Constructive Conflict, Participation, and Shared Governance

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Constructive Conflict,Participation, and Shared Governance

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Administration & SocietyXX(X) 1 –27

© 2011 SAGE PublicationsDOI: 10.1177/0095399711422495

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422495 AASXXX10.1177/0095399711422495Elías and AlkadryAdministration & Society© 2011 SAGE Publications

1Eastern Washington University, Spokane, USA2Florida International University, Miami, USA*Authors made equal contributions and are listed in reverse alphabetical order

Corresponding Author:Mohamad G. Alkadry, Department of Public Administration, Florida International University, Modesto A. Maidique Campus, PCA 260A, 11200 S.W. 8th Street, Miami, FL 33199, USA Email:[email protected]

Constructive Conflict, Participation, and Shared Governance

María Verónica Elías1 and Mohamad G. Alkadry2

Abstract

This article discusses citizen participation in the governance process in light of two theoretical approaches: hooks’s talking back as a way to empower citizens and Mary Parker Follett’s constructive conflict as a form of participa-tion founded in political dialogue. The authors argue that constructive con-flict not only allows citizens and government to jointly define and redefine the governance process in truly collaborative ways but also permits the joint construction and delivery of effective public programs. The point of contact between citizens and administrators presents an ideal opportunity where citizens are most willing, by virtue of their physical presence in the routine interaction between citizens and administrators, and most able, by knowing something about their situation and the program/policy that affects them directly, to participate.

Keywords

constructive conflict, citizen participation, Follett, collaborative governance

Citizen participation through the institutions of representative democracy is deeply rooted in the notion of popular sovereignty (Birch, 1964; Dionne, 1991; Greider, 1992; Grofman, 1989; Rimmerman, 1997; Wittman, 1989).



2 Administration & Society XX(X)

Citizens elect representatives to federal, state, and local political institutions, and these representatives in turn act on mandates given to them by the people. Doubt about the ability of representative political institutions to deliver on democratic values started brewing as early as the turn of the 20th century (Addams, 1905; Follett, 1918; Mattson, 1998). Making the policy process more accessible to citizen input and feedback would enhance the representa-tiveness of the system (Conway, 1991; Kushma, 1988). However, the funda-mental issues of willingness and ability of citizens to participate will continue to create a dilemma for citizen participation in policy forums (Bryce, 1921; Dahl, 1950; Kushma, 1988).

Two very compelling discourses in the field of public administration involve legitimacy and effectiveness. The ongoing discourse on legitimacy dates back to the founding fathers (Finer, 1978; Harmon, 1995; McSwite, 1997; Rourke, 1978; Weber, 1917/1968; Wilson, 1887), whereas the discourse on effectiveness is more recent and is bottled under many labels—managerialism, responsiveness, managing for results, and managing for outcomes, among oth-ers (Alkadry & Farazmand, 2004; Gormley, 1989). Calls for more politics (part of the legitimacy discourse) are seen as contradictory to effectiveness principles, and calls for effectiveness are often seen as contradictory to politics and democratic deliberation. This article promises to reconcile the need to engage the public (politics) and the need for effective delivery of services.

The article argues that citizen participation should be grounded not only in democratic principles but also in the practice of joint knowledge creation through deliberation between public administrators and citizens (Follett, 1924; Hummel & Stivers, 1998). Deliberation about shared concerns holds the potential to “get things done” effectively via collaborative practices, thus bringing efficiency closer to democracy (Briggs, 2008). Some authors even argue that there might be some “underlying rationality or intelligence in dem-ocratic processes” that could greatly enhance collaborative policy making (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993, pp. 23-24).

First, we consider the issue of citizen participation from a political perspec-tive grounded in principles of democracy and popular sovereignty. Then, we look at the issue from a knowledge perspective arguing that an encompassing knowledge creation by citizens and administrators is critical to the effective formation and management of public programs and services. Critical theorists have made it imperative for representative democracy to acknowledge local knowledge claims. If reality is standpoint sensitive and local, then that must have implications for engaging citizens. Third, we discuss the idea of “con-structive conflict” (Follett, 1925a) as a way to bridge the divide between citi-zens and government in meaningful ways. These three sections make a case



Elías and Alkadry 3

for a form of participation in which citizens are willing and able to participate in public decision making. Deliberation grounded in constructive conflict empowers citizens to be active cocreators in the governance process.

We use “talking back” (hooks, 1989) as a springboard to access a more profound and constructive dialogue based on collaborative knowledge cre-ation to face public problems. We find this later framework embodied in Follett’s (1918/1923, 1925a) community process and constructive conflict. Our underlying assumption is that citizens have indisputable hands-on exper-tise derived from their daily contact with, and proximity to, local problems that affect them (Hummel & Stivers, 1998). Allowing these different “knowl-edges” (Hummel, 2006) to become the center of the policy-making process would enable a governance process that is potentially more effective and democratic. In this framework, it is essential that administrators, who are privy to technical knowledge, and citizens, who are privy to experiential knowledge of problems at the local level, make sense of shared concerns and resolve them as a whole. We argue that such collaboration can happen from a jointly created perspective through an open and continuously evolving process of deliberation or what Follett (1918/1923, 1919) calls “community process.”

Participation and Popular SovereigntyPublic Administration theorists have been very cognizant of the importance of popular sovereignty. Wilson (1887) and Weber (1917/1968) recommend the strengthening of representative democracy principles through the separa-tion of politics from administration and through limiting the decision-making roles of nonelected officials. These scholars focus on enhancing representa-tive democracy through ensuring that only elected officials are involved in the decision-making process. Weber and Wilson recommend that elected officials make policy that administrators would objectively (Weber) or effi-ciently (Wilson) implement. In this traditional view, public administration rests on the assumption that citizens participate in the process only through their elected officials (Albo, 1993a, 1993b). However, technology and spe-cialization (Thompson, 1961/1969), nonfeasibility of the separation between politics and administration (Appleby, 1949), and administrative powers (Herring, 1936) all present substantial challenges to the original assumptions of Weber and Wilson as they relate to the separation between politics and administration.

Subsequent public administration scholars tinker with Weber’s (1917/1968) and Wilson’s (1887) orthodoxy but do not shift the focus from representative to participative democracy as a potential mean of attaining popular sovereignty.




The New Public Administration (Marini, 1971; Waldo, 1971) assumes that representation is better achieved by better administrative advocacy for the citizens and, in some cases, by making the administration more representa-tive of society. Contemporary critical theorists such as Zanetti (1997, 1998) affirm this administrative role of advocacy and lawyering on behalf of citi-zens. Postmodern discourse theory provides a form of participation by which everybody shares the decision-making power with everybody else at the policy-making stage but not necessarily at the administrative or policy-implementation stage (Fox & Miller, 1995).

Even when people wish to participate, it seems that such participation from a constitutional perspective is limited to voting, public hearings, written comments in pending rules, and access to agency information. Lately in the United States and the Western world, we started seeing efforts to increase participation through different forums such as electronic town hall meetings, voting by telephone, and using the Internet to connect democratic researchers and activists worldwide (Slaton & Becker, 1998). Government initiatives to increase the involvement of people in administrative issues—specifically the Administration Procedures Act of 1946 and the Federal Open Information Act of 1966—invite nonempowering forms, by Arnstein’s (1969) standards, of participation from citizens to actions already taken or to planning that has already taken place.

In summary, the representative political system suffers from many cri-tiques of its ability to deliver the popular sovereignty outcome as prescribed by a republic form of government. Election finance, low voter turnout, exces-sive advertising during campaigns, and the complexity of the policy process for the average citizen are only examples of problems with the American implementation of representative democracy. Deliberative democracy may lead to both popular sovereignty and more effective public administration.

Participation and Knowledge About CitizensThere is little doubt that public institutions should be judged based on their ability to be responsive to the needs of the citizens. Responsiveness is a movement that has been increasingly gaining traction in the field of public administration under many labels: effectiveness, managing for results, and outcomes-based management to name a few. A very important component of the responsiveness formulae is access to good information about “consumers” of public goods and services. In such context, the complexity of this informa-tion only resembles the increasing complexity and diversity of the issues addressed by government (Bens, 1994). Governments in the postprogressive




era became more involved in issues that dealt with the welfare of citizens, which made gathering information about consumer needs and preferences important for crafting public policy (Schachter, 1995).

Public decision making requires information about the people being served. At the heart of this information gathering process is the assumption that policy makers could gather information about a “collective public”—an assumption that is increasingly being contested (Hummel, 1997; Miller, 2002; Yeatman, 1994). Advances in epistemic approaches in the past few decades have raised doubts about the ability of administrators to form knowledge claims about “consumers” of public services when these consumers do not participate directly in the administrative process (Miller, Alkadry, & Donohue, 2001). The doubt is particularly about the ability of public administrators to remove themselves from observed phenomena and make so-called objective claims about a “reality” and a policy situation that is being judged, observed, or resolved. Social experiences are, in fact, not objective but rather intersubjective in nature (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Taylor, 1987). Assuming that consumer information is “out there” waiting to be “harvested” by “expert” researchers and administrators downplays the citizens’ capability to think and argue from their unique viewpoints and expertise, and to discuss and persuade others, including public officials.

The process of making knowledge claims is the primary focus of feminist epistemic investigations (Olsen, 1994; Rose, 1987; Rose & Rose, 1976, 1979). If the observation is dependent on the observer and the social context, then the observation process must be based not only on external observations but also on the internal reflexivity of the observer (Code, 1993). Rose (1987) con-structs the argument that what distinguishes feminist methodology from non-feminist methodology is that it promises to fuse together subjective and objective tools of knowledge building. This somewhat mirrors Harding’s (1986, 1987, 1993) defense of “standpoint epistemology.” Harding argues that science’s objectivity is essentially compromised by the failure of scientific methods to examine the context of science. She rejects the objectivity assump-tion that science is value free and independent or external to social context. The subject is male and the context is patriarchal and male dominated. Thus, according to Harding, a feminist epistemology’s largest contribution is to initi-ate scientific observation from the experiences and “lives” of the marginalized people (Bar On, 1993). This would make scientific questions more critical and would reveal more comprehensive findings.

There are two major implications for the above discussion of standpoint epistemology. First, objective claims about reality become suspect because the objectivity of the observer, the observation, and the observed reality are




also suspect. Second, knowledge’s subjective nature invites the representa-tion of various perspectives other than, but not excluding, the dominant one. Citizens are privy to the knowledge that the administrator, the policy analyst, and the politician would not have. A welfare recipient is privy to information about being on welfare that salaried politicians and administrators would not have. This by itself grants power to citizen participants in the administrative process. The unfeasibility of objective and universal knowledge claims empowers citizens and frontline administrators to play an active role to create a more “intelligent” democratic governance process and more effective pub-lic programs.

Feminists were not the only ones to question the ability of administrators to make judgments about the reality of citizens. Postmodernists also question the existence of a single reality (Hassard & Parker, 1993; Lyotard, 1979/1984). There is no one truth and no one reality but rather many realities and many truths (Yeatman, 1994). The lack of a single reality translates into a lack of a single policy problem or reality and a single public that would be served by the policy. The process should rather reflect the multiple interpretations of what constitutes the problem, the public affected by and affecting the policy, and the actual policy (Yanow, 2000). In its effort to delegitimize grand narra-tives of policy, postmodernism privileges local narratives and minirealities. The implications of postmodernism for public administration and public policy include the inability of traditional policy analysis tools to capture information about the public (Hummel, 2008). Policy analysis’ goal of mak-ing statements about a reality that exists “out there” is shattered by postmod-ern and phenomenological arguments that reality resides inside each of us and in our social experiences. There is no readily available reality that can be defined through one single language or perspective, or through existing poli-cies and procedures. Instead, a cornucopia of multiple realities inexorably permeates every social relationship and political situation. Those multiple realities are better stated by the citizens themselves and not by an observer who would be tainted by claims to objective knowledge that is not so objec-tive (Hummel, 2008; Yanow, 2000).

The process of “gathering” information about “consumer needs” has not necessarily resulted in more participatory or effective policy-making process. In fact, it has served the opposite goal: that of keeping decision making in the hands of “experts” or technocrats, thus isolating the value of what the public can contribute. As a result, we see policies that do not address problems that affect citizens daily (Stone, 2001). This is usually done by placing citizens in the role of passive consumers of services within a system that treats them merely as (and encourages them to be) “providers” of information. The




traditional assumption is that information about “citizens-consumers” could better inform policy and that policy decisions would thus be more demo-cratic. Under that model, citizens are spectators or passive contributors at best, rather than cocreators in the governance process. Meanwhile, bureau-crats and technicians make decision about what information about citizens is acceptable and admissible in the process of making and implementing policy. In that context, citizens are not genuinely or meaningfully involved in shap-ing policy or making any governance decision, but rather, they are considered an information repository. This consumer–producer model of governance not only leaves out of consideration the keen knowledge about the situation that citizens are privy to, but it also contributes to unilateral and undemocratic decision making in governance that becomes fixed and reified.

From a distinctly different perspective, Follett (1918/1923) argues that reality is collectively created in the shared experiences that come to light through deliberation or the creative process of integrating people’s different ideas into a more encompassing and new group idea. A “creative experience” (Follett, 1924) forms the basis for “community process” (Follett, 1918/1923, 1919) or people’s back-and-forth deliberative exchanges, in which individ-ual ideas “lose” their boundaries of (and ties to) individual ownership and become the basis for a new and collectively created idea. People’s delibera-tive exchanges begin with perhaps one idea or a few dispersed and apparently unconnected ideas. However, deliberation evolves as a continuous flow where ideas build onto one another—a process whereby internal logic can only be understood from within the process, in the eyes and words of those participating in it. As we will argue in the last section of this article, Follett’s (1918/1923, 1919) “community process” perspective emerges as an open and integrating approach that brings to bear new possibilities for participatory governance—a process that transcends mere confrontation and antagonism among parties and rather focuses on creating collaborative practices.

Along a similar line of argument reflecting progressive ideals of the turn-of-the-century America, Addams (2002) and Dewey (1998) bring to light Follett’s deliberative democracy as a shared and creative process. These thinkers prompt us to consider the utter necessity for the diversity of thoughts and ideas to achieve democracy in practical terms or democracy “as a way of life.” Like Follett’s “creative experience,” Addams (2002) argues that the interdependency of all people and their respective experiences (as well as their values and beliefs) constitute the central aspects that would transform democratic ideals into democratic practices, yielding benefits to society, especially to its ignored and oppressed classes. Similarly, Dewey (1916) believes that shared activities are the basis for socially intelligent practices




insofar as people understand the consequences of their acts “as having a bear-ing upon what others are doing and [take] into account the consequences of their behavior upon [themselves]” (Dewey, 1916, pp. 8-10). Much like Follett’s (1924) “circular behavior,” Dewey’s reciprocity implies a reflexivity of our actions on other people’s lives, while other people’s actions and beliefs have a bearing on our own lives. Directing one’s actions in light of those of others, is as crucial element of Follett’ community process theory as it is in Addams’ and Dewey’s practical democracy or democracy as a way of life. The latter, they understood, is a collaborative process rooted in the under-standing of other people’s situations as a prerequisite for enacting judgments and for acting. Viewing reality from different perspectives makes us question our own beliefs and rethink the issues as if we were in the other person’s shoes. Follett, Addams, and Dewey agree that this approach toward a diverse and complex reality embodies democracy as a lived practice, as way of life.

Citizens Ability and Willingness to ParticipateDecision making in Plato’s Republic was reserved to those who were able, by virtue of their knowledge and expertise, to make decisions and those who were willing, by virtue of their civic awareness, to do so. Although others were still considered subjects of the Republic, they failed to meet this ability and willing-ness litmus test. Plato’s argument is relevant for several authors who argue that citizens often clutter the decision-making process with uninformed opinions or that they are apathetic altogether. This section argues that willingness and abil-ity of citizens are contingent on the access to a deliberative process that is open to multiple perspectives and “knowledges” (Hummel, 2006).

Ability to ParticipateMuch has been written about public awareness and the role that the unaware public could play in decision making (Bryce, 1921; Dahl, 1950; Waltz, 1967). Some argue that citizen participation needs to be preceded by public aware-ness of policy issues (Bryce, 1921; Dahl, 1950). Some argue for educating the public (Pollard, 1920), whereas others argue for excluding those who are ignorant from the policy process altogether (Waltz, 1967), consistent with John Stuart Mill’s idea of giving “more political rights” to the wise among the pub-lic. There are also some scholars who argue that achieving an intelligent and democratic policy making calls for the involvement of different constituen-cies and especially those citizens who traditionally lacked the power to access the policy-making process (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993; Stone, 2001). The




issue of the public’s ability to participate is far from settled. Cronin (1989) argues that “there exists in America both an uncertainty about the ability of the average voter to make policy and about the desirability of having elected officials make unilateral decisions” (p. 9). Bureaucracy trivializes the aware-ness of the public on certain matters. In Power and Discontent, Gamson (1968) argues that citizens are interested in power, whereas officials are inter-ested in social control. This contradiction traditionally presented an irreconcil-able dilemma for political and administrative theory that aim to strike a balance between the needs of democracy and the ability of government to efficiently accomplish its objectives. Kushma (1988) argues that

Low levels of political awareness stem not from individual limitations but are rather structurally and institutionally induced. Some of the reasons stem from the social, economic and educational inequities that directly affect individuals’ political skills, knowledge and values. (p. 200)

Policy making is therefore defined as dealing with “highly technical and complex issues” and using bureaucratic language (Hummel, 2008) that by itself renders policy implementation and policy making obscure to the every-day citizen. Despite the evidence that citizens possess important knowledge and they ought to participate in the governance process (Hummel & Stivers, 1998), administrators continue to be skeptical about the quality of information provided by citizen participation (Heikkila & Isett, 2007).

The bureaucratic drive for social control brings to question the sincerity of administrators in giving decision-making power to the public. In effect, all the rungs of participation in Arnstein’s (1969) ladder, especially those at the lower end, are examples of government manipulation of the public. Manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, and placation all fall short of even power sharing. Partnership, delegated power, and citizen control make power sharing possible but still do not accomplish the citizen sovereignty prescribed by pop-ular sovereignty. At best, these rungs of participation (the higher ones) entail power delegation from bureaucracy to citizens. At worst, these forms of par-ticipation entail no participation at all.

Levine et al. (1988) argue that bureaucracy is an obstacle to democracy and the articulation of popular will. The assumption of neutrality inherent in the public administration orthodoxy “insulates” administrators from public input, thus creating a buffer similar to that described by Gramsci (1971) between the masses and decision makers. Kushma (1988) adds that




In too many [policy matters] from the national security state to admin-istrative agencies, local government development agencies, and regu-latory bodies, the insistence on expertise and secrecy is but a gambit to limit public participation and minimize governmental accountability. (p. 203)

A concern for this distance between administration and the lives of the common citizens explains the shift in emphasis of populist theorist Mary Parker Follett from political institutions to social centers and public forums. Follett’s experience starts with a poor neighborhood in Boston (through the debating team) and spreads to all of Boston through the establishment of social centers. In the “social centers” in 1908, Follett and the Women’s Municipal League started using school buildings to hold citizen forums. This represented an intellectual shift for Follett from reliance on political institutions in The Speaker of the House in 1896 to reliance on social centers in The New State in 1918. Follett (1918/1923) writes that “you cannot establish democratic control by legislation [ . . . ]; there is only one way to get democratic control—by people learning how to evolve collective ideas” (p. 91). It is in the framework of jointly evolving new ideas that the deliberative process becomes practical. Along with Follett (1918/1923), and as indicated earlier, Addams (2002) and Dewey (1998) endorse the idea that collective intelligence can only be achieved through openness to diverse and differing viewpoints and experi-ences. Several contemporary public policy scholars support these ideas (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993; Stone, 2001; Yanow, 2000)

Follett’s (1918/1923) group idea emerges in the open and collective pro-cess of deliberation. An always-evolving community process creates the “collective thought” (p. 30), which cannot be attributed to any one singular participant, but, rather, to the shared process. Collective processes not only guide a genuine grassroots decision making but also emerge as necessary to debunk the assumption that citizens are not able to actively participate in the governance process. In that sense, Follett (1924) argues for a responsible engagement based on the different types of expertise that capture the diverse social experiences and situations:

The social process is a process of cooperating experience. But for this every one of us must acquire the scientific attitude of mind. This will not make us professional experts; it will enable us to work with profes-sional experts and to find our place in a society which needs the exper-tise of all, to build up a society which shall embody the experience of all. (p. 30)




Awareness of public issues also poses a greater challenge for the institu-tions of representative democracy than it does for participative democracy. People pass judgments on politicians through their right to vote. This means that there is enough reliance on a certain minimum level of awareness on the part of the public. Evaluating a politician would require much more effort and intellect than deciding whether one likes a policy that is affecting him or her. In other words, it is easier, and perhaps more appropriate, for Jane Public to make up her mind on whether or not she likes the policy that affects her than it would be for her to decide whether she likes the position of the politician who represents her.

Citizens are best equipped to intelligently and efficaciously participate in matters that affect them directly (Briggs, 2008; Elias, 2010; Follett, 1918/1923; Gaventa & Barrett, 2010; Kemmis, 1990). The ability of citizens to participate is contingent on their access to a participation venue and their knowledge of the issues at hand. Given our earlier discussion of standpoint epistemology, what people know is valuable and essentially a prerequisite for responsive and effective administrative action. Every citizen has vital information, especially about his or her own lived experiences in local governance processes.

What is needed is a form of participation that would allow people to make decisions about things that affect them at the point of contact with govern-ment and its policies. It is through open, contestable, and regular deliberation with administrators that we can engage the citizens’ experiential knowledge in local governance and collaborative decision making. Follett (1924) refers to the joint deliberative process that aims to make sense of a shared reality as “circular response” and “integration,” whereby the participants collectively create a new and encompassing idea, a joint course of action or decision. Integration of people’s ideas into group process happens by means of “circu-lar response” (Follett, 1924, p. 53)—“the interweaving of the different fac-tors of the evolving situation sometimes takes place so rapidly before our eyes as to make the process very plain” (p. 57). Integration, or this “recipro-cal influence [or] evolving situation” (Follett, 1924, p. 57), is embodied in the dynamic and always changing process where “reaction is always reaction to a relating” (p. 62).

Integration of ideas evolves in the embodiment of a jointly created reality by the participants. It resembles a tennis match (Follett, 1918/1923), where one player responds to the other’s strike that itself had been influenced by the first player’s own strike plus the other person’s prior strike, and so forth, in a continuous process that recreates a unique dynamic of jointly created mean-ings. So, when we react to someone’s viewpoint plus someone else’s view-point, we are really reacting to the ongoing deliberative process, plus our




interpretation of the evolving interactions, plus the other person’s interpre-tation about the situation in the very moment the deliberative process is taking place (Follett, 1918/1923).

Willingness to ParticipateWhenever one discusses the issue of public participation, common sense poses an important question of whether the public would be willing to participate in the policy process. If low voter turnout is an indication of an apathetic pub-lic, then that same public would refrain from participating in all other public affairs. Therefore, participative democracy is likely to be impeded as much by apathy as representative democracy.

However, as Neblo, Esterling, Kennedy, Lazer, and Sokhey’s (2010) empiri-cal research persuasively argues, “Willingness to deliberate is much higher than research in political behavior might suggest, and [ . . . ] those most willing to deliberate are precisely those turned off by standard partisan and interest group politics” (p. 582). Although some people may not participate in any form of public issue decisions or discussion sessions, people who get involved in matters that are meaningful to their daily lives, do it more frequently, avidly, and wholeheartedly than when they limit their participation to electoral pro-cesses. Some practical examples of deliberative democracy are the collective endeavors that take place in neighborhood associations that collaborate regu-larly with other local groups, public administrators, and politicians (Briggs, 2008; Elias, 2010; Gaventa & Barrett, 2010; Kathi & Cooper, 2005; Neblo et al., 2010; Walljasper, 1997). People who participate in deliberative forums and grassroots endeavors are also likely to bring about changes in their communities by means of their deep knowledge of local politics and of neighborhoods’ condi-tions and problems. Likewise, experienced grassroots organizations possess a keen knowledge to engage, and collaborate with, other groups and organiza-tions by means of dynamic and long-lasting relationships. Therefore, the issue of people’s willingness to participate in public affairs is much more complex than merely adjudicating apathy or sympathy without questioning in depth not only who participates but also why (Neblo et al., 2010). This section first chal-lenges the conclusion that a nonvoting public would be unwilling to partici-pate in politics. Then, it addresses the issue of willingness of the public to participate in administrative discourse.

There is some evidence of decline in political activity as basic as voting and participation in political parties. Kushma (1988) argues that the 20th cen-tury witnessed a decline of parties and mass political participation. There is also an increase in nonvoting activity that enhances elite control over policy




(Dalton, 1996; Inglehart, 1990). The solution, to Kushma, is reinvigorating local partisan politics. Others like Putnam (1995) argue that the decline in social and civic association participation has acted to reduce America’s “Social Capital,” which in turn resulted in the alienation of Americans not only from themselves but also from the political process.

Johnson, Hays, and Hays (1998a, 1998b) discuss the issue of civic engage-ment, which includes an array of political behaviors in addition to voting (also see Bens, 1994; Pew Research Center, 1997). Citing Downs (1957), Peltzman (1998) argues that voters should be “rationally ignorant” because voting is not an economically rational choice. Other scholars are optimistic about public willingness to participate in political activities. Echoing our argument above, Rimmerman (1997), Greider (1992), and Dionne (1991) argue that civic indifference is a reality only if voting is the only measure. Rimmerman (1997) argues that

At all levels of society, citizens wish to expand their sense of civic responsibility. In other words, citizens wish to go beyond voting and participate meaningfully in decisions that will affect the quality and direction of their lives in both their communities and workplaces. (p. 48)

In a survey conducted by the Medill School of Journalism and a Chicago television station, 3,323 citizens were interviewed and 1,001 of them were labeled by the researchers as nonvoters (Johnson et al., 1998a, 1998b). These citizens were older than 21 and were not registered to vote, and they indicated that they would either “probably not vote” or “definitely not vote” in the 1996 election year. Respondents were then asked questions to identify the nature and severity of their alienation from the mainstream political process. Then, cluster analysis was used to classify respondents into five groups of nonvot-ers. These five groups are labeled by Johnson et al. (1998b) as “doers” (29%), “unplugged” (27%), “irritables” (8%), “don’t knows” (14%), and the “alien-ated” (12%). Among these categories, only the “unplugged” and the “don’t knows” had no political opinions, and only the “don’t knows” paid no atten-tion to politics. Therefore, it becomes difficult to reduce nonvoting behavior to mere apathy, unwillingness, or inability to participate (Neblo et al., 2010). Furthermore, that argument is problematic because it reduces political par-ticipation to voting during elections disregarding other expressions of civic engagement that see politics as more than mere partisan politics and political participation as more than casting a vote during election times.1

Any conclusive argument on this issue would fall short of acknowledging the complexity of the matter regarding citizen involvement versus citizen




apathy. The reasons for such complexity are that (a) citizens may indeed par-ticipate in more meaningful ways than what the polls account for, such as in many forms of direct civic engagement and on a regular basis, as stated previ-ously; (b) such hands-on participative practice does not usually occur over-night, but it is rather a practice learned over time, a habit of mind that is acquired in the doing, in the participating; and, finally, (c) it is unrealistic to think that all citizens may participate in the political process, although some will and do participate, especially on the issues that affect them directly, that is, issues that happen at the level where the public becomes “real,” at the local level, in neighborhoods.2

Trust also affects the willingness of people to participate. The issue of distrust in government is hard to miss. A 2009 Wall Street Journal–NBC poll showed that

Just 4% said that they trust the government “just about always” while 19% said “most of the time.” The overwhelming majority, 65%, said they trust the government “only some of the time.” About one in 10 Americans, 11%, said they “never” trust the government. (Davis, 2009, p. 1)

This distrust also causes citizens to refrain from making an effort to par-ticipate (King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998). However, several studies show that citizens are more likely to be engaged if they feel that their feedback is taken seriously (Conglianese, 2005; King et al., 1998; King, Stivers, & Box, 1998; Ulbig, 2008).

An important question before this article is whether public administrators would be willing to work with citizens as equals and thus cogovern or sub-stantially share in the governance process. Taking advantage of the different types of expertise is crucial to jointly frame issues and concerns and find solutions to public problems. Traditionally, the researcher would ask what exactly are we expecting citizens to do or how to involve them in the gover-nance process. Will they be expected to gather information and educate them-selves about issues that do not affect them directly? On one hand, scholars have argued that citizens are not likely to do that (Robbins, Simonsen, & Feldman, 2008). Are they expected to make the time, for evening meetings or trips across the city, to participate? Again, research suggests that citizens are not likely to do that (Callahan, 2007). On the other hand, Follett (1924) argues that citizens ought to gain as much information as possible to be able to see all the sides of any given situation and then participate in the delibera-tive process. Public interest and intentionality are present in those cases where the individual has some sort of ownership of the issue at hand. It seems




farfetched to expect people to have interest and issue ownership of all policy issues.

However, as stated previously, people are likely to care and know more about issues that affect them directly, and this is where their involvement could be crucial for creating a better informed, more efficacious and demo-cratic governance process (Briggs, 2008; Elias, 2010; Kemmis, 1990). The constraints to engage citizens in governance are many. Unless we make a purposive effort to make sure that collective processes among citizens and administrators guide the policy process, effectiveness and responsiveness will inexorably fail its public purpose. In short, how willing and able are citi-zens to become active and to participate in the affairs of the state? Arendt (1958, 2005) argues that the construction of the public space is learned in the doing, in the practice of citizenship. More than a status, citizenship is a skill and a habit that can only be learned in the practice of participating with others in the affairs of the state and through deliberation, constantly creating and recreating the public space (Arendt, 2005).

From Talking Back to Constructive ConflictWe are not socially conditioned to talk back to authority but are rather social-ized to respect authority at home, school, church, and work (Ferguson, 1985). In this section, we argue for a more robust form of participation involving actions by administrators and citizens. Under hooks’s (1989) talking back, citizens talk back to authority, and administrators listen and ease the condi-tions that have traditionally prohibited them from taking action. Too much respect for authority and a fear of retaliation are the first hurdles citizens have to sort out to speak up, as opposed to being idle subjects when dealing with administrators who may hold the shut-off valve to their livelihood (housing officer or an income maintenance worker). According to hooks (1989), talk-ing back “means speaking as an equal to an authority figure . . . daring to disagree and . . . having an opinion” (p. 5). Most cultures would traditionally view talking back as a form of disrespect and disregard for authority.

hooks’s (1989) talking back is a starting point in a forum of interactive participation between citizens and administrators. It also is a liberating and emancipating force. This interactive participation would empower citizens and, at the same time, allow for meaningful information gathering on the part of administrators. hooks notes on talking back,

Moving from silence into speech is for the oppressed, the colonized, the exploited, and those who stand and struggle side by side a gesture




of defiance that heals, that makes new life and new growth possible. It is that act of speech, of “talking back,” that is no mere gesture of empty words, that is the expression of our movement from object to subject—the liberated voice. (p. 9)

hooks’s (1989) talking back inspires citizens to participate at the point of contact with the administration. If knowledge about citizens is best presented by citizens themselves and if citizens are already interacting with govern-ment at the service-delivery stage, then why not empower citizens at that stage to enter into a discourse with administrators? This would also reduce the likelihood of the “thing-ification” of people by administrators (Magnusson, 1993; also see Hummel, 2008).

Despite the allegedly irreconcilable aims of democratic and bureaucratic values, scholarly case-based research has recently shown that the inclusive-ness and freedom of democratic values and goals can be realized along the lines of efficiency and results when, for example, “civic capacity”—as the learned capability to work with people from multiple sectors, agencies, and actors over time to improve people’s lives—is encouraged (Briggs, 2008; Gaventa & Barrett, 2010). To create inclusive decision-making processes, the administrator is charged with facilitating the possibilities and opportunities for participatory governance. This would include making necessary resources available and accessible to citizens and civic groups, such as providing techni-cal advice and the logistic arrangements for an open venue that allows citizens to meet and deliberate about public issues regularly (Forester, 1989, 1999).

Citizens’ talk-back would also yield power if it results in some administra-tive action, and not all citizens’ talk-back results in action for many reasons. For this form of participation to yield any citizen power or sovereignty, administrators would need to be equally empowered to make decisions at that stage (Alkadry, 2003; Alkadry & Nyhan, 2005). In this sense, talking back not only empowers citizens but also administrators who come under intense pressure to move from passivity into action, that is, to live up to the expecta-tions of empowered and outspoken citizens. Talking back is also crucial to give public voice to those traditionally deprived of voice and left outside the public sphere altogether.

Nevertheless, talking back still remains in the transactional realm among groups: an “us versus them.” Under “talking back,” the people traditionally left outside the public discourse gain new decision-making power, essentially turning the tables around. Although an important accomplishment toward a more democratic discourse, this situation perpetuates the “us versus them” approach, which is divisive and confrontational by definition. In that




framework, decision-making power still remains on any one side of the table, that is, in the battlefield of a continuous effort to tip over the power structure to the other side. Furthermore, under this approach, there are still “providers” and “consumers” of information—people with more decision-making power and others with less or none. In a “talking back” framework, the issue of which side holds the power to define problems and make decisions still remains the center of the discussion and motive for dissent. Its adversarial taint continues to be the focus of the “deliberation.” “Talking back” could jumpstart a fruitful deliberative and liberating process, especially for the traditionally silenced, underrepresented, and discriminated societal groups. However, it fails to bridge the gap between citizens and administrators in ways that would allow for genuine collaboration, as equals, in the governance process. Talking back brings people’s voices from the darkness out in the open, though their con-nection and interaction with administrators still remains loose, possibly adversarial, and contested. Citizens and government still remain dispersed and separate, and power is always “power-over” rather than “power-with” (Follett, 1925c).

Follett (1924, 1925c), however, proposes the integration of those “polar-izations” into a process that builds on differences. In the back-and-forth of deliberation, people’s different stances can create a shared solution, a new whole. Although deep divides between people and government still remain central in hooks’s talking back, Follett’s (1925c) “constructive conflict” capi-talizes on the different viewpoints to transform conflict into a constructive deliberative process. In group process, power is shared among the partici-pants, revealing itself in the dynamic and evolving deliberative process that integrates apparently disparate thoughts into a collective and shared idea. In fact, Follett’s “power-with,” or the shared authority during deliberation and action, lead community processes from framing issues to making decisions collaboratively. Furthermore, taking orders from the situation—or the “law of the situation” (Follett, 1925b)—can truly inform the process from the ground up. From that viewpoint, the deliberative process, and not the exper-tise of either the administrator or the citizen, redefines and reframes public problems anew.

In Follett’s group process, the center of attention is no longer holding power in and of itself but rather, gaining an understanding about shared con-cerns that need immediate attention. “Circular response,” as the back-and-forth of deliberative practices, is based on “power-with,” as opposed to “power-over” (Follett, 1925c). Shared power emerges as both the source and the process that guides the understanding and resolution of a problem or decides what course of action is most appropriate. The process of circular response always




accounts for much more than adding up people’s isolated ideas. In fact, as Follett (1918/1923) asserts,

I never react to you but to you-plus-me; or to be more accurate, it is I-plus-you reacting to you-plus-me.[ . . . ] “I” can never influence “you” because you have already influenced me. In the very process of meeting, by the very process of meeting, we both become something different. (pp. 62-63)

In other words, Follett’s (1918/1923) integration and circular response appear as crucial components of deliberative democracy as the recognition of intersubjective experiences of seeing oneself in the other person’s experience and vice versa. Community process à la Follett has the potential to engage citizens and administrators at the same level, as “one,” in a holistic and poten-tially transformative fashion.

Follett’s (1918/1923, 1919) community process moves the discussion away from the “us-versus-them” approach, more characteristic of hooks’s (1989) talking back. In Follett’s (1918/1923) community process, people come together through a unifying process, what she called a “self-and-through others.” Unifying activity allows a shared power, or “power-with,” flattening out the traditional hierarchy led by “power-over” relationships. In that context, “constructive conflict” (Follett, 1925a) is the acknowledgment that differences among people should be cherished in their singularity as a way to integrate them into a deliberative process that creates something new and unique to the participants’ intersubjective dynamics. Integration could thus bring together viewpoints and perspectives that at first sight might seem irresolvable or irreconcilable.

As an approach that bridges the gaps between the representatives (and their administrative arms) and the represented (including those traditionally dis-placed and ignored), constructive conflict is based on the idea that a regular process of deliberation brings people’s differences to a new collective idea that represent a real integration of thoughts and action. In that sense, no side seeks their viewpoint to be held above others, but rather, the purpose is to use all the perspectives to create a life better for all. Follett makes a case for bring-ing together what at first sight may appear as polarized or just different view-points, into a collective process that, when practiced over time can tackle the most difficult public issues. Constructive conflict is based on the integration of differences, that is, unifying differences in a process that allows all sides to grow into one—the collective. Far from dividing or giving power to one group over another—a central concern in hooks’s (1989) talking back—constructive




conflict unifies divergent ideas and viewpoints into a new solution that is collectively created through the back and forth of deliberations and the “in-between” spaces that people create when they meet, deliberate, and work together (Arendt, 2005).

Regardless of where deliberation begins—from the bottom–up or from the top–down (Briggs, 2008)—what counts the most is that people come together and create a unifying process that is inclusive and dynamic and which results in a integrated idea (Follett, 1918/1923, 1924). In coming together in a delib-erative process, people acknowledge that differences and similarities in the group can create much richer understanding of issues and solutions than any idea that people could craft individually or in isolation. Ultimately, the focus is not on the citizens or the administrators but rather on the process of their coming together in deliberation.

A community process approach to collectively make decisions about pub-lic issues and concerns is not an efficient or speedy approach nor is it harmo-nious or value free. On the contrary, it is rather messy, time-consuming, and contentious. Finally, a collaborative process à la Follett helps bridge the tra-ditional divide between citizens and administrators. Follett’s community pro-cess ensures a more inclusive governance process and a more intelligent policy making (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993) as it pulls together different ideas, expertise, or “knowledges” (Hummel, 2006) into the deliberation to create a new collective knowledge that is more encompassing by definition, more democratic, and suitable to effect change (Follett, 1918/1923).

ConclusionWe first presented the case for citizen participation to enhance administrative responsiveness and to provide a participative route to popular sovereignty. Then, we presented the challenge of willingness and ability of citizens to participate in public affairs. The article built the case for deliberative democ-racy and argued that the front line is where administrators and citizens most often interact. The front line is also where citizens are able to participate, by virtue of them knowing their own realities, and willing to doing so because they are already interacting with administrators. The challenge then is to find a way to empower citizens to participate and provide a mechanism for that interaction to be meaningful. We recognized bell hooks’s talking back as a springboard to more freeing and liberating interactions between citizens and public administrators, especially for those citizens traditionally neglected or ignored. Follett’s constructive conflict, as the process by which citizens and administrators interact openly in shared governance, helps us take a great leap




in our quest for democratic governance. Through deliberation, constructive conflict redefines governance as a unifying process created and recreated on understanding people’s multiple perspectives and situations.

Talking back (hooks, 1989) highlights the need to bring attention to the tradi-tional lack of meaningful dialogue between citizens and government and over-come deep social and political divides. Talking back is presented in this article as a starting point toward the practice of shared governance. In this critical sce-nario of talking back, citizens are both willing and able to participate in a man-ner that empowers them and, at the same time, provides critical information about their needs and preferences. However, we argue that such approach per-petuates traditional and antagonistic divisions between citizens and government, based on “power-over” relationships (Follett, 1925c), which allow confrontation and exclusion to continue to dominate the governance process. In short, talking back falls short of achieving the democratic ideal of truly shared governance. Finally, we made a case for “constructive conflict” (Follett, 1925a) as a perspec-tive that could better capture the complexities of shared governance while attempting to bridge the traditional gap between citizens and government.

Under a “constructive conflict” approach (Follett, 1925a), administrators can better understand—and thus participate in—the dynamic processes of citizens’ joint practices to solve local problems. We argue that capturing the meanings that people create collectively as they make sense of a shared real-ity is paramount to understanding their worldview—how they understand a certain reality that they are in touch with, such as criminal activity in neigh-borhoods, or planning and zoning projects in areas they are familiar with.

In this view, citizens and administrators could come together and create both democratic and effective policy by allowing their collective practices to inform the process, make sense of the problem, and devise solutions—or what Follett (1925b) would refer to as “the law of the situation.” Through regular deliberative practices (Follett, 1918/1923; Forester, 1999), citizens and public administrators are able to define issues and problems anew, strat-egize solutions, and mobilize resources, as they jointly evolve group ideas. Far from seeking to eradicate conflict, community process is based on the integration of different views into a new group idea (Follett, 1924). A (re)solution or action path emerges in the back-and-forth of discussions, in the questions and answers, and in the “in-between” spaces (of deliberation and understanding) that people create and recreate when they meet and work together (Arendt, 2005; Follett, 1924).

Popular sovereignty implies the engagement of citizens in the governance process. The challenges to the feasibility of attaining a single truth about a collective public also bring focus to the flawed conception of individuals as




mere consumers of services and as isolated individualities. A reality that is defined by the many “truths” and viewpoints out there holds a greater possi-bility for making the governance process more democratic, whereby issues are spoken about in the open and decided by the group process.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or pub-lication of this article.

Notes

1. Some examples of participatory processes and expressions that transcend the elec-toral process are those of neighborhood improvement associations, neighborhood councils, and citizen-laden initiatives, among others (Elias, 2010; Kathi & Cooper, 2005; Walljasper, 1997). They seek to resolve problems by collectively engaging multiple agencies and actors at multiple scales, starting at the neighborhood level.

2. For a recent in-depth empirical study of political participation, see Neblo et al. (2010). The authors argue that, counter to traditional research about political behavior, people most interested to participate in deliberative processes are those less likely to participate in traditional partisan politics (the young, the poor, and racial minorities) who are most often turned off by “politics as usual.” Their study also counters the traditional assumption that in America people are not willing to deliberate about politics.

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Bios

María Verónica Elías, PhD, is an assistant professor of public administration at Eastern Washington University, Spokane, Washington. Her current research focuses on neighborhood improvement group dynamics, grassroots democracy, and phenom-enological research of community process.

Mohamad G. Alkadry, PhD, is associate professor of public administration at Florida International University in Miami, Florida. His current research focuses on organizational responsiveness, multiculturalism, and gender and race issues.



Constructive Conflict, Participation, and Shared Governance

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