The Turnover and Politicisation of Lithuanian Public Sector Managers

World Political Science Review 2014; aop

Vitalis Nakro š is *

The Turnover and Politicisation of Lithuanian Public Sector Managers Abstract : This article presents the results of our research on party patronage and

state politicisation in different Lithuanian public sector organisations (govern-

ment agencies and agencies under the ministries, state-owned enterprises, per-

sonal health care and educational institutions). Although repeating alterations of

governments best explained the frequent turnover of some public sector heads,

their politicisation was related to the length of party rule in power, beliefs of the

political and administrative elite and density of the party networks. The legal

protection of civil service jobs was only important in the case of the agencies

under the ministries whose managers always held career civil service positions.

Furthermore, substantial variation in the scope of politicisation was related to

such administrative factors as the political salience of policy areas and organi-

sational functions, as well as budget size, which suggested different motivations

and opportunities of party patronage in the Lithuanian public sector.

Keywords: party patronage; politicisation; public sector managers.

Original reference: Nakro š is, Vitalis (2014). “ Lietuvos vie š ojo sektoriaus

organizacijų vadovų kaita ir politizacija, ” Politologija 74(2): 3 – 37.

DOI 10.1515/wpsr-2014-0019

1 Introduction There is widespread agreement that politicisation is one of the most important

factors reducing the competence, efficiency and effectiveness of governance

( Peters and Pierre 2004 ). The existence of impartial or meritocratic recruitment

of public employees is causally linked to quality of governance ( Rothstein 2012 ).

Although exerting political influence in senior staffing decisions can add to stra-

tegic responsiveness in government, it also indicates tendencies towards patron-

age and favoritism that can undermine good governance ( OECD 2011 ).

*Corresponding author: Dr. Vitalis Nakro š is, Professor at the Institute of International

Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, Vokie č i ų str. 10, Vilnius LT-01130, Lithuania,

e-mail: [email protected]

Authenticated | [email protected] author's copyDownload Date | 12/9/14 12:34 PM

2 Vitalis Nakrošis

It is widely regarded that party patronage and state politicisation is a fre-

quent feature of post-communist democracies ( Kopeck ý 2006 ). Depoliticising the

civil service was perceived to be a major reform objective in CEE countries seeking

a break from the communist past when party bureaucracy was superior over state

administration ( Goetz and Wollmann 2001 ). As political interference contradicts

such principles of a career civil service model as merit, professionalism and neu-

trality, the success of civil service reforms was undermined by political interfer-

ence in these countries ( Verheijen and Coombes 1998 ).

Political influence in the appointment and dismissal of managers remains

rather frequent in Lithuanian public sector organisations. In her annual address

to the nation, Lithuania ’ s President D. Grybauskait ė stated that “ at the start of

the new programming period of EU funds we can observe an artificial rotation

of managers – it is sought to replace the heads of the European Social Fund

Agency, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Paying Agency, long-term care

residences for disabled children, vocational schools, libraries and culture centres

with party cadres ” (Lietuvos Respublikos Prezident ė s Dalios Grybauskait ė s

metinis prane š imas 2014 ).

Politicisation can be defined as “ the substitution of political criteria for

merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion and disciplining of

members of the public service ” ( Peters 2013 , p. 4). The power of political parties

to make party/partisan appointments in the public/civil service stands for party

patronage ( Kopeck ý and Mair 2011 ). Party patronage usually materialises in the

appointment and dismissal of senior executives. However, having party or per-

sonal loyalty does not always contradict professionalism – party nominees can

also be professionally qualified ( Kopeck ý et al. 2012 ).

Rewarding the loyal members of political parties and controlling the deci-

sion-making process are the main and interrelated reasons behind party patron-

age and state politicisation ( Kopeck ý et al. 2008 ). The study of party patronage

in 15 European countries found that the main motivation of party patronage was

control, confirming that patronage was an organisational rather than electoral

resource ( Kopeck ý et al. 2012 , p. 361). However, the motivation of politicisation

can vary across policy areas or public sector organisations. For example, large

state-owned enterprises or organisations providing public services to people

can be more attractive for making political appointments. Therefore, besides the

role of political parties in exercising patronage strategies it is also important to

analyse important administrative factors that shape state politicisation.

Previous research provided two main explanations of politicisation in the

CEE region. Depoliticisation was initially explained in terms of the Europeani-

sation of CEE administrations that made their civil servants more professional

( Dimitrova 2005 ). However, it was later found that the adoption of new civil service


The Turnover and Politicisation of Lithuanian Public Sector Managers 3

legislation did not actually reduce the politicisation of top officials in many CEE

countries after EU enlargement ( Meyer-Sahling 2009 ) when the EU rules of politi-

cal conditionality were discontinued (except in Romania and Bulgaria).

Subsequent studies of politicisation in the CEE region focused on domestic

political developments. More specifically, it was the variable of wholesale govern-

ment changes that was identified to explain the politicisation of ministerial lead-

ership in several CEE countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, the Czech

Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia) ( Meyer-Sahling and Veen 2012 ). However,

this research measured the perceptions of politicisation based on a small-N expert

survey, whose data could provide only subjective estimates of politicisation.

In addition to instability and polarisation of party systems, there are other

domestic factors influencing politicisation: “ the rules of the game ” legitimis-

ing party patronage or party networks and their building through patronage

( Nakro š is and Gud ž inskas 2012/2013 , pp. 102 – 103). There has been little analysis

on the influence of these political factors on the patterns of politicisation in the

CEE region. Therefore, there is a need not only to gather more objective empirical

data on political appointments but also to continue investigating the significance

of various political and administrative factors in order to improve our under-

standing of politicisation in the post-communist countries.

This article aims to describe and explain the turnover and politicisation of

Lithuanian public sector managers. What are the patterns of change and politi-

cisation of these managers in different Lithuanian public sector organisations ?

Which external and internal factors can best explain these phenomena ? We

employ a longitudinal approach to the study of politicisation in the period 1990 –

2013 based on the analysis of biographical data.

The politicisation of Lithuanian public sector managers is apparent not only

in state and local institutions where civil servants are employed but also in other

public sector organisations staffed with public servants. Since party patronage

can penetrate lower levels of public administration, it is important to analyse and

compare the scope of politicisation and its mechanisms in different sets of public

sector organisations:

– Government agencies and agencies under the ministries that fall under the

legal category of budgetary institutions;

– State-owned enterprises with different legal statuses (joint stock companies,

closed joint stock companies or state enterprises);

– Personal health care and educational institutions which usually have the

legal status of public (non-profit) institutions.

This article is divided into several parts. The first part provides a theoretical

framework for the study of politicisation and its methodology. The second part


4 Vitalis Nakrošis

of the article presents main empirical results. Finally, the article concludes and

offers recommendations for future research on politicisation in Lithuania and

other post-communist countries.

2 Theoretical framework for analysis and methodology

2.1 Theoretical framework for analysis and hypotheses

This article employs a framework for analysing party patronage and state politici-

sation based on game-theoretic reasoning (Nakro š is and Gud ž inskas 2012/2013).

Previously, Geddes (1996) explained state reforms in Latin America on the basis

of the prisoner ’ s dilemma. In this research, we focus on cooperation between

political parties based on the model of prisoner ’ s dilemma in order to reveal the

main causal mechanisms behind patronage and politicisation. The article elabo-

rates four causal mechanisms behind party patronage and state politicisation

in the post-communist countries: (1) unstable and polarised party systems; (2)

“ the rules of the game ” legitimising party patronage; (3) dense party networks

and their building through patronage; (4) and insufficient regulation and weak

enforcement of the merit principle in state administrations. Furthermore, we con-

sider the importance of a few administrative factors in the study of politicisation.

The first factor is the nature of party competition. Although Grzymala-Busse

(2007) argued that the existence of a competitive ideological opposition bloc was

a precondition for taming parties ’ rent-seeking behavior, this claim was chal-

lenged by Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012) who found that wholesale government

alternations (especially between different ideological blocs) increase politicisa-

tion of top managers. The latter explanation is more in line with game theory,

which argues that the higher the future probability of interaction among actors,

the more cooperation is likely to emerge ( Nowak and Highfield 2011 ). Therefore,

it is possible to hypothesise that owing to limited cooperation between politi-

cal parties in more polarised party systems one can expect higher politicisation

of senior executives. As the Lithuanian party system is very fragmented with

regular alterations between left-wing and right-wing party blocs (Nakro š is and

Gud ž inskas 2012/2013), we expect that this factor will add to the turnover and

politicisation of Lithuanian managers employed in central-level organisations.

The second factor is beliefs of political and administrative elites towards

patronage and politicisation. Game theory argues that individuals are more likely



to cooperate if a larger group is expected to value their reputations ( Nowak and

Highfield 2011 ). Therefore, if political and administrative elites do not adhere to

democratic and professional “ rules of the game ” and the majority of powerful

actors perceive party patronage as legitimate behaviour in office, it is possible to

hypothesise that a good deal of state politicisation is likely to emerge as a result

of it. Since there is evidence that the Lithuanian political and administrative elite

treats party patronage as quite rightful (see below), we expect that this factor

will also contribute the turnover and politicisation of Lithuanian heads in various

public sector organisations.

The third factor is a type of party network (width or density). It was previ-

ously hypothesised that party patronage in contemporary democracies could be a

supply-driven phenomenon ( Kopeck ý et al. 2008 ). We take this hypothesis further

by arguing that the ability of political parties to exercise party patronage depends

partly on the width and density of party networks. According to the cooperation

mechanism of network reciprocity in game theory, the denser the network, the

less cooperation is likely to emerge between different actors ( Nowak and High-

field 2011 ). Accordingly, we hypothesise that the denser the party network, the

more party patronage can be expected. As there are significant differences in the

Lithuanian party system in terms of party age and size (Nakro š is and Gud ž inskas

2012/2013), one can expect that this factor will affect opportunities and strategies

of patronage exercised by different political parties.

The fourth factor is legal regulation of the civil service. Game theory recog-

nises the importance of working rules and credible sanctions for cooperation

between actors ( Ostrom 2005 ). Moreover, in the CEE region one should note the

importance of external requirements from a superior jurisdiction or office on

the application of rules. CEE civil service reforms were heavily influenced by

the political conditionality of EU membership ( Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier

2005 ; Bouckaert 2009 ). Since the Lithuanian Civil Service Law provides for the

protection of (top) jobs in the civil service, we expect that the successful enforce-

ment of this legislation can constrain the turnover and politicisation of agency

managers in the civil service.

Finally, we take into account a few important administrative factors in the

study of politicisation. Politicisation can differ according to the scope of govern-

ment expenditure or revenue of public sector organisations. The more financially

attractive is a policy area or an organisation, the stronger is the motivation of

political parties to control it through political appointments. Higher politicisation

can be also expected in the domain of public services. In addition to the political

salience of these tasks, political appointments at the bottom of public adminis-

tration can serve for political parties as a way of vote or support gathering ( M ü ller

2006 ).


6 Vitalis Nakrošis

Overall, the likelihood of managers ’ turnover and politicisation should be

higher when fragmentation and polarisation of the party system is high, merito-

cratic management of top managers is not accepted by the elite, political party

networks are dense, the legal protection of top civil servants is weak and public

sector organisations control significant financial resources or are engaged in

service delivery.

2.2 Methodology

Although it is recognised that politicisation exists in many public administra-

tions, identifying and measuring it is quite complicated and contentious ( Peters

and Pierre 2004 , p. 11). This research analysed biographical data on the career

and politicisation of various Lithuanian public sector managers:

– Managers of the government agencies and the agencies under the ministries

in the period 1990 – 2012 (N = 314);

– CEOs of the state-owned enterprises in the period 1990 – 2012 (N = 369);

– Heads of the personal health care institutions in 1997 – 2013 (N = 348);

– Heads of the state and municipal educational institutions from the munici-

palities of Vilnius city and district in 2001 – 2013 (N = 253).

The dependent variables of this research were the turnover of public sector man-

agers and their politicisation. These variables are interrelated. Although not every

case of managers ’ change can be attributed to party patronage, a fast turnover of

managers frequently coexists with high politicisation in their appointment and

dismissal. However, high politicisation can also exist in the absence of high staff

turnover, when positions of senior executives are already captured by political

parties or when the incumbent managers search for political patrons in order to

safeguard their managerial positions and control over organisational resources.

Therefore, the variables of managers ’ turnover and politicisation may not be sig-

nificantly related.

If turnover of managers in public sector organisations is usually measured

according to their time in office (from appointment to dismissal), it is much more

challenging to estimate the scope of politicisation. This article measured the level

of politicisation according to the number of positions in public sector organisa-

tions which are directly or indirectly controlled by political parties de jure or de facto . De facto politicisation of managers is most frequently operationalised as

the involvement of public sector managers in political party activities ( Dahlstrom

and Niklasson 2013 ). We consider agency heads to be politicised if they have: (1)

served as ministers or held a position of political (personal) confidence in the



Lithuanian civil service; (2) stood or been elected to the Lithuanian parliament, a

municipal council or the European Parliament; (3) been appointed by a political

party as a delegate, observer or member of an electoral commission or the Higher

Electoral Commission; (4) been employed by a political party in its structure; and

(5) been appointed from an organisation associated with a certain political party.

This operationalisation allows objectively measuring the scope of politicisa-

tion in different public sector organisations over time. However, this approach does

not reveal whether public sector managers were politicised directly (appointed to

managerial positions based on their party loyalty) or professionally (when politi-

cally affiliated candidates are sufficiently professional for managerial positions)

( Peters 2013 ). It should be noted that such measurement of politicisation based

on the biographical data captured only those managers whose political activities

were publicly known. We believe that politicisation estimated on the basis of offi-

cial lists of party members (not publicly available) would be somewhat higher.

The independent variables of this research were changes in the parliamentary

majority (operationalised in terms of two different sets of governments appointed

after a large or small change in the ruling majority), the length of party rule in

government (the number of years they have been in power), beliefs of the political

and administrative elite measured on the basis of their perceptions towards party

patronage and state politicisation, density of the party networks (operationalised

in terms of party age and size), regulation and enforcement of the protection of

top civil service jobs (based on survey data and expert opinions).

Various tests of descriptive and inferential statistics were applied while ana-

lysing the data. If descriptive statistics allowed summarising main politicisation

trends, inferential statistics enabled us to test our hypotheses concerning politi-

cisation causes and mechanisms. Moreover, we carried out a survival analysis in

order to assess the influence of politicisation and other factors on the turnover

of managers in particular groups of public sector organisations. The quantita-

tive data was complemented with qualitative information from desk research and

interviews in order to better interpret quantitative information.

3 Empirical results of the study

3.1 The change and politicisation of Lithuanian public sector managers

Our analysis of the empirical data showed substantial variation in the scope of

managers ’ turnover and politicisation across different types of organisations and


8 Vitalis Nakrošis

managerial positions. The average career length of a CEO in a state-owned enter-

prise was 7 years, but it ranged from 3 years in the energy sector to 11 years in

forestry enterprises. The average career length of managers in the government

agencies and the agencies under the ministries was only 5 years. Heads of the

educational institutions changed every 12 years, whereas those of the personal

health care institutions – every 11 years. 1

The most politicised organisations within the Lithuanian public sector were

the personal health care and educational institutions. Up to 53% of heads of the

personal health care institutions and 43% of those of the educational institutions

were politically affiliated. The least politicised organisations were the budgetary

institutions – only 19% of the agency managers were involved in political party

activities. The scope of politicisation was 36% in the state-owned enterprises (see

Table 1 below). Although we did not analyse politicisation in the administrations

of the Lithuanian ministries, our results did not match the finding of patronage

research in 15 European countries that indicated the decreasing pervasiveness of

politicisation moving from ministries to non-departmental and executive institu-

tions ( Kopeck ý et al. 2012 , p. 370). Politicisation was highest among those Lithu-

anian public sector organisations that were located farthest from the government

centre (the state-owned enterprises, the personal health care and educational

institutions).

Moreover, there was substantial variation in the level of politicisation of

public sector managers within different groups of organisations. The most politi-

cised state-owned enterprises were energy (43%) and especially forestry enter-

prises (56%). Politicisation within the personal health care institutions depended

1 Due to data availability the average career length of heads of the personal health care and

educational institutions was calculated for different periods of time, making this indicator not

comparable to other groups of the Lithuanian public sector organisations.

Table 1 The Scope of Politicisation in Various Lithuanian Public Sector Organisations.

Budgetary institutions

Other public sector organisations

Government agencies

(1990 – 2012)

Agencies under the ministries (1990 – 2012)

State-owned enterprises

(1990 – 2012)

Personal health care institutions

(1997 – 2013)

Educational institutions

(2001 – 2013)

% of politicised

managers

28 16 36 53 43

Source: analysis of the data on the politicisation of the Lithuanian public sector managers.



on the level of health services provided – primary health care centres were the

most politicised organisations. Politicisation in the educational institutions was

much higher in the municipality of Vilnius district (77%) compared to the munici-

pality of Vilnius city (26%).

The level of politicisation in the Lithuanian public sector organisations

was uneven throughout the 1990 – 2013 period. The politicisation of managers

appointed to the government agencies and the agencies the under ministries

was highest during 2002 – 2005 and that of CEOs from the state-owned enter-

prises was highest during 2003 – 2005. This period also witnessed an increase of

party patronage in the administrations of the Lithuanian ministries as a result

of senior civil service reform in 2002, when politically-appointed vice-ministers

were replaced with state secretaries and ministerial under-secretaries (all career

civil servants whose appointment was politicised by the governing political

parties). Therefore, it can be argued that politicisation at the central level of gov-

ernment was highest during the political terms of the Lithuanian governments

12 and 13 led by Prime Minister A. Brazauskas from the Lithuanian Social Demo-

cratic Party.

It is worth noting that the adoption of a new procedure for the selection of

heads in the state and municipal educational institutions in 2011 has not reduced

the politicisation of their heads. According to the new procedure, heads of all

the educational institutions (except higher education institutions) are selected

by a committee in which the weight of owners ’ (a particular municipality or the

Ministry of Education and Science) vote makes up only 25% of the total vote.

Despite this change in the appointment of educational heads, their politicisation

remains relatively high – 50% of the new heads appointed under the new proce-

dure were politically affiliated compared with 43% of those appointed before its

introduction.

A statistically significant link between the turnover of managers and their

politicisation, however, existed only in the case of the personal health care and

educational institutions. Survival of the politicised heads of personal health care

institutions in office was 12 years longer than that of the non-politicised manag-

ers. Also, in the municipality of Vilnius district members of the Electoral Action

of Poles in Lithuania survived in their positions two times longer than those

engaged in the political activities of other parties. Therefore, it was rational for

individual candidates or the incumbent managers of these particular organisa-

tions to become or remain politicised in order to gain or safeguard managerial

positions and control over organisational resources.

The following sections of this article analyse which other factors can explain

differences in the turnover and politicisation of the Lithuanian public sector

managers.


10 Vitalis Nakrošis

3.2 The influence of party competition on politicisation

We first analysed the influence of changes in the parliamentary majority and cor-

responding changes of government on the turnover of managers and their politi-

cisation. In order to measure this relation, we divided all Lithuanian governments

into two sets: seven Lithuanian governments that came into power after a large

change in the parliamentary majority (governments 1, 3, 5, 8, 11, 12, 15) and eight

governments that started their terms after a small change in the parliamentary

majority (governments 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14). The majority of managers in the

government agencies and the agencies under the ministries were appointed and

dismissed by the governments which came into power following large changes in

the parliamentary majority. The appointment and dismissal of CEOs in the state-

owned enterprises was similarly quite frequently enacted after such changes

in the parliamentary majority (see Table 2 below). Previous evidence that most

organisational changes in the Lithuanian agency landscape occurred during the

political terms of such governments ( Nakro š is and Martinaitis 2011 ) suggests a

link between the organisational and staff changes at the agency level. Sometimes

state institutions or their internal departments are restructured in order to force

Table 2 The Appointment and Dismissal of Managers in the Lithuanian Public Sector Organisa-

tions by Types of Lithuanian Governments.

Type of government

Appointment and dismissal of managers in

budgetary institutions (government agencies

and agencies under the ministries)

Appointment and dismissal of managers in state-owned enterprises

Number of appointed

heads

Number of dismissed

heads

Number of appointed

heads

Number of dismissed

heads

Governments that came into

power after a large change in the

parliamentary majority (governments

1, 3, 5, 8, 11, 12, 15)

176 (69.3%) 110 (66.7%) 231 (67.7%) 152 (72.7%)

Governments that came into

power after a small change in the

parliamentary majority (governments

2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14)

78 (30.7%) 55 (33.3%) 110 (32.3%) 57 (27.3%)

Total: 254 (100%) 165 (100%) 341 (100%) 209 (100%)

Source: analysis of the data on the turnover of the Lithuanian public sector managers.



managers not loyal to the governing political parties out of office and appoint

new loyal managers (see below on politically motivated reforms of the govern-

ment agencies in Lithuania).

However, the scope of changes in the parliamentary majority, which explains

the turnover of managers in the Lithuanian agencies and the state-owned enter-

prises, does not explain the politicisation of these central-level organisations.

Therefore, it is important to assess the influence of party dominance in govern-

ment on the scope of politicisation.

Our analysis found a statistically significant relation between the length

of party rule in power and the politicisation of agency managers. The longer a

political party held office, the more often agency managers became affiliated

to this political party. For example, the most politicised agency managers were

appointed by the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party whose control of the execu-

tive was the longest in Lithuania, followed by the Homeland Union – Lithuanian

Christian Democrats (the second longest governing party) which appointed some-

what fewer politically affiliated agency heads. The relation between the duration

of party dominance over the state apparatus and the number of politicised man-

agers was also found to be significant in the state-owned enterprises. The major-

ity of politicised CEOs in these organisations were appointed by those political

parties that had been in power for relatively long periods of time (the Lithuanian

Social Democratic Party, the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats

and the Liberal and Centre Union).

The trend of politicisation in the personal health care institutions was

somewhat different. The most politicised managers in these organisations were

appointed by the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats, followed

by the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party. The most politicised managers in

the educational institutions of the Vilnius district and city municipalities were

appointed by the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania and the Liberal and

Centre Union which dominated the councils of the respective municipalities in

the past two decades. Although the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian

Democrats only rarely belonged to the ruling majority of the Vilnius city council,

this party also had a substantial number of school heads engaged in its political

activities. This evidence suggests that the politicisation trends in these providers

of public services at the local level cannot be imputed only to the length of party

rule in office but could be related also to (more right-wing) political beliefs of

heads employed in the personal health care and educational institutions, as well

as different patronage strategies of individual political parties (see the following

section).

All of these findings show that the regular alterations between left-wing and

right-wing party blocs in Lithuania only explained the turnover of public sector



managers in the central-level organisations, whereas the duration of party domi-

nance over public administration partially accounted for the politicisation of

public sector heads at the central level and, to a lesser extent, in local public

sector organisations.

3.3 Beliefs of political and administrative elites and their influence on politicisation

We also analysed the extent to which differences in the scope of politicisation

were related to beliefs of political and administrative elites towards party patron-

age. Although most Lithuanian political parties exercise party patronage, beliefs

of their representatives tend to vary. Data from the 2014 survey of the Lithuanian

political and administrative elite (N = 74) revealed that about 50% of all respond-

ents “ fully or agreed more than disagreed ” with the statement that after a change

of government politicians should have a right to replace state officials and career

managers employed in the civil service. Representatives of the party bloc that

formed the Lithuanian government 16 (led by the Lithuanian Social Democratic

Party) tended to have stronger patronage beliefs (56.4% of respondents who “ fully

or agreed more than disagreed ” with this statement) compared to representatives

of the opposing party bloc that formed the previous government 15 (led by the

Homeland Union) (45% of respective respondents), but this difference was not

statistically significant ( Nakro š is and Bankauskait ė -Grigali ū nien ė 2015 ).

Furthermore, the perception of politicisation in the policy areas assigned

to cabinet ministers was significantly related to membership in different politi-

cal party blocs. Members of the opposing party bloc more frequently perceived

that the governing political parties exercised illegitimate party patronage over

the management of senior executives compared to members of the ruling party

bloc. Therefore, in the polarised party system use of patronage strategies can be

related not only to general beliefs of the Lithuanian elite towards the replace-

ment of managers after a change of government but also to their specific percep-

tions that the political parties in power abused their political power to politicise

the actual appointment and dismissal of public sector managers (Nakro š is and

Bankauskait ė -Grigali ū nien ė 2015).

Our biographical data confirms that the Lithuanian political parties actu-

ally followed somewhat different patronage strategies. The Lithuanian Social

Democratic Party often de facto politicised senior executives – it appointed the

most politicised managers in the government agencies and the agencies under

the ministries during its political terms in government. It was also found that

most (28%) of the new heads appointed to the educational institutions after the



introduction of the new selection procedure belonged to this political party. The

fact the largest number of politicised managers in the Lithuanian public sector

organisations (except in the educational institutions of the Vilnius city and dis-

trict municipalities) participated in the political activities of this party was related

not only to the longest length of this party ’ s rule in power (11 years), but also to

the politicisation beliefs of its politicians.

Sustained party patronage over a long period of time can lead to the politi-

cal capture of certain public sector organisations or policy areas, where a single

political party becomes entrenched. A total of 57% of CEOs appointed to the

state-owned enterprises in the transport sector belonged to the Lithuanian

Social Democratic Party, whose politicians controlled the Ministry of Transport

and Communications for a long part of this party ’ s rule in office. This party also

appointed 78% of the politicised agency managers employed in the policy areas

assigned to the Ministry of the Interior, which can be a result of previous party

patronage (as this party has not controlled this policy area since 2004). Moreover,

73% of the politicised managers in the government agencies were engaged in the

political activities of this party (as opposed to managers in the agencies under

the ministries who tended to represent a few main political parties). This could

be associated with this party ’ s control over the Prime Minister ’ s position in some

previous governments. Other political parties also tended to have strong posi-

tions in the top management of some public sector organisations. For example,

during 2001 – 2013 63% of the politicised managers in the educational institutions

belonged to the Liberal and Centre Union in the municipality of Vilnius city, while

67% of those in the Vilnius district municipality participated in the political activ-

ities of the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania or the Homeland Union – Lithu-

anian Christian Democrats.

On the other hand, the Homeland Union was more prone to exercising the

strategy of structural politicisation, whereby career civil service positions are

replaced by positions of political (personal) confidence in state institutions. For

example, the principle of political appointments in the government agencies was

introduced two times during this party ’ s term in power. Structural changes are

usually based on the perceived needs of political control over bureaucracy: after

a change of government the old team has to make room for a new team. The fact

that there was a significant change of the incumbent managers after the 2010

reform of the government agencies indicates its politically motivated nature –

this organisational change was exploited for replacing some managers loyal to

the previous government.

It is interesting to note, however, that during the last rule of the Home-

land Union politicisation in the dismissal of some managers did not translate

into new politically motivated appointments. Despite the structural reform of



the state-owned enterprises during the political term of the Lithuanian govern-

ment 15, the number of politicised CEOs in the state-owned enterprises actually

dropped down. This confirms that this reform was based on the Scandinavian

principle of depoliticising the state-owned enterprises by separating their man-

agement from direct political influence. There was also no evidence that the

Homeland Union exercised party patronage to politicise the management of the

educational institutions – the managers of these institutions in the municipali-

ties of Vilnius city and district became members of this party when this party did

not hold power. The use of structural politicisation during the rule of the Home-

land Union in reorganising certain institutions and changing the nature of civil

servants ’ positions can be understood as a response to the dominance or even

entrenchment of parties from the opposing political bloc in some public sector

organisations. For instance, the mobilisation of politicised managers in Lithua-

nian-speaking schools of the municipalities of Vilnius city and district can be ini-

tiated in response to extensive party patronage exercised by the Electoral Action

of Poles in Lithuania in the schools of ethnic minorities in the Vilnius region.

Overall, there is evidence that the Lithuanian political and administrative

elite perceived party patronage as quite rightful, increasing the chances of politi-

cisation in the Lithuanian public sector organisations. Variation in the elite beliefs

towards party patronage can explain differences in party patronage strategies

exercised by different political parties, with the Lithuanian Social Democratic

Party de facto politicising top managers, and the Homeland Union – Lithuanian

Christian Democrats employing structural politicisation.

3.4 Party networks and their development through party patronage

Moreover, we analysed how the politicisation of the Lithuanian public sector

organisations was related to the nature of political party networks. With some

exceptions, larger Lithuanian political parties appointed relatively more politi-

cised managers in the government agencies and the agencies under the min-

istries. The number of party members was also positively associated with the

politicisation of CEOs in the state-owned enterprises: the majority of the politi-

cally affiliated CEOs were appointed by larger parties. The largest political parties

also appointed the most heads in the personal health care institutions, thus

engaging influential members of local elites in their party networks.

It is also important to explore networking mechanisms that shape the politi-

cisation of public sector managers. Relatively large political parties (such as

the Homeland Union and the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party) had more



opportunities to select not only ministers but also senior executives of public

sector organisations from their ranks ( Krupavi č ius and Luko š aitis 2004 , p. 336).

More specifically, due to its communist origins the latter party enjoyed the largest

supply of politically loyal candidates – the availability of soviet cadres and inher-

ited nomenklatura relations added the demand of party patronage ( Palidauskait ė

2011 ). This factor can be related to politicians ’ interest to restructure individual

institutions and their internal departments, as well as create new institutions and

positions – the growth of public administration increases possibilities for reward-

ing party loyalists.

Unlike older and larger parties, which were set up after the re-establishment

of the Lithuanian independence, newer and smaller parties that emerged during

the party system evolution often suffered from a shortage of sufficiently quali-

fied candidates. This is why the latter parties sometimes searched for loyal can-

didates outside their ranks (in various public and private sector organisations),

thus using patronage as a deliberate strategy for building their party networks.

For instance, during the political terms of the Liberal and Centre Union in the

municipality of Vilnius city, a considerable amount of managers in the educa-

tional institutions became members of this party. There was also evidence that

the Labor Party, which controlled the Ministry of Education and Science during

the political term of the Lithuanian government 16, actually politicised the man-

agement of the educational institutions.

All of this evidence confirms the use of dense party networks in making

political appointments and the development of party networks through party

patronage. Patronage opportunities and strategies depended on the age and size

of political parties: if older and larger parties tended to select loyal managers

from their ranks, newer and smaller parties were forced to build their networks

by recruiting external candidates to managerial positions.

3.5 The influence of civil service regulation and other administrative factors on politicisation

Finally, we analysed the extent to which the protection of top civil service jobs

affects the turnover and politicisation of agency managers. The relatively low

politicisation of the budgetary institutions and especially the agencies under the

ministries (as compared to other Lithuanian public sector organisations) could be

imputed to the adoption of civil service legislation that was applied to the man-

agement of Lithuanian civil servants.

The SIGMA report argued that the legal protection of Lithuanian top officials

was highest in the whole CEE region, and only 22% of the surveyed civil servants



from the Lithuanian ministers agreed that political parties place their supporters

in the ministerial structure ( Meyer-Sahling 2009 ). Also, the Lithuanian admin-

istrative courts often favored claims raised by the Lithuanian civil servants who

defend their illegal dismissal from office. For instance, a director of Lithuania ’ s

Labor Exchange who is one of the longest serving agency managers in the Lithu-

anian civil service returned to his position in 2011 after the court ruling that his

dismissal was illegal.

However, the principle of job security and its enforcement in the civil service

did not always prevent a politically motivated change of top civil servants. It was

found that the adoption of the Civil Service Laws in 1999 and 2002 did not reduce

the scope of politicisation – in fact, due to domestic political factors the politi-

cisation of agency managers grew during this period together with the scope of

public administration (Nakro š is and Bankauskait ė -Grigali ū nien ė 2015). It seems

that political parties were to some extent able to circumvent the principle of job

security through a few political strategies. First, government-wide organisational

changes were adopted by some governments in power in order to replace certain

incumbent managers (Nakrošis and Budraitis 2012). Second, the Lithuanian Civil

Service Law was recently amended in order to make it possible to dismiss indi-

vidual civil servants by the mutual agreement of an employer and an employee,

which can be politically abused by the governing political parties.

Furthermore, we considered the link between the political salience of public

sector organisations and their budget size on the one side and the politicisation of

their managers on the other. The most politicised government agencies and agen-

cies the under ministries were operating in the areas of public services assigned

to the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Social Security and

Labor and the Ministry of Health. The most politicised organisations of personal

health care were the primary health care centres that were the closest to patients.

Ethnic minority schools were the most politicised organisations of primary and

secondary education – 95% of heads of ethnic minority schools in the municipal-

ity of Vilnius district were politically affiliated. This suggests the politicisation of

public services: influential members of the local elite are politically appointed

and maintained in positions that are sensitive to local people and/or valuable to

political parties as a source of votes or political support.

Also, there was a link between the scope of politicisation and the level of

budgetary appropriations allocated to different public sector organisations.

Due to high strategic importance and high asset values the energy companies

were the most politicised state-owned enterprises. Despite the similar char-

acteristics of the transport companies, their politicisation level was somewhat

smaller. Although the forestry companies were not characterised by high asset

values, the resources of these companies were significant at the local level – a



high level of their politicisation could be partially ascribed to this factor. This

indicates that political parties can be tempted to control not only the provision of

public services that are politically salient or valuable but even the use of public

expenditure, state investments and corporate assets. Therefore, similarly to other

European countries ( Kopeck ý et al. 2012 ), party patronage became an important

organisational resource in Lithuania.

4 Conclusions and recommendations for future research

To summarise, the turnover of the Lithuanian public sector managers was best

explained by alternations in the ruling majorities and associated changes of gov-

ernments, but their politicisation was accounted for by the length of party rule in

government, beliefs of the political and administrative elite and density of their

networks. However, the personal health care and educational institutions, where

politicisation was much higher compared to other public sector organisations

analysed in this study, constituted an exception to this trend. Since there was a

significant link between the stability of their managers and the level of politicisa-

tion, it is particularly rational for these heads to engage in patronage relations at

the local level.

The legal protection of civil service jobs was found to be a significant factor

only for the managers of the agencies under the ministries. Also, other admin-

istrative factors were related to the scope of politicisation: the political salience

of policy areas and administrative tasks executed by different public sector

organisations, as well as the size of their budgetary appropriations. These factors

suggest different politicisation opportunities: political parties were most moti-

vated to politicise the management of public services that have larger budgets

and offer greater political value and that of the state-owned enterprises with rela-

tively significant assets at the central and local levels.

Overall, the turnover of managers in the Lithuanian public sector organisa-

tions and their politicisation was related to a combination of political and admin-

istrative variables. In contrast to the results of previous research, political party

competition and government changes alone were not able to explain the scope

and dynamics of politicisation in Lithuania. Our research suggests that differ-

ent types (structural or de facto ) and mechanisms (top-down or bottom-up) of

politicisation strategies were exercised by the governing political parties during

changes in the ruling majority or competition among candidates for manage-

rial positions. These strategies were more actively used in the policy areas and



organisations characterised by higher political salience and larger funding. The

likelihood and scope of politicisation depended on such important facilitat-

ing factors as density of the party networks, which increased the possibility of

politicisation when certain parties hold power, or such constraining factors as

civil service legislation which limited (but did not eliminate) politicisation in the

budgetary institutions.

The results of this politicisation research in Lithuania confirm the insights of

game theory (prisoner ’ s dilemma), which emphasises cooperation opportunities

among political parties (Nakro š is and Gud ž inskas 2012/2013). Competing politi-

cal party blocs in Lithuania exercised strategies of party patronage that reflected

the behavior of their opponents. If one party bloc de facto politicised career civil

servants holding managerial positions, the competing party bloc followed with

structural politicisation by restructuring institutions and changing the status of

managers ’ positions in order to remove some incumbent managers. Although

most political parties were aware of the negative effects of party patronage and

publicly opposed it, as rational actors they had no interest in discontinuing their

patronage practices in the absence of party cooperation and trustworthy agree-

ments on the professionalisation of managers.

This top-down mechanism can explain politicisation and its dynamics at

the central level of government, especially in the government agencies and

the state-owned enterprises. However, the politicisation of local organisations

(the personal health care institutions, educational institutions and forestry

companies) was based on a different mechanism (see Table 3 below). First,

Table 3 Comparison of the top-down and bottom-up approaches to politicisation.

Top-down politicisation Bottom-up politicisation

Motivation of

party patronage

Rewarding loyal party members,

controlling the decision-making

process

Keeping of managerial positions,

rewarding loyal organisational

staff, controlling organisational

activities and resources

Driving force of

politicisation

Party elites: political parties, elected or

appointed politicians

Administrative elites: managers

of public sector organisations

Result of

politicisation

De jure and de facto politicisation:

an increase in the number of political

appointees or appointment of politically

(personally) loyal members to positions

of career civil service, a relatively

frequent turnover of managers

Membership of public sector

organisations ’ managers in

political parties and frequent

party switching, a relatively

infrequent turnover of managers

Processes related

to politicisation

Creation of new public sector

organisations and their restructuring

Stability of public sector

organisations



the motivation of politicisation and its driving force were different: if in the

bottom-up approach political parties exercised patronage over certain manag-

ers in order to reward party loyalists members or control the decision-making

process, according to the bottom-up approach managers of public sector organ-

isations themselves searched for party patrons in order to keep their managerial

positions, reward loyal members of their organisations or control their activi-

ties and use of their resources. Second, these approaches differed according

to the results of politicisation and its processes: if top-down politicisation led

to higher de jure and de facto politicisation which was frequently related to

changes in the structure of public sector organisations and turnover of manag-

ers, bottom-up politicisation occurred in a relatively stable institutional envi-

ronment, reached a relatively large scope and included party switching, which

was especially the case in the forestry companies. However, these extreme

approaches to politicisation can overlap in practice: some organisations may

exhibit the characteristics of both approaches. For instance, the educational

institutions in the municipality of Vilnius district were equally politicised on

the top-down and bottom-up basis.

Future research on turnover of public sector managers and politicisation can

be continued in a few directions. First, it is possible to collect and analyse data

on the turnover of managers and their politicisation in other Lithuanian public

sector organisations. For instance, it would be interesting to compare the results

of this research, whose scope covered the budgetary institutions, state-owned

enterprises and public (non-profit) institutions, with those of the municipal insti-

tutions, municipality-owned companies or other public sector organisations.

Second, it would be useful to carry out case studies on politicisation and turno-

ver of managers in single organisations or their groups in order to validate the

politicisation causes and mechanisms identified in this study.

Third, due to the relatively high level of politicisation and its importance in

the Lithuanian public sector, it would be relevant to analyse reforms of higher

civil/public service and the results of their implementation. For example, why

has the reform of selecting heads of the state and municipal educational insti-

tutions, which was implemented in 2011, failed to reduce the relatively high

scope of politicisation in these organisations ? Has the rotation of heads of the

personal health care institutions, which was recently introduced in Lithuania,

produced any positive effects ? Fourth, the observation that the least politicised

public sector organisations are those that deal with EU affairs (Nakro š is and

Bankauskait ė -Grigali ū nien ė 2015) leads to a research question relevant to the

studies of Europeanisation: how does the EU influence the (de)politicisation of

public sector organisations and which Europeanisation mechanisms could con-

strain political parties from exercising patronage strategies ?



Fifth, having collected a sufficient volume of data on politicisation and

party patronage in other countries, a comparative analysis could be under-

taken between Lithuania and other post-communist countries. For instance, our

research results show a few interesting similarities to politicisation trends in

other CEE countries. The Hungarian civil service was also politicised as a result

of changing national governments (Meyer-Sahling 2008). A link between agenci-

fication and political appointments was also found in Poland throughout 2001 –

2006, when “ the creation of new quangos, which were staffed by party loyalists,

was a means of increasing the number of appointments available for the govern-

ing party ” ( Gwiazda 2008 , p. 819). In terms of politicisation beliefs, a survey in

Slovenia revealed that 77% of the country ’ s political officials agreed to the state-

ment that “ ministers must have the ultimate say in the selection of a candidate ”

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Article note: This article is the result of research on party patronage and state politicisation

in Lithuanian public sector organisations that was conducted by the Institute of International

Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University. The following researchers of this institute

contributed to this research: V. Nakro š is, I. Bogu š inskait ė , N. Lauri š onyt ė , D. Likait ė and

E. Č eponyt ė .


The Turnover and Politicisation of Lithuanian Public Sector Managers

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