía, leimprimieron su propio sello e inauguraron nuevas formas de pensar3.

No quisiera entrar en más detalles sobre este punto, sino destacar que Heideggery Zubiri son parte de esa potente tradición filosófica. Parece que en el caso deHeidegger habría un consenso mayor que en el de Zubiri, sobre todo porque ésteúltimo filósofo es conocido en habla hispana, no así en el mundo alemán, francés,inglés o italiano.

Pues bien, el filósofo Jorge Eduardo Rivera4 publicó hace un par de años unlibro titulado Heidegger y Zubiri, cuyo contenido lo constituyen no una merareunión de artículos, sino que todos ellos conforman una orgánica propia y unainspiración común que es el ser en cuanto tal.

El libro está divido en dos partes. En la primera parte, Rivera se introduce enalgunos problemas fundamentales de la ontología de Heidegger. Allí, encontramosescritos como: La verdad implícita en Ser y tiempo; Jemeinigkeit; Zunächst undZumeist; Bewandtnis; El espacio en Ser y tiempo; Reversión de la metafísica; Elsilencio originario en el pensar de Heidegger y, finalmente, Heidegger y la escuchadel silencio originario.

POL IT ICAL PH ILOSOPHY


En la segunda parte, Rivera explora algunos tópicos de la metafísica deZubiri. Allí, Rivera nos ofrece textos como: La crítica de Zubiri a Heidegger; Elorigen de la filosofía en Xavier Zubiri; Acerca de la Inteligencia sentiente enXavier Zubiri; El hombre y Dios: un curso de Xavier Zubiri; Heidegger y Zubiri.Esbozo de un camino y, finalmente, Realidad y aprehensión de realidad en XavierZubiri. Ensayo de probación.No es mi propósito hablar del contenido de ese libro, sino destacar una idea

que Rivera dice en el prólogo de ese texto, y es que su objetivo allí no ha sidotender un puente entre ambos pensadores y, por lo tanto, es una tarea pendiente.Yo quisiera asumir ese desafío — en estricto rigor, no el de tender un puente,sino de repensar, simplemente, lo propuesto por esos dos filósofos — desde unaactividad que está más presente que nunca en la historia del hombre. Me refieroa la política.

1. Heidegger, Zubiri: la política

La importancia de los filósofos de los que se ocupa Rivera, demás está decirsu importante aporte a la historia de la filosofía, podemos encontrarla en lasáreas — entre otras áreas, por supuesto — en las cuales, algunos nos estamosdesarrollando. Específicamente, en mi caso, la política. Y para ser más exacto ala filosofía política y a lo que se suele llamar hoy día “ciencia política”. ¿Qué tieneque ver la ciencia política con Heidegger y Zubiri?

Aparentemente, la ciencia política tiene ya ganado un espacio en el saber. Sinembargo, ¿es esto efectivamente así, si la miramos a la luz de la filosofía? Noquiero entrar en detalles, pero sí arrojar algunas ideas.

Heidegger escribió en 1927, Sein und Zeit. Sein und Zeit sólo es comparableen magnitud a la Kritik der reiner Vernunft de Kant o a la Phänomenologie desGeistes de Hegel, al decir de F.-W. Von Herrmann.

Como se sabe Heidegger tuvo como hilo conductor de su investigación dieSeinsfrage. Ese fue su norte y fin. Auf einen Stern zugehen... nos dice Heideggeren un bello texto titulado Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. Esa única estrella —para Heidegger — fue el ser, qué quiere decir ser, qué significa el ser en generaly en todas sus formas.

De este libro de Heidegger quiero referirme, en particular, al parágrafo 4.Luego de exponer Heidegger, en el parágrafo 1, la necesidad de reiterar lapregunta por el sentido del ser, Heidegger nos señalará que hay una preeminenciaóntica de esta pregunta (parágrafo 2) y en el parágrafo 3 nos argumentará quehay no sólo una preeminencia óntica de la pregunta por el ser, sino también unapreeminencia ontológica de la pregunta por el ser.

A continuación, en el parágrafo 4 — parágrafo que me interesa destacar —,Heidegger nos dice que una ciencia adquiere el estatus de tal cuando pone encrisis sus fundamentos. En época de Heidegger, la matemática, la biología, lafísica, etc. estaban experimentando una crisis de o en sus fundamentos. Y lafilosofía también estaba viviendo su propia crisis con las investigaciones delpropio Heidegger. Dice en Ser y tiempo:

4 PATRICIO BRICKLE 2

“El verdadero ‘movimiento’ de las ciencias se produce por la revisión máso menos radical (aunque no transparente para sí misma) de los conceptosfundamentales. El nivel de una ciencia se determina por su mayor o menorcapacidad de experimentar una crisis en sus conceptos fundamentales. En estascrisis inmanentes de las ciencias se tambalea la relación de la investigaciónpositiva con las cosas interrogadas mismas. Las diversas disciplinas muestran hoypor doquier la tendencia a establecer nuevos fundamentos para su investigación.”5

Pues bien, cuando una ciencia pone en crisis sus fundamentos toca la filosofía,porque es ella la actitud humana que se ocupa de los fundamentos no sólo de estaciencia o de aquella otra ciencia en particular, sino del fundamento de todo loque hay. Es su síno6.

El análisis que realiza Heidegger es el siguiente: primero habría una ontologíafundamental que es la pregunta por el ser; segundo, habrían unas ontologíasregionales que son todas aquellas “filosofías” parceladas, esto es, filosofía política,filosofía de las ciencias, filosofía del derecho, etc.; en otras palabras, todas lasparcelas de la realidad de que se ocupa la filosofía que no sean en rigor la cienciaque se busca (zetoúmene epistéme); finalmente, y tercero, estarían las cienciasparticulares, las ciencias en general, las ciencias positivas, las ciencias experimentales,etc. Añade Heidegger:

“La pregunta por el ser apunta, por consiguiente, a determinar las condicionesa priori de la posibilidad no sólo de las ciencias que investigan el ente en cuantotal o cual [que serían las ciencias positivas, y, en nuestro caso, la cienciapolítica], y que por ende se mueven ya siempre en una comprensión del ser, sinoque ella apunta también a determinar la condición de posibilidad de lasontologías mismas [que sería la filosofía política, por ejemplo] que anteceden alas ciencias ónticas y las fundan. Toda ontología, por rico y sólidamente articuladoque sea el sistema de categorías de que dispone, es en el fondo ciega y contrariaa su finalidad más propia si no ha aclarado primero suficientemente el sentidodel ser y no ha comprendido esta aclaración como su tarea fundamental... Lainvestigación ontológica misma, rectamente comprendida, le da a la preguntapor el ser su primacía ontológica, más allá de la mera reanudación de una tradiciónvenerable y de la profundización en un problema hasta ahora opaco.”7

Heidegger durante toda su vida pensante no hace más que ontología fundamental,su ocupación no es más ni menos que la pregunta por el sentido del ser engeneral. Entonces, a mi juicio, en nuestro siglo se produjo una disociación entrela ontología fundamental, las ontologías regionales y las ciencias particulares; seprodujo un vacío discursivo — si se me permite decirlo así — entre esos trestipos de conocimientos — en razón de que el gran filósofo que fue Heidegger nose ocupó de ningunas de esas ontologías, como sí había acontecido en latradición filosófica, por ejemplo, con Aristóteles, Platón o Descartes — que sóloha sido llenado por los trabajos filosóficos de Zubiri. Me atrevería a decir, queZubiri es el puente entre la gran tradición metafísica de occidente y las cienciaspositivas todas, en su búsqueda de la totalidad del saber.

Zubiri es un filósofo que reflexionó a partir de los problemas inmediatamentepresentes, a partir de su época, a partir de nuestra historia actual que se ha

3 HEIDEGGER Y ZUBIRI: REFUNDACION DE LA POLITOLOGIA 5

caracterizado por el dominio exacerbado de las ciencias positivas y por laparcelación de la filosofía. La labor que realizó Zubiri fue tremenda puesto quesu trabajo consistió en ir desde las ciencias positivas a la ontología fundamental(Heidegger) y desde la ontología fundamental hacia las ontologías regionales(como llama Heidegger, en Ser y tiempo, a la antropología filosófica, la filosofíadel derecho, la filosofía de la historia, etc.). Me explico: Zubiri asciende a lapregunta por el ser planteada por Heidegger en Ser y tiempo con todo el saberpositivo de su momento y respondió a ella con un macizo libro titulado Sobre laesencia (1962). Este libro de Zubiri es, a mi juicio, su respuesta a la preguntafundamental de Heidegger en Ser y tiempo.

Es interesante observar el camino intelectual que desarrolla Zubiri a lo largode su reflexión filosófica. El tema que le tuvo en vilo — en una primera etapa— fue la antropología filosófica. Pues bien, mientras Zubiri reflexionaba sobretemas antropológicos concluye que el hombre es una estructura sustantiva, nosustancial, y que esta sustantividad se caracteriza por ser un estado constructoque consiste, a su vez, en ser una unidad primaria, en donde sus notas— él nohabla de propiedades — son coherentes entre sí y no inherentes a una sustancia.Zubiri evita hablar de sustancia, porque este concepto tiene su peso en el pensamientoaristotélico y acuña la palabra sustantividad para describir la estructura propia dela realidad. Entonces Zubiri pensó que esta idea metafísica necesitaba de unamayor explicación y pensó en ponerla a modo de apéndice en su futuro librosobre antropología filosófica. Sin embargo, el resultado, finalmente, fue queaquello que sólo se pensó como un apéndice para analizar “metafísicamente” eltema antropológico, terminó convirtiéndose en su pensamiento metafísico. Sulibro Sobre la esencia fue concebido, en un principio, como explicitación de unconcepto o categoría de sus investigaciones antropológicas.

Pero Zubiri no se queda sólo en la respuesta metafísica, sino que su reflexiónla trasladará hacia otros campos del saber. Y allí Zubiri realizó una labor titánica,puesto que comenzó a desarrollar las “ontologías regionales”. Su pensamiento alrespecto ha quedado plasmado en varios libros. Estos libros son auténticasfilosofías parceladas, partículares, por así decirlo. Zubiri escribió, por ejemplo,un libro sobre antropología filosófica llamado Sobre el hombre8. Reflexionótambién sobre cosmología o filosofía de las ciencias, plasmando sus ideas en doslibros titulados: Espacio, Tiempo, Materia9 y Estructura dinámica de la realidad10.Escribió una trilogía sobre el conocimiento llamada Inteligencia sentiente11 yuna trilogía sobre el tema de Dios con el nombre El problema teologal delhombre12. Y muchos otros temas y problemas fueron objeto de su atenciónfilosófica.

Por eso pienso que hay un gran trabajo por realizar en el campo de la politología.Es necesario que las ciencias o aquellas disciplinas que quieran independizarsede la filosofía (es el caso de las ciencias políticas, que creen poder salir adelantesin la filosofía) miren lo que ha acontecido en la gran tradición metafísica,tradición a la que pertenece Heidegger y Zubiri. Es lo que pide, por ejemplo,Julien Freund en La Crisis del Estado y otros estudios13, cuando se refiere a lacrisis de los valores del mundo contemporáneo y que Freund ve la solución


“mediante la reintegración de la antigua metafísica”, es decir, Freund apela y seocupa de la filosofía antigua, porque cree que sólo a través de ella se puede hoyfundamentar las ciencias políticas. Habría que responder a Freund: Heidegger yZubiri representan la re-fundación de la filosofía y la re-inauguración de nuevasposibilidades del pensar. Son una especie de nuevos Heráclito y Parménides14.De allí que Rivera haya escrito en el Prólogo de Heidegger y Zubiri, que esnecesario establecer un diálogo serio entre y con estos dos pensadores, tarea quecada uno de nosotros puede emprender. Hasta donde yo sé, algunos científicosestán haciendo parte de esta tarea. He ahí, por ejemplo, Diego Gracia y su trabajoen el campo de la bioética donde ha dado tantos frutos y la obra del psiquiatrachileno, César Ojeda, entre la que podemos mencionar el ensayo de psiquiatríafenomenológicaDelirio, Realidad e Imaginación15. En ellos se observa un verdaderoco-pensar con estos filósofos y no meramente una repetición de ideas, muchasveces más complejas que las del mismo filósofo, tan recurrente hoy día en algunosde sus seguidores.

Mi tesis es que sólo la filosofía de Zubiri ha estado a la altura del pensar deHeidegger, así como lo estuvo en la antigüedad el pensar de Aristóteles respectoal de Platón. No olvidemos que Zubiri tiene una posición muy enérgica desde losinicios de su reflexión filosófica en relación a cómo se debe “construir” una filosofía.Así lo podemos ver en su tesis doctoral, Ensayo de una teoría fenomenológicadel juicio16. Allí podemos leer, en las primeras páginas, lo siguiente:

“Aislada de la ciencia, la Filosofía parece tener para algunos espíritus saborun tanto anodino; en cambio, presentarla como la necesidad postrera del espíritudespués de haber agotado todas sus otras actividades, es decir de ella todo lo másque se puede decir: corona de la cultura”.

Y más adelante añade:“Es curioso el espectáculo del nacimiento y del renacimiento de una filosofía.

Y este espectáculo es tan instructivo que nos sirve casi de definición y métodode la filosofía. Los problemas filosóficos nacen de la necesidad de fundamentarla ciencia objetiva y de interpretar sus resultados.”17

Sostengo que la discíplina política va a encontrar su lugar en las “ciencias delespíritu” o en las “ciencias positivas” cuando sea capaz de asimilar la metafísicade Zubiri y la ontología de Heidegger. Una posible “ciencia política” construidaa partir de la filosofía de Heidegger y Zubiri es necesario proponerse a futuro.No una ciencia política fundada en la tradición metafísica desde Platón hasta lafilosofía pre-heideggeriana, sino postheideggeriana, es decir, una a partir de lostrabajos de Heidegger y Zubiri, que no son otra cosa que un diálogo y un encuentrocon la gran tradición metafísica. Ambos filósofos refundaron, reconstruyeron yrevitalizaron el ejercicio filosófico. A partir de sus trabajos es posible generarcategorías políticas que no necesariamente serán científicas. Categorías como eldas Man o el mit-Sein propias de la ontología de Heidegger o bien categoríascomo suidad, sistema, notas (constitutivas, constitucionales y adventicias);propias de la metafísica de Zubiri, pueden ser una importante contribución parala comprensión de los fenómenos “políticos”. Entonces, la “ciencia política” quesurja a partir de estos análisis — pienso- será una ciencia política muy particular.


No un cientismo político, sino un eidénai político o una polisofía (concepto delque hablaré más adelante), es decir, un saber de la pólis. Saber, eidénai, esposeer intelectivamente la verdad de las cosas, nos cuenta Zubiri — hablando deAristóteles — en Cinco lecciones de filosofía18.

Lo que he intentado hasta aquí es detenerme a reflexionar sobre lo que pareceobvio, pues, hoy día, estamos inhundados de propaganda “política”, de referendum“político”, de elecciones “políticas”, de conquistas “políticas”, de líderes “políticos”,etc. ¿De qué estamos hablando, cuando agregamos la expresión “política” encada una de esas afirmaciones compuestas? Quien se esté iniciando en las“ciencias políticas” recibirá una serie de dogmas, no sujetos al debate a lo largode su formación. Es urgentemente necesario, a mi modo de ver, pensar una y otravez, repensar y replantear desde nuestra situación cuál es el lugar que le correspondea la política en la vida del hombre, en la vida de una comunidad, en la vida social yen el mundo actual. Es necesario poner en crisis los supuestos, los fundamentossobre los cuales la “ciencia” política dice sostenerse. Es necesario undescontructivismo en la política, desde nuestro propio acontecer. En efecto,cuando las ciencias políticas “diálogan” con la filosofía política, lo hacen, porejemplo, con Hobbes, Maquiavelo, Locke, etc.; a su vez, cuando la filosofíapolítica “dialoga” con la filosofía, lo hace con Platón, Aristóteles, Hegel, Kant,etc. Es menester que dialogen con Heidegger y con Zubiri.

En otras palabras, quisiera manifestar que lo mejor de la posición política deHeidegger no está en sus discursos o en su adhesión o simpatía con el movimientonacionalsocialista (fuente de objeción que utilizan los cientistas políticos contraHeidegger y que les lleva a ignorarlo — el tema queda finiquitado, por tanto,antes de que ellos hayan leído sus escritos —, pero que a mi juicio hay quecomprender en su contexto histórico, en sentido amplio), sino en libros comoIntroducción a la metafísica, Nietzsche o Serenidad, entre otros; y que unalectura acuciosa de las “ontologías regionales” configuradas por Zubiri en susescritos mencionados más arriba, es la mejor herramienta — me parece — parala creación de una “ciencia” política o bien el lugar desde donde debe brotar, hoydía, una reflexión en torno a la política, como quiera llamársela. La idea es queel lugar desde donde una ciencia política o una política a secas necesita nacer paraganarse un real espacio en el saber, podría no ser la filosofía preheideggeriana,sino postheideggeriana.

Pues bien, a continuación quisiera realizar un bosquejo por donde, a mi modode ver, debe ser tratado el tema político en el caso de Heidegger, su vinculacióncon la filosofía política y la ciencia política, y nuestro parecer sobre qué pasa,hoy, con estas dos discíplinas. Quede claro que es una primera aproximación aun estudio más extenso sobre el tema de alguien que ha sido formado en lafilosofía, en la ciencia política y las relaciones internaciones, y que, además,trabaja como funcionario del Estado. A Zubiri lo dejaremos para otra ocasión.Eso sí quiero señalar que lo que he llamado ontología regional en Zubiri, enestricto rigor no lo es, porque su nacimiento es fruto de las investigacioneszubirianas y no heideggerianas, esto es, desde su metafísica y no desde la ontología,es decir, desde la realidad y no desde el ser.


2. Heidegger y la política

Existe una investigación realziada por el filósofo Sigbert Gebert — discípulode Von Herrmann — cuyo título es Filosofía negativa19, que consiste en pensaro desarrollar una Filosofía Política sobre la base del pensamiento de Heideggeren los escritos 1933/34, teniendo presente que de lo que se ocupa Heidegger enSer y tiempo es de elaborar una ontología fundamenal que, sin duda, podrá ofrecerlíneamientos a una ontología de lo político, pero que, ante todo, la ocupación deHeidegger es por la ontología fundamental. Pero la obra de Gebert no cuenta contodo aquello que ha aparecido, especialmente en los últimos tres o cuatro años,en las nuevas fuentes que permiten el agotamiento monográfico del pensamientode Heidegger del período 1933–34, reunidos en el tomo 16 de sus ObrasCompletas (Gesamtausgabe, GA) Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges(1910–1976), editado por Hermann Heidegger en el año 2000, que el libro deGebert indudablemente no considera por el año de su investigación, 1992. Noobstante, el libro de Gebert está absolutamente vigente.

El tomo 16 contiene varios capítulos que muestran una faceta del filósofoparticularmente práctica, pero hay uno, a mi modo de ver, fundamental, y es elcapítulo “Rektor der Freiburger Universität (1933–1934)”. Están por primeravez reunidas en ese capítulo todas las fuentes, no sólo las conocidas, como el“Discurso del Rectorado”, sino que también otras como los discursos a losestudiantes, en donde Heidegger los exhorta a no trabajar solamente con sucabeza, sino también con las manos y con los pies, por decirlo de alguna manera,esto es, el estudiante alemán se debe ocupar no sólo de la vida académica, sinotambién del trabajo. Se encuentran, además, los archivos de la universidad, lasnotas personales de Heidegger, etc.; en total son unos 120 textos que pueden sertomados como un todo, y que, naturalmente, hace pensar que no puede considerarseagotado el tema político de Heidegger sólo con el “Discurso del rectorado”. Porlo tanto, los discursos a los estudiantes, sus declaraciones sobre los político, ensentido amplio, en tanto filósofo, están reunidos por completo en este tomo, ycontiene, además, textos que no pueden ser alíneados directamente con el temasólo porque hayan surgido precisamente en ese período de tiempo. En consecuencia,podemos hoy día orientarnos rápidamente hacia esta fuente si queremos tratar eltema de la políticia en Heidegger, es decir, el tomo 16.

Ahora bien, si quisieramos ver esa fuente desde un punto de vista filosóficopodríamos decir que no se observa un diálogo entre la filosofía y las cienciaspolíticas, y, lo más importante, ni se plantea el tema. No hay en esos textos deHeidegger algo que podríamos propiamente denominar un diálogo entre lasciencia política y sus postulados políticos, salvo si se entiende la expresiónciencia política en el sentido de hacer de la ciencia un elemento al servicio de lacausa política como se vivió en la Rusia comunista. He allí, por ejemplo, el casodel bioquímico ruso Oparín y su explicación materialista del origen de la vida.Pero no es el caso de Heidegger. El pensador alemán no está trabajando en esostextos al servicio de la causa nazi, sino que expone su visión (noús) del asuntoen cuestión y arrastrado por su pensamiento fundacional. No hay tampoco algo


así como una ocupación explícita del tema, como lo que hemos conocido en latradición filosófica por nombre La República o Leviatán. Por lo tanto, el tomo16 no es la filosofía política de Heidegger.

Pues bien, nosotros sostenemos que las ciencias políticas se conforman apartir de la filosofía. Sin embargo, el estado actual es que no hay diálogo ninguno,prácticamente, entre los filósofos y los cientistas políticos. Las ciencias políticastratan de ser muy concretas: se preocupan de la gestión del Estado, etc.; encambio, la filosofía política se ocupa de realizar el esqueleto, de poner las formas,estructuras o el andamiaje de la orgazanición social, que involucra no sólo elgobierno sino también el individuo gobernado. Claro está Bobbio entiende quela filosofía política se resume en cuatro formas como ha sido comprendida a lolargo de su historia: la búsqueda del fundamento último del poder; como ladeterminación del concepto general de política; como la búsqueda de un estadoideal aunque no se concrete nunca; y como discurso crítico20. En otras palabras,la connotación o el sentido en que normalmente es usado el término filosofía esde teoría. En efecto, decimos, filosofía es teoría, especulación, abstracción.Entonces, frente a una filosofía política que sería una idea, un modelo, unconcepto de lo que es la política, tendríamos, por otra parte, una ciencia políticaque sería una práxis, una concreción de la política. Yme parece que hay unanimidadde sentir entre los cientistas políticos en torno a que la ciencia política debeactuar, operar, obrar. En efecto, más que teorizar y elucubrar grandes proyectosrespecto a la pólis, el cientista político debe obrar en la sociedad, específicamenteen el Estado. Una pregunta inmediata respecto a esta posición es: acaso lateología — que no tiene ningún problema en llamarse no científica — no haobrado en la historia del hombre. Si de obrar y operar se trata, entonces elproblema de qué es la política y la vinculación de la filosofía política con laciencia política debería ser resuelto por los ingenieros civiles. Pero -pensamos-no es tarea de ellos.

Por lo tanto, es necesario, entre otras cosas, desarrollar — si es que existe —un diálogo entre las ciencias políticas y la filosofía a través de los escritosde Heidegger, y precisar, asimismo, determinados fenómenos espirituales, quepodrían “iluminar” el tema político para generar determinadas categoríaspolíticas como por ejemplo, un “pueblo histórico”, esto es, lo que significa serhistórico (geschichtlich sein) a diferencia de, simplemente, tener una historia(geschlichte haben)21. Tal vez una categoría fundamental de lo que he llamado,más arriba, polisofía. En efecto, en este punto, quisiera hacer una analogía conla tarea que se propuso la Escuela de Arquitectura de la Universidad Católica deValparaíso, Chile, cuando fue fundada por el arquitecto Alberto Cruz y por elpoeta Godofredo Iommi, pues su reflexión no se centraba en averiguar qué tipode materiales son más resistentes para ésta u otra obra, ni tampoco en las formasque configurarían una obra arquitectónica. Su problema era y ha sido otro. Suproblema es como ha lugar la arquitectura, porque no es lo mismo una obraarquitectónica realizada con una palabra matemática o filosófica, que una conuna palabra poética, y dentro de ésta no daba lo mismo una palabra poética líricaque una de otro orden. Es el gran proyecto poético-arquitectónico liderado por


Cruz y Iommi llamado “Amereida”22. Allí, es justo decirlo, hay una verdaderamirada, un nuevo lenguaje, la asistencia a la inauguración de un nuevo oficio quesin duda tiene el esfuerzo de ser latinoamericano. Hay un verdadero modusvivendi, donde Rimbaud tiene un lugar destacado. Había que seguir lo que elpoeta frances había anunciado en su juventud y había puesto en obra. Siemprerondaba en él, el pensamiento que desde los griegos la palabra ya no rimaba conla acción (poesía y arquitectura). Y esa fue una de las grandes labores del poetamaldito y que la escuela, entiéndase la escuela de arquitectura, debía tener comopropósito. Y allí surgía, prístino como todo lo grande, la fundación de una escuela,porque ese propósito no se podía asumir en soledad. Era una meta colectiva. Elha lugar, el locus, es el lugar del habla colectivo.

¿Por qué quise hacer esta analogía? Porque la propuesta de esa escuela hasido pensar la arquitectura a partir de los importantes trabajos de Heidegger,entre otros pensadores, en torno al espacio, el habitar, la obra de arte, el lugar dela palabra en la vida y en el ser humano, etc. En consecuencia, el problemapolítico en Heidegger podría ser ni tarea de una filosofía política ya establecidani de una ciencia política determinada. Entonces, ¿qué es? Polisofía, esto es,como se ha lugar la política. Porque no es lo mismo una pólis, por una parte,construida concretamente a partir de una ciencia política que, por otra parte, unareflexión teórica de la pólis a partir de una filosofía política determinada (porejemplo, para Aristóteles la pólis posibilita la consecusión de la eudaimoníahumana mediante el florecimiento de sus virtudes; para Hobbes la pólis posibilitala sobrevivencia del individuo en la búsqueda de su contínuo movimiento vital;etc). En efecto, un tercer estadio podría ser la polísofía (que no postula contenidos),pues es el ha lugar (ousía) de la pólis, es decir, una formalidad que puede serllenada con el contenido “acontecer histórico de los pueblos”, “destino”, “pueblohistórico”. Estas categorías podrían dar lugar a una “forma” de fenómeno socialque se relaciona con la dirección de nuestra comunidad, distinta en cada caso, encada nación, para cada grupo humano que haya decidido marchar en conjunto,convivir en torno a valores “comunes”, funcionar como un todo integrado y noindividuos disgregados.Adiferencia de la teoría filosófica, la polisofía no propugnaríaque tal organización sea la mejor para una esencia, sino que respetaría el devenirhistórico y muchas veces contradictorio del hombre en lo social y de lo socialen el hombre. Esta polisofía no es comparable a la filosofía política o a lasciencias políticas. Es otra cosa, porque surjiría de la ontología fundamental y node la tradición filosófica clásica. Podría relacionarse con ellas de maneraparalela o bien fundamentándolas, pero es otra cosa. En Heidegger la esenciahumana — por decirlo de alguna manera — es apertura, por lo tanto, puede sertodas las posibilidades que sólo se agotan con la muerte. Entonces, ¿qué tipode régimen “político” puede caberle a un grupo determinado de hombres, sila esencia o forma propia de cada uno de ellos es pura aperturidad? Infinitaposibilidades.

Por otra parte, en el tomo 26, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik imAusgang von Leibniz (1928), de las obras completas de Heidegger, se puede leerque en la metontología de la existencia recae, por ejemplo, la cuestión de la


ética; la ética no es de manera alguna un tema de la ontología fundamental, sinoque de la metontología de la existencia, fundamentada ontológicamente. Luegonombra Heidegger al arte, es decir, tenemos la filosofía del arte, que tambiénpertenece a la metontología de la existencia y, de la misma manera, Heideggerpodría haber escrito sólo un palabra de referencia POLITICA. No obstante,Heidegger no se ocupa de ninguna institución, ya que la ontología fundamentalno necesita ocuparse de ellas, pues la cuestión de las instituciones es una cuestiónde las ciencias políticas o de la filosofía política, que, por su parte, podríanrecibir su fundamentación, respectivamente, de la metontología de lo político(filosofía política nacida de la ontología fundamental. O bien, lo que hemosllamado polisofía). El lugar de las ciencias políticas, si se piensa solamente en elpasaje de la obra Ser y tiempo, donde se dan los líneamientos de la fundamentaciónde la metontología — o si se quiere de las ontologías regionales—, es eseparágrafo 4. Lo que Heidegger ahí todavía denomina ontología regional y denominaa continuación metontología, consiste en la designación de la ontología a partirde una existencia concreta. Naturalmente de una existencia que se hacecomprensible sobre una base ontológica fundamental. La metontología se ocupade la existencia ética, cultural, de la existencia política.

En resumen, ontología regional es el título que Heidegger primeramenteutiliza en la introducción de Ser y tiempo; ahora, después de que la ontologíafundamental ha sido expuesta, puede él formular un título especial y ese es el dela metontología, más exactamente la transformación ontológica de la ontologíafundamental en la ontología de lo siendo. Y esta diferencia es importante, puesnos sirve de orientación para comprender la metontología de lo político, es decir,la existencia política. Por lo tanto, es aquí donde tendría su sitio las institucionespolíticas, es aquí donde debería pensarse metontológicamente sobre las instituciones,y se podrían refundar, a su vez, las ciencias políticas.

Todas las ciencias son ciencias de “lo siendo”, es decir ónticas, cienciasónticas; pero si ahora están fundamentadas en una metontología de la existenciaque, por su parte, está fundamentada en una ontología fundamental, todo adoptauna nueva conformación. En consecuencia, para el desarrollo de la concepciónde la transformación de la ontología fundamental en metontología es importantetambién el tomo 26.

Ahora bien, ¿Qué significa que pueda llegar a ser una categoría política, porejemplo, la expresión “un pueblo histórico”. ¿Abarcaría la concepción de Heideggera todos los pueblos, a los de Sudamérica, por ejemplo? Esta es una cuestiónfundamental. Pienso que Heidegger parte primeramente de la situación alemana,pero estoy convencido de que todo lo dicho por él no está pensado sólo para elpueblo elegido alemán, sino que partiendo de la situación histórica de su pueblo,está dirigido a todos los pueblos. ¿Es América latina hoy un pueblo histórico,esto es, ha llegado a una madurez que le permita ver (noús) su historia no meramentecomo pasado, sus mitos no meramene como leyendas, sus conquistas nomeramente como hazañas, sus heroes no meramente como figuras? Cada una denuestras comunidades debe buscar su propio acontecer y destino. En efecto, elser habla en todas partes, en todas las épocas y en todas las lenguas. Si no fuera


sí, La República de Platón no sería más que una pieza de museo al igual que lahistoria entera de la filosofía.

Pero hay más. El fenómeno político en Heidegger también puede encontrarseen su concepción sobre la universidad (la idea de universidad de von Humboldt,la que él asume positivamente y que es recuperada en el tomo 16. Ello es unacomplementación esencial al “Discurso del Rectorado”). En efecto, la entrada altema de Heidegger “Filosofía y Política”, designémoslo así, es también la reflexiónfilosófica sobre la esencia de la universidad y de la ciencia y su necesidad derefundación a través de la filosofía. Se trata de que el interés de Heidegger porla política se presenta primeramente en el rol social de la universidad. Launiversidad en la filosofía tienen la tarea delíneadora de la refundación de todaslas ciencias, para lo cual se toma de una manera estratégica la idea de laantigüedad, pero ahora sobre suelo nuevo, su propia filosofía, que consiste enuna nueva reflexión y refundación de la esencia de la filosofía. La filosofía tiene,por tanto, su sino (destino) en la universidad; es decir, Heidegger reflexionasobre la esencia de la universidad — pues desde allí se puede transformar lasociedad — y sobre la refundación filosófica de la ciencia que tiene lugar allí,con el fin de dar un nueva orientación intelectual (espiritual) a su pueblo, que loconsidera — seamos honestos, no sólo Heidegger — el centro de Europa y la“asignada” para dirigir el continente y detener todo lo que no es europeo,entiéndase Rusia y América23 (nótese el debate hoy día en relación al ingreso deTurquía a la Unión Europea).

La universidad, entonces, no es un fin en sí mismo y, por ello, no es sólo unpretexto para llevar a cabo una reflexión filosófica en torno a lo político, sinoque su reflexión filosófica es la que le lleva a ver a Heidegger en la Universidadla posibilidad de un “nuevo hombre” (el nuevo estudiante alemán)24 y, enconsecuencia, de un “nuevo mundo”. La posibilidad de una transformación. Esaconcepción sobre la misión de la Universidad y de la ciencia respecto al puebloestá pensada desde Ser y tiempo, es decir, sobre una forma determinada decomprensión del ser. Pero a partir de los Beiträge zur Philosophie sucede queHeidegger ve que la universidad y que en el conocimiento difundido por ella, osea, la tecnificación de todo lo que es, no corresponde a la misión que se le haencomendado, de tal manera que la universidad como empresa, y con todas susciencias, se ha separado del puro devenir del ser. No obstante, ello no significaque Heidegger se haya despedido de la idea central de la universidad, sino queél ve que el camino primeramente ha de tomarse ahora desde el punto de vistahistórico del ser. La técnica moderna podría ser la fundamentación del cuartoFührung y, muy probablemente, el problema político, porque la técnica es elúnico gran poder que está por sobre todos los regímenes políticos y formas degobierno. Es ingobernable, inmanejable, incontrolable.

En definitiva, a mi modo de ver, para hacerse más o menos un cuadrocompleto de la actividad y aporte filosóficos de Heidegger en el ámbito políticoes imprescindible la lectura del tomo 16 y no se puede soslayar el tomo 26 desus obras completas. Insisto, sólo con el Discurso del Rectorado no se llega muylejos.


La cuestión fundamental que nos propusimos al comienzo de estas líneas fuepreguntarnos sobre la relación de la filosofía política, la ciencia política y elpensamiento de Heidegger, así como la manera que debía ser tratado el tema deHeidegger y la política. He intentado mostrar, de manera general, cómo, a mimodo de ver, debe ser abordado el problema, sin entrar a analizar el tomo 16, locual será tema de otro artículo.

Pero hay otros textos de Heidegger, además de los nombrados, que meparecen muy importantes tratarlos. Me refiero, en primer, lugar al tomo 36/37Sein und Wahrheit (2001); que contiene — las dos conferencias del período derectoría — : 1. Die Grundfrage der Philosophie (semestre de verano 1933) y2. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (semestre de invierno 1933/34). Asimismo, laconferencia que Heidegger dictó después de la rectoría, es decir, el tomo 38:Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache (sommersemester 1934) es desuma importancia porque aparece el tema de la historia y de la lengua. Es unaconferencia, por tanto, a la que debemos prestar especial atención. Naturalmente,también debe tratarse el tomo 39, es decir: Hölderlins Hymnes “Germanien”und “Der Rhein” (Wintersemester 1934/35). Del mismo modo, el tomo 65(1989); Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936–1938), ya que Heideggertambién se manifiesta de manera crítica sobre las decisiones epocales de los años30, es decir, la cuestión del biologismo y del racismo. F.-W. Von Herrmannresume gran parte de estas obras en su libro Wege ins Ereignis. Zu Heideggers“Beiträge zur Philosophie”25, donde él los repasa y procesa, y en donde todo elcapítulo primero tiene un carácter introductorio a los Beiträge. Algo así como uncomentario, si se quiere. Se puede leer como presentación a su libro lo siguiente:“Desde que los ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie’ son accesibles en virtud de supublicación en calidad de tomo 65 de las Obras Completas, cada uno — quereclame para sí el tener suficiente entendimiento hermenéutico del pensamientode Heidegger — está llamado a compenetrarse en los estándares y estructura dela visión y del método del pensamiento-suceso que presentan los ‘Beiträge’;pues él gana una orientación segura para el tratamiento hermenéutico de lasobras de Heidegger desde comienzos de los años 30. En el capítulo cuarto, desdedonde se proyecta esa vía al suceso, el autor analiza temas fundamentales delsuceso, o del pensamiento histórico del ser, es decir, cuestiones sobre la técnicamoderna y el arte, sobre la lengua y sobre la vecindad entre pensamiento ypoesía, así como sobre la relación esencial entre el hombre y Dios en el suceso”.

En seguida, tambien es importante para este tema destacar Superación de lametafísica, pues se trata de un texto donde Heidegger se ocupa de los dirigentesy su relación con el poder, la planificación humana, la guerra y la paz, ladevastación de la tierra; entre otras materias. Hay allí, en consecuencia, un fuertecomponente político.

En definitiva, hay un buen número de obras que debemos estudiardetenidamente si es que realmente queremos dialogar con el filósofo de nuestrotiempo. Por eso adhiero a las palabras de W. Biemel expresadas en unaentrevista: “Es manifiesto que en 1933 Heidegger tuvo la ilusión de que veníauna verdadera revolución. Recuérdese que había sido muy crítico con la situación


en el tiempo de la república de Weimar. No cabe duda de que se dejó llevar,dando incluso conferencias que hoy nos resultan incomprensibles. El discursodel rectorado no fue, sin embargo, nacionalsocialista en el sentido corriente porqueel núcleo del discurso lo constituye el concepto de alétheia. Teniendo todo estoen cuenta me parece que el libro de Farías es un intento de reducir a Heideggeral período entre abril de 1933 y febrero de 1934. O sea que no quiere concederque Heidegger se distanció del nazismo. Cuando yo estuve estudiando con élhablaba de los nazis como de criminales. Pero lo peor en el libro de Farías esque no se ocupa de la obra de Heidegger. Lo mismo vale para el libro de Ott quese concentra en el distanciamiento de Heidegger del catolicismo y en su discursode rectorado, sin entrar en lo verdaderamente decisivo: la obra escrita”. (Lascursivas son mías)26.

3. Consideraciones finales

La relación de la ontología de Heidegger y de la metafísica de Zubiri con lapolítica está por hacerse. Es un desafío que debemos asumir. No se puede, a mijuicio, en el caso de Heidegger seguir discutiendo su adhesión al nacionalsocialismoy, como consecuencia de ello, despachar inmediatamente su importante pensamiento.Del mismo modo, no se puede seguir ignorando el pensamiento de Zubiri,simplemente, porque haya escrito en lengua española y porque todavía algunosdetractores lo tachen de escolástico.

Es deber de cada uno de nosotros descubrir el verdadero alcance de suspensamientos y eso es obra no sólo de uno o dos cientistas políticos o filósofospolíticos, sino de la comunidad completa de investigadores.

NOTAS


1. Las siguientes consideraciones no comprometende manera alguna al Ministerio de RelacionesExteriores de Chile. Son, por tanto, de exclusivaresponsabilidad del autor.

2. Sin duda que hay muy buenos estudios en tornoa la relación de Heidegger y la política (no así deZubiri y la política). Todos ellos vistos desde unaperspectiva filósófica. Así, Pöggeler, Beaufret,Fedier, Gebert, etc. Sin embargo, no puedo estar enabsoluto de acuerdo con el artículo “El casoHeidegger” de Luc Ferry yAlain Renaut — o biencon publicaciones como las de Victor Farías —,aparecido en Heidegger o el final de la filosofíade Juan Manuel Navarro Cordón y RamónRodríguez (Compiladores), Editorial Complutense,2° Edición, diciembre 1997, pp. 111–125; porquedisentir, hoy día, del estado actual de cosaspolíticas, del establishment político, — seconsidera — es estar, inmediatamente, en contrade “los valores democráticos” y, en consecuencia,se es catalogado de facista o nacista. Mi intención,

aquí, es mostrar que los cientistas políticos tenemosuna deuda con Heidegger.

3. Martin Heidegger en Nietzsche (tomo I, EdicionesDestino, trad. Juan Luis Vermal, 2000, p. 46)sostiene: “El gran pensador es grande porquees capaz de oír lo que hay de grande en la obrade los otros ‘grandes’ y de transformarlooriginiariamente”.

4. Filósofo chileno. Se formó en los años 60s contoda la pléyade de filósofos alemanes comoHeidegger, Gadamer, Fink, Welte, Müller, etc. y,en España, con Xavier Zubiri. Traductor alespañol de Ser y tiempo de Heidegger (Madrid,Trotta, 2003). Ha escrito entre otros libros:Konnaturales Erkennen und vostellendes Denken(1967); La filosofía en la Universidad (1970);Filosofía griega. De Tales a Sócrates (1985); Deasombros y nostalgia. Ensayos filosóficos (1999);Heidegger y Zubiri (2002).

5. Heidegger, Martin. Ser y tiempo, trad. Jorge EduardoRivera, Madrid, Editorial Trotta, 2003, p. 32.


6. Cf.Grundbegriffe, Sommersemester, 1941 (GA51).7. Heidegger, Martin, Ser y tiempo, trad. Jorge

Eduardo Rivera, Madrid, Editorial Trotta, 2003,p. 32.

8. Zubiri, Xavier, Sobre el hombre, Póstumo,AlianzaEditorial, 1986.

9. Zubiri, Xavier, Espacio, Tiempo, Materia, AlianzaEditorial, Póstumo, 1996.

10. Zubiri, Xavier, Estructura dinámica de larealidad, Póstumo, Alianza Editorial, 1989.

11. Aunque en rigor, la trilogía de la inteligencia —formada por Inteligencia y realidad (Soc. E. yP/Alianza, 1980); Inteligencia y lógos (Soc. E. yP/Alianza, 1982); Inteligencia y razón (Soc. E. yP/Alianza, 1983). Los tres libros constituyen loque Zubiri ha denominado Inteligencia sentiente— no es una ontología regional, porque realidade intelección son estrictamente congéneres,pertenecen a un mismo génos.

12. La trilogía del tema de Dios la constituyen: Elhombre y Dios, Alianza Editorial, 1984; Elproblema de la historia de las religiones, AlianzaEditorial, 1993; El problema teologal del hombre.Cristianismo, Alianza Editorial,1997.

13. Cf. Freund, Julien, La Crisis del Estado y otrosestudios, Universidad de Chile, Instituto de CienciaPolítica, 1982.

14. Nótese el rol que juega la expresión Lógos en laontología de Heidegger y el de Noología en lametafísica de Zubiri.

15. Cf. Ojeda César,Delirio, Realidad e Imaginación,Chile, Editorial Universidad, 1987.

16. Zubiri, Xavier, Ensayo de una teoríafenomenológica del juicio, Madrid, Tip. de la“Rev. de Arch., Bibli. y Museos”, Olózaga.Núm. I. 1923. P. 7.

17. Idem, pp. 22–23.18. Zubiri, Xavier, Cinco lecciones de filosofía, 1°

Edición, Soc. E. y P., 1963, p. 20.19. Cf. Gebert, Sigbert. Negative Politik. Zur

Grundlegung der Politischen Philosophie ausder Daseinsanalytik und ihrer Bewährung in denPolitischen Schriften Martin Heidegger von1933/34, Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 1992.Este libro es una excelente monografía del“pensamiento político” de Heidegger. SostieneGebert que el punto de partida de su investigación

es “la desolada situación actual de la filosofíapolítica y de la política”.

20. Cf. Bobbio, N. El filósofo y la política, Fondo deCultura Económica, 1996.

21. Dice Heidegger: “Ser histórico significa: sabiendode lo acaecido actuar en lo venidero para liberara lo pasado de su fuerza comprometedora ypreservarlo en su cambiante grandeza. Pero esesaber se plasma en la constitución del Estado deun pueblo, ese saber es el Estado. Él es laestructura que evoca y une, en donde el puebloqueda expuesto a todos los grandes podereshumanos del ser. El Estado está siendo y es en lamedida que plasma esos poderes en la existenciadel pueblo”. GA 16, Frankfurt am Main, VittorioKlostermann GmbH, 2000, p. 200. Al respecto,obsérvese lo que afirma el arquitecto AlbertoCruz en su libro Don. Arquitectura, donde se lee:“…lo que acaece es que, bien parece, queseguimos siendo considerados naturaleza[entiéndase América como continente], nohistoria… No heredad que se constituye entradición… Ante lo dicho, Amereida [palabracompuesta por Amer: América; y Eida: Eneída]:Amer = extensión naturaleza. Eída, Eneida;historia”. Tomo 10, 10 p., Chile, Ediciones ARQ,Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y EstudiosUrbanos, Pontificia Universidad Católica deChile, abril 2002.

22. Poema que narra la travesía, de un grupo depensadores, por el continente americano, dondeparticiparon, entre otros, el filósofo FrancoisFedier y el poeta Michel Deguy, los arquitectoschilenos Miguel Eyquem y Fabio Cruz.

23. Cf. Introducción a la metafísica, trad. AngelaAckermann, Tercera reimpresión, enero 1999,Barcelona, Editorial Gedisa.

24. Cf. GA 16, Cap. 108, “El estudiante alemán encalidad de trabajador. Discurso en la Ceremoniade Matriculación, 25 de noviembre de 1933”.

25. Cf. F.–W. Von Herrmann, Wege ins Ereignis. ZuHeideggers “Beiträge zur Philosophie”, Frankfurtam Main, V. Klostermann, 1994.

26. En torno a Heidegger, Entrevista a Walter Biemel,Raúl Fornet–Betancourt y Klaus Hedwig,Concordia N°15, 1989, en http://personales.ciudad.com.ar/M_Heidegger/biemel.htm.

THE UNIQUE ROLE OF “CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVISM”IN THE CREATION OF USEFUL PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE

ERIC GILDER

Constructive Alternativism as a Pragmatic wayof Creating Testable “Useful Fictions”

In an analysis of the origins, scope and assumptions of philosophicalconstructivism, Michael Mahoney describes it as a meta-theory which balanceselements of “platonic and neo-Kantian idealism, representational realism,critical rationalism and “evolutionary empiricism.”1 Thus, according to Mahoney,constructive meta-theories generally:

1. acknowledge the power of ideas and mental/symbolic processes that mediate,constrain, and order the particulars and patterns of experience;

2. acknowledge the existence of a “real” external world... that can be knownto us only indirectly and imperfectly;

3. acknowledge the potential power of reason and rationality in humanknowing, that power being most apparent when applied in the service of critical(disconfirmatory) examination rather than positive (confirmatory) justification; and,

4. assert that the function of data (sense and scientific) in knowledge developmentis essentially one of selecting or winnowing enacted hypotheses; in this sense,data do not justify or form the foundation of valid knowledge, but insteadselectively eliminate less viable approximations [emphasis in original].2

I basically agree with Mahoney, but I would argue that, in the fields of art andvalues, theories are not easily negated3, but, even if this were possible, athorough-going disconfirmatory mode of reasoning can be destructive. Mahoneyhimself quotes Hans Vaihinger to say:

“A regrettable lack of scientific understanding is apt to appear in the conclusionfrequently drawn that because such constructs are devoid of reality they are tobe devoid of utility... . The history of mankind is full of examples proving theexistence not only of fruitful errors (take religions alone, for example) but alsoof harmful truths [emphasis in original].”4

Vaihinger posits a law of ideational shifts, in which ideas can develop: fictional,hypothetical and dogmatic.5 This shift is related to the increasing certainty withwhich one holds about an idea: I may hold some ideas as mere operationalfictions (e.g., thinking of the behavior of electric current in wire as analogous towater flow in pipes), others as hypotheses (e.g., a person’s worldview can be


apprehended though the employment of thematic construct analysis), and yetothers with dogmatic certainty (e.g., the law of gravity or the fact that the earthis roughly round). Drawing from Vaihinger, American psychologist George A.Kelly suggests that scientists can productively entertain hypotheses cast in an“invitational” mode (Suppose we regard electricity as water) rather than in justindicative, conditional, subjunctive or imperative modes.6 In any case, I agreewith Jack Orr, who employs Kenneth Burke’s conception of the dialecticalrelationship between the symbolic and non-symbolic world to argue for aphilosophy of “critical rationalism” versus a pure intersubjectivism (reality issocially constructed in all its forms7 or mechanistic objectivism (reality existsand the interpretation of that reality is unproblematic). As Orr states:

“In Burke’s terms, as long as one appreciates both the symbolic constructionof reality and the “non-symbolic reality”, it is possible to relate the two dialectically,one can question a rhetorical construction of reality in the name of reality assuch. If, however, the concept of objective reality is abandoned, wherein shallone question those rationalizations, mystifications, and reifications whichmasquerade as the ultimately real?”8

Orr concludes his discussion of critical rationalism by naming five qualitiesof the philosophy:

1. objective truth cannot be consistently denied, but knowledge is uncertain...;2. knowledge claims are contingent upon the framework of the knower...; 3. sociallyconstructed frames of reference may be distinguished qualitatively as rational, orirrational...; 4. all constructions of reality and criteria for rationality must be heldopen to criticism, even the concept of critical rationality...; and, 5. criticism is thepersistent aim of inquiry.9

The philosophy of critical rationalism that Orr describes provides thephilosophical foundation of the communicative theories of Jürgen Habermas,Stephen Toulmin, Ch. Perelman, Wayne Brockriede, Wayne Booth and Kellyhimself. As Kelly sees it, constructive alternativism begins with two basicnotions: “first, that man [sic]10 might be better understood if he were viewed inthe perspectives of the centuries rather than the flicker of passing moments; andsecond, that each man contemplates in his own personal way the stream ofevents upon which he finds himself so swiftly borne.”11

Philosophical constructivism “emphasizes the creative capacity of the livingthing to represent the environment, not merely respond to it”.12 Constructivealternativism is, then, the philosophical foundation of the psychological methodologyof personal construct theory, which seeks to describe how individual humansconstrue and act purposely in the world. Ultimately to Kelly, theories are thethinking product of people who seek freedom from events occurring across time,to whom life is an adventure. “What we are proposing is neither a conventionalphilosophy nor a conventional psychology. As a philosophy [constructivealternativism] is rooted in the psychological observation of man.As a psychologyit is concerned with the philosophical outlooks of individual man”, claimsKelly.13 On a theoretical level, constructive alternativism posits that every theory

18 ERIC GILDER 2

of science is subject to modification or replacement; they are but useful fictions.Kelly argues that his theory builds upon Vaihinger’s philosophy of “As-if”:

“In [his theory of “As-if”] he [Vaihinger] offered a system of thought in whichGod or reality might best be represented as paradigms. This was not to say thateither God or reality was any less certain than anything else in the realm of man’sawareness, but only that all matters confronting man might best be regarded inhypothetical ways. In some measure, I suppose, I am suggesting that Vaihinger’sposition has particular value for psychology.”14

According to the philosophy of constructive alternativism, people are as freeas their operative paradigms allow them to be. As Kelly states, “the structure weerect is what rules us”: “Determinism and freedom are opposite sides of the samecoin — two aspects of the same relationship. This is an important point for a manto grasp, whether he be a scholar or a neurotic — or both!”15

So, although our hypothetical constructions or “useful fictions” are expendableinstruments of orientation to the world, and not a copy of reality, theories doreflect the personal commitment of their maker, and, although “fictive”, theorieshave real effects upon real people. As philosopher Stephen Pepper argues in hisWorld Hypotheses, each major hypothesis is governed by a root metaphor orconception of the world and of people themselves; such a use of metaphor,Burke reminds us, is an innate human activity.16 A “mechanist”, for example,will view people as mechanical sub-assemblies of a grand design; a “formist”will view people as abstract categories of properties; a “contextualist” vision ofreality will be governed by the movement of time across place; and an “organicist”will see the world as an integrated life-form, incorporating all individual personsin its biosphere. Pepper is claiming that whatever theory of knowing one holds,a root metaphor is at work molding a particular vision of knowledge and practiceon the part of the theorist.17 As Kelly would suggest, the root metaphor of asocial theory is a “super-ordinal” construct of that theoretical system whichdetermines its individual elements and constructions.18 J.M.M. Mair describesthe power that such metaphors of man can possess:

“In this light we can readily begin to see all claims about man as a “developedape” or a “fallen angel”, a “mechanical toy” or a “super-computer”, as a “mindlessepiphenomenon of a mindless universe” or an “open system in the largerecosystem of the planet earth”, not as bald assertions about what man is, but asmetaphors for exploring the endless mystery of what man may yet make ofhimself. The danger here comes... when we mistake metaphor—or acts ofintentional mistake making in the service of understanding—for truth itself, orwhen we confuse . . an invitation to inquiry with dogmatic assertion. Not one ofthe metaphors of man which has yet been elaborated can provide a full accountof his nature nor need we assume that any single or any combinations ofmetaphors in the future will do so either. [Metaphors have their value, but] if welose ourselves in metaphors of man which are too small for us we may gain acertain kind of security for a time, but are likely to pay a high price in despair,confusion and the denial of freedom we can ill afford to lose [emphasis inoriginal].”19

3 THE “CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVISM” PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE 19

I therefore posit that the multiple selves of any author as revealed in his textsare only as free or determined as their core constructs allow them to be. Themethod herein anticipated will allow an ascertainment of how an author’s “logical”self and “emotional” self inter-relate in his conception of authorship, and how thismulti-faceted author construes his on-going relationship with his hypothesizedaudience. While (through the application of Kelly’s Personal Constructs Theory(PCT) and dimensions of transition, built as it is upon the philosophy of constructivealternativism) I have intended to demonstrate that it is possible to construeauthors and their multiple implied selves are creative actors in the world; i.e., thatthey are important constructors of rhetorical realities for “their” readers; my mainpurpose is to demonstrate that such a multiple-selves construing of the rhetoricalprocess can be developed into a comprehensive, yet usable rhetorical methodology.20

Critical Challenges to Personal Constructs Theoryand a Rhetorical Authorial Response

According to Phillip Tichenor and Douglas McLeod in the “Logic of Social andBehavioral Sciences”, the basic issues in communication theory and practice centerupon five concerns:

1. the question of causation vs. prediction;2. the question of the interplay between induction and deduction;3. the question of choosing between mechanism/reductionism and holistic

conceptions of reality(epistemology);4. the question of choosing between macro and micro approaches; and,5. the question of validity.Concerning the question of causation, Kelly was more interested in studying

how every person (including himself, the theoretician) is able to represent andpredict his or her future than to assigning clear-cut causes to every action. As perKelly’s conception of the role of induction versus deduction, he assumes thatpeople inductively construct their reality according to the deductive schemadetermined by their operating core constructs. This rule applies to both researchersand subjects (or observers) of research according to Kelly.21 For example, apsychotherapist treats his or her patient as a cooperator, a partner in discoveringthe rules of construing the meaning of past experiences.22 Kelly’s theory ofpersonality is reflexive in nature as any comprehensive scientific theory is. (Inreflexive theories, deduction and induction are intimately related and cannotbe profitably divorced from each other.) The main fault Kelly finds with conventionalbehavioristic research (dubbed by him as the process of “accumulativefragmentalism”) is that it provides a host of answers without posing interestingquestions or reconstructions of knowledge.23 Both Kelly and his student DonBannister contend that theory as reflected in the “creativity cycle” ofcircumspection/pre-emption/control can assist social scientists in developingresearch questions that are neither trivial (too limited in scope) nor unmanageable(too broad and “loose”). In the “Challenges to Personal Construct” cycle, ideasfor research are developed from personal knowledge24 and perceptions; are then

20 ERIC GILDER 4

formed into proposed questions of importance to the researcher; and are finallyrefined into testable hypotheses. Reliability in Kelly’s theory is, according toMair, concerned not with simple repetition of unchanging results, but withaccurately predicting change.25 Similarly, the concept of validity in Kelly’s theoryis also tied to prediction: “The construct theory notion of validity does not hingeon separating logical from empirical validity — it implies that all validity islogical, in that the failure to predict successfully implies some non sequitur inthe hierarchical lines of implication from which the prediction was derived.”26

In my view, Kelly’s theory of man via personal constructs is a “criticalrationalist” one; it is not reductionistic. Kelly acknowledges the ties of his theoryto positivism via Vaihinger, but it is, in Pepper’s term, an “undogmatic”positivism.27 To Kelly, people, (including philosophers of science) are free toconstrue the reality of the world in any fashion they wish, but, if theirconstruction of reality is not open to sharing by others, their ability to predict thefuture course of events will suffer. Maddi points out that critics of Kelly, such asJerome Bruner, have accused Kelly of downplaying the role of passion in man.As Bruner argues: “[Kelly’s book] fails signally, I think, in dealing convincinglywith the human passions. There was a strategy in Freud’s choice of Moses orMichelangelo or Little Hans. If it were true that Freud was too often the victimof the dramatic instance, it is also true that with the same coin he paid his wayto an understanding of the depths and heights of la condition humaine. Bycomparison, the young men and women of professor Kelly’s clinical examplesare worried by their dates, their studies, and their conformity. If Freud’s clinicalworld is a grotesque of fin de siecle Vienna, Kelly’s is a gloss of the post-adolescent peer group of Columbus, Ohio”.28

As Bruner would suggest, Kelly’s “mentalism” might have been appropriatefor his college subjects, but not for everyone.29 Kelly argues, however, that thesecriticisms miss the point, that through his theory he was attempting to transcendthe thinking/feeling dichotomy: “The reader may have noted that in talking aboutexperience I have been careful not to use either the terms, “emotional or “affective.”I have been equally careful not to invoke the notion of “cognition.” The classicdistinction which separates these two has, in the manner of most classic distinctionsthat once were useful, become a barrier to sensitive psychological inquiry. When oneso divides the experience of man, it becomes difficult to make the most of theholistic aspirations that may infuse the science of psychology with new life.30

Bannister argues that most critics of Kelly’s personal construct theory, suchas Bruner, are not true constructive alternativists, but “naive realists” who believethat the traditional psychological concept of emotion is a “real” thing, “not a constructabout the nature of man.”31 In short, Kelly’s theory does not exclude “emotion”from humans, Mildred McCoy argues, it reconceptualizes the meaning assignedto emotion to one in which it is grounded within the whole realm of proactivehuman experience, a reconstruction that elevates emotion to the proper place thattraditional psychology has denied.32

Kelly’s theory of personality has most often been considered a “micro”methodological approach, but via the concept of constructive alternativism, it


has “macro” utilities and implications. For example, if social scientists accept onlythe fundamental postulate that the “objects” of their studies are thinking beingswho conceive of the world in much of the same way as they do, the implicationsare large.33 As Kelly would suggest, both professional scientists and the “man asscientist” are set free by their respective application of theories to the “stream ofevents.” The influence of this concept has not only affected the reductionistpsychological theories of early communication research, but it also affects themacro theorizing of “critical school” scholars by suggesting that people are notlumps of clay passively molded by class forces in a culture.34 Thus, this “man asscientist” stance has within it the argumentative capability to question both thetoo tightly drawn and trivial research generated by reductionistic science, as wellas the often too loose and untestable suppositions (dare I say constructs?) of criticalschool theorists.35

Basically, according to Kelly’s theory, a person’s constructs are validated byhis or her own experience. Therefore, constructive critical work could be producedif critics would be mindful of the interpolation of two levels of experience thatoperates when they perform the ethical act of criticizing texts: 1. the experienceof the author, on how they construe or predict the future; and, 2. how critics, inthe act of criticism, are responding to the text as their personally lived experience.In this fashion, acts of rhetorical criticism will be explicitly reflexive, and readersof that work of “artistic” criticism will not have to guess at the critic’s philosophicalbaggage load, as well as the author’s philosophical stance as revealed by the textunder scrutiny.

As communication scholar Robert R. Monaghan has stated, there are noperfect hypotheses or theories about rhetorical situations or events, just as thereare no perfect people.36 The decisive test of validity of a rhetorical theory restsupon its connection to the lived “felt” or “common” experience of all human beings,as Pepper describes: “Common sense... we thus discovered to be the very securebasis for all knowledge. There is no evidence to indicate that common sense willever fail mankind except as more refined knowledge supplements it... . Ourevidence... indicates that every item of common sense is a dubitandum, a matterthat ought to being doubted in the sense to being subject to rigorous criticalscrutiny, but this very same evidence indicates that the totality of common senseitself is, so to speak, not a dubitandum. It is a well-attested fact. All evidencepoints to it as the ultimate source of our cognitive refinements, and as the lowestlegitimate level to which cognition could sink should these refinements fail.37

In this view, research is “valid” if it enables researchers to better understandthis universal human experiencing. For example, Kelly states that in the doingof psychological research, a researcher needs to “intimately collaborate” with hisor her subjects and subject “himself [or herself] to the same experimental procedureshe proposes for his subjects”, the goal being the full experiencing of what his orher subjects experience.38 As Kelly argues, “close observation of everything thathappens, rather than confining one’s attention to those events for which theexperimental design has preconceived categories, is not only humanisticallyappropriate; it is good basic scientific method.”39 Similarly, “consistency” is held

22 ERIC GILDER 6

to be more important to Kelly than the traditional scientific definition of“reliability”, in the reading of repertory test results.40 In Pepper’s terms, Kelly’s“consistency” construct is a form of “structural corroboration.”As Pepper definesit: “Structural corroboration consists in the convergence of qualitatively differentitems of evidence in support of a single item. We see its operation in its crudestform in the assembling of “circumstantial evidence”, and its refined form intheories such as those of astronomical mechanics, which have proved cognitivelyvery impressive because of their high predictive powers and their extensiveorganization of huge masses of diverse, mutually corroborative observations.Structural corroboration requires a theory or hypothesis for the connection of thevarious items of evidence, and what is said to be corroborated here by theconvergence of evidence is not so much the evidence itself as the theory whichconnects it together. Actually the two assist each other. The theory is progressivelyconfirmed as it successively draws more evidence in, and the various differentitems of evidence achieve higher and higher corroboration in proportion as moreitems enter harmoniously into the structure of the theory. Structural corroborationis thus more individual than social. It depends upon the intellectual imaginationof a man [or woman] to conceive an hypothesis which will hold together diversefacts, and his power to demonstrate how diverse facts bear upon one another. Itis a corroboration of fact with fact41.

I agree with Pepper here, with one exception: I do not see the same demarcationbetween the individual and the social that he does: pace Kelly’s remark ondeterminism and freedom (that they “are opposite sides of the same coin”), Iposit that we, as individual practicing critics and writers, are, in part, the socialproduct of those people from whom we have learned. In my studies on literaryand rhetorical critics such as Wayne Booth, I have hoped to clearly demonstratethat we are not our own “self”, but, rather, a unity of socially-grounded multiple“selves”; complex, rich “selves” formed as much by the rhetorical community ofwhich we are a part as we form it. Such a wondrously intricate humanity that isa person and a critic can only be rightfully and faithfully rendered by an affectivelycredulous, yet logically critical qualitative methodology that is created hereinfrom the seminal thoughts provided me by a Kelly and a Pepper.42

NOTES


1. Michael J. Mahoney, Constructive Metatheory:I. Basic Features and Historical Foundations,„International Journal of Personal ConstructPsychology“, no. 1, 1988, p. 4.

2. Ibidem, pp. 4–5.3. Ibidem, notes xlvi–xlvii.4. Ibidem, p. 25.5. Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of “As-If”: ASystem of the Theoretical Practical and Religiousof Mankind, trans. C.K. Ogden, London, KeganPaul, 1935.

6. Brendan Maher, ed., Clinical Psychology andPersonality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly,New York, Willey, 1969, p. 149.

7. Barry Brummentt, Some Implications of “Process”or “Intersubjectivity”: Post-Modern Rhetoric,“Philosophy and Rhetoric”, no. 9, 1976, pp. 21–50.

8. Jack C. Orr, How Shall We Say: “Reality IsSocially Constructed through Communication?”,“Central States Speech Journal”, no. 29, 1978,p. 270.

9. Ibidem, pp. 272–273.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

24 ERIC GILDER 8

10. George A. Kelly, The Psychology of PersonalConstructs: Vol. One — A Theory of Personality,New York, Norton, 1955, p. 3.

11. The reader will, I hope, understand that further[sic]s after “the”, “him” and “man” are to beincorporated by reference.

12. George A. Kelly, op. cit., p. 8.13. Ibidem, p. 16.14. Brendan Maher, op. cit., p. 149.15. G.A. Kelly, op. cit., pp. 20–21.16. Kenneth Burke, AGrammar of Motives, Berkeley,

University of California Press, 1984, pp. 141–150.17. Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypotheses: A Study

in Evidence, Berkeley, University of CaliforniaPress, 1970, pp. 151, 186, 232, 280, 328–330.

18. G.A. Kelly, op. cit., pp. 19–22.19. Don Bannister, ed., New Perspectives in Personal

Construct Theory, London,Academic Press, 1977,p. 129.

20. See Eric Gilder, Man and Mission: ConstruingWayne Booth’s Theology of Literature as Rhetoric,Sibiu, “Lucian Blaga” University Press, 2003.

21. B. Maher, op. cit., p. 136.22. Ibidem, p. 53.23. Ibidem, pp. 115–117, 125.24. Cf Maher, op. cit., pp. 127–130 and Bannister,

op. cit., apud Michael Polanyi, PersonalKnowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy,Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962.

25. Don Bannister and J.M. Mair, The Evaluation ofPersonal Constructs, London, Academic Press,1968, p. 157.

26. Ibidem, p. 178.27. See Maher, op. cit., p. 149 and Pepper, op. cit.,

p. 334.28. Salvatore R. Maddi, Personality Theories: A

Comparative Analysis, 3rd ed., Homewood, DorseyPress, 1976, p. 155.

29. Maddi comments that if a perfect prediction ofevents were really possible for a person to achieve,

life would be boring indeed. A fair question toask of Kelly would be: “Does every person act asa calculating scientist at all times?”

30. Bannister, op. cit., p. 27.31. Ibidem, p. 26.32. Bannister, op. cit., pp. 93–124.33. This has already to some extent in mass

communication theory and practice, as witnessedby the move away from the “mass public” modelsof Hovland et al, in the 1930s, thourgh the “two-step” model of communicative influence of Katzand Lazarfeld toward the audience-driven themeof “uses and gratifications” research today. SeeM.L. DeFleur and Sandra Ball-Rokeach, Theoriesof Mass Communication, 4th ed., New York:Longman, 1982, pp. 143–165, 183–198.

34. Everett M. Rogers, The Empirical and thecritical schools of Communication Research,“Communication Yearbook”, no. 5, MichaelBurgoon ed., New York, Transaction, 1982,pp. 125–144. See also William H. Melody andRobin E. Mansell, The Debate Over Criticalvs. Administrative Research, “Journal ofCommunication”, Summer, 1983, pp. 103–116.

35. Don Bannister, Personal Construct Theory andResearch Method, “Human Inquiry: A Sourcebookof New Paradigm Research”, eds. Peter Reasonand John Rowan, New York, Wiley, 1981,pp. 191–199.

36. Robert R. Monaghan, Measurement in SpeechEducation, “The CommunicativeArts and Sciencesof Speech”, ed. Keith Brooks, Columbus, Merrill,1967, p. 571.

37. Pepper, op. cit., p. 320.38. Maher, op. cit., p. 140.39. Kelly, op. cit., p. 140.40. Ibidem, pp. 231–232.41. Pepper, op. cit., p. 321.42. See Gilder, op. cit.

Bannister, Don, (ed.), New Perspectives in PersonalConstruct Theory, London,Academic Press, 1977.

Bannister, Don, Personal Construct Theory andResearch Method, “Human Inquiry:ASourcebookof New Paradigm Research”, New York, Wiley,Peter Reason and John Rowan, 1981, pp. 191–99.

Bannister, Don, and J.M.M. Mair, The Evaluation ofPersonal Constructs, London, Academic Press,1968.

Booth, Wayne C., Critical Understanding: The Powersand Limits of Pluralism, Chicago, University ofChicago Press, 1979.

Brockriede, Wayne, Rhetorical Criticism as Argument,“Quarterly Journal of Speech 60”, 1974, pp. 165–74.

Brummentt, Barry, Some Implications of ‘Process’ or

‘Intersubjectivity’, Post-Modern Rhetoric,“Philosophy and Rhetoric”, no. 9, 1976, pp. 21–50.

Burke, Kenneth A., Contemporary Literary Critics,2nd edition, Detroit, edition Elmer Borklund,Gale Research, 1982, pp. 103–110.

Burke, Kenneth, Attitudes Towards History, 3rd edition,Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984.

Burke, Kenneth, A Grammar of Motives, Berkeley,University of California Press, 1969.

DeFleur, Melvin L., and Sandra Ball-Rokeach,Theories of Mass Communication, 4th edition,New York, Longman, 1982.

Gilder, Eric, Communication for Development andHabermas ‘Ideal Speech Situation’, “MediaDevelopment”, 35(4), Winter 1988, pp. 34–37.


Gilder, Eric, Man and Mission: Construing WayneBooth’s Theology of Literature as Rhetoric, Sibiu,“Lucian Blaga” University Press, 2003.

Kelly, George A., The Psychology of PersonalConstructs: Vol. One — A Theory of Personality,New York, Norton, 1955.

Maddi, Salvatore R., Personality Theories: AComparative Analysis, 3rd edition, Homewood,Dorsey Press, 1976.

Maher, Brendan, (ed.), Clinical Psychology andPersonality: The Selected Papers of George Kelly,New York, Wiley, 1969.

Mahoney, Michael J., Constructive Metatheory:I. Basic Features and Historical Foundations,“International Journal of Personal ConstructPsychology”, 1, 1988, pp. 1–35.

McCoy, Mildred M., A Reconstruction of Emotion,“New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory”,D. Bannister, London, Academic Press, 1977,pp. 93–124.

Melody, William H., and Robin E. Mansell, TheDebate Over Critical vs. Administrative Research:Circularity or Challenge?, “Journal ofCommunication”, Summer, 1983, pp. 103–16.

Monaghan, Robert R., Measurement in SpeechEducation, “The Communicative Arts andSciences of Speech”, Columbus: Merrill, KeithBrooks, 1967, pp. 564–79.

Orr, C. Jack, How Shall We Say: ‘Reality Is SociallyConstructed through Communication?, “CentralStates Speech Journal”, 29, 1978, pp. 263–74.

Pepper, Stephen C., World Hypotheses: A Study inEvidence, Berkeley, University of CaliforniaPress, 1942/1970.

Perelman, Ch. and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The NewRhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, Trans.John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver, NotreDame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.

Polanyi, Michel, Personal Knowledge: Towards aPost-Critical Philosophy, Chicago, University ofChicago Press, 1962.

Rogers, Everett M., The Empirical and theCritical Schools of Communication Research,“Communication Yearbook”, 5, New York,Transaction, Michael Burgoon, 1982, pp. 125–44.

Tichenor, Phillip J. and Douglas M. McLeod, TheLogic of Social and Behavioral Science,“Research Methods in Mass Communication”,2nd edition, Guido H. Stempel III and BruceH. Westley, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall,1989, pp. 10–29.

Toulmin, Stephen E., The Uses of Argument,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958.

Toulmin, Stephen E., Human Understanding, VolumeI: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts,Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972.

Vaihinger, Hans, The Philosophy of “As-if”: A Systemof the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictionsof Mankind, Trans. C.K. Ogden, London, KeganPaul, 1935.

LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALESET L’ÉTHIQUE ACTUELLE DU POUVOIR

ADELA DELIU

La problématique vaste et complexe des rapports entre éthique et politiqueest redevenue un point de référence pour les analyses et les disputes théoriquesà la fin du XXe siècle. Les réflections sur ce rapport ont fait ressortir, dans lepérimètre de la pensée éthique et politique, des perceptions, des arguments et desattitudes contradictoires, déterminées, en bonne mesure, par les expériences vécues.Ainsi, d’une part, à la suite de l’effondrement des régimes totalitaires, les tendancesqui visaient «le discrédit des critiques de l’aliénation politique» ont pris del’ampleur, mais aussi des objections liées à l’évaluation de l’action politique «avecles unités de mesure spécifiques aux valeurs éthiques». D’autre part, la nécessitéde consolider ces connexions, comme fondement et garantie pour assurer laliberté, l’égalité et la justice1 a été de plus en plus affirmée. En conséquence,aujourd’hui, quand le monde est marqué par deux tendances complémentaires,respectivement,«la scission des frontières idéologiques», par la globalisation etl’intensification des différences entre les cultures, les mentalités et les styles devie, il s’impose une attitude aux nouvelles hypothèses et méthodes de recherchede cette connexion.

Etant donné la complexité et la difficulté de ce problème théorique mais aussipratique, il s’impose la précision que les repères de cette démarche visent lestendances actuelles de l’analyse des rapports entre l’éthique et la politiqueinternationale, implicitement l’importance et la signification des valeurs éthiquesdans ce contexte. Cette démarche est accompagnée aussi par l’interprétation decertains évènements politiques et attitudes internationales qui mettent en discussionles stratégies d’action, les paradigmes théoriques et leur dimension morale.

L’analyse, la réévaluation et la repensée des rapports entre éthique et politique,plus précisément la politique internationale, ne peuvent ignorer les interrogationsdes valeurs impliquées et ne peuvent exclure non plus les connexions et lesrapports avec la réalité existante, implicitement «avec leçons de l’histoire» desexpériences communes et particulières. Ce fait, puisque la démarche théorique,adaptée avec changements du monde actuel, exclut la variante que les valeurspolitiques et morales soient associées avec ces contenus-là, déduits d’une Véritémétaphysique, avec des valences absolues et universelles. De nos jours, lorsquel’univers des utopies et le territoire des idéologies n’ont plus aucun pouvoir réel


de conviction, celle-ci étant annihilée par le besoin des hommes de modeler etde gouverner leur propre vie et non pas de «transformer le monde», tenir comptede la réalité conflictuelle de la vie et de la diversité des situations particulièresreprésente une condition essentielle d’une analyse théorique à laquelle il peutdétacher des valeurs communes et de nouvelles règles d’action. Davantage, leconflit entre les valeurs ou «la guerre des divinités», selon l’expression de MaxWeber, attire surtout l’attention sur le fait que les valeurs et les raisons des valeursne sont pas équivalentes, mais antagoniques ou complémentaires et, aussi, quela rationalité scientifique «est incapable, au fond, de trouver la solution de tousles problèmes posés par l’esprit humain»2.

Souvent les valeurs accompagnent les espoirs concernant l’émancipation deshommes mais aussi une série des troubles liés aux possibilités de résoudre lesproblèmes majeurs de la société et du monde actuel. Dans cet espace diversifié,les valeurs morales se multiplient en «morales concurrentes», alternatives oucontradictoires, ce qui détermine l’affirmation du relativisme, dont la conséquencepositive est la stimulation de la tolérance. Il y a aussi des cas dans lesquelss’affirment soit la dégradation ou «le crépuscule de l’éthique», soit l’inutilité dela morale en politique. Au niveau des relations internationales, on considère quel’association de la morale à la politique est une association bizarre ou forcée.D’ailleurs, le composant ou la dimension éthique de la politique internationaleconstitue aujourd’hui, pour beaucoup de commentateurs, une ironie ou une autreutopie. Pour eux, l’idée de moralité internationale est, en elle-même, contradictoireet son acceptation présuppose que les Etats partagent des valeurs et des croyancescommunes, jamais disputées ou négociées3.

Les valeurs morales constituent un système important de signalisation, nécessairepour coordonner des attitudes et actions politiques, mais aussi pour l’avertissementdes risques et de leurs conséquences négatives. C’est pourquoi il s’impose quel’analyse des rapports entre la politique et la moralité dépasse le stade danslequel on discute seulement sur la moralité des gouverneurs ou la moralité despoliticiens. Lorsque «la dissipation des responsabilités morales» est évidente, eton y remarque aussi «une dégradation continuelle de l’univers moral, administrépar la politique», aujourd’hui, plus que jamais, est néccessaire l’analyse «de lamoralité politique», avant tout, de la dimension morale des décisions du pouvoir4.Dans cette direction, Paul Ricoeur considérait que l’éthique et la politique nepeuvent être analysées indépendamment l’une de l’autre. Les deux domaines«même s’ils se croisent, ne peuvent fusionner». Il y a même un plus grand péril:celui «d’ignorer le croisement de l’éthique et de la politique plus que de lesconfondre»5. Ce péril, apprécie Ricoeur, est alimenté aussi par la multiplication descrises reflétées autant au nivel des politiques internes qu’au nivel international.

La connexion entre l’éthique et la politique, en général, ou le problème de lamoralité dans les relations internationales, souligne les difficultés réelles dansles démarches théoriques. Celles-ci sont en bonne partie déterminées par lenombre et la nature des questions concernant la dimension morale des relationsinternationales. Ces questions mettent l’accent sur le soulignement du statutd’éthique ou sur le rôle dans la structuration des décisions politiques et la

2 LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET L’ÉTHIQUE ACTUELLE DU POUVOIR 27

réglementation des rapports parmi les États. Aussi, sont importantes lesquestions qui visent la compatibilité de la dimension normative, reflétée auniveau de la pratique politique et dans le fonctionnement des institutions et lecomposant morale, associée aux exigences concernant la défense et le respectdes droits de l’homme ou l’accord entre la légitimité formulée et soutenuephilosophiquement et moralement. Dans ce cadre, nombreux sont les commentateursqui, en partant de la thèse qu’il y a des différences fondamentales entre la véritépolitique et la vérité éthique, soutiennent l’incompatibilité entre la morale et lapolitique internationale. En même temps, il y a aussi beaucoup de voix quiaffirment que les valeurs morales sont indissociables des valeurs politiques, mêmenécessaires pour redéfinir les relations internationales, dans la restructurationdes politiques pour maintenir l’ordre mondial et, surtout, dans la mise en évidencedes directions d’action, corrélées avec l’établissement de critères de compréhensionet d’évaluation de causes et d’effets, d’objectifs ou de moyens utilisés.

La théorie du pouvoir dans les relations internationales a été et l’est encoremarquée par les impératifs concrets du présent, mais aussi par l’évolution desintérêts et des aspirations humaines. De ce point de vue, les théoriciens de cedomaine, de H. Morgenthau à J. Rosneau, ont soutenu l’idée que le principefondamental des relations internationales est le maintien de l’équilibre parmi lespuissances et ont affirmé l’indépendance structurelle de la politique internationale.Ils ont principalement abordé les trois articulations essentielles du pouvoir: lerapport entre les composants matériels du puissances, les éléments qui constituentles bases des relations inter-étatiques et la capacité prédictive de la théorieconcernant l’évolution des rapports de forces6. À leur tour, les penseurs politiquesvont définir leurs positions par l’analyse et l’interprétation des événementspolitiques ou ils vont lancer leurs hypothèses et constructions dans les troisdirections fondamentales où se sont déroulés les débats, liés au rôle de la moralitédans les relations internationales. Il s’agit du réalisme politique et du scepticismemoral, du libéralisme et l’universalisme moral et du postmodernisme qui instituele relativisme éthique.

Les changements produits après la fin de la «guerre froide» ont généré unenouvelle configuration politique sur le plan mondial. Ces changements ontégalement imposé de nouvelles réflexions d’ordre politique, moral et géostratégique.D’une part, ces changements sont necessaires à cause de la crise des valeurstraditionnelles et des concepts avec une relevance discutable, comme la sécurité,la souveraineté, la redistribution et la citoyenneté. D’autre part, ces changementssont sollicités par le grand et fréquent nombre de disputes sur les dilemmes morauxqui accompagnent les actions internationales les plus sonores et les plus amples.Il s’agit d’interventions humanitaires et pour l’assurance de la sécurité nationaleet internationale, l’impôt de la justice sur le plan mondial et de l’ordre moral etpas moins par le front ouvert contre le terrorisme, par le recours à la force, pourl’instauration de la démocratie. Tous ces actes et pensées, évalués dans la perspectivedes théories morales, mettent en évidence le fait que l’attitude et le comportementpolitique se réalisent en fonction de la situation et de l’expérience concrètes etnon par le rapport aux principes abstraits7.

28 ADELA DELIU 3

Les commentaires et les analyses qui visent la multiplication, la nature et lalégitimité des interventions politiques et militaires prennent en considération lescauses, les objectifs visés mais aussi les conséquences qui produisent de nouveauxproblèmes politiques et dilemmes moraux. Dans ce contexte, G. Andreani et P.Hassner apprécient que l’interventionnisme a généralement créé des problèmeset dilemmes pareils. Avec la spécification que les problèmes qui surgissent sontcomplètement differents des problèmes du maintien de la paix classique, lesdeux auteurs de l’étude Morale et violence internationale avertissent sur lesdifficultés de compréhension, d’action et de coopération. Ces difficultés visent:le décalage entre le mandat politique et les moyens utilisés, la protection desforces d’intervention et la neutralisation des forces rebelles et de résistance, lareconstruction de l’État et la réhabilitation de l’économie. En plus, le recours àla force, soit sur la base du principe de légitimité de la défense de sécurité, soitpour des raisons strictement humanitaires de défense et de garantie des droits del’homme, à l’instar des interventions en Somalie, au Rwanda, en Bosnie, au Kosovo,en Irak a généré des disputes et des réactions critiques autour de certains dilemmescomme: l’utilisation de la force à l’appui des victimes de l’oppression totalitaireou la contrainte et l’annihilation des oppresseurs, l’assurance de l’équilibre entrel’intervention des forces de sécurité et le risque d’effets collatéraux, le rapportentre l’autonomie des actions militaires et leur subordination par rapport à lapolitique qui les soutient et les légitime, implicitement, la charge de la responsabilitéde toutes interventions pendant et après les actions déroulées8.

La nouvelle dynamique des rapports entre les États et l’extension de ladémocratie en vertu des principes qui la légitiment (le principe de la liberté, leprincipe de l’organisation d’élections libres et le principe de l’autodétermination)et celle d’un desideratum à peu près généralisé, mettent en évidence aussi leproblème éthique des moyens utilisés pour imposer et défendre le droit à ladémocratie. Des questions essentielles apparaissent dans ce sens: la démocratiepeut-elle être imposée par la force et le droit à la démocratie peut-il être défendupar des méthodes autoritaires ? La démocratie est-elle une solution pour des paysavec un potentiel conflictuel en évidence élevé, des pays avec des différenceséthnoculturelles inconnues et contestées ? Une série d’objections ont été formuléesà ces questions visant «la confirmation du droit à la démocratie comme appartenantau droit international». De cette manière on invoque le fait qu’il n’y a pas unedéfinition de la démocratie à l’unanimité acceptée et même pas de procéduresdémocratiques ayant une valabilité générale. De plus, même si on considère que«l’intervention démocratique peut être justifiée par l’évolution de la notion desouverainité», de la perspective du droit international, ce fait ne remplit pas unconsensus large. Davantage, même si on reconnaît la distinction entre le respectde la démocratie et la reconnaissance des droits de l’homme, on ignore le conflitentre les deux demandes, avec des effets négatifs dans tous les plans de la vieinterne et internationale9.

Les critiques de l’intervention démocratique mettent en discussion la légitimitéde toutes les opérations subordonnées à cet objectif et attirent l’attention sur lefait que, au-delà de l’affirmation d’égalité entre les Etats versus la responsabilitéentre les grands puissances, se trouve le droit de chaque peuple à une existence


libre, paisible et civilisée. Explicitement, les représentants de l’école critique dudroit international considèrent que cette politique interventionniste ne crée pasla belle et désirée démocratie, mais elle impose et justifie un autre type de domination,essentiellement neolibérale10.

Dans le même esprit critique, il est analysé aussi «le dilemme de la sécurité»,un syntagme et un concept utilisé dans la théorie des relations internationales,avec des origines dans la théorie politique de Th. Hobbes. Ce «dilemme de lasécurité», qui fait équivaler le système politique à un système anarchique, a commeprémisse théorique l’extension de l’état naturel au niveau des relations internationaleset vise l’assurance de la sécurité par l’augmentation exagérée du pouvoir11. Leparadoxe est qu’on arrive à un renforcement de l’état d’insécurité et à «unespirale d’hostilités et d’armements». En conséquence, ce ne sont pas les relationsanarchiques qui sont responsables du renforcement de l’état d’agitation socialeet internationale, mais la méfiance réciproque entre des Etats (plus précisémentdans leurs intentions de démocratisation et pacification du monde) et les échecsrépétés sur le plan de la communication.

Une perspective opposée à l’interventionnisme est celle lancée par l’auteur«de l’éthique du discours», Jürgen Habermas, qui se propose de continuer le projetkantien de «la paix éternelle». Ce qui particularise sa démarche est l’affirmationde l’unité rationnelle du langage et la nécessité de la connexion de la théorieavec «la réalité et l’ordre historique». Ainsi, par la connaissance des tendancesnaturelles, qui permettent le passage de l’état naturel vers jus cosmopoliticus, onpeut arriver à une cohabitation paisible seulement à condition de créer d’urgenceun «espace politique international» et une réforme des institutions existantes.Exprimé de manière synthétique, cet espace est celui «des interactions et desconciliations des intérêts individuels, de la conscience morale et des traditionsconservées par la communauté»12. En même temps, il faut souligner que cet espacede l’harmonie des relations et des intérêts humains est loin de confirmer, avecdes arguments philosophiques, «l’universalisme moral», fortement soutenu parKant, visé par Habermas et contesté par d’autres penseurs politiques contemporains.

En général, l’attitude critique par rapport à l’interventionnisme et lescontroverses concernant les solutions formulées, attirent l’attention, également,sur la responsabilité politique des Etats impliqués par rapport aux risques derenforcer les vieilles tendances ou de générer de nouveaux conflits et, pas moins,d’en multiplier et exagérer dramatiquement les coûts moraux et humains. Onparle souvent en termes durs et impérieux de la dégradation morale du mondepolitique actuel comme d’un problème réel et grav, souvent difficile à quantifier.Une telle voix critique est celle de Noam Chomsky, dont la philosophie politique,conformément à certains commentateurs, a certains accents qui se croisent avecla philosophie anarchique. Le point de départ dans son analyse critique, de Desambitions impériales est représenté par la définition du système impérial commesystème de domination et de «l’Etat imposteur», comme organisme institutionnel,qui ignore le droit international, promeut l’aggression et ignore enfreint les droitsde l’homme. Son message exprime la confiance aux hommes et non aux institutionsdu pouvoir. Le seul type de gouvernement acceptable est celui de la liberté deconscience, est le gouvernement qui exclut toute autorité arbitraire. A l’antipode

30 ADELA DELIU 5

se trouvent tous les gouvernements dont l’autorité est exclusivement soutenuepar le pouvoir ou par la popularité médiatisée, implicitement, par le gouvernementaméricain. L’indignation résulte du comportement politique des autorités, qui,bien qu’il «soit sans cesse à couvert en bienveillance», cache l’intention desEtats-Unis de détenir et de garder le contrôle du monde13. En ce qui cencerne lapolitique américaine actuelle, explicitement à l’intervention et à l’effondrementde la dictature en Irak, Chomsky n’hésite pas à rappeler une ancienne devise,conformément à l’idée que le bien s’impose forcément par l’amputation du mal.La rhétorique de la libération d’Irak est aussi critiquée et en même temps quecelle de l’instauration de la démocratie, dont la légitimité est acceptée et reconnue,seulement avec l’accord et l’approbation des sauveurs14.

Un autre type de réaction déontologique et morale est souvent provoqué parles efforts des puissances d’entretenir avec des moyens de plus en plus sophistiquésle dramatisme d’un monde marqué par des conflits et des tensions, beaucoupétant de nature ethnique et religieuse. De cette manière, parce que le pouvoir nepeut s’imposer et maintenir exclusivement par la justification rationnelle ou parla domination dure, les autorités politiques n’hésitent pas à faire appel à «undispositif destiné à produire des effets de la catégorie comparable avec les illusionscrée par le mécanisme théâtral»15.

Plus que jamais, tant dans la politique interne qu’internationale, la mesure dupouvoir est donnée aussi par la capacité de créer et de transmettre des imagesdont la valeur dépasse, comme impact, le pouvoir de l’argumentation logique.L’accès, à «la télé-réalité» plutôt qu’à la réalité, le croisement de l’image (commesubstitut de la pensée, comme G. Sartori soutenait en Homo videns) avec lecynisme du «télé-politicien», transforme la zone du politique dans une scène oùles dramatisations et les effets visuels sont vitaux pour l’exercice et le maintiendu pouvoir. D’ailleurs, le pouvoir, confronté à une triple menace, c’est-à-dire cellede «la vérité qui risque de briser l’écran des apparences», du soupçon et «del’usure qui l’oblige à la révolutionner», est déterminé à recourir aux techniquesd’enchaînement des images dans une mise en scène où les valences narrativesdes actions projetées sont essentielles et non pas la valeur de la vérité ou de lamorale en politique16.

La politique, en général, s’est trouvée et continue d’être sous l’assaut d’undiscrédit frénétique, surtout en ce qui concerne la confiance aux structures dupouvoir (interne et international), au management politique, mais aussi àl’évaluation des performances politiques, sous l’aspect humain et moral. Etantconnu le fait que la politique ne se rapporte pas à un monde avec un ordrepréétabli et dépourvu de contraintes et que sa vocation fondamentale est celle deservir l’homme, le rôle de la connaissance solide du phénomène politique et lerôle des valeurs morales n’est pas mis en doute, au moins au niveau déclaratif.Pourtant même si on entend fréquemment les voix qui soutiennent que les valeursmorales sont indispensables en politique et, également, dans la rédéfinition desrelations internationales, dans l’établissement des critères d’évaluation et dans lemaintien de l’ordre et de la cohésion humaine, on constate, en fait, le mimétismede la moralité ou une faible influence des valeurs morales. Il en résulte, d’unepart, des efforts des analystes de décodifier les intentions politiques réelles et le


message humain et, d’autre part, l’évidence que la responsabilité est assuméeseulement verbalement et imposée au niveau des déclarations comme obligationou transférée aux institutions par lesquelles se créent les prémisses de l’apparitiondu politicien justicière. D’ailleurs, cette responsabilité dissimulée et non-assuméecomme responsabilité authentique met en évidence une série de contradictions.En bonne mesure, celles-ci visent la dimension théorique et pragmatique de lapolitique internationale, implicitement les controverses entre les différentscourants et orientations politiques et également les contradictions soulignées parles analystes politiques entre le composant rationnel et celui irrationnel desrelations internationales. Celles-ci se reflètent dans la démarche des plus importantsproblèmes du monde contemporain, principalement dans la légitimité théoriquedes décisions politiques et pas moins dans la compréhension du rôle de l’éthiqueet des mécanismes moraux dans le cadre des relations internationales.

Le composant rationnel du pouvoir, reflété dans l’axiome de l’Etat rationnel,est soutenu tant par les représentants du réalisme politique, que par ceux dulibéralisme institutionnel. Dans les deux cas on apprécie que la rationalité ducomportement politique est demandée, d’abord par la double détermination entrel’état d’anarchie, au niveau général, et la politique des Etats (qui à leur tournourrissent cet état) ou est soutenue, par les adeptes du libéralisme, par les procéduresinstituées de la prise de décisions, respectivement le recours au « choix rationnel», parl’intermédiaire des institutions internationales17.

La rationalité de l’Etat et de la décision politique dans le plan des relationsinternationales ont été parfois repoussés ou analyséses dans des perspectivesdifférentes. Un repère théorique important et une position clairement expriméesont ceux formulés au début du XXeme siècle par Carl Schmitt, adepte dudécisionisme («Souverain est celui qui décide sur l’exception»), qui apprecieque le principe fondamental de la politique est le binôme «ami-ennemi»ou «allié-adversaire». Cette distinction fait que l’espace politique contienneinévitablement «une altérité conflictuelle» qui ne peut pas être abordée parrapport aux principes rationnels ou normes communes, reconnues et acceptéespar tous. La politique et la souveraineté sont subordonnées à «la logique dupouvoir», et «la conduite morale des Etats» n’est pas évaluée par rapport à uneprétendue morale abstraite, mais seulement dans et par la guerre18. Autrementdit, la sphère de la politique internationale est prédestinée aux tensions et auxconflits, tandis que le critère moral-imoral, appliqué aux relations internationalesne peut être qu’arbitraire. Dans ce paradigme d’interprétation se trouve aussil’approche réaliste de H. Morgenthau. En utilisant la volonté du pouvoir desEtats dans la définition des relations internationales comme critère, Morgenthause situe sur la même position théorique que celle développée par Carl Schmitt, àl’exception du fait qu’il considère le critère «ami-ennemi» non-relevant dans ladéfinition de la politique internationale. Pour lui, «toute la politique exterieuren’est que la volonté du pouvoir de maintenir, de grandir et d’affirmer le pouvoir»et non le respect des principes moraux abstraits ou des normes, du présupposédroit international, invoqué par H. Kelsen. En conséquence, les principes morauxsont intangibles, mais on peut tout au plus s’approcher de ce but, «par unéquilibre d’intérêts et par une solution partielle des conflits»19.

32 ADELA DELIU 7

La rationalité de l’Etat et des décisions politiques dans le contexte des relationsinternationales ont été reanalysés aussi de la perspective de certaines recherchesinterdisciplinaires, qui introduisent des données du domaine de la psychologiesociale et de la sociologie des groupes. Ainsi, R. McElroy apprécie que, dans lapolitique exterieure, la conscience a un rôle et impact important sur les facteursdécisionnels. Ce rôle se met en évidence en deux situations distinctes: la premièrevise la relevance morale d’une action politique qui influence et soutient ladécision, respectivement le programme de politique exterieure, et la deuxièmesituation met l’accent sur la conscience des facteurs de décision qui les déterminentà choisir, d’une manière raisonnable, des actions avec une signification morale.Par conséquent, la conscience acceptée comme instance morale, plus ou moinsobjective au niveau de chaque individu, peut influencer «les facteurs de décisionà avoir ou à repousser des initiatives de politique exterieure, grâce à leursimplications morales»20.

L’analyse des relations internationales est indissociable de l’analyse desthéories et concepts politiques et éthiques. Ceci, parce que même si on constateà première vue la prévalence des dimensions pragmatiques et normatives, lalégitimité des actions politiques, à base des fondements éthiques-philosophiques,ne peut être ignorée. De plus, dans les conditions d’un désaccord réel entre ledesideratum général concernant l’affirmation d’une nouvelle société libre,paisible, équilibrée et humaine et beaucoup de divisions et disputes au niveaudes intérêts, convictions et valeurs, on s’impose, plus que jamais, la concentrationsur ces fondements théoriques. Ceux-ci sont destinés à assurer, d’une part, lesexplications nécessaires pour diminuer la perspective des conflits et des guerreset, d’autre part, d’offrir un cadre intelligible à l’expression libre et à la coopérationdes Etats. Cette nécessité est de plus en plus évidente aujourd’hui, surtout aprèsles attentats de 11 septembre 2001 des Etats-Unis, lorsqu’une nouvelle théoriedes conflits ou «la théorie de la barbarie» se préfigure. La l’enjeu principal estune stratégie centrée sur des intérêts économiques et politiques et soutenus parl’ascension des ressentiments manifestés dans des actions violentes etirrationnelles. Les actions terroristes, en réalité, «une imitation de la guerre civile»,confirment cette tendance mais sous la forme «du rituel tragique spectaculaire»où la fonction du sacrifice est loin de contribuer à «l’apprivoisement de la violence»21.

Les théories sur les relations internationales mettent en évidence, d’une part,qu’elles s’inscrivent dans ce que R. Aron appelait des «relations globales», avecdes données et des principes acceptés et, d’autre part, qu’elles sont dépendantesdes décisions subsumées à un système de valeurs partiellement soutenues.Également, la compréhension et l’évaluation correcte de la politique internationaleprésupposent la connaissance de à qu’implique la coopération, dans lesconditions d’acceptation de la diversité humaine et des causes qui alimentent desréactions violentes et produisent des conflits sociaux et politiques. Dans ce sens,R. Aron, même s’il a plaidé pour l’autonomie du politique, il n’a pas acceptél’isolement de «la totalité sociale» et n’a pas exclu l’interdépendance entre ledomaine du politique et la sphère de la connaissance, de la liberté et de lamoralité. Ce «spectateur engagé» a repoussé toute mystification et démarcheunilatérale et exagérée concernant la légalité ou la moralité de la politique


interne et internationale. Dans sa vision, l’action politique refléte et concrétiseune attitude par rapport aux valeurs affirmées et également «un acte moral puisqu’ilimplique toujours une communauté». Ainsi, en exclusant toute exagération dutype de celles lancées par les théories progressistes de facture scientifique, parl’idéalismemoralisateur ou par lemoralisme conservateur,Aron situe le raisonnementhistorique comme le raisonnement moral «dans une sphère intermédiaire parmiles principes universels, abstraits et les principes du réalisme brut». En raison decette position, il n’ignore et n’exagère le rôle de la moralité en politique, mais ilassocie la moralité avec la prudence et la sagesse. L’auteur français était convaincuque «la moralité de la sagesse» représente plus que «la moralité de la compassion».Même si elle est loin de contribuer à résoudre des conflits de différentes zonesdu monde, cette moralité constitue pourtant un support réel pour «le plus acceptablecompromis» ou pour ce qui a été nommé un «compromis raisonnable»22.

Les données du monde contemporain et les discours théoriques actuels mettenten évidence l’impératif de repenser et d’identifier de nouvelles significations durapport moralité-politique internationale. Au-delà des désaccords concernant lalégitimité et les principes de fonction du système international, des controversesconcernant certains problèmes qui visent les actions politiques déroulées,l’intérêt national ou le destin commun, l’égalité entre les Etats et la responsabilitédes grands pouvoirs, la nécessité de reconstruire la solidarité humaine, autour devaleurs authentiques, deviennent de plus en plus évidentes. Le recours à la force,à la pression et à l’intimidation sont également des moyens immoraux etinhumains qui ont menacé et toujours menaceront la civilisation de l’humanité.

NOTES

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1. Évelyne Pisier, Istoria ideilor politice, trad. IolandaIaworski, Timiºoara; Amarcord, 2000, p. 515.

2. Sylvie Mesure,Alain Renaut, Rãzboiul zeilor, eseudespre cearta valorilor, trad. Roxana Albu ºiCiprian Mihali, Târgoviºte, Pandora-M, 2002, p. 80.

3. Gilles Andreani, Pierre Hassner, Moraleet violence internationale, “Commentaire” v111/2005, p. 651.

4. Zygmunt Bauman, Etica postmodernã, trad. DoinaLicã, Timiºoara, Amarcord, 2000, p. 300.

5. Paul Ricoeur, Eseuri de hermeneuticã, trad. VasileTonoiu, Bucureºti, Humanitas, 1995, p. 300.

6. Iulia Motoc, Teoria relaþiilor internaþionale,Sursele filosofiei morale ºi a dreptului, Bucureºti,Paideia, 2001, p. 96.

7. Bernard Williams, La fortune morale, Paris,P.U.F., 1994, p. 42.

8. Gilles Andreani, Pierre Hassner, ibidem, p. 650.9. Iulia Motoc, op. cit., p. 72.

10. Iulia Motoc, op. cit., p. 73.11. J. Hertz, Idealist Internationalism and the

Security, „Dilemma“, pp. 157–180, în: I. Motoc,op. cit., p. 47.

12. Jürgen Habermas, La paix perpétuelle, lebicentenaire d’une idée kantienne, Paris, EdituraDu Cerf, 1996, pp. 42–46.

13. Noam Chomsky, Ambiþii imperiale, trad. Henrietaªerban, Prahova, Antet XX Press, 2005, p. 43.

14. Ibidem, p. 55.15. Georges Ballandier, Scena puterii, trad. Fãrcaº

Sanda, Oradea, Aion, 2000, p. 16.16. Ibidem, p. 85.17. Iulia Motoc, op. cit., p. 56–58.18. Sylvie Mesure, Alain Renaut, op. cit., p. 103–104.19. Hans Morgenthau, La notion du politique et la

théorie des différends internationaux, Paris,1933, p. 3.

20. R. McElroy, Moralitatea în politica externãamericanã, rolul eticii în relaþiile internaþionale,Bucureºti, Paideia, 1998, p. 56.

21. Georges Ballandier, op. cit., p. 109.22. Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations,

Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1983, p. 64.

LA MONDIALISATION COMME OBJET PHILOSOPHIQUE?

ANDRÉ TOSEL

On ne saurait énoncer quelque chose sur la catégorie de mondialisation sanssituer son inscription dans une constellation sémantique et conceptuelle oùfigurent les notions de monde, mondanéité, être-au-monde. Notre rapport aumonde, à notre monde «moderne», ne va pas de soi, il émerge après que se soientépuisées deux grandes modalités, que l’on eut sommairement définir commeappartenance au cosmos antique et comme situation dans le mundus de la traditionjuive et chrétienne.

• Le cosmos antique est la totalité sensée et hiérarchisée des étants, totalitétoujours déjà donnée dans sa forme originiare comme un odre, avec ses places,l’homme occupant un lieu médian qui le fait appartenir au divin, à l’intelligible,et au physique, au sensible. Cette double appartenance est médiatisée par lanature éthico-politique spécifique de l’animal humain qui a le logos et vit dansla polis où il peut actualiser sa vertu proprement humaine, dans la sphère de lapraxis. Cette sphère est originale en ce que l’homme libre, le citoyen, dans lacontingence, peut faire être le champ des activités poiético-pratiques. Toutefoisla vie bonne, l’eu prattein n’a pour le philosophe qu’une nécessité relative.Importe pour la satisfaction totale la vie selon la theoria, la vue de l’ordre en sonéternité, sa considération, qui seule donne le site où le cosmos peut être compris,ses signes déchiffrés, sa loi observée.

• Le mundus chrétien ne remet certes pas en question l’ordre, mais il enrenouvelle profondément l’économie et le sens. Le monde astral et terrestre,les cieux et la terre, ne sont plus éternels mais créés par un Dieu personnel créateurqui intervient dans son cours pour en faire une histoire du salut. Les hiérarchiesterrestres de la cité entre hommes libres et esclaves ne sont pas détruites, mais tousles hommes sont des fils de Dieu auxquels le salut est annoncé, non pas donné.Perdu par le péché, l’homme est par sa liberté un principe d’errance dans lacréation, mais il peut aussi entendre l’appel salvateur de la révélation en vivantdans le monde comme s’il n’était pas de ce monde, en usant de lui pour se préparerà la consommation des temps, en aménageant ce monde par son labeur.

La mondanéité moderne se détermine comme destruction et effacement ducosmos et du mundus. La nature n’est plus ce qu’il faut imiter, la surnature tombedans le préjugé. L’homme est au monde sur le mode de l’être-jeté, et cet «être-jeté» se découvre comme forme de la constitution humaine d’un monde del’homme, d’une histoire poiético-pratique que l’homme est supposé pouvoirfaire à partir de ses capacités. Que cette mondaneïté se divise d’elle-même en


monde civil des nations, en royaume intelligible de la liberté par delà le royaumede la nécessité, le «mondain» a cessé dans tous les cas d’être un donné cosmologique,ou un créé tragique, il devient le processus de l’auto-production de l’homme, detous les hommes désormais posés comme libres. Il est un produit d’une activitéde production hantée par le modèle de la causa sui, dont tous les hommesparticipent en tant que sujets autonomes.

Notre être-au-monde, au monde devenu mondialité, résultat du processus demondialisation de la production, est d’abord la fin du monde, la fin du mondedonné antique et celle du monde dans lequel nous est signifié l’appel à vivre en cemonde sans en être le fils. La mondanéité moderne repose sur la déconsidérationdu cosmos et du mundus, sur la puissance du désir, de la subjectivité désirante, seprojetant en devenir monde de son autoproduction et réalisant ainsi son Soi absolu.Comme le remarque Jean-Luc Nancy1, le désir qui liquide la considération desastres divins, déconsidère le monde pour en faire l’objet de son desiderium qui sesidère lui-même dans la production du monde de la production pour la production,capitaliste jusqu’à nouvel ordre. La planète errante du libre désir naît du désastredu cosmos et du mundus, et elle fait de la terre qu’elle recouvre sa propre planète.Longtemps cette autoproduction a réussi à fairre coïncider la conquête de la terreet la promesse mondialiste, universaliste, de faire de cette conquête sidérante lemonde que la liberté humaine produit à partir d’elle-même, le regnum hominis, levrai mundus intelligibilis. C’est à l’aune de cette promesse que nous voudrionsinterroger la philosophie actuelle dans sa confrontation avec la mondialisation.

De l’apologie à l’apocalypse de la mondialisationou comment s’orienter dans la pensée

Si en ces moments les plus hauts, la philosophie occidentale moderne s’estvoulue pensée de l’universel rationnel comme fondement du mondial sous lesauspices du droit (Kant et le cosmopolitisme), si avec Hegel et Marx elle a penséensemble cet universel et les contradictions du monde réel, la philosophieactuelle, du moins en France, a renoncé à penser la mondialisation de manièredirecte, en unissant élaboration des catégories de l’universel et analyse déterminéedes processus effectifs.

Les seules exceptions notables sont celles d’Eric Weil qui dans sa Philosophiepolitique2 trop oubliée, s’interrogeait sur le mécanisme social en voie demondialisation; ou de philosophes marqués par le meilleur de Marx (HenriLefebvre, Étienne Balibar, Jacques Bidet, Daniel Bensaïd, Jean Robelin, YvesSchwartz, Jean-Marie Vincent). La philosophie délègue cette analyse aux sciencessociales qui la tentent dans un style différent pour chacune d’elles. Ainsil’économie politique présente un champ antagonique où s’affrontent la thèselibérale (dominante) du marché mondial comme base d’un nouvel ordreinternational et la thèse critique (minoritaire) de cet ordre au nom de la structuredivisée de l’économie-monde (école de Samir Amin, de Giorgio Arrighi, deImmanuel Wallerstein). Ainsi la sociologie, depuis Max Weber, traite le problèmeà partir d’une interrogation sur la spécificité de la sociéte moderne commesociété de la rationalisation mondiale des structures économiques, politiques,

36 ANDRÉ TOSEL 2

juridiques et culturelles. Une énorme littérature spécialisée a vu le jour; le moinsque l’on puisse dire est qu’elle n’a pas attiré l’attention des philosophes professionnels.

Ce partage des tâches a pour effet de conduire la philosophie à aborder lamondialisation du capitalisme de manière indirecte, par prétérition ou pareuphémisation. On peut grossièrement regrouper en effet sous deux chefs cetteapproche de la mondialisation par la philosopie, celle de l’apologie de lamondialisation par euphémisation de ses contradictions, et celle de lamondialisation déterminée par prétérition comme l’événement indiscriminéd’une apocalypse sans au delà.

• L’apologie indirecte de la mondialisation capitaliste est le fait de laphilosophie politique issue du libéralisme. Elle prend acte de la mondialisation dumarché des capitaux, de l’interdépendance des économies capitalistes, de ladominance des technologies à haute valeur ajoutée qui sont des technologies dela communication et de l’information. Elle prend la forme de la thèse du nouvelordre mondial supposé avoir émergé de la disparition du communisme de typesoviétique pour soutenir que dans les contradictions et les inégalités du marchémondial se réalise une complémentarité des économies et des politiques donttémoigne la constitution de zones nouvelles de libre-échange tendant àl’unification en une fédération quasi étatique (ainsi la communauté européenne).On n’a pas assez remarqué que cette philosophie politique accepte un partageinitial des tâches avec l’économie politique, dont elle accepte de laisserdéterminer cette autonomie de l’extérieur et de recevoir comme objets à traiterdes objets séparés de leurs conditions de possibilité économiques et sociales. Ellerabat ses propres objets politiques sur le droit et la morale. C’est ainsi que lathématique de la justice et de ses principes éthiques permet d’assurer lacommunication avec la pratique libérale au niveau socio-économique sans quesoient thématisés les processus de démantèlement du Welfare State, lesrésistances qui l’acompagnent, les transformations de l’État invité à devenirsocialement modeste, tous aspects de la mondialisation. En consacrant la coupureentre économie et politique et en assurant la subordination des fonctionspubliques de l’État à l’élément juridico-moral tel que le définit la supposéesociété civile, les théories de la justice redéfinissent la liberté de l’État commeliberté d’adaptation aux lois redevenues «naturelles» de l’économie.

Cette apologie indirecte culmine dans l’élaboration d’un nouveau droitinternational public et privé avec ses institutions propres: d’une part l’O.N.U. et lagénéralisation du droit d’ingérence dans la politique d’États supposés bafouerles droits de l’homme et du citoyen; d’autre part, le Fonds Monétaire Internationalet la Banque Mondiale qui conditionnent leur aide à la mise en pratiquede politiques économiques fondées sur la productivité du capital. Si les juristestiennent le devant de la scène, une fraction non négligeable de la philosophieaccompagne ce mouvement en développant une philosopie du droitcommunicationnelle et une éthique du discours universalisable, en quoi lamondialisation accomplirait positivement les promesses de la modernité.

• D’un autre bord, dans le sillage des grandes critiques de la modernité commeréalisation de la métaphysique, critiques issues de Nietzsche et de Heidegger, laphilosophie procède à une reconnaissance panique de la mondialisation capitaliste

3 LE MONDIALISATION COMME OBJET PHILOSOPHIQUE? 37

identifiée à une reconnaissance panique de la mondialisation capitaliste identifiéeà la domination de la techno-science, et de son nihilisme. La mondialité est lamanifestation destinale ou épocale d’un envoi de l’être où se consomme sonoubli dans la manipulation de l’étant par l’étant humain. Cette approche ne tientpas compte de la constitution de la communauté internationale ni de son droit enqui elle ne voit que l’ultime avatar de même projet métaphysique. Elle se veutradicale et se place sur le plan ontologique. Et son ontologie est une ontologienégative dont le pathos est celui du tragique. Elle fait apparaître le non-sensd’une production identifiée à la technique comme telle, vouée à devenir auto-référentielle. Elle souligne le renversement de cette production en consommation,en consomption des hommes et des choses. Elle montre dans la crise écologiquesans précédent que connaît la planète l’effet du nihilisme occidental et ellerecherche des issues dans la seule pensée poétique ou dans des idéalisationscontre-factuelles d’expériences historiques du passé. Par la mondialisation de lamétaphysique devenue technique planétaire de la manipulation des hommes etdes choses se constitue un monde qui est l’im-monde.

Nous voudrions contribuer à la critique de ces deux modalités spéculaires depenser, ou plutôt d’impenser, la mondialisation-processus et la mondialité-résultat.Toutes deux, en effet, manquent la spécificité historique de la mondialisationcomme devenir-monde des rapports de production capitalistes.

De son côté, l’apologie juridico-communicationnelle de la société civileinternationale fait de la mondialisation un universel abstrait séparé de sesconditions et de ses formes contradictoires de réalisation; elle l’idéalise commeune sorte d’ultra-impérialisme (thèse déjà développée par le théoricien de laSeconde Internationale, Karl Kautsky): la concentration des capitaux conduiraità la fusion «pacifique» des capitalismes nationaux en des aires pacifiées capablesde réguler leur concurrence interne dans une exploitation en commun des ressources,sans guerre réciproque. Or il se trouve que le capital ne peut pas se coaliser enses formes différenciées et contradictoires contre le travail sans produire desdivisions internes au sein de la force de travail, sans opposer les diversesfractions de la force de travail internationale les unes aux autres; il se trouveaussi que les États ne coexistent pas dans l’indifférence mais se lient en sehiérarchisant en centres et périphéries, partagés eux-mêmes selon la mêmelogique de division du centre et de la périphérie. Il se trouve enfin que dans ceprocessus incessant de restructuration la dérégulation opérée en raison desdifférences de productivité est le mode même de régulation, et que donc laguerre économique et militaire est toujours possible (et réelle). Si le droitinternational public et privé fait signe en direction d’une organisation universelledu travail social, voire d’un sur-État, cet horizon est non seulement lointain maisambigu. Pour l’instant, le droit s’il n’est pas simple idéologie de légitimationdemeure une diction universelle de la constitution de la hiérarchie del’économie-monde, nulle domination ne pouvant désormais être et durer sanspouvoir dire un universel du droit, sans pouvoir se dire comme cet universel.Dans le meilleur des cas, le droit international est protestation contre l’inhumainde telle diction du droit et promesse d’un droit plus humain.

D’autre part, l’apocalyptique ontologique compromet la lucidité qui luipermet d’individualiser les risques majeurs de la mondialisation par une vision

38 ANDRÉ TOSEL 4

fantasmatique des processus effectifs de l’économie-monde. Ceux-ci sontdéplacés en de grades entités démoniaques, véritables figures du mal ontologiquequi se concentrent dans le couple Savoir-Pouvoir, identifiable indifféremment àla Métaphysique, à la Technique, à la Technoscience, au Nihilisme. La dénonciationfondée du fantasme rationaliste de maîtrise constitue son adversaire en unetotalité sans extériorité, sans fissures ni écarts internes, par où une résistance,une lutte déterminée pourraient faire sens. À la mondialo-philie économico-juridique, à son culte abstrait d’un nouvel ordre international coïncidant avec ledroit, à son idéalisation naturalisante du marché, s’oppose une mondialophobieontologico-esthétique tout aussi abstraite, avec sa complaisance esthétisante pourle négatif, avec sa massive identification de la métaphysique et de la technique,avec son incapacité à analyser sans prétérition philosophante arbitraire lamondialisation comme technologie sociale d’un rapport social déterminé, lerapport capitaliste. Une lucidité ontologique impuissante et biaisée dément lespromesses non tenues du droit international, mais manque le droit commemoment de la nouvelle technique sociale du capitalisme mondial, et avec lui lerapport social fondamental.

Dans les deux cas, la pensée abdique, désorientée, oscillant entre la demi-assurance d’une transubstantiation juridique des risques majeurs qui définissentla mondialisation et la séduction morbide devant les formes du négatif, les crisesde tout ordre, du sens, des valeurs qui la caractérisent tout autant. La questionest alors celle du vieux Kant: entre apologie et apocalypse comment s’orienterdans la pensée de la mondialisation?

La mondialisation comme technique sociale— économico-politique — de l’internationalisation

du capitalisme historique

La philosophie est ainsi confrontée à la tâche d’une prise directe, ni apologétiqueni euphémisante, de la mondialisation, au devoir théorique d’en définir le conceptavec rigueur. Nous posons ici que la mondialisation est l’internationalisation durapport de production capitaliste fondé sur la soumission réelle du travail parle capital. Si Marx ne peut être crédité d’une analyse complète de cetteinternationalisation, il en a donné les principes. Les théoriciens de l’économie-monde ont pu les développer en les rectifiant. Tentons de les reformuler enmontrant comment cette reformulation est susceptible de réorienter la philosophiedu droit international, d’en dépasser les limites qui sont celles-là même qui en fontune apologétique constituante du capitalisme mondialisé, et de guider l’analysedes structures de la société moderne. Les résultats obtenus sur le terrain de laphilosophie sociale, politique, et juridique permettront alors de revenir sur laquestion proprement ontologique de la mondialité.

La mondialisation est la création d’une nouvelle structure d’ensemble de laproduction, porteuse d’un nouveau système de techniques sociales, toutesfinalisées par la recherche de la productivité différentielle du capital au moyende la réduction du temps de travail. Ces techniques sociales sont celles de lagestion informatisée de la production, de la généralisation du travail «immatériel».


Porté par ces techniques innovantes qui ne sont jamais pures techniques, maistoujours matérialisations sociales du rapport d’exploitation, le mouvement ducapital internationalise le marché des capitaux et de la production. La mondialisationest radicalement économiciste et techniciste, mais elle est tout autant politiciste,dans la mesure où elle ne peut s’accomplir que dans le mouvement d’uneperpétuelle rehiérarchisation politique des États protecteurs des firmesdominantes (y compris des multinationales qui ont toujours une base nationale).La mondialisation oblige tout d’abord à récuser la conception de la sociétécomme ensemble de secteurs ou de pratiques séparés, chacun organisé selon sonordre de justification propre (selon la conception exposée par Luc Boltanski etLaurent Thévenot dans leur ouvrage De la justification. Les économies de lagrandeur). Elle est tout à la fois économique, politique, technique et juridique,et elle oblige à recourir à un modèle théorique fondé sur l’impureté et l’intricationdes pratiques. Elle ne peut être pensée comme un métaniveau qui viendraitsurdéterminer le niveau national ou local. Elle est la scène désormais premièrequi investit les dimensions, ou scènes nationales, de l’intérieur, et les transforme.Le mondial est un niveau interne du national.

Cette primauté de l’international permet de reprendre la question de l’Étatpar-delà les truismes répétitifs des théories de l’État de droit. Les États ne sontpas appelés à dépérir devant et dans la société civile internationale comme voudraitle faire croire l’utopie néolibérale. Ils sont voués à assumer une autre fonctionqui s’enracine négativement dans leur incapacité à contrôler la formation dumarché mondial du capital (d’autres opérateurs économiques peuvent en effetanticiper toutes les mesures prises par les États en matière de limitation deschanges). Les États ont désormais la fonction d’assurer politiquement la gestiondifférenciée de la force de travail en encadrant les techniques de délocalisationd’entreprises en raison du coût différentiel de la force de travail et en promouvantles techniques fondées sur le gain de productivité (économie du temps de travail).Seules peuvent développer ces techniques à haute valeur ajoutée les firmesmultinationales capables de créer des réseaux d’entreprises constituées denombreuses unités de production. Comme à leur tour ces firmes ont une basenationale dominante, la mondialisation est politique: elle spécialise les États enraison de leurs liens aux firmes, aux branches de la production où se redéfinit laproductivité du travail et donc du capital. L’accroissement de la productivité sepose en ressource politique directe en commandant la hiérarchisation des États.

La mondialisation n’est donc pas l’instauration d’un nouvel ordre internationaloù s’échangeraient et se formeraient des complémentarités de secteurs. Elle estun ordre et un espace de domination hégémonique où la place dans la hiérarchiese joue sur la capacité de chaque État à produire et exporter des biens via lesfirmes «multinationales-nationales», si l’on peut dire, biens qui requièrent dutravail très qualifié et des masses croissantes de capital financier. Ces mêmesÉtats sont aussi ceux où le travail le moins qualifié est devenu trop cher parrapport au prix du marché international du travail: il leur revient à la fois detraiter le chômage structural incompressible et de créer les conditions politiquespermettant aux firmes de recourir à la délocalisation pour la production des biensprimaires devenus moins rentables. La mondialisation est la forme technico-

40 ANDRÉ TOSEL 6

sociale nouvelle de la solution classique donnée au problème structural ducapitalisme historique: comment accroître la rémunération du capital en maintenantélevée la demande de travail du côté des travailleurs, en évitant donc le pleinemploi. Elle a toujours pour contenu — horresco referens— la lutte de classesdu capital et du travail. Elle ne peut se réduire à la seule coopération entresecteurs dont les uns seraient internationalisés, exportateurs de produits de hautetechnologie, à la rentabilité élevée, et dont les autres, producteurs de biensprimaires, seraient déconnectés du marché mondial. C’est toujours le capital(financier en l’occurence) qui, par son mouvement d’ensemble, met en concurrenceles marchés nationaux de la force de travail et exige de s’articuler à la politiqueétatique. Celle-ci se présente alors à la fois comme gestion de cette force de travailet comme agent co-constitutif du renforcement des secteurs compétitifs qui surle marché mondial deviennent les définisseurs de la norme sociale de productivité.

L’État territorial-national ne disparaît pas plus que la classe ouvrière. Il sedéplace et devient l’agent d’une projection inédite de la territorialité nationale au-delà du territoire historique. L’État n’est plus l’unité d’un simple marché intérieurqui réaliserait à son échelle le fonctionnement du capital. S’il conserve la gestionterritorialisante de la force de travail, il se projette dans la constitution d’un territoireexterritorialisé qui est celui des lieux où l’État produit, vend, et garantit cetteproduction et cette vente. La France n’est pas d’abord un lieu commun de vie et deculture; elle est (dans) le réseau des firmes françaises qui vendent et qui essaiment.Le président de la République conçoit son rôle comme celui d’un commis-voyageuren chef. L’État intervient comme point nodal de la politique des firmes tournéesvers l’expansion, il se charge de réduire au moindre coût les activités qui nes’inscrivent pas dans les réseaux des firmes. La fonction de souveraineté de l’États’altère en ce qu’elle ne consiste plus à concentrer les rapports de pouvoir à sonéchelle, mais à les transformer pour les représenter au niveau international enconfigurations directement internationales. La représentation politique est aussi lareprésentation commerciale de l’entreprise France en ses firmes, et elle se dédoubleen ce qu’à l’intérieur du territoire national l’État représente cette configuration desentreprises nationales auprès des autres forces3.

On comprend que l’offensive menée contre le Welfare State s’inscrit en cetteperspective d’une mondialisation qui est bien désémancipation en matière dedroits sociaux et qui n’a pas encore rencontré de résistance adéquate. Oncomprend pourquoi et comment est en cours un processus de privatisation del’État et de ses appareils idéologiques que sont les services publics (transports,système de formation scolaire et universitaire, service de santé et de sécuritésociale). L’État se privatise dans la mesure où les marchés et les entreprises publiquesse trouvent soumis à des normes de productivité directement issues du marchémondial. Les grandes négociations internationales deviennent des événementsde la politique intérieure et de droit intérieur. La politique économique internationaledonne ou impose de plus en plus ses objets à la politique intérieure.

La mondialisation développe ainsi un nationalisme spécifique proprementéconomique qui fait de la nation une entreprise — le modèle de l’entreprisedevenant le pilier de l’idéologie nécessaire pour obtenir la soumission des Étatsaux normes de productivité du marché. Elle constitue la concurrence comme


concurrence nationale où interviennent des firmes qui ne sont pas apatrides, maisbien nationales dans leur aptitude à faire du territoire national là où elles opèrent.L’État n’a de puissance que dans la mesure où il peut articuler des réseauxéconomico-financiers qui sont tout aussi bien politiques et institutionnels. Cettepuissance a pour condition une gestion différenciée de la force de travail: lapartie de cette force de travail qui ne correspond plus à la rentabilité moyennedéfinie mondialement ne peut être qu’en position d’exclusion structurale permanente.Même si la masse des exclus varie, elle prend la forme (post?)moderne d’uneindividualité humaine définie de manière privative et cumulative: elle recouvrela masse croissante des «hommes sans», sans travail d’abord, puis sans domicilefixe, voire sans papiers dans le cas des immigrés non tolérés. La gestion de laforce de travail implique un lien spécifique entre nationalisme et racismes,puisque la racisation de la masse des réfugiés économiques, venus des nationsdominées, mis en concurrence avec les travailleurs nationaux, permet à l’État dediviser cette force de travail en l’opposant à elle-même, en la différenciant, enfaisant de la citoyenneté nationale un privilège, à la fois économique et politique.

La concurrence mondiale prend simultanément la forme d’un retour de ceque la tradition marxiste nommait l’impérialisme. Mais la mondialisation modifiecet impérialisme en lui donnant la forme tendancielle de quasi empires, quedomine aujourd’hui l’empire des États-Unis (avec sa zone d’expansion directesur toute l’Amérique du Nord et une partie de l’Amérique Centrale). La formationd’espaces supranationaux à vocation impériale ou sub-impériale repose sur lescontraintes de la productivité, puisque l’emportent les espaces qui sont producteurset exportateurs de technologies à haute productivité. L’économisme est politicismeune fois encore en ce que l’unification économique (jamais totale) de ces espacesse démultiplie en son intérieur même quand elle parvient à se traduire commeunification politique (toujours instable). La mondialisation est la montée en puissanced’États quasi impériaux (dont demain peut-être l’Europe), d’hégémoniser lesÉtats-Nations plus faibles en les subordonnant au moyen des contraintesexercées par les marchés des capitaux et en jouant des processus de racisation etd’ethnicisation.Ainsi, à tous les niveaux du système-monde opère transversalementla même norme de la productivité, moteur de la concurrence économique,politique, militaire, en prise sur les oppositions nationalitaires et identitaires.C’est elle qui unifie ce que la sociologie libéral-sociale des ordres de justificationvoudrait nous présenter comme autant de sphères distinctes, susceptibles chacunede produire sa norme de justice (Walzer, Thévenot et Boltanski). C’est cette unitéqui ouvre sur une pluralité d’histoires à vitesses différentes que le cosmopolitismemondialophile se refuse à penser radicalement et que l’ontologie mondialophobeignore superbement en donnant ainsi à son radicalisme une tournure équivoque.

Du droit international dans la mondialisation

Tout discours sur le droit international et le nouvel ordre mondial supposésuivre de la mondialisation doit donc se mesurer à cette analyse. On ne peutsouscrise à la thèse que s’opèrerait par le jeu de la mondialisation une organisationde la communauté internationale qui pour la première fois dans l’histoire ferait

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des droits de l’homme et du citoyen sa charte et serait à même de se donner unestructure politique effective. On assiste aujourd’hui à l’émergence d’un étrangecosmopolitisme guerrier, à un cosmopacifisme militaire, oú se dit la mondialisation.Si Hobbes jugeait impossible de transformer l’état de nature qui règne entre Étatssouverains et signifie permanence de la guerre, le droit international pense quel’heure a sonné pour donner corps au projet kantien d’une fédération d’Etats dedroit réalisant l’état civil entre États. Le fameuxTiers qui était absent dans les relationsinternationales que la Société des nations, après 1918, et l’Organisation des NationsUnies, après 1945 n’avaient pas pu réaliser, serait mis à l’ordre du jour de lamondialisation. Un contractualisme cosmopolitique pourrait régir le système-monde.

Il aurait les traits suivants:1. Peut être passé entre États un pacte préliminaire de non agression, ces

États se proposant de constituer les uns avec les autres une association permanente.C’est le pactum societatis 1.

2. Un second pacte, non plus négatif, mais positif, se forme si les Étatss’accordent sur une série de règles communes pour résoudre les différends lesopposant et pour organiser le recours à une force légitime commune. C’est lepactum societatis 2.

3. Doit s’acomplir un assujettissement à un pouvoir commun qui soit capablede faire respecter les pactes 1 et 2, ainsi souscrits, en recourant si besoin est à laforce. C’est le pactum subjectionis.

4. La reconnaissance et la protection des droits fondamentaux de liberté sontassurés, ces droits limitant et autorisant tout à la fois le pouvoir constitué. C’estce schéma qui déjà structure potentiellement l’Organisation des Nations Unies.Résultat d’un pactum societatis, l’Organisation doit désormais disposer du pactumsubjectionis, c’est-à-dire du monopole de l’exercice légitime du pouvoir decontrainte internationale. La guerre du Golfe persique contre l’Irak aurait esquisséen 1991 ce passage d’un pacte à l’autre, les États-Unis pouvant être considéréscomme le bras armé de l’O.N.U. pour rétablir la souveraineté d’un État indépendantagressé injustement. Ainsi un droit cosmopolitique aurait exprimé le nouvelordre international en justifiant le retour de la théorie de la guerre juste, le justumbellum des scolastiques catholiques.

Il est possible de faire une autre lecture de ce qui est sûrement la premièreguerre cosmopolitique à l’époque de la mondialisation. Voici les rudiments d’unetraduction réaliste stratégique de la guerre du droit international. En cinq leçons.

• Leçon 1. Après la fin de l’Empire du Mal soviétique et de la guerre froide,les États-Unis, en alliance avec les États européens occidentaux, ont la charge dela marche économique, politique, morale, du monde «mondialisé». Leur fonctiondoit être redéfinie dans le sens de laGlobal Security. Les États-Unis ont l’occasionhistorique de construire un système international enfin juste, fondé sur les valeursmorales et politiques de paix et d’équité, et aussi fondé sur l’économie capitalistemondialisée et la généralisation de la démocratie. CetteManifest Destiny impliquedonc la construction d’un système de sécurité globale entre pays qui appartiennentaux aires les plus industrialisées, sous la direction politique et militaire des États-Unis.

• Leçon 2. Cette construction à son tour exige une correction radicale de l’O.N.U.qui ne peut plus être un simple lieu d’expression des conflits, réfléchissant les


rapports de forces internationales, paralysé par les oppositions des anciennesdeux super-puissances et de leurs blocs. Les Nations Unies doivent être le lieud’énonciation du système de la sécurité globale, telle que la conçoivent les États-Unis. Si l’O.N.U. ne peut se prêter à cette énonciation, et si les votes qui s’ymanifestent sont incertains, l’O.T.A.N peut être le cadre de cette stratégie, et, loind’être dissoute, elle doit être utilisée comme cadre et forme d’intervention pourrétablir militairement le droit, comme l’a montré la guerre du Kosovo, menéecontre un État, la Serbie, qui n’était formellement en guerre contre aucun des Étatsjusticiers. En rétablissant le droit, l’O.T.A.N. assure la sécurité de la communautémondiale telle que l’interprètent les pays hégémoniques.

• Leçon 3. En effet, avec le droit, ce sont les intérêts nationaux et impériauxdes pays qui sont préservés dans une situation de vulnérabilité produite par lareconstruction instable des identités nationales. Certains États, en effet, ne sontplus en mesure d’assurer la protection des nationalités qu’ils avaient fédérées etqui cherchent avec l’indépendance le protectorat d’États du centre capitalisteplus puissants (cas de l’ex-Yougoslavie). D’autres sont tentés de se constituer enpuissances subimpériales fondées sur le contrôle de ressources stratégiques (lepétrole), et des espaces stratégiques en concurrence directe avec ce centre (casde l’Irak). Tous doivent être réprimés, redéfinis et soumis à l’ordre du droit.

• Leçon 4. Pour réaliser concrètement les objectifs de la nouvelle stratégie,les grandes puissances industrielles doivent abandonner le vieux principe de noningérence dans les affaires intérieures des États souverains, principe qui appartientà l’ancien droit européen et que la S.D.N. et l’O.N.U. avaient déjà ébranlé,poursuivant sur une base démocratique le processus initié par la Sainte-Allianceà la fin des guerres napoléoniennes. La nouvelle Sainte-Alliance, sous directionimpériale américaine, reformule le principe théologique du justum bellum sousla forme du droit humanitaire d’ingérence dans tous les cas où elle jugeraitnécessaire d’intervenir pour résoudre les crises attentatoires à l’ordre mondial.

• Leçon 5. Le pacifisme guerrier du cosmopolitisme juridique affronte le risqued’une guerre totale contre l’ennemi qui est immédiatement criminalisé commeennemi du droit, et donc du genre humain. L’ennemi du droit cesse d’être, eneffet, un justus hostis, il occupe la place de l’injustus, de l’impie des croisadeschères au justum bellum. Cet ennemi mérite le châtiment qui le déclasse ou ledéspécifie, le séparant de sa dignité d’être humain. La presse américaine, à ladifférence de la presse européenne, n’a pas caché la violence inouïe qui acaractérisé la guerre du Golfe: recours à de nouvelles armes de destructionmassive, terreur exercée sur les populations civiles, désastres écologiques, blocuséconomique dévastateur maintenu dix ans après les combats, contrôle total desmedia privés d’images, silence imposé aux victimes du mauvais côté, la guerreétant elle-même présentée comme un immense jeu vidéo sans risques pour lesjusticiers (zéro mort). La première guerre de la mondialisation, la guerre du droitinternational et de son pacifisme, a été une guerre totale, elle a dénié à l’ennemison statut politique pour se présenter comme une opération de policehumanitaire. À la limite, ce droit a paradoxalement restauré le principe abominéet immoral du machiavélisme vulgaire selon lequel «la fin justifie tous lesmoyens». La «vertu» n’a pas hésité à se faire terreur, hommage inattendu à

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l’«affreux Robespierre». L’extermination de personnes innocentes a été jugéeconforme à la morale et au droit réunis. Les principes de cette morale et de cedroit ont été accommodés selon une nouvelle scolastique dont les ex-nouveauxphilosophes français se sont faits les spécialistes. Aux États-Unis s’estdéveloppée une nouvelle spécialité, l’éthique de la guerre juste, avec les travauximportants de Charles Beitz, Stanley Hoffman, Michael Walzer (un des rares àavoir été traduit en français, avec Guerres justes, guerres injustes, Paris, Belin,1998). On peut prédire sans se tromper leur importation bruyante en France. Iln’est ni étonnant ni nouveau que le moralisme se renverse en terrorisme.

La communanté internationale telle qu’elle se présente en ses institutionsreconnues (O.N.U. et tribunaux internationaux) ne peut être considérée comme lereprésentant de l’humain et de ses droits. Cette communanté se compose d’Étatsinégaux et inégalement capables de dire le droit international. Que dit le droit?Réponse: ce que dit celui qui dit le droit. Qui dit le droit? Les États les pluspuissants et en particulier les États quasi impériaux, qui sans d’ailleurs disposerd’un pouvoir réellement international se donnent un bras armé. Loin de préexisterà cette diction, le droit est sa construction. Mais cette construction demeure celled’un différend puisqu’il est toujours possible d’exercer le droit de protestercontre le droit dit par la puissance impériale. Les contradictions demeurent quifont du droit une production spécifique d’universel normatif, mais cet universeln’est jamais séparé des conditions de sa réalisation et des formes de sa contestation.

Contrairement à ce que la doxa libérale affirme sur ce point, la mondialisationen sa phase actuelle n’est pas liée à une percée de l’universalisme effectif. Celui-ci a connu son meilleur moment dans la période 1945–1968, lorsque la décolonisation(la guerre du Vietnam comprise) a coïncidé avec l’extension du Welfare State.Depuis, la contre-révolution néo-libérale a imposé, avec le démantèlement desrudiments de l’État de droit social, une désemancipation internationale enscindant l’humanité selon les rapports contradictoires d’une coopération-concurrence,en organisant le retour de la guerre juste et du droit à la guerre. Plus profondément,malgré leur prétention, les grandes institutions qui émergent en cette mondialisationne renvoient pas à l’humanité comme sujet. Elles ne renvoient qu’à la communautéinternationale de fait qui est une puissance morale «fictive», une puissancemorale dont les puissances impériales doivent assurer la représentation. Le droitinternational public ne peut aujourd’hui dépasser ses limites et celles-ci tiennentaux mécanismes de la représentation qui font de la communauté internationalela représentation des États qui la fondent. Le représenté réel n’est pas l’humanité,mais cela même qui la divise et l’inégalise, la productivité du capital en tantqu’elle règle la puissance productive des États inséparable de leur puissancepolitique. Ou plutôt: la partie n’est pas finie, le représenté «est» le conflit qui naîtdes résistances à cette productivité aveugle.

Mondialisation, ontologie et nihilisme

On ne saurait cependant s’en tenir à une critique du droit international montrantà quelles impasses conduit l’impensé de la mondialisation. La question a bienune dimension ontologique, comme l’a perçu de manière fantastique l’apocalyptique


mondialophobe. La pensée de l’être-au-monde développée par l’analytiqueexistentiale de Martin Heidegger, prolongée par la méditation sur la conditionhumaine d’Hannah Arendt et par d’autres, peut être considérée comme uneapproche ontologique négative de la mondialisation, à bien des égards plusprofonde et moins hypocrite que le cosmo-politisme-bellicisme libéral. Portantà son paroxysme le désir de la libre subjectivité dans son appropriation de l’être,la mondialisation ne se confondrait pas tant avec l’être-au-monde du saseinqu’elle en scellerait l’aliénation. Si notre vie est marquée par le fait d’être aumonde, si le monde est l’existential de la vie, qui a pour sens d’être contenu enson phénomène, cet in-der-Welt-Sein ne se confond pas avec la mondialisationqui en est l’oubli. L’activité dominée par la production aliène le sujet producteurau monde et fait de lui un errant, un étranger, une cause errante, sans astre,un désastre. La «conception» du monde en sa mondialité productive dénoueirréversiblement le lien de l’humanité à la terre et au ciel. La production de lamondialité annihile la condition originaire de possibilité de notre être-au-mondeen images du monde où se réfléchit narcissiquement, sans altérité, le désirrationnel devenu volonté de maîtrise. Prise dans la production de son monde enexpansion totalisante, la subjectivité maîtresse renonce à «habiter» le mondepour le faire, défaire, et refaire à son image, objet de son projet de maîtrise. Noussommes à la fois maîtres imaginaires de ce monde de la mondialité et esclavesde sa loi de reproduction à l’identique. Nous avons perdu le rapport-au-monde,l’être-au-monde, nous sommes devenus sans monde, nous sommes im-monde(s).Si cette approche ne saurait passer pour une analyse déterminée des processusspécifiques de la mondialisation, on ne saurait lui nier une lucidité, celle de lalumière noire qui ne se laisse pas abuser par les mensonges de la lecture libéraleet de ses avatars. Heidegger fait de l’être-au-monde autre chose qu’une catégoriecorrélative du produire; il en fait un existential. Le monde est le propre duDasein.Le Dasein est être-au-monde-en-commun, Mitsein.

La communauté des hommes en son rapport au monde, saisie en son historicité,ne se confond pas avec la mondialité résultat de la mondialisation, si celle-ci estune dépendance de l’ipséité du sujet-souverain. Heidegger retrouve la grandepolémique qui a déchiré l’idéalisme allemand. Dans la gigantomachie philosophique,il se range du côté de Schelling, contre Hegel, il donne à la critique romantiquede la modernité sa plus grande pertinence, à la hauteur des défis du siècle.

Autant dire que nous nous trouvons confrontés à l’équation heideggerienneentre technique et mondialisation, mondialisation et métaphysique. La mondialisationserait la forme que prend le destin de la métaphysique comme techniquedevenue planétaire, technique de la manipulation et de la consommation deshommes et des choses, des étants. On aurait là comme une transcription de laréversibilité entre production et nihilisme repérée par Marx dès le Manifeste duparti communiste et formulée en des phrases de feu: «La bourgeoisie a créé lemarché mondial [...] Ce bouleversement continuel de la production, ce constantébranlement de tout le système social, cette agitation et cette insécuritéperpétuelles distinguent l’époque bourgeoise de toutes les précédentes. Tous lesrapports sociaux traditionnels et figés avec leur cortège de croyances et d’idéesadmises et vénérées se dissolvent; celles qui les remplacent deviennent surannées

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avant de se cristalliser. Tout ce qui était solide et stable se volatilise, tout ce quiétait sacré est profané». Le capital achèverait la métaphysique en se faisantmonde mais en consumant la possibilité de l’être-au-monde. Les aspects les plusviolents et destructeurs de la mondialisation capitaliste, son húbris, obligent àprendre au sérieux un certain Heidegger, celui qui en son langage donne lechiffre existential des risques effectifs de notre situation ontologique et oblige ànous défaire des assurances du rationalisme téléologique, de son affirmationd’un Sujet-origine promis à l’actualisation heureuse de ses Fin(s). Notre monde,celui dans lequel nous sommes «jetés», ne peut plus se raconter d’Histoire(s),comme le dit Louis Althusser en ses derniers textes. Notre «monde» est cemonde-ci, il est là; il est son «il y a», et il n’obéit à la logique de nul Sens-Maître,certainement pas à celle du cosmopolitisme cher au nouveau droit international.

L’ontologie destinale a du moins la valeur d’une provocation à l’autocritiquede la modernité mondialisée. Il est vrai que la nouvelle production est productionde nouvelles destructions en hommes, savoir-sfaire, cultures, modes de vie,capitaux et techniques devenues obsolètes sans avoir perdu leur efficacité. Elleest l’anéantissement de tout ce qui fait obstacle à l’infini de l’accumulationpoursuivant l’idéal de la causa sui que Spinoza ne réservait qu’à la substance etqu’il pensait en fonction de la cessation de l’esclavage. Mais on ne peut en resterlà. Soulignons ce qui n’est pas tenable en cette autre approche philosophiquedont la radicalité doit être maintenue sous réserves critiques (comme le fontcertains philosophes post-heideggeriens qui ne s’orientent ni dans le sens d’unedonation religieuse, ni dans celui d’une nostalgie de l’origine: Jacques Derrida,Gérard Granel, Jean-Luc Nancy). Deux points méritent ainsi d’être soulignés.

• La déconstruction du projet moderne comme arraisonnement technique del’étant peut aboutir à un constat indépassable. Rien ne peut être envisagé sinonde laisser-être et advenir, accomplir, l’aliénation au monde mondialisé commedestin. Les diverses formes historiques d’exploitation et de domination qui continuentà se nouer autour du travail sont alors légitimées comme autant de figures dudestin ou du hasard. L’ontologie risque de se résoudre en attente d’une apocalypsesans dieu. Et de se retourner en une autre apologie — négative — de ce qui est,sauf miracle. Rien n’est plus possible, il n’est nul besoin de sujet. Le triomphede la «Technique» finit alors par spiritualiser le mouvement du capital en puissanceautoréflexive, sui référentielle, en esprit. De l’esprit du capitalisme au capitalismecomme esprit (fût-il malin). Il resterait à attendre que la société mondiale de laproduction-destruction aille au bout d’elle-même, à son «effondement», qu’elleachève sa déclinaison, qu’elle fasse coïncider son excès avec son déclin. Laseule forme de responsabilité serait celle d’un quiétisme à la sérénité durementacquise, le seul recours serait celui de la méditation de la poésie pensante et deson ouverture.

• Ce quiétisme ne peut être justifié que pour autant que l’on accepte la conceptionheideggérienne de la technique. Or force est de constater que séparée de son lienà la métaphysique de la subjectivité, la technique demeure une abstractionindéterminée à laquelle on attribue une constellation informe de rapports sociauxcomplexes. L’effet de suggestion et de provocation du constat heideggérien sepaie d’un prix exorbitant, celui de la dénégation de la possibilité de toute autre


analyse. Il se trouve en effet qu’une technique n’est pas d’abord une opérationd’arraisonnement de l’étant, elle est et demeure une séparation ingénieuse etmodeste du réel et du possible, elle est une expérimentation tâtonnante dans unmonde sans ordre ni sens prédéterminé. La finalisation sociale d’un ensemble detechniques sous un rapport social est une chose, la Technique en soi en est uneautre. La mondialisation implique une technologie sociale qui a façonné l’ordreproductif autour de techniques décisives pour organiser la soumission mondialedu travail et accroître sa productivité sous la dominance du capital qui les aincorporées. Ce sont les techniques réflexives de techniques qui forment et organisentles techniques. Leur analyse fine échappe aux prises de l’ontologie destinale. Orc’est elle qui commande la détermination d’issues alternatives. La mondialisationredéfinit l’usage social indissolublement économique et politique des techniquesdans le sens de leur traduction en temps: gain de temps dans la mobilisation dutravail, dans la circulation du capital financier et des informations, dans lesapprentissages, gains de qualité. C’est à l’échelle mondiale que sont confrontésles divers travaux des branches de production stratégiques et autres. On ne pourra,le pire n’étant pas toujours sûr, inverser la tendance lourde par laquelle lamondialisation produit un monde sans mondanéïté pour des masses croissantesd’hommes que si la critique individualise concrètement une autre finalisation dela technologie sociale, en réinvestissant ce niveau pour redécouvrir la sagessedes arts et techniques et la conjuguer à l’art politique d’une action qui soit aussiproduction, d’une production qui soit action.

Finitude et risques majeurs. Ou de l’impossibilisation des possibles

La division de l’humanité produite par la mondialisation capitaliste commesa condition de possibilité paradoxale pose ainsi de manière inédite la questionontologique, celle de la finitude comprise de manière positive, d’un rationalismetrans-rationnel, délivré de l’obsession de la maîtrise des choses et des hommes,de la domination de la nature et de l’histoire. L’humanité aujourd’hui, à l’époquede l’économie-monde capitaliste, n’est pas tant définie comme ensemble depossibilités entravées que comme ensemble d’impossibilités pratiques liées à lacontrainte d’une productivité déliée, elle, de tout souci du bien commun. Lapossibilité d’une productivité infinite du capital, obtenue par l’exploitation de laproductivité du travail, devenue un impératif inconditionnel, se renverse enproduction d’une masse croissante de travailleurs séparés des conditions d’exercicede leurs libertés, d’exclus du procès d’exploitation du travail, exilés du mondedans le monde réellement immonde des dénués de tout, des pauvres absolus, des«sans papiers, sans travail, sans domicile». L’humain se divise dans les inégalisationsqui structurent la hiérarchie sociale. La mondialisation réalise l’humain dansl’inhumain d’une séparation accrue entre ceux qui ne donnent pas parce qu’ilsn’ont plus rien à donner et ceux qui ne donnent pas parce qu’ils ne veulent pasdonner. Le droit se divise dans les inégalités croissantes de sa diction au momentoù les plus puissants occupent la place de l’universel.

Cet universel existe en fait de manière négative dans la somme des risquesmajeurs que la mondialisation capitaliste produit. Il n’existe pas comme un

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possible qui tend vers sa fin pré-donnée. Le risque d’un seuil d’irréversibilitédans la division de l’humanité en humanités toujours plus inégales n’est pas leseul. Il oblige à reposer la question du bien commun comme question à nouveauet autrement substantielle, non plus seulement procédurale, puisqu’il en va eneffet de la subsistance de masses humaines appauvries et de la substance mêmede la vie en ce monde. Si la question ontologique est celle de l’être pour l’étantqui la pose, la mondialisation modalise cette question comme celle de notre être-en-commun. Et désormais cet être-en-commun révèle son lien à l’être commenature et comme vie, dans une finitude radicale. Le risque de l’inégalisation etde la réduction à l’humanité nue est solidaire désormais du risque d’unedégradation irréversible des conditions naturelles — physiques, chimiques,biologiques — de la vie humaine sur la planète Terre. La question écologique estontologique et la mondialisation capitaliste est lourde d’une catastropheécologique majeure. À son tour, la question écologique est solidaire de la questionbioéthique qui concerne la possibilité donnée à l’espèce humaine de «se faire»en intervenant sur les mécanismes de la reproduction de sa vie. Cette possibiliténouvelle, dans les conditions de la mondialisation, ne peut pas ne pas êtresurdéterminée à son tour par les conditions de productivité du capital et par lamarchandisation: une bioindustrie soumise à un biocapital est déjà une réalitélourde de nouvelles inégalisations et de nouvelles violences. La mondialisationrepose à nouveaux frais la question ontologique comme triple question de notrerapport à notre être-en-commun socio-historique, à notre être de vivant, et ànotre être de chose naturelle dans la nature.

La conscience planétaire qui excite beaucoup de bons esprits se définit enréalité par le fait que ces trois impossibilités pratiques menacent de passer à lapossibilité réelle. Elles se constituent désormais en limites infranchissables àl’action politique. Si sont inévitables et permanents les débats sur le contenupositif de l’humain et la dispute pour désigner qui dira le droit et le droit de direle droit, cette dispute et ces débats ne sont formulables aujourd’hui qu’en termesd’une ontologie sociale négative: il est urgent de procéder au repérage de l’inhumainhistorique et de penser du bord de sa limite afin de déterminer les formes d’«impossibilisation» de sa possibilité réelle. Cet inhumain se dit dans les troisrisques majeurs qui définissent la mondialité et qui sont autant de menaces surla vie de l’humain. Ils nous disent ce qu’il ne faut pas faire et qui une fois faitrendrait à la fois impossible la survie de masses humaines à la limite de lasubsistance, la vie bonne de ceux qui ont produit des conditions de vie relativementhumaines, et enfin la simple vie sur cette terre. Ces trois risques majeurss’enracinent dans une technologie sociale finalisée par la productivité absolutedu capital, et non par le souci agissant d’une liberté pour tous de disposerhumainement des conditions de reproduction et de production. Si l’humanitén’est pas et ne peut être un sujet, mais demeure une image divisée façonnée parles puissances économiques qui ont le pouvoir politique et juridique de ladéfinir, les forces ou puissances antagoniques existent qui peuvent exercer leurpropre pouvoir de dire et de contredire l’inhumain immanent aux trois risquesontologiques majeurs de la mondialité. L’humain n’existe que dans la controversepour dire l’inhumain et dans le vide laissé béant par cette controverse. Rien ne


peut représenter l’humanité sinon la contradiction de l’inhumain dite par lesforces qui s’opposent à toute prétention à la représentation hégémonique maisparticulière de l’humain, car ici aussi le représentant se substitue au représenté.La lutte pour dire et contredire l’inhumain en ses formes mondiales est bien luttepour le droit, mais lutte contre le droit et dans le droit, pour un droit qui disantce qu’il ne faut pas faire mais qu’il est désormais possible de faire au risque decompromettre l’être de l’humain, est affronté à la tâche de dire en sa négationmême le positif qu’il convient enfin et maintenant de faire pour ne pas fairel’impossible, c’est-à-dire produire la mort de toute possibilité.

La mondialisation, comme la révolution française ou bolchevique, est bien unévénement phisolophique, le seul événement de notre actualité. À ne pasréordonner ses questions autour de cet événement qui n’est pas promesse, maisprésentation des risques d’une impossibilité réelle et d’une limitation absolue de lapolitique, la philosophie démisionne devant la tâche de penser le lien qui unit lemonde et l’immonde, et elle s’enferme dans l’autophagie et dans l’idéologie. Laphilosophie n’a pas à regretter la perte d’un sens qui serait Le Sens, le sens du sens,la nostalgie de l’Être à retrouver. C’est dans le non sens radical du triple risqueontologique de la mondialité qu’il faut séjourner pour, dans la lutte, produire dusens, un autre sens, faire (du) sens. Le lien de tout ce qui fait sens dans le non-sensde la mondialisation est constitué par la résistance contre l’ordre de la productivitédevenue impérialiste du capital et de sa mesure le profit. Mais il existe toujours deschoses, des biens, des services, des hommes, qui ne sont pas engloutis dans lenéant actif du capital, qui vivent et s’opposent. Le pire n’est pas toujours sûr.

Les ontologues et les déconstructeurs de la mondialophobie ne détiennentqu’une demi-vérité en ce qu’ils se trompent sur la cause du devenir-immonde dela mondialisation. L’immonde ne relève pas de la science, de la technique, de latechnoscience, de la technologie sociale. Celle-ci désigne plutôt une modalité denotre être social. Pour conjurer et dépasser le nihilisme mondial, il faut plus descience, plus de technique, une autre technologie sociale. La mondialisation del’économie capitaliste repose la question des rapports réciproques de la nature,de la vie, et de l’historicité humaine: la question de notre être comme être-en-commun, par-delà l’exploitation du travail, au sein d’une nature qu’il faut contrôlersans la détruire, dans le flux d’une vie dont nous pouvons orienter les conditionsde reproduction sans les dévier vers de nouvelles monstruosités. Si la philosophieest amour de la sagesse, la réalisation de cette dernière est confiée à la sagessede l’art qui est aussi poésie, à la sagesse d’un art poétique, celui qui fait l’humainpar prosaïque lutte contre l’inhumain. Sagesse d’un art poétique qui estsimultanément l’art politique, l’art de faire vertu des risques majeurs auxuelsnous expose la Fortune. Formons alors l’idée d’un Machiavel de la multitudedans la mondialisation.

NOTES

50 ANDRÉ TOSEL 16

1. Le sens du monde, Paris, Galilée, 1993.2. Philosophie politique, Paris, Vrin, 1956.

3. Pour cette analyse, voir l’ouvrage de Jean Robelin,La Petite fabrique du droit, Paris, Kimé, 1995.

THE EDUCATED WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC EYE

HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN

“No, the woman is not our brother”Simone de Beauvoir

This study is estimating the attitudes of the Romanian society towards theeducated women. The arena of this investigation is the public sphere. Given thatthe notion “public sphere” is too complex to be approached without a researchstrategy, I shall focus mainly on the Romanian printed press and on the jobenvironment, as important branches of what is called “the public sphere”. Thus,this study aims at identifying the particulaities of the relationship education —social recognition in the case of women (adults, living in an urban area) and atexplaining those particulaities.

What triggers the study is the following puzzle: Educated women do not seemto enjoy consideration because of their education. Therefore, I shall examine therelationship between education, as independent variable and public consideration(respect) as dependent variable. For this purpose, I shall use qualitative contentanalysis of the Romanian printed press in the last six years (since the “milleniumturn”) and a questionnaire (a random research conducted in 1999, see the annex).

In what concerns the qualitative content analysis of the Romanian printedpress, I shall observe how numerous, how well situated and on which pages arethe articles about educated women in the main daily newspapers (the mostimportant ones, according to their printing run).

The concise theoretical background:the feminism inscribed into the social capital debate

There is a dimension of feminism within this so significant debate around thesocial capital. The phrase of William A. Galston, “Won’t You Be My Neighbor”complements the attitude of exclusion towards the others (women amongst others)voiced by Simone de Beauvoir.

Robert D. Putnam has started this debate around social capital and he shows,that trust is at the core of cooperation and togetherness. What is social capital?It is formed of values, solidarity and sentiments of community. The civic attitude,the trust and the sense of solidarity are at the core of every functioning society.

POL IT ICAL SOC IOLOGY


These are the main dimensions of the social capital. Social capital is the ultimatepre-requisite and consequence of any effective social policy.

InMaking Democracy Work1, Putnam offers one of the most significant studiesinvestigating the importance of the civic engagement for politics in recent years.In this book the investigations starts from the analysis of the relationship betweeneconomic modernity and institutional performance, towards a more complexdiscussion around the relationship between community and civic engagement. Intheir investigation of civic traditions in modern Italy they found that theperformance of political institutions was influenced by the character of civic life— termed “the civic community.”2 Such civic communities were characterizedby: civic engagement; political equality; solidarity, trust and tolerance; and a stronglife of the associations.

Robert Putnam and his team of researchers were able to compare themes andranges of data sources for different regions in Italy. The result was that there isa clear relationship between civic and “uncivic” regions — and that “publicaffairs are more successfully ordered in the former.”3 His conclusion was thatdemocracies (and economies) function better when there exists an independentand durable tradition of civic engagement and solidarity. This book effectivelyrepresented a manual, a guide able to determine an agenda for those willing toexplore the possibility for maintaining the convivial conditions for democracy toflourish.

Feminist studies as well investigate the importance of civic engagement forwomen and, of course they raise questions concerning the very possibility ofsuch engagement and of identifying the method to make women present, trusted,respected. In most cases such requirements, traditionally, are not met. Usually,women are partially included and not really into the social fabric. Given theirgrand social role (often they are the family keepers, cooking, cleaning, bringingup children, maintaining the family united) society welcomes women, but onlyin their input. Once they overstepped the “circle of trust”, outside the traditionalroles and jobs, society proves a daring lack of social capital, “punishing” eitherby means of “humor” or by means of diminishing, overlooking, ignoring theirefforts of solidarity. The women’s social capital is never returned to them, neveravailable for them within (“the common bank of social capital”). Yet, thisphenomenon is very serious not only for some shallow feeling like women pride.The very existence of community is put into question by sexist (and racist, forthat matter) attitudes, as well as by the lack of political equality, solidarity, trustand tolerance.

Recently, two Romanian studies have investigated a century of Romanianfeminism. They are: Emanciparea femeii române. Antologie de texte/TheEmancipation of the Romanian Woman. An Anthgology of texts), Vol. I, 1815–1918,edited by ªtefania Mihãilescu, at Editura Ecumenicã, in 2001, and Din istoriafeminismului românesc. 1838–1929/From the History of Romanian Feminism editedby ªtefania Mihãilescu at Jassy, Editura Polirom, in 2002. These works show that theidea of the equality between the sexes that we have taken for granted duringcommunism was present in the Romanian society even from the beginning of the 19th

52 HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN 2

century. Thus, the reader may find about the joint between the literary and feministmovements supporting modern women rights at the dawn of Romanian modernity.

Such movements had to face narrow minded mentalities and stereotypes thathave never completely disappeared. They all crossed 19th century and continuedto govern the social and political Romanian public spheres, deep into the 20th

century. Underneath an ideologically promoted appearance of equality — duringcommunism — the abusive old mentality has survived and flourished. Thefeminist “fight” was never considered a legitimate “communist fight” to theextent that it was never mentioned. The volumes offer this “absent” knowledgeof feminist documents and movements, yet to be recuperated from beneath theveil of silence and forgetfulness. In general, from these documents we understandthat Romanian feminism has developed itself as part of the generous philosophyof human rights and equality brought about by Enlightenment.

Thus we find out also how many were the “serious” feminist journals of theperiod investigated: “Lumea nouã literarã ºi ºtiinþificã” (“The New Literary andScientific World”), “Drepturile femeii” (“Woman’s Rights”), “Femeia românã”(“Romanian Woman”), “Unirea femeii române” (“The Union of the RomanianWoman”), “Familia” (“The Family”), “Dochia”. The characteristics of the RomanianEnlightenment were complemented by cosmopolitism and humanism (a deepknowledge of foreign languages, history and of the current European models ofmodern development). The tradition of “Calimachi Code” — stating the equalitybetween the sexes — was retrieved, too. We are reminded of Sofia Cristoscoleuand Sofia Nãdejde as bright figures of feminists, promoting their contemporaryEuropean models of feminism in Romania and of Cornelia Emilian, as apromoter of the American model of feminism, around the year 1887. We noticethat even the term “feminism” was bravely used in Romania so early in theRomanian history of feminism, along with the identification of a problematics.

The legal and financial rights of the Romanian woman are put into relationwith the ridicule of the idea of “the dependence of the woman”. This idea is stillactual in the writings of Carole Pateman.4 She also interprets as degrading thefact that women are often forced by the economic, social, political and culturaltraditions, not to earn enough as to be independent. Only a financially independentwoman could challenge the sexual contract that she has unwillingly inherited.Maria Flechtenmacher and Adela Xenopol are unknown predecessors (unknowneven for the public of Romanian educated women) of Carole Pateman, in thissense. Many of their arguments go to support the actual idea that “the force issuffocating the right”.

Sofia Nãdejde — maybe the most radical of the Romanian feminists in theinvestigated period — was tackling the sexism based on “biologism” — on theidea that women are the prisoners of their (strange) biology (an argument thatreminds us of Simone de Beauvoir). In this sense there are mentioned interestingwritings of this author occasioned by her disputes with Titu Maiorescu, exposingher arguments based on the philosophy of culture and especially on the standpointof J.S. Mill. In her work “Noua societate” (The New Society), she is also writingabout the necessary reforms for an accelerated modernization of the Romanian

3 THE EDUCATED WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC EYE 53

society, context in which she considers as most important role of the educatedwomen societies. She speaks about the necessity of a “moral betterment” that couldbe accomplished through concrete, financial, economic, juridical and politicalreforms and that, in turn would most certainly lead to the “moral betterment” ofthe society as a whole. Emilia Humpel, a teacher, Titu Maiorescu’s sister, spokeof the “bleakness of the present” expressing her scepticism in relation to successof the necessary legislative and economic in creating a society more sensitive andmore supportive in what concerns the women’s rights as independent individual,both within her family and outside its limits.

Nelli Cornea has published, among others, the article entitledWhat’s Feminism?,that depicts, through literary examples, the “fuzzy identity” of the Romanianwoman, pleading for the free development of the woman as individual, again, avery actual topic in contemporary feminism.

Cornelia Emilian reminds of Mary Wollstonecraft — A Vindication of theWoman’s Rights, 1792 — in her argument for the access at culture for women,accordingly to their inner “dispozitions”.

The reaction to feminism and feminist problematics involved “Curierul deambe sexe” (the “Journal for both sexes”) and names like I. Heliade Rãdulescu(who considered that the woman is the (even linguistically) keeper of thenational spirit), or C.A. Rosetti (who argued that inequality comes (“naturally”)with civilization like a symbol of the pathetic and moralist masculinism).

Closer to the present, our contemporary, Anne Phillips, is currently involvedin researches that could be gathered under the aegis of “Sexual and CulturalEquality. Conflicts and Tensions”. This leading figure in feminist political theory,in her widely studied book Engendering Democracy has examined key dimensionsin contemporary democratic and feminist thinking — including liberal democracy,participatory democracy and civic republicanism. The author demonstrated thatdemocracy and feminism are twin topics and argued that each of the keydimensions examined operates with a supposedly gender-neutral understandingof citizenship that continues to privilege the male. In her writings generally,she is interested in what is still the mainstream understanding of politicalrepresentation in (contemporary liberal) democracies. In particular, it is the notionthat representatives are elected to represent constituents’ opinions, preferencesand ideas, and that their sexual, racial or ethnic characteristics should thereforebe regarded as irrelevant. But these aspects are far from being irrelevant, as herstudies show. In her sound investigations, she is pursuing connections betweengender, ethnicity and race, exploring the common ground between various groupsthat have experienced political marginality or exclusion. By addressing issueslike political marginality and exclusion she opens an avenue to a wider “politicsof difference” to which often the analysts — men and women — prove to be blind.

If feminism is attuned with the problematic of democracy, this is not the casewith liberalism.Anne Phillips has studied the difficulties posed by this relationshipsince the mid-1980s, when she started also to develop the theme of the tensionsbetween equality and difference, in what concerns feminism. She is also interestedin topics like deliberative democracy, civic republicanism, and critical theory,


that open avenues for feminism to challenge the narrowness of contemporaryliberalism, but also the inequalities occasioned by it. The relationship betweenpublic and private spheres is also a realm for feminist debates and an area thatcomes close to the debate around social capital.

On such theoretical basis I argue that social capital should be also measuredby feminist indicators such as: the assessing of the struggles for (economic)redistribution and struggles for (political or cultural) recognition and the “critiqueof assimilationism” (as interpreted within both feminist and multicultural theoryfields) should not be read as a lack of interest in solidarity and community, or inconvergence, and the equality of respect (without which a substantive equalityof condition is not possible). From this perspective the printed press cannot be“the dog-keeper of democracy”, unless it succeeds at being social capital supportive,that is, in an inclusive, anti-sexist and anti-racist manner. This theoretical argumentis also the starting point for a further more sociological type of research. Aspecial attention should be paid to the weak culture of feminism in Romania, thatis, to the lack of knowledge and awareness related to the meanings and implications,as to the benefits of feminism, for the educated women, at present.

The qualitative content analysis

This research was conducted for a period of six years in six Bucharest dailies.Those were România liberã, Curentul, Ziua, Evenimentul zilei, Libertatea andNaþional.

I have chosen these particular dailies because my professional experiencewith newspapers taught me that the first two tend to be more informative, whilethe last three are tabloids and they offer a good range of material interesting fora comparative approach. Thus, Ziua tends to be a very unequal newspaper in termsof the quality (or, more specific, in terms of the accuracy and the argumentation)of the printed information presented. In this newspaper, the investigative journalismoverlaps with the sensationalism of the articles. Their drive for sensationalismoverpasses often any quality standards (even if we speak in a more strict senseof a journalistic quality or, in an enlarged sense, of a democratic, social capitaland feminism supportive quality). Evenimentul zilei has changed dramaticallyover the period of the last five years from a tabloid to a more informative andtowards a critical newspaper, much more of a watchdog against the institutedpolitical power more “liberal” generally and much more “feminist” in attitudes andperspectives than it used to be.

The first two dailies show some enlightened gender standards.Women specialistsare presented (as rare as this happens in comparison with the frequency ofpresenting successful or career men, it happens) almost with the same considerationas men are. First, the articles are situated in favorable journalistic positions onthe page (first page, last page, not towards the middle part of the middle pages).Second, when they show photos they tend to be standard professional photos. Inspite of this, for instance, on its publicity pages, România liberã displays typical89.89.... sex hotline photos, less frequent after 2001. Third, but most important,


the articles are not interested more of the personal and sex life of the careerwoman than of her actual career, as in other newspapers. Yet, generally, the feministdiscourse of România liberã has (slightly) improved over time.

The tabloids describe women as bodies, using a degrading language, regardlessof their concrete situation they find themselves in and regardless of their careerresults, or of their education. They use an intended sensational tone to (s)exploitwomen and the situation presented. They present mainly erotic, violent or degradingdata about all the women, even if they are stars, models, actresses, politicians, orordinary women committing, for instance, the murder of their children. InLibertatea (famous for the rubric “The girl on page 3”), women are portrayed mainlyin such “tabloid” instances, and they are valued after their “silicon value”. Thenewspaper has maintained its sexist discourse for the last five years.

A good illustration of the general sexist approach is given by the article“Nanny” Fran Was Raped from the Naþional, 7 May (2001). There is a popularsit com soap opera having as main character “nanny” Fran, a good-looking, strongcharacter, sharp, amazing with children and in her sociability, fun, extravagantdressing and not too educated woman, in her thirties. Her qualities are no newsfor the journalist of the Naþional. Interesting is only the rape that happened 15years ago in the life of this actress! Like this is not bad enough, the article goeson and on about the fact that she does not like children in the real life, implyingthat this is a serious crime for a woman. The fact that she has a good marriageand that the rapist was caught in 3 days and was convicted to 120 years in jailwith no possibility of commuting this sanction are not considered interestingeither and are mentioned only briefly without commentaries. A comparison withwhat sanction is given in Romania for rape would have been devastating. Theintention is to taint both the image of the real woman as a successful actress andthe image on the screen (that is too good to be true!).

The qualitative content analysis results were going to correlate themselveswith the results obtained using the questionnaire.

The questionnaire

This mean of research was intended to offer the possibility of correlating themost social data with the most personal data within the shortest space possible.This is the reason I was keen on using a one-page long questionnaire, half a pagewith questions concerning knowledge of and attitudes towards newspapers’ contentand the other half about the social profile.

According to my sociological direct observation, people in Romania are notvery eager to express their opinions in street in the front of a total stranger. I wasalso a busy operator and the people I approached were in a big hurry to go homeafter work. This was a supplementary reason for trying to be at once clear in thisphase of my inquiry and brief and leave the sophistication for the phaseof analyzing and interpreting data. (It is eventually a matter of social capitalnot to abuse of anyone’s time). The reason why I approached people at themetro (“Polytechnics”) was that there around 15:00 there are a great diversity of


people to pick up from. While they are waiting, bored, for their metro, some aretempted to engage in a short conversation. Even so, some were reluctant, somewere confused, and some were giving incomplete answers. Men were moreirritated than women because of the content of the questions. When I wentinquiring without a male company, men were either rude or trying to getpersonally involved with me. Even at this level, without any relation to the actualresponses I could have some conclusions about the Romanian social network. Insociety even educated women tend to be submissive, decorative, socially inert,while men “approximate” the visibility in the public sphere that is otherwise thandecorative with lack of seriousness, with desire for adventure, and as a consequencewith an invitation at verbal aggressiveness or at sexual involvement of somesort.

The questionnaire was applied so as to obtain a simple random sample. Thebasic idea is the method of selection whereby each possible sample of n unitsfrom a population of N units has an equal chance of being selected. For thepurposes of this school project I have decided to evaluate 20 questionnaires.From a total population of Bucharest of approximately 2.2 millions, 20 people isnot a representative sample, but it still may produce interesting and pertinentqualitative interpretations. I have interviewed every 5th person, men and womenalternatively.

The sociological data did not differentiate in any significant manner thepersons interviewed. Ten people, seven women and three men, answered that theprinted press presents mainly catastrophes and women either as victims or asmodels, or just as sexy images.Agroup of six thought that newspapers are interestedin presenting male important people and sexy women. Another group of fourconsidered that media is concerned about grown up men and about catastrophesconcerning social facts (murders, rapes, circulation accidents).

Correlating the results obtained through qualitative content analysis and theresponses at the questionnaire I obtained the following particulars describing therelationship between women’s education and their social recognition in Romania.Thus, they are three. Firstly, educated women are almost invisible within publicarena. In the second place when they show up, they are promoted as somethingelse then what they are: they are exploited as annexes of powerful men (forinstance, Nadia Constantinescu as president’s wife, not as the specialist), or theyare inquired almost exclusively about their personal life (for example, AndreeaEsca’s pregnancy). Thirdly, women’s very pretension at professionalism is devalued,since the intellectual prestige is used by the media to cast a better light on theirphysical features (see the way models are presented as students).

Correlating and construing results

From the perspective of this study, the mechanism determining the predominanceof the negative correlation between women’s education and their social recognitionin Romania is the traditionalist and sexist attitude of perceiving educated womenas not being trust-worthy, not minding their “natural” business, etc.


Given the fact that even in qualitative terms the negative correlation of thevariables was stronger, I am going to focus further in construing this problem,precisely because I consider that it constitutes a social problem, and not the aspectof the positive correlation. So, having said that the situation it is not a catastrophe,that signs of civil society’s struggle with sexism exist, I shall continue interpretingonly the main particulars of this negative correlation between the chosen variables.

The particulars of the relationship investigated are sustained and reproducedby the trivial sexist discourse embraced by the Romanian society generally andespecially by the idle journalistic shorthand that stereotypes represent.

Thus, in the collective study “Our Image in All Dailies”5, it is shown: “howthe gender dimension is shaped by the mass-media discriminative discourse.Women are referred to just as trivial Objects for the private use of men oras sexual accessories. But media also performs an instructive activity in thesociety. Therefore, this discriminative discourse may preserve and continuouslyshape only sexist opinions. No wonder than the broad extension of sexism incontemporary Romania.”

Not that sexism goes unchallenged in the Romanian press, but it tends tomake the general rule and impose it as “normality”.

There is even a current linguistic censorship of women’s achievement of visiblecareer standards. As Brânduºa Palade shows in her article “Career woman”:

“This censorship works both on the level of discourse and the collectiveimaginary. The discourse reflects the collective imaginary and the collectiveimaginary shapes and informs the discourse. Moreover, this mutual relationshipbetween these elements creates a broad propensity of the attitude disapprovingwomen’s career interests. Thus, the continual use of patriarchal stereotypes maysucceed in discouraging a local reinvention of women’s identity.”6

Even if, in my opinion, this approach is too “catastrophic” in the image ofinescapable censorship, I agree with the fact that women are discouraged inreinventing their identities as feminist individuals, which in fact translates asindividuals with particular rights. Even more serious, most college educated womenspeak now the patriarchal discourse and internalize it as “truth”, “fact”, “objectivereality” (as M. Miroiu has noticed in more than one instance, too). Once forcedto reflect upon such “objective reality” the educated women arrive at questioningboth its truth and its objectivity. Persevering on this critical path they becomedisenchanted and they understand that women experiences are not exclusivelybodily experiences and that feminists are not necessarily hysterical, visceral,extremists, frustrated, perverse, asexual, related to frigidness, mania, indoctrination,or to the vulgar aggression, ambition, or malice. Reading this attitude in the keyoffered by Simone de Beauvoir, they become only afterwards women, in a processof disenchantment with the world and not due to their education.After the momentof “awakening” they might become women even to a larger extent than they werebefore, only then gaining their identity and consciousness, only then able toarticulate demands addressed to the social capital, at the same time, to the power inexercise. Only then, the full use of a self-validated identity could support and imposeviable and successful — social and political — feminist policies (and lives).


ANNEX

Please tick the case that is applicable to you:

1) You read the printed press (the dailies): once a monthEvery two weeks

weeklyDaily.

2) In your opinion the most important articles have as main characters:childrenelders

Grown-upMenWomenCalamities (natural, economic,

political, social, etc.).

3) You consider that most articles about women have as protagonist (pleasedo circle the encountered cases and number them in the order of their apparitionfrequency): Women professor

Women researcherWomen lawyerWomen engineerWomen modelWomen victimWomen aggressorSexy women.

4) Sex: F/M.

5) Age: 20/29 30/39 40/49 50/over.

6) Education: High-school... Faculty... Graduate studies...

7) Profession...

8) You have how many co-workers?More then 1000500/1000

Under 500Under 50.

9) Your position within the hierarchy at your job?You have 2–5 supervisorsYou have oneYou are the boss.

Thank you for your time!7


NOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY


1. R.D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work Civictraditions in modern Italy, Princeton, New Jersey,Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 83–120 .

2. Ibidem, p. 15.3. Ibidem, p. 113.4. Carole Pateman is an esteemed Professor

worldwide, currently working for the Departmentof Political Science at the University of California

at Los Angeles (UCLA), author and editor ofnumerous books.

5. “AnaLize”, Anateme, no. 3, 1998, p. 1.6. Ibidem, p. 15.7. This questionnaire was actually applied in

Romania in order to gather a significant basisand a starting point for the qualitative analysisinterpretations and conclusions.

Newspapers, 2000–2005: România liberã, Libertatea,Curentul, Ziua, Evenimentul zilei, National and“AnALize Journal”, Anateme, no. 3, 1998.

Fukuyama, F., “Social Capital and the GlobalEconomy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, issue 5,September, 1995.

Mihailescu, ªtefania (ed.), Emanciparea femeii române.Antologie de texte, vol. I, 1815–1918, Bucharest,Editura Ecumenicã, 2001.

Mihãilescu, ªtefania (ed.), Din istoria feminismuluiromânesc, vol. I, 1838–1929, Iaºi, EdituraPolirom, 2002.

Moser, C.A., Kalton, G., Survey Methods in SocialInvestigation, London, Heinemann EducationalBooks, 1997.

Pateman, Carole, The Disorder of Women: Democracy,Feminism, and Political Theory, Polity Press, 1989.

Pateman, Carole, The Sexual Contract, Polity Press,1988.

Phillips, Anne, Representing difference: why shouldit matter if women get elected?, in Anna Coote(ed) New Gender Agenda, London, IPPR, 2000.

Phillips, Anne, Does Feminism need a conception ofCivil Society?, in S Chambers, R W Kymlicka(eds) Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society,Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.

Phillips,Anne, Feminism and the Politics of Difference:Or Where Have All the Women Gone?, in:S. Palmer James and S. Palmer (eds), VisibleWomen, New York, Hart Publishing Co., 2002.

Putnam, Robert D., Bowling Alone: America’sDeclining Social Capital, “Journal of Democracy”,Vol. 6, January, 1995.

Robert Putnam, Robert Putnam Responds, “TheAmerican Prospect”, no. 25 , March–April, 1996.

Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work Civictraditions in modern Italy, Princeton, New Jersey,Princeton University Press, 1993.

WilliamA. Galston,Won’t You Be My Neighbor, “TheAmerican Prospect”, no. 26, May–June, 1996.

Zanden, Vander J.W., Social Psychology, New York,McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1987.

THE “CULT OF PERSONALITY” IN ROMANIA

RODICA IAMANDI*

There is an acknowledged difficulty in the attempt to define the phrase “thecult of personality”. First, because the current and common-sense formula, “personaladulation”, has substituted itself for the phrase “the cult of personality”, a highlyideologically loaded expression, with a much more complex meaning. This isprobably the reason why in the specifically Romanian post-1989 literature, the cultof personality is defined as a political practice attributing an exaggerated role toa political personality within the evolution of society, producing a deformationof the whole political life of the country1 or, as a systematic attitude provokedand controlled, concerning a leader (or a personality) considered gifted with specialqualities as an intellectual, as a sensitivity, as a manager, as a visionary, etc., aswere considered examples such as Hitler, Stalin, Mao Zedong, Ceauºescu,Bokassa, IdiAmin.2 An inventory of the extant pre-1990 definitions (even if theywere conceived from the perspective of Leninist-Marxist philosophy) presentedmany nuances of meaning. The theoreticians of the communist period noticedsomething that the author has herself encountered. It is precisely the nuance thatthe name does not capture the whole complex of aspects — economical, social,political, ethical, ideological, etc. — that the phrase in discussion refers to.3

Second, in the literature, in all the cases of exploitation and oppression of massesanalyzed, those that were corresponding to the concentration of power in thehands of a single person, a cult of personality is identified (as with the Pharaohin the ancient Egypt, the Emperor in China, the absolute Monarch in feudalEurope, the “Führer” in Nazi Germany). Even more, in these works there is atheoretical foundation of the cult of personality that may be analytically inscribedwithin the cult of the “genius”, or of the ”hero”, or of the “crucial personality”.This is as in the works of the romantics — such as F. Schelling and Th. Carlyle— or in those of the young Hegeliens — such as B. Bauer and N. Stirner. Thesame happens in the case of the Russian peasant 19th century revolutionaries, theNarodnics, or in the works of F. Nietzsche.4

Finally, in the literature of the cult, the idea that the “cult of personality”generates in the life of society a chain of phenomena contrary to the generalhuman moral norms is underlined. Therefore, the correct attitude of the people,i.e., in which the accomplishment of their social duty is replaced by the blind——————

* Text edited by Eric Gilder, PhD, visiting professor (Lucian Blaga), University, Sibiu.


compliance to the proletariat’s will, to a will to be manipulated by their deifiedleader (or to whomever bears the supreme authority). By so doing, people werecontributing to the spread of amoral methods used in defense for the existingorder.5

Historically, the essential contribution to bringing the meaning of “the cult ofpersonality” into a definite semantic field was had by Nikita Sergheevici Khrushcev.At the 20th (1956) Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.)he had condemned the cult of comrade Iosif Vissarionovici Djougaºvili, betterknown as Stalin. In the official report, presented at the Congress, Khrushcevsays that “the Central Committee (C.C.) has taken a strong attitude against thecult of personality, a cult that is proved itself foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, against transforming this or that activist into a hero working wonders,at the same time minimizing the role of the Party and of the popular masses,leading to diminishing their creative activity. The spread of the cult of personalityhas decreased the role of collective rule within the Party and often it has broughtabout serious deficiencies in our work.”6 The C.C. analyzed in June 1956 theobjective conditions that were in favor of the spreading of the cult of personality.The subjective factors that resulted from Stalin’s personality were as wellconsidered, in a decision entitled (in a genuine communist style) “On doing awaywith the cult of personality and with its consequences”.

Apparently, in the “Secret discourse”7, to which foreign delegates had noaccess to at the time, Khrushcev was much harsher, denouncing Stalin’s deedsas crimes. It is due to this specific association between the cult of personality andthe name of Stalin that many political analysts consider “the cult of personality”an “ideological euphemism for the entire system of lies, corruption, mass crimesand universal fear.”8

RaymondAron’s perspective is extremely useful in understanding how Stalinismwas built. He identifies five phases in the history of the Russian Bolshevik Party,of which the fourth phase is of most interest. “During the forth phase, that of theabsolute power of Stalin, all major decisions are taken by a single man. This manis surrounded by his comrades with whom he discusses within the Politburo, butto whom he is incapable to impose his will. Consequently, since 1934, he beginseven to terrorize everyone, and the factions are eliminated with no mercy, notonly politically, but also physically. The opponents within the Party, either realor virtual, are considered traitors. Thus they are killed either after they were solemnlytried and this sentence was pronounced either following their ‘confession’, orthey were eliminated in prison.”9

Within such a system, it is obvious that the power was situated at the top ofthe Party hierarchy and that a single man possessed it. “A person and that personalone was deciding the fate of all others, covering them in glory or in shame,transforming the servants of the régime into fiddles or into traitors.”10 Accordingto Khrushev, the beginning of Stalin’s cult of personality was marked by theterrorism of the years 1934–1938, oriented against Party members. At first, theaim was to end the life of Stalin’s already defeated adversaries, but then itchanged, striking even the most devoted of the Stalinists. “Why was terrorism

62 RODICA IAMANDI 2

directed against the very militants of the communist Party, those who did notdeviate from the line of the Party?” To this question, Khrushcev offers only oneanswer, one single interpretation: the cult of personality. Or, all one can say is thatthis is actually no answer, no explanation.11

It seems that Stalin was at the origin of the notion “enemy of the people” andthat this expression made possible the use of the most terrible oppression, againstanyone who would disagree, in any manner whatsoever, with Stalin. Khrushcevhas shown that “when Stalin said that this person or the other had to be arrested,it had to be admitted on word basis, that it was about being an enemy of thepeople. And then, Beria’s clique, in charge of the state Security organs, wouldgo above themselves to prove the guilt of the person arrested and to sustain thedocuments they forged”. The same character has underlined: “What kind of proofsdid they provide? The convicts’ confessions, (were provided) and the judges weretaking these seriously. And how can crimes never committed be confessed? Inonly one way, after applying physical forms of constraint, tortures generatinglack of conscience, intellectual confusion, deprivation of human dignity.”12

According to Raymond Aron’s opinion, The Secret Report of Khruschev’soffers a singular illustration for Montesquieu’s theory on despotism, a theoryaccording to which the principle of despotism is merely fear — an insidious fear— progressively taking over all individuals inside a collectivity. To the question“Why didn’t we do anything?” Khrushcev answers “with sincerity and naïveté”:“it was impossible for us to undertake any action. Whenever we were convenedby the supreme leader, we never knew if it was in order to consult us concerningan important decision, or to throw us away in Lubianka prison.”13

Whichever the theory of history adopted at some point, we have to take theindividuals into consideration as well. In order to go from potential to reality,from the intelligible functions of purgation to the lack of measure within the real,ample process of purgation, it was needed a unique ingredient, a man, Stalinhimself. One should not minimize the role this person/personality had played dueto that absolute power that he has possessed. At the same time, the phenomenacalled “the cult of personality” are not indebted only to the particularities of aunique man, but also to the technique of organization and action of a certain Party,which explains the appearance of the “cult of personality” within the satellitecommunist countries and around the leaders of those states, as well.

According to some historians, the cult of Stalin appeared in the period1926–1927. In many of the speeches given by the “left-wing” opposition leaders,there was even then present the protest against Stalin’s cult of personality. Thus,at the 14th Congress of the Bolshevik Communist Party of the Soviet Union, bythe end of December 1925, L. Kamenev has warned about the danger of amplificationof the cult of some leaders and especially of Stalin’s: “We are against the creationof the theory of ‘the leader’, we are against the creation of ‘the leader’. We areagainst the Sercuritate, in fact reuniting the politics and whole organization,situating itself above the political organ… Personally, I consider that our generalsecretary is not a personality to gather around a polarized old Bolshevikheadquarters… Especially because I have told these views personally and

3 THE “CULT OF PERSONALITY” IN ROMANIA 63

repeatedly to comrade Stalin, especially because I have told about these thingsrepeatedly to the group of Leninist comrades, I repeat what I have said here atthe Congress: I have reached the conclusion that comrade Stalin cannot fulfil therole of polarizing agent for the Bolshevik head-quarters.”14

This sign marked only the beginning of Stalin’s ascension. Apparently, hemanifested a heavy democratism, almost in contrast with the “aristocratic” Trotsky.Stalin was relatively accessible, rude and simple. He walked around freelythrough the C.C. building and Kremlin, almost without any guard. Sometimes,he stopped by unannounced at the Institute of Red Professors to talk to thestudents. If at the beginning of the third decade in most official institutions therecould be seen portraits of Lenin and Trotsky (after 1924, Trotsky’s portrait wasno longer to be seen), in the early days, Stalin’s portrait would not appear anywhere;it started to be displayed everywhere only from 1930 onwards, after in 1929,with a pomp unnatural for the times, Stalin was celebrated at his 50th birthday .

The birthday messages congratulating him would go beyond well-wishing,attributing qualities to him such as “wonderful”, “top”, but also words like “grand”and “genius”. The collection of articles and memories about Stalin, issued in1929, contained many exaggerations and deformations of the facts. The idea that“during Lenin, comrade Stalin, one of his disciples”, was at the same time hisgreatest help, who, different from others, in all the important phases of therevolution, in all the decisive moments of activity of the Party led by VladimirIllich “went side by side with him, without any hesitation.”15

Some of the authors of this collection attempted to prove that although Stalinwas more of a patrician within the Party, in reality, he was an important theoreticianof Marxism-Leninism. In an article entitled “Stalin and the Red Army”, K.E.Voroºilov attributes to Stalin non-existent merits in the Civil War.

Thus, in 1931, in the preface to the six volumes edition of Lenin’s works, theeditor, V.V. Adoratski, affirmed that Lenin’s works have to be studied with aStalin perspective in mind. E. Iaroslavski and A. Bubnov, the authors of thehistory books of the Bolshevik Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had alsoincluded pages consecrated to Stalin’s merits. Thus, the eulogies, that hadconsiderably increased in number after the C.C. plenary meeting of January1933, were perhaps not totally lacking sincerity; but they were essentially full ofthe zeal of carefully stimulated flattery. The fact that the first to resort to limitlesseulogy were the members of his Political Bureau, especially Molotov andKaganovich, conferred those eulogies immediately the character of an officialpolitical line to be followed as well by those who have never considered Stalininfallible.

Salin’s chorus of flattery was supported by voices of former oppositionleaders, whose voices were at times even louder that those of the others. Piaþakov,Zinoviev, Kamenev were publishing articles where they were admitting theirmistakes and recognizing how right is “the great leader of workers worldwide —comrade Stalin”. In the first issue of Pravda in 1934, an article of H. Radek spokeof Stalin only in superlatives.After a couple of days, the article became a brochure,with 225 000 copies being printed.

64 RODICA IAMANDI 4

Stalin’s cult was not formed out of mere vanity alone, but also from a thirstof power, situating his singularly, above the Party and beyond any critique, a factmade obvious at the 17th Congress of the Bolshevik Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union, where each and every speaker was evoking the “greatness”and the “genius” of Stalin. Then, through Comintern, the cult of the Stalin wasimplemented within all communist parties from abroad. At the same time, theexample of the Bolshevik Communist Party of the Soviet Union stimulated theformation of cults of the local leaders within the satellite communist countriesas well.

2. Forms of the “Cult of Personality”in Communist Romania before 1965

In Romania, the first signs of a “cult of personality” (while in very mutedforms in comparison to what was yet to come) was noticed from the period whenthe Communist Party was not a unique political force within society, dedicatedespecially to Ana Pauker. She came from Moscow along with the Red Armytanks, a fact that gave her, in that specific pro-Soviet sate of mind of the time, apeculiar aura; plus the intervention of the Party propaganda that, over-estimatingher merits and revolutionary qualities, as it will next be the case with Gheorghiu-Dej, and, especially, with Ceauºescu — these factors made her a second “Passionaria”(after the name of Dolores Ibaruri). Along with her adulation, a style wasinaugurated that would be continued also in the decades to come. “As she usedto say herself, all happens because she expresses the highest knowledge, madeaccessible to all. Listening to them at the meetings, with the clear anddetermined voice, vibrating at her high wisdom, at her great love for people,each felt her close, as if she would speak only to them, about their lives, abouttheir needs, and each listens to her all ears, absorbing every word and everythought.”16 Even in that time notions like freedom, independence and sovereignty,as the idea of love for the country: “the ardent love for the country goes throughas a red wire, all her activity, all her fight” was manipulated.17 Thus, Ana Paukerarrived (next to Gheorghiu-Dej and Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu) as one of the mainaspirants for the Party leadership, a dispute for power in which she counted onher links to Stalin’s circle, as well as upon the support of certain key emigrationcomrades (Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu, Iosif Chiºinevski) with who sheformed the so-called “external group”. Therefore, this acerbic fight for supremacywithin the Party had dominated the history of Romania in the first decade afterwar, a fight conducted mainly between the exponents of the two groups —Gheorghiu-Dej, from the inside and Ana Pauker, from the outside, each trying toenter the graces of Stalin (seen as the principal referee of this dispute). Theminority ethnic origin of Ana Pauker (who has succeeded to win the trust andappreciation, both from Stalin and from the majority of persons in her entourage)had determined the Moscow dictator’s support in eventually giving the “winningcup” of this contest to Gheorghiu-Dej, who had all the required qualities for acommunist leader in that historical context, and, also, he was devoted to Stalinism


with all his being. Justifying this choice, Stalin addressed Molotov (who hadsustained Ana Pauker): “Dear Viaceslav Mihailovici, Ana is a good comrade,trustworthy, but, the Romanian Party needs a leader from the working class, atrue Romanian.”18 Hence, starting actually October 1945, at the National Conference,for almost two decades he will be — with short intermittence — the almightycharacter in Romania, both in what concerns the Party and the state.

Far from offering a solution to the fight for power once and for all, the disputebetween the two leadership teams continued, gaining often-tensioned accents.Dej’s anxiety was even bigger, since the “external group” kept close links withSoviet institutions, especially with the N.K.V.D. of Beria; at the same time, thecompeting group (Pauker, Luca, T. Georgescu) recognized the first secretary ofthe Party at the plenary meeting from 1961 and they acted “as a group constitutedsingularly, outside the elected organs (…), most important matters of Partyleadership and of state being resolved by the secretariat and not by the PoliticalBureau, because there they had majority and the secretary general, in manymatters of great importance, was placed in a weaker position, left by himself.”19

Given all this Dej would “come out” on top of this situation, due to his lessobvious qualities — political ability, tact and diplomacy — had been waiting forfavorable conditions in the final confrontation to appear, especially since he hadStalin’s acceptance, who, unsatisfied with the tensioned atmosphere within theParty, said bluntly to Dej: “if they get in your way, scare them away!”20

The opportunity to do so came along with the C.C. plenary meeting in 26–27May 1952, called to discuss the serious deviations from the Party’s line of theformer leadership of the Finance Ministry and of Romania’s Popular Bank, realizingthat Vasile Luca “has separated himself from the Party… has surrounded himselfwith Party’s enemies, has stood up against the general line of the Party”; thatTeohari Georgescu “manifested conciliatory attitude related to the rightwingdeviations of Vasile Luca”. Serious accusations Dej had for Ana Pauker, as well,saying that “the deviation from the Party line in matters of agriculture andcollections”, that “she has cultivated unprincipled relations within the Party”.Considering all these elements, the plenary meeting reached the conclusion thatthe exclusion of Vasile Luca21 from the C.C. and of Teohari Georgescu from thePolitical Bureau and from the C.C. secretariat were necessary, as later wasextended to cover the functions of vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers.Ana Pauker was sanctioned only with a warning, but the plenary did not electher again as member in the secretariat and of the Political Bureau of the C.C., asa first step towards her final elimination from the leadership of the Party.22

The disparaging and removal of the “anti-Party”, “fraction” group of Pauker-Luca-Georgescu from the leadership of the Romanian Worker’s Party andafterwards, entirely from the Party served to overcome, through the implicationsand consequences the sphere of a power struggle, political disputes withinthe communist Party, which then became a real “monolith Party”, dominated inan authoritarian manner by a group with a unique political orientation and, infact, by a single man who would obtain thus the monopoly of personal power.Gheorghiu-Dej’s dictatorship over the Party was then exercised without mediation

66 RODICA IAMANDI 6

over the country as well and the “cult of personality” he generated was nothing elsebut a local Stalinism.

Even if the cult of personality of Dej and his power inside the Party got aconsiderable boost, he couldn’t yet consider himself as entirely mastering thesituation, as long as he felt his position within the Party threatened by his eternalrival — Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu. The solution that he chose — following the adviceand with the support of his obedient and zealous subordinate — AlexandruDrãghici (minister of internal affairs) — was the harshest, that is the physicalelimination of his adversary. Consequently, Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu was arrestedunder the false accusation of “espionage in the service of imperialism” and“crime of high treason”. Then, he was tried, sentenced to death and executed ina great hurry, in the night of 16th to 17th of April 1954, “shot from behind”.

Without any doubt, Gheorghiu-Dej and his minister of internal affairs, Drãghici,bear the main responsibility for this murder, but the entire membership of the Partyat the time (including members of Political Bureau and of the C.C.) were guiltyand responsible. The latter could not exonerate themselves for initiating, encouragingand supporting the proliferation of the cult of personality of Dej, with unfortunateconsequences for the entire Romanian society. For they had also have overlooked,encouraging a condemnable complicity, many abuses and illegalities to whichthe entire intellectual Romanian elite (many from the intellectually flourishingperiod between the two World Wars, but also other prominent figures in ourscience and culture) had fallen victim to, given the inhumane regime of physicaland moral extermination within the created Romanian gulag.

Even more, while in the Soviet Union Stalinist crimes were uncovered andtherefore society there was going through a profound process of conscience-raising, in Romania there were very few signs of change; the Romanian Worker’sParty continued to patronize a “society with rigid forms, leaded by petrified dogmas,‘Stalinizing’ everything as an automatic device would do, once started beingimpossible to stop, insulating all the possible niches from the thawing wind that,blowing throughout all Eastern Europe, could have blown inside Romania aswell.”23 The disappearance of Stalin, instead of giving Dej and his friends theopportunity of long-awaited normalization of domestic life, considered it aninternal affair of the Soviet Union, ignoring the similar de-Stalinization processtaking place within the most of the satellite countries of central and south-eastern Europe (the Hungarian revolution of 1956 being the most violent formof manifestation of this “political thaw”). Dej felt himself as the master of thesituation both within the Party and in the country, a fact that permitted him toovercome successfully the moment of Hungarian revolution, namely all theturmoil generated as consequence within Romanian young generation.

Interior stability, plus the experience gained from the “Hungarian lesson”prompted Dej to take the next step, decisive in Romanian foreign policy (a stepthat would bring him great popularity) — parting with Moscow’s direct influence.The international context, dominated by the politics of relaxation generated byKhrushcev, was in his favor and Dej’s tactics of overstating the “Romanian-Soviet friendship” and of the fidelity towards Moscow was as absurd as it was


efficient. One has to notice that the ability and diplomacy that characterized thewhole political career of this now-neglected communist leader. The way Dej hadobtained what no other satellite of Moscow had succeeded in doing: i.e., thewithdrawal of the quota of participation at “sovroms” and especially the “miracle”of June1958, that is, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops that had been stationedin Romania since 1944, was exemplary of his diplomatic talent.

These successes consolidated internal stability, bringing about a bonus ofpopularity to the communist leader, more than all the Party propaganda andhe exacerbation of the “cult of personality” had accomplished. Starting thehistoric detachment from Soviet domination was a great achievement of Dej, butunfortunately, this gain did not extend to de-Stalinization as well, a processstarted by Khrushcev at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party.For Gheorghiu-Dej — as Silviu Brucan recognized — the Soviet experience thathe had gained to date become an à la carte menu, that is, he was choosing fromit just what suited him. Thus, Romanian experienced a de-satelliltization to saveStalinism and not to reform it, as Khrushcev tried in the Soviet Union.”24

Dumitru Popescu says in a memoir that, “Our Stalin was not dead, our Stalinwas defending himself”25, in relation to Dej’s attitude during the 1958 campaign,when under a barrage of attacks against those contaminated by the events inHungary and Poland, was an attack against the critics of Stalinism, seen as areaction to the cult of Stalin aimed eventually at Dej. Even if only MironConstantinescu and Iosif Chiºinevski were found to be scapegoats, according toDumitru Popescu, “behind them were large categories of Party activists eager toopen a public political process of Stalinism, including a process of the wayStalin reflected himself in our social reality and continued to reflect himself therebecause the generative factors were not removed.”26

Under such circumstances, the equivocal attitude of Dej towards there-launching of the process of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union at the 22nd

Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party, in October 1961 seemsunderstandable. He could not afford to situate himself in a position of attacktowards the orientation of the Congress and Khrushev, or to sustain openly thecult of Stalin. With characteristic ability, he found an “original” way to exposeStalinism by taking it against his old opponents from the “exterior group” duringthe plenary of the C.C., from 30th of November — 5th of December 1961.

The report presented by Dej at the plenary meeting considered fully justified“the measures taken by the Soviet Union Communist Party to end the cult ofpersonality and its consequences”, for under that influence “methods andpractices contrary to Leninist norms have taken place, overstepping the democraticrules in Party life”, but he added, “the methods generated by the cult ofpersonality and by its consequences did not have the extent they had in othercountries”, because the Party, his activists guarded “the fundamental principlesof the Party”, did not give way to pressures and unhesitatingly protected the lifeand the dignity of the Party members27 the main attack was directed againtowards “the anti-Party group Pauker-Luca” and towards his supporters (TeohariGeorgescu, Iosif Chilinevski and Miron Constantinescu) — supposedly the main

68 RODICA IAMANDI 8

exponents of Stalinist cult and practices, with old and new accusations, exposingfor the first time their ill-fated role in co-operativization of the agriculturalsector, the fact that in spite of the indications ofAna Pauker to Teohari Georgescu“in the name of the struggle against kulaks, over eighty thousand peasants, mostof them working peasants, were sent to trial”, under the accusation that they didnot respected their obligations towards the state.

Transferring the responsibility for all inequalities and abuses to the “fractiongroups”, Dej considered “a fortune for our Party that their possessions did notresult in inequality, so there were no serious injustices done to be repaired andno one was to be rehabilitated post-mortem.”28 In the same vein of falsifying thehistory, many of the senior Party leadership spoke, but none excelling in demagogyand servility his successor to power, the new leader of the Romanian CommunistParty (R.C.P.), Nicolae Ceauºescu. (How sincere he was was demonstrated sevenyears later, when he launched a virulent critique aimed at the former leadershipof which he had been a part, as an opening act to the process he was going toattribute to Dej.) In so doing, Ceauºescu was not concerned by the fate of theParty or by the fate of Dej’s victims, but more with personal reasons, andprimarily irritated by the fact that the parting with Moscow had been initiated byDej with good consequences being already seen by 1964. “For a long while —declared Ceauºescu shortly after the plenary meeting from April 1968 — weused to think and to declare publicly with satisfaction that we have nothing torehabilitate, that in Romania abuses, violations of Party democracy or of socialistlegislation did not take place. Even more, it was said that it was a great happinessfor us that we have had someone to protect the Party and state activists.”29

Ceauºescu was pointing to the observation that, beyond the cynicism of theappreciations Dej had made was the easy way he had distanced himself from theresponsibilities for many illegalities committed under his lead, saying “we havenothing to rehabilitate”, ignoring knowingly the victims of the genocide of1937–1938 including R.C.P. members such as the assassinations of ªtefan Foriºand Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu, ignoring knowingly the thousands of victims of theRomanian gulag after 1948.

The reforming action triggered by Khrushcev at the 20th Congress of theSoviet Union Communist Party and developed at the 22nd, with all the positiveeffects for the new Soviet domestic politics encouraged same actions in thesatellite countries from the eastern Europe, with first manifestations being evidentin Albania and Hungary.

Paradoxically, especially now when Stalinism and the cult of personality hadbeen denounced, when profound changes were taking place, Dej and RomanianWorker’s Party were dominating the Romanian political scene. Dej was favoredalso by his united team of collaborators, consisting of specialists in various fieldsand devoted political men. Under his leadership, there were accomplishments,such as the diplomatic solution to the Soviet-Chinese ideological conflict, froman apparently neutral standpoint, or the parting with Moscow, or the generalamnesty for political prisoners — a surprising political decision even for themost ardent supporters of the régime. This amnesty was the unique liberating


opportunity for many leading personalities of Romanian science and culture. Allthese events were the apogee of his career and brought about his large politicalsupport.

An objective evaluation of Gheorghiu-Dej’s activity as leader of state, cannotomit the fact that in spite of the errors committed as consequence of his “cult ofpersonality”, that he had captured the masses due to his adroitness in politics, healso led Romania to the general renewal path that had opened to eastern Europeat the beginning of 1964.As a benchmark for the new historical epoch for Romania,the Declaration from April (1964) while conceived by this Party leader as aperspective program, it became his political testament. Two priorities werestated therein: the stabilization of external political goals, and the internalstabilization of the domestic politics. He succeeded to accomplish only the first,obtaining with many risks the autonomy of the Party, its inalienable right tomanifest itself as a national political force, and especially, the relativeindependence of the country and its national sovereignty. “Even partially realizedon this exterior dimension of it — noticed Victor Frunzã — this work (lefthalfway) contributed to a different reception of Gheorghiu-Dej by the history,from, let’s say, the reception if he would have disappeared in 1956, not only withhis hands tainted by the blood of thousands of victims, but with qualities thatmake him an important complex personality for our contemporary epoch…Most certainly, Dej cannot be in trial for what he wanted to, but he did not succeedto accomplish. Posterity has to be grateful for what he has done good for thecountry and for the Romanian people.”30 Beyond these attainments there areerrors that remain, though, very serious ones, like the crimes initiated and patronizedfor almost two decades, while he was gathering in his hands the entire powerwithin the Party and state. For these actions, he has been examined by a sternhistory and found guilty without any hesitation.

3. The “Cult of Personality” as Practicedand Imposed under Nicolae Ceauºescu

The successes obtained by Gheorghiu-Dej, especially, on the level of therelative independence of the country and of the gaining of national sovereignty,were subordinated by his successor, Nicolae Ceauºescu, to a personal interest.The two personalities became the motif of an absurd propaganda campaign thatwould lead step-by-step towards setting up a dictatorship and a “cult of personality”without precedent in Romanian history. Ceauºescu’s road towards personaldictatorship was much more oppressive than that of Dej, when it was graduallyset in place by a chain of apparently inoffensive measures, but each holdingdangerous implications for democracy.

Although only three years passed since his confirmation at the 9th Congressof the Party as secretary general of the C.C. of R.C.P., Nicolae Ceauºescu hadaccumulated already power. In December, 1967 he assumed for himself the functionof president of the Council of State, so he was now Head of State, as well asGeneral Party Secretary. He used these powers to first uncover the abuses and

70 RODICA IAMANDI 10

illegalities of the former leadership (excepting himself), aiming his attacksmainly at his rival Alexandru Drãghici and at Gheorghiu-Dej. This action wasnot ostentatious, all taking place in the second part of the C.C. of the R.C.P.plenary meeting of April 1968 (called to foster the development of education atall levels). For example, he did not even take the floor at this meeting, but rathertackled this subject at another meeting (a meeting of the activists of Bucharest)on 26th of April.

That plenary had represented, after Dumitru Popescu, “the climax of de-Stalinization in Romania at its peak.31 The centrality of “security” acquired itsinfamous place in Romania due to its importance at that stage of development ofthe socialist régime (being consumed with alleged abuses, illegalities and crimes).Particularly given that Ceauºescu considered that these abuses could not byblamed on the “cult of personality” as others did, but that they were characteristicof “the states of economic, political, social and educational low level of thepeople and due the backward mentality of those who have committed all thesecrimes”, that is, as phenomena outside socialism that should be left outside.32

The plenary meeting then rehabilitated Lucreþiu Pãtrãºcanu, ªtefan Foriº andother victims of the “cult of personality”, as those condemned and executed inthe Soviet Union at the order of Stalin during “Great Terror” years, 1937–1938.Also, by eliminating the main culprit in Pãtrãºcanu’s case, Alexandru Drãghici,Ceauºescu gave a signal for the removal of all inconvenient people, namely allof Dej’s former inner circle.

Ceauºescu’s intransigent attitude in all matters of interest to the Party and forthe country, such as those tackled at the plenary from April 1968, or his firmposition in the Czechoslovakia matter (in which, by condemning the Sovietintervention propelled him into the posture of a national hero) the Romanianpopulation saw in him an ideal, more liberal leader, more democratic and moreopen to renewal than his predecessor, while, at the same time, he becameinternationally famous. Great leaders, such as Harold Wilson of Britain, Charlesde Gaulle of France, and Richard Nixon of the United States, came rushing toofficially visit him in Bucharest. However, this so-called “liberation” was only arelative one, though. Within the Party, he employed the traditional “rotation ofthe staff” to minimize or eliminate the influence of the “old guard”. Hence, inthe Party, it would not be possible for a real opposition to the renewed Stalinistmethods, to the ascension of a “new cult of personality” to form, with only singularvoices being heard.

An eyewitness of the time considers that Czechoslovakia’s invasion was thedecisive moment for the creation of a “cult of personality” for Ceauºescu: “inthose moments a certain attitude imposed itself towards Ceauºescu within theParty. As the word went back then, the man who established this attitude as anecessity within the Permanent Presidential Council was Maurer. His reasoningwas solid and clear. He supposedly said, Now Romania is personalized byCeauºescu. Ceauºescu, by the nature of his function has to face all dangersconfronting the country. We have to give him a bigger say, a bigger politicalforce, to prove he has his back covered; that he is assured that there is no niche


into the leadership of Romania, into the Communist Party, that someone couldever speculate to attack the positions promoted by Ceauºescu in the name of theParty and of the country. This action imposes an obvious solidarity with Ceauºescu,an unconditioned support of his positions, a definition of these positions as totallyexpressing the Party, the country, the people”.33

During this first period (1965–1971), Ceauºescu succeeded to assure himselfpopularity. The people saw in him the “providential man”; the leader restoringtheir dignity, expressing their own hopes and dreams. They could not imaginethat he would use this popularity to ease his way to a total occupation of power.And nothing, and no one, thus impeded the application of his plan. It all startedwith changes inside the mechanism of power, placed in operation at the 9th

Congress of the Party in 1965, when the Romanian Worker’s Party became theRomanian Communist Party and Romanian Popular Republic became RomanianSocialist Republic, when the Congresses were re-numbered and a newconstitution was adopted. By the 1969 Congress and ones following, the changesin the mechanism of power became much obvious, and more precisely aimed.Of great importance was the change of the name of the supreme function withinthe Party, from Secretary-General of the C.C. of the R.C.P., into that ofSecretary-General of R.C.P. At the time, Ceauºescu was already President of thePresidential Council, the supreme functionary of the state. From now on,Ceauºescu was to be elected not by the plenary of the C.C. but directly by theCongress of the Party. Thus, he became the only immovable person in the Party,protected under the simulacrum of Party democracy.

This measure affected the entire Party, diminishing the importance and roleof the other leadership bodies, especially that of the Political Bureau (to which evenDej had paid attention), because it used to be the main means of expression of theprinciple of collective leadership. Otherwise, Ceauºescu himself declared theimportance of this principle at the 9th Congress, as supreme principle of Partyleadership.34 Yet, he defied elementary norms of Party democracy, being electedby a show of hands and unceasing cheers. It should be noted here that the choiceof the delegates at a Congress was preceded by a careful staff selection, monitoredby Ceauºescu himself and, in time, by Elena Ceauºescu, his wife, head of the feared“Cabinet number 2”. Furthermore, all the members of C.C. were drawn from theranks of these same delegates, therefore completing the image of a grotesque show.

Over time, Ceauºescu’s thirst for power grew larger. When he has visited Chinaand North Korea in 1971 he was seduced by the dimensions and by the forms ofmanifestation of the “cult of personality” seen. He saw meetings of adulation ofthe leader, fascinating spectacles of light and sound, and thereby decided to importmore of such a political and cultural system to Romania. Thus:

“In Romaniawe are in error inwhat concerns thematter of the cult of personality”,Dumitru Popescu remarked, “as it is commented upon now is seems that itconsisted of festive events only”. For Ceauºescu such “festivism” was totallyunsatisfactory and lame, much less than what he wanted. “A few voices singing“osana” were small potatoes. He was way beyond such tiny satisfactions. He wouldlook over the newspapers, find phrases full with eulogy and not be thrilled at all.


For him, mass hysteria was essential, millions’ “osana”, over-enthusiasticcollectives’ adhesion, the rumble of the meetings in the public square, the hugecrows of workers with their arms stretched up to reach him, the living queuesalong his car rides lasting for kilometers, arms scanning from hundreds ofchests. He has built as a lucid and calculated architect the complicated frame ofmass delirium (...) He has organized periodically gigantic congresses andconferences. He has institutionalized the grand country tours, the pompous workvisits in the counties, plants, towns, villages and the so-called dialogue with thepeople were hundreds of thousands participated.”35

Thus, in a second phase (1971–1980), Romania obtained a “mini-culturalrevolution” leading to an oversized “cult of personality”.After assuming the functionof supreme commander of the armed forces, he transformed the low-prestigePolitical Bureau into the Political Executive Committee, politically controllingthe entire activity of the government. I. Gh. Maurer, then-head of the government,faced Ceauºescu’s acts with ever-greater difficulty, for his successors will nowhave a solely decorative role. After 1974, Elena Ceauºescu launched herself intopolitics, gaining one leadership function after another, up to “prime vice-primeminister”. At this time, Ceauºescu’s control over all acts of internal and externalpolitics is complete. Differences in the ruling circle start to show, both in mattersof form and content (especially from Maurer’s part) but his honorable attitude isnot followed as an example by many others. Therefore, many politicians opposingimposture and megalomania of Ceauºescu’s political, social and economic lifeleft their functions “willingly” or were set aside.

The “shadow directors” of such a “personality cult” staged congresses, publicgatherings and homage shows, training impressively large masses, in Chineseand North Korean style. Masses almost never gather willingly. The “shadowdirectors” thus invent and institutionalize all types of National Councils mimickingdemocracy, only to elect as their head, with exaggerated pomp, Nicolae Ceauºescu.Finally, the plenary meeting of March 1974 proposed to the Great NationalAssembly the institution of the function of President of Romania and for thatfunction unanimously elected Nicolae Ceauºescu.

Through this new function, Ceauºescu reached the climax of political power;with 1974, the dictatorial régime was stepping into a new historical phase. In onlynine years, he had become the most powerful man in Romania, “an absolutemonarch”36, according to Silviu Brucan, and the following rise to power of his wife,Elena Ceauºescu, made Romania a “communist two-headed monarchy.”37 Theythen succeeded to build an almost perfect model of a personal-dictatorship politicalsystem, permitting them not only to control Romania, in every political way, but thepersonal life of the 23 million Romanians, as well, for almost a quarter of a century.

Perplexed, the “public opinion” had assisted such a metamorphosis of the leadersin which they had placed so many hopes. Ceauºescu was the one who promisedat the tribune of the 9th Congress not to admit “any forms of overstepping theprinciple of work and collective leadership”, and he had proposed as well theintroduction of procedures to which “no Party member can have more that onefunction of leadership, either within the Party or within the state.”38


During the period that entered history as the “Golden Epoch” or as “NicolaeCeauºescu Epoch”, came into form after 1971, the “cult of personality” acquiredthe most absurd forms of expression, by which his totalitarian power was finallyconsecrated. Any act of internal or external policy was now “under the thumb”of the General Secretary, any action took place only under his “direct supervisionand guidance”, given his “pretentious indications” — expressions obsessivelyusual with Party propaganda of the epoch.At the same time, a “cult of personality”of Elena Ceauºescu was carefully installed, motivated by her allegedly exceptionalmerits during the revolutionary times in Romania. This as done although Ceauºescuhimself had asked at the tribune of the 9th Congress that any personality fromhistory be objectively presented, considering that “the exaggeration of the meritsof some militants” was damaging. “No leader, no matter how prominent,” saidCeauºescu then, “can be presented as the only agent of the historical events, withoutdeifying that person, to denying the role of the masses, of the people… Wouldbe wrong to exaggerate past merits of some leaders only to put the history ‘inaccord’ with the present.”39

With characteristic demagogy, after the plenary meeting of 1968, Ceauºescustated that the activity of any Party member was to start from “an objective andlucid analysis of the facts and not from the myths. We do not need idols. We donot need to transform people into flags.”40 However, by bending the historicaltruth, Party propaganda has put into circulation facts and appreciations well overthe limit of credibility in creating a heroic aura for Ceauºescu, so to increase hisdomestic and foreign prestige. In reality such propaganda harmed no one, beingtoo extreme to be believed by anyone: the presence of Nicolae Ceauºescu, aged 12in the revolutionary movement, at 15 into the Party, or his important contributionto the activity of the NationalAnti-Fascist Committee in 1933 and the arrangementof the 1st of May 1939 demonstration with the future Elena Ceauºescu, or even theepisode of his presence in the prison camp at Târgu Jiu… In direct relation to thedevelopment of the communist totalitarianism is the proliferation of the “cult ofpersonality” of Nicolae Ceauºescu in the 1960s and ’70s and, in the ’80s the “cultof personality” of Elena Ceauºescu, to grotesque extremes. Thanks to a perfectlyfunctioning propaganda mechanism and to a rhetoric overstating the merits of theSecretary General, forcing the superlatives of the Romanian language over decentlimits, the cult flourished. No less useful were the actions of (re-named) artists,writers, plastic artists, who, from either conviction or opportunism, made itpossible to set him high on a pedestal of power. Thanks to them, Ceauºescu cameto believe himself that he was the “Genius of the Carpathians”, that the history ofthe Romanian people began (and would end) with him. The newspapers, VladGeorgescu (one of the opponents of the régime from abroad) remarked, saw himas “the icon of a prince”, referring to him as “Man”, written with capital letter (asonce “God” was written). “His people” was used in reference to Ceauºescu as withthe kings of old, but no prince or king in Romania (not even those with the biggestegos) would approve of these unnatural forms of expressions, or of them beingpracticed to such an extent as to transform into a familial cult. Only Stalin has beengenius, prophet, and father of many nations.“41


Such appropriations and manipulations of national and patriotic feelings,obstinately invoking the historical past under the pretext that it restores to apeople their true national dignity were diversions in the service of the “cult ofpersonality”. The festive meetings and the pompous festive shows held to allegedlyhonor the patriotic actions of forefathers were just pretexts to inoculate into thepublic opinion the idea that the R.C.P. was in fact the person continuing thetraditions of fight for social justice, independence and national sovereignty ofthe Romanian people. By relationship as relatives, the Secretary General, cameto personify the aspirations of all Romanians. This cult grew to a point that thename and figure of Nicolae Ceauºescu were situated next to legendary symbolsof Romanian history — from Burebista to Decebal, Bãlcescu and Cuza. Fromhere to associating the Party and Ceauºescu with the name of the country in apopular slogan of “the golden epoch”, “the Party, Ceauºescu, Romania”, was justa step. Within such a context it is easy to understand that any criticism ofdictatorship, of the “cult of personality”, or directed to the absurd economic andsocial policies generated thereby was immediately qualified as “anti-Romanian”and sanctioned as such by the oppressive régime.

Without any doubt, the “cult of personality” so carefully cultivated was supportedby a wise foreign policy, of national independence and sovereignty. Such foreignpolicies were approved by all Western powers, as well, since the principles ofthese policies were mostly part of the Helsinki Treaty. (Indeed, many were thesame policies as those formulated by Dej in his “Declaration of April 1964”.)

Thus, the President of Romania, by accurately speculating upon the designsof Western leaders, “naturally” came to consider himself (with the aid of a largechorus) as one of the great personalities of the contemporary world. A clearretrospective view on the last quarter of century of communism should seriouslyput the question of how such a possibility of the absurd “cult of personality” ofCeauºescu and his despotic régime came to be, especially after the sad experienceof Dej with an earlier variant. It is the author’s contention that such a state ofevents that brought Romania to the “brink of disaster” was born at the confluenceof three factors: the Stalinist model, the will of the leader and the active orpassive acceptance of the population to be so led.42 The active support was offeredby the higher communist activists (“the nomenclature”), the admirers and councilswhich always surrounded Ceauºescu, and local activists. The passive supportwas offered by the resigned, humble or indifferent masses, acquiescing in dictatorialdecisions even when these were not in their best interests, affecting their hopesand their human dignity and freedom. For too long, stand-up reactions were almostnon-existent, nut this should not be explained by mere cowardice, but rather bya temporarily “rational” compromise, given that the “cult of personality” and thedictatorship were both considered “temporary” aberrations by their fragility,artificiality, demagogy and lack of truth. Ceauºescu possessed a syncretic, culticnature, combining elements of the cults of Mussolini, Hitler, Mao and Kim deSung (weaving within the same fabric the traditional Asian cultic elements withthe modern Soviet elements of Stalin’s “cult of personality.”43)


NOTES


1. Sergiu Tãmaº, Dicþionar politic. Instituþiiledemocraþiei ºi cultura civicã/Political Dictionary.The Institutions of Democracy and the CivicCulture, Bucharest, Editura Academiei Române,1993.

2. ***Dicþionar enciclopedic, vol. I, A.C., Bucharest,Editura Enciclopedicã, 1993.

3. Ovidiu Trãsnea, Nicolae Kallos (coord.), Micãenciclopedie de politologiei, Bucharest, Edituraªtiinþificã ºi Enciclopedicã, 1977, pp. 111–112.

4. O.G. Drobniþki, I.S. Kon (coord.), Mic dicþionarde eticã, Moscova, Editura pentru literaturãpoliticã, 1965, pp. 25–26 (C).

5. Ibidem.6. N.S. Khrushchev, Raportul de activitate alComitetului Central al Partidului Comunist alUniunii Sovietice la Congresul al XX-lea alPartidului/Activity Report..., Bucharest, Editurade Stat pentru Literaturã Politicã, 1956, p. 134.

7. “Discursul secret”/“The Secret Discourse” ofHrushcev at the 20th Congress of CPSU,immediately taken over in the Western press, andin TariqAli, The Stalinist Legacy, Harmondsworth,Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1984, pp. 256–270,apud Vladimir Tismãneanu, Reinventareapoliticului. Europa rãsãriteanã de la Stalin laHavel/Reinventing the political… trans. inRomanian by Alexandru Vlad, Polirom, 1997and A. Rossi, Autopsie du stalinisme, Paris,1957, apud Raymond Aron, Democraþie ºitotalitarism, trans. in Romanian by SimonaCeauºu, Bucharest, Editura ALL Educaþional,2001, pp. 204–220.

8. Vladimir Tismãneanu, op.cit., p. 74.9. Raymond Aron, Democraþie ºi totalitarism/

Democracy and Totalitarism, trans. SimonaCeauºu, Bucharest, Editura ALL Educaþional,2001, p. 194.

10. Ibidem, p. 212.11. Ibidem, p. 219.12. A. Rossi, Autopsie du stalinism, Paris, 1957,

p. 10, apud Raymond Aron, op. cit., p. 209. .13. R. Aron, op. cit., p. 211.14. Apud Roy Medvedev, Despre Stalin ºi Stalinism,

Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 1991, p. 56.15. Ibidem, p. 133.16. Victor Frunzã, Istoria stalinismului în România/

The History of Stalinism in Romania, Bucharest,Editura Humanitas, 1990, p. 491.

17. Ibidem.18. Silviu Brucan, Generaþia irositã/ The Wasted

Generation, Bucharest, Editura Univers&Calistrat Hogaº, 1992, p. 59.

19. Gheorghiu-Dej, Darea de seamã a delegaþieiP.M.R. la cel de-al XX-lea Congres al P.C.U.S./Report of the P.M.R. Delegation at the XXthCongress of P.C.U.S., in “Scânteia” newspaper,anul XXXI, nr. 5371, 7 decembrie, 1961, p. 1.

20. Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincerã a poporuluiromân/A Sincere History of the Romanian People,

Bucureºti, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1997,p. 471.

21. Not after long, Vasile Luca was arrested, trailedand at 10th October 1954, sentenced to his death,sentence changed after the appeal, to a sentencefor life.

22. “Scânteia” newspaper, anul XXI, nr. 2360, 29 mai,1952, p. 1.

23. Victor Frunzã, op. cit., p. 423.24. Silviu Brucan, op. cit., p. 95.25. Dumitru Popescu, Am fost ºi cioplitor de himere/

I was an unrealty carver, too, Bucharest, EdituraExpres, 1994, p. 50.

26. Ibidem, op. cit., p. 153.27. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, op. cit., p. 1.28. Ibidem.29. Nicolae Ceauºescu, Cuvântare la adunarea

activului de partid al municipiului Bucureºti/Speech at the Bucharest Party Summons, 26 IV1968.

30. Victor Frunzã, op. cit., pp. 459–461.31. Dumitru Popescu, op. cit., p. 133.32. Nicolae Ceauºescu, România pe drumul

desãvârºirii construcþiei socialiste/Romania onthe Road of Perfecting Socialist Construction,vol. III, Bucharest, Editura Politicã, 1969, p. 194.

33. Dumitru Popescu, op. cit., p. 153.34. Nicolae Ceauºescu, România pe drumul

desãvârºirii construcþiei socialiste, vol. I,Bucharest, Editura Politicã, 1968, p. 74.

35. Dumitru Popescu, op. cit., p. 234.36. Silviu Brucan, op. cit., p. 145.37. Florin Constantiniu, op. cit., p. 515.38. Nicolae Ceauºescu, op. cit., p. 74.39. Ibidem, p. 515.40. Nicolae Ceauºescu, România pe drumul

desãvârºirii construcþiei socialiste, vol. III,Bucharest, Editura Politicã, 1969, p. 194.

41. Vlad Georgescu, Politicã ºi istorie. Cazulcomuniºtilor români 1944–1977/The Case of theRomanian Communist, München, Ion DumitruVerlag, 1983, p. 91.

42. Florin Constantiniu, op. cit., p. 516.43. See also Lavinia Betea, Psihologie politicã.

Individ, lider, mulþime în regimul comunist/Political Psychology. Individual, Leader, Crowdduring the Communist Régime, Iaºi, Polirom,2001, pp. 176–177, 188–190, for a development ofthis argument, as for a competent identificationand analysis of the propaganda directions that havebuilt the cult of personality of Nicolae Ceauºescu:the fasifying of biography, the identification of theleader with the Party, the people and the country,the appropriation of the mission of the “saviour” ofthe nation, the appropriation of the role of avisionary and un rested guide for the destiny of themasses, the appropriation of the status of aninternational politician.

ROMANIA AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY(PART I)

DANIELA IONESCU

Introduction

The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the short and far-termeconomic impact of CommonAgricultural Policy (C.A.P.) over: Romanian farmers’income; national budget; consumer prices; trade with European Union (E.U.);rural development. The above-mentioned impacts will be studied in details forthe next three years after enlargement because this is the period generallyconsidered to be the most economically painful. It is a period of adaptation,during which Romania has to implement the expensive E.U.’s criteria.The medium-far term impact will be considered for a time span that goes

beyond the first three years of membership (2010 or 2011) up to 2016, whenRomania will enjoy the full benefits of C.A.P. It will be analyzed the futureeffects of the C.A.P. reform from June 2003 upon the Romanian agriculture. Asa new member, most of the terms of this reform will not be applied to Romaniain the first 3 years after accession but only afterwards.Who will be the victims and who will be the beneficiaries of the C.A.P. on short

and long term? Is the reformist trend inside E.U. beneficiary for the Romanianagriculture? What structural advantages and disadvantages has the Romanianagriculture in regard with C.A.P.?Which is the bill that the national government hasto pay for the implementation of C.A.P.? These are few of the most importantquestions that the paper will try to answer concerning mainly the economic aspects.

I. Explanation of the Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.)— market measures

C.A.P. is the best-integrated sector in E.U. 90% of the agricultural productionof the member states is subjected to E.U.’s reglementations. It has the twopillars: Pillar 1 regards the market reglementations as well as the subsidies andquotas. The second one involves the measures for the rural development.Each year the Council of Ministers negotiates three kinds of prices. E.U.

imposes certain prices for the internal market, such as the indicative price. (Ind.P). These have always been higher than those on the international market; therefore

INTERNAT IONAL RELAT IONSAND EUROPEAN STUDIES


the E.U. consumers are paying more for food than the non-E.U.. The reason ofthis price is to assure a reasonable level of income for farmers. The interventionprice (Intervt. P) is the minimum price guaranteed. When the offer is higher thanthe demand for some products, the Community buys them in order not todecrease the market price under the intervention price. The intervention price islower than the indicative price but higher than the international price (W.P.)Ind.P>Intervt.P>W.P. The threshold price refers to the protectionist policy of theCommunity, by which it does not allow the import of agricultural products atlower prices than the threshold price. After the expenditure for the transport andtrading, the price becomes higher than the internal prices.A very important component is the subventions: direct payments, the financing

of export and others.The direct payments — The subventions for production are given to those

products that may have a high price on the market, for example, due to a highcustom duty, thus discouraging their consumption. It is granted either on eachproduct, on area or on each animal. They are granted for: olive oil, oil bearing,sheep meat, and tobacco. There are also bonuses for the high quality of someproducts or animals as well as for processing the food. The 2003 reform hintedto a decoupling of the subsidies from the amount of production. Nevertheless, inorder to safeguard particular production sectors and avoid abandoning themsome specific aid payments would be provided for such products as durumwheat, rice, nuts, energy crops and starch potatoes.

The Compensatory payments — Were introduced in 1992 (McSharry C.A.P.reform) in order to compensate the losses suffered by farmers as a result of thedecrease in the intervention prices close to the international ones. These paymentshave no connection with the amount of production and they are granted as a steadyyearly amount of money either per hectare or per animal. The farmers have to respectsome standards of food and animal quality and the welfare of the environment.

Export subsidies — The agricultural products have higher prices than theaverage world prices from outside E.U. Therefore the communitarian producersare not enticed to export their products. Consequently, the E.U. encourages themto export at a price considerably lower than those from E.U. and the E.U. supportsthe price difference. Thus, the E.U. farmers can find easier markets avoidingoverburdening the E.U. market and they loose no money.

The custom tariff protection—Those who export on the E.U. market have torespect the health and quality criteria, which are quite expensive. They are alsosubjected to a single custom tariff for all the products.1The rural development sector will be presented in details in a following

chapter dedicated to this subject.

II. Romanian agriculture’s major characteristics,problems and challenges

Romania has a remarkable agricultural potential, but is not effectively exploited.It is on the second place after Poland among the Central East-European candidates

78 DANIELA IONESCU 2

concerning the available agricultural land. After accession might be the 7thcountry after France, Spain, Poland, Germany, Italy and UK, having an 8% fromthe total European Union’s agricultural land.Romania has the largest number of population involved in agriculture (42%

in 2004) to which it corresponds a contribution to Gross Domestic Product(G.D.P.) of approx. 10%. Therefore the Agricultural sector is one of the mostimportant in Romanian economy. In E.U. 1,7% from its population is involvedin agriculture, while its contribution to G.D.P. is 4.2%.Romania has the most fragmented agricultural land in all E.U. and from all

the candidates — the average is 2 ha. Most of them are subsistence or semi-subsistence farms that produce for self-consumption rather than for the market.This is also responsible for the low productivity, while E.U. has big farmersassociations able to resist to European competition and also able to influence theE.U. policy. The Romanian National Institute for Statistics estimated that morethan 60% of the production is for the self-consumption and not for the market.This represented a big problem when the quotas of production were negotiated.The quota is a maximum quantity of production allowed by the E.U. and is notsupposed to be exceeded. This is negotiated taking as a reference point the productsthat reached the market and not the real production. Since only 40% of what hasbeen produced in Romania was destined to the market, was very difficult toobtain good quotas mainly when it came of milk and wine. If the fragmentationand the subsistence character is maintained the same problem will occur for thenext round of negotiations. This may impinge over agro-food production.Another negative consequence of the excessive fragmentation is the poverty.

In 2001 the average monthly income for a Romanian farm was 165 euro. This isonly 12% more than the income of a family of unemployed. Moreover, this sumincludes the value of the products that are for self-consumption and they representaround 57%. Therefore, the cash account for much less, around 75 euro. Needlesto say that this has upon consequences upon the productivity of this farm andupon its means of modernization. There is a limited access to inputs and servicesdue to the poverty. For example there are still farmers who cannot afford to havenot even one tractor.

The trade balance is persistently negative and the share of agriculture in theRomanian exports decreased constantly. Its main partner (exporter and importer)is E.U. Until 2004 the second importer partner were the C.E.F.T.A. countries, butsince 2004 this is not available anymore since its members became E.U. members.The Romanian products have a lower quality and are more expensive than thestrongly subsidized E.U. agricultural products (formore details see theTrade chapter).The High rate of unemployment affects marnly the rural population: in 2002

only half of it was employed. The Social infrastructure represents another bigchallenge since 60% of farmers are old (over 50) and very poorly educated. Thismakes difficult the modernization of the sector and is oe of the reasons for itslack of efficiency. The infrastructure in the rural area is totally insufficient. In2001 only 10% of the rural roads were modernized. This has a negative impactover the transport infrastructure. The transport of the agricultural products in

3 ROMANIA AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 79

Romania it is one of the most expansive one in Eastern Europe. It is time consumingand fuel consuming. The communication infrastructure is also very poor. Onephone central was available for an area of 100 km, serving more than two villages.The Agricultural Banks’ activity is also very poor. They are of almost no use forfarmers since they cannot fulfill the criteria imposed by these banks for gettingcredits.The state financial resources are small due to the macroeconomic problems

that undermine the Romanian economy. One of the consequences is that the statesubsidies are much under the E.U.’s ones: less than 5% for the crop productionfrom theAgricultural national budget in comparison with 41.5 % from the E.U.’sbudget. The state help was granted only to big farms with over 100ha and to thepublic sector rather than the private one. This means that more than 90% of thefarms were excluded from any state aid. Another result of the governmental lackof money is that the agricultural investments are very poor. Also the domesticlegislation is not clear and sometimes is contradictory. There is no investmentbank for the local authorities, which should support their small projects. Theinternational programs were hampered because of diverse constraints: in thecase of World Bank and its Rural Development Program — there is a too longperiod for preparation; lack of flexibility of WB’s representatives in allowing thestarting in some parts of this project. This program is in stand-by in the lastthree years. S.A.P.A.R.D. program co-financed by E.U. has particular structuraland administrative difficulties, which decreased considerably the fundabsorption and the number of beneficiaries.

The financial consultancy system in the agricultural sector is in a cradle stage.They are too expansive and the application procedure is too complicated to beeasily accessed by the Romanian farmers. Consequently, this system is of no useat this moment.

The degradation of the agricultural soil due to human activity and naturalcauses is one of the biggest concerns of the Romanian authorities. It affects thequality of 12 million of agricultural land, from which 7.5 million ha are cropland.Due to the bad management in collecting and storing the garbage, the subterraneanwaters are mostly affected and through them, the quality of the plants. One ofthe main problems that affect the quality of the soil is the abandon of theagricultural land. Because of the extreme fragmentation of the agricultural landas well as due to the lack of financial means, many farmers cold not afford totake care of their land. It is estimated that the abandoned land accounts for5–10% yearly. The fragmentation makes also difficult the implementation of somenational measures that should stop or prevent the further deterioration the soil.2

Advantages of the agricultural sector and its potential

The agricultural sector has one of the biggest agricultural lands from EasternEurope. The soil is favorable for an intensive agriculture and is of a goodquality. Romania has a strong tradition in agriculture and this sector is diversifiedsince it produces a wide range of agro-products from vegetables to animal farms.


During the Communist period was developed the high-level education in agriculture,being set up a network of faculties and research institutions in this area. Consequently,Romania is not lacking in highly trained specialists: such are the agriculturalengineers. The agricultural sector has a very good productivity for durum wheat,which is above the average production in E.U. The milk production increased inthe last years exponentially. The Romanian trade is completely integrated in tothe European system since 60% of it is done with E.U.Another important characteristic of the agricultural sector is that it has a strong

potential for agro-tourism and eco-tourism, but it has not been properly used. Astudy of Commission evaluated that Romania is the fourth preferred country forthis kind of tourism by the E.U. tourists. The mot important attractions were theauthenticity of traditions and the daily life (the traditional agriculture, the sheepbreeding). The eco-tourist activities that could be developed are: bird watchingin the Danube Delta, horse riding, walking with the bicycle or with the cart.The great potential for organic agriculture is to be emphasized, too. It has

already acknowledged that the area for organic agriculture should triple in thefirst three years after accession and for the next ten years is supposed to growsix times. Organic agriculture is strongly encouraged by the E.U. through a lotof bonuses, primes and payments; it has attractive prices and an increasingdemand on the market. If Romania will reach its prospects in this area will havebe the 6th country with the largest organic agricultural land from E.U., after UK,Germany, The Netherlands, Denmark and Italy.

III. E.U. policy towards Romania. The Association Agreementand the results of the C.A.P. negotiations

The Association TreatyUntil Romania concluded its Accession Treaty in 2005, the relationship with

E.U. was regulated by the Association Agreement (or the European Agreement),which was signed in 1993 and entered into force three years later. Although themain idea of the Treaty was to envisage free trade between the E.U. and Romania,the agricultural sector one of the most sensitive issues in EU was not subjectedto the same terms like all the other sectors. In the article 3 of the Protocol 3,paragraph 2 from the Treaty ofAssociation, the Romanian processed agriculturalproducts (stipulated in Annex A) were not subjected to any tax exemption. Forthe other agricultural products the Community admitted an increase of theimport quotas with 10% yearly for the next 5 years while the custom tariffs forthese products will be reduced with 20% for 3 years and then frozen in the last2. Both the quotas and the custom tariff reductions were not enough to encouragethe E.U. imports of agricultural products from this country. Moreover, the termsof the Treaty rather encouraged the export of raw agricultural products, with allits negative consequences for Romania. From all the other candidate countrieswho concluded these Association Treaties with E.U., including Bulgaria,Romania had the worst terms concerning the Agricultural trade: the lowestquotas of export to E.U. and the smallest number of products that were subjected


to the custom tariffs reductions. However, the E.U. became the most importantmarket for the Romanian agricultural products but the balance of trade remainedconstantly negative.3

The results of C.A.P. negotiations4The negotiations for Chapter 7, Agriculture, started on 1 of October 2002,

after the negotiations with the countries from the first wave of enlargement(Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Baltic countries) camealmost to an end. The result of this situation was that Romania’s requirementscould not exceed what has been already negotiated and granted with the firstcandidates. The negotiations for this difficult chapter were concluded on 1st ofApril 2004.

The C.A.P. budget for RomaniaRomania has obtained an overall amount of 4.7 billion euro that will be

granted for the 2007–2009 (the first three years after accession). The directpayments will be granted gradually. In the first year will receive 25% from thelevel of direct payments at that moment, it will increase with 5% till 2010, andthen will increase with 10% till 2016 when it had to reach 100%. The estimatedvalue of these direct payments is of 881 billions euro. The market measures (theindicative prices, the intervention prices) represent 732 billions euro. The ruraldevelopment accounts for 2.3 billions euro + 800 millions for projects fundedfrom structural funds. Romania has the right to use 20% of the rural funds asdirect payments until the amount will reach 100%.Until 2006 Romania has to organize theAgency for Interventions and Payments

and the Integrated System for Administration and Control, without which themoney for the market measures could not be possibly granted.From six periods of transition required by Romania to implement the acquis

communautaire, it received 4 in the following areas: 3 years, till 2009, for themodernization of the units, which are processing and collecting the milk, to applythe acquis for the diary farms, for modernization of the units for processing themeat and 8 years for the elimination of the hybrid vineyards and their replacementwith other types allowed by the E.U. standards.A very important result was that 7 million ha of agrarian land was accepted

eligible for direct payments, which, places Romania on the second place after Polandamong the other candidates and on the 6th place in Europe. This represents 102%from what Romania has initially required. It also obtained a series of bonusesand primes per animal head and these subventions represent 80% and 100%from what Romania required. For example in the sugar sector, the negotiations,though tough, were successfully concluded with a quota of production for Romaniathat covers the internal consumption. For the diary sector was also negotiated agood quota of production, keeping in mind that only 40% of the milk producedin Romania fulfills the E.U. standards.Romania will not be subjected for the next years after accession to the same

criteria and requirements that are subjected the old members of the E.U. as a


result of the 2003 C.A.P. reform. This reform introduced new eligibility criteriaand a new system of financial discipline Romania will be exempted from theserequirements until will fully enjoy the same benefits like the old members anduntil will completely implement the criteria stipulated in the Accession Treaty.

IV. Short and Long-term impact of the E.U. overthe Agricultural sector in Romania

IV.1. The introduction of the C.A.P. prices, the Single Payment Scheme on Area (S.P.S.A.)and their effects over the prices in Romania and over the farmer’s income-short term

Concerning the E.U. funds-only the direct payments granted to the farmerswill be introduced step by step. Payments for supporting the market and for therural development would be granted 100% immediately after the integration.5Romania, as well as all the other 10 candidates + Bulgaria will receive the

direct payments gradually during a period of 10 years starting from the date ofthe accession. In the Romanian case the direct payments will start from 2007(possibly) and will be only 25% from those granted to the old member states. Till2010 they will increase with 5% and then will increase yearly with 10%, reachingthe same level of direct payments with those received by the old 15 memberstates in 2016.6

Table 1

The gradual introduction of the direct payments in Romaniaand the other 10 candidates (the percentages)

Based on Treaty of AccessionThe C.A.P. reform from 2003 introduced a scheme for single payment

starting with 2005. It is based on the direct payments that the farmers receivedbetween 2000–2002. Romania (and the other candidate countries) as a new comerwho did not receive payments and who has to make a big administrative effortto implement C.A.P. was offered the option of Single Payment Scheme(S.P.S.A.) on area. Yet this will be applied for a short period after the integration(3 years) with the possibility to prolong it with maximum 2 years. In order toreceive the direct payments Romania must have the administrative capacity toimplement them till 2011, if not than it can continue with the S.P.S.A. but thesubsidies will be frozen at 50%. S.P.S.A. is a uniform payment per hectare paidonce per year. The amount of money is calculated based on the total amount of


Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

CEE 10 25% 30% 35% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100%Romania &Bulgaria

— — — 25% 30% 35% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

the direct payments divided to the eligible agricultural area. In order to be eligiblea farm has to have a certain size. Romania chose a minimum of 1ha for a farmin order to be eligible to receive the payments... According to the agreementbetween Romania and the E.U. in 2007 (the presumably date of accession) thedirect payment will be 34.90 euro per hectare, representing 25% of the directpayment granted to the old member states.After Romania’s accession to E.U. only the direct payments are subjected to

a gradual increasing while all the other components of C.A.P. will fully enter toforce starting from the first year of membership. Also any state intervention onthe market will have to be changed according to the E.U. regulations.

Figure 1

Impact of C.A.P. on farmer’s income for the most important activities 2007

Added valuein Billion lei7

Barley sun fl. Milk pork eggwheat corn potatoes beef chicken

Source: World Bank Report June 20058


25.000

20.000

15.000

10.000

5.000

0

-5.000

Present policies

C.A.P. + S.P.S.A.

C.A.P. prices without direct payments (S.P.S.A.)

In the cereal sector the prices after 2002 at some important agricultural productsin Romania (such as wheat, corn, barely potatoes) raised above the E.U. prices(see Table 2) as a result of the increasing of input prices (for seeds and fertilizersmainly) and the macro-economic situation. Also the quality of the Romaniancereals is (for many of them) under the E.U.’s standards. Consequently after theaccession the cereal producers will be the most affected ones. They will have toadjust their prices to the E.U.’s level, which is lower and they will also have toproduce better quality, which implies higher input prices. Therefore the WorldBank calculated that in the first three years after accession the losses of thecereal producers will be considerable (30% for wheat, 44% for barely, 43% forcorn from the actual income calculated for 2004)). The evaluation was madeexcluding the direct payments that will be granted. Even with the direct payments(granted gradually) the losses for cereal producers will be reduced to a half butthey will remain consistent.

Table 2

2003–2004 cereal prices euro/kg Romania – E.U.

Sources: European Commission Directorate General of Agriculture, The Romanian Associationof Meat producers, the Romanian Ministry of Agriculture, Environment and Waters

The meat sectorThis sector may have some advantages comparative with the cereal one. The

decrease of cereal prices will bring a decrease of input costs for animal farms.This will be quite welcoming since the prices at pork are with 20–30% above theE.U.’s indicative price level. Comparatively the prices gap between E.U. andRomania is smaller than in the cereal sector. Yet, this approach should be takencarefully since the quality of some of Romanian products is inferior to those ofE.U. So, the price gap may be bigger and consequently after accession the animalproducers will have to decrease at the level required by E.U. The poultry sectoris one of the most inefficient one and the World Bank calculated that would bethe most affected, with losses that will mount to 31%. The same source estimatedthat, generally, the income for the meat producers might rather increase in thefirst 3 years after accession (except the poultry sector) even without the DirectPayment Scheme (D.P.S.) (e.g., +21% for beef).


CerealsRomania

minimum – maximum priceEuro/kg

E.U.Intervention priceEuro/kg

Wheat/durum wheat/barely 0.10-0.16 0.8

Corn 0.12-0.16 0.8

Table 3

2003–2004 meat prices euro/kg Romania – E.U.

Sources: European Commission Directorate General of Agriculture, The RomanianAssociation of Meat producers, the Romanian Ministry of Agriculture, Environment and Waters

Diary sectorThe milk production generates an important part of the Romanian farmers

income, accounting for 22%. 98% of it is produced in private, small-medium sizedfarms. Milk price although has increased in the last 2 years (2003–2004) is closeto E.U.’s indicative price level or even a little under it. Again should be takeninto consideration the quality which may also extend the gap prices betweenRomania and E.U.: e.g., in 2001 only 40% of the milk produced in Romania tobe exported on communitarian market met the E.U.’s quality criteria. Overallwas estimated by the World Bank and the European Commission9 that theincome of milk producers will increase as a result of C.A.P. (+32% — WorldBank estimation).Only the egg producers will record large losses due to the acute inefficiency

of this sector (up to 60% of their actual income–calculated for 2004) and withoutdirect payments. It was calculated that the rough impact of the C.A.P. priceswould decrease the farmers’ income mainly in the first years with approximately19% if the Single Payment Scheme on Area does not accompany it as it wasdescribed above. Although this Scheme will be applied, the losses will mount to9% from the actual income mainly in the first year of accession, 2007, when thecombination between the C.A.P. requirements and the low level of the directpayment (25% from the E.U.) will inflict a heavy burden upon the farmers.Romania will also have to give up to some national direct payments such is theone set up in 2003 by which the government decided to pay around 70 euro perhectare (ha) for those farms that had more than 5 ha (which cover onlyapprox.18% of the whole number of farmers due to the fact that more than 80%are small farms with less than 5 ha.). In comparison the Direct Payment grantedfor 2007 will be only half of it — 34.90 euro per ha. The advantage would bethat smaller farms (with a minimum of 1 ha) will also benefit because until nowthe governmental policy was to favour only the big farms (over 100 ha) and thepublic sector.

Both World Bank and the European Commission agreed in their evaluationsthat in order to soften the decrease of farmers’ income immediately after the


MeatRomaniaMinimum – Maximum PriceEuro/kg

E.U.Intervention priceEuro/kg

pork 2–2.20 1.6–1.7

beef 1.6–1.7 1.6–1.7poultry 1.2–1.5 1.4

accession there is a need to supply the E.U.’s direct payments with nationalfinancial support that should reach 20–30 % from the E.U. actual level of directpayments. Was calculated that in order to maintain the income at the pre-accessionlevel (2005) would be necessary a 20% financial aid, while if it is intended toincrease them, 30% would be the right figure. If this financial help is not grantedthan the agricultural incomes will reach the 2005 level only in 2010 when thelevel of direct payments will be 40% from the E.U. average level. In other wordsthe impact over Romanian farmers will be disastrous mainly in the cereal sector.After 1997 the ability of a farmer to spend on inputs has decreased constantlyand dramatically until it reached in 2004 a half from what it used to be in 1994.If this trend will continue after 2007 will be very difficult for many farmers toincrease their productivity. Therefore a national supplement added to the directpayment in the first years seems necessary. World Bank also calculated that thesmallest farms and the largest farms will be the main beneficiaries of the directpayments, mainly if they are coupled with the financial aid from the nationalbudget, while the medium farms (between 10–100 ha) may benefit less.

IV.2. The eligibility issue for direct payments

Romania decided that only those farms with a minimum of 1 ha will beeligible for the Direct Payments. This represents the highest accepted ceiling foreligibility in E.U..10 The minimum eligible area in E.U. is 0,3 ha while themaximum is 1 ha. Romania as well as all the other eastern candidates chose themaximum level because the cost of implementation of the direct payments forfarms smaller than 1 ha would have been extremely burdening for their budgetsince the majority of farms in these countries has less than 1 ha. For Romaniathe phenomenon of division of land in small farms is even more acute since49.5% from 4.5 millions of farms have less than 1 ha.These are the so-called subsistence farms that produce for self consumption

while only the rest of the products is sold on the market. This is also one of thereasons for the high inefficiency of the Romanian agriculture. Consequently thesefarms will be excluded from direct payments.11 The positive aspect is that only5% of the agricultural land will be excluded (as it can be noticed from Figure 2),the negative one is that almost 50% of the farms will not receive anything. It wascalculated that the impact of this situation over farms with less than 1ha will benegligible since 34.90 euro/ha per year cannot be a significant improvement.Even for theWorld Bank or the European Commission was difficult to calculate

the exact impact of C.A.P. over prices for consumers and they resorted tosimulations for the next 3–6 years. Romania is a special case due to the high lackof efficiency of its agro-food sector.As we could notice from Table 2, the cereal prices set up by producers for

wheat and corn are above the E.U. intervention prices, moreover their quality isunder the communitarian standards. After the accession the producers will haveto reduce the price to the E.U.’s level and therefore is expected a certain smalldecrease in prices on the consumer market for basic cereal products, such asbread, after accession.


Figure 2

The distribution of farms in relation with their number and seize

Source: World Bank Report, June 2005

IV.3. Impact over consumers’ incomes

The vegetable sector is very important for the Romanian consumer becausethe prices for meat are high and many people replaced the meat consumptionwith vegetables. As it can be noticed from the table nr. 4 the prices are under theE.U. level. Although the domestic wholesale chain (open markets) remains veryimportant, it recorded a certain decrease in the last years in the favor ofsupermarkets. Here most of the vegetables are coming from import, Romania


Numberof farms

Agriculturalsurface

being dependent on imports since 1993. The main source is Turkey (40%),followed by the C.E.F.T.A. countries (which now are E.U. members) with 18%and E.U. with 13%.12 The quality of these products is higher than the Romanianones but also their price is higher. If the trend continues and if the situation fromthe other candidates who joined E.U. in 2004 can be a hint, then the Romanianconsumer may expect a moderate increase of prices for vegetable after accession.

Table 4

Prices on consumer market for vegetables in Romania and E.U.with a minimum and a maximum price (were chosen the most relevant

vegetables on the Romanian consumption market) 2004

Euro/kg

Sources: Romanian Institute for Statistics and EUROSTAT 2002

In the meat sector the 2004 prices in Romania are equal and even above theE.U.’s consumer prices. Pork and poultry are more expansive than in E.U., which,logically, follows the producer prices (see table 5). Beef is under E.U. consumerprice.13 Therefore might be expected a small decrease in prices at these products.Should be also taken into consideration that Romania domestic demand isdependent on pork (35%) and poultry (50%) imports and the main exporters onthe Romanian market are Hungary, US and E.U. countries. After accession thecommerce between Romania and Hungary will be completely free of taxes meaningthat the nowadays taxes imposed to Hungarian agro-products (20%) will beremoved and therefore their products should be less expansive on the Romanianmarket. On the other hand it can be noticed that there is a quite big gap betweenproducer’s prices and consumer’s prices (see table nr. 3 and table nr. 5). Meatpork bought directly from the producer is three times less expansive than the oneavailable on the market.14 This accounts for another negative point of Romania’sagro-food chain. The transport prices are high and there is no system of checkingthe dealers who intermediate the trade and who can set very high prices.15Considering all said above, we can assume that after Romanian’s accession, theprices for pork and poultry will decrease slightly while the beef price mayincrease. The chain market (producer–dealer) will be better regulated, fact thatwill help narrowing the gap between producer’s and consumer’s prices.

World Bank estimated that, overall, the consumer prices will increase moderatelyafter Romania’s accession. In this context it has been calculated (World Bank)that in the next three years following the accession the expenses for food willincrease with around +3% and on the medium term (next 6 years after accession)


Vegetables Romania UEPotatoes 0.25-0.27 0.40-0.80Pepper 0.70-0.90 0.50-1.00Bean 0.70-1.00 1.30-1.80Tomatoes 0.55-0.70 0.80-1.50

Table 5

Prices on consumer market for meat in Romania and E.U.with a minimum and a maximum price (were chosen the most relevant

type of meat for the Romanian consumer) 2004

Euro/kg

Sources: Romanian Institute for Statistics and EUROSTAT 2005

this value will decrease to 1.6%. The highest increase will be at eggs +16% anddiary products +6.8%. Yet the importance of these products in the domesticexpenditure is considered reduced. It has been noticed that although prices atagricultural products increased in all the other 10 candidates yet the impact wassoftened by the emergence of supermarkets and of the international providerswho strengthened the competition, something that is expected to happen inRomania too. The most affected would be the poorest farms and those householdsthat do not produce food for their own consumption, these being those from theurban area.

IV.4. The impact of quotas

In order to prevent the overproduction the E.U. set up some maximumquantities that should not be exceeded for products such as: milk, fruits, vegetables,sugar, potatoes, etc. Quotas are set up yearly at the communitarian level and thenare negotiated and distributed for each country. If these quotas are surpassed,fines will be paid. Romania obtained some good quotas for sugar and milkmainly. The problem is that these quotas may turn against it. For these productsRomania experienced in the last 10 years a sharp decline in production and thetrend continue to be negative, although at a slower pace after 2002. Moreover,for milk, only 40% of the quantity produced in the reference period (1996–1999)complied with the E.U. quality and sanitary standards. For sugar and milk thequotas obtained covers the internal consumption. If the farmers don’t manage tofulfill the quality criteria as well as to prevent the decreasing of production, thenthese quotas will be lost and replaced with smaller ones thus preventing thedevelopment of these sectors.16

IV.5. Costs of the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy

Romania will be a net beneficiary of the C.A.P. budget, although this wouldnot be very obvious in the first years of accession when it will have to spendimportant funds with the implementation of C.A.P., its institutions and itsstandards of quality and safety. Starting with 2007 the Romanian contribution to


Meat Romania European UnionPork 3.80-6 2.30-4Beef 3.30-5 4.50-6Poultry 2.20-3.20 1.40-2.40

the E.U. budget will be of around 800 million euro while Romania it will receiveduring the period of 2007–2009 approximately 4.7 billion euro. This amount ofmoney is calculated for the next 3 years. From this amount, 800 millions will bedirect payments. It does not involve national co-finance but the sate has to paythe implementation (e.g. the setting up of a National Payment Agency). 732millions will be and for market measures. It involves the intervention prices and there-financing of export prices. 2,424 million euro for rural development grantedduring 2007–2009. Romania has to co-finance it 25%. While 800 millions forinfrastructure projects.Although at a first glance Romania seems to receive a lot of money (after

Poland it received the highest amount of funds for agriculture) the positive balancemay not be as big as it may seem.

1. The direct payments issueAs both World Bank and the European Union had concluded it, in order to

soften the decrease of farmers’ income in the first years of accession, theRomanian government should supply the direct payment received in the firstyears with 20–30 % from the C.A.P. direct payments. In doing so the state hastwo options: to take money directly from the budget but this will increase thealready big public deficit or it is allowed to take 20% from the funds granted forrural development but this would mean to undermine and slow down the programsmeant to develop and increase the efficiency of the agriculture.

2. The institutional building and structural instrumentsIn general terms the implementation of C.A.P. policy involves the setting up

of common market organizations, quality certifications, sanitary and phyto-sanitarycontrol, etc. Romania has been lagging quite a lot at this chapter. The existingsanitary and veterinary control is far from E.U. standards while the commonmarketorganizations are in the cradle stage yet.17 The larger the gap is the more moneyrequires filling it in. Romania has the right to receive funds from E.U. budget,after accession. These funds should cover integrally the costs of these adjustments.Unfortunately, in practice, E.U. declared herself unable to sustain these costs till2013, when the new members contribution to C.A.P. budget will increase enoughto cover these kinds of expenses.18 Such a conclusion implies that Romania hasto pay the costs of the C.A.P. implementation till 2013 at least, integrally.Althoughit has not been calculated the exact cost of this expenditure it is inferred that thebudget for Agriculture will have to be increased with a minimum of 50% (at the2004 level) in order to be able to cover the implementation of C.A.P.19In order to make functional the C.A.P. policies it is necessary to create the

institutional and administrative framework. This includes the setting up ofmanagement systems such as a paying agency and the Integrated Administrationand Control System, the RomanianAgency for Food Safety, etc.20 Very importantwas also the setting up of S.A.P.A.R.D. Agency in which the Romanian part wasleft to manage the E.U. funds by itself. E.U. financed all these structural adjustmentsbut a co-finance from the national budget was also necessary.


3. The quality and sanitary standardsThis is perhaps the most sensitive aspect of the acquis-communautaire

implementation due to its particularly high costs. As it had been mentionedabove (the implementation of C.A.P. policy sub-chapter) the state has to organizethe administrative framework for checking the agricultural products quality andfor setting up the standards in tune with EC requirements. But those who haveto implement them are the farmers. These requirements are very specific andthey include 90% of the agricultural products. They cannot be negotiated andthey are compulsory, otherwise the producer cannot sell his products on themarket. The costs of implementation of the sanitary and quality standards aresupported by farmers, Since 91% from the cereal products are produced in privatesmall farms.21 Although it has not been made a clear estimation for how much acereal producer needs in order to respect the E.U. criteria so that he can sell onthe market, yet a rough estimation raises the price to around 500 euro for a farmthat has less than 1ha.22 Since these kinds of farms are excluded from any directpayments or rural development funds and since the smallest farms are also thepoorest (with an average of 70 euro/month)23 it is likely that their owners willnot be able to pay for the changes to meet the E.U. criteria. Therefore they willnot be allowed to sell their products. This means that in short time their farm willdisappear. From the efficiency point of view this will help Romania’s agricultureto create bigger farms and to give up, step by step, to the subsistence farmingwhich impinges over its productivity. More capable managers will take over moreland. From the social point of view this might end up with a disaster for manypeople. 42 % of population is involved in agriculture and from this 50% has farmsless than 1ha.Even for medium farms that might be eligible for direct payments and other

funds, the introduction of the new requirements might prove too costly andthey may constitute a heavy burden. As World Bank estimated their losses mightgo to up 9% comparing with the pre-accession years, even if they receive directpayments.

The animal-diary sector will be the most affected one by the C.A.P. standards.The milk and pork production decreased year by year. The input prices at theseproducts increased while the pork and poultry quality was lower than the E.U.’sproducts. Also the Romanian consumers had to pay higher prices than the E.U.’scitizens were paying for the same products and they were getting lower quality.24That is why pork, poultry and diary products faced a strong and almost crushingcompetition coming from the cheaper and better E.U.’s products. Small farmsown 84.5% pigs (between 1–5 pigs) while big farms with over 500 animals areonly 52 (small farms are 1.170.000).25 These figures are relevant since smallfarms produce rather for subsistence and their ability to sell products is reduceddue to the reasons mentioned above (low quality, high prices, crushingcompetition with the E.U. products). The small farmers have to comply with awhole set of veterinary standards, they have to buy new machines (e.g., for


milking), to build up new stables that should correspond to E.U. criteria, to usea certain type of food, etc. For a small-medium size farm this may lead toexpanses that are above 1000 euro. If a big farm can afford to do this, for a smallone with only 2–3 pigs and cows these would inflict a heavy financial burdenand it is likely that they will not manage to comply. 95,8% from the diary farmshas 1–2 cows and only 284 have more than 50 cows.26 In a medium diary farm,milk represents half of the income resulted from the selling of their products.27Therefore the inability to sell this product may bring bankruptcy for these farmsand keeping in mind their number, these may have serious social consequences.The milk sector is perhaps one of the most difficult to be harmonized due tonumerous and expensive criteria. There is no wonder that exactly the livestockand dairy sector is the least harmonized from all (see table 6). Romania negotiateddiverse primes and bonuses for cattle breeders but in order to get them they haveto comply with E.U. expensive standards. Adding to this that livestock sectordoes not receive direct payments and that they will have to sell at the E.U.indicative price which for poultry, pork and eggs will be lower than the pre-accession price, the impact might be quite tough at the level of small andmedium farms mainly. The negative impact of the E.U. criteria over the livestockand diary sector is extended also over the units for purchasing and processingthese products. One of the reasons for the lack of efficiency of this sector wasthe small number of these units and their quite high prices. After the accessionthey will be even fewer and their prices might be even higher because they stilldo not fulfill the E.U. standards and their adoption will bring new expenses forthose who can afford them or just closing off for those who cannot.It is true that Romania negotiated and obtained a series of 3 years transitional

periods for the introduction of the acquis-communautaire in the livestock anddiary sector. It is doubtful that this is enough time for small farms tomodernize, sinceit is expected that in the first three years after accession their incomes may decrease.

Table 6

The situation of harmonization of the agriculture-food sectorwith the E.U. standards in 2005

Source: The Ministry of European Integration


Harmonizedin a high degree Partially harmonized Not harmonized

Seeds production Fruits and vegetables SugarWine culture Cereals Milk and diary productsWine Milling Pork, beefFito-sanitary control Pesticide Eggs, poultryVeterinary-Sanitary control

IV.6. The commercial trade sector

IV.6.1. Impact of accession over Romania’s external trade and commitments

Perhaps the most important result of Romania’s accession, concerning tradeis that the Trade Agreements concluded by Romania until now will have to becanceled or changed. As a member of E.U. Romania will have to accept theCommon Custom Tariff by which all member states must apply the same tariffswhen it comes of trade done with non-EU states.The main consequences upon Romania’s agreements and partners will be as

it follows:World Trade Organization-Romania received the status of semi-developed

country, which is unique among the other central-east candidates. This statusallowed it to negotiate very high and therefore very favorable tariffs, thus beingable to protect its domestic producers. After accession Romania will have to giveup to the status of semi developed country and therefore to the advantageoustariff regime negotiated. It will have to align their custom tariff to that of E.U.’s,which is lower than the one practices by Romania at this moment. The statuschanging will transform Romania from a beneficiary of the Generalized Systemof Trade Performances (GSTP) to a donor.

Central — European Free trade Association (C.E.F.T.A.) — In 1997 becamemember of C.E.F.T.A. and it adopted the preferential system. Yet, the lack ofefficiency of Romania’s agriculture determined high negative trade balance withC.E.F.T.A.’s members (see Table 8) and therefore, temporarily Romania tookprotectionist measures for its domestic products (mainly against Hungary andPoland). Since almost all C.E.F.T.A. countries are already members of E.U., thenaccordingly, Romania has to give up to any protectionist measures and join theE.U. free trade area.28

Table 7

Romania’s agro-food trade balance million (USD) with its main partners

Source: The Romanian Ministry of Agriculture 2004

As a E.U. member Romania will have to participate in the preferentialagreements concluded with countries from Africa, Caraibe and Pacific.

It appears that at least for the first years after accession Romania will ratherloose than gain as a result of giving up to its old commitments. The members ofC.E.F.T.A. were among the most important trade partners in trade agricultureand the trade balance with them was largely in their favor. After accession it is


1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

E.U. -212 -77 -134 -155 -221 -217

C.E.F.T.A. -181 -118 -160 -227 -190 -276

likely that this negative trade balance will increase since Romania does not haveany means left to protect its producers. Also as a result of changing its statusfrom semi developed to developed country Romania will have to replace theadvantageous custom tariffs negotiated with the less favorable ones of E.U. Theadvantages will be more obvious on the long run. E.U. is one of the world mostpowerful economic powers and the mightiest one in Europe. Therefore, as amember of E.U., Romania will be able to promote its interests more successfullyin the international trade since will be backed by the strong E.U.’s capacity ofnegotiations.

IV. 6. 2. Trade with E.U.

The most important aspect of Romania’s agricultural trade is that whilebefore 1989 was a traditional agro-exporter with a strong positive trade balance,after 1990, the situation changed radically and the balance became negative, afact that remained as such till today. Moreover, if till 1997 Romania used toexport processed agricultural products, after this year the structure of its exportschanged in the favor of unprocessed, raw materials and export of live animals(pigs and cows mainly). Also the share of agro-food imports/exports (see figure3) decreased steadily from year to year until now. E.U. represents the most importantpartner for Romania after 1993 mainly, but unfortunately for the Romanian partthe trade balance remained strongly in favor of E.U. (see the table). Apart fromthe domestic faults of this sector the terms of trade imposed by E.U. to Romaniain the last 10 years did nothing to soften this situation on the contrary it hamperedit. It is interesting to notice that after Romania suffered the tough impact oftransition from communism in 1990–1993, it started a period of relative progressin most of areas, including agriculture. Between 1994–1997 the balance ofagricultural trade recorded a certain positive trend, which was followed after1997 and mainly after 1999 by a sharp downturn.29 In 1993 Romania signed theAssociation Agreement with E.U. by which, starting with 1996, the tradebetween themwas liberalized, the only exception being for the agricultural productsIt was stipulated that the Romanian processed agricultural products were notsubjected to any favorable free tax regime; they were to be treated like all the otherproducts coming from countries which E.U. had noAssociationAgreement with.This meant that the Romanian processed agro-products were subjected to

protectionist import custom tariffs. E.U. negotiated some quotas for Romanianproducts (the quantity of products that E.U. would import from Romania withreduced custom tariffs). But both the quotas and the reduction of E.U.’s customtariffs were quite small, while the production prices in Romania increased abovethe international average ones. Moreover, the Romanian producers could notmake a full use of these quotas, because many of their products did not meetE.U.’s criteria of quality and safety. Also in 1997–1998 the government reducedor almost eliminated any subventions for agricultural products as a result of theWorld Bank and International Monetary Fund pressure. While the Romanianproducers did not benefit almost at all from the semi-liberalized regime of agro


trade, the E.U.’s exporters enjoyed fully the whole benefits of it. The unsubsidized,poor and backward Romanian agro-producers had to face the crushing competitionof (in comparison) heavily subsidized communitarian products that were invadingthe Romanian market at lower prices and having a better quality. The result wasthat from an exporter of processed food, Romania became a net exporter of raw

Figure nr. 3

Source: The European Commission, DG VI 2003

agro-material with all the negative consequences, while the negative trade balancewith E.U. grew up. Is this situation going to change after accession? Certainlynot for the next years. One of the most important partners used to be C.E.F.T.A.(Central European Free TradeAssociation) countries that already joined the E.U.club in 2004. The trade balance has been already negative, but this is expectedto increase since as members of E.U. both Romania and the former C.E.F.T.A.members will have to give up to any protectionist tariffs among them and thereforeRomania will be exposed to a free competition coming from the new memberssuch as Hungary and Poland, competition which has been partially deterredthrough some protectionist custom tariffs (20–25%) that the domestic authoritiesimposed them in order to protect somehow the Romanian pork and poultry producers,the most affected ones. After accession all these will disappear. Therefore for theshort-medium future it is expected that the negative trade balance with E.U. willbe maintained and even expanded.


IV.7. The rural development sector after 2003 reform

Anew policy for rural development was introduced as the second pillar of theE.U. Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.) in the framework of Agenda 2000 inMarch 1999.Agenda 2000 reformed the C.A.P. in view of the expected enlargementto largely rural countries, such as Poland, Bulgaria or Romania.Abrief descriptionof the main targets of the Rural development as well as its ways of funding is inthe Cassette 1.

One of the problems with rural policy is that has to be co-financed from thenational budget with 25% which represents around 606 million (Romania receives2.3 billion for rural development from E.U. for the next 3 years 2007–2009) andthis will constitute another burden for the already strained national budget. But thebiggest challenge is represented by the absorption of the rural development funds.As a result of the 2003 reform, starting with 2005, together with the modulation isintroduced also the cross-compliance criteria: in order to be eligible for the newsystem of payments the farmers have to fulfil new environmental standards, foodsafety, animals and plants’ health and also to maintain the agricultural ground ingood conditions even if it is not worked. Before the 2003 reform only theenvironmental requirements existed but they were optional. Now the failure toobserve all these rules will result in the loss of rights to full subsidy payments Yet,the member states can decide and implement this cross-conditionality according tothe specificity of each area fact, which can give them some flexibility inimplementing this policy. The Romanian farmers will be also subjected to the samecross-compliance but not immediately after the accession. The important point isthat a considerably amount of money from the rural development fund is targetingexactly the implementation of these new requirements: 27% of EAGGFexpenditure (see the table). In order to receive money for introducing the newstandards for food quality, animal health, friendly environment agriculture, theRomanian farmer has first, to fulfill the old criteria for which he is not going toreceive any support. The expenses of a small-medium (1–10 ha) Romanian farm foraccomplishing old standards have been very roughly calculated at an average of500–1000 euro (the figure may vary in connection with the type of activity–animalfarm or crop farming, with the environmental conditions, etc).The average income of a small–medium farm (1–10 ha) in Romania has been

calculated in 2001 as being between 70–100 euro/month cash. Therefore theprices for implementing the old E.U. criteria seem prohibitive for more than 70%of the farms. Consequently the access of the majority of farmers to rural developmentfunds that regards implementation of cross-compliance criteria (that is standardsabove the existing ones) is practically blocked.Another set of important measures are those regarding the restructuring of the

semi subsistence farms that represent the crushing majority in Romania (andalso in all the other eastern candidates). These farmers may receive 1000 euro/farm.30 The condition to receive the money is to present a plan which explainshow the farm might be transformed in a commercially efficient one. Around18% of the Romanian farmers are old people (over 60 years old) and they havevery basic notions of arithmetic and writing. The level of education is generally


Funding the Second Pillar — rural development

Source: The European Commission: DG VI 2004


EAGGF Guarantee Section or Guidance Section — Guarantee

For the whole E.U.

I. Added measures

• early retirement,• less-favored areas,• agro-environment measures,• afforestation of farmland,• renovation and development of villages,• protection and conservation of rural heritage,• diversification of farm activities,• improvement of infrastructure.

II. Reforming C.A.P.

— fulfilling the new standards for environment, public safety, animal safety, etc.(temporary support and gradually decreasing for 5 years with a maximum of 10.000 euro/year/houselhold). They are not compulsory yet.

— Consultancy support — in order to increase the efficiency of their farms and tocomply to the new standards the farmers are encouraged to use the consultancy companiessupport. Their expenditure will be 80% covered the maximum being 1.500 euro.— food quality — payments for those farmers who participates national and

communitarian schemes for improving the food quality following the cross-compliancestandards maxim 300 euro/year/household for 5 years.

III. Support for semi-subsistence farms

IV. Payments that complement the direct payments

V. Measures S.A.P.A.R.D. type

— stimulating the setting up of farmers organizations— technical assistance

EAGGF Guarantee section

— investments in agro-companies— support for young farmers-maximum 30.000 euro— career support— forests— development of rural areas

Table 9

Rural development expenditure starting with the most expansive chapters

Source: Rural Development in the E.U., Fact Sheets 2003, European Commission, Agricultural andRural Development, Luxembourg 2003

very low in the rural area where only 8% of the population between 20–24 yearsattends different forms of education. The consultancy system is very poorlydeveloped and most of the farmers do not even know of their existence or if theyknow they are too expansive to afford them. Therefore, the making up of asuccessful plan for restructuring his farmmight be a task much over the possibilities’of a Romanian farmer and consequently, he will not receive any help even if hemight be willing to do some improvements.The aging of rural population is a problem existent in the E.U. also but in a

smaller proportion than in Romania. The E.U. came with the solution of the earlyretirement of farmers (starting with 55 years old). The rural pensions in Romaniahave been always embarrassingly low (around 5 euro/month)31 and totallyunsatisfactory even for a minimum level of subsistence. This is one of the mainreasons for which long after they become pensioners the farmers continue theirworking. The only way to convince the old farmers to give up to their land infavor of younger and more capable ones is to provide them with much higherlevel of pensions than the existent ones. Yet, the government alone does not havethe financial means to realize this. The Ministry of Agriculture is planning tointroduce a new pension scheme which, at least at this stage seems to make nodifference with the old scheme: for each hectare of land sold, an old farmer willreceive 100 euro/year.32 8 euro/month is an amount of money for which no farmerwill give up to his land. Consequently the early retirement plan of E.U. will have


Rural development chapters Share in EAGGF expenditure 2006 (%)

Agro-environment 27.5

Development and restructuring of farms 25.8

Less-favored areas 12.5

Afforestation of farmland 9.8

Farm investments 9.5

Marketing 7.7

Young farmers support 3.7

Early retirement 2.9

Career support 0.7

no success if the pension system will not be substantially improved, a task thatthe domestic government cannot financially afford in the next years. The E.U.program that encourages young people to start up a farm might be a bettersolution since 30.000 euro may be a tempting amount of money for many.33

The S.A.P.A.R.D.34 program

The best way to verify the ability of Romania to absorb E.U.’s funds for the nextyears is to view the results of the S.A.P.A.R.D. program. Since 1998 when itstarted, until 2004 the S.A.P.A.R.D. program recorded a much reduced ability ofabsorbing the structural funds. The result after 6 years is not at all encouraging.Because of the administrative problems in the beginning the starting of the programwas delayed with 18 months. Romania was granted 151 millions euro/year for2000–2006. Yet, three years after its beginning, in 2003 it absorbed only 16.3millions. Only in 2004 Romania received the whole amount of money. Veryimportant is that the private beneficiaries, the small farmers did beneficiate only ina very small existent of these funds. The main beneficiaries remained the publicsector with 1,336 projects while the private one has only 733, half from the publicones.35 A small–medium farm is practically excluded from the benefices ofS.A.P.A.R.D..One of the reasons regards the co-financing.A small or even mediumfarm can hardly afford to pay 50% of a project of a minimum 5000 euro, since theirwhole income may not go beyond 2000 euro/ year in the best case.36 Also, theapplication forms together with the set of requirements are too complicated to becorrectly understood by the farmers who, most of them are old, poor and poorlyeducated. Mostly important is that the target of the programmeets only partially thespecific needs of the Romanian agriculture and is rather directed to the E.U. needs.The program is more focused on environmental improvements than on socialaspects: e.g it does not include the modernization of the agricultural technology thatis lagging far behind E.U. mainly in the smallest and poorest farms. To thestructural faults of the program are added the administrative ones. S.A.P.A.R.D. isthe program that enjoyed the largest autonomy, meaning that Romania has theflexibility to manage it with very little E.U. intervention. Unfortunately theRomanian authorities proved almost unable to make the program work well. Oneof the major faults was the restricted access to information concerning the exactprocedure of application.37 The farmers who were expressing an interest in thisprogram were given diskettes (floppy) with the application forms and were told todownload them. Most of these people have not even seen a computer all their life,even more to know the meaning of the word “download”. This is just only one(extreme and funny) example of how the Romanian authorities understood theirinformational task. The process of application was so difficult and so entangledbureaucratically (the applicants needed a mountain of papers stamped by 5–6institutions) that many of the applicants were simply bored and they gave up. In2004, the year of concluding the negotiations for the Agricultural chapter theS.A.P.A.R.D. program, in spite of considerably improvements continued to workunsatisfactorily with a reduce capacity of absorbing funds.38


The analysis of the S.A.P.A.R.D. program is important because is a test forthe administrative ability of a country to implement the C.A.P. requirementswhich, after accession are more complex. Characteristic for the E.U. (and thePillar 2 of C.A.P. makes no difference), is that most of the funds are conditionedby the forwarding of successful projects. Romania rather failed this test, whichposes a question of its future ability to make full use of money destined to ruraldevelopment. It also seems that only big farms and public sector will enjoy acertain benefit while for most of the farms smaller than 10 ha that represents98% of the total, the access to its benefits will be rather closed.

IV. 7. Long-term impact of 2003 C.A.P. reform

The decoupling of direct payments from the amount of production in order tocounter-act the overproduction that has been marring the E.U. agro-market formany years is the main element of the 2003 reform. For the first 5 yearsRomania will not be subjected to the same requirements but it will adopt asimplified form of granting the direct payments under the S.P.S.A. (Single DirectPayment Scheme onAre), which has been already discussed. Yet, for the medium–longer term Romania will have to apply the new system. The decoupling is onlypartial and some agricultural products will be partially exempted from it (suchare the cereals and livestock sector) or totally exempted (the fruits and vegetables).39This means that the stimuli for overproduction are still there. The fact that thedecoupling is not complete but partial is rather an advantage for Romaniabecause it stimulates production in sectors that are heavily suffering ofunderproduction such is the vegetable and livestock sector: in 2000–2002 thevegetable production in Romania was 60–70% less than in E.U. and forexample, in the same period the milk production in Romania was 50% less thanin E.U.40 On the contrary, the idea of decoupling, though beneficial for the futuredevelopment of agriculture in E.U. generally, may rather hamper, in theRomanian case an agricultural sector that is producing much under itspossibilities.

The partial decoupling of direct payments will complicate the administrativeprocedure, which is already very complicated, because it will combine the oldtypes of payments with the new ones plus the national financial aid, if necessary.This will be a future important problem for Romania who has been encounteringproblems with the setting up of the administrative framework for the muchsimpler Scheme of Direct Payments.

The cross-compliance and its impact over Romania’s agriculture havebeen already discussed in the previous sections of this paper. Although theperspectives do not seems very rosy from this point of view, Romania mayhave a chance with the development of organic agriculture for which it has aconsiderably potential. Unfortunately, until now this potential has not beenexploited. Although the number of organic farms is increasing it still remainsmuch under possibilities (approx. 55.000 ha). Organic farms will easier fulfillthe cross-compliance requirements.


The modulation system is another important element of the 2003 C.A.P.reform. Its main idea is that some money will be taken from the Pillar 1 (directpayments and diverse subventions) and given to pillar 2 — rural development.Under this proposal, 20% of direct payments would be taken away from farmersand will be transferred to rural development pillar in order to promote foodquality, meet higher standards and foster animal welfare. The direct paymentswill be reduced progressively 3% in 2005, 4% in 2006, 5% in 2007. What isimportant for Romania is that these modulations will be applied only to bigfarms that receive more than 5000 euro/year direct payments. Since more than80% of the Romanian farms are small or medium (0.5–10 ha) it is likely thatmodulation will affect a very small number of farms.

The reform of the market policy regards certain measures taken concerningthe intervention prices, the indicative prices and the primes and bonuses grantedas it is presented in the table:

Table nr. 7

Source: European Commission DG VI 2003

In the table above I have presented those changes that are more or lessrelevant for Romania. It can be noticed that there is a strong trend inside E.U.for reducing the Intervention Prices following the 2003 reform. Although thesemeasures regard a time span that is before Romania’s accession or immediatelyafter, it gives an idea of what it will have to face as a member of C.A.P. in thecoming years. The cereals, including barely and durum wheat represent the most


Cereals (crops)—The reduction with 50% of the monthly increase of the Intervention Price

Barely— complete giving up to the Intervention Price

Durum Wheat— decrease of the supplementary aid with up to 285 euro/ha

Rice — The Intervention Price reduced with 50% (150 euro/tone); the freezing of thequantity eligible to intervention measures; increasing of the direct payment from52 euro/tone –177 euro/tone

Energetic crops— direct payment set up to 45 euro/ha

Bonuses for drying the cereals, oily seeds, cotton seeds and cotton— increase from19 euro/ha to 24 euro/ha

Nuts — the present system will be replaced by a single direct payment of 120.75euro/ha

Milk and diary products — for butter the Intervention Price reduced with 25% for2004–2007; the intervention for butter will be limited to 30.000 tones (for all E.U.members); for milk there will be no Indicative Price anymore.

important part of the agricultural production and Romania is a net exporter atthis sector. Therefore the reduction of the Intervention Prices, which seems to bethe long-term trend will decrease the income of the Romanian cereal producers(for the short term the impact has been already discussed in the chapter for directpayments impact). Milk, which is another important product in the Romanianfarms, will have no indicative price starting with 2005. This means that theprices at this product will decrease. This is not a very good piece of news for themilk producers who, although are estimated to benefit from the reduction ofinputs (cereal prices will decrease) as a result of E.U. membership, will enjoythese benefits to a smaller extent.

Conclusion to the analysis of the Economic impact of the C.A.P.

The paper demonstrates that the main trend inside the E.U. is shaping afuture in which the new comers, including Romania will enjoy to a much lessextent the benefits that created the welfare of the E.U. farmers.The result of the negotiations between Romania and E.U. is rather mixed. On

the short-medium term the agricultural sector will suffer some shocks bothsocial and economic: Small farms and the subsistence farms will be the mostaffected even bankrupted, while the access to the E.U. funds might be quitedifficult due to the numerous and costly criteria; the consumer prices will increasealthough not too much; the negative trade balance with the E.U. may even increase.Many of the negative consequences that Romania will have to face as a result

of the C.A.P. policy are due to the particular backwardness of its agriculturalsector. Yet, this study came to the conclusion that the E.U.’s approach during thenegotiations did not always match to the realities from this country. This isparticularly true when it comes about the S.A.P.A.R.D. program and its semi-failure. Many of its structural targets were created to answer to the E.U.’s ownproblems (such is the environmental criteria) rather than to the Romanian’s morepressing social needs. The E.U.’s rigid and exclusive way of negotiations and anot very realistic agenda for this case, made the Romania’s situation even moredifficult than it was anyhow. The major result of all these misfits was that itdelayed the implementation of the E.U. acquis communautaire. The Romanianreduced administrative capacity to manage the very demanding task of theimplementation of the C.A.P. institution played, of course, the major role in thesedelays.The European Community proved also to be a very tough political negotiator

with a generous discourse of integration but with a much stingier approach intechnical details. The accession offer for the agriculture is the result of a negotiationsprocess among the old member states and the Commission in which most of thecandidate countries, except Poland, played a very limited role. Romania’s abilityto influence this process was even more reduced.One of the major results is that Romania will have to restructure its agricultural

sector with a financial support from the E.U. that is not as large as it may seem.To resume, for the short-medium term (2006–2013) from the approximately


1,5 millions euro that will receive under market measures for the next three yearswill be deduced the 800 millions Romania’s contribution to the C.A.P. plus thecost of the institutional implementation of this policy which will reduce thefinancial support to something less than 500 million euro the net money.

As a member of E.U. Romania will loose the advantages gained in the WorldTrade Organization and the complete opening of its trade borders to the formermembers of C.E.F.T.A. who now are E.U. members will do nothing than toincrease its negative agricultural trade balance with them (mainly with Hungaryand Poland). Overall the trade balance with E.U. has been for many yearsnegative and this situation will not change but it may even get worse in the firstyears after accession.

The results of the negotiations are definitely in the favor of the old MemberStates who insured for themselves the biggest part of the E.U. budget, while thenew members, although many and poorer than the poorest E.U. old membershave to be content with a tiny part. Theoretically this result might be reversedonce they become insiders but the E.U.–15 took some safeguard clauses in theshape of 2003 C.A.P. reform and German-French agreement to freeze the C.A.P.budget for the next E.U. budget.The conclusions stated above may seem rather bleak and someone may ask

if indeed it is worthy for Romania to join C.A.P. after all? Romania has no choice.C.A.P. is a part of E.U. and it has to accept it or to give up to the E.U. membership.The integration in E.U. is not done in pieces. Romania’s gains in other fieldssuch as: security, international political position, foreign direct investments, etcmay overrun the losses mentioned above. Even more important these negativeimpacts are calculated only for the first years after enlargement and thereforethey are temporary. In 2016 Romania will enjoy the full direct payments. As forthe access to the rural funds it is difficult to evaluate how long may take forRomania to learn how to absorb these funds efficiently.

The main benefits will be more obvious on the long-term trend. One of themwill be that on the international trade arena where Romania’s position will beconsiderably enhanced since will be back by the strong negotiations power ofE.U. The participation to C.A.P. as well as the new trend inside it, which tries tostress more on quality than on quantity, seemingly very harsh in the beginning,may force the Romanian agriculture into a more rapid restructuring than if it hadstayed out of it. The high fragmentation of land should decrease allowing onlyto the most competitive farms to survive. Romanian agriculture is working muchunder its potential. Therefore it is expected that the C.A.P. will prompt a betteruse of it. Romania has very good natural conditions for agriculture; it has a goodagricultural tradition as well as crop diversity; it has trained and educated peoplein the area (agricultural engineers); it has a good potential for organic agriculturewhich attracts good E.U. funds, has a large offer on the communitarian marketand attractive prices. The accession to E.U. may also offer diversification ofactivities such as agro-tourism, and a better commercialization of some traditionalproducts; also the common market organizations will receive a necessary boost,straightening the influence of Romanian farmers on the E.U. market.


NOTES


1. European Commission (2002c), “Agriculture inthe E.U. Statistical and Economic Information2001”, January, available on www.europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2001.

2. For data on Romania see European Institute fromRomania, Impact Study, nr. 11, Bucharest 2004;for E.U. data see European Commission,Directorate General for Agriculture (DG VI),Agriculture in the Economic Union — Statisticaland Economical Information 2002, Brussels,February 2003.

3. The European Agreement with Romania. Thetext can be found, on www. europa.eu.int/enlargem/Romania.

4. Accession Treaty concluded between Romaniaand E.U., on www.mie.ro/tratat_aderare/English/doc.htm.

5. European Commission, DG VI, “The CommonAgricultural Policy explained”, October 2004,www.euroap.eu.int/comm/agriculture/cap.pdf.

6. Treaty of Accession with Romania.7. The national currency is LEI and at the momentwhen the World Bank’s Reports were written 1Euro = 36.000 Lei. This paper will use the sameexchange rate although starting with June 2005the value of LEI was adjusted in order to cut offthe inflation, meaning that now 1 Euro =36 Lei.

8. World Bank Report, “Sectorul Agrar dinRomania într-o perspectivã europeanã”, ChapterIII, June 2005 available on www.siteresources.worldbank.org/INTROMANIAINROMANIAN/resources/capitolulV, pdf.

9. The European Commission, Directorate Generalfor Agriculture, “Agriculture Situation in theCandidate Countries”, July 2002, on www.europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/enlarge/publi/countryrep/romania.pdf.

10. See The Romanian Ministry of Euro-AtlanticIntegration: www.mie/ro/archives/news/2004.

11. The European Institute from Romania, “Studiide Impact (PAISII). Ierarhizarea prioritãþilor dedezvoltare agricolã ºi ruralã în România. Influenþelenoii reforme a Politicii Agricole Comunitare”,Bucharest, 2004.

12. Ministry of Romanian Agriculture, “Date desprecomerþul Românesc între 2000–2003”, fact sheets.

13. The Romanian National Institute of Statistics, thedata are available on this site: www.insse.ro/inidcatori/Eluna

14. The Romanian National Institute of Statistic andEUROSTAT 2002–2003.

15. The European Institute from Romania, “PoliticaAgricolã”, Working Paper for the PHARE projectRO0006.18.02.

16. Treaty of Accession with Romania Annex B,paragraph 4 and The European Institute fromRomania, “Politica Agricolã Comunã. Consecinþeasupra României”, October 2002 available onthe site of the Institute: www.ier.ro.

17. The European Institute from Romania,“Ierarhizarea prioritãþilor...”, 2004.

18. The European Commission (2003), “Proposalfor a Council Regulation establishing commonrules for direct support schemes..., COM (2003),p. 23.

19. World Bank Report, 2005.20. The European Commission (2002d), Directorat

General Enlargement, “Enlargement of the E.U.Guide to the Negotiations Chapter by Chapter”,updated December 2002, on www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargem/guide.pdf.

21. European Commission (2002d), DirectoratGeneral Enlargement, Idem.

22. The European Institute from Romania,“Ierarhizarea prioritãþilor...”, 2004.

23. Idem.24. The European Commission, Directorate General

of Agriculture, Analysis of the Impact onAgricultural Markets and incomes of E.U.Enlargement to the CEECs, March 2002, onwww.europa.eu.int/comm/enlarge/Agriculture/2002/doc.pdf.

25. The Romanian National Institute of Statistic andEUROSTAT 2002–2003.

26. “Romania’s Position Paper Chapter 7,Agriculture”,paper presented at the Conference on Accessionto the European Union — Romania, Brussels, 10January 2002, CONF_RO 1/02.

27. The European Institute from Romania, “PoliticaAgricolã Comunã – Consecinþe...”.

28. The European Commission, “Analysis of theImpact on Agricultural…”, March 2002.

29. Economic Intelligence Unit, “Country Report-Romania”, for April 1997; June 1999.

30. The European Commission (2002b), “Mid-TermReview of the Common Agricultural Policy…”.

31. The European Institute form Romania,“Ierarhizare…”, 2004.

32. World Bank, June 2005.33. European Commission (2002b), “Mid-Term

Review..”, 2002.34. The S.A.P.A.R.D. program was designed by EU

to grant pre-accession funds in order to help thecandidate countries to comply with the EUrequirements and also to help them to modernizethis sector.

35. The Romanian Ministry of Integration www.mie.ro /doc.pdf.

36. Estimation made on the data provided by theNational Institute of Statistics from Romania.

37. “Adevãrul“, “Programul S.A.P.A.R.D. este datpe dischetã þãranilor români”, April 2003.

38. The European Commission, “Country Report-Romania”, November 2003.

39. The European Commission (2002b),“Communication from the Commission to theCouncil and the European Parliament. Mid-TermReview of the Common Agricultural Policy”,COM (2002) p. 394.

40. The European Institute form Romania,Ierarhizare…, 2004.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARTICLES AND BOOKS


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The European Commission, Directorate General forAgriculture, “Agriculture Situation in theCandidate Countries”, July 2002 on www.europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/enlarge/publi/countryrep/romania.pdf.

The European Commission (2003), “Proposal for aCouncil Regulation establishing common rulesfor direct support schemes...”, COM (2003), p. 23.

The European Commission (2002d), DirectoratGeneral Enlargement, “Enlargement of the E.U..Guide to the Negotiations Chapter by Chapter”,updated December 2002 on www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargem/guide.pdf.

The European Commission, Directorate General ofAgriculture, “Analysis of the Impact onAgriculturalMarkets and incomes of E.U. Enlargement to theCEECs”, March 2002 on www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlarge/Agriculture/2002/doc.pdf.

The European Commission (2002b), “Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council and theEuroepa Parliament. Mid-Term Review of theCommon Agricultural Policy”, COM (2002),p. 394.

European Commission, “Rural Development in theE.U. Agricultural and Rural Development”, FactSheets, Luxembourg 2003.

European Commission, “Country Report-Romania”,November 2003.

European Commission DGVI (Agriculture), “Prospectsfor Agricultural Markets”, Brussels 2001 onwww.europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/2001_engl.doc.pdf; “European Commission DG VI (2002)”,“Questions and Answers. Commission’sEnlargement proposals”, 30 January, 2002.

European Commission DG VI (2002), “Questionsand Answers. Commission’s Enlargementproposals”, 30 January, 2002.

European Council (2002a), “Presidency Conclusions.Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13December 2002”, SN 400.02.

The European Institute from Romania, “Studii deImpact (PAISII). Ierarhizarea prioritãþilor dedezvolatre agricolã ºi ruralã în România.Influenþele noii reforme a Politicii AgricoleComunitare”, Bucharest, 2004.

European Institute from Romania, “Politica Agricola”,Working Paper for the PHARE projectRO0006.18.02.

European Institute from Romania, “Politica AgricolãComunã — Consecinþe asupra României”,October 2002 available on the site of theInstitute: www.ier.ro.

World Bank Report, “Sectorul Agrar din Româniaîntr-o perspectivã europeanã”, Chapter III, June2005 available on www.siteresources.worldbank.org/INTROMANIAINROMANIAN/ resources/capitolulV.pdf.

Economic Intelligence Unit, “Country Report-Romania”, for April 1997, June 1999.

Economic Intelligence Unit, “Country Report forPoland and for Hungary”, April–June 2005.

Accession Treaty concluded between Romania andE.U., on www.mie.ro/tratat_aderare/English/doc.htm.

Romania’s Position Paper Chapter 7 — Agriculture,paper presented at the Conference on Accessionto the European Union — Romania Brussels, 10January 2002, CONF_RO 1/02.

EUROSTAT 2002–2003, on www.europa.eu.int/EUROSTAT.

European Agreement with Romania — its full textcan be found, on www. europa.eu.int/enlargem/Romania.

Ministry of Romanian Agriculture, Date desprecomerþul Românesc între 2000–2003, Factsheets.

Daugbjerg C., Policy feedback and paradigm shift inE.U. agricultural policy: the effects of theMacSharry reform on future reform, “Journal ofEuropean Public Policy”, 2003, vol. 10:3 June,pp. 421–437.

Daugbjerg C. and Swinbank A., The C.A.P. and E.U.Enlargement: Propsects for an Alternative Strategyto Avoid Lock-In of the C.A.P. Support, “Journalof Common Market”, vol. 42, nr.1, pp. 99–199.

Frohberg K. and Hartmann, M. (2002), FinancingEnlargement: The Case of Agriculture and RuralDevelopment, “Review of European EconomicPolicy”, vol. 37 nr. 2, pp. 71–77.

Phinnemore D., Preparing for Enlargement, in:Gower J., “The European Union Handbook”, 2ndedition, London, 2002.

COMPARING THE EUROPEAN MODEL AND THE ASEAN WAY:IS THERE A THIRD WAY OF REGIONALISM

FOR THE EAST ASIAN COOPERATION?

ZHU GUICHANG*

Introduction

Regionalism has gained new momentum in world economics and politics inthe post-Cold War era. Its role in facilitating economic and trade cooperationamong regional states, promoting regional peace and stability, and shapingregional, even world order, has been recognized and analyzed by many analysts.Despite their disagreement about the causes and dynamics of regional integration,they share the common view about the importance of the regional integrationand the necessity of paying attention to the development of this phenomenon.

Regional integration in Europe and EastAsia has attracted much more attentionthan other regions for different reasons. The European integration and the EUhave made great progress in breaking through the traditional transnationalcooperation and has become a model of regional integration. Therefore, it isunderstandable of its attractiveness. Regional integration in East Asia is a recentpractice with fewer achievements. However, its distinctive way of promotingregional integration, the so-called ASEAN way has received much criticism. Asa result, it is significant to make a comparative study of regionalism in Europeand East Asia, to find the advantages and disadvantages of both models ofregional integration, and to explore the possibility of a third way to promotingregional integration in East Asia.

In this paper, it is assumed that regional institutional arrangements created forpromoting regional integration are not only the indicators of representing thedegree of regional integration but also the important factors in shaping theprocess of integration and determining the success and failure of the process.The degree of regional integration can be ordered according to the levels ofinstitutionalization of regional cooperation. The European model of integrationcan be considered as representing the high-level institutionalized integration,while theASEAN way representing the low-level one. Though regional integrationwith low-level institutionalization is widely present in the world, it will be


——————* Centre for European Studies, Shandong University, Jinan-China.

fragile and easy to be interrupted and even destroyed by both internal andexternal forces. Regional integration with high-level institutionalization representedby the EU is more stable and dynamic, but the EU is very unique and can not besimply emulated by other regions. However, its uniqueness doesn’t mean itsexperiences of institutional integration are irrelevant to other regions. It seemsthat there should be a third way of regionalism betweenASEANway and Europeanmodel, that is between the low degree of institutional integration limited tointergovernmental cooperation and the high level one expanded to supranationalgovernance. EastAsia can be the region for experimenting this kind of regionalism.

Based on the hypothesis, the paper will analyze the institutional characteristicsof the European model and explain why the Member States of the EU transfertheir sovereignty to the Community and create the unique supranational governancesystems. The functions and the role of the supranational governance system inpromoting integration will be explored. The doubts about the supranational featuresof the European model will be analyzed.

Turning to the East Asia, the paper will focus on theASEAN way and explainits basic principle of non-interference, its informal way of cooperation, its weakinstitutionalization and non-legalistic decision-making procedures.

Moving to the next part, the paper will explain what are the main reasonsbehind the differences of the European model and the ASEAN way. The paperargued that the homogeneous characteristics of western Europe and theheterogeneous features of SoutheastAsia provide sound explanations for differencesbetween the two models. While stressing the different features of the two regionsand their different approaches to regional integration, the paper also pointed outthe similarities of the European Model andASEAN way by using level-analysis.

Despite there is much criticism toASEANway, It seemed that it most EastAsianstates embraced it. It was widely accepted and applied by the ASEAN RegionalForum (ARF), ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, South Korea), the Asia-Pacific EconomicCooperation (APEC) and other regional organizations. However, the weaknesses ofthe ASEAN way in promoting regional integration can not be neglected. Thisweakness can be redressed in some degree by learning the European experience.

ASEAN+3 as a tentative process of East Asian integration can benefit a lot fromthe experiences of European Union and theASEAN. If it can successfully combinethe models together, then a new way of regionalism in East Asia will arise.

2. The European model of regional integration

European integration and the EU have long been widely regarded as themodel of formal regional integration. What is the European model? Differentscholars with different disciplines have different views about the Europeanmodel. Scholars of international relations tend to view the EU as the futuremodel of the world order system based on multilateralism and international law.Scholars of economics see the EU as the model of economic integration withcommon market and common currency. Scholars of sociology tend to view theEU as the capitalist model with emphasis of social market economy. That is to

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say, it is difficult to find a consensus on the exact meaning of the Europeanmodel. In fact, there even exist different opinions about the European modelamong the same scholarship.

This paper does not want to discuss the different views about the Europeanmodel, but focuses on the European political and institutional integration. Theconcept of political and institutional integration is defined “not as the emergenceof completely novel Community institutions but as the growing competence ofthe European Community to make binding rules in any given policy domain.”1Based on this definition, the European model can be referred to the pooling andsharing sovereignty of the Member States of the EU at the Community level andthe supranational governance system. In fact, European Community/EU haslong been considered as “an exercise in the pooling and sharing of sovereignty.”2

What is the pooling of sovereignty? According to Keohane, “sovereignty ispooled, in the sense that, in many areas, states’ legal authority over internal andexternal affairs is transferred to the Community as a whole, authoring actionthrough procedures not involving state vetoes.” Without transference ofsovereignty (the authority, power, competence) from the member states level tothe community level, there will be no integration process. In this sense, integrationprocess can be regarded as a process of continuous transference of state sovereignty.Once the member states stop transferring their sacred sovereignty, the integrationprocess will be jeopardized. The “Empty Chair Crisis” of the European integrationin 1966 was a case in point. However, the transference of sovereignty to communitylevel does not mean eroding or even losing of state sovereignty. It just means thepooling and sharing of sovereignty. In order to exercise the transferred sovereigntyat the community level, a set of supranational institutions will be created and anumber of principles, rules and norms will also be set out.

From the beginning of the European integration, a set of supranationalinstitutions such as European Commission, the European Parliament (calledAssembly initially) and the European Court of Justice was created together withsome intergovernmental institutions such as Council of Ministers. With thedevelopment of the integration, these supranational institutions have played moreimportant role in governing regional affairs. The European integration has so farachieved great success in terms of enlargement and deepening. Membership ofthe EU expanded from original six member states to 25 in 2004. It will be furtherexpanded to include Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia in 2007. Despite strong oppositionand long-term delays, the European leaders decided to kick off the accessionnegotiation process with Turkey this year. The process of the European integrationhas developed steadily from establishing a free trade area, customs union, commonagricultural and fisheries policy, to building a common market, economic andmonetary union and single currency, from economic integration to political,security and military integration.

Many factors have contributed to its successes, however, transferring sovereigntyto the Community level and the supranational institutions are crucial to itscontinued development, especially the role of supranational institutions such asCommission, European Court of Justice in preventing the rollback of the

3 A COMPARASION OF THE EUROPEAN MODEL AND THE ASEAN WAY 109

integration. Even though there are many disagreements among academics aboutthe real transferring of sovereignty, the autonomy of European supranationalinstitutions, one can not deny the fact that more and more decisions and legislationsregulating traditional national affairs are made not by national governments andparliaments, but by European institutions, not by unanimous consent, but byqualified majority-voting and even simple majority voting, that the EU law hassupremacy over Member States’ law and has direct effect at the Member Stateswithout transferring into domestic law. In fact, with the development of theEuropean integration, a unique supranational entity has been emerging, whichgoes beyond merely inter-state arrangements typical of institutional activity atthe international level.

The supranational character or the supranationality of the EC/EU has alreadybeen pointed out and analyzed by neo-functionalism.3 For Haas, supranationalitydid not mean that Community institutions exercise authority over nationalgovernments, but rather refer to a process or style of decision-making, “a cumulativepattern of accommodation in which the participants refrain from unconditionallyvetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means ofcompromises upgrading common interests.”4 Whether we view supranationalismas a process of supranational decision-making or as a structure of supranationalinstitutions or as a combination of the two, we can see that supranationalism isthe essence of the European political and institutional integration.

Yet, the supranationality of European integration has been questioned byrealism and liberal intergovernmentalism.5 First, the intergovernmentalism insistedthat the process of the European Union supranational decision-making tookplace within the context of intergovernmental agreements. National governmentsare the masters of the constitutional treaties establishing the European Coal andSteel Community, European Economic Community, the Single European Act,and the European Union. It is they that launch the negotiation process to draft anew treaty or revise the existing treaties. These treaties or revised treaties mustbe ratified by the European Council and then by individual member states.Otherwise they will not come into effect. The current French and Dutch no voteon the European Constitution was a case in point. It is the member states thatdecide whether, when, in what areas the supranational decision-making processwill be applied. This kind of decision is called the “history-making decisions”,or the “celebrated intergovernmental bargains.”6 According to Peterson,“history-making decisions” are taken at a “super-systemic” level, or one thattranscends the EU’s day to day policy process. History-making decisions alterthe Union’s legislative procedures, rebalance the relative powers of EUinstitutions, or change the EU’s remit.”7 The dominant actors in the super-systemic level are European Council and the national governments inintergovernmental conferences. “Most history-making decisions are madeunanimously and intergovernmentally.”8

Secondly, the intergovernmentalism questioned the autonomy of thesupranational institutions and therefore their active role in regional integration.Although member states delegated authority to supranational institutions, they

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still can instruct, police, monitor, and rein in supranational actors at any time.That is to say, the supranational institutions are just the instructed agents of themember states without independence and autonomy. Consequently, they justfunction mostly as passive devices to reduce the transaction costs and enhancethe efficiency of intergovernmental negotiations and agreements.9 Taken theEuropean Commission as an example, although according toTreaties, it has exclusiveright of initiative, and is made up of individuals who must act independently andmake allegiance to the EU, it normally consults national representatives at everystage of formulating its policy proposals, because it knows very well that the fateof its proposals will be in the hands of Council of Ministers.

In fact, there are innumerable committees of national experts and bureaucratspreparing the Commission’s proposals. The execution of the Council’s directives bythe Commission is closely supervised by the committees of national bureaucrats,some of which can be overruled the Commission’s moves.10 In other words, what theCommission did was just the member states wanted. Even the alleged independentCommissioners themselves are not really independent because their nomination ismade by their own government. In short, “the Commission is not a supranationalentity in the sense of being an authoritative decision-making above the nation-state,nor has loyalty been transferred from nation-state to the Commission.”11

Whether the criticism made by intergovernmentalism on the supranationalityof the EU is true or not, it did point out another feature of the European integration.That is nation-states and national governments have still played a dominant rolein the European integration process. It seems to be interesting and surprising thatthe two contrasting features exist in the same process of the European integration.However, if we adopt the method of level analysis (see Peterson 1995), then wecan have a better understanding of the two features of the European integration.At the super-systemic level, the history-making decisions which address thequestion of how EU governance changes are always based on the consensus andintergovernmental agreements among the Member States reflecting the memberstates’ interests and preferences, and “reflect the distinctly political rationality:the desire of national governments to remain in power.”12 At the systemic andsub-systemic levels, the policy-setting and policy-shaping decisions which addressthe questions of what to do and how to do it mainly rely on the Europeaninstitutions such as the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, theCommittee of Permanent Representatives, and follow the Community method ofdecision-making. The two or three-level analysis tells us that the supranationaland national features of the European integration are not mutually exclusive butsymbiotic. They coexist in the European integration process and become thedistinctive features of the European model of regional integration.

3. ASEAN way of regional integration

Unlike the model of European integration, the East Asia has experiencedquite different pattern of regional integration. The most distinctive form of


regional integration in East Asia was the so-called “ASEAN way” which wasgradually developed since the foundation of the Association of South-East AsianNations (ASEAN) on 8 August 1967 by signing the Bangkok Declaration. Thisfounding document, however, unlike the Treaty of Rome establishing theEuropean Economic Community, was not a legally binding document and requiredno ratification of the member states. It just expressed the common determinationof the member states (the five founding member states are Indonesia, Malaysia,Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) to ensure their stability and security fromexternal interference and to preserve their national identities. It also set out theASEAN’s three central objectives such as to accelerate economic growth, socialprogress and cultural development in the region, to promote regional peace andstability, and to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on mattersof common interest (see the Bangkok Declaration, Thailand, 8 August 1967,www.aseansec.org.) In fact,ASEANwas not created as a mechanism for resolvingdisputes among the member states but as a forum to managing their differencesin that it operated on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs ofthe member states from its formation. It did not have its secretariat until 1976.The Secretariat was given no supranational authority.

According to Jeannie Henderson, there are three reasons why the non-interference principle became a guiding tenet of the ASEAN.13 The first reasonwas that its member states feared external support for their domestic communistinsurgencies. During the height of the cold war, this fear had its grounds.However, this fear did not exist any longer since the late 1970s. The secondreason was that ASEAN’s ethnic, religious, political and economic diversityrisked irreconcilable differences between its members unless these aspects ofnational life were excluded from discussions. This reason still holds true today,even with nearly forty years development. TheASEAN’s diversity is not narrowingbut widening with the enlargement of theASEAN, especially with the admissionof Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. The third reason was that themember states’ governments of the ASEAN were unwilling to cede their new-found sovereignty, either to a supranational body or by allowing members tocomment each other’s internal affairs. The member states’ sensitivity towardstheir sovereignty was due to the fact that all member states of ASEAN exceptThailand had been colonized and just won their independence after the end ofthe Second World War. This sensitivity towards sovereignty made the ASEANoperate on quite distinctive ASEAN way from the beginning.

What is ASEAN way? Its main contents can be identified in the writtenfundamental agreements or documents of ASEAN. ASEAN did not conclude alegally binding treaty until the first ever ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976 — theTreaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), which containsfundamental principles for inter-state relations. These principles include: (a)“mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrityand national identity of all nations”; (b) “the right of every state to lead its

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national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion”; (c)“non-interference in the internal affairs of one another”; (d) “settlement ofdifferences or disputes by peaceful means”; (e) “renunciation of the threat of useof force”; and (f) “effective cooperation among themselves.”14 The TAC’sfundamental principles are in fact not different from those of the UN Charter andother international norms and principles. However, it represented a formal andregional commitment to these principles. Since then, TAC has become the mostimportant legal foundation for regulating the relations among the member statesof theASEAN.All non-founding members of ASEAN acceded to the TAC at thetime of their entry into the association. Major East Asia states like China, Japan,the Republic of Korea also acceded to the TAC. The criteria for attending EastAsia Summit set out by ASEAN were the accession to the TAC. Australia, NewZealand, and India acceded to the TAC for attending the first East Asia Summit.That is to say, the above-mentioned principles of TAC have been accepted andabided by both within the ASEAN and beyond it.

AmitavAcharya argued that ASEAN way could be regarded as the prominentsymbol of ASEAN. According to him, ASEAN way has two main aspects: “Thefirst is avoidance of formal mechanisms and procedures of conflict resolution”;and the second is “the principle of consensus”. Acharya and among otherscholars take the ASEAN way as the particular approach to conflict-reduction orconflict management or bargaining style in the South East Asia. In this paperASEAN way, however, will be defined in a broad sense as an approach to regionalintegration in South East Asia. It has the following characteristics.15

First,ASEAN has proceeded without formal institutional designing and building.It has no regional parliament or council of ministers with law-making powers,no power of enforcement, and no judicial system. Although as mentioned above,ASEAN Secretariat was established in 1976 after nine years of its founding.However, its basic mandate is to provide for greater efficiency in the coordinationof ASEAN organs and for more effective implementation of ASEAN projectsand activities. That is to say it plays a coordinating and facilitating role. In 1992,the ASEAN Summit agreed that formal summit would be held every three yearsrather than on ad hoc basis, with the provision for informal ones in interveningyears. It also agreed to re-designate the Secretary-General of theASEAN Secretariatinto the Secretary-General of ASEAN with an enlarged mandate to initiate,advise, coordinate, and implementASEAN activities. The Secretary-General hasbeen accorded ministerial status and serves as the spokesman and representativeofASEAN. Despite these improvements,ASEAN Secretariat is not a supranationalinstitution and ASEAN is a regional entity with weak institutionalization.

Second, related to the first point, ASEAN member states have tried to avoidthe formal mechanisms and procedures of negotiation. They prefer the informaland non-legalistic decision-making procedures in dealing with their relationsand their common problems. Since its formation, the way to arrive at agreementsin ASEAN has been through careful consultation and consensus rather than


across-the-table negotiations involving bargaining and give-and-take. AndASEANhas been cooperating through informal understandings that impose no legallybinding obligations. For the reached agreements, member states have just moralobligations to apply to them.

Third, ASEAN has moved crementally and at a pace comfortable to allmember states, which can be attributed to its consensus decision-making. Asmentioned above, all decisions are made within ASEAN on the basis ofconsensus. There is no voting and of course no veto in the ASEAN decision-making process. If a consensus cannot be reached on an important issue, theASEAN states agree to disagree and go their separate ways, and ASEANassumes no common position on the issue. ASEAN also has conditioned itsmembers to work around conflict. While intra-ASEAN issues may not beresolved, they can be put aside so that they do not interfere with cooperation onother matters.16

After the end of the cold war, ASEAN has accelerated its integration processand strengthened their cooperation both within themselves and with outsideworld. The 1992 Singapore summit agreed to deepen their economic cooperationby initiating an economic programme to establish the Common Effective PreferentialTariff for theASEAN Free TradeArea (AFTA). Under this agreement, the AFTAmember states are legally committed to reducing tariffs on their trade with oneanother. The tariff reductions are to be carried out through national legalenactments by each party to the agreement in accordance with an agreed schedule.AFTA could be seen as the first substantial step toward integrating the ASEANmarket, and the real launching economic integration of ASEAN. Before 1992,ASEAN had initiated and developed many economic programmes to strengthentheir cooperation, but most of them failed. One of the reasons for this failure isthe absence of binding instruments and monitoring system. The successfullaunching of the AFTA and relatively smooth development can be contributed tothe legally binging nature of AFTA commitments.

Since the launching of theAFTA,ASEAN economic cooperation and integrationhas expanded to other sectors such as investment, service, finance and monetary.Meanwhile, in 1996, ASEAN agreed on a mechanism and rules for settlingdisputes arising from any of the economic agreements binding the association.In 1997, ASEAN leaders adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020. In 2003, ASEANleaders made the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) andcommitted themselves to realizing the ASEAN Community. All thesedevelopments indicate that the way of ASEAN regional integration is changingand adapting to the new reality. As Jeannie Henderson observed “the legallybinging nature of AFTA commitments and the role of the ASEAN Secretariatin monitoring observance of the scheme contrasted with the essentiallyconsultative nature of much of ASEAN’s functional cooperation”. Despitethe adaptation of the ASEAN way in recent years, its characteristics of weakinstitutionalization, informal understanding and non-legalistic decision-makingbased on consensus are still prevailing in the South East Asia regionalintegration.17

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4. Comparing the European model and the ASEAN way

The patterns of regional integration in Europe and Southeast Asia, as aboveshown, are quite different. The European model of integration can be consideredas representing the high-level institutionalized integration, while the ASEANway representing the low-level one. The differentiation may be over-simplifiedbut it does reflect the different approaches to regional integration in the tworegions. What then are the main reasons for the differences between theEuropean model and the ASEAN way?

Helen Wallace attributed the European model of regional integration to thespecificity of western Europe. According to her, four characteristics can be identifiedin western Europe. Fist, the collective memory of the devastation of the second worldwar made western Europe countries preoccupied with collective security. Strongcommitment has been made to devise regimes specifically to promote collectivesecurity, and the security of individual states since the end of the war. Thispreoccupation with security and the security arrangements have had “profoundimpacts on how cross-border regimes have been shaped to promote political andeconomic exchanges as a means of embedding cooperative behaviour”).18 In otherwords, European integrationwas the product of “a common disaster and predicament:the war and its aftermath, American hegemony and the Soviet threat.”19

Second, “western Europe is an overcrowded region in terms of both populationand the number of distinct states. The connections between populations inadjacent states have deep roots in history, then overlaid by the newer impactsof globalization.” “Neighbouring states have developed local frameworks forcooperation, both to regulate their borders with each other, and to developparticular forms of particular cooperation.”20

Third, western European countries have more or less the same politicalsystem, that is, the liberal democratic systems. Without taking this dimensioninto account, it will be impossible to understand the institutional characteristicsof the EU. “The EC and later the EU were in part devised to contribute todemocratic stabilization as the club of European liberal democracies, characterizedalso by their functioning market economies”.

Fourth, western European countries have more or less similar social welfaresystem. The social impact of the economic integration has to be taken intoaccount in devising European institutions.

Besides the above-mentioned four characteristics, we can add some points tothe specificity. For example, most of western European countries are developedstates sharing the same culture and religion. All these factors have combined toshape the development of European integration, and its approach to promotingand managing regional integration.

In comparison with western Europe, Southeast Asia is a much moreheterogeneous region. First, Southeast Asian countries have quite differentpolitical systems. As Jeannie Henderson observed that “the Association’spolitical spectrum broadened with the inclusion of the communist governmentsof Vietnam and Las, and of Myanmar’s authoritarian military regime, just asliberal democracy was becoming more entrenched in the Philippines and


Thailand”. There are no democratic criteria for admission new member state intothe ASEAN, while the EC/EU has set out strict political conditions. Unlike theEC/EU as a club of liberal democracies, ASEAN is a highly heterogeneousorganization politically. The diversity of political systems of ASEAN memberstates has made the informal way of cooperation more acceptable and viablethan the formal one.21

Second, Southeast Asia is also a region with various economic systems andgreat economic disparity. Member states like Singapore, Brunei and Thailandhave established functioning market economic systems, while other memberstates like Myanmar and Laos still maintain their planned economy. The economicdisparity within ASEAN ranged from industrialized states like Singapore toagricultural countries like Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar in terms of degree ofindustrialization, and in terms of per capita income/GNP “from Singapore’s$32,940 to Cambodia’s $300, and Vietnam’s $320.”22 Given the different stagesof economic development within ASEAN, their economies should becomplementary. On the contrary, “the emergence and consolidation of ASEANtook place in a climate of fairly low level of intra-regional transactions andinterdependence.” “Even today, ASEAN’s trade with non-ASEAN members issignificantly higher than intra-ASEAN trade.”23 This low-level transactions andinterdependence within ASEAN makes the regional economic integrationdifficult and less urgent. However, the high dependence of ASEAN economieson extra-regional trade partners makes ASEAN regionalism “stronger in itsexternal relations than in intra-ASEAN cooperation.”24

Third, Southeast Asian countries have different cultures and religions. Theregional diversity of culture and religion ranged from Singapore and Vietnam’sConfucianism to Indonesia’s Islam and Myanmar’s Buddhism. They also havedifferent strategic views.

In short, the diversity among Southeast Asian countries in terms of politicalsystems, economic development, culture and religion makes the formalinstitutionalized cooperation difficult, if not impossible. The heterogeneouscharacteristics of the Southeast Asia have shaped the development of itsintegration, and its approach to promoting and managing regional integration. Inorder to achieve and maintain unity in this great diversity, ASEAN memberstates have to follow the ASEAN way to promoting regional cooperation. Thisway may be not desirable but workable.

Although the homogeneous characteristics of western Europe and theheterogeneous features of Southeast Asia provide sound explanations fordifferences between the European model and the ASEAN way, they do notexhaust the explanation. For example, the external power, especially the UntiedStates has pursued quite different policies to the two regions. In Europe, it hasenthusiastically promoted multilateral cooperation by establishing the NATOand the OECE (today’s OECD), and by supporting the ECSC, EEC. In SoutheastAsia or broadly in East Asia, the United States chose to deal with East Asiancountries individually and bilaterally, which constitutes a major barrier to theregional cooperation. Given the significant presence and importance of the USpower in the two regions, the impact of its approach on the regional integration

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can not be neglected.25 (The different features of the two regions and theirdifferent approaches to regional integration can not, however, be exaggerated.The similarities of the European Model andASEAN way can easily be identified.To use Peterson’s three-level analysis, the European model and ASEAN way arequite similar in the super-systemic level. In this level, both of them adhere to theevolutionary approach, relying largely on painstaking consensus-building toreach agreements. Although EU has formal institutions and decision-makingprocedure with majority-voting system, “the participants in the EU policyprocess tend to base cooperation on consensus, and eschew cooperation whenthere is more than short-term dissensus.”26 In fact, consensus-building is themost frequent way of developing agreements in the EU. In this level, both ofthem depend on the strong commitments and political leadership of the memberstates. The European model and ASEAN way are also similar in the sub-systemic level in terms of formal and informal policy networks.

Although the European Model and ASEAN way are quite different in thesystemic level, the distance between them is not as large as it was in the pastbecause the current process of globalization, mutual interdependence, andmultilateralism affects the regional integration in the same way. In fact, since theend of the Cold War, the differences between the European model and ASEANway have been narrowed. They are converging on building and strengtheningformal institutions and reaching legally-binding agreements. However, thisconvergence doesn’t mean the ASEAN integration will follow and emulate theEuropean model, which will be proved futile just as the African Union shows.Neither is the European model better than theASEAN way. It just meansASEANcan learn some successful experiences of European integration to enrich andimprove its unique way of promoting regional integration.

What, then, canASEAN learn from EU?ASEANmay learn from EU in manyaspects such as democratic political systems, rule of law, democratic governance, andregional institutional buildings. However, the most important point that ASEANshould learn from EU would be the European new attitudes towards sovereigntyand its relevant practices. ASEAN member states may change or adapt theirapproaches towards sovereignty in the context of globalization and mutualinterdependence, just as the EU Member States did after the end of the secondworld war. As we said in the first part, European integration can be regarded asan exercise of pooling and sharing sovereignty. EU member states haveembraced a notion of pooled and limited sovereignty since the launching ofEuropean integration process, which was quite different from the classicalconception of external sovereignty that “a state must have control of its externalpolicies and be free of external authority structures.”27 The embrace of newconception of sovereignty of European states made their integration processmore sustainable and successful. European experience in terms of changing theirattitudes to traditional absolute sovereignty can provide some clues forSoutheast Asian states to change and adapt their current view towardssovereignty. Nowadays, Southeast Asian states still cling to a more traditionalnotion of sovereignty, and strongly oppose external interference in their domesticaffairs, and are reluctant to pool and limit their sacred sovereignty.


The recent debate on ASEAN’s principle of non-interference among ASEANmember states can illustrate their reluctance.28 Since 1997, ASEAN faced serverchallenges posed by the enlargement especially the political situation inCambodia and Myanmar, economic and financial crisis, upheavals and terrorismin Indonesia, transnational problems like toxic smog, tsunami disaster, andrecent avian bird flu. How to meet these challenges quickly and effectively?ASEAN member states have different opinions. Malaysia and Thailand proposedsome proposals like “constructive intervention” and “flexible engagement”.These proposals may have different contents but all insisted that if one memberstate’s actions had a cross-border impact and affected other member states oraffected ASEAN’s diplomatic credibility, ASEAN affected member states orASEAN would be able to offer constructive criticism, concerns and advice to thecountry, which is not, and should not be, considered as “interference” in itsdomestic affairs.

These proposals were clearly inconsistent with and in fact a fundamentalmove away from the principle of non-interference, which elicited debate amongthe ASEAN member states. Indonesia and the new member states opposed theseproposals and insisted on the principle of non-interference. The result of thedebate was a compromise between two sides. The proposals were rejected butthey promised to practice “enhanced interaction” henceforth, which meansASEANcould have more open exchanges on issues with clearly defined cross-bordereffects while respecting the principle of non-interference.

The debate shows that given the short history of national independence andtheir vulnerability as developing or transitional states, ASEAN member statesare still sensitive about their sovereignty and maintain the classical conceptionof sovereignty on the one hand, however, on the other hand, under the conditionsof their increasingly mutual interdependence and the rising of cross-borderproblems, they came to realize that they had to adapt their attitudes towardstraditional absolute sovereignty if they wanted to tackle effectively their commonproblems, to benefit from their cooperation, and to make ASEAN as a credibleand powerful international actor. The practice of “enhanced interaction” did notindicate that ASEAN would follow the European model but indicate thatASEAN would change its operating principles in a gradual and cautious way.

5. ASEAN way beyond Southeast Asia

In comparison with European model, ASEAN way has been under morecriticism and suspicion. ASEAN was criticized by its failure to quickly andeffectively response to the financial crisis in the region in 1997. It was alsocriticized by its reluctance to press some member states’ governments likeMyanmar to respect human rights and rule of law, and to reform its militaryregime. Its ability and role of managing and solving regional problems has beenquestioned. Some external critics even went further to conclude that the ASEANway had failed.29 However, despite these criticisms and contrary to the rashconclusion, the ASEAN way has been and will continue to be the only effectiveway to bring these diverse states together and to achieve unity in this great

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diversity. Moreover, its relevance to the wider region of East Asia or the Asia-Pacific has been acknowledged. In fact, ASEAN way was widely accepted andapplied by theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, SouthKorea), Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), Asia-Pacific EconomicCooperation (APEC) and other regional organizations. This raised theexpectation that ASEAN way could serve as a model for East Asia and evenAsia-Pacific.

East Asia has witnessed the flourishing of regional institutions since the endof the Cold War. The ARF, APEC, and ASEAN+3 are the most importantinstitutions in East Asia and Asia-Pacific region up to now. ARF is the onlymultilateral security framework in the region and brings all the major powersboth within and outside the Asia-Pacific region together. The ARF was formallyproposed by ASEAN and endorsed by its dialogue partners at the Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) in 1993 and began its operation in 1994. Itsobjectives, which were outlined in the first ARF Chairman’s Statement in 1994,are to (a) foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and securityissues of common interest and concern, and to (b) make significant contributionto efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF seeks to build mutual confidence and trust among itsmembers through regular consultations at the ministerial, senior officials andexperts level, and joint activities. It also seeks to develop a capacity to preventconflict through diplomacy.

The ARF is proceeding at a pace comfortable to all participants, which havediverse strategic views, security concerns, interests, capabilities, and expectationsthus making it very difficult to move forward at a fast pace. Its process ischaracterized by informality: it has no collective bureaucratic apparatus, and evenno own secretariat. Its decision-making procedures are based on consensus andits agreements have no legally binding force on its member states. It has noresource and ability to resolve a conflict when it emerges.30 These characteristicsof the ARF are similar to the ASEAN way. In fact, ASEAN as the initiator of theARF has assumed a leading role in the ARF from the beginning and its leadingrole will be continued in the foreseeable future.

ASEAN’s leading role in the ARF makes the Forum operating according tothe ASEAN way and following the ASEAN model. However, this may causesome problems. The ARF is limited to security issues. If there is no consensuson the related security issues among the members, there will be a risk ofstagnation and even rolling-back of the Forum because of its lacking issue-linkages. The fact that it has been unable to make its planned progression fromconfidence-building to preventive diplomacy illustrates this problem. ASEANway of avoiding problems, focusing only on common agreed issues, and shelvingthe divisive issues may be difficult for western members of the ARF to accept.While it is necessary for theARF to follow theASEAN way, it seems inadequatefor ARF to make further progress beyond the area of confidence-building.

Unlike the ARF, the APEC has not been dominated or driven by the ASEAN.But its procedures and operating principles have been shaped by the ASEANway. At the first ministerial gathering in Canberra in November 1994, ASEAN’s


proposals that different levels of economic and political development within theAPEC states should be taken into account, that APEC should be a forum forconstructive discussion, not a mechanism to enforce action by its members, wereaccepted. It was agreed at the meeting that “diversity in levels of economicdevelopment would be taken into account, that decisions would be reached byconsensus, and that emphasis would be placed on an informal, frank exchangeof views.”31 Thus, APEC’s procedures resembledASEAN way. LikeARF, it lacksformal and binding decision-making, and enforcement mechanism.

The APEC has made great progress in its admission of new members, inregional economic and technical cooperation, in business facilitation, and inregional trade liberalization. Moreover, its political significance has considerablyincreased as it offers a useful opportunity for major powers (the United States,Russia, China, and Japan) in the region to meet each other and to address thepolitical and urgent issues. Despite its dynamism and progress, the APEC stillfaces some obstacles in the future development.32 One of the obstacles will beAPEC’s operating principles with emphasis on consensus and non-bindingagreements. Trade liberalization has become the main objective of the APECsince the meeting in Seattle in November 1993. However, trade liberalizationwas not pursued by negotiating a binding agreement like the EC and GATT/WTOdid, but by submitting “Individual Action Plans.”33 Even though IAPs weredesigned to achieve free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacificregion by the year 2010 for developed economies and 2020 for developingeconomies, they were made by members themselves and had no legally bindingeffect, and there were no supervision system to monitoring the implementationof these plans. For this reason, it seems that the target will be not realizedaccording to the schedule. The fact that with only five years left, the developedeconomies have made no substantial efforts to liberalize their trade and investmentillustrates the limitations of theAPEC’s approach to regional economic integration.

Unlike the ARF and APEC which were designed to deal with security andeconomic issues respectively, the ASEAN+3 is a comprehensive mechanismaddressing political, economic and security issues in East Asia. It was establishedin 1997 against the backdrop of financial crisis and economic downturn in EastAsia with the aim of expanding and deepening cooperation between the two sub-regions, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. Since its inception, the ASEAN+3process has taken up various measures to strengthen regional cooperation andintegration.

Like theARF,ASEAN has been the driving force of the process ofASEAN+3,and in fact the ASEAN+3 process was the combination of the existing dialoguemechanisms of ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan, and ASEAN-RoK. In this sense,it was an incomplete multilateral mechanism. From the beginning, theASEAN+3mechanism put more emphasis on strengthening bilateral cooperation betweenASEAN-China,ASEAN-Japan andASEAN-RoK. No surprisingly,ASEAN Leadersand their counterparts from China, Japan and RoK at the inaugural meeting ofASEAN+3 summit issued three Joint Statements (ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan, and ASEAN-RoK Joint Statements) rather than one. They managed toproduce a joint statement on East Asia cooperation at the third ASEAN+3

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Summit in Manila in 1999, in which the leaders expressed their hope to promotedialogue and to deepen and consolidate collective efforts with a view to advancingmutual understanding, trust, good neighborliness and friendly relations, peace,stability and prosperity in East Asia and the world.

As the newest regional cooperation mechanism in East Asia, the ASEAN+3process raised great expectations on East Asian integration. It is expected in the finalreport of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) which was set up to bring togetherexperts from Track-2 to discuss the future of cooperation in East Asia that theASEAN+3 processwill eventually lead to the formation of an EastAsianCommunity.Whether this high expectation is realistic or just rhetoric, it did raise a serious questionof how to promote East Asian integration based on theASEAN+3 process.

There is and will be no easy answer to this complex question, but the above-mentioned European model and ASEAN way can provide some experiences andlessons to the East Asian integration. First, regional integration needs strongpolitical commitments of the states, especially regional big powers’ strong politicalcommitments to regional cooperation. The Franco-German axis has providedstrong dynamics to the European Community/European Union and has served asthe “engine” of the European integration since 1950s. As the largest country in theSoutheast Asia, Indonesia’s strong political commitments to regional cooperationwere crucial for the establishment and the development of the ASEAN. In EastAsia, cooperation between China and Japan and their strong political commitmentsto regional cooperation are pivotal to the development of East Asian integration.

Second, a set of regional institutions should be established and empowered togoverning the regional affairs along with the integration process. From thebeginning of the European integration, a set of well-structured European institutionswas created and endowed with true power of decision and action. The powerfulEuropean institutions have played significant role in promoting Europeanintegration and in safeguarding community interests. Regional integration requiresmember states to respect and promote community interests while pursuing theirnational interest. However, without strong regional institutions with true power, itwill be difficult to guarantee that member states will act like this. While theEuropean model of regional integration with supranational institutions may not suitthe East Asia, its institution-based integration did have profound implications toEast Asian integration. While the ASEAN way with weak institutions may besuitable for the reality of East Asia, the weakness of ASEAN may suggests thatEast Asian integration will face the same problem in the future.

For this reason, the measures proposed by EAVG and selected by the officialEast Asia Study Group (EASG) like the formation of an East Asia Forum, anEast Asia Business Council and a network of East Asian eminent intellectuals,and the evolution of the ASEAN+3 Summit to an East Asian Summit, and otherinstitutional buildings should be given careful consideration. The first East AsiaSummit was held on schedule in December 2005. But according to the Declarationof the first East Asia Summit, the Summit was established not as a formalinstitution to facilitate regional cooperation but as a forum for dialogue on broadstrategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with theaim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia. These


institutional building measures may promote the institutionalization of the EastAsia cooperation process and will lay a solid institutional basis for futuredevelopment of East Asian integration.

Third, while regional integration may need informal ways of cooperation,formal instruments and legally binding commitments are indispensable to thedevelopment of regional integration. European integration has had firm legalfoundations from the beginning. The fundamental treaties like Rome Treaty,Merger Treaty, Single European Act, Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdan Treay, NiceTreaty, and the Constitutional Treaty, together with enormous European law(regulations and directives) have constituted the so-called acquis communautaire.The candidate states must accept the acquis communautaire before they join theEU. The European integration is characterized by the rule of law. By contrast,ASEAN still prefers to cooperation based on informal ways. However, thelimitations of this way has become clear with the deepening of the integrationprocess. The successful experience of European integration and the painful lessonsofASEAN in this aspect should remind East Asian countries to promote regionalintegration through law, rather than just by diplomacy.

6. Conclusion

European integration has not only brought peace, stability, prosperity to theregion, which had been the major battle fields of the two world wars, but alsocreated a supranational political and legal system, which transcended the traditionaltransnational cooperation and has become a model of regional integration.Inspired by the progress of the European integration, Southeast Asian statesestablishedASEAN in 1967 to promote regional integration. Unlike the EuropeanCommunity, ASEAN has developed a quite different way, the so-called ASEANway, to strengthening regional cooperation. Rather than creating a regionalsupranational governance system, the ASEAN regionalism has been limited toinformal consultation and cooperation, and has been characterized by its weakinstitutionalization. These characteristics of the ASEAN way has invoked muchcriticism, however, it seems that ASEAN has achieved the similar progress likethe EC/EU in bringing peace, stability and to a less degree prosperity to theregion. Furthermore, it has become the engine and the model of regional integrationin the wider region beyond Southeast Asia. Europe and Asia have developedquite different forms of regionalism.

From a normative point of view, European Union serves as the model ofregional integration in terms of transcending divergent national interests andgoverning regional affairs effectively. Other regions in the world including EastAsia and Asia-Pacific should emulate the European model rather than followingits own way. However, the contextual factors and the specificity of westernEurope which have shaped the European integration process should not beoverlooked. East Asia is not a region like western Europe with homogenouspolitical and economic system, and common culture and identity, but rather aregion with substantial cultural, political and economic differences, its integrationprocess can not simply follow the European model without considering the

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regional reality. While the ASEAN way has been widely applied in East Asianand Asia-Pacific regional institutions like APEC, ARF, ASEAN+3, its weaknessand limitations as the ASEAN has shown should not be neglected.

How, then, should the East Asian integration be promoted? Is there any thirdway of regionalism between the European model and the ASEAN way? Theanswer may be no, butASEAN+3 as a tentative process of EastAsian integrationcan benefit a lot from the experiences of European Union and theASEAN. It canbenefit from the ASEAN’s experiences in bringing the diverse regional statestogether and in achieving unity in this great diversity. It can also benefit fromASEAN’s experiences in engaging with external powers like the United States,China, Japan and in gaining their support for regional integration. This will beextremely important for East Asian integration because the United States as theextra-regional power have profound strategic, security, political and economicinterest in the region and most of EastAsia countries treat their bilateral relationswith the U.S.A. with a higher priority than relations among themselves. Giventhe United States’ strategic importance, huge influence and military presence inthe region, the East Asian integration can not achieve any substantial progresswithout gaining American full support.

The European experiences in building an effective regional governancesystem based on formal institutions and law can be helpful and useful for theEast Asia countries to design and build their regional institutions. The practicesof the European states in transferring, pooling and sharing their national sovereignty,and the new attitudes towards sovereignty, can remind the East Asian states thatthere exists an alternative way to preserve their sovereignty, and therefore willencourage them to embrace and practice the new ideas of sovereignty.

The comparative study of the European model and theASEAN way highlightsthe different characteristics of the two models, but it also points out the trend ofthe convergence of the two models as the ASEAN has moved towards moreinstitutionalized cooperation since the late 1990s. The two models look like sodifferent, but that doesn’t mean they are mutual exclusive. On the contrary, theymay be mutual complementary. If that is the case, East Asia can be the region tocombine the merits of the twomodels and to experiment a third way of regionalism.

NOTES


1. Caporaso, James A., and Keeler, John T.S. “TheEuropean Union and regional integrationtheory”, in CarolynRhodes and SoniaMazey (eds.),The State of the European Union: Building aEuropean Polity? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner&Company, 1995 pp. 29–62.

2. Keohane, Robert O. and Hoffmann, Stanley,“Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s”,in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann(eds.), The New European Community: Decision-Making and Institutional Change, Boulder,Westview Press, 1991.

3. Haas, Ernst B, “Technology, Pluralism and theNew Europe”, in Stephen R. Graubard (ed.),A New Europe? Boston 1964: Houghton Mifflin.

4. Haas, Ernst B, Beyond the Nation State:Functionalism and International Organization,Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.

5. Hoffmann, Stanley, “Obstinate or Obsolete: TheFate of the Nation-State in Europe”, Daedalus;Milward, Alan S, The European Rescue of theNation-State, London 1992: Routledge; Moravcsik,Andrew, The Choice for Europe: Social Purposeand State Power from Messina to Maastricht,

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Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press,1992, 95(3): pp. 862–915.

6. Moravcsik, Andrew, “Preferences and Powerin the European Community: A LiberalIntergovernmentalist Approach”, Journal ofCommonMarket Studies, 1993, 31(4): pp. 473–524.

7. Peterson, John, “Decision-Making in the EuropeanUnion: towards a framework for analysis”,Journal of European Public Policy,1995, 2(1),pp. 69–93.

8. Idem, p. 84.9. Caporaso, James A. (1998) “Regional integration

theory: Understanding our past and anticipatingour future”, Journal of European Public Policy,1998 5(1): pp. 1–16.

10. Hoffmann, Stanley, “Obstinate or Obsolete: TheFate of the Nation-State in Europe”, Daedalus;Milward, Alan S, The European Rescue of theNation-State, London: Routledge, 1992, 95(3):pp. 862–915.

11. Keohane, Robert O. and Hoffmann, Stanley,“Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s”, inRobert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.),The New European Community: Decision-Makingand Institutional Change, Boulder, WestviewPress, 1991, p. 16.

12. Peterson, John, “Decision-Making in the EuropeanUnion: towards a framework for analysis”,Journal of European Public Policy,1995, 2(1):p. 72.

13. Henderson, Jeannie, ReassessingASEAN,AdelphiPaper 328, Oxford: Oxford University Press forthe IISS, 1999, pp. 16–17.

14. Acharya, Mmitav, “Collective identity and conflictmanagement in Southeast Asia”, in EmanuelAdler and Michael Barnett (eds.), SecurityCommunities, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1998, p. 209.

15. Idem, pp. 210–212.16. Dahl, Arnfinn-Jorgenson, Regional Organisation

and Order in Southeast Asia, London: Macmillan1982;Antolik, Michael, ASEAN and the Diplomacyof Accommodation, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.,1990.

17. Henderson, Jeannie, ReassessingASEAN,AdelphiPaper 328, Oxford: Oxford University Press forthe IISS, 1999, p. 23.

18. Idem, p. 34.19. Wallace, William, “Regionalism in Europe:

Model or Exception?” in Andrew Gamble andAnthory Payne, (eds.), Regionalism and WorldOrder, London: Macmillan, 1996, p. 201.

20. Wallance, Helen, “The Policy Process: AMoving Pendulum”, in Helen Wallace andWilliam Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in theEuropean Union, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2000, pp. 51–52.

21. Idem, pp. 51–52.22. Henderson, Jeannie, ReassessingASEAN,Adelphi

Paper 328, Oxford: Oxford University Press forthe IISS, 1999, p. 34.

23. Acharya, Mmitav, “Collective identity andconflict management in Southeast Asia”, inEmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.),Security Communities, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1998, p. 205.

24. Akrasanee, Narongchai, “Issues in ASEANEconomic Regionalism”, in Karl D. Jackson andM. Hadi Soesastro (eds.), ASEAN Security andEconomic Development, Berkeley: University ofCalifornia, 1984, p. 72.

25. Pemple, T. J, “East Asia: Emerging Webs ofRegional Connectedness”, in Yan Xuetong andZhou Fangyin (eds.), Security Cooperation inEast Asia, Beijing: Beijing University Press,2004, pp. 228–229.

26. Wallance, Helen, “The Policy Process: AMoving Pendulum”, in Helen Wallace andWilliam Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in theEuropean Union, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2000, p. 63.

27. Keohane, Robert O. (2002) “Ironies of Sovereignty:The European Union and the United States”.Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (4), 2002,p. 308.

28. Henderson, Jeannie, ReassessingASEAN,AdelphiPaper 328, Oxford: Oxford University Press forthe IISS, 1999, pp. 48–55.

29. Idem, p. 48.30. Attina, Fulvio and Zhu Guichang, “Security

Culture and the Construction of SecurityPartnerships: the European Union and ChinaCompared”, Mediterranean Journal of HumanRights Vol. 5: 2001, pp. 101–102.

31. Bessho, Kero (1999), Identities and Security inEast Asia, Adelphi Paper 325, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press for the IISS, 1999, p. 65.

32. Foot, Rosemary, “Pacific Asia: The Developmentof Regional Dialogue”, in Andrew Gamble andAnthory Payne, (eds.), Regionalism and WorldOrder, London: Macmillan, 1996 p. 347.

33. Bessho, Kero (1999), Identities and Security inEast Asia, Adelphi Paper 325, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press for the IISS, 1999, p. 66.

HISTORY AND THE POLICY OF RECONCILIATION

LUCIAN JORA

Is it possible to produce new historical narratives, which meet the higheststandards of historical scholarship, while opening new space for discussionamong former protagonists in a conflict? What is the potential for developing ashared history? What methodology should be used? In examining the variousmyths that have developed over time, which case studies could have the greatestpotential for success? What role does history play in political reconciliation, andwhat role can historians play in public debates about the past? What can theycontribute to the search for state and institutional accountability for historicalinjustices? What might these narratives look like, how could they be publicized,and how large a spectrum of viewpoints could these narratives span, while excludingversions generally judged to be denial or the incitement of xenophobia?1

A major methodological challenge is the integration of two kinds of history,one based on traditional ways of reconstructing events and one based onmemory and narratives. It was agreed that the key to a successful project wouldrequire the bridging of serious historical research with contemporary publicdialogue. In order for a project to succeed, several underlying principles need tobe recognized. 1) Empirical evidence is important to the legitimacy of the project;2) The recognition of facts by both parties is vital; 3) It is important to carve outan original niche for the project and not to replicate current or past efforts by thehistorical community; 4) A joint narrative that does not deny the legitimacy ofthe other is important in the process.2 However as far as the second point isconcerned we may agree that is important not to replicate previous work butwhat about several situation in which this work in whether unknown whetherunused? Furthermore, historians have little choice in the focusing on victim-hood and the burden of the past, because this is what is provided by contemporarypublic discourse. This is connected to the general caution concerned the possibilitythat a project might create a narrative of mutual productive interaction thatwould overshadow the conflict in history. While falsely harmonious narrativescan be dangerous, the possibility of reconciliation is built on acknowledgementof both conflict and coexistence.3

Traditional history is now felt to be insufficient as a mean to understand theevents of a certain period; memory and trauma have a special relationship. Thekey moments are events in which time is compressed: they draw the prehistory


of the key events, particularly the nineteenth century and the interwar period,into their narrative, and, as all foundational events do, it projects into the futureas well. If we take an example of an extreme sensitive subject from the contemporaryPolish-Jewish history, a key historical misunderstanding lies in the fact that theJews focus exclusively on the Holocaust and see it as separate from World WarII, while for the Poles, conversely, the key event isWorldWar II, with the Holocaust,at least until very recently, being largely unknown among the general populaceand largely ignored by scholars.4

Another recent Central European example coming in our mind came from thecontext of Czech-German, or Romanian-Hungarian relations, places where historyis clearly not a stale science. History is a living entity, which, far from remainingbehind the ivied walls of academia, pervades all aspects of Central Europeanculture and politics. This does not discount the importance of historical researchof many historians in the region, but merely points out once more the fact thatthe choice of research topics and the emphasis of conclusions do not escape thecontext of the age in which they are written. Each era, each group, each historianis moved to present history in a certain way. At times, a climate of fear movedhistorians to present their findings in totalitarian regime-approved manner.Furthermore like anywhere else, what happened in the past is not as importantfor today as what people believe has happened. The question then becomes“Who does the reminding?” Quite clearly that role is filled by intellectuals andthe ruling elites.5

Recent Representative Projects

The Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs and Elazar Barkan,of Claremont Graduate University, initiated the IHI (International History Initiative)in 2001. The first meeting with the support of an advisors group of distinguishedhistorians took place on February 15–16, 2002, at the Pocantico ConferenceCenter of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The goal of the project was to addresshistorical issues of a disputed past in order to transform historical disputes froma cause of further or renewed conflict into a tool in long-term reconciliation andpeace-building.6

IHI brings together historians and other scholars from opposing sides ofhistorical conflicts to jointly research and discuss difficult parts of their commonhistories. In attempting to bring long-term historical perspectives to bear inredressing contemporary conflicts, we expect to encounter thematic and practicalchallenges. We recognize that the complex nature of history means that eachconflict is unique in many respects. Yet, we expect that comparative work wouldenable IHI to articulate several key areas of inquiry regarding those aspects ofconflicts and post-conflict transition that are shared. These could include: therole of mediators and outsiders in bridging historical narratives; types of conflictsmost likely to benefit from this tool, and at which stage(s); an investigation ofthe related roles of historians and truth commissions, as well as their differences;and the challenge of how best to disseminate the resulting collaboratively produced

126 LUCIAN JORA 2

historical narratives to the public, in order to promote deliberation for furtherpolitical and social reconciliation.7 IHI proposes to bring together groups foreach case study that would determine as a fundamental part of their mandate anagenda of critical issues for each case, as well as the methodology with which toaddress it. The flexibility to reframe a debate will provide new opportunities toaddress old conflicts from a fresh perspective. External initiatives are necessaryto commence the process for the many conflicts where political actors lack thewill or the interest to facilitate such a historical inquiry, and to rigorously assessits potential.8

A note on terminology

As a project with global agenda and aspirations, the intercultural difficultiesof presenting these concepts, not all of which can be translated in a neutral,value-free form, create added difficulties. Finding the right terminology for eachcase study is one challenge the project is addressing. Elzam Brakan thinks thatthree terms are especially problematical: reconciliation a concept seen by manyto be primarily informed by Christian principles, is a case in point.9 Commissionis another that carries negative connotations in some cultures. Finally “negotiated”history does not mean bartering truth for evidence, nor treating all claims as valid.Rather, “negotiated” means taking account of the other’s narrative and attemptingto incorporate it into one’s own; joint research and discussions delegitimizepatently false claims, and narrow the gap between the interlocutors.10 The outcomeof successful negotiated history is both the respect shown to the defendablenarratives of both sides of a conflict, and, as importantly, the process itself,which underscores the willingness of the current generation to overcome theburden of historical conflict. The convening of historical commissions as anattempt to clarify contentious historical issues that undermine the developmentof peaceful, cooperative relations between groups or states is not new. IHIcontribution lies in several areas:

First of all, historical commissions as tools for transition and reconciliationhave received relatively little attention compared to such projects as truthcommissions, trials, lustration and the opening of secret police files. IHI as avehicle for convening historical commissions is an attempt to contribute to ourcollective knowledge of how such commissions work and when they workbest.11 Unlike earlier commissions, which were convened by governments asofficial, bilateral bodies, the commissions as envisioned by IHI are unique inbeing convened by civil society actors and in being multilateral. The commissionswill bring transnational approaches to history to bear on questions of contestedhistories. Civil society involvement can lower the political stakes and enablegreater openness of historical investigations, including in cases where governmentsare not willing or able to do so.12

Drawing on the observation that historians, together with lawyers, are increasinglybeing drawn into debates about the past and questions of justice and reconciliationwithout having the tradition of involvement in policy debates that lawyers do,

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IHI search for the most effective way to involve historians in this public arenawithout compromising their scholar integrity.13 We have to admit this is a verychallenging task, often opposed by the historians themselves, a few are motivatedby academic criteria but for most we suppose the simple commodity. This mayenlarge the circle of actors whose expertise can be utilized in the search for newtools to promote long-term peace and civic engagement. Finally, the record ofpublicizing the findings of historical commissions to date is mixed. Manyhistorical commissions remain virtually unknown to the greater public, while theresults of some, such as the Czech-German, or the Romanian-Hungarian HistoricalCommissions have been publicized through creative work with history educators.One of IHI like organizations top priorities is to ensure that the findings ofsuccessful historical commissions are disseminated beyond the narrow range ofelite actors initially involved in political normalization efforts to engage abroader array of citizens, including the university, secondary school teachers andstudents, and the media.14

Anticipated Outcomes/Products

Throughout the Central and Eastern Europe and many other parts of theworld, history has often been (and still is) an instrument of political purposes beingshaped according to perceived national needs. This is reflected through historybooks, which are used in schools in those countries at all levels. It goes withoutsaying that this kind of teaching material often strengthens the national prejudicesabout neighbouring countries and the concept of our enemies.

The first outcome of the projects would be the successful convening of all theplanned historians meetings for a given case study and the issuing of a jointreport. This will indicate the furtherance of conversations or deliberations whichhave not taken place before and which were at the very least fraught with difficultyat the outset. This construction of a public space, which did not exist before,could facilitate and instigate further work by others who are not directly a partof the project.

A second challenge is the public dissemination of the results of the commissionaccording with the initial plans. Material based on the initial scholarly report haveto be published both in print format and on a website which would be broadlyadvertised to scholars, policy makers, the media, educators and others. It wascrucial to involve select media, non-governmental organizations and educators inthe promotion of discussions and deliberation about the results of the commissions.These can help to create activities that ensure the findings reach those outside thenarrow range the political elite usually involved in political reconciliation, therebycreating a broader process, not limited to diplomats, government leaders and theacademy. Religious institutions, leaders and educators would be essential to thiseffort, as religious institutions have grass-roots, locally based constituencies thatcan be mobilized. NGOs that could be partners in these efforts would be educationalones like Germany’s George Eckert Institute, which focuses on the revision ofhistory and social science textbooks and collaboration with international textbook

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commissions, and the U.S.-based Facing History and Ourselves and Teaching forTolerance, both of which use challenging material about traumatic pasts to promotemoral deliberation among secondary school students.15

A third outcome would be the development of training programs: manyconflicts which could benefit from the creation of a historical commission takeplace in countries where historians do not have adequate access to writtenarchives or data-basing capability. Indeed, many conflicts are so recent that theskills needed would be in the taking of oral histories more than archivalresearch; and in some places there are very few formally trained historians. Thedevelopment of training methods and resources would be a valuable contributionto the capacity of societies in which there is a widely recognized need for greatertransparency and knowledge about past human rights abuses, but currentlyinsufficient skills and resources to undertake such historical inquiries.16

Another recent project has been developed by the Centre for Democracy andReconciliation in South-Eastern Europe (CDRSEE). This project on the lastyears tried to offer a solution to the highly debated problem concerning Historyteaching among former enemies in an attempt to set up an agenda for grass rootsreconciliation from one side and a closer to the historical truth version of History,from the other side.17 In cooperation with teachers and educational experts from allSouth-Eastern European countries, the Thessalonica based center produced fourHistory Teaching Books, which train the critical view on one’s own history andteaches what the other side considers as the truth.18

During teacher training workshops organized by the Center for Democracyand Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, December 2000 to February 2002, somehistory teachers from several different Southeast European countries asked formaterials that they could use in their lessons apart from the standard textbook.According to the organizers this project is a response to their demand and aremedy to the lack of good textbooks in some countries. However we are meantto ask how representative are those history teachers for this professional branchin their own countries. The debate as we have noticed had involved not necessaryhistory teachers but university academics and the kind of approach as proposed bythe participants according with our own experience has not been very popularamong old school history teachers. Yet the most difficult aspect to render in printand capture in a book is the experience of communication. Getting to know theother was as important as the scientific discourse recorded in this book. It wasdemonstrated again that in this field the dynamic of human contact is morepowerful than scientific findings, and changes in the teaching of history willcome from motivated individuals rather than impersonal institutions.

The Workbooks project consists of developing alternative teaching materialsfor history teachers at the primary and secondary school level in SoutheastEuropean countries. The four workbooks have the following four themes: TheOttoman Empire (assessed at a workshop in Istanbul, July 2003); Nations andStates in Southeast Europe (assessed in Bucharest, November 2003); The BalkanWars (assessed in Cyprus, February 2003); The Second World War (assessed inZagreb, September 2003).


A team of coordinators has been working on this project, planning andimplementing, since the beginning of 2002. The coordinators are also the editorsof the workbooks.19 One or two contributors from each of the eleven countriescollected the materials – pictures, diplomatic texts, treaties, memoirs, literature,testimonies, newspapers — for the each topic. The sources are documents ondifferent aspects of each historical topic presented from different nationalperspectives, thus providing by definition multi-perspectivity via a comparativeapproach.20 The workbooks are meant to be used by secondary and primaryschool teachers. 15 000 history teachers are meant to receive the workbooks intheir own language. 3000 copies of the English version are suppose to be distributedto the above listed target groups. The workbooks would also be useful foruniversity courses such as sociology, education, history, Balkan studies, Europeanstudies, Political science, policy studies, etc.21

In the last decade, the concept of a new approach towards history emerged asacounterweight to new aggressive and defensive nationalisms. The con-sequentidea to promote a common history of the region was also launched in politicaland intellectual environments. However, this new history should not be a newconstruction, which would replace the national histories. It would rather be anew interpretation of the national pasts based on a common cultural and institutionalheritage. And it implies the introduction in history teaching of supra-nationalelements as a counterweight to ethnocentric or even nationalistic historicalnarratives.22 In Communist countries before 1989 the prevailing combinationwas one of a Marxian analysis of the overall historical development with theemphasis on political and military history, and national themes.23 The collapseof communism in the region took with it the Marxist historiography, which haddetermined for decades the accounts and interpretations of the past. Yet thisofficial historiography produced by state institutions (universities and researchinstitutes) and taught in the schools as the dominant scientific discourse was notalways in line with social memory and the perception of the past as they werecommunicated through the family.Written and oral history would often encounterand contradict each other. The existence of parallel narratives meant that thechange of the dominant narrative did not take place in vacuum or without strongresistance. So the old official history gave way (in some places) to a new history.The divisive historical discourse propounded by antagonistic nationalisms,usually in pairs, certainly does not promote a supranational history. Memory alsoplays a divisive role in a region of wars and uprooting. Peter Burke claims thathistory is forgotten by the victors but not by the vanquished, citing the exampleof the English structural amnesia and the Irish hypertrophied memory. He alsoobserves that uprooted peoples, such as the Polish, seem obsessed wirth theirpast (we would add here the Armenians).24

The Central and Southeastern Europe is inhabited by vanquished and uprootedpeople. This is reflected in the national historiography of all states on the regionand confirmed by the weighty shadow of History on the public life of thosesocieties.Yet the duty of remembering, in the way it is defined, is not entirely honest.Memory selective, by definition is accompanied by the parallel process ofoblivion, which often assumes the form of an official censorship of embarrassing

130 LUCIAN JORA 6

memories. It is what Paul Connerton calls organized oblivion.25 Censorship is afeature of both individual and collective memory (in the way individuals composetheir autobiography, or in cases of deliberate, unofficial suppression, such asGermany after WWII and France after Vichy). In such cases social memory doesnot repudiate the official history; on the contrary, their silences complement eachother and society learns to remember its past in a particular way. The fact thatthe Turk is the favorite enemy of Balkan peoples is neither new nor unexpected.The Balkan nationalisms which led to the formation of national states in theregion were developed against the crumbling Ottoman empire and in oppositionto everything the Turks stood for in the Western mind. The Ottoman Empire,associated with the Orient and all its negative connotations, constituted a negativeexample and was held to be the main cause for the backwardness of the otherBalkan peoples.26 Although the Turks remained in the Balkans for half amillennium, they were always considered as outsiders and their presence wasseen as temporary.27 This view, although the dominant one has its opposite. Ahistoriographical trend of Turkish origin claims that the Ottoman Empire was agolden age for the Balkans a heaven of religious tolerance and harmoniouscoexistence of the peoples. According to this view, the emergence of Balkannationalisms was a sign of ingratitude towards the Ottomans, which destroyedthe conditions of order and peace in the region and triggered a period of disorderand war. In fact, this reversionary historiography of the Ottoman period has fedin part the new trends for a shared Balkan history, which would attempt topromote the uniting elements of Balkan peoples as the heritage of a commonpast. In such a history the Ottoman Empire would have to have if not a leadingat least an important role and of course this would not be accepted only by thosewho idealise the Balkan experience of the Ottomans. Indeed, although notconsidered a Balkan people the Turks are the main sine qua non of the Balkan-ness.28 The Balkan peoples may have rejected their Ottoman heritage in thecontext of their Western orientation, but they carry this heritage in their everydaylife. In fact, in many aspects such as cuisine this heritage has been assimilatedso fully as to be perceived and projected as a special national feature. Sharedexperiences are thus felt to be exclusive, and the multiple is perceived as unique.This we does not include others and does not share anything.29

So how could one go about writing a common regional history? Is there animagined Balkan community to which this history would relate? If not, is thereone being formed now? If yes to which extend? Can it be instrumentalised andto what end? Who will determine the content of this new common history? Andhow can it be incorporated in an educational strategy which would help decodeand understand the south east European world of today? Skepticism about thefeasibility of û and the need for a supranational history has been expressedalready in the case of a common European history, based on the efforts made sofar.30 Doubts are summarized by Koulouri summarized in the following questions:Can we really speak of continuity in European history? Would the writing of thishistory be based on the model of national histories? Might it be that we arewitnessing a process of constructing Europe in the same way national stateswere formed? Similarly, in the case of the Balkans, the writing of one history


would require that each ethno-cultural community in the region acknowledge aminimum proportion of Balkanness as element of its identity, and also that thereis both temporal and spatial continuity. Given that identity normally involves someterritoriality, a definition of the Balkan territory is as important as the compilationof a Balkan history. The new holistic perception of Balkan history cannot butcorrespond to a new holistic perception of Balkan territory: to the acceptance ofthe relative and fluid character of frontiers and a description of the territorialstructure in new terms. Yet in a region of constantly changing borderlines suchan aspiration would seem at least utopian at this time.31

If we were to use the concept of cultural borders in writing the history, weshould accept a priori that cultural borders are never closed or impermeable.This means that the geographical area where a culture is established may befixed, but it is not sealed. In this way we can under-stand the endless interactionand mutual penetration among the different national/cultural entities which leadto new patterns. A shared history presupposes spatial continuity a culturalcontinuum û but also, more importantly, temporal continuity. Of course, thesehistorical experiences were neither exclusively nor evenly distributed throughouta particular region. Even the communist period, for all its denigration by thepost-communist Balkan societies, is still a shared historical experience whosevestiges are visible to an external observer. The Ottoman dominance, The Ortodoxy,the Communism. But then we may ask. What kind of Ottoman dominance orwhat kind of Communism the one experienced by Albania, the one experiencedby Yugoslavia, or the Romanian one? These common historical pasts should beperceived as fields of cultural exchange and interaction rather than one-wayinfluence of the dominant national/cultural group in each case. The highestbarrier for a shared history is to accept as equal the various cultural contributionsand relativise the uniqueness of the nation.32Within Central and Eastern Europeeach nation sees itself as unique, incomparable and superior, and employs historyto prove it. Yet supremacy has no history, it is a-historical for its entire disguiseas historical. Qualifying uniqueness means making cross-cultural comparisonsto highlight the common, unifying elements. In this respect, too, the trend isdifferent: neighbouring nations vie for the exclusive use of national symbols andfigures which are seen as essential to their own identity.33

Despite widespread skepticism as to the feasibility of a shared regionalhistory for the Central and Eastern European nations, there is an increasing numberof those who believe in the expediency of a unifying teaching to promote acommon historical consciousness, mutual understanding and tolerance. Thesolution is thus seen in the context of a new educational approach rather than anovel method of historiography.

The role of education

The basic idea is that a change in the teaching methods of history may havea long-term effect on the way neighbouring peoples see one another. Specifically,E. Kofos suggests that: An improvement of school textbooks may function as along duration Confidence Building Measure a tool for reconciliation.34 An

132 LUCIAN JORA 8

assertion easy to make however difficult to apply outside the Academia. CristinaKoulouri considers: It is true that totalitarian and authoritarian regimes haveattempted to control the education of the young, hence also schoolbooks; but itis also true that much more than effective means of propaganda and consciencemanipulation, schoolbooks are a mirror of the society that produces them. Theyrarely contain stereotypes and values unacceptable to society. Therefore theircontent may be a good guide as to a societs values; history books, in particular,may reflect the image a human society has of its past and, indirectly, the way itimagines its future. This reasoning has been the basis for the recent spate ofresearch projects and publications. The underlying assumption behind thisactivity is that there is some connection more or less direct between the contentof textbooks and the escalation of nationalism, whose extreme manifestation isarmed conflict.35 Of course, already in the 1920s and 1930s schoolbooks hadbeen judged and largely found guilty of the wars in the 20 th century.36 It wasdeemed necessary to revise them to eradicate negative stereotypes and prejudiceagainst other peoples, and many efforts were made to this end in Europe (e.g.,between France and Germany, Germany and Poland, etc.). The results are visibleinWestern European books, although ethnocentrism often seems hard to overcome.Nevertheless, schoolbooks cannot be treated as a uniform set. As in all similarcases, we can discern both common traits and deviations. Thus, althoughethnocentrism appears prominent in the historical narrative it does not alwaysassume the form of nationalism. Historical methods also differ as each countryhas its own tradition of history and historiography. Essentially, however, schoolbooksmerely reflect the prevalent ideology not necessarily the official one as it isdiffused through the media, the family and other social institutions. If a cold waris currently going on among text is because there are strong feelings in societythat also nurture another cold war among the media, which reflect and shapementalities as much as the school.37 Therefore the responsibility of historians isa political one. Historical discourse cannot be used to justify past or presentregimes; it must develop critical spirits and free citizens.38

Critical thinking acquired through learning history is, after all, the future citizensonly protection against distortions, simplification and manipulation. This criticalhistorical discourse is by definition ironic, since irony is inherently self-critical,inherently dialectic, and promotes self-knowledge by liberating us from ourillusions.39

So if history is rewritten, it cannot feign ignorance or innocence. Besides, thepolitical developments in the Balkans and the revision of the past coincide withinternational developments in historiography: the re-evaluation of historical canonsand grand-narratives, the questioning of objective historical knowledge, theemphasis on the subjective, the particular and the personal, the examinationof the margins and the discovery of history obscure protagonists. The neweducational approach to history is summarized in the application of acomparative, multiperspective method, the focus on economic, social andcultural history and the development of students analytical and interpretativeskills to enable them to evaluate the information they receive.40


Comparative history aims to acquaint students with both differences andsimilarities and abolish the dogmatic teaching of the objective history of the oneand only truth. The move away from political and military history towardseconomic, social and cultural history is meant to teach historical experienceswhich are more familiar and interesting to children and de emphasize war as anelement of historical evolution, especially in terms of the relations with neighbouringstates. It also aims at teaching conflicts from a new perspective, in terms of bothcontent and method. Finally, the development of critical thinking is the mainpurpose of historical teaching, so that future citizens will be immune to attemptsto manipulate them.41 The ultimate goal of this concept of writing and teachinghistory is to promote mutual tolerance and understanding. Yet which kind ofhistory would promote tolerance? A history that emphasizes similarities in theabstract, or one which does not conceal the differences? We usually think thattolerance towards the Other, the different, must come from the acknowledgementof our similarities.42 Sylviane Agacinski, however, puts forward a differentview: The first chapter, Common Past, Shared History, refers to these commonpasts which can form the basis of a shared history.43 It includes papers deliveredin three workshops, namely workshop I on Hungarian legacy in SoutheasternEurope; workshop V titled The Balkan empires: common heritage, differentHeirs, part of which was workshop V Greeks and Turks: the Janus of a commonhistory; and workshop VI titled Yugoslavia: A Look in the Broken Mirror. Whois the other? Yasemin Soysal and Lilian Antoniou demonstrate this dipole asregards the definition of national evolution by Greeks and Turks, respectively.They examine the textbooks of lower secondary schools in Britain, Greece andTurkey to show that Turkish identity is a state identity with the main focus onnational territory, while Greek identity is a cultural identity with the main focuson national time. The two national histories relation to Europe is equallydifferent: Greece inside but outside, Turkey outside but inside.44 The irresoluteEuropean character of the Byzantium and the Ottoman Empires clear identificationwith the Orient is also reflected in British school-books which represent theviewpoint of an external observer Western Europe as to the history of the easternpart of the continent.

Similar circumstances are found in Romania. In her study of Romanianschoolbooks Codruþa Matei finds that the Byzantine heritage, being identifiedwith Orthodoxy, is seen as very important to Romanian history while the Ottomanempire is presented as an extraneous element, although it is a major factor innational history.45 The textbooks place particular emphasis on the Romanianprincipalities relations with the Ottoman Empire, especially on the specialadministrative status of the principalities and Romanian resistance against theOttomans.46 Matei also reports the classroom experience of her pupils as to theirpicture of the Ottoman Empire, and discovers stereotypes which are not foundeither in the books or in the teaching. In the area of Byzantine and Ottomanstudies each country follows its own tradition of historiography, which is notdictated by purely scientific criteria but is usually connected with politicalconditions.47 In the case of Romania, Bogdan Murgescu explains that the growth

134 LUCIAN JORA 10

of Byzantine and Ottoman studies in the 1960s and 1970s after the traditioncreated by N. Iorga and later by Mihai Maxim functioned as an escape from thattimes heavily politicised history. However, he points out that today there isconsiderably less interest as young people are not particularly attracted by anacademic career, especially in fields which in their eyes do not seem to producesocially significant knowledge.48 The Hungarian heritage appears to be lessimportant for Balkan schoolbooks. As Mirela-Luminiþa Murgescu explains, theworld history taught in SE European countries is clearly Western-oriented andthe history of SE Europe is presented through bipartite relations with neighbouringcountries rather than a unified whole.49 As one would expect, because of thesevery bilateral historical relations the Hungarians figure much more in Romanian,Serbian, Croatian or even Slovenian textbooks than other peoples of SEEurope.50 Of course, Hungary appears under the prism of each national history,and Hungarians figure in schoolbooks only in as much as they come into contactwith the authors own nation.51

The ideas presented above are very generous. Remain to be seen to whichextent those ideas and initiatives will find the way from the ivory tower ofAcademia and enjoyable round tables to the reality on the field. The seminarsmost visible result was four alterative History school books. Although availableon line for free (http://www.see-jhp.org/hw_alternative.html”; http://www.see-jhp.org/hw_alternative.html) according with our knowledge at least in Romaniathey are almost unknown. The school books were preceded by a number ofinformal meetings and two series of (http://www.see-jhp.org/project_phase2.html) seven workshops for teacher trainers to examine alternative methods ofteaching history, particularly controversial historical events, completed inFebruary 2002.52 So far we were unable to find information regarding the degreeNational Ministries of Education from various target countries succeeded totransform the initiatives into state policies, or whether or not the four schoolbooksare officially accepted as legitimate alternative teaching materials in the schools.The next step would be to find how many teachers effectively use thosematerials and with what kind of results.

NOTES


1. www.salzburgdialogues.net2. Idem.3. Dr. Elazar Barkan http://www.salzburgseminar.

org/ihjr/index.cfm?Status=Projects&FullAbstract=1&IDEvent=807

4. Dr. Elazar Barkan www.salzburgseminar.org/mediafiles/MEDIA11750.PDF

5. Andrew Stroehlein, Czechs and the Czech-German Declaration: History to Approach aNew of Failure The Thesis submitted in partialrequirement for the degree of Master ofPhilosophy at the Institute of Russian and EastEuropean Studies, University of Glasgow,

September 1997, http://www.blisty.cz/files/isarc/9709/19970917c.html.

6. Barkan & Cole www.cceia.org/media/IHIdescription.pdf.

7. Ibid.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.10. Ibid.11. This will be supplemented by an initial scholarly

study of past historical commissions and theirachievements conducted by IHI co-director ElazarBarkan with funding from the United StatesInstitute of Peace.

136 LUCIAN JORA 12

12. Barkan & Cole, International History InitiativeIHI The Historical Commissions Project Of theCarnegie Council on Ethics and InternationalAffairs , ht tp: / /www.cceia.org/media/IHIdescription. pdf, p. 2.

13. Ibid.14. IHI is currently exploring the feasibility of various

case studies, with the intent of focusing on themost promising ones. These include: An EastCentral Europe case, beginning with Polish-Jewish history; a Pacific Asian case focusing onconsiderations of Japan colonial history as anessential backdrop to the events of World War II;the first study within this case is be Korea-Japan;Zimbabwe: the legacy of violence within theliberation movement as a source of contemporaryconflict; Cyprus, potentially in conjunction withthe evolving political discussions, which mightyield results in a relatively short time; a Turkish-Armenian investigation; an Indonesian-EastTimor case.

15. www.cceia.org/media/IHIdescription.pdf16. The Project Directors are: Elazar Barkan, who is

Professor of History and Cultural Studies atClaremont Graduate University and the author ofThe Guilt of Nations: Restitution and NegotiatingHistorical Injustices (Norton, 2000) and theeditor of a multi-authored volume on the role ofapology in political reconciliation (forthcoming).Lili Cole is Senior ProgramOfficer at the CarnegieCouncil on Ethics and International Affairs, aNew York-based 501C-3 public research andeducation institution, where she directs theHistory and the Politics of Reconciliation Program.She is the co-editor, with Peter Danchin, ofProtecting the Human Rights of ReligiousMinorities in Eastern Europe (Columbia, 2002).

17. In our view Historical Truth is understood as aversion of History attempting to present it as acomplexity from as many points of view aspossible, closer to the concept of Total History astheorized by the French Ecolle des Annaless.

18. This project is generously supported by http://www.usaid.gov/The United States Agency forInternational Development (USAID) and the:http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/index_html and the German Ministry of ForeignAffairs.

19. Dr. Christina Koulouri is the General Coordinatorof this project, is the General Editor of all four ofthe workbooks, and is the Chair of the CDRSEE’sHistory Education Committee. She has coordinatedthe History Education Committee’s work since itwas founded in 1998, including 7 textbookworkshops, 7 teacher training workshops, 4assessment workshops of the Workbooks, and isthe Editor of the two publications produced bythe HEC so far. Dr. Halil Berktay of SabanciUniversity in Istanbul, and Dr. Bogdan Murgescuof the University of Bucharest are co-editors of

the teaching pack on the Ottoman Empire. Dr.Mirela Luminita Murgescu of the University ofBucharest is the editor of the pack on theCreation of Nations and States; According withthe organizers, in Bucharest, Mirela and BogdanMurgescu have a team of graduate students inthe department of history who are ready to beginthe Romanian Communication Committee. Theyare in touch with a network of history teachersacross the country.

20. The contributors were in constant communicationwith the coordinators regarding the materials thatthey were gathering and sending; they also metwith each other on two occasions. The firstmeeting was early in the project, in November2002 in Belgrade, for the coordinators to discusswith the contributors their role and responsibilities,and the aim of the project. The second meetingwas towards the end of the creation phase of theworkbooks. Any omissions in first drafts wereidentified, and the contributors were able to seethe complete result of their work. After thatworkshop, the contributors submitted the finalmaterials that were needed for all fourworkbooks.

21. http:/ /www.cdsee.org/teaching_modern_sehistory.html.

22. Dr. Christina Koulouri, New Challenges for theStudy of Modern Greek History, www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposiumPapersonline/LSE-published%20paper.pdf, p. 2.

23. Dr. Christina Koulouri, New Challenges for theStudy of Modern Greek History, www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposiumPapersonline/LSE-published%20paper.pdf, p. 2.

24. www.cdse.org/teaching_modern_sehistory.html.25. P. Burke, Varieties of Cutural History, Cambridge:

Polity Press, 1997, pp. 53–54, quoted by Koulouriin Clio in the Balkans, p. 10, available on line:http://www.cdse.org/teaching.

26. www.cdse.org/teaching_modern_sehistory.html.27. P. Connerton, How societies remember, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1989, quoted byKoulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 10, http://www.cdse.org/teaching.

28. www.cdse.org/teaching§_modern_sehistory.html.

29. Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 13, http://www.cdse.org/teaching


31. Cf. Elli Skopetea, Turks and the Balkans, quotedby, Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 13,http://www.cdse.org/teaching.

32. www.cdse.org/teaching_modern_sehistory.html.33. Ibid.34. Evangelos Kofos, Long Duration CBMs in the

Balkans: Re-assessment of the Role of Historyand Geography School Textbooks, in Cultureand Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe


(International Conference, Thessaloniki, Greece,June 26–29, 1997), Association for Democracyin the Balkans, Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, pp. 85–97.

35. Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 20, availableon line:http://www.cdse.org/teaching.

36. Hayden White, Interview. The Ironic Poetics oflate Modernity, Historien 2 (2000), pp. 191–193.

37. Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 14, http://www.cdse.org/teaching.


39. F. Braudel, Grammaire des civilisations, quotedby Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 16, http://www.cdse.org/teaching.

40. www.cdse.org/teaching§_modern_sehistory.html.41. R. Stradling, Teaching 20th-century European

history, Council of Europe, 2001, p. 88.42. Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 15, available

on line:http://www.cdse.org/teaching.

43. Ibid.44. Koulouri in Clio in the Balkans, p. 20, available

on line www.cdse.org/teaching_modern_sehistory.html.

45. Ibid.46. Ibid.47. Ibid.48. Ibid.49. Ibid.50. Ibid.51. Idem, p. 22.52. The findings from the analysis of Balkan

textbooks in the workshops organized by theHistory Education Committee of the CDRSEEwere first summarized in Teaching the Historyof Southeastern Europe, Thessaloniki 2001;pp. 22–23.

L’ÉNERGIE (RUSSE), L’EUROPE ET LES PERSPECTIVES

ANA BAZAC

Le mois de janvier 2006 a mis l’Europe devant le choque de l’énergie et dela dépendance:

1. Tout d’abord la croissance du prix du gaz. L’Europe a négocié avec la Russiel’année dernière dans le contexte international du haussement des prix et spécialementdu prix des hydrocarbures. Mais la Russie a demandé à l’Ukraine aussi quecette-ci se soumette aux règles du marché. L’Ukraine a refusé et le premierjanvier la Russie a coupé le gaz.

L’augmentation du prix du gaz russe pour l’Ukraine n’a pas seulement descauses politiques (liées à la volonté de la classe politique ukrainienne au pouvoirde refuser l’alliance avec la Russie et de devenir le supporter des Etats-Unis)mais, et premièrement, des causes économiques. Le haussement des prix s’estinscrit et est inscrit dans la logique de l’époque. Les détenteurs de richessesnaturelles et surtout d’énergie doivent profiter au maximum de l’intervalle danslequel le développement se déroule dans le vieux cadre. Ce cadre se structure pardes relations de production, capitalistes, mais aussi par la technique dominanteaujourd’hui. Pas seulement la Russie suive de profiter au maximum de l’intervallequand la croissance économique se base encore sur la technique liée aux sourcesconventionnelles d’énergie. Et en maintenant une position économique déterminanteon peut presser avec plus de succès pour une position politique confortable.

Mais, pour continuer à lier l’économique au politique, ce n’est pas l’OMC(Organisation Mondiale du Commerce) qui a recommandé l’abolition des prixfavorisants? De ce point de vue, l’OMC pourrait presser la Russie d’augmenterle prix pour le Belarus aussi; et la seule réponse serait alors l’intégration Russie-Belarus dans une structure étatique unique (fédérative).

Mais même si l’OMC a recommandé l’augmentation graduelle des prix aucelui du marché, l’alignement de tous les prix au celui du marché ne serait-il unemesure perverse? C’est-à-dire si le Turkménistan et l’Uzbekistan hausserontaussi le prix de leur gaz — on sait que la compagnie RosUcrEnergo, formée deGazprom et la filiale suisse de Reifeissen Bank et intermédiaire dans l’affaire, aréussi aplaner le conflit seulement en achetant du gaz bien plus bon marché deces deux pays et de Kazahstan — ne serait cette mesure un précédent pour tousles détenteurs de matières premières du monde et en même temps la cause de ladestruction du présent ordre économique mondial? L’accord à peine signé le


4 janvier 2006 entre la Russie et l’Ukraine durera-t-il les cinq années préconisées?Et cette mesure n’augmenterait-elle le prix payé par les pays européens pour letransit du gaz en Ukraine?

2. Le mi-janvier un atroce froid de loup1 a déterminé la baisse dansl’approvisionnement au gaz des pays européens. De son coté l’Ukraine, qui aprofité en utilisant sa propriété sur les gazolines (sur le transit) pour voler du gaz,a voulu ameuter l’Europe contre la Russie tout en réclamant l’augmentation duprix du transit (payé bien sur par tous les bénéficiaires).

3.Même si la Georgie et l’Arménie ne sont pas dans l’Europe, on doit remémoreraussi la demande de la Russie envers ces deux pays de payer pour le gaz un prixplus proche au prix du marché.

Avant d’aller plus loin on doit mentionner que l’augmentation des prix del’énergie dans tous ces pays entraînera des pressions sociales, des émeutes canalisées,comme auparavant dans la guerre civile algérienne de 19872 jusqu’à la fin desannées 90, vers des tendances non démocratiques.

4. En juin 2006, le Turkménistan a annoncé Gazprom qu’il va hausser le prixde transit, et ainsi Gazprom a averti à son tour les pays de la Communauté desÉtats Indépendants qu’ils auront payé le gaz russe «au prix européen». En cecontexte, l’éventuelle décision de l’Ukraine de dénoncer l’accord avec Gazpromgénérerait une nouvelle crise du gaz3.

Ainsi deux problèmes, intersectés et pas neufs évidemment mais qui ontmontré un nouveau niveau qualitatif, ont frappé les politiciens de l’Europe:l’approvisionnement avec l’énergie et la relation avec la Russie.

Ce n’est pas du tout pour la première fois dans les dernières décennies que lalogique du système nous secoue. Qu’on ne se rappelle pas seulement le choc du1973 mais aussi la haussée des intérêts à la fin des années ’70, liée du deuxièmechoc pétrolier d’après la révolution islamique iranienne. Mais on sait que larelation de subjugation des pays faibles mais riches en matières premières par lespays développés a toujours été, parce qu’elle l’est, structurelle pour le capitalisme:on doit acheter le plus bon marché possible et on doit vendre au plus haut niveaupossible de point de vue quantitatif et qualitatif.

Pourquoi alors les événements du mois de janvier et spécialement ceux entrela Russie et l’Ukraine sont si importants?

Est-ce parce que les précédents réalisés pendant les années ’70 ont-ils été oubliésces dernières 16 années à cause du triomphe du capital transnational? Parce que laRussie n’est pas un pays d’Afrique qu’on peut dominer facilement? Parce quetoute la question est toute proche de l’Europe? Ou bien parce que le prix actuelde l’énergie est plus contraignant sur l’économie qu’il y a plus de trente années?

La réponse affirmative est valable pour toutes ces interrogations. Et encore.L’état actuel du système capitaliste global est plus vulnérable qu’auparavant.Même s’il se trouve dans la phase ascendante de la révolution industrielle présente,du capitalisme présent (transnational) et du cycle long (Kondratieff) présent, quandla haussée plus oumoins légère mais contrôlée des prix4 a déterminé la généralisationrapide des innovations techniques et en même temps a pu contrebalancer jusqu’àprésent les conséquences sociales de cette généralisation (c’est à dire l’accroissement

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du chômage, donc la baisse des salaires). Mais la concurrence mondiale s’estaccru et s’accroît chaque jour. Et les pays émergents ne concurrent seulementavec leurs produits plus bons marchés mais aussi pour l’énergie.

L’augmentation générale des prix qui s’accélère5 certainement après la démarcherusso-ukrainienne menace la consommation et les profits6, pour ne parler ici dufardeau pesé sur les familles et les gens qui n’appartiennent pas aux grandsdétenteurs de capital. Les plus forts survivront et deviendront plus forts qu’avant,mais qui sont aujourd’hui ces plus forts?

Les grandes sociétés soutenues par des états forts. Comme avant la premièreguerre mondiale, la plus acharnée lutte se passe entre les plus forts. Mais aujourd’huile paysage de ceux-ci est plus dense: les grandes puissances sont peu à peudisloquées de leur place traditionnelle, ce sont la Chine7 et l’Inde qui sont les plusaffamés compétiteurs pour l’énergie et les matières premières et en même tempspour les marchés, les relations entre les pays développés et «le reste» ne sont plus siconfortables comme jadis, «le reste» a des armes et surtout ce sont les valeursdémocratiques promus par «la vieille Europe» qui montrent — comme d’ailleurs ilsl’ont montré dès le commencement— la direction. Parce qu’il y a une contradictionessentielle entre ces valeurs et les relations capitalistes comme telles, c’est-à-direcomme relations mondiales. Et si on veut que la démocratie et les droits de l’hommerègnent partout, donc à l’échelle des relations internationales aussi, on doit faire desefforts pour dessiner les alternatives au présent management de l’ordre mondial.

Que peut faire l’Europe? Diversifier les sources d’énergie8: l’Afrique de Nordest à coté, la région Caspique est plus loin, mais tous ces espaces sont incertainsde point de vue politique, ne parlant pas de la compétition pour eux. Réduire lenombre des partenaires de qui on dépend: par exemple l’Allemagne a démarréle projet de la pipeline de la Russie par la mer Balte. Développer le stockage,utiliser l’énergie avec parcimonie9 — et éduquer la population en ce sens —,accentuer la recherche pour des alternatives. Et on fait tout ça, comme après1973 et 1979, mais évidemment avec plus de détermination: si les dépenses pourla recherche, développement et démonstration (RD&D) en énergie ont diminuédepuis les premières années ’80 — aussi parce que le prix du pétrole asignificativement diminué depuis 198510 jusqu’à la fin des ’90 — la consciencedes multiples provocations de notre temps génère plus ou moins rapidement unautre approche du problème.

Il y a quandmême des difficultés. Les rapports deWorld EnergyCouncil11 (WEC)ont montré que les frais des gouvernements en matière de RD&D en énergie ontdécliné, aussi parce que les compagnies publiques d’énergie ont été privatisées.Si la planification stratégique à long terme a décliné aussi, justement à cause dumanque des compagnies publiques d’énergie qui auparavant ont soutenu cetteactivité, on ne peut quand même avoir une image cohérente sur la situationentière parce que les compagnies privées n’offrent pas leurs dates auWEC d’unemanière transparente et permanente.

Concrètement, les dépenses pour la RD&D en énergie augmenteront légèrementen ce qui concerne la réduction des prix de revient de l’exploration et production(la croissance de l’efficacité) en fonction des nouvelles ressources qui seront deplus en plus difficiles à exploiter. De ce point de vue la première concurrence est

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celle pour les ressources exploitables avec les technologies existantes. Lesdépenses augmenteront dans une grande proportion pour le stockage et le transportde l’énergie. Les grands acteurs/joueurs dans l’énergie seront justement ceux quicontrôleront le transport: ou bien la propriété des sources sans la propriété despipelines, gazolines, câbles et installations ne sera pas assez puissante.

On développera les frais pour les combustibles non conventionnels12 mais laproportion est et sera beaucoup plus petite qu’on s’imagine: jusqu’à l’horizon2050, l’utilisation du pétrole, du gaz et du charbon prévaudra sur celle du nucléaire,du soleil, de la biomasse, du vent et des marées13. Les dépenses pour la réductiondes poudres provenant de l’exploitation et de l’utilisation de pétrole, du gaz etdu charbon ne pourront atteindre que moins que le double de la concentration dudioxyde de charbon dans l’atmosphère aux niveaux préindustriels seulementvers 2100: et seulement si l’amélioration de l’efficacité de l’utilisation de l’énergie,et si le développement des sources non conventionnelles et du nucléaire (on nedit pas ici la provenance fission/fusion) seront les principaux objectifs de lastratégie énergétique14.

C’est une question d’évolution graduelle évidemment mais la disproportionaigue entre les dépenses pour l’armement15 et celles pour la RD&D en énergien’est pas avant tout la conséquence des difficultés techniques.

Parce que les compagnies d’énergie sont privées, même si elles tendent àdiversifier leurs sources de profit et à construire leur position à long terme ellesn’ont pas l’argent nécessaire pour une RD&D d’envergure — en ce sens leurcollaboration avec les grands bancs est limité par le profit tiré toujours à la suitede l’exploitation profitable hic et nunc, c’est-à-dire aux plus petits frais dumoment — et ne sont pas parties d’une stratégie unique et cohérente à l’échellemondiale. Le modèle est ainsi celui de permanent atermoiement, du transfère desproblèmes et des tâches vers l’horizon suivant où ceux-ci seront plus coûteux.

Par exemple, en avril 2006, le président Bush a annoncé, «à cause del’augmentation des prix de l’énergie», que les Etats-Unis vont suspendre lesrègles écologiques dans les raffineries, stopper les achats du gouvernement pourses réserves et donner plus de temps pour que les compagnies payent leursemprunts de ces réserves. En quête des profits, il s’agit de la consolidation ducontrôle sur l’offre et les prix dans les mains des monopoles énergétiques:l’intérêt de développer l’énergie alternative et écologique est plus bas que celuid’exacerber la crise présente, même avec les dépenses militaires de plus en plusaccrues.

L’optimisme et l’attitude conciliatrice des rapports ont en vue plutôt lacapacité générale d’apprendre forcée par les contraintes de l’environnement.Mais même si historiques, ces contraintes ne sont pas «naturelles», elles sont lesconséquences de l’exploitation et du traitement privé de la nature et de la société.La conscience de ces conséquences et la gravité de celles-ci impliqueraitaujourd’hui un changement radical dans la stratégie énergétique, économique etsociale: parce que le passage rapide vers une stratégie mondiale unitaire etcohérente, intégrée et sociale est le seul démarche qui préviendrait la détériorationde l’environnement naturel et sociale et sauverait le long terme de l’humanité.


Que doit donc faire l’Europe? Elle a évidemment un handicape: les Etats-Unis et le Japon dépensent environ 65% des sommes utilisées par les gouvernementsmembres de l’Agence Internationale de l’Énergie16. L’Europe ne peut pas dépassercette proportion mais elle peut unir ses efforts avec ceux des pays en cours dedéveloppement, surtout les pays qui offrent l’énergie.

D’ailleurs en 2004 l’Union Européenne et 11 pays du sud-est du continent ontconstitué la Communauté d’Énergie pour unifier les règles concernant l’énergie eten même temps pour réduire la sur-dépendance en renforçant la coopération et lesinvestissements17. Mais la coopération avec la Russie, plus ancienne, s’est manifestéepar les investissements croisés des compagnies.Ainsi les compagnies européennesde transport de gaz (voir les allemandes Wirom18, Wintershall, Wingas Gas, labritannique Gas transportation, les italiennes Volta et Promgas, la française FRAGaz, l’autrichienneTrading company (et OMV, qui appartienne 30% auGazprom19),la grecque Prometheus Gas, les polonaises Gas Trading et Europol Gas, la bulgareTopenergy, la hongroise Panrusgas, la serbe Progress et le turque Turusgaz20) ontdes actionnaires russes comme elles sont aussi des partenaires avec Gazprom, laplus grande compagnie en matière de gaz21. Les intérêts du capital se nattent en cequi concerne le prix et le développement. (De ce point de vue la Russie, et pasl’Ukraine, est pour l’Europe le partenaire et l’acteur plus important: c’est Gazpromqui fournit 25% du gaz utilisé en Europe en pressant sur les réserves stratégiquesdes compagnies et des états; le froid de loup de la Sibérie et pas d’Ukraine a généréle haussements du prix du gaz dans les contrats pour février déjà. La dépendanced’Ukraine peut être minimisée plus facilement22).

Comme tout le monde, l’Union Européenne doit résoudre le problème del’énergie23 en faisant face en même temps aux provocations complexes del’environnement24, de la concurrence et du développement. L’intégration et laformation du marché unique en matière d’énergie a été et est le processus le plusimportant de point de vue de la concentration et la consolidation du capital maisaussi de point de vue des standards d’utilisation de l’énergie.

La notion de développement durable (Bruntland, 198725) qui suggère lanécessité de réviser les relations sociales, contient certainement «l’utilisation plusintelligente26 des moins des combustibles fossiles et le développement desalternatives»27. Ainsi la politique énergétique de l’Union consiste dans «lacombinaison de l’économie d’énergie — par une utilisation plus efficace —environ 1% de la consommation annuelle28— avec des sources alternatives, surtoutrenouvelables et une coopération internationale plus résolue»29. La coopération estvitale parce que l’Union importe 50% de son pétrole et de son gaz (utilisant 80%des combustibles fossiles) et cette dépendance pourra augmenter en 2030 à 70%30.

On savait bien que la conversion vers une économie basée sur l’énergie produitepar le vent, la biomasse, le hydro et le soleil — jusqu’à la conversion vers uneéconomie basée sur le hydrogène — est absolument nécessaire31. Cependant ledéveloppement de cette économie a été avant tout subordonné aux exigences«du marché»32. Et un moyen de respecter l’accord de Kyoto est l’achat des«degrés» de pollution avec le dioxyde de carbone des pays qui ont réduit leuractivité industrielle (comme de la Roumanie). L’Union a promu comme objectif

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essentiel la prévention de la hausse de la température moyenne globale de plusde 2 degrés Celsius. Mais cet objectif ne pourra pas arrêter la fonte de la banquisede Groenland avec toutes les conséquences: ça veut dire que la concentrationde bioxyde de carbone sera de 450 /1 million, plus haut qu’à nos jours (environ380 /1 million) et qu’avant la révolution industrielle (275/ million. La questionest ainsi moins liée aux obstacles technologiques qu’aux obstacles politiques: lerythme d’implémentation des nouvelles technologies, l’allocation des fonds33, laconscience de la gravité de la situation sont le résultat des intérêts restrictifs ducapital, qui est évidemment «sans frontières».

La chance de l’Europe ne peut pas du tout provenir du soutien politique despays qui s’opposent à la Russie du point de vue des Etats-Unis par exemple. Sil’intégration économique européenne est quand même la chance intermédiairede l’Europe, la solution à court terme de l’Europe en matière d’énergie neconsiste pas dans la position partisane auprès la Georgie — qui a accusé laRussie d’avoir saboté la gazoline vers Tbilissi34, qui s’est retiré du Conseil desministres de la Communauté des États Indépendants sous le motive qu’elledésire entrer dans l’OTAN et qui a invité les russes de quitter leurs bases militairesd’Osétie de Sud et d’Abhasie. Les réserves de pétrole et du gaz de la Caspiennene peuvent substituer à court terme l’énergie russe: le pipeline Bakou-Tbilissi-Ceyhan et le gazoline Bakou-Tbilissi-Erzurum ne sont pas encore construits eten tout cas le plus proche pouvoir est celui de la Russie. Le mouvement géorgiend’acheter 2 millions mètres cubes par jours d’Iran — approximativement lamoitié des besoins de Georgie — n’est pas une «victoire» contre la Russie àcause du prix du gaz qu’elle n’a pas dévoilée et surtout à cause des relationsrusso-iraniennes. D’ailleurs en avril 2006 la Moldavie a cédé au Gazprom leréseau électrique qui la traverse vers les Balkans et l’Europe centrale. Maintenanton sait que le prix payé par la Georgie pour le gaz russe est moins haut que celuipayé par la Roumanie: «la Georgie est plus proche de la Russie que la Roumanie»,mais la condition que l’état roumain ne veut pas vendre sa compagnie Romgazest un obstacle pour la tendance de concentration russe35.

La Russie veut profiter au maximum de la situation présente sur le marché dugaz. Les bonnes relations politiques n’ont pas empêché la Russie de demander àArménie de doubler d’avril 2006 le prix payé jusqu’à maintenant de 56$ / 1000mètres cubes. L’Arménie dépend encore 100% du gaz russe et plus de 70% deson infrastructure appartient à la Russie. Mais ce n’est pas une question de«perfidie»: simplement la Russie a vu une opportunité d’acheter une partie dugazoline futur Iran-Arménie au prix d’un prix «amical» pour l’Arménie et ausside payer un loyer «amical» pour la base militaire de Gyumri. Et l’achat a étéréalisé en échange avec le prix fixe du gaz russe jusqu’en 2009.

La démarche de la Russie sera suivie par mêmes démarches d’autres possesseursde hydrocarbures. Avec toutes les pressions politiques, des augmentations desprix de toutes les matières premières auront lieu.

Il y a, évidemment, plusieurs aspects du problème iranien. En tout cas lesévénements liés à l’Iran déterminent que le rôle de la Russie augmente36, sur leplan économique et politique aussi. Comme après la révolution islamique de


1789, un nouveau choque pétrolier se profile à cause d’une escalade du conflitiranien37. Les réserves de la Mer du Nord ne dureront pas à l’infini (en2020–2030 seulement la Norvège ayant des ressources d’énergie), on a besoinde temps pour construire des pipe-lines alternatifs, il y a plusieurs courtisanspour les gouvernements amis des pays desquels on a tant besoin.

Le futur immédiat est ainsi très palpitant: espérons qu’on ira désamorcer lesconflits, et ça serait possible justement à cause de la sagesse politique des classesgouvernantes de tous les pays: elle savent très bien que la guerre peut être leterrain de leur chute. Mais en même temps, rappelons que la guerre est un moyende destruction des forces productives et ainsi elle permet que la domination declasse gagne encore un peu de temps. Et puis si «les conditions subjectives» nesont pas — et elles ne le sont pas — mûres pour le changement politique radicalanti-capitaliste et mondial, une crise provoquée d’une guerre ne ferait que«montrer» que ce changement serait «simplement utopique».

Ainsi la question énergétique se lie serrement avec celle du pouvoir militaireet politique. Le comportement de la Russie n’est pas du tout différent de celuides autres puissances. Et pas parce que la morale serait celle qui règne lesrelations internationales, l’Europe doit voir la Russie comme une collaboratricede premier rang et tendre à une intégration économique plus profonde. L’Europefait déjà tout ça et sa persévérance est tout à fait pragmatique.

Mais les démarches européennes, comme d’ailleurs celles de la Russie (etcomme d’autres pays) ont lieu dans le cadre de la concurrence: chaque pays/chaque capital voit le terrain/le capital des autres comme le prix pour la puissancemanifestée dans la lutte et ils s’approchent du but de l’intégration par desrelations simples et au fond timides. Tout le monde sait déjà qu’est-ce que c’estque la géopolitique, mais les liaisons entre l’Union Européenne et la Russie sontd’une façon quelconque séparées de relations avec la Chine, par exemple. Leproblème est ainsi le sens donné à l’intégration régionale (européenne): celui demoyen d’affermissement régional ou celui d’étape d’intégration mondiale. Lesens est évidemment capitaliste et pour cette raison ce problème est lié à unautre: libéraliser le marché (d’énergie) et en même temps promouvoir la planificationintégrée. Comme on le voit bien, les pays veulent libéraliser l’espace extérieuret protéger le leur: le principe de réciprocité est ainsi attaqué par la configurationstructurelle des relations entre les pays puissants dans un domaine ou en généralet les pays dépendants, dans un domaine ou en général.

Le Gazprom— qui s’est fait sa propre compagnie média, en incluant Vedomosti,Izvestia, Komsomolskaïa Pravda et la station NTV — a voulu évidemmentprofiter de la situation en investissant dans l’énergie de l’Europe: cesinvestissements sont le résultat de la libéralisation mais conduisent au monopolede Gazprom. Cette pression de la Russie par l’intermède de ses ressourcesénergétiques — nommée par certains une nouvelle «guerre froide»38 — est aufond le réciproque des investissements européens (et mondiaux) dans la Russie.Tout simplement la Russie veut dépasser son statut de fournisseur des ressourcesénergétiques pour l’Europe39 en achetant des réseaux de distribution comme descentrales électriques européennes.

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En Europe, comme partout d’ailleurs, on a vu et voit encore une «guerre»entre les «libéraux» et les protectionnistes, dans chaque pays et entre les pays.

À cause de sa dépendance de l’énergie russe (un tiers de son nécessaire) quedu fait que la Russie est son premier partenaire commercial, l’Allemagne40 asigné, fin d’avril 2006, l’accord de collaboration entre E.ON Ruhrgas (la grandecompagnie européenne de distribution), le producteur de produits chimiquesBASF et Gazprom pour la construction du gazoline Russie Allemagne sous lamer Baltique et, en même temps, l’accord de recevoir une partie des actives dela compagnie de distributionWingas (qui opère enAllemagne, France, Belgique,Autriche et la République Chèque). Mais en contrepartie, Wingas participeraavec 35% à l’exploitation de gaz Iujno-Ruskoie. En ce qui concerne E.ON, ellepermettra à la Russie accès à son réseau de sous distribution de l’Europe de l’esten échange avec sa participation à la production de l’énergie. L’Italie aussi se mêledans cette affaire de construction du plus grand consortium qui contrôlera lalivraison du gaz en Europe.

Mais la Grande Bretagne s’oppose à l’expansion de Gazprom, endurcissantses lois pour arrêter la Russie de prendre Centrica41, la principale compagnie dedistribution britannique. Et l’Agence Internationale pour l’ÉnergieAtomique (AIEA)a aussi averti que l’Europe est trop dépendante de l’énergie russe.

Certaines voix de l’Europe Centrale et de l’Est s’alignent à cette position«indépendantiste». La Russie a averti42 que l’opposition de l’Europe conduiraGazprom se diriger vers l’Amérique du Nord43 et vers l’Asie.

La France a pressé que l’Union Européenne permette l’accès de Gazprom enEurope si la Russie permet aussi l’achat de ses réseaux de distribution par lesinvestisseurs européens, condition refusé par la Russie. (Pour sa position, laFrance a été exclue du plan du consortium.)

Au bout du conte c’est la création du marché unique dans ce domaine. Enreste c’est la lutte économique et l’amitié idéologique avec les Etats-Unis quicirconscrivent les relations économiques de l’Union avec ses voisins de la terraferma.

En tout cas, les projets russes de réorientation de ses exports d’énergiedépendent des revenus obtenus en Europe. Et tout ça est basé sur la tendanced’amplification des prix de l’énergie.

Ainsi le contrôle des moyens d’énergie et de production par les compagnieseuropéennes ne va pas si facilement, même si ce contrôle vient de plus en plusde la part des compagnies européennes intégrées. Ni la diversification de ladépendance énergétique n’est pas sans périls. La recherche pour un moyend’énergie révolutionnaire parait plutôt être la solution.

Mais la recherche n’est pas seulement une question d’invention scientifique:la direction de la canalisation de l’argent et la volonté politique pour implémenterla science dans la vie quotidienne constituent des obstacles qu’on ne peut pasignorer. Le fait que le rythme de la recherche concernant la fusion nucléaire a étélié aux fonds insuffisants, dans le contexte de la baisse des fonds pour larecherche et le développement de l’énergie, n’a pas été le résultat de la pénuriedu capital, à cause de la récession prolongée (c’était la phase descendante du


cycle long): le surplus du capital inutilisé dans la production a été converti dansla spéculation financière et dans l’armement et beaucoup moins dans la recherche.Et même la recherche militaire n’a pas été trop appliquée en ce qui concernel’énergie alternative.

Pourquoi donc? Était-ce parce que même avec l’augmentation des prix dupétrole et du gaz, on pensait qu’on en avait encore assez? Certainement, mais pasles ressources facilement disponibles alors et encore abondantes ont freiné lafocalisation des fonds pour la recherche et le développement de l’énergiealternative. Ou bien cette cause s’est tressé avec le motif économique mis enévidence par et dans la logique du système: jusqu’à ce que le prix existant était/estplus bas que les sommes nécessaires pour la RD&D de l’énergie alternative, laplus grande partie des fonds préconisés à l’énergie a été/est canalisé pourcontinuer l’exploitation des hydrocarbures. Dans ce cadre on ne peut non plusnégliger le motif politique: guerre froide et de nos jours le prolongement de celui-ci, l’escalade des armements, la compétition et dans une mesure plus réduite lacollaboration des états en ce qui concerne la recherche révolutionnaire.

C’est pour cette raison que même en 2005 les dessins et les espérancesconcernant l’énergie en 203044 ont en vue que 80% de l’offre de l’énergie serontdes combustibles fossiles, même si les besoins s’accroîtront de 50% face à200545, et que seulement 2% de l’offre de l’énergie viendra des sourcesrenouvelables autres que le hydro46. La demande de gaz s’accroîtra plus rapidement,substituant le charbon comme la seconde source d’énergie avant 2015. Ondépensera beaucoup d’argent pour réduire la pollution et utiliser économiquementl’énergie mais les résultats ne pourront pas arrêter la tendance actuelle dechangement climatique mondial et de désordre écologique. D’autant plus queplus de la moitié de la demande de l’énergie proviendra des pays en cours dedéveloppement: même si l’intégration régionale sera un clé pour le succès desdémarches47, le financement de l’énergie (et de la recherche) dans les pays extérieursà l’OCDE sera une grande provocation.

Ainsi parce que les ressources de combustibles fossiles et d’uranium et lesavancements technologiques pour l’exploitation de ceux-ci sont «géants»48, lesfutures décennies ne seront pas les témoins des changements révolutionnaires ence qui concerne l’énergie.Mais ça veut dire aussi qu’on ne verra pas des changementsrévolutionnaires dans les relations économiques et politiques mondiales.

C’est la logique du capital qui pousse les propriétaires (de l’énergie) et lesdirigeants de l’économie d’exploiter avec les plus bas prix les ressources etd’investir seulement dans l’espoir d’un futur profit et d’une situation exclusive.La direction politique suive certainement cette logique. Les conséquences sur lanature et la société sont absolument secondaires.

Dominer les sources d’énergie existantes et profiter de la propriété de cessources: c’est le cours principal de la politique internationale actuelle malgréles avertissements de la nature, l’essor de la connaissance scientifique et l’étatdes sociétés.

De point de vue scientifique ce cours n’est pas du tout implacable. L’exemplele plus important est ici la recherche sur la fusion nucléaire49. L’histoire de la

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coopération internationale pour la RD&D de la fusion nucléaire a relevé que lalogique de la recherche scientifique réclame la déclassification de l’informationscientifique et que si la guerre froide a pu freiner la circulation libre del’information scientifique elle n’a pas pu l’empêcher50. La coopération internationalea reçu un impulse du fait que la recherche sur la fusion était, et l’est, très chère.Pour cette raison le JET a pu être la base pour le projet transnational ITER51, dedémonstration de la possibilité technologique et économique de produire énergiepar la fusion. En 1992 s’est formé le group European Safety and EnvironmentalAssesment for Fusion Power, qui a construit en 1995 la théorie de l’énergie par lafusion nucléaire comme l’énergie propice au développement durable52. Mais lafusion a des avantages aussi dans la non-prolifération: si les usines nucléaires parla fission ont une application duale, de pouvoir produire électricité mais aussi biendes armes nucléaires53, la production de l’énergie par fusion n’entrain pas desmatériels qui demanderaient les contrôles de l’Agence International d’ÉnergieAtomique. Et pourtant les sommes utilisées pour la RD&D en fusion sont beaucoupplus réduites que celles pour l’armement. (Justement pour cette applicabilité dualeles sommes pour la fusion ont été plus petites que celles pour la fission54 même side nos jours la proportion s’est inversée.

La coopération internationale s’inscrit ainsi dans la logique des choses del’heure actuelle. On ne peut plus se développer en manière isolée, de plus que laposition pionnière dans la RD&D ne dure pas. Dans le plus coûteux projetcommun après celui de la Station Spatiale Internationale, le RéacteurInternational Thermonucléaire Expérimental55, l’Union Européenne participeavec environ 50% et les États-Unis, le Japon, la Chine, la Russie, la Corée deSud — chacun avec moins de 10%. À cause de ses dettes et de ses frais pourfaire la guerre, l’Amérique n’a pas pu obtenir la place que sa position de Super-puissance militaire l’aurait supposée. Et comme on le sait, la France, au nom del’Union Européenne a gagné devant le Japon: on construira le Réacteur àCadarache, ce qui est très avantageux pour l’emploi et le développement de larégion. En même temps, parce qu’on est au commencement on tend à profiter detoute position/opportunité on a.56

Le développement de l’énergie propre issue de la fusion n’annulera pas ladépendance de l’Europe de la Russie, des pays de la mer Caspienne comme despays de l’Afrique du Nord: mais il aura accentuer toute espèce de dépendance,aussi celle de ces pays face à l’Europe. Ainsi ces environ 40 années jusqu’à latransformation de la fusion dans une méthode banale de fabrication de l’énergiesont pleines des antagonismes aigus pour la puissance dans le vieux cadre desforces productives et relations de productions existantes.

Chacun des pays et des structures développés a, et tous ensemble ont, commetous les pays d’ailleurs, des problèmes créés par la logique du système: chacundépense l’argent pour l’armement et pour la défense, ce qui inclût un systèmebureaucratique si élargi et profond qu’on frissonne, dans tous les pays la sommepour l’armement est plus grosse que celle pour l’aide pour le développement.Mais on doit voir les sommes utilisées pour la prévention des maladies commela tuberculose et les autres maladies de la pauvreté. L’intérêt à court terme —


celui du profit privé hic et nunc — qui subordonne les états justement à causedes liens si étroits entre la bureaucratie politique et ce profit privé entre de plusen plus en collision avec l’intérêt social et celui à long terme en même temps.

Nous vivons dans une époque de transition.Est-ce que le futur est-il dessiné par les nouvelles technologies qu’on devra

projeter sur la base de la nouvelle énergie issue de la fusion nucléaire?Certainement, et ainsi une nouvelle «phase d’or» dans le développement del’humanité pourra avoir lieu. Pas du chômage, parce que le fait que le prix desbiens sera de plus en plus bon marché permettra déduire la valeur du travail dela qualité de celui-ci, donc de la vie des travailleurs. L’écologie, la culture,l’éducation permanente, les relations sociales, l’aide et le développement detoutes les couches sociales et de toutes les régions du monde, la recherche etl’industrie basée sur la recherche sont les domaines qui ont une vraie faim de laforce de travail et qui seront les moyens d’élever la qualité de la vie des gens.

D’autre part, toute cette «philosophie» parait aujourd’hui invraisemblable.Les prix, et surtout ceux de l’énergie, montent, la lutte pour ressources estsauvage, millions des êtres humains souffrent parce qu’il y a des ressourcesvitales, comme l’eau, qui manquent. À cause de la pénurie, de la pauvreté, de lasouffrance, les relations interhumaines s’endurcissent, l’aliénation est plusprofonde que jamais et l’autoritarisme et l’irrationalisme de la direction politiquedonnent l’impression d’une chute dans un nouveau Moyen Age. Est-ce que lefutur est-il le maître du présent? Oui, répondent la science et la technique, maistout dépend de la responsabilité des gens.

Les perspectives de l’énergie montrent les perspectives sociales et politiquesdu monde et de l’Europe. Le critère essentiel pour le développement des nouvellesforces productives est la différence entre le prix de cette démarche et le profitobtenu des vieilles forces productives. Et si ce profit peut être obtenu par desmoyens extra économiques — par la guerre et la menace à la guerre, mais aussipar des pressions économiques et par des actions politiques tout à fait loin d’être«orthodoxes», démocratiques — on l’obtient.

La focalisation de ces pages sur l’énergie n’exclut pas certainement desautres facteurs et leur influence de permanente bifurcation de l’histoire. Laconclusion ne mène pas du tout au pessimisme, mais à l’interrogation des sensde la société présente.

Le «délai» que nous vivons n’est pas un cul de sac de l’histoire. L’analyselucide des facteurs, rapports et conditions de cet intervalle de quelques décenniesdessiné par l’énergie permet que la critique sociale gagne aussi du temps.

NOTES

148 ANA BAZAC 11

1. Qui a entraîné même minus 65 degrés en Sibérie,là où sont les champs pétrolifères et plus deminus 30 degrés à Moscou et à Sankt Petersbourg.

2. Liée certainement de la décision dugouvernement français de 1986 de payer à

l’Algérie le gaz au tarif mondial et non plus autarif des contrats longs.

3. Voir Gândul, le 24 juin 2006.4. Voir http://www.oecd.orgtopicstatsportal/0,2647,en_2825_495691_1_1_1_1_1 , 00 . h tm l


Conformément aux Indices des Prix deConsommation (IPC), la mesure générale del’inflation sauf alimentation et sauf énergie, dansles pays de l’OCDE les prix ont augmenté avec2,7% l’année terminée en décembre 2005comparativement à l’année terminée en novembre2005 de 2,6%. Mais (voir OCDE, PrincipauxIndicateurs Économiques, février 2006,18628078.pdf) on doit savoir que si l’inflation auprix à la consommation de l’alimentation a étéd’environ 1% (la rate des 12 mois), lé prix à laconsommation de l’énergie s’est accrû d’environ12,2%.Voir aussi Jean-Philippe Cotis, économiste chefde l’OCDE, What is the economic outlook forOECD countries?, septembre 2005 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/27/35310111.pdf. où l’auteura souligné que la montée des prix des combustiblesinfluence les pays en fonction du moment de leurcycle économique et que l’inflation est dangereusepour le capital dans ses deux hypostases.

5. Le développement accéléré, c’est-à-dire lademande accélérée (mais on ne doit pas oublierles massifs achats par les fonds d’investissements,les nouveaux intermédiaires sur le marché), ontdéjà généré le haussement des prix des matièrespremières. Qu’on voit seulement le prix del’aluminium et du zinc: en 2005 l’aluminium ahaussé avec 14% face à l’augmentation estiméde 10%, tandis que le zinc — avec 52%, et pasavec 26% qu’on a prévu. Jusqu’à mi-janvier2006 le prix du zinc a atteint le record absolu de2071,5 $/la tonne, tandis que le prix del’aluminium s’est placé sur le plus haut niveaudes derniers 17 ans. Le 3 février 2006, l’aluminiumétait 2592,50 $ /la tonne, le zinc — 2357,50 $ /latonne Voir le rapport sur 2005 du London MetalExchange, The World Centre for Non-ferrousMetal Trading, à http://www.lme.co.uk, les datesde 3 février et l’article de Sandra Buchanan, Profitsdouble for second year running dans “MetalYearbook 2005’’, voir ibidem.

6. Voir AGENCE INTERNATIONALE DEL’ENERGIE, The impact of higher oil prices onthe global economy, with a focus on developingeconomies, 2004, http://www.iea.org/textbase/w o r k / 2 0 0 4 / c ambo d i a / b j _ s e s s i o n 1 . 3 -jacobs%20presentation.pdf où une simulation decroissance des prix avec 10$/le baril a montréque l’influence est globalement négative, sansmême tenir compte des effets secondaires sur laconfidence des consommateurs/du marché et surle prix du gaz, d’électricité et des autrescombustibles: le Produit Net Brut (PNB) despays diminue avec 0,5% la première année avecles prix élevés (mais un facteur important estl’utilisation des revenues supplémentaires par lesexportateurs de combustible), le PNB du mondeaurait été plus grand depuis 2001 si le prix dupétrole n’aurait pas crû et la situation des pays en

cours de développement et importateurs dupétrole se détériore.

7. Voir Brian Smith, China’s growing trade withAfrica indicative of Sino-Western energyconflicts, 24 January 2006, http://www.wsws.org

8. C’était la première réponse après les événementsde janvier-mars 2006, voir aussi FergusMichaels, Europe’s energy crisis sharpensantagonisms with Russia, 6 April 2006,http://www.wsws.org

9. Voir qu’on parle du «charbon propre», c”est àdire des techniques d’utilisation efficace et plusécologique qu’aujourd’hui du charbon commesolution contre la dépendance du pétrole. Maisc’est une question politique ici: l’éparpillementquasi uniforme des réserves du charbon — saufle Moyen Orient — fait que les États-Unisdétiennent 26% des réserves, la Russie et lesmembres de la Communauté des ÉtatsIndépendants – 23%, la Chine – 12%, l’Australie– 8%, l’Allemagne – 7%, l’Afrique du Sud – 5%.En tout cas, conformément au l’Institut Mondialdu Charbon, ces réserves dureront 164 années,tandis ce que celles du gaz – 67 années et cellesdu pétrole – 41. (Gândul, le 29 novembre 2005).

10. WEC, Energy Technologies for the Twenty-FirstCentury (2001), http://www.worldenergy.org/w e c - g e i s / p u b l i c a t i o n s / r e p o r t s / e t 2 1 /introduction/introduction.asp

11. Les conclusion desquels sont plutôt optimistes:«la taille et la composition des récentes dépensespour la RD&D peuvent être considérées commeplus oumoins appropriées aux futures provocationset opportunités qu’on anticipe», ibidem.

12. Voir aussi l’intention de la Corporation Spatialerusse Energhia de commencer un projet deconstruction d’une base permanente sur la Lunepour livrer jusqu’en 2020 à l’échelle industriellel’isotope Hélium-3, qui n’existe pas sur la Terremais est abondant sur notre satellite naturel,conformément au România liberã, le 28 janvier2006.

13. Energy Data Centre, Global Energy Scenarios to2050 and Beyond (2001), http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/edc/scenario.asp

14. Ibidem.Mais le nucléaire présent, par fission, n’est pas si«propre» comme on le croit: la gestions des déchetsradioactifs n’est pas encore résolue à plus forteraison que qu’il s’agit d’une durée de la nocivitéde ces déchets de plusieurs milliers d’années.Ainsi la solution nucléaire de la présente criseénergétique s’oppose à la demande dudéveloppement durable: elle est simplement unesolution économique dans la logique de typeLouis XIV du capitalisme.

15. Voir le budget militaire américain de 440milliards $ pour l’année fiscale 2007, unecroissance de 7% et qui entraîne des réductionsdes programmes sociales comme Medicare et

150 ANA BAZAC 13

Medicaid, plus de la demi des dépensesmilitaires mondiales d’environ 1000 de milliards$. Voir le Quadrennial Defense Review, janvier2006. Mais aussi pour l’Europe, Burkard Schmitt,European Union Defence Expenditures, 2005,http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/11-bsdef.pdf (mêmesi les dépenses militaires de l’Union sontd’environ 2% du Produit Interne Brut, en 2004,la France a dépensé 32,4 milliards euro,l’Allemagne –24,2 milliards euro, GrandeBretagne –26,8 milliards euro; les six les plusforts pays ont dépensé 80% du budget européenpour la défense et 98% des sommes utiliséespour la recherche militaire; en 2004, les Etats-Unis ont dépensé plus de deux fois plus quel’Union; mais EDA chief: Defense budget racewith US is irrelevant, http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-134450-168type=News

16. WEC, ibidem.17. Mais cette coopération a supposé par exemple

que l’Union Européenne a exigé que la Roumaniepaye le gaz produit dans le pays avec le mêmeprix que le gaz importé — sans demander àl’Autriche de payer sa énergie hydro avec lemême prix que celui obtenu de sources fossiles— et avant privatiser la production interne degaz. Donc les profits iront dans les poches descompagnies qui vont acheter les ressourcesroumaines de gaz. Voir l’observation del’économiste Ilie ªerbãnescu, Preþul gazelor: omurdãrie fãrã margini a UE, dans «JurnalulNaþional», le 21 mars 2006.

18. Qui opère en Roumanie et qui a commepartenaires Romgaz –50 % et Wieh –50%.

19. Gândul, le 11 mai 2006.20. Le partenariat dans ces compagnies est le

suivant: en Allemagne, Wingas Gas: Gazprom– 35,9%, Wintershall –65%; Wintershall Erdhas:Gazprom –50,9%,Wintershall –50%; ZarubezhgasErdgashandel: Gazprom –100%; en GrandeBretagne, Gas transportation: Gazprom –10%,British Gas –40, Elf –10%, BP –10%, Conoco–10%, Tuhrgas –5%, Distrigaz –5%; en Italie,Volta: Gazprom –49%, Edison –51%; Promgas:Gazprom-50%, SNAM –50%; en France, FRAGaz: Gazprom –50%, Gas de France –50%; enAutriche, Trading comany: Gazprom –50%, OMV–50%; en Grèce, Prometheus Gas: Gazprom–50%, Copeluzos Group –50%; en Pologne, GasTrading: Gazprom –35%; Europol Gas: Gazprom–48%; en Bulgarie, Topenergy: Gazprom –100%;en Hongrie, Panrusgas: Gazprom –50%, MOL–50%; en Serbie, Progress: Gazprom –50%,Progres 15%; en Turquie, Turusgaz: Gazprom–40%.

21. Mais la quatrième compagnie énergétique, aprèsl’américaine ExxonMobil, le BP (BritishPetroleum), la Royal Dutch Shell, et avant lafrançaise Total, de point de vue de la valeur demarché.

22. Même la Roumanie a contracté directement avecGazprom (par l’intermède de Transgaz) pouréviter le doublage des contrats avec l’Ukraine,voir Adevãrul, le 20 janvier 2006, p. B1. Maisvoir Livre Vert „Vers une stratégie européennede sécurité d’approvisionnement énergétique“,http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/fr/lpi_lv_fr1.html

23. Voir la Politique Énergétique de la CommissionEuropéenne: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy/index_en.html, EU Energy Grants andLoans: http://www.eurpa.eu.int/grants/topics/energy/energy_en.htm, EU Legislation in Force:Energy Policy: http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/repert/index-12.htm

24. Voir le rapport Avoiding Dangerous ClimateChange, janvier 2006, http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/internat/dangerous-cc.htm

25. Voir le Rapport Bruntland, 1987, http://www.srds.ndirect.co.uk/sustaina.htm#TheBruntlandreport

26. Voir le programme “Énergie intelligente pourl’Europe” (2003–2006) qui a dépensé /est encours de dépenser 200 millions euro dans larecherche pour économiser l’énergie, pour sonutilisation efficace et pour les ressourcesrenouvelables.

27. Euguides, “Energy Policy in the European Union,2005”, http://www.eubusiness.com/guides/ energy

28. Par exemple par la «co-génération», c’est-à-direpar les usines qui produisent en même tempsélectricité et chaleur en utilisant le gaz, et pas lesdérivées du pétrole ou le charbon; ou par lesstandards de construction et des installations dechauffage et d’air conditionné qui réduiront lademande d’énergie d’environ 25% d’ici en 2020(en calculant le doublage des installations d’airconditionné); ou par la meilleure utilisation dutransport public et privé: le management dutrafique et la planification urbaine s’ajouteraainsi au bio combustibles qui fourniront en 20105,75% de la consommation totale de l’énergie etqui pourront remplacer 20% du pétrole utilisécomme combustible en 2020. Voir le SixièmeProgramme Cadre de l’UE pour la Recherche etle Développement Technologique.

29. Euguides, ibidem.30. Ibidem.31. The European Renewable Energy CentresAgency

a été fondé en 1991 comme un EuropeanEconomic Interest Grouping en incorporant 48groupes de recherche proéminantes de toutel’Europe; Voir http://www.eurec.be Mais voirEuropean Environment Agency http://www.eea.eu.int. Aussi le rapport Energy and environmentin the European Union, préparé par AEATechnology Environment, partenaire deEuropean Topic Centre on Air nd ClimateChange, http://www.eea.eu.int/environmental_

issue-report_2002_31/en Mais aussi laCommission européene diréction generale del’énergie et des transports, http://www.managenergy.net et le rapport Restructuring ofthe European Commission Energy & TransportDG - Mai 2004, http://www.managenergy.net/conference/2004.html

32. Voir le rapport Market-based instruments forenvironmental policy in Europe http://reports.eea.eu.int/technical_report_2005_8 C’est significatifque le premier rapport basé sur des indicateurs,Energy and Environment in the European Union,2002, de European Environment Agency (voirenergy_low_sum_en.pdf) a montré que sans desmesures additionnelles, le décroissement desémissions de dioxine de carbone ne continuerajusqu’à 2010, que la décroissance de laconsommation de l’énergie n’aura pas lieu après2010, au contraire, que le prix de l’énergie abaissé à cause aussi de la libéralisation desmarchés, de la décroissance des prix descombustibles fossiles (!) et des subventions, quele cible du Protocole de Kyoto de réduire jusqu’à2010 avec 8% de niveau de 1990 les émissionsde gaz au effet de serre ne serra pas atteint en2010 mais que la pollution avec dioxine desoufre, oxyde de nitrogène, des composantsorganiques et des particules décroîtra avec lestaxes sur le carbone et en générale avecl’internalisation des coûts de l’environnement etla suppression des subventions. Dans ce rapportla proportion des sources renouvelabless’ensuivait croître à 12% en 2010.Voir aussi le problème de système de bourseCO2, le prix, les quantités, les conséquences,chez Yann Moulier-Boutang, L’irruption del’écologie ou le grand chiasme de l’économiepolitique, 2006, http://multitudes.samizdat.net/...

33. Voir la Pétition Européenne pour la Recherche etl’Innovation, janvier 2006, qui demande auConseil d’Europe et à la présidence autrichienned’accepter sans coupes le budget pour2007–2013 et surtout d’accepter les propositionsinitiales de la Commission européenne pour leSeptième Programme Cadre 2007–2013 pour laRecherche, le Développement Technologique etla Démonstration (FP7) et pour le Programme dela Compétitivité et de l’Innovation (PCI,2007–2013) en http://www.eurec.be/aboutEUREC/new.htm Le FP7 a démarré le ‘FP7Research Priorities for the Renewable EnergySector’, le premier mars 2005.

34. Après cette accusation, le gouvernement géorgiena coupé le gaz pour l’ambassade russe à Tbilissi,les russes répondant par la même mesure àMoscou, et a exclu quelques jours les avionsrusses de l’espace aérien georgien.

35. Voir Gândul, le 13 mai 2006.36. Entre 1985 et 1995 le rôle de l’OPEP

(Organisation des Pays Exportateurs de Pétrole)

diminua à cause de l’arrivée des nouveauxproducteurs comme la Grande Bretagne, parfoisexportateurs comme la Norvège et à cause durôle croissant de l’URSS. L’attitude des paysarabes envers la Russie, et pas seulement, doitêtre liée à cette concurence.

37. Déjà l’Iran, le quatrième producteur mondial depétrole, a menacé qu’en cas de conflit armé, ilcessera les exports du pétrole brut (qui sont versl’Europe et l’Asie), ainsi qu’il bloquera la gorgeOrmuz parmi laquelle passent les transports depétrole des autres pays du Golfe.À cause de l’augmentation de la demandemondiale de pétrole — surtout dans les paysasiatiques, ou seulement dans le premiertrimestre de 2006 la demande de la Chine estaccrût de 25% — le conflit iranien entraîne unecherté générale des marchandises et la pressionde l’inflation. L’incertitude concernant l’inflationa déjà généré l’orientation des investisseurs versl’or, qui est devenu plus cher, et vers lesspéculations financières. La petite turbulence dumarché international du mois du juin 2006 en estla conséquence.

38. C’était un euro-parlementaire de la part de ladémocratie chrétienne allemande qui a dit pour laDie Welt que le comportement de Gazprom estune guerre froide aux méthodes nouvelles, voirPeter Schwarz,Gazprom threat increases tensionsin Europe, 26Aprilie 2006, http://www. wsws.org

39. 90% des exports de pétrole et gaz de la Russiesont pour l’Europe.

40. À cause des relations entre l’ancien chancellierSchröder et Gazprom, en Allemagne a eu lieu undébat sur les liaisons entre les relationsextérieures et les politiciens, voir StefanSteinberg, Gerhard Schröder, Gazprom andGerman foreign policy, 11 Aprilie 2006, http://www.wsws.orgEn tout cas, Schröder a devenu le conseiller passeulement de Gazprom mais aussi du groupemédia Ringier.

41. Gazprom veut contrôler 20% du marchébritannique d’ici en 2015.

42. Voir Financial Times de 20 avril 2006.43. Très intéressé par le gaz liquéfié que la Russie lui

livrera en 2010, après la construction d’ungazoline dans l’Extrême Orient.

44. Fatih Birol (International Energy Agency),World Energy Prospects for 2030, dans „TheWorld Energy Book”,Autumn 2005, http://www.worldenergybook.com mais aussi le rapport2005 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/lpi_lv_en.htm

45. Pour un tau moyen de croissance économique de1,6% per annum.

46. Energy Data Centre, ibidem.47. Voir André Caillé (president de World Energy

Council), Regional Integration: a Key of Success,ibidem.


152 ANA BAZAC 15

48. Energy Data Centre, ibidem.49. Voir http://www.fusion.org.uk/focus/growth.jpg50. V.D. Shafranov, On the history of the research

into controlled thermonuclear fusion (2000,2001), http://fire.pppl.gov/rf_shafranov.pdf En1956, pendant la visite de Khruschev en GrandeBretagne, le scientifique russe I.V. Kurtchatov,qui a déjà organisé en 1955 une conférenceunionale sur la fusion, a tenu une conférencedevant les chercheurs britanniques sur lapossibilité de produire des réactionsthermonucléaires; la même année, unedélégation scientifique de Suède a visité l’institutde Kurtchatov, et comme réponse des chercheurssoviétiques allèrent en Suède; en 1957, à Venises’est tenu une première conférence internationaleavec des rapports concernant la fusion; lesrapports et les articles de l’institut de Kurtchatovont été déclassifiés avant la conférence deGenève L’atome pour la paix, 1958; en 1961 àSalzburg a eu lieu la première conférence del’Agence International d’Énergie Atomique(AIEA), en 1965 — la deuxième, en 1968 — latroisième et en 1970 la direction russe derecherche (tokamak) devint international.En 1978 le projet britannique Joint EuropeanTorus (JET) a été lancé comme européen et adevenu opérationnel en 1983. En 1991 le JET a

produit pour la première fois une quantitésignificative d’énergie et en 1997 le JET a établitle record. Mais déjà en 1985 le projet dedévelopper le JET a commencé à prendrecontour.

51. International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor.Voir http://www.iter.org En 2001 le projet d’ITERa été prêt pour avancer vers sa réalisation. En2016 la construction finira et vers 2040 l’énergieproduite par la fusion pourra entrer dans laproduction de masse.

52. Voir http://www.fusion.org.uk/susdev/index.htm53. Voir R.A. Ricci, Un anno dedicato alla fisica

(2004), http://www2.sif.it/riviste/nsag/nsag-2004-01-02/04.pdf

54. WEC, ibidem.55. Voir http://www.itercad.org et http://www-cad.

cea.fr56. Vers la fin du janvier, l’agence Russia News a

annoncé que la Corporation Spatiale «Energhia»réalisera une base et une liaison permanente avecla Lune (jusqu’à 2015) pour exploiter, au termede 2020, l’isotope Hélium-3 utilisable dans lafusion. La Russie veut ainsi perpétuer sa positionde monopole en matière d’énergie. Mais lesautres pays développeront la recherche pourd’autres sources.

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PUTIN:THE “CIS PROJECT” RENEWED*

STANISLAV SECRIERU**

Introduction

Since 2000, Russia under Putin pursued coherent and pragmatic foreignpolicy with clearly defined priorities and well-structured interests. Recognizinglimits of available resources, Kremlin reduced unnecessary and costly presencearound the world and instead of dreaming of recovery of superpower statuspreferred rather concentrating on its immediate neighbourhood, genericallycalled “near abroad”. Perceiving itself as a regional superpower, Russia during thelast five years via economic, political and military instruments strived to stopdegradation of its influence and to rebuild its power position across ex-Sovietperiphery. Because Kremlin considered regional predominance vital for themaintenance of its great power status in the world, CIS countries became toppriority of Russian multivectoral foreign policy. Unlike Primakov’s aggressivemultipolarity, Putin’s multivectoral foreign course was called to accommodateRussia’s interest in development of non-conflict relations and close interactionwith the West and some Asian partners with the desire to play a dominant rolein the CIS space. It was presumed in Kremlin that, once successfullyimplemented, this strategy would prepare the restoration of Russia’s powerpositions beyond “near abroad” in the long-term.

1. CIS Space and the Question of Russia’s Great Power Identity

For the past three centuries, Russian rulers have viewed their country as aEuropean/Eurasian/global great power, wielding enormous military strength. Itformed coalitions with other powers in Europe and beyond, but these coalitionswere usually short-lived and did not encroach upon Russia’s strategicindependence. With the end of the USSR, the situation has drastically changedand Russia for the first time in centuries was weaker than the major powers andalliances in Europe andAsia. The question in the post-ColdWar world was, doesRussia intend to stand-alone, align itself with the West, or attempt to cobble——————

* First published in UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 10 (January 2006), available at: www.ucm.es/info/unisci** The author is grateful to anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier version of this article.


together an anti-American alliance with China and other states in Asia and theMiddle East?1 The search for a certain answer to strategic dilemmas of post-Soviet Russia made Moscow’s foreign policy highly unpredictable. As a resultRussia’s international behavior realigned several times during the 90’s, evolvingfrom integration into multipolar and institutionalized West to counter-balancingUS hegemony, NATO-centrism in Europe and opposing to “savage” economicglobalization.

Many observers considered that post-11 September cooperation betweenRussia and the US in removing the Taliban regime from Afghanistan andapparently Europe-first approach of Putin was a strategic option for Moscowthat intended to close a “black chapter” in relations with the West and to edify adefinitively new “strategic identity”. In line with this stream of thought expertsargued that President Putin’s policies in 2001 indicated that he wanted toreconstruct Russia’s identity and foreign policy. In particular it has beenmentioned that topics of multipolarity did not appear in president’s speechesoften, nor did the rhetoric of Russia as a great power; instead, Putin increasinglytalked about Russia’s integration into the world and Europe in particular. Inoverall evaluation, together with denunciations of isolation, European and globalintegration became the leitmotif of Putin’s most important security and foreignpolicy statements.2

But, when the dust settled in Afghanistan after US military operation, Russiaexternal behavior and not only rhetoric reveled in full Kremlin internationalcourse. Despite the obligatory equivocations, the Kremlin has neither forged anEU entente against America nor widened its “partnership for peace” withWashington. Instead, it has demanded concessions for the accession of formerSoviet bloc nations into the European Union, sniped at the West for NATOexpansion, conducted a mammoth nuclear exercise, announced the successfuldevelopment of a new ICBM to defeat America’s national missile defense, andvigorously sought to carve out “imperial” spheres of influence in Moldova,Georgia, and the CIS.3 All these give solid reasons to think that “integrationist”interpretation of Putin’s international strategy is one-sided and does not graspthe continuity of Russian strategic thinking. While unveiling Putin’s strongdesire for inclusion in the international community and selective engagementwith the West, this approach fails to capture the aspects of great power thinkingwhich guided his strategy from the very beginning. In his “manifesto” Putinmentioned about derjavnosti4 as one of Russian traditional values on which hasto be based Russia’s revival in the 21st century. Therefore, for Putin, Russia canrevive and successfully develop only as a great power recognized and respectedin the world. In this regard Putin warned the possible opponents to this idea ininternational community that it is too early to bury Russia as a great power.5

Having this in mind, integration and internationalization began playing adouble role in Putin’s strategy: the public diplomacy tool aimed to prove Russian“normality” and defuse any suspicion of the international community in regardto the possibility of facing a resurgent and very aggressive Russia; facilitator ofRussian economic modernization and means to recover the lost positions in

154 STANISLAV SECRIERU 2

some sectors of the world economy.6 In parallel with already mentioned rhetoricof integration and particular course of internationalization, Putin pursuesvigorously a strategy of power concentration7 at home and in the “near abroad”aimed at reestablishing Russia’s greatness, assuring state “real sovereignty”which was diminished under the chaotic Yeltsin rule8 and in this way increasingthe great power autonomy in relations with the most significant players of theinternational community. In short, combination between internationalization andpower concentration tactics has to assure Russia’s successful integration inworld community on its own terms and secure favorable place in the club ofgreat powers.

Behind integration/internationalization, on the one hand, and powerconcentration, on the other hand, there is reluctance to accept that integrationnecessarily entails a certain loss of national sovereignty and freedom of action.This could be explained partially by Russia’s self-perception for five centuriesas a great power, a vision that did not change radically during the last decade ofpolitical and economic transition. In this regard, Moscow desires the name,cache and material dividends of economic integration, but not at the cost of being“just another member” of a larger international community, subject to group dictates.9

Confirmation of this line of thinking could be found in the Medium-TermStrategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation andthe EU which underlines that as a world power situated on two continents,Russia should retain: its freedom to determine and implement its domestic andforeign policies; its status and advantages of a Euro-Asian state and the largestcountry of the CIS; independence of its position and activities at internationalorganizations.10 Therefore, the main foreign policy preoccupation of Russia isthe preservation of the statute of a freestanding actor in the international systemand the recognition of the CIS space as sphere of its vital interests.

Adopting this perspective, the post-11 September cooperation with the USwas regarded rather as a tactical move in order to tackle security problems on itssouthern flank and gain more leverage across entire CIS space than a long-termstrategy to align with the West. Putin could not prevent US military deploymentin Central Asia, therefore it was easier to adopt cooperative attitude rather thanto oppose it. In this regard, some commentators expressed the opinion thatPutin’s performance after 11 September attacks was praised perhaps beyondmerit, because it was the quickness of response rather than the quality ofcooperative effort that made the difference. Putin, preoccupied with the “greatpower status”, instantly saw a chance to increase international ratings by makinga few symbolic gestures and did not spoil this chance by untimely bargaining.11

More than that, by assuming cooperative attitude in case of the US interventionin Afghanistan, Russia sought to position itself as a great power in the “globalwar on terror”, by presumably fighting already international terrorism in theNorthern Caucasus. From Kremlin’s perspective, such a move has to provideinternational legitimacy and support for the so-called “anti-terrorist campaign”in Chechnya and future Russian government’s tough responses to terroristthreats inside the country as well as out of its borders. In addition, the US operation

3 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PUTIN THE “CIS PROJECT” 155

against the Taliban regime and terrorist networks, opened for Russia a windowof opportunity to diminish, if not totally neutralize, the threat of radical Islamspreading from Afghanistan in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Supporting theUS with information and the Northern Alliance with arms and other equipment,Russia contributed to the removal of a significant source of threats and in thisway managed to improve the fragile security in its soft underbelly.

In the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 terrorists attacks, the Kremlinhoped that the United States would recognize Russia as a “regional superpower”and provide an appropriate level of support so that Moscow could act asWashington’s proxy in Eurasia. The principal goal was to ensure that no otherEurasian state can obstruct Russian engagement with the outside world throughits territory and that no foreign troops were based anywhere in Eurasia unlesssuch a deployment occurs with Russian blessing.12 The so-called “logic of bigexchange” was also tested in relations with the EU. Putin persisted in his effortsto improve relations with Brussels and important European capitals, promisingas much oil and gas as Europe needs and selectively opening the country forEuropean investments in profitable sectors. In the same time, Moscow refusedto subdue its great power autonomy, denouncing any attempt of EU to interferein its internal affairs (economic policies or Chechen conflict) and positioningitself as a Europe’s gateway to the former Soviet Union. In this way, the relationwith EU has been seen like an element that will consolidate Russian positions inthe CIS.13

Overcoming an epoch of normative disarray, Russia under Putin adopted aview of autonomous and self-asserted international actor struggling to rebuildfaded greatness. In these circumstances, the CIS space has enough substance butalso a significant psychological value for Russian ruling elite. The re-birth of the“CIS project” meant, from normative point of view, the reproduction of Russia’scenturies old great power identity and the desire to maintain strategic independencein relations with other power centres. In practical terms, the renewal of the CISinitiatives implied Russia’s pro-active engagement in defence of highly challengedstatus quo in its periphery. While fortifying its positions, Kremlin intended tokeep safe its own backyard from “unauthorized” interference of outside powersin the CIS space. Having this in mind, Kremlin has concentrated on institutionalbuilding, Russian capital expansion, strengthening political ties with leaders,preserving military presence.

The very methods used to exercise influence and recover power positions inthe CIS space were in direct connection with the internal political evolutions inRussia. Consolidating “managed democracy” in Russia, under the label of strongstate, Putin supported “successor scenario” or re-election of favourable to theKremlin leaders in ex-Soviet states. Unlike Western counterparts, Moscow wasless critique in regard to violations of electoral legislation when its favourite wasabout to prevail over other candidates. Suppressing all-mighty oligarchs ofYeltsin era and placing trustful people in big state or even private companies,14Putin backed Russian business major takeovers of strategic sectors in the CISspace and often used state monopolies to punish disloyal leaders of ex-Soviet


republics. Rapid “militarisation” of power elites under Putin15 has also influencedRussian military strategy in the CIS space. While reducing participation inmilitary operations around the world, Russia increased substantially expendituresaimed to upgrade military infrastructure in the regions, considered in Kremlin,of vital interests for Russia. This is indicated by Moscow’s specific actionsaimed at beefing up military bases and installations in CentralAsia, Transcaucasusas well as in Transnistria, the Crimea, and Belarus.16

In the core of the “CIS project” there is an assumption that even if Russia ispoor and underdeveloped according to Western standards, it remains themetropolitan power of Eurasia; and as the leading power of the region, it iscommitted to a strategy that prevents any outside actor from undermining Russianinterests.17 That is why Russia behaved simultaneously as an old colonial powerin retreat and as a young expansionist state, as a guardian of the status quo andas a dynamic predator, while its policy style betrayed a fusion of superiority andinferiority.18

The guiding slogan of this strategy represented the famous quotation of tsarAlexander III displayed on the wall of the General Staff Academy in Moscowand that influenced the strategic identity of decision-makers: “Russia has onlytwo friends in the world, its army and its navy”. The remix version of thisquotation adapted to the new international environment envisaged that Russiahas only three friends in the world, its army, its energy monopolies, and pro-Russian orientated leaders in the CIS space.

Putin’s vector toward the post Soviet-space is widely accepted among thecountry elites and has total support not only of Russia’s great power adherents,but also in liberal-democratic circles.19 As Russian analyst Andrei Piontkovskiiproperly observed: “What unites the entire Russian elite is the idea of dominationor creation of an empire in the ex-Soviet space.”20 The best example is representedby the leader of the Union of Right Forces and godfather of privatization inRussia Anatoli Chiubais who declared that the Russia’s ideology in the 21stcentury should be liberal imperialism, and the main mission of Russia should bethe creation of a liberal empire. This project can be realized in his view throughthe expansion of the Russian business across the CIS space. Only as a liberalempire Russia can remain a great power and become equal to the United States,China, and the European Union.21

Thus, the problem of creating a new system of international relations in theformer Soviet space became one of the highest priorities for the Russianleadership. If we look carefully at president Putin’s annual speeches on the stateof the Federation, we will see that the Commonwealth of Independent Statesrepresents the top priority of the Russian foreign policy. Representative from thispoint of view is Putin’s speech onApril 18, 2002, which contained altogether nineparagraphs dealing with foreign affairs, and seven of them were dedicated to theso-called “near abroad.”22 The same attention is awarded to the CIS countries inofficial documents of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of NationalDefense, being recognized as the main priority of Russian foreign and securitypolicy and attributing to Russia the role of center of gravitation in the region.23


During the high profile meeting in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PresidentPutin sincerely explained in the best geopolitical traditions why the CIS space isof vital interest for Russian Federation and what has to be done in this area. Inhis address to Russian diplomats, President Putin urged them not to be distractedfrom events and policies in countries of the Commonwealth of IndependentStates. He declared that Russia was not using its influence to the full, includingthe historically formed credit of trust, friendship and strong ties linking ourpeoples. In conclusion he affirmed that there cannot be any vacuum in internationalrelations; the absence of an effective Russian policy in the CIS, or even anunreasonable pause in this area, will inevitably encourage other, more activestates, to fill this political space energetically. To prevent this scenario allresources should be directed towards the integration processes in inter-regionalorganizations, including the Eurasian Economic Union, later Eurasian EconomicCommunity and the Single Economic Space.24 Thus, the fusion of geopoliticaland geo-economic motives pushed Russia to employ institutional, political,military and last but not least economic instruments to hold the three-centuryborder between her and the outside world.

2. The “CIS Project” in Action

In order to prevent further political, economic and military fragmentation ofthe CIS space, Russia developed a new and multilevel institutional base, usingmainly the CIS summits only for bilateral talks and as a forum for exchange ofopinions between presidents.

In October 2002 Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan signed the founding documents of a Collective Security TreatyOrganization (CSTO), which were ratified later in 2003. The strategic conceptof this organization entailed the creation of three regional groups of forces: theWestern group that includes Russia and Belarus, the Caucasian group composedof Russia and Armenia; and the Central Asian group consisted of Russia,Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.25 Besides traditional military threats,the Charter of the CSTO stresses the commitment of its members to fightinternational terrorism and extremism, illegal trade of narcotics, psychotropicsubstances or arms, organized trans-national crime, and illegal migration.26

Also, in security matters, Russia partially used the terrorist threat to advanceits own interests in the CIS space and create new institutional networks. Playingon security fears in Central Asia connected to the spread of Islamic radicalism,Russia was pushing with papers and plans for multilateral structures. In 2000,Putin proposed the creation of the CIS Joint Counter-Terrorist Center based inMoscow, whose activities were supposed to be supervised by the director ofFSB.27 Later, after the establishment of this centre, the first regional division hasbeen opened in Bishkek covering Central Asian republics, except the neutralTurkmenistan. Kyrgyzstan was not randomly chosen, this republic hosting on itsterritory the headquarter of the rapid deployment forces of Collective SecurityTreaty and later of Collective Security Treaty Organization in Central Asia. Thus,


adoption during the CIS summits of common positions on international terrorismin combination with development of the CSTO and the CIS Joint Counter-TerroristCenter were seen in Kremlin not only as efficient tools for addressing Russia’ssecurity concerns, but also as means to prevent the centrifugal process amongformer-Soviet republics and to forge homogeneous military-security space underRussian leadership.

In September 2003, Presidents of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazahkstansigned a treaty on a Single Economic Space (SES) and the Concept of a SingleEconomic Space. The agreement on the creation of a Single Economic Spaceenvisaged the gradual formation of a highly integrated structure that wouldpromote a common macroeconomic policy; would harmonize the legislation ontrade, competition, and natural monopolies; and would promote the free movementof labour force, goods, services and capital.28 All these, according to the Russianside should culminate with the creation of a monetary union based on a commoncurrency, presumable the rouble.29

In the same year, Russia has promoted the development of the ShanghaiCooperation Organization (SCO), bringing together Russia, China and theCentral Asian republics as a more preferable alternative for enhancing collectivesecurity in the region than the US sponsored GUUAM30 grouping.31 Taking inconsideration Russian and Chinese concerns over the spread of radical Islam inthe region, Moscow and Beijing launched the initiative, called to develop thecounter-terrorist dimension inside the SCO.

Neither have been forgotten the separatist enclaves like Transnistria, Abkhazia,South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh that organized their own mini-CIS summitswith Moscow’s blessing coordinating actions of resistance to constitutionalauthorities, military and economic cooperation. In addition, separatist leaders havehad unlimited access to Russian central authorities that materialized in extensiveexchange of opinions with high-rank officials in Moscow and various forms ofmaterial support which made possible the survival of these out-law entities.

The new Russian institutionalism in the CIS space was doubled by particularsub-regional policies in Central Asia, South Caucasus and Western NewlyIndependent States.

2.1 Central AsiaIn order to promote and defend Russian regional interests, Putin launched a

more pragmatic, active and efficient course in relations with the Central Asianrepublics. Despite the fact that the new policy was constrained by the reducedamount of resources, Moscow managed to strengthen its positions in theregion.32According to the new orientation, Russia pursued the following objectivesin the Central Asia: stability in the region based on cooperation with all fiverepublics; guarantee for Russia’s access to and transit of resources via theterritory of the Asian republics; creation of a single economic space that willfacilitate economic modernization of Russia; preservation of the geo-strategicposition in the region in order to maintain the great power status; recognition ofRussia’s leading role in the region.33


Implementation of these objectives is based on three relatively separateintrigues. One centers on the vast hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian area andthe pipelines that carry oil and natural gas to the world markets; the secondrevolves around the military responses available in addressing the challenge ofIslamic terrorism; the third involves building and consolidating a network ofpersonal ties with the capricious Central Asian rulers.34

On the economic front, especially concerning gas and oil reserves, Russianpolicy registered significant success. Actually, Moscow has played the oil gamewith a remarkable reserve and an uncharacteristic precision. Gazprom waseffectively playing a leading role for Russian foreign policy in the region,negotiating deals for the long-term supply of gas through its pipeline system.35

A ten-year agreement was signed with Kazakhstan in November 2001, andwith Uzbekistan in January 2002 for the joint extraction and export of fuels. Asset forth in the agreement with Uzbekneftgaz, by 2010 there should be adoubling of gas piped from Uzbekistan to Russia; such shipments stood at 5billion cubic meters in 2003. In May 2002, Gazprom and KazMunayGaz createdthe KazRosGaz joint venture for the purchase of gas from Kazakhstan and itssale in the CIS and beyond. The goal was to dissuade Nazarbaev from buildinga trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Already in 2002 Russia was trading export pipelineaccess to Turkmenistan in return for shares in gas development projects. Forexample, the United Arab Emirates’ Dragon Oil and Malaysia’s Petronas wereforced to give some of their shares in Turkmen off-shore gas field to Russia’sZarubezhneft and Itera in return for export pipelines access. Russia’s oil majorshave also increased their level of activity in the region. Lukoil has invested onebillion dollars in Kazakhstan. The company owns a 15 percent stake in theKarachaganak gas condensate field, a 50 percent stake in Turgay venture(Kumkol field), a 5 percent stake in TengizChevrOil (Tengiz oil field), and a 12.5percent stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.36 In May 2002 Russia hasstruck a bilateral deal with Kazakhstan regarding demarcation of the Caspianseabed.37 In November 2002 after Russia blessed the brutal crackdown onopposition which followed the failed assassination against President Niyazov,the Turkmenbashy rewarded Russia with a 25 year deal to buy Turkmen gas at amere $44 per 1000 cubic meters half the price Russia gets for its own gas inEurope. Moreover, only half of the $44 will be paid in cash, the rest in barter.38

Also Russia invested considerable energy into upgrading the competingTengiz–Novorossiisk (TN) pipeline, which opened for business in mid-2001.Without much emotion, Russian officials continue emphasizing that its capacitycould be doubled by 2006, at only a fraction of the cost of constructing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline through several conflict-ridden regions. As it becameclear that there was not enough oil in the Azeri sector (contested as its borderswill probably remain), Kazakhstan will be the new focus point in energy competition.And it is exactly at this point that Russia has several political strings to pull.Putin’s visit to Astana in January 2004, accompanied by Lukoil President VagitAlekperov demonstrated his readiness to expand the existing cooperation andexemplary personal chemistry between him and Nazarbaev. If indeed Kazakh oil


flows along the politically convenient and economically efficient Russian lines,Moscow would have every reason to be satisfied with the outcome of energyresources game.39

Concerning military issues, Moscow launched a diplomatic offensive to regainpositions weakened by the penetration of the US in Central Asia. Putin himselfvisited Kyrgyzstan in December 2002, and inApril 2003 met President NursultanNazarbaev in Omsk and President Saparmurat Niyazov in Moscow. The mainfruit of these endeavors was Bishkek’s willingness to grant Russia a militarybase, under the auspices of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. On 23 October2003, Putin personally inaugurated the Russian base at Kant that would house700 servicemen and about 20 aircraft, operating for the Collective RapidResponse Forces, at an estimated cost of $150 million a year.40 The military basein Kant already has been equipped with 10 aircrafts SU-27 and SU-24, 2transport aircrafts and a few helicopters.41 In this way, Russia intends to counter-balance US/NATO base at Manas. Hence, also the intensification of Russianefforts to advance arms exports to Central Asia, most notably through the sale ofaircrafts to Kazakhstan42 and opening of the biggest military base outsideRussian borders in the suburbs of Dushanbe in late 2004, an action that subscribedto Moscow’s efforts to strengthen its positions in the region.43

On the political level and personal ties with the leaders of the Central Asianrepublics, Kremlin’s strategy performed efficiently. In spite of the US militarypresence, within a few short years, Moscow has recovered most of its lost influenceand even managed to acquire new levels of political control. The institution-building activities (CSO and SES) emphasized strengthening bilateral ties, primarilyat the top level. In addition to official state visits, President Putin consistentlyused multilateral gatherings for a series of tête-à-tête meetings, granting thegreatest priority to Kazakhstan, but emphasizing also the value of alliances withKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, paying due respect to Uzbekistan and not forgettingthe self-isolating Turkmenistan. During his first term, he held more than a dozenpersonal meetings with each of the Central Asian leaders (with the exception ofTurkmenbashi), expressing criticism neither of their increasingly despotic rulenor of the legitimacy of the referenda on extending their respective terms inoffice.44

2.2 The South CaucasusUnder Putin, Russia has not abandoned the South Caucasus and behaved as

a status quo power. The North and South Caucasus were seen by Moscow asinterlinked security regions. In this sense, ensuring Russian security in the north(in the context of multiplication of attacks organized by radical Islamic paramilitarytroops in Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karaceaevo-Cerkessia and North Ossetia)demanded an active policy further to the south. However, Russian thinking hasshifted away from the tight association between military presence and protectionof Russian interests. This linkage has not been abandoned entirely, as Russiaretains bases in Georgia and a large contingent in Armenia to freeze the militarystatus quo. The focus of Russian policy has become increasingly geo-economic


and the interests have been promoted through active economic and diplomaticmeasures.45

Russian policy towards South Caucasian republics has concentrated on threeinterconnected issues: first, the terrorist threat (misused to get the desired politicaloutcomes); second, the interests of Russian state and of the oil companies in thebroader geo-economic perspective (expansion of Russian business); finally,Russia’s ability to project military force for conflict management (maintenanceof military bases and build up in Caspian Sea).46

The strategic alliance withArmenia, especially after the revolution in Georgia,has deepened in economic and military terms. Armenia continued to play therole of the host to a several Russian bases and several thousand Russian troops,who patrol Armenia’s border with Turkey and Iran. During the Georgianpolitical crisis in November 2003, the Russian and Armenian defence ministerssigned agreements deepeningmilitary cooperation,Yerevan remaining in Kremlin’sopinion the only true ally in the South Caucasus.47

On another front, Russia has staged a takeover of a number of Armenia’seconomic arteries, a move that has not encountered serious obstacles due to anenormous debt to Russia of $98 million. As a part of debt settlement scheme,Russia was given productive assets in the military-industrial area. Specifically,the Hrazdan thermal power plant, the Mars electronic plant, and three research-and-production enterprises: for mathematical machines, for the study of materials,and for automated control systems.48 Thus,Armenia wiped out entirely its externaldebt to Russia.

In February 2003 Russia and Armenia reached a decision to transfer thefinancial flow of the nuclear station to UES of Russia. On September 17, 2003the government of Armenia agreed to turn over the nuclear station to thetrusteeship of the Russian energy holding. And, in August 2003 Armenia signedan agreement with UES to transfer the property complex of Sevan-Razdansky inorder to cancel debts owed for deliveries of nuclear fuel for the ArmyanskayaNuclear Station. Thus, almost the entire energy complex of the republic haspassed to the control of UES of Russia.49 In other sectors, Russian financialinstitutions, often under ethnicArmenian management, were slowly moving intoArmenia’s banking and insurance segment of economy.50

Putin reoriented Russian policy away from a more or less malign neglect ofAzerbaijan.51 Putin sealed better relations with Azerbaijan during a Moscowvisit by President GeidarAliev in January 2002. Russia signed a visa-free agreementwithAzerbaijan (unlike Georgians, who require visas to visit Russia since March2001). As a quid pro quo, Baku leased the strategic Gabala early-warning radarstation to Russia for another ten years and participated in the large-scale navalexercise organized by Russia in the Caspian Sea. In the past, Moscow hadaccused Azerbaijan of sheltering some Chechen rebels, but Aliev promptlycondemned the Nord Ost hostage raid in October 2002 and closed the office ofChechen rebel president Aslan Maskhadov’s representative in Baku.52

In September 2002 Russia has struck a deal with Azerbaijan regarding thedemarcation of the Caspian seabed and lifted off, al least formally, its opposition


to the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. As a reward, in 2003Russian capital has been allowed in the transport system of Azerbaijan; theformer deputy minister of roads and communication, Aleksandr Annenkov hasincorporated Anshil in its joint venture.53 After the death of Geidar Aliev, Russiaquickly expressed its total support for Ilham Aliev who was formally elected asPresident in October 2003. In February 2004 the newly elected president paid avisit to Moscow, during which both heads of states agreed to expand bilateralcooperation in the military sphere. After the scandal around the failed attempt toprivatize the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), by a groupof Western investors,54 President Putin expressed the interests of Russian statecompanies in Azerbaijan’s energy sector. However, the Nagorno-Karabakhconflict and Russian one-sided position remains a trouble issue in bilateralrelations between Moscow and Baku.55

In comparison with Armenia or even Azerbaijan, Moscow’s relations withTbilisi have evolved in the opposite direction. Seriously alarmed by the USmilitary deployment in Georgia, Russia has deliberately escalated the terroristthreat in Pankisi Gorge.56 The crisis reached culmination in September 2002when Moscow issued an ultimatum to Tbilisi and started planning for militarystrikes. The Russian president announced his order to the General Staff to prepareplans for a military operation against an alleged “safe heaven” for Chechenterrorists in the remote and inaccessible Georgian region. However, in a coupleof weeks, a face-saving compromise was achieved under considerable internationalpressure. Careful examination of that mini-crisis confirms that Moscow was notso much confronting a terrorist challenge as exploiting to put pressure onGeorgia and to influence the outcome of the predictable chaotic post-Shevardnadze political transition. The Russian leadership was nevertheless takenby surprise by the sharp escalation of political crisis in Tbilisi in November2003, and therefore opted for a cautious line, implicitly encouraging Adzharia’sseparatism and expecting the new leadership (too pro-Western in its option) tofail to establish a modicum of order.57 Rejecting the myth of a popular and velvetrevolution, Moscow called on the Euro-Atlantic community to avoid rushing tohail the still untested leadership in Tbilisi. Moscow also denounced the notionthat events in Georgia might be a model for other post-Soviet states, such asUkraine.58

Even after the removal in spring 2004 of the local authoritarian leaderAbashidzeand reintegration of Adzharia in Georgia, Russian strategy on the preservation ofdeadlocks in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts did not change. On thecontrary, during the summer of 2004 Kremlin actively opposed to any attemptsof Tbilisi authorities to bring back two separatist regions. In July 2004, Moscowopenly supported South Ossetia in a mini-crisis with Tbilisi government and wasdirectly implicated in the presidential elections in Abkhazia in November 2004that transformed into a disaster. In a desperate move to impose its favorite, Kremlinintroduced sanctions against pro-Russian Abkhazia.59 In the end, opposition leaderSerghei Bagapsha became president and Rauli Hadjimba (Kremlin’s favorite)vice-president of self-proclaimed Abkhazian republic.


In the economic sphere, Russian business aggressively penetrated Georgia,mainly in the energy sector. UES of Russia bought the Georgian assets of theAmericanAES Group. These include a 75 percent interests in the Tbilisi energy-distributing firm, Telasi, two electric generating stations in Tbilisi (capacity 600megawatts), 50 percent of shares of AES-Transenergy, which delivers electricityto Turkey and has management rights in Khramesi. The latter company ownstwo hydroelectric power stations (capacity 223 megawatts). Thus, the Russianholding obtained 20 percent of Georgian market for electricity production and35 percent of its power distribution system. Significantly, the Russian monopolisthas control over all private and industrial users in Tbilisi, to whom it may nowdictate the terms. In 2003 Gazprom got the right to participate in the managementof Georgia’s gas pipelines. To carry out this task Gazprom and the InternationalGas Corporation of Georgia intend to create a joint enterprise for exploiting andconstructing gas pipelines and for operations in other sphere of the gas industry.60In the financial sector, Russian Vneshtorgbank became the main shareholder ofthe biggest commercial bank in Georgia. As for transport, Aeroflot was preparinga takeover of the Georgian private airline company “Aerzena”.61

2.3 Western Newly Independent StatesRussia followed the same patterns of behavior but much more assertive in

relations with WNIS. The transformation of these states in 2004 into immediateneighborhood of NATO and EU increased the stakes of the game and requestedpro-active political and economic policies in order to keep strong positions in theWNIS, obstruct engagement of these states with Euro-Atlantic community andback the government’s project of a Single Economic Space and initiatives insideCollective Security Treaty Organization.

In accordance to the new strategy, Putin backed the expansion of Russianbusiness interests in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus to counter balance those ofEuropean and American companies present in these countries and to assuretakeover over profitable and strategic industries. Having the support of thegovernments, representatives of Russian business managed to buy on discount pricehighly competitive enterprises. This brought not only a number of major deals,but achieved something more important — control over the strategic sectors ofthe economy and infrastructures of the states.

For instance, Russian investors have shown their interest in an enterprise inthe heavy-industry sector — Moldova Cable factory, which was acquired laterin full form by Saint Petersburg’s SevCable for $1.7 million. Another suchtakeover in the Moldovan market involved the republic’s agricultural sector,main sources of state revenues. In early 2003 the Moscow Inter-republicanWine-making Factory completed its purchase of the wine-related Calarascomplex for $3.7 million. Moscow Inter-republic belongs to Bank of Moscow,that is, the new owner of the enterprise is the Moscow city government. Anothersector, which attracted attention to the so-called “Russian investors”, wasevidently electric energy and its infrastructure. In October 2003 UES of Russiaheaded by Anatoli Chiubais held talks with the government of Moldova and


Trans-Dniester separatist authorities on taking part in privatization of theMoldovanelectric utility.62

In Belarus and Ukraine, Russia directed its efforts towards the communicationand energy sectors, and heavy industries. Thus, Russian mobile communicationMTS has consolidated 83.7 percent of the Ukrainian market and needed only tocomplete the purchase of TDS’s 16.3 percent share to become 100 percent ownerof Ukrainian Mobile Communication. In accordance to its strategy to becomethe main supplier of GSM services across the whole of the post-Soviet landscape,MTS planed to increase its holdings in the Belarus cell phone firm MTS-Belarusto a controlling interest.63

More obstacles have been encountered by Moscow in privatization of theenergy sector or heavy industries in Belarus and Ukraine. The first controversialissue represented the privatization of the natural gas transit system in Ukraine.Initially, Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko and the deputy Prime Ministerresponsible for energy, Yulia Tymoshenko, initiated the overdue reform onUkraine’s gas sector, preparatory for its privatization with both Western andRussian partners. The Kremlin responded by colluding with pro-Kuchma oligarchiccircles in Ukraine to outset that reformist government and proposed the creationof a joint venture with a substantial Russian share in it. Needing Putin’s supportfor a “successor scenario” and being joined by the Ukrainian faction of oligarchsin connection to Kremlin, which seemed to favor the gas consortium agreementin their own interests, Kuchma struck the deal under which Ukraine’s gas transitsystem would be turned over to a joint Russian-Ukrainian venture, on a paritybasis with the possibility of involving international capital. The agreementsigned in October 2002 is valid for 30 years, plus a five-year automatic extensionperiod, with further negotiable prolongation.64 Later, Russian investors took partin privatization of Ukratatnafta, company Oriana and Krivorojstali, the last onesparking a huge scandal because of grave procedural irregularities.65

In Belarus, Russian business has not managed to take control of the energysystem, oil refining and petrochemicals and brewing. Only by the end of 2005Moscow scored substantial gains in Belarus gas sector. Initially Minsk’s refusalto cede in front of Moscow’s economic offensive provoked in January 2004 apolitical scandal between the two states, members of the Union Russia-Belarus.President Lukashenko refused to sell shares of Beltransgaz to Gazprom for $600million, declaring that international auditors evaluated the company’s price to $5billion.66 As a result Russia suspended its gas exports to Belarus. Kremlindispatched urgently to Minsk a state commission to negotiate with Belarusgovernment and after a few days supplies have been re-established. The dealconcerning the privatization of Beltransgaz remained unresolved until 2005. InDecember, after several unsuccessful attempts, Russia in exchange of pricesbelow market rates, barter and debt relief, gained control over Belarus section ofthe Yamal-Europe network which delivers approximately 10 per cent of Russiangas exports to European consumers.

Economic penetration inWNIS was backed by Russia’s diplomatic offensive.In this regard, definitive settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in Russian terms


should complete Moldova’s transformation into political and economic satellite.On 3 July 2002 a draft agreement proposing to turn Moldova into a federationwas made public in Kiev during the five-sided negotiations format betweenMoldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE. The draft was initiallysubmitted by the OSCE, but, as it was revealed later on, Russia was the mainauthor of the agreement. Originating in the Moscow Memorandum conceived in1997 by Russia’s minister of foreign affairs Yevgeny Primakov, the initiativesought to place federalized Moldova, internally and externally, under theoversight of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE. However, this arrangement intendedto ensure multiple Russian representations in Moldova. This was due to somestrong reasons: Russia’s veto power in the OSCE; the absence of Westerncountries and especially of Romania as a direct neighbor from the mediating/guarantor group; Russia’s involvement in the conflict on the side of Russianlanguage minority.67

Later in 2002, Russia proved its ability to influence the OSCE decisions onthe Moldovan issue. At the ministerial meeting held in Portugal in December2002, the OSCE extended the deadline for the withdrawal of remaining troopsand ammunitions to the end of 2003, but potentially for a longer period, giventhe introduction, on Russia’s insistence, of a special clause. In accordance withit, the withdrawal will be conducted if necessary conditions are in place.68 Also,the OSCE new document only acknowledged Russia’s intention to withdraw thetroops, not its obligation any longer.

On November 17, 2003, bypassing the OSCE process and with only ten daysbefore the Maastricht summit, Russia launched its own plan for the resolution ofthe Transnistrian conflict. Dmitri Kozak, a senior figure of President Putin’sstaff, promoted the text of this plan diplomatically. The memorandum proposedthe basic principles of a new constitution for what would become the FederalRepublic of Moldova. Kozak’s memorandum envisaged the creation of a politicalentity consisting of a federal territory and two subjects of the Federation — theTransnistrian Moldovan Republic and Gagauzi Yeri. The federal territory wouldconsist of the rest of Moldova, excluding these two subjects.

On November 24, Moldovan presidential press service announced thatPresident Putin would visit Moldova on Tuesday December 25, expecting thatthe Kozak memorandum would be signed that day by President Voronin. OnNovember 25, it was announced that President Putin’s visit had been cancelled.Under internal and external pressure, President Voronin refused to sign theRussian sponsored plan, marking the first significant diplomatic defeat of Putinin WNIS.69 It was an important warning to Kremlin, which was contemplating asuccessor scenario for the more strategically important Ukraine.

Russia entered 2004 with a huge handicap in bilateral relations with Ukrainedue to the territorial dispute in Kerchy Strait, which connects Black and AzovSeas and separates in the same time Crimea from the Russian Taman Peninsula.Invoking ecological concerns, the authorities of Krasnodarsky Kray launched inSeptember 2003 the project of building of a dam, meant to restore the damagedseaboard of Taman Peninsula, omitting to say that such a move can incorporate


the Tuzla Island into Russian Federation’s territory. The order was given fromKremlin when somebody explained to president Putin that until 1925 there wasno island, but only the Taman Peninsula. Therefore, in order to restore the“historical justice” and to accompany the move of building a new base inNovorossiisk, local authorities began their work. In this way, Russia challengedthe territorial integrity of Ukraine and was seeking to obtain a bilateral exerciseof sovereignty over Kerchy Straight, preventing any foreign intrusion in AzovSea. Moscow’s unfriendly behavior inflamed spirits in Kiev and as a result theUkrainian authorities responded by dispatching military troops on Tuzla Islandand the most extremist voices in the Ukrainian Rada proposed not to ratify theAgreement on a Single Economic Space so praised by Russian president.

But, a few months before the elections in Ukraine, Kremlin threw all its might(financial assistance, TV state channels, PR specialists, pop singers, members ofparliament) in support of the Yanukovich camp, backed also by Kuchma. InAugust, the Russian government proposed the bill on tax exemption for oil andgas exports in countries members of the Single Economic Space, reducing in thisway the price of fuels for Ukraine, Belarus, Kazahkstan and causing to Russianbudget a hole in approximately $1 billion.70 The offensive on the Ukrainiandirection was followed by President Putin’s two high-profile forays in Kiev,openly campaigning for the pro-Moscow Prime Minister Yanukovich. After thesecond round of the presidential elections, Putin hurried to congratulate thelatter from Brazil, where he was in visit, before the official announcement of theelection results. Later on, Kremlin refused to consider the elections as a fraudand denounced in a Cold War style rhetoric the US and EU aggressiveintervention in Ukraine’s internal affairs.71 Neither the deployment of BorisGryzlov, speaker of the Russian State Duma, nor the urgent meeting betweenKuchma, in Moscow airport, and Putin, helped Russia to prevent the mosthumiliating defeat in the CIS space since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Failure in Ukraine seriously discredited Kremlin’s foreign policy and incombination with the Georgian revolution and Moldova’s reorientation, put the“CIS project” under a big question, especially on its European front. From normativepoint of view, events in Kiev, which once was the hard-core of the Russian state,questioned the very idea of Russia’s great power identity. Therefore, despite itspragmatic nature, Russian multivectorness unveiled for Kremlin at least twoserious challenges related to the CIS space. Firstly, Russia’s assertive behaviourtoward its neighbors was likely to provoke serious political crisis in relationswith the West, which remains essential for Moscow in addressing securityissues, for instance in the Northern Caucasus or Central Asia and economicproblems linked to modernization or accession to WTO. Secondly, mismatchbetween even revisited ambitions, reduced to the ex-Soviet area and the amountof resources available, in combination with the rise of very attractive andpowerful actors in Eurasia, raised serious doubts over the sustainability of the“CIS project” in the medium and long term. Implementation of Russian militaryand economic projects in the CIS space requires a huge amount of resources andit is hard to imagine how a country with armed forces in rapid degradation and


an economy based on natural resources could perform successfully the functionof a regional center of gravity.

To understand what went wrong Putin called immediately for the re-evaluation of the entire Russian policy in the CIS space. At the beginning of2005, Kremlin on many occasions announced the conclusions it reached andadopted measures that put new accents in the implementation of the “CISproject”.

3. 2005 and Beyond It: “CIS Project” Reasserted

Implementation of the “CIS project” did not go very smoothly, Moscowconstantly discovered obstacles on its way. Since 2003, the Russian project hasbeen tested externally by much deeper infiltrations of other dynamic regionalplayers in the Russian “near abroad” and internally by the process of replacementof power elites in ex-Soviet republics with direct impact over strategic orientationsof these countries. Russian leadership perceived these as a well-organized plotof the West aimed to weaken Moscow’s positions in the CIS.

Revealing in this sense are the commentaries made by Nikolai Patrushev,chief of FSB, who accused “certain political forces” in the Western countries ofbehaving in the “worst Cold War traditions” and applying double standards toRussia. According to Patrushev, a man from Putin inner circle, Russia’s opponentsare seeking to “purposefully and consistently” weaken Russian influence in theCIS, in particular, and in the international arena in general. The recent events inGeorgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, in his opinion, are a clear proof of thispernicious trend. In the end, he linked the growing rivalry between Russia andthe West to Russia’s increasing economic might and the unwillingness of mostdeveloped countries to let Russia become a “serious economic competitor”.72

Seen in this light, US under the cover of global war on terrorism and spreadof democratic values, seek to undermine Russia’s positions in the former Sovietrepublics, encircle it and in this way deny the strategic independence of Moscowon the world scene.73 Further more, according to Kremlin perception, the EUbehaviour in WNIS and South Caucasus is nothing else than an experiment fortesting mechanisms and efficiency of its Common Foreign and Security Policyin new neighbourhood.74 Nevertheless, the US and EU “unfriendly” attitude towardsthe ex-Soviet republics and the “orange” elites strategic “blindness” do not discourageRussia, which have to be patient and prepare for long game in the CIS.75

In this sense, Modest Kolerov, the head of the newly created presidentialdepartment for inter-regional and cultural ties with the foreign states, observedthat following the EU’s deep crisis, it became clear that, for the countries in thewestern part of the CIS and in the South Caucasus, the chances of joining therich bloc even in the long-term are nil. Thus, the gradual crumbling of the“orangemythology” on the one hand, and Russia’s remaining economic and politicalleverage on the other, a window of opportunity will open up for Moscow tostrengthen its positions in the post-Soviet lands.76 This opinion has been echoedin academic circles, which in their turn appreciated EU’s activities in the CIS for


the most part as having a “virtual” character and due to systemic crisis expect todevote less attention from EU to its external surroundings.77

As far as concerns the US involvement in the CIS, Kremlin assumes thatWashington will follow EU’s fate. Due to the US military, political and economicover-commitment inAfghanistan and Iraq,Washington is on the edge of overstretch.Thus, because the US efforts are totally absorbed by the Greater Middle East, theformer Soviet space could not represent in the long run a top priority for the WhiteHouse.Moreover, US feel the necessity to have Russia on its side in anti-terrorist andnon-proliferation initiatives that is why Moscow for the foreseeable future will be avaluable partner for Washington on various international security issues.

Once these conclusions have been drawn, Kremlin decided at the beginningof 2005 to pursue the same policy line in the CIS, but this time more vigorously,punishing for betrayal the “rebel” leaders and rewarding those who are ready toprotect and respect unconditionally the Russian interests. Overcoming the defeatin Ukraine, Putin created a presidential department, which under the cover ofinter-regional and cultural ties with foreign states, took over the relations withthe CIS countries. Anticipating the further reorientation of Chisinau authoritiestowards theWest, Russia tried to sabotage the parliamentary elections in Moldovaand promote in power leaders with strong connections in the Russian businesscircles. Punishing for political reorientation, Moscow artificially staged theenergy crisis in Ukraine suspending for a few days its exports of oil to this countryand banned the import of agricultural products from Moldova.

Immediately after the popular uprising in Andijan, when Uzbek authoritieshave been under pressure for gross human right violations, Moscow rapidlythrown its support behind Islam Karimov. This move paid off valuable dividendsin the months that followed, Uzbekistan demanding evacuation of US militarybase from its territory, concluding extremely favourable economic deals forMoscow and, in the end sealing a military alliance with Russia, under the termsof which aggression against one country will be treated as attack on both partieswith all further consequences.78 In order to use the full window of opportunity,Russia tries to bring Uzbekistan in the CSTO and the Eurasian EconomicCommunity by 2006.

On the economic front, Moscow successfully completed agreements withTurkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan until 2010–2015, which give itvirtual control over the export of their products through Russian pipelines.Specifically, these agreements represent the virtual completion of Russia’ssuccessful efforts to organize a gas cartel of producers wherein it would dominatethe export of CIS natural gas and obtain a stranglehold over the economies of thegas-producing and consuming states in the CIS. This implies that Moscow nolonger will have a competitor who can challenge its price setting capabilitieswith regard to natural gas form within the CIS. This cartel also will havesignificant repercussions for other major consumers like Europe, China andpotentially India.79

On the institutional level, Russia reenergized its efforts in the implementationof the provisions of the treaty on the Single Economic Space using the last CIS


summit in Kazan for a new round of talks and signing documents that allowupgrading economic relations. The initiative to create a bank inside the EurasianEconomic Community by 2006 that will finance substantial investments projects,made some experts to discuss the possibility of using the Russian ruble as acommon currency between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

In the security and military domain, Russia favoured the rapprochement withChina under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, refusing inthe same time the status of observer in the organization to the US. Beinginvolved in a tug-of-war over military bases in CentralAsia, Russia pushed insidethe SCO for member states a common stance against the US military presenceand organized a high-scale anti-terrorist exercise with China, which looked moreas Cold War conventional deterrence in the US address. Also, Kremlin pressedfor an inter-institutional cooperation between CSTO and NATO, instead of anindividual approach promoted by theAlliance in relations with the former Sovietrepublics. During last meeting of CSTO foreign ministers in Moscow, has beensigned agreement on establishing joint peacekeeping forces, a body Russia hopesto develop into mobile forces similar to those of NATO. To encourage partnersKremlin promised gas and arms on discount prices and offered its assistance intraining of such forces.

Nor have been forgotten the pro-Russian separatist enclaves in the CIS space,which under the close supervision of Modest Kolerov organized a record numberof summits in 2005. As a response to Georgian and Moldovan efforts to press forthe solution of conflicts on their territory and the withdrawal of Russian troops,Kremlin used these summits to neutralize any diplomatic initiative that goesagainst Russian interests and to coordinate activities that will keep intactnegotiations mechanism dominated by Moscow.

Finally in a tactical move aimed apparently to soothe relations with West,Kremlin announced intention to set up “civilized” rules for managing ongoinggeopolitical competition in Eurasia between Russia, the United States and theEuropean Union. By inviting to so-called “civilized” rule of the game over theheads of the political leaders, institutions and populations of the countries in theformer Soviet space, Moscow intended to discredit and diminish respect forWestern power and influence and in the same time to obtain recognition ofRussian sphere of influence in CIS space. Further more, some experts areinclined to think that Russian strategy may be to try and constrict the US andWestern interests by shifting Eurasian initiatives through a US-Russian dialogue,which would flow through the Kremlin.80

Conclusion

Political developments in 2005 proved that despite significant setbacksprovoked by the colour revolutions and the infiltration of many attractive playersin the CIS, Kremlin decided to keep the course and to defend firmly the highlycontested status quo in former Soviet space. Preserving the deeply rooted inRussian strategic thinking mentality of a fortress under a constant siege, Kremlin


still rates the “near abroad” as the main foreign policy priority. From this pointof view, hegemony in the CIS space has to prevent the construction of a hostile“cordone sanitare” around Russia and consequently its isolation. Because forRussia the “near abroad” is, also, about the reproduction of great power identity, themaintenance of such a cherished strategic independence and survival in thesuper league of world powers, the “CIS project” will remain in the core of theRussian foreign policy preoccupations for the foreseeable future and will continueto drain the biggest part of Russia’s resources. However, having enough residualpower to influence the evolutions in the former Soviet republics in the shortterm, Russia, due to lack of financial resources and coordination capacity, wouldnot be able in the medium and long term to develop successfully the economicor security projects in its immediate periphery. Despite Russia’s determinationto play a dominant role in the “near abroad”, the CIS countries will look morepersistently outward, opening, in this way, the region to a greater influence ofhighly dynamic international actors. Consequently, further political, military andeconomic diversification of the CIS space will precipitate the decline ofKremlin’s influence across the former Soviet republics, a fact that will challengedecisively Russia’s great power identity and its place on the world scene.

NOTES


1. Trenin, Dmitri: ”The Russian Angle”, in Goodby,James; Buwalda, Petrus and Trenin, Dmitri (eds.)(2002): A Strategy for Stable Peace: Toward aEuroatlantic Security Community, United StatesInstitute for Peace, Washington, D.C., pp. 35–36.

2. See Zevelev, Igor: “Russian and AmericanNational Identity, Foreign Policy, and BilateralRelations”, International Politics, Vol. 39, No. 4(December 2002), pp. 447–465.

3. Rosefielde, Steven (2005): “The Miasma ofGlobal Engagement”, inRussia in the 21st Century.The Prodigal Superpower. Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, pp. 112–116.

4. Derjavnosti (great-powerness) means that Russiawas and despite temporary difficulties will remaina great power.

5. For more on Putin’s vision of Russia in the 21stcentury see “Putin, Vladimir: “Rossya na RubejeTysyaceletii” [Russia on the Threshold ofMillenniums],Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 December1999.

6. This is a strategy very similar to the one promotedby minister of foreign affairs in tsarist RussiaAleksandr Gorchakov. For more on similarities inGorchakov and Putin foreign policy approachessee Splidsboel-Hansen, Flemming: “Past andFuture Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and RussianForeign Policy”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54,No. 3 (May 2002), pp. 389–390. In a reportaddressed to Aleksandr II, Gorchakov presented

the main priorities of Russian foreign policybetween 1856–1867, among these: to overcomeisolation, create favorable conditions for internalreforms, to minimize risks for Russia to beinvolved in high scale war operations. For moreon Gorchakov’s foreign policy activity seeLopatnikov, Viktor (2004): Piedestal. Vremya iSlujenie Kantslera Gorciakova [Podium. Timeand Service of Chancellor Gorchakov]. Moskva,Molodaya Gvardiya.

7. For more on combination of internationalizationand power concentration elements in Putin’sinternational strategy see Tsygankov, Andrei P.:“Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a NormalGreat Power”, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 2(April/June 2005), pp. 132–158.

8. “Real sovereignty” means that the state is free toindependently determine its domestic, foreignand defense policies, enter into unions and leavethem, form strategic partnerships or stay awayfrom them, etc. For more detailed explanationsof the concept and level of Russia’s realsovereignty see Kokoshin,Andrei: “What is Russia:A Superpower, a Great Power or a RegionalPower?”, International Affairs: A RussianJournal of World Politics, Diplomacy &International Relations, Vol. 48, No. 6 (2002),pp. 103–104.

9. Lo, Bobo (2003): “The Economic Agenda”, inVladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian

Foreign Policy. London, Blackwell Publishing,pp. 51–71.

10. Medium-term Strategy for Development ofRelations between the Russian Federation andthe European Union (2000–2010), in http://www.europa.eu.int/com/external_relations/russia/russian_medium_term_strategy/index.htm.

11. Opinion expressed by Baev, Pavel: “PutinReconstitutes Russia’s Great Power Status”,Ponars Policy Memo, No. 318 (November 2003),pp. 2–3.

12. Gvosdev, Nikolas K.: “The Sources of RussianConduct”,National Interest, No. 75 (Spring 2004),pp. 33–35.

13. Lynch, Dov: “Russia’s Strategic Partnership withEurope”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, No.2 (Spring 2004), pp. 99–118.

14. Among people from Putin close circles who arein charge of important Russian companiesAlekesei Miller head of Gazprom, SergeiBogdanchikov president of Rosneft, ViktorIvanov curator of Aeroflot and the Almaz-Anteiair defense systems holding company, NikolaiTokarev head of Zarubezhneft, Sergei Chemezovhead of Rosoboroneksport (which acquiredAvtoVAZ), Andrei Belianinov head of theFederal Arms Procurement Service, VladimirSmirnov head of Teknsnabeksport (controls overa third of the world’s uranium product market).

15. “Militarisation” of power elites implies hugeinflux of ex-militaries or security service officersin federal or regional power structures. For anextensive sociological analysis on “militarisation”of power elites in Russia and consequences ofthis process see Kryshtanovskaya, Olga (2005):Anatomiya Rossiiskoi Elity [Anatomy of RussianElite]. Moskva, Zaharov.

16. Muhin, Vladimir: “Sila kak InstrumentVneshnepoliticheskogo Vliyanya” [Force asInstrument of Foreign Political Influence],Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 October 2005.

17. See Gvosdev, op. cit., p. 34.18. Characterization given by Pavel Baev to the

Russian behavior in the North and South Caucasusfits perfectly the general approach across the CISspace. Baev, Pavel: “Russia’s Policies in the Northand South Caucasus” in Lynch, Dov (eds.) (2003):The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU,Chaillot Papers, No. 65 Paris, EU Institute forSecurity Studies, pp. 41–51.

19. Shevtsova, Lilia (2005): “From OligarchicAuthoritarianism to BureaucraticAuthoritarianism”in Putin’s Russia, Washington, D.C., CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, pp. 335–336.

20. Piontkovskii, Andrei: “Imperskii Kompleks”[Imperial Complex], Fond Liberalinaya Missiya,30 January 2004.

21. For more on liberal empire project see Chiubais,Anatoli: “Missya Rossii v XXI Veke” [Russia’sMission in 21st century], Nezavisimaya Gazeta,1 October 2003.

22. Poslanie Prezidenta Rossii FederalinomSobraniu [Russian President Address to FederalAssembly], 18 April 2002, in http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2002/04/18/0000_type63372_28876.shtml.

23. See Kontseptsiya Vneshnei Politiki RossiiskoiFederatsii [Foreign Policy Concept of RussianFederation], 28 June, 2000, in http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd/; Actualinye ZadaciRazvitiya Vorujonyh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii[Priority Tasks of the Development of the ArmedForces of the Russian Federation], October 2003,in http://www.mil.ru/articles/article5324.shtml.

24. Vstrecya Presidenta Putina s Poslami RossiiskoiFederatsii [President Putin Meeting withAmbassadors of Russian Federation], “Interfax”,12 July 2004, in http://www.interfax.com/com?item=Rus&pg=0&id=5739470&req.

25. Muhin, Vladimir: “Bez Stimula Net Integratsii”[Integration Is Impossible Without Incentives],Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 December 2003.

26. For full text of the CSTO charter see Saat, J.H.:“The Collective Security Treaty Organization”,Central Asian Series, 05/09 (February 2005),pp. 12–19.

27. Baev, Pavel: “Counter-terrorism as a BuildingBlock for Putin’s Regime” in Hedenskog, Jakob;Nygren, Bertil; Oldberg, Ingmar and Pursiainen,Christer (eds.) (2005): Russia As a Great Power:Dimension of Security Under Putin, London,Routledge, p. 328.

28. Soglashenie o Formirovanii EdinogoEconomiceskogo Prostranstva [Agreement onCreation of Single Economic Space], inhttp://www.kremlin.ru/interdocs/2003/09/19/1744_type72066_52478.shtml?type=72066.

29. Declaration of Prime Minister Mihail Kasyanov,in www.context-ua.com/articles/macroeconomy/21126.html.

30. In the period between spring 1999 and spring2002, Uzbekistan was a full member of thegroup. While Uzbekistan was a member, thegroup operated under the acronym “GUUAM”.

31. See Gvosdev, op. cit., p. 35.32. Allison, Roy: “Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s

Central Asia Policy”, International Affairs, Vol.80, No. 2 (March 2004), pp. 277–293.

33. Trofimov, Dmitri: “Russia and the United Statesin Central Asia: Problems, Prospects andInterests”, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol.19, No. 1 (2003), p. 76.

34. Baev, Pavel: “Assessing Russia’s Cards: ThreePetty Games in Central Asia”, CambridgeReview of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2(July 2004), pp. 269–270.

35. Ibid., pp. 275–276.36. Rutland, Peter: “Russia’s Response to US

Regional Influence”, NBR Analysis, Vol. 14, No.4 (November 2003), pp. 48–50.

37. Kovalev, Gheorghii: “Rossisko-KazahskayaDelimitatsya” [Russo-Kazakh Delimitation],


Politcom.ru, 13 January 2004, in http://www.politcom.ru/4_kazah.htm.

38. Baikova, Elena: “Gazovie Igriy Turkmenbashi”[Turkmenbashi Gas Games], NezavisimayaGazeta, 22 December 2003; Rutland, op. cit.,p. 49.

39. Baev, Assessing, op. cit., p. 27840. Rutland, op. cit., p. 47.41. Stanovaya, Tatyana: “Vladimir Putin v Kirgizii”

[Vladimir Putin in Kyrgyzstan], Politcom.ru, 27October 2003, in http://www.politcom.ru/5_base.htm.

42. Baev, Assessing, op. cit., p. 275.43. Burmistrov, Vladimir: “I Snova Azia Stanovitsya

Nevestoi” [AsiaAgain BecomesWife], StolicinayaJizni, 21 October 2004.

44. Baev, Assessing, op. cit., p. 279.45. Lynch, Dov: “A Regional Insecurity Dynamics”,

in Lynch, Dov (eds.) (2003): The South Caucasus:A Challenge for the EU, Chaillot Papers, No. 65Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, pp. 17–18.

46. Baev, Russia’s Policies, op. cit., pp. 41–42.47. Iskyan, Kim: “Armenia in Russia’s Embrace”,

Moscow Times, 24 March 2004.48. Socor, Vladimir: “Armenia Drifting FromMilitary

to Economic Dependence on Russia”, TheMonitor — ADaily Briefing on the Former SovietStates, 4 January 2002.

49. Pinchuk, Denis: “Buy, Russia, Buy”, Agency ofConflict Situations, 22 September 2003, inhttp://www.rosbaltnews.com/2003/09/22/64145.html.

50. Iskyan, op. cit.51. Lynch, A Regional Insecurity, op. cit., p. 17.52. Rutland, op. cit., p. 46.53. Pinchuk, op. cit.54. Starting in 1997, Viktor Kozeny, a Czech

businessmen, “acting on his own behalf and asan agent” of Bourke, Pinkerton and others,reportedly made a series of bribes to four seniorofficials of the Azeri government, SOCAR andthe Azeri State Property Fund. The bribes wereapparently intended to ensure that the presidentof Azerbaijan would issue a special decree toallow privatization of SOCAR and to permit theinvestment consortium run by Kozeny to acquirea controlling stake in SOCAR. However, in1999, the Azeri government announced thatSOCAR’s privatization plans were cancelled andthe company would stay under governmentcontrol. Viktor Kozney has been charged by aNew York district court with grand larceny forallegedly defrauding clients of the US hedgefund company Omega Advisors Inc. of $182million and in the same year his lawyer HansBodmer has been indicted over an allegedconspiracy to bribe Azerbaijani governmentofficials in violation of the US Foreign CorruptPractices Act. For more on privatization inAzerbaijan and SOCAR scandal see Gulieva,

Gulnaz: “Azerbaijan Prolongs Privatization”,Caspian Bussines Week, 21 July 2004.

55. Aliev, Yalcin: “Na Konu Karabah” [Karabakh Isat Stake], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 February2004.

56. For a more developed analysis of crisis concerningPankisi Gorge see German, Tracey C.: “ThePankisi: Georgia’s Achilles Heel in Its Relationswith Russia?”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 23,No. 1 (March 2004), pp. 27–39.

57. Baev, Russia’s Policies, op. cit., pp. 44–45.58. Lynch, Dov: “Misperceptions and Divergences”,

in Lynch, Dov (eds.) (2005), What Russia Sees,Chaillot Papers, No. 74, Paris, EU Institute forsecurity Studies, pp. 7–22.

59. Bagiro, Dmitri: “Rossya Pugaet a Bagapshu neStrashno” [Russia Threatens, But Bagapsha IsNot Affraid], Politcom.ru, 2 December 2004, inhttp://www.politcom.ru/7_russia_abhaz.htm.

60. Pinchuk, op. cit.61. Novikov, Vladimir: “Kak Rossiyani Reformiruiut

Economiku Gruzii” [How Does Russia ReformsGeorgian Economy], Kommersant, 15 February2005.

62. Pinchuk, op. cit.63. Ibid.64. Socor, Vladimir: “Putin, Gazprom Seek Control

of Ukraine’s Gas Pipelines to Europe”, IASPSPolicy Briefings, 27 October 2002.

65. Krivorojstali among the biggest steel factories inEurope has been sold in dubious circumstancesfor USD 800 million to a group of businessmenclosely linked to president Kuchma’s clan andMoscow financial circles. Not surprisingly newlyelected president Victor Yushchenko supportedre-nationalization of factory and repetition ofprivatization in much transparent conditions. Inlate October 2005 during televised auction,Krivorojstali has been sold for USD 4,8 billionto Mittal Steel Company.

66. Lukashenko on Privatization of Beltransgaz,“RosBiznesKonsalting analysis”, 16 February2004, in http://top.rbc.ru/index.shtml/news/daythemes/2004/02/16_bod.shtml.

67. Socor, Vladimir: “Federalization Experiment inMoldova”, Russia and Eurasia Review, July 162002.

68. OSCE Mission to Moldova, “News Digest”, 23December 23 2002.

69. Tuchikov, Vladimir: “Diplomaticeskoe Srajenieza Pridnestrovie” [Diplomatic Battle forTransnistria], Politcom.ru, 3 December 2003, inhttp://www.politcom.ru/5_russia_moldova.htm.

70. Varduli, Nikolai: “Rossya Priblizitsya k Ukrainena 34 Miliarda” [Russia Will Be Closer toUkraine on 34 Billions], Kommersant, 8 August2004.

71. Deputy speaker of the Russian lower house(State Duma), Valentin Kuptsov said thatinterference in Ukraine’s affairs in connection


with the presidential election is inadmissible,and the entire world should recognize its results.Deputy Speaker of Duma Commentaries onElections in Ukraine, “Itar Tass “, 24 November2004, in: http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=1768383&PageNum=0.

72. Quoted in Torbakov, Igor: “Russian PunditsDivided on How to React to the Death Throws ofPost-Soviet World”, The Eurasia Daily Monitor,20 May 2005.

73. Shirokov, Aleksandr: “Rossiyu Okrujayut sZapada i Yuga” [Russia Is Encircled from Westand South], RBC Daily, 13 May 2005.

74. Opinion echoed in academic circles. See, forinstance Karaganov, Sergei: “Rossya i Evropa:Trudnoe Sblijenie” [Russia and Europe: DifficultRapprochement], Rossiskaya Gazeta, 1 April2005; Bordachev, Timofei; Moshes, Arkadii:“Rossya: Konets Evropeizatsii” [Russia: TheEnd of Europenization], Rossya v GlobalinoiPolitike, No. 2 (Aprili/June 2003), pp. 49–63.

75. In this regard, some Russian experts mentionedthat most pragmatic political cycles in Russia arepreparing for “long game” in CIS countries. See

for instance Trenin, Dmitri: “Rossya i KonetsEvrazii” [Russia and the End of Eurasia], Pro etContra, Vol. 9, No.1 (July–August 2005),pp. 6–17.

76. Quoted in Torbakov, Igor: “Russian ForeignPolicy Experts Mull Strategy Toward Post-Soviet Lands”, The Eurasia Daily Monitor, 8July 2005.

77. See for example Bordachev, Timofei: “UECrisis: What Opportunities for Russia?”, Russie.Cei. Visions, No. 7 (October 2005), pp. 8–11.

78. For more on conditions of the treaty seeDogovoro Soiuznicheskih Otnoshenyah Mejdu RossiiskoiFederatsiei i Respublikoi Uzbekistan, 14November 2005, in http://www.kremlin.ru/interdocs/2005/11/14/1934_type72066_97086.shtml?type=72066.

79. For more detailed analysis see Blank, Stephen:“Russia Realizes Its Cartel”, Central Asia —Caucasus Analyst, 30 November 2005.

80. In this sense see Simakovsky, Mark: “KremlinCalls for “Civilized” Rules of the Game inEurasia”, Central Asia — Caucasus Analyst, 21September 2005.


REPORT OF THE RAAS-FULBRIGHT CONFERENCE:“NEW/OLD WORLDS: SPACES IN TRANSITION”,

THE CENTER FOR AMERICAN STUDIES

Romania, the European Space and America all were subjects of involved and insightfuldiscussions at the Romanian Association of American Studies (RAAS) – Fulbright Bi-AnnualConference held at the Center for American Studies at the Faculty of Foreign Languages andLiteratures, the University of Bucharest, 2–3 February, 2006. Opening remarks by Prof. Dr. RodicaMihãila, RAAS President; US Ambassador to Romania, H.E. Nicholas Taubman; Secretary ofState, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Valentin Naumescu; Director of the Romanian DiplomaticInstitute and Dean of Faculty of History (University of Bucharest), Prof. Dr. Vlad Nistor; Secretaryof State, Ministry of Education and Research, Prof. Dr. Dumitru Miron; Manager, Saatchi &Saatchi, Radu Florescu, and Executive Director of the U.S. – Romanian Fulbright Commission,Prof. Dr. Barbara Nelson outlined the vital role of the meeting in articulating and prospecting thegrowing integration of Romania with the forces of humane globalization and internationalization.Participants (which included American Fulbright grantees to Romania for the academic year2005–2006) hailed from all parts of Romania (from both public and private universities), fromHungary, from Israel, and from the USA.

Keynote speaker Prof. Dr. John Carlos Rowe of the University of Southern California beganthe academic sections of the meting with a detailed critique “Reading Reading Lolita in Tehran:[A Memoir in Books] in Idaho.” Dr. Rowe provided an extensive background on the author, AzarNafisi, and questioned whether the writer’s professed “aesthetic radicalism” provided intellectualcover for her committed neo-conservative “Pax Americana” foreign policy stance. Following thischallenging opening, a comprehensive roundtable on “re-mapping” the theory of AmericanStudies by Rodica Mihaila (“Post-Cold War Spaces of Transition in the Reconceptualization ofAmerica”); Marius Jucan (“Questioning Today’s Perspectives on American Exceptionalism”);Stefan Avadanei (“Critical Thinking/Literary Theory”) and Adina Ciugureanu (“Cultural‘Hybrids’ or Old Metaphors for New Worlds”) set the nuanced tone for the remainder of themultiple, sequenced workshop sessions covering the themes “Old/New Mythologies,”“Transitional Geographies,” “Technologies of Representation”, “Cartographies of Exile” and “ThePolitics of Identity.” While this participant could not possibly have attended all the sessions(numbering thirteen, with over seventy individual presentations), the ones he did attend and/orparticipate were marked by papers of a uniform high quality and discussions of depth on thevarious intersecting themes of the meeting.

The extensive academic sessions were well complemented by the social program, whichincluded a cocktail at the newly established Terasa Amsterdam, and an integrated avant gradeperformance by “Margento” (led byAmerican Studies Ph.D. candidate Christian Tanasescu) at thenew, expanded site of the American Cultural Center.

The organizers were keen to point out the vital role of their sponsors (the U.S. – RomanianFulbright Commission, the Public Diplomacy Office of the U.S. Embassy, Saatchi & Saatchi(Romania), the University of Bucharest, the “Margento” Foundation and the Sitka-Alaska ForeignBook Center) in sustaining the meeting.

In summation, this participant can say with assurance that American Studies is “alive andwell” in Romania, and has a definitely bright future, whatever challenges (social, political orcultural) the exemplar of “the West” faces in the beginning of the 21st century, given the steadfast,yet critically thoughtful identification of Romania and its intellectual space with the American(post)modernity “project.”

Eric Gilder

I SPR I ’s ACADEMIC L IFE


CONFERENCES, CALL FOR PAPERS, SCHOLARSHIPS, ETC.*

1. International ConferencesInternational Conference on “Europe andAsia: Regions in Flux?”, Contemporary Europe

Research Centre, The University of Melbourne, 6–7 December 2006Much more than a simple examination of EU — Asia relations, this major international

conference titled “Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux” examines the European experience ofintegration and considers to what extent the European model can provide lessons and inspirationfor East Asian attempts at community building.

Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux is run from the Contemporary Europe Research Centre(CERC) at the University of Melbourne, Australia and is funded by a grant from the EuropeanUnion (Contract number 2005-2762/001-001), with additional support from the University ofMelbourne, the University of Limerick, Keio University and the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.Paper proposals and enquiries can be emailed to [email protected].

Although the submission deadlines for the following items have already lapsed, there mightbe some interest in attending the events below or in following up presented papers.

International Conference on “Governments & Communities in Partnership: From Theoryto Practice”, Centre for Public Policy, The University of Melbourne (Melbourne), 25-27September 2006

The conference is organised by the Centre for Public Policy at the University of Melbournewith the support of the OECD.

The conference will bring together key policy makers, community leaders and researchersfrom around Australia, together with leading experts from the UK, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Canada,the United States and New Zealand. The aim of the program is to deepen the academic and policydebate about the impact and value of efforts to join-up different public services and relatedinitiatives to strengthen communities.

The organisers of the conference welcome papers and presentations in the following areas: (1)why collaboration matters; (2) the role of place; (3) governance models and issues, (4) health,environment and indigenous collaborations; (5) funding and financing issues; (6) democraticaccountability; (7) evaluating the impacts of local partnerships; (8) leadership and skills forcollaborative governance.

For further information, please visit: http://www.public-policy.unimelb.edu.au/conference06/call.html. Alternatively you can contact Lauren Rosewarne (Centre Manager) via email [email protected].

2. International Seminars and ConferencesNEW! — Conferenec on “Reinventing Poland: International Conference In Memory Of

George Blazyca”Centre for Contemporary European Studies, University of Paisley10–11 November 2006.

The deadline for the submission of abstracts is 18 August 2006.The Centre for Contemporary European Studies and Paisley Business School, University of

Paisley, are organising a conference in memory of Professor George Blazyca. The conference willbe organised around five thematic areas within the general framework of ‘Reinventing Poland’.These will be the interpretation of Polish history, economic transition, the reinvention of sociologyand culture, the implications of EU accession and regional development, allowing for acomparison of Poland with Scotland. A number of prominent speakers from Poland and the UKare likely to attend, including Tadeusz Kowalik, Ryszard Rapacki, Marian Górski, GeorgeKolankiewicz, John Bates and Aleks Szczerbiak. The organisers are also seeking further offers ofcontributions on these thematic areas and there will be a session for research students to presentwork in progress.

Paper proposals (up to 500 words) shall be submitted to Martin Myant at the University ofPaisley ( [email protected]).

176 ISPRI’s ACADEMIC LIFE 2

———————* Courtesy of Contemporary Europe Research Centre, The University of Melbourne.

Further information on the conference will be made available at the following web address:http://www.paisley.ac.uk/business/cces/new.asp

NEW! — EUSA 10th Biennial International Conference ECPR (European Consortiumfor Political Research).

For information on ECPR Joint Session and Conferences, please visit: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/ 4th ECPR Conference, Pisa (Italy). 6-8 September 2007.

Further information, including exact dates, will be available in due course.2008 Joint Sessions, Rennes (France)Further information, including exact dates, will be available in due course.International Sociological Association (ISA) — Sociology ConferencesFor ISA events in 2005 see the following web site: http://www.ucm.es/info/isa/cforp0.htmCentre of Economic Policy Research (CPR) — Forthcoming eventsFor CPR events in 2005 see the following web site: http://www.cepr.org/meets/Diary/

listyear.asp?year=2005European Sociological Association (ESA) — ConferencesFor ESA events in 2005 see the following web site: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/esa/

conferences.htmAlthough the submission deadlines for the following items have already lapsed, there might

be some interest in attending the events below or in following up presented papers.International Conference / Workshop on “Beyond the Crisis of the European Project?

The Political Economy of Europe and the Political Economies in Europe in (post-) disciplinaryperspectives” European Sociological Association Critical Political Economy Research NetworkVrije Universiteit Amsterdam (The Netherlands) 31 August — 2 September 2006

The workshop brings together critical scholarship on the political economy of the EuropeanUnion and European capitalist economies. It seeks to contribute to an understanding of the crisisof the European project by moving beyond disciplinary and theoretical boundaries.

For further information, please visit ESA Critical Political Economy RN website:http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/esa/polecon.htm

XIV International Economic History Congress “The Question of the first EEC/ECenlargement and the other European Countries’ Response, 1961-1973” Helsinki, Finland21-25 August 2006

The Congress will focus on United Kingdom’s, Ireland’s and Denmark’s membership in theEuropean Communities, from 1973 onwards. There are already various historical integrationstudies dealing with the EC arrangement up to the early 1970s, but the recent opening of thearchival materials on the diplomatic process has given a new impetus to research on the topic. ThisSession will gather European historians to discuss this development from a combined political andeconomic point of view, based on their research results and ongoing research. It would also beconsidered whether it would be appropriate to target to a joint publication on the topic.For more information, please contact: Tapani Paavonen by email at [email protected]

UACES 36th Annual Conference and 11th Research Conference on “Exchanging Ideason Europe 2006: Visions of Europe: Key Problems, New Trajectories” Limerick, Ireland 31August — 2 September 2006.

The invitation for proposals this year is for papers belonging to pre-organised panels, althoughindividual paper proposals will still be considered. As well as the research panels, there will alsobe a range of plenary panels and plenary speakers.

For further information, please visit: www.uaces.org/limerick.htm; or email:[email protected]

Interdisciplinary Conference on “Image and Identity in Contemporary Europe”University of Wales (Bangor, Wales, United Kingdom) 7-9 September 2006.

The expansion of the EU and the re-emergence of regionalisms have stimulated reflections onissues of identity, citizenship, nationality and globalization. This conference will focus on howindividual states (or national groups within states) perceive themselves and/or are perceived byothers since the Second World War. Whilst speakers may choose to address the construction ofidentities through historical discourse, state building, institutional development, music or literary


forms, the conference would especially like to encourage a debate on the role of visual media, suchas cinema, photography and the internet in the creation/representation of identity.For further information, please contact: Dr. Laura Rorato ([email protected]) or Dr CarolTully ([email protected]).

ECPR’s 1st Graduate Conference on “Contentious Politics” University of Essex (UK)7-10 September 2006.

The ECPR is pleased to announce its first Graduate Conference, which will take place at theUniversity of Essex from 7-9 September 2006 and will run in alternate years. All panels, roundtables, registration and the book exhibition will be located at the University of Essex, and campusaccommodation will be available. This is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to cometogether from all over Europe to share their work and experience by presenting papers or bysimply observing, and as with all ECPR conferences, there will be a number of social events.For further information, please see http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/graduateconference/index.aspx

Conference on “The EC/EU: AWorld Security Actor? — An Assessment after 50 Yearsof the External Actions of the EC/EU” University of Cergy-Pontoise (North-West of Paris,France) 14-16 September 2006.

This is one of six conferences to be held before the March 2007 Brussels meeting entitled “TheEuropean Experience: 1957-2007”. This preliminary conference will focus upon external relationsof the EC/EU, and how these have contributed to European security over the period underconsideration. The conference takes the widest interpretation of security: economic, peace,development, diplomatic and military contributions, and neighbourhood security. The perspectiveis largely that of the efforts of the EC/EU institutions, although it is realised that the member statesare also major external players, both independently, and through the EC/EU.

For further information, please visit: http://calenda.revues.org/nouvelle5824.htmlECPR Standing Group on the European Union: Third Pan-European Conference on EU

Politics Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey 21-23 September 2006The ECPR Standing Group on the European Union is organizing its Third Pan-European

Conference. It will be hosted by Bilgi University in Istanbul, Turkey from 21 to 23 September2006. The Conference will have the following general sections covering major fields of currentresearch on the EU as well as an open section for cross-cutting and interdisciplinary themes: (1)Theories of European Integration; (2) EU Institutions and Politics; (3) Political Economy of theEuropean Union; (4) EU Law and Policies; (5) Equality, Diversity, and European Integration; (6)EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy; (7) Foreign Policy and External Relations; (8)Migration and European Integration.

For further information, please see: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/standinggroups/eu/index.aspx

Russian International Studies Association (RISA) 4th Convention on “Space and Time inWorld Politics and International Relations”

MGIMO University (Moscow, Russian Federation) 23–24 September 2006.Space and time are the basic parameters of politics, as such they set objective framework of

political activity of any kind. Both the objective and subjective features of space and time aresubject to dynamics, they are changing as a result of global processes. The international status ofa state is, first and foremost, its position in space in respect of its partners and opponents. How arethe spatial dimensions of world politics evolving today? How is the spatiality of modern politicsconnected to territoriality and sovereignty? The time factor in its turn also affects world politicsand international relations. Where has the “Modernity” begun and when does it end?When has the“Axial age” in world politics begun and what does this concept imply? These are only some of theresearch issues that deal with space and time as significant factors of world politics andinternational relations.

For further information, please contact: [email protected] on “European Unity and Division: Regions, Religions, Civilisations” Monash

University Prato Centre (Prato, Italy) 25–27 September 2006.The conference is organised by the Centre for European Studies, Monash University, in

collaboration with the European University Institute. Recent events have highlighted the ambitions


and difficulties of an integrative project that aspires to transcend long-standing cultural orgeopolitical boundaries. The debate on divisions has moved beyond an initial focus on states andnations. It is now widely recognized that the making of Europe can only be understood as an inter-civilisational process. The aim of the conference is to explore the complex and changingrelationships between the sources of Europe’s diversity, with particular emphasis on long-termhistorical dynamics, but with some reference to present constellations. For further details, pleasesee: http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/lcl/conferences/european-unity/

3rd Prato International Community Informatics Conference on “Constructing andSharing Memory: Community Informatics, Identity and Empowerment”, MonashUniversity Centre and The Centre for Community Networking Research (Prato, Italy) 9-11October 2006

The conference organizers are seeking abstracts from academics, practitioners and PhDstudents for a conference and workshop event at the Monash University Centre, Prato, Italy. Thereare also a limited number of workshop slots available. If you believe that you can offer anengaging and relevant workshop, please submit a short proposal as soon as possible.A draft program and further information on the conference topics as well as potential themes forpapers and presentations can be found on-line at the conference web site. A brochure fordistribution and notice boards can also be downloaded from the web site (http://www.ccnr.net/prato2006). Alternatively, you can email ([email protected])

BISAAnnual 2006 Conference in Cork (Ireland) & ISA 2007 Conference in Chicago (USA)Contemporary Research in International Political Theory Panels (CRIPT)

18-20 December 2006.The Contemporary Research in International Political Theory (CRIPT), a British International

Studies Association (BISA) working group will held its annual conference in Cork (Ireland), andthe 2007 International Studies Association (ISA) conference in Chicago (USA).

This panel will seek to lay some foundations for ongoing research into the resources offeredby complexity theory for the understanding of global politics. The theme for this year’s CRIPTpanels is “The Moment of Complexity? Implications of the Emergence of a New ScientificParadigm for the Study of Global Politics”.

For further information, please visit the official BISA website (http://www.bisa.ac.uk/confs/confs.htm) or contact the organisers at [email protected]

3. International Courses, Workshops, Training SessionsFor more information, please visit the website (www.collegiumminor.org) or contact the

organisers at [email protected] Political Economy Research Network Workshop Workshop on ‘Beyond the

Crisis of the European Project? The Political Economy of Europe and the PoliticalEconomies in Europe in (post-)disciplinary Perspectives’ European Sociological Association,Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam (The Netherlands) 31 August – 2 September 2006.

The workshop brings together critical scholarship on the political economy of the EuropeanUnion and European capitalist economies. It seeks to contribute to an understanding of the crisisof the European project by moving beyond disciplinary and theoretical boundaries.Invited speakers are: Alan Cafruny (Hamilton College, NY, US); Bob Jessop (Lancaster, UK);Dorothee Bohle (CEU Budapest, Hungary); Hans-Jürgen Bieling (Marburg, Germany); MagnusRyner (Birmingham, UK).

Paper proposals dealing with the topic of the workshop from different thematic and theoreticalperspectives are invited. The abstracts (circa 400 words) should be sent to the network coordinatorat [email protected] before 31 March 2006.

For further information, please see: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/esa/polecon.htmECPR Summer Schools in Methods & Techniques University of Ljubljana (Slovenia)

7 -18 August 2006.The ECPR is pleased to launch a brand new ECTS accredited Summer School in Methods &

Techniques aimed at graduate students within social sciences and neighbouring disciplines. Thetwo week intensive courses have been designed to complement participants’ methodological


training in their home institutions, while also offering the opportunity to engage withcontemporaries and hear evening presentations, podium discussions and debates on contentiousmethodological issues.

For further information, please contact Emer Padden (Administrative Assistant) [email protected]

For further information, please visit: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/summerschools/ljubljana/index.aspx

For general information on ECPR sponsored summer schools, please visit:http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/summerschools/index.asp

Internships in the Institutions of the European UnionFor information on internships, trainee ships and stages in EU institutions, please visit

http://www.delaus.cec.eu.int/employment/Internships_europe.htmEuropean Training InstituteFor information on upcoming training programs in EU Public Affairs, please visit:

http://www.eutraining.be

4. Calls for Papers, Articles, Submissions and PrizesUACES/Routledge Book Series on “Contemporary European Studies”Proposals are now accepted.The new UACES/Routledge book series, Contemporary European Studies, is inviting

proposals for high quality research monographs in all sub-fields of European Studies. We areparticularly keen to publish interdisciplinary research, but all proposals will be given seriousconsideration.

For further advice and information, or to submit proposals, please contact one (or all) of theseries editors: Tanja Boerzel ([email protected]); Michelle Cini ([email protected]); Alex Warleigh ([email protected]).

Journal of Contemporary European Research (JCER) Submissions throughout the year.The editorial team of the JCER would like to invite scholars and practitioners to submit their workfor publication. The JCER is committed to promoting original research and insightful debate inEuropean Studies. To this aim, it publishes full-length research articles (7000-8000 words) as wellas shorter comment pieces (3000-5000 words) in the fields of European politics, law, economicsand sociology. JCER aims to provide a forum for emerging scholars of European Studies byallowing them to present their ideas alongside those of more established academics andpractitioners. Therefore, contributions from PhD students in the advanced phase of their doctoralresearch, post-doctoral students, as well as the wider academic and practitioner community areencouraged. The journal is published biannually in May and November. Please note that theclosing date for submissions for November issue was 30 June 2005.

The contributions should be emailed to the Editor, Lars Hoffman ([email protected]).Should you want to review books in your area of expertise, please send an email to Stijn Billiet([email protected]) with your name, institutional affiliation, position and up to three areas ofexpertise, and you will be included in the JCER pool of experts.

Further information as well as guidelines for authors are to be found on our web site:http://www.jcer.net

European Journal of Political ResearchSubmissions throughout the year.The European Journal of Political Research, published by Blackwell Publishing on behalf of

the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), would like to invite scholars andpractitioners to submit their work for publication, or offer their services as reviewers. Potentialauthor and referees are welcome to register at http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ejprFor further details, please visit: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0304-4130

5. Masters programs, positions and scholarshipsNEW! — Nepos.net PhD-course catalogue Autumn 2006NEW! — Nepos.net PhD-course catalogue Autumn 2006


Nepos.net is a network of Northern European university departments and other PhD educatinginstitutions within political science, public administration and international relations. The purposeof the network is the provision of research-oriented specialised Ph.D. courses to Ph.d-students.

The network has recently put on-line an electronic catalogue of PhD courses, which isavailable at: http://nepos.net/neposnet_courses_06_2

For further information about nepos.net, please visit: http://nepos.net/aboutFellowships Programs at the European University Institute Florence, ItalyApplication deadlines: OngoingThe European University Institute in Florence, Italy, offers three different fellowship

programmes.(1) Max Weber Fellowships for junior post-docs who would like to embark on an academic

career and improve their teaching and professional skills. (2) Jean Monnet Fellowships at theRobert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies with its emphasis on research for junior academicsat an early stage in their professional careers. (3) Senior Fellowships for established academicswith an international reputation for short stays of up to ten months in one of the Institute’s fourdepartments.

For further information and online application materials, please visit: http://www.iue.it/Servac/Postdoctoral/; or email: [email protected]

PhD Courses at The Danish Political Science Research SchoolThe Danish Political Science Research School (Denmark) Applications close in

January–May 2006 (Dates Vary by Course)The Danish Political Science Research School offers the following new PhD-courses during

spring 2006: (1) Imperial Ideologies; (2) Interpretive Political Science; (3) Advanced Dataanalysis in the Social Sciences using Stata; (4) Institutional Organizational Analysis — Changeand Transformation; (5) Intersectional Analysis; (6) Principles of Social Policy — Challenges andReconceptualisations; (7) From Bureaucracy to Entrepreneurial Governance? Person, Ethics andOrganization in the New Public Management.

For further information, please visit: http://polforsk.dk/phdevents/

7. Job VacanciesNEW! — Fixed-term Departmental Lecturership in Modern Politics and Society of

China, Faculty Of Oriental StudiesUniversity of Oxford (United Kingdom) Applications close on 24 May 2006.Applications are invited for a one-year Departmental Lectureship in the Modern Politics and

Society of China. This is a fixed-term post, tenable from 1 October 2006 (or as soon as possiblethereafter) to 30 September 2007. Departmental Lecturer Salary is £20,044 — £26,470 P.A.Applicants should either have, or be near to completing, a doctorate on Modern China in a relevantsocial science discipline. Applications shall be sent to the office of Secretary to the Board ofOriental Studies (see contact details below).

For further information on position particulars, including details of how to apply, pleasecontact the office of Secretary to the Board of Oriental Studies (Oriental Institute, Pusey Lane,Oxford OX1 2LE, UK; Fax: 44 1865 278190; Tel. 44 1865 288200; E-mail [email protected]), or visit: should be obtained from http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/fp/

NEW! — Teaching Assistant in Politics Department of Politics and Public Administration,University of Limerick, (Limerick, Republic of Ireland) Applications close on 26 May 2006(receipt of forms).

The University of Limerick is seeking to appoint a Teaching Assistant in Politics. This post istenable for ten months from 1 September 2006. The salary is �28,867 p.a. pro rata.

The successful candidate will have degrees in Politics and/ or International Relations, andpreferably a PhD. (S)He should also have research experience and demonstrated research potentialin one or more of the following areas: international relations, international peacekeeping,international security, and international organization. The successful candidate should further haveexperience of undergraduate teaching in Politics and/ or IR in higher education; experience ofpostgraduate teaching is desirable.


The position involves undertaking lecturing and seminar teaching for modules on:International peacekeeping; International security; International organization; and InternationalRelations. Additionally, the job entails the following tasks and activities: maintain an activeresearch and publications profile in the area of international relations; facilitate the developmentof a supportive and collegial ethos within the Department; the College and in the University;assume other appropriate responsibilities as identified by the Head of DepartmentFor further information, please contact Dr Neil Robinson (Department of Politics and PublicAdministration, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland) via phone (353 61 202320), via fax(353 61 202569), via email ([email protected]).

NEW! — Senior Researcher in EU StudiesDanish Institute for International Studies (Copenhagen, Denmark)Applications close on 26 May 2006 (receipt of forms).DIIS is an independent research institution located in Copenhagen, providing high quality

research in a number of fields.A position as senior researcher in the field of EU Studies is now available at the Danish

Institute for International Studies (DIIS). DIIS is in a process of restructuring and reframing itsresearch on the internal dynamics of the EU and the senior researcher will get the opportunity toinfluence both direction and content. The position will also involve some managementresponsibility. It will be possible to work with researchers with different backgrounds within thehuman and social sciences and a diversity of theoretical, methodological and geographicalinterests. The vacancy is to be filled as soon as possible and preferably before 1 September 2006.

The successful candidate shall have a strong profile in one or more of the following areas: EUpolicy making, sector policies, institutions or the effects of enlargements.

Applicantsmust submit a presentation of current and future research interests, a CV (includinga list of publications) and three sets of copies of five publications for assessment. Applicationsshould be addressed to Director Nanna Hvidt (DIIS, Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen K,Denmark).

For further information on job description and the application procedure, please visit:http://www.diis.dk/sw23582.asp

NEW! — University Lectureship in International StudiesCentre of International Studies, University of Cambridge (United Kingdom)

Applications close on 2 June 2006.Applications are invited for a University Lectureship in International Studies, to start from 1

October 2006 or as soon thereafter as practicable. Salary: £25,565 — £39,452The successful applicant is expected to have a strong research record, and/ or potential, in the

study of international organization. The person appointed will also be expected to contribute to theteaching programs of the M.Phil in International Relations, and the M.Studies in InternationalRelations (the latter run jointly with the Institute of Continuing Education).

Further particulars of the post may be obtained from Mr Matthew Ham (AdministrativeOfficer, Centre of International Studies, 17 Mill Lane, Cambridge, CB2 1RX) via phone (01223767228) or via email ([email protected]).

The applications also should be sent to Mr Ham. The applications should include a full CV,personal statement, the names of two referees, and the University’s Cover Sheet for Employment(http://www.admin.cam.ac.uk/offices/personnel/forms/pd18/). Reference letters shall be sent to MrHam directly, also by 2 June. Candidates should include with their application one example oftheir published work, which will be returned after the selection procedure is completed, on request.Short-listed candidates will be invited to Cambridge on Monday 19 June to give a short seminaron some aspect of their current research, to be followed by a formal interview.

For further information, please visit the website (www.intstudies.cam.ac.uk) or contact ProfChristopher Hill ([email protected]).

NEW! — Positions in European Governance and Society College of Human Sciences,University College Dublin (Dublin, Ireland)

The new UCD School of Politics and International Relations incorporated the formerDepartment of Politics at the Dublin European Institute (DEI) and the Centre of Development


Studies (CDS). For both the Department of Politics and the DEI, the study of the European Unionhas been a central area of undergraduate and graduate teaching and internationally profiledresearch. It is the ambition of the School that these existing strengths should be maintained anddeveloped even further. Of particular interest would be linkages between the study of Europe andits external environment with a focus on normative power and/or discrete policy areas such astrade, development and human rights. Another focus of interest would be linkages between Europeand processes of political and social change; democratisation and democratic revolutions,enlargement, political integration and constitutional politics.

Expressions of interest from scholars are welcome who have: a) an academic of establishedinternational reputation with a substantial portfolio of published research in peer-reviewedinternational journals and with major international publishers who is enthusiastic about bringinghis/her research and teaching experience to UCD Dublin. b) recent doctoral or post-doctoralgraduates with at least one piece of published research in a peer-reviewed international journal ora single authored monograph with an international publisher who show tremendous promise asresearchers, teachers and colleagues and who wish to establish and develop their careers at UCDDublin.

Applications — including your curriculum vitae and a brief statement of intent (up to fivepages) — shall be emailed in confidence to the search committee chair Dr. Ben Tonra.

For further information, please contact Dr. Ben Tonra (Director of the Dublin EuropeanInstitute at the UCD School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin,Dublin 4, Ireland) via phone (+353-1-716-7615/7634) or via email ([email protected])

Academic and Research Positions in the EUFor information and new entries, please visit: http://www.academicjobseu.com/default.aspThe European Researchers’ Mobility PortalThe European Commission’s “The European Researchers’ Mobility Portal” includes current

grants and fellowships, research job vacancies — in the EU, at national as well as internationallevel. It also provides practical information on the research activities of the EU (The EuropeanResearch Area, Framework Progams, etc.).

The portal is available at http://europa.eu.int/eracareers/index_en.cfmECPR Research MarketFor information and new entries, please visit: http://www.ecprnet.org/researchmarket/

search.asp

8. Other ItemsEuropean studies and research organizationsEuropean Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)Website: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/European Union Studies Association (EUSA)Website: http://www.eustudies.org/European Communities Studies association (ECSA)Website: http://www.ecsanet.org/The University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES)Website: http://www.uaces.org/


Alexandru BobocFormã ºi valoare. În orizonturile filosofiei culturii, Editura Grinta, Cluj-Napoca, 2005, 176 p.

B O O K R E V I E W S


The book Form and value is amongst these rarebooks able to answer to certain particular theoreticaland methodological needs, as to the “new requirementsof life and of the new history”. The contemporaryperiod of time — or, “the entering in a new epoch ofthe universal history” — developed in a context ofvarious difficulties met by a spiritual life, it is, in fact,a period “of the crisis of the contemporary world”,and it is identified as a call to a reconfiguration ofboth culture and civilization by reconsidering thevalue creation. Finding again the culture through thisrenewed taste for value and value creation isconsidered, in this volume, a new manner to “balancethings… in a crisis situation”. From such aperspective, “the situation in truth and value, in thehorizon of the conscience of values” is delimiting oneof the main requirements for moral regenerationnowadays, for instituting normality. For this purpose,the book is offering the opportunity to enjoy arestructuring of the essential problematic of thephilosophy of culture in the perspective opened bythe topic of creation and of the accomplished work.Towards such aims of this cultural approach, thesense, the style, and the value — as “permanence ofthe cultural life” and as “forms of the universal in itsincidence”— represent only a frame of systematization.Since the creation and the “work of art” (as anaccomplishment of further capitalization) areunderstood as a “fortunate meeting” between thedimension of the sense, the style, and the value, theirsituation in the perspective of the philosophy ofculture is presented at once, as a complex meetingbetween the significance given to the differenttheoretical approaches of the stylistics and thephilosophy of style, of aesthetics and of thephilosophy of art, of the philosophy of the work ofart, the philosophy of value and philosophicalanthropology. In a structural respect, the volumeconsecrates separate chapters, in this same order, tothe relationship between culture and history and tothe dispute around “historicism”, to the style and tothe styles — differently put, to the field of stylisticsand to the philosophy of style (especially to thecontributions brought by Nietzsche, Spengler andBlaga ), to the sense and to the value, as to the disputearound the “autonomy” of values.

A special chapter is dedicated to the creation andto the work of art, to the philosophy of the work of artas an attempt to give new signification to the

ontology of the work by a “return to subjectivity”,towards “the form of inclusion (in molding) of thedemiurgic man” who, “objectifying his creative forces”,undertakes the environment as “world”. Through theshape (that “comes, contextually (in language, work,action, etc.) as an Idea”) it is also analyzed “thefixation of the creation in an absolute, unique,determination”, the shape demarcating “the perceptionand the behavior of the creator” and, also, the“objectifying” of the work of art and its inclusion inculture. In the final chapter of the book, the work ofart as a “world” in “ontological difference”, the workin the shape of the “unique work of art” is reflectedas an “insertion of an intentional horizon”, extremelydifferent from any other horizon (real, imaginary)because it “ “opens itself” only in terms of value andnot through the limits of the actual “look” of the onewho institutes it”. The author specifies — in anextremely refined stylistic form, illustrative for theentire book — “ “World” means, more than a worldof interpretation (“a possible world”), a manner ofbeing (of a unprecedented level) through an exit ofthe concrete time and horizon and through setting allthese in the shapes of the universality: intentionallyand temporality, intentionality and value. These comealong with the created work, but they in themselvesare not created, but they simply “are”, by the way ofbeing human and by the manner of being of thehuman world”(p.174). In the author’s opinion, such a“world” gains the power of model and the power tomold under the species of sense and value, under thespecies of “aeternitatis”.

The methods considered efficient in such anapproach, in fact, a “ methodological pluralism sui-generis, so adequate ( and inclusive) for any moderntheoretical-methodological architecture”, were thesemantic and logical analysis, the phenomenologicaldescription, the hermeneutics. The clear favorite ofthe author is the phenomenological method (“thephenomenological-hermeneutic modality ofinvestigation”). Yet, the volume represents aphenomenological-hermeneutic theory, as theconsequence of a phenomenological and ontologicalapproach. From this perspective, the “ complexattempt” to understanding a work of art reunites, asessential, “the aspects phenomenological-hermeneuticand the ontological aspects”(p.94), while theapplication of this method to the study of art findingan appropriated realm in the “ philosophical

2 BOOK REVIEW 185

analyses”. The phenomenology is considered also asa “ radical renewal in the style of the moderncreation”, as a ”break from tradition” which, in thephrasing of H. Reiner Sepp, is oriented “against theconcept of reality embraced in the 19th century,especially against the naturalism and historicism”,against the tendencies “to represent reality as a wholeand to copy reality” situating “together therepresentation and what is represented”, not “theimage of reality (p.156). In this particular meaning,the phenomenology appears as a critique of the“copy-cat conscience” and also as a projection of the“intentional conscience” that allows the “orientationtowards what is objective”, towards reality “as it isnoticed”, and not as it “ indirectly appears, in theimage, in the symbol, in the formula, in the inferredconcept, in convention”.

Creation and the work of art as “ culturalrealities” and as “world in ontological difference” inthe perspective or in the “horizon” of the philosophyof culture are treated as well in general and theoreticalterms, as in the land-mark accomplishments of theRomanian culture: Mioriþa*, Eminescu’s poetics,Brâncuºi sculpture. “The world of the ewe lamb”, anexemplary “world” given the axiological institutionand the stylistic matrix of the Romanian spirituality isappreciated as “the history of the human fulfillmentwithin the space of culture, of the human fulfillmentin such a cultural”, “a sui-generis intentionality, to beperceived in the horizon-shape of its themes andunitary affirmed by the modality of axiologicalstructuring a spirituality ( and a historical and culturalcommunity)”(p.104). Thus, the ewe lamb “world” is“real”, “it is a cultural reality not only by its meaningfor the human life in a precise spiritual and historicaland cultural context, by the manner in which thefundamental valorical institution (the objectifying ofthe human being through creation) has had thechance to an exemplary affirmation”(p.106). “Thedepth of the ideation” (“the essential message”) andthe poetic beauty of the ballad are interpreted as thebears of a “world” in which the man and the cardinal

values of his fulfillment consecrate the determinaterole of the free will and of human freedom. The studyof Eminescu’s creation, meant to reflect the sense ofthe reasons of “placing” Eminescu amongst “thetitans of the universal culture”, in fact, the reasons forsituating “his presence, through the very linguisticform of the valorical institution, on the map ofuniversality”(p.131), discloses the poet-philosopher,especially the temporal and spatial coordinates “ofthe modalities of assimilation and reinstitution for themonadological world” of a Leibnizean inspiration,the coordinates of the singularity and these of theopposition eternal-ephemeral, not through a meretransposition, but through “an inauguralaccomplishment, exemplary ...bearing the seal of aunique style, impossible to reiterate and inimitable...”(p.152). The phenomenological-hermeneuticalmanner of interpretation is applied as well to the artof Brâncuºi, an art beyond any “iconicity”, beyondwhat, in Cassirer’s expression, is considered to be “akey for the human nature: the symbol”. “The spiritualturn” (in the connotation given to this term byKandinsky by the turn of the century), related to the“exterior nature”, to the “forms” born starting from it,from the “freedom” to mold the forms and the colorsassociated to these forms by “ determinate appeal ofan interior necessity”, is presented the case ofBrâncuºi as a form of respect for the “ pure forms”,for the geometrization of the object and for themultiple perspective, for the search for “theunmediated” as an expression of “nearness”, for the“living being of the material as such, with itsimminent virtues of utterance”(p.169), for the“totaling simplicity” that makes for “the archetypalbeginnings”. The philosophical perspective of amplereflexive aspiration — in the spirit in which theauthor, Professor Alexandru Boboc, has publishednumerous volumes and has contributed at the formationof many generations of students — is marking in adefinitely manner the phenomenological-hermeneuticinterpretation of the creation and of the work of artand, through it, he contributes significantly to thecontemporary discussion over this issue.

———————* In English, The Ewe Lamb, the title of a Romanian popular ballad.** Translation in English by Henrieta ªerban.

Gabriela Tãnãsescu**

Ion GoianLeo Strauss. Arta de a scrie. Itinerarii de lecturã, Bucureºti, Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe Politiceºi Relaþii Internaþionale, 2005, 177 p., ISBN 973-7745-11-6

The Secret of Political Philosophy

Modern man wants to master the fate right hereand now, being inscribed in a general movement ofdistancing himself from the origins, from primordiality

and from its eternity, he is forestalled by the politicalphilosophy. But these aspects are only a part of thesecret. In order to read as much as possible into thissecret, the solution is to uncover the traces left by the“ancient ideal in the human conscience”.1 A rich

material, well structured and interestingly put inperspective by the “lecture”, this work opens the neo-conservatory perspectives over political philosophyfor a broader public. There is to be noticed from thevery beginning the accent put on well-captured ideasand on diversified information, the work addressing avery important area in the political philosophy today,at once at an universal level, as, especially, at thelevel of political science, in Romania.

The book is describing the interpretativeuniverse of the political philosophy as portrayed byLeo Strauss, in its pages, structured as it follows: anargument, ten chapters, an “excursus”, bibliographyand index. The argument of the author is clear.Exploring something of the locksmith minutenessshown in the lectures of the ancient philosophersattuned by Strauss to Hobbes, Machiavelli, etc., thereaders would have the chance to be at once tried andenriched by an exposure to such exquisite texts,never neutral, ever demanding.

Each one of the book’s chapters represents anessential lesson of political philosophy. Here I shallpresent these chapters, pinpointing the main ideasthrough brief comments. The first chapter isexploring the erudition proved by Leo Strauss in hiswork, under the title “Between Socrates andProtagoras”, investigating in the same time thequestion of modernity circumscribed the crisisyielded by the failure of the classic ideal of virtue inpolitical philosophy. Modernity is a sort of settling toa collective húbris that is, getting accustomed withall that denotes a collective lack of wisdom. Thesecond chapter, “Life-Marks and Publications” isimportant to inscribe the author in his epoch. Thedetails given accurately following Leo Strauss’s lifeand work are complemented with other details, suchas those documenting the courage of the author indistancing himself at once from the prejudices andfrom the prescribed intellectual routes. For instance,we find out how his book on Maimonide,Philosophie und Gesetz published in 1935 atSchocken publishing house, in Berlin, has beenconsidered by Walter Benjamin as extremelydangerous for its author, in the sense that it wouldcancel for him the possibility of being recommendedat a department of Jerusalem University. Whilemodern Judaism remains of interest for the author,the precautions of a political or religiousfundamentalist Zionist are foreign for him, as one canunderstand from the texts gathered aside the studiesdedicated to Spinoza in Le testament de Spinoza.

Ion Goian surprises such aspects, and manymore, in the chapter with the same title. Chapter fouris one of the most interesting in the book. In “ThePersecution and the art of writing” he interprets thework with the same title signed by Leo Strauss,identifying here a revolution in the interpretation ofthe political philosophy texts, occasioned by LeoStrauss. Thus, Strauss is interpreting the politicalphilosophy texts in a complex manner, avoiding any

reductionism, in the spirit of a “guide-book ofesotericism of the philosophical text”. In thiscomplex interpretative spirit are to be understood aswell the famous and confusing quotes from LeoStrauss that are so often used in the contemporaryattempts of interpretation of the political philosophyfrom the perspective opened by Strauss (as it is, forexample, “We shall have to consider whether thatEnlightenment deserves its name or whether its truename is Obfuscation” from Thoughts on Machiavelli).In the chapter “Natural Right and History”, Goiandiscusses the book of Strauss with the same title,exploring the generous theme of the human nature inpolitical philosophy and also the manner in thishuman nature wich is reflected in the natural right.Another dimension of the analysis follows theperspective of denying the natural right inhistoricism. Along a hobbesian tradition of politicalphilosophy, as Goian shows, Strauss surprises thereplacement of the central classical ideal politicalconcept in philosophy, politeía, with a modernpolitical philosophy concept, political power,potentia or potestas, investigated on either the“physical”, or the “lawful” dimension”.2 A lessexplored Leo Strauss text, but put in perspective in itsright importance in Goian’s book is “Progress orReturn”, investigating the opposition between the(Greek) classical philosophy and Judaism. All theideas developed in this approach are essential forunderstanding the cultural bases of the Europeancivilization and for the most discussed Western crisisof values, too. Philosophy situates itself beyond thetremendous shivering fears that are characteristic forthe religious life, anchored in the area of the interestfor the origins, for the prime realities and forcertitude. From such antagonism spring at once thecreativity and the crisis that are Western societyfeatures. The text is published in the Thomas L.Pangle volume, The Rebirth of Classical PoliticalRationalism (1989).

What is political philosophy is as well the title ofa chapter of interrogations addressed to therelationship between the classical and modernpolitical philosophy. This relationship could bedescribed through three aspects. First of all, asphilosophy is, political philosophy is also a search foruniversal knowledge and a distinction from the mereopinions. Second, and in consequence, politicalphilosophy has to be differentiated from politicalthought, given the fact that it refuses the opinions, theconvictions and the beliefs, favoring the pursuit ofknowledge. Third, in a hobbesian tradition, at L.Strauss the political, le politique, is interpreted fromthe human nature perspective – therefore, le politiqueis necessary because the domination over the humanbeing is necessary, given the fact that man is bad byhis nature.

Leo Strauss’s name is related to a renewal of theperception of political philosophy. This aspect isattentively approached in chapter nine, “Political

186 BOOK REVIEW 3

Philosophy and hermeneutics”. As the authorunderlines, the interpretation of the philosophical textimposes the awareness concerning the double contextbrought by “the opposing categories of the exotericand the esoteric, of the necessary beliefs and of thetrue beliefs, of the philosophical education and of thecrowds’ education, of the contemplative life and ofthe moral and political life”.3 Such complexity, andsuch opening in approaching the political, lepolitique, have been bringing Strauss a paradoxicalinterest from the ranks of neo-conservativeideologues. From this perspective, of a “straussianparadox”, are especially interesting the texts from“Excursus” related to “Leo Strauss and Neocons”,and to “A Neo-Plato Vision over the Political Elite”.

The rich material capitalized and presented inthis book is the more important as, the author showsit, “Leo Strauss remains an author far less known asit should be and, I would say, yet, far less translatedin Romania. Unfortunately, there are only a fewtranslations from the work of Leo Strauss in Romanianand, since we are here, there are extremely few copiesof Leo Strauss’s book in the Romanian libraries”.4

The author thanks to École des Hautes Études enSciences Sociales (ÉHÉSS) Paris, as well to the FlemishRoyal Academy of Arts and Sciences, and to theBrussels Catholic University, and, implicitly, to theRomanian Academy, which has made possible theseinteracademic exchanges, opportunities materializedin this high standard book.

4 BOOK REVIEW 187

1. Ion Goian, Leo Strauss – Arta de a scrie. Itinerariide lecturã, Bucureºti, Editura Institutului deªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, 2005,p.12.

2. Ibidem, p. 78-79.3. Ibidem, p.121.4. Ibidem, p. 9. The author inscribes at nuance the

particular matters in the general ones, approaching

the issues critically without limiting intellectualprecautions. Hence, he continues: “There arevery few specialty books, it must be said, in anyfield of activity and, paraphrasing a well-knownsaying, one could say that, busy as the rulers arewith the Romanian European integration, in thegreat public libraries of Romania the dusk isapproaching”.

Henrieta ªerban

NOTES

Under the generic title Theory of ModernSociety, the work offers the XIXth century history ofthe civil society concept and its «developments» inXXth century. What we call here a conceptual historyreflects a rigorous selection and a chronologicaldisposing of the most influential analyses of therelation state–civil society in the modern thought,namely: the hegelian dialectical philosophy andMarx’s critical-radical philosophy, followed byFerdinand Tönnies’s theory of capitalist society — (asociety viewed as transition from Gemeinschaft toGesellschaft). These theories are investigated startingwith the philosophical and political theories ofmodern society from the first half of the XXth

century and from Robert Michels’s theory ofoligarchicall phenomenon and of democraticprinciple. The author investigates as well MaxWeber’s theory on the limits of the politicaldemocray in the industrial and bureaucratical societyand the analysis of socialism and its relation with thespecific social order imposed by democracy andcapitalism, as detailed by Joseph A. Schumpeter. Theselection operated in the theories of the second half

of the XXth century aimed at situating in weberianand schumpeterian extraction: the economical theoryof the politics or the “New Political Economy” and“the public choice theory”. These are illustrated inthis book, among others, by Anthony Downs, JamesM. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Albert O. Hirschmanthrough Public Choice Society, initially Committeeon Nonmarket Decisions and by the sketch of aphilosophy of public sphere proposed by Daniel Bell.The author has complemented these theories andconcepts with an analysis of the concept of “publicinterest”, as a part of political speech and not as apolitical science instrument.

The criterion of this selection was that of thequality of the theories — the theories are consideredinnovative, real “pathfinders” — a quality reflectedin their capacity to identify problematical fields, toelaborate conceptual frames and to formulate key-questions and answers of “durable importance”. As aresult, the author’s choice was to analyse the“fundamental theoretical works” with “a spectaculardevelopment”, those that “through their systematicand time tested exercise..., imposed themselves in the

Cristian-Ion PopaTeorii ale societãþii moderne. Evaluãri ºi reconstrucþii actuale, Bucureºti, Editura Institutului de ªtiinþePollitice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, 2005, 256 p.

social and cultural space of our time as true ways ofthinking, of a surprising inner coherence, asmeditations on the historical states and evolutions ingeneral” (p. 6). Their theoretical altitude wasspecified through underlining their quality of“genuine conceptions as the world” and, in Marx’scase, the quality of political project for theimprovement of the modern society. The author optedfor “the systematical reconstruction” and “criticalevaluation” of these “exemplary philosophicalworks”, subordinating to it “the effort to identify theirlogical structure” and “their durable semantic load”,beginning with the decantation of their fundamentalanthropological suppositions in order to be able torelieve the primary co-ordinates of human conditionin the modern world, as settled by the authors (ibid.).

The analysis of human condition in the modernsociety portrays the man as a private person, “as awhole”, consisting of natural necessities and ofarbitrary will, and the man as a person which entersinto a general system of social relations, in Marx —the thinker that occupies, besides Marx, a privilegedposition in the economy of this work, the others beingjust “the followers” who developed them —, pointsauthor points out to the real separation between theproduction and circulation of goods, the socialdomain, organized according by the civil law), and tothe political and administrative power. The authorspecifies the two directions followed by politicalthought by the end of XVIIIth century: 1. the socialtheory developed from the political economyperspective and 2. the modern state theory inspiredby natural law. Based on the latter the authorconstrues the hegelian theory of the law — “thetheory of modern orders” — as a conceptualinnovation defining the entire ulterior politicalphilosophy on modern society.

As such, the work presents exemplarily theessence of the Hegelian conceptual innovation of thedistinction between the civil or bourgeois societysphere and the political sphere of the state, asbetween “the real creation of the modern world”which “uproots the individual from his traditionallinks, to convert him into an independent, singularperson”, and this historical creation, the state whichmediates among particular groups and generalinterests of the society. The Hegelian solution of thestate as “the crowning of the entire [social] edifice-motivate by the necessity of its “limitated, butdecisive” intervention in the spontaneous unfoldingof the inter-individual connections within the civilsociety in order to “set up the state of law” thatremoves all “accidental and arbitrary aspects fromthe human actions and from the subjectiveconscience” —, is presented through what constitutesthe source of theoretical and social — criticalinspiration for Marx. For Marx, the mediation

provided by bureaucracy, by the “mandatory”functionaries of the state in civil society (therepresentatives of general interest) and the ones ofthe social states (of the corporations) at the level ofthe state, which in Hegel assures the identity betweenparticular and general interest (or what Hegel callsconcrete freedom), represents only an apparentsolution. It doesn’t resolve the separation or the“essential duplication”, how Marx calls it) betweenthe “citizen of the state” (“the self as universalperson, a hypostasis in which all the human being areidentical”) (p. 52) and the “individual belonging tothe civil societiy”, or between the man as social beingand the private man (sustained by the principle of“individualism” as aim of the social existence), theHegelian philosophy of the law thus constituting itself into a (“mystical”) celebration of the privateperson, life and property, into “the greatestachievement of modern constitutional state” (p. 98).As a result, the fundamental problem posed by “anupside-down conceptualisation of the Hegeliantheory of law..., essentially, a theory of the modernarrangements” and the solution for this problem isbuilt and reflected as a part of a theoreticalcomprehensive ensemble that offered one of the mostimportant classical intelectual source for the criticalsocial reflection. “The overthrow” realized by Marxis presented as a research of the “civil societyanatomy” from the perspective of the politicaleconomy and “for the purpose of reconstructing thewhole social existence of the man within thishorizon” (p. 100). Following Jacques Bidet, theauthor underlines the “strong contrast between theacuity of [Marxian] analysis of capitalism, ... and theweakness of his political project, of his idea ofsocialist society” (p. 135).

The comparative analyses of the conceptualizedcivil society at Hegel and Marx — in the first place,and at other thinkers — with specific ideaticdifferences and a specific load, has the considerablemerit of emphasizing systematizated arguments inthe favour of constructing civil society as the“general system of social relations”, a conotationeither ignored or distorted, unfortunately, from evenin select political on political analysis from ourcountry.

It should be also noticed that the author’smethodological options and his selection criteria arethe premises for a laborious approach whosecharacteristics are the precision of the theoreticalreconstruction, the moderation and the fineness of theappreciations, the constancy in pointing out at thenovelty and at the value of the studied theory, theconstancy in invoking and making operational thefundamental bibliographical sources. The rigoeur andthe argumentative sobriety give the measure of thisveritable point of reference in the present editorialspecialized landscape.

188 BOOK REVIEW 5

Gabriela Tãnãsescu

Henrieta ªerban

T H E R E V I E W O F R E V I E W S


HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, JohnsHopkins University Press, vol. 27, no. 2, 2005 is ajournal of comparative studies, in the field ofhumanist science, social sciences and law.

The studies included in this issue approach abroad range of themes from the above stated sphereof the interests for knowledge and research. There isa distinct interest for the topic of reconciliation (as inthe article of Tim Kelsall), for the problematicsurounding the relationship between promotingsocial and economic human rights and promoting thehuman rights, in general, in Africa (present in thearticle signed by Jonathan Klaaren), for the collectiverights (approached by Miodrag A. Jovanovic), andfor assessing human rights (in the article signed by

Mac Darrow and Amparo Tomas). KatarinaTomasevski raises inedite questions, important bothfor the generality and for the particularities of certaineconomic, social and cultural human rights.

The books prezented in the section dedicated tobook reviews are raising also interesting questionswhose stakes are transcending a strictly theoreticalarea of social and political research. Good examplesin this sense are the reviews of Kurt Mills’book,entitled The Refugees Convention. 50 Years OnGlobalisation and International Law, edited bySusan Kneebone, 2003 and of the book signed byMadeline Davis, Universal Jurisdiction: NationalCourts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes underInternational Law, edited by Stephen Macedo, 2004.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, BlackwellPublishing, vol. 67, no. 1, 2005 published under theaegis of Southern Political Science Association,stands out through the attention given to the originalstudies in all the domains of political science. Thereader notices a special interest for investigatingelectoral campaigns — noticeable are the studies„Strategy, selection and candidate competition inU.S. House and Senate Elections“, by Jamie L.Carson, „Campaign Effect and the Dynamics ofTurnout Intention in Election 2000“, by D. SunshineHillygns and „Black Candidates and Black Voters:Assessing the Impact of Candidate Race ouUncounted Vote Rates“, by Michael C. Herron andJasjeet S. Sekhon.

There is also interest for the domain of thepolitical construction of the constitutions, as in thearticle signed by Michael Besso. Another importantarea of research concerns the analysis of the notion“global distributive justice” interpreted in theperspective of actual comments on the ideas of Kantand Rawls — a good example in this respect is thearticle of Brian J. Shaw), but the volume comprisesother studies in important and actual domains ofpolitical science, too.

The volume includes a remarkable section ofbook reviews, where there are prezented 19 books onvarious subjects: local government and publicmanagement, ecology, public policies, electoralcampaigns, law, racism, feminism, public opinion.

NATIONALITIES PAPERS, a review issuedunder the aegis of the Association for the Study ofNationalities and with the support of the College ofArts and Sciences of the University of North Carolinaat Charlotte, the College of Arts and Sciences ofBaylor University and from the ShevchenkoScientific Society in America, comprises in itsnumber 1, volume 34, March 2006, studiescircumscribed to the research of nationalitiesproblems, generally and of the political societies inTajikistan, Serbia, Turkey and Romania.

In the beginning, in his study on the radical Islamin Tajikistan, Emmanuel Karagiannis (University ofPennsylvania, USA) analyzes the complex andworrying roots (in the Rahmonov regime) of the

largest radical Islamic group in Tajikistan — Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (The Islamic Party of Liberation) —and of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT),officially registered as an Islamic political party(Tajikistan being, as a matter of fact, the only CentralAsian country to officially register an Islamicpolitical party). The theories used in this analyses arethat of structural-functional, resource mobilizationtheory, political opportunity theory and framingtheory. Given the insufficient stress on theideological factor in these theories, and the spreadingdegree of the radical ideas within the most religiousfactions of the Tajik society, “the alternative sourceof religious guidance”, is explained through de-Islamization of IRPT and through the ideological

190 THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS 2

vacuum among religious Tajiks that has been filledby Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Two main directions in the research of thepolitical problems of minorities in Serbia are reflectedin the study on the ethnic cleansing (“a recurrenttragedy”) — as a tool of state building in theYugoslav multinational setting and as a means ofsecurity, for instance, from the “first Yugoslavia” in1918 till the present consequences of the process ofstate desintegration and reformation began in the1990s (Kleida Mulaj, London School of Economicsand Political Sciences) — and, as well, in the studyon the intra-serb challenges to the Serb DemocraticParty (Nina Caspersen, Lancaster University, UK).

Of a particular interest concerning thedocumentation, for historical, cultural and linguistic

argumentation and the sensibility for the Romanianpublic is Thede’s Kahl (Austrian Institute of East andSoutheast European Studies) research on the islamisationof the Meglen Vlachs (Megleno-Romanians), havingas a study case the village of Nânti (Nótia) and the“Nântinets” in the present-day Turkey. Thiscontribution is more important since, until a fewyears ago, the history of the settlement of the MeglenVlachs in Turkey was unknown or was assumed asuncertain. Also, an important contribution is that ofGheorghiþã Geanã (Anthropological ResearchCentre of the Romanian Academy) on the origins ofnational consciousness in Romanians, studiedthrough the Carpathian folk fairs, “mainly economicbut also socio-cultural events” in the three Romanianprincipalities: Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania.

The EAST ASIAN REVIEW, no. 1, volume 18,spring 2006, a publication of the Institute for EastAsian Studies in Seoul, is relevant for the currentdebates on North Korea, investigating theperspectives on the durability and the evolution of itsregime and its position within the Northeast Asianeconomic cooperation. The maintaining of NorthKorean regime, despite deteriorated economy, naturaldisaster, famine, rapid increase of North Koreanrefugees, political and diplomatical isolation andpressures from the U.S., is explained by Yoon Mi-Ryang through its use of physical coercion and othermechanisms for voluntary compliance, as suchpunishment and censorship. One of the most effectiveand less costly means for obtaining voluntaryagreement or compliance of the population is theJuche thought, an important “instrument in providinga consistent framework for commitment and action inthe North Korean political arena. It offers anunderpinning for the party’s incessant demand forspartan austerity, sacrifice, discipline, anddedication... Since the mid-1970s, however, itappears that Juche has become glorified as an end initself along with the great leader kim Il Sung. In thisatmosphere, Juche is the absolute standard for thepeople to follow.... The study of the Juche thoughtplays a crucial role in educating North Koreans inlearning from the writings and lives of Kim Il-Sungand Kim Jong-Il that are the major sources formaintaining political solidarity” (p. 27). “The coreconcept of the Juche thought is the independentstance of rejecting dependence on others and of usingone’s own powers, believing in one’s own strengthand displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance”, that means an ideology which sustains theindependent foreign policy, a self-sufficienteconomy, and a self-reliant defense posture. ExceptJuche thought, as sources of “political socialization”appear: the state-run distribution system, the successof the North Korean regime in the Early Stage, an

adaptation to environmental changes through reformsand Confucian values. The “most irrational” of theConfucian values “is the blind obedience based oncustoms and internalized traditions... In addition,because the North Korean people have neverexperienced democratic orders, the Confucian andpaternalistic values are still deeply rooted in theirconsciousness determining their behavioral patterns”(p. 29).

The present evolution of the North Korea isanalyzed by Cho Young-Gook (research professor,Kyungnam University, Seoul) through the July 1stmeasures which include some market-orientedecnomic policy determined by “the deterioratingcondition of national security due to the nuclearstandoff with the U.S.” (p. 36). The author identifiesthe specific of the national development strategy —reform of the inter-economic system including themixture of partial or comprehensive economic reformand the intermediate character from the socialisteconomic reform to the market-based economicsystem — and he examines the chances that theeconomic North Korean regime would tolerate “thecapitalist intervention”.

The Northeast Asian regionalism is consideredfrom a cultural perspective (“Cultural Alternativesfor the Northeast Asian Community: OvercomingCognitive Obstacles in China, Japan, and SouthKorea”, by Kim Myongsob, Yonsei University, andLee Dong-Yoon, Sogang University) and from aneconomic one (“Northeast Asian EconomicCooperation and Inter-Korean EconomicDevelopment”, by Lee Seog-Ki, Korea Institute forIndustrial Economics & Trade, Seoul). The reviewcomprises also an analyse of the inter-Koreanrelations in the context of East Asian power relations,an analyse which sustains the thesis that the progressfor inter-Korean relations will be developed “slowlybut steadily”, for as long as the momentum and theinstitutionalization of cooperation are maintained.

Gabriela Tãnãsescu

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