The Signifigance of Mosqueswithin Political Culture in the

17th CenturyComparing the Mosques of Shahjahanabad and Isfahan

Painting by William Carpenter of Jami’ Masjid, Shahjahanabad, 18521

Painting by Pascal Coste of Masjid-I Shah in Isfahan, 18412

Essay: Final draftName: Willem van der Sluis

1 http://collections.vam.ac.uk/search/?limit=15&q=William+Carpenter&commit=Search&quality=1&after-adbc=AD&before-adbc=AD&material%5B0%5D=62&narrow=1&offset=15&slug=0 (referenced on 14-4-2014)2 http://islamic-arts.org/2012/imam-shah-mosque-in-isfahan-iran/ (referenced on 14-4-2014)

Course: Political CultureTheme: The Mughals

Teacher: Anjana SinghDate: 13-6-2014

Words:

Table of Content

Introductionpage: 3-5

One: The Empires of Shahjahan and Shah Abbas Ipage: 6

1.1: Empires and Their New Capitalspage: 6-8 1.2: The Role of Islam

page: 9-12

Two: The Mosque as a Political Buildingpage: 13

2.1: A Mosquepage: 13-142.2: The Place of the Mosque in the Citypage: 142.3: The Khutba page: 142.4: The Madrasa page: 142.5: The Administration of Justicepage: 14

Conclusionspage: 15

Literature page: 16-17

2

Introduction

“Wherever you pray, that place is a mosque.”3

The Prophet Muhammad(570-632 A.D.) himself has been recorded saying

this sentence in relation to prayer. On a technical level the

mosque, the English translation of the term Masjid, therefore does

not necessarily indicated the building like we know it today. It

only needed to consist of one wall with its main feature being that

it provides the direction towards the qibla, the black stone within

the Ka’ba in Mecca.4 But as we can see, mosques are numerous in the

Islamic world and have also been built in every other part of the

3 Robert Hillenbrand, Islamic architecture: form, function and meaning. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 31.4 Idibem.

3

world. As the most important religious building in Islam, it became

the central place for worship for Muslims and it started from the

very beginning to develop various functions, one of which is a

political function.5

The role of the mosque within political culture will be

examined in this essay. This will be done for two congregational

mosques in cities that became the new capitals of two empires in the

seventeenth century eastern Islamic world. These are the Jami’

Masjid in Shahjahanabad, the new capital of the Muhgal emperor Shah

Jahan(1628-1658)6 of India and the Masjid-I Shah in Isfahan, the new

capital of the Safavid emperor Shah Abbas I(1586-1628)7 of Iran.

Shah Jahan and Shah Abbas I both decided they needed a new

capital as their political, administrative and religious centers. In

order to establish this they built, besides a large congregational

mosque, different constructions like a palace and a bazaar centered

around a grand square. All these constructions had different

functions in relations to economics, culture and politics. In order

to get a sense of a part of the political culture of both empires

and their most important cities and buildings, this essay will

provide a comprehensible comparison between the role of the two

congregational mosques within the political culture of their

respective Islamic empires. The focus will be on Shah Jahan and Shah

Abbas I, but because their mosques were built at the end of their

reigns and preformed also their functions afterwards, the reigns of

their successors also needs to be taken into account. Therefore the

research question is:

5 Hillenbrand, Islamic Architecture, 61.6 Ebba Koch, Mughal architecture: an outline of its history and development (1526-1858). (Munich: Prestel, 1991.), 93.7 Stephen P. Blake, “Fathpur Sikri and Isfahan: the founding and layout of capital cities in Mughal India and Safavid Iran.” In Cities in the Pre-Modern Islamic World: the urban impact of religion, state and society, eds. Amira K. Bennison and Alison L. Gascoigne, 145-157. (Oxon: Routledge , 2007), 145.

4

“What was the significance of the Jami’ Masjid of Shahjahanabad and the Masjid-I Shah of

Isfahan within the political cultures of seventeen century Mughal India and Safavid Iran

respectively?”

But what then is political culture? For starters, political

culture tries to be something more than only political history. It

looks beyond what we call default history and it therefore covers a wide

variety of things. Among these are the conditions outside the

political realm that create a certain kind of political system,

political rituals and speech from an anthropological perspective,

norms and values that are dominated within the political realm and

how they change overtime8, and the significance of religion in

politics. Besides this, according to Henk te Velde, political

culture is not just about the small political elite, but takes the

relation between politics and society into account. It is therefore

a constant struggle about the boundaries of the political realm and

the way people should behave within.9 He states: “At the core of the study of

political culture is the research of the forms in politics and the form of politics.”10 In

regards to this essay the significance of religion, with a focus on

mosques, will be at the heart of the political cultures that will be

examined. By looking at the significance of the mosque within the

political culture it is clear that the mosque finds it way in both

the religious and the secular domain.

A comprehensible answer to the research question will be given

according to themes, with each theme providing a different aspect of

the significance of the mosque within the political culture. But

before examining these themes, some historical background is needed.

This first part will therefore provide an introduction for both

8 Henk te Velde, Politieke cultuur en politieke geschiedenis, Groniek, 391-393.9 te Velde, Politieke cultuur en politieke geschiedenis, 398.10 te Velde, Politieke cultuur en politieke geschiedenis, 399.

5

empires and Shah’s, covers their motives to (re-)built a new capital

and looks into the role of Islam within their empires.

The second part will provide an introduction to what a mosque

actually is. Besides this, it will cover the following four themes.

The first theme is the place of the mosque within the city. Both

being the Friday or congregational mosque, they took a prominent

place within the city. They both were built in the center of the

city near the palace of the Shah’s, the political leaders of the two

empires .11 This shows their political importance.

The second theme is the khutba. This is an important part of the

Friday Jumu’ah prayers given in the mosque. It consist of a part

prayer, a part sermon and a part formal address. This khutba, given

by the khatib, has an important political role because the rulers

legitimacy depended on his name being mentioned during the Jumu’ah,

it was a tool to affirm allegiance and it was the platform from

which political announcements were made.12

The third theme is the madrasa. This is commonly known as a

place for religious study adjacent to the mosque. Both mosques in

question had one or more madrasas which fulfilled a role within

Islamic education. This in turn is important for the formation and

the function of the Islamic religious establishment which could

influence the two Shah’s bureaucracy and administration.

The fourth theme is the administration of justice. According to

Hillebrand there exists a long-standing relationship between mosques

and the administration of justice.13 So this part will look at what

the role of both mosques was in relations to the administration of

justice and which other forms regarding this administration existed.

11 C. Edmund Bosworth, ed., Historic Cities in the Islamic World (Leiden: Brill, 2007),133 and 176.12 Hillenbrand, Islamic Architecture, 46 and 61.13 Hillenbrand, Islamic Architecture, 61.

6

Most these themes are chosen according to what Robert

Hillebrand sees in general to be the important political functions

of a mosque. He deals with the madrasa separately, but as is

mentioned above education and the religious establishment preformed

an important political function. It is the aim of this essay to show

to what extent the Jami’ Masjid and the Masjid-I Shah made use of

these functions.

To conclude, a comprehensible answer to the research question

will be given. The significance of the Jami’Masjid and the Masjid-I

Shah within the political cultures of the Mughal and Safavid empires

and their main similarities and differences will be given in an

overview and the main conclusion will be provided.

One: The Empires of Shahjahan and Shah Abbas I

1.1: Empires and Their New Capitals

Together with the Ottoman Empire, the empires of the Safavids and

the Mughals were the major Islamic empires of the pre-modern world.

They were established at the beginning of the sixteenth century, in

1501 and 1526 respectively, and reached their apogee of power in

the seventeenth century, to which Shah Abbas I and Shah Jahan made

important contributions. But after this century decline and

eventually collapse followed. In the case of the Safavids, this came

much earlier than for the Mughals. The last Safavids were overthrown

in 1722, this did not happen to the Mughals until 1857.

The Safavid empire was known to many by different names. For

the inhabitants the name of the country was Iran, to Arabs and Turks

it was ‘Ajamistan, land of the barbarians, and in Europe it was

known as Persia.14

14 Stephen P. Blake, Half the World, The Social Architecture of Safavid Isfahan, 1590–1722. (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999), 3.

7

The empire’s geography was

characterized by mountains

and deserts with only three

rivers flowing through. It

stretched out from what we

now know as Iraq and

Azerbaijan to Afghanistan,

but its borders depended on

the outcome of the battles with the Ottomans, Uzbegs and Mughals.15

Due to the lack of arable land it had only an

Map of Safavid empire16 estimated population between

eight and ten million people, a major contrast with the large plains

of Mughal India and its population in the tens of millions.17 This

explains why almost half of the population of Safavid Iran were

nomadic tribesmen.18

The Safavid dynasty originated with the fourteen century

Islamic mystic, Shaykh Safi al-Din, and over the years his

successors gained more followers, called Sufis or Muslim mystics.

This grew out to be the Safaviyya Sufi Order of which the future

Shah’s were the spiritual leaders.19 The first of them was Shah

Isma’il I(1501-1524), he founded the Safavid empire in 1501 after he

defeated the Aq Quyunlu forces, who ruled western Iran in the late

fifteenth century. The Safaviyya Sufi Order had already a long time

alliance with Turkish tribesmen, known as the Qizilbash, and

together they made this victory and further expansion of the empire

possible. The tribesmen regarded Isma’il, as well as his successors,

15 Blake, Half the World, 4.16 http://www.zonu.com/detail-en/2010-01-05-11618/The-Safavid-Empire-or-Safavid-Dynasty-1501-1722.html (Referenced 4-5-2014)17 Blake, Half the World, 5.18 Blake, Half the World, 6.19 R.S.Canby, Shah 'Abbas: the remaking of Iran. (London: British Museum Press,

2009),14.8

as their divine leaders. 20 But in order to keep individual tribe

leaders from gaining too much power, Isma’il’s son Tahmasp I(1524-

76), divided the Qizilbash tribes internally and moved them around.

This weakened the power relationship between them and the emperor.

The effect was a civil war between Qizilbash tribes after the death

of Tahmasp I.21

The first two successors of Tahmasp failed to end the civil

war, but the third did not. Shah Abbas I(1587-1629) succeeded to end

this civil war in 1590 and became the fifth Safavid emperor. The

civil war was a period of political and economic instability, it

undermined the authority of the emperor and

resulted in the loss of territory both to

the Ottomans in the west and the Uzbegs in

the east. It would therefore be the main

incentive for Abbas to undertake sweeping

reforms.22 First of all, he executed a group

of tribal leaders and his viceroy, Murshid

Quli Khan, who had helped getting him on the

throne.23 In order to prevent subsequent

civil wars he increased his personal bodyguard, still consisting of

Qizilbash tribesmen, but he made them more loyal by incorporating

them into the imperial household. The same did he with his newly

created Shah Abbas I24 corps of household

slaves composed of Christian converts to Shi’a Islam from the

northwest of the empire. Both these groups held the most important

imperial positions.25 To do this he needed more income, so he

20 Blake, Half the World, 6-721 Blake, Half the World, 8.22 Ibidem.23 Ibidem.24 http://www.superstock.com/stock-photos-images/1566-781588 (Referenced on 1-5-2014)25 Blake, Half the World, 9.

9

incorporated agricultural land from the tribal leaders into the

imperial domain and established a imperial monopoly on the export of

silk.26 He reorganized the empire, but his reforms also included the

seeds of decline. Among these are the disappearance of the

theocratic basis, conflict between old and new elements in the

military class and the upbringing of successors within the harem

with no idea of the outside world. 27 A French jeweler and traveler

to the Safavid empire, Jean Chardin, stated it in these fine words:

As soon as this great and noble prince ceased to live, Persia ceased to prosper.”28

Shah Abbas I’s most important move would be the establishment

of his new capital, Ishafan. The city had been the capital of Iran

during the Saljuq period in the eleventh to thirteenth century. With

rise of the Safavids Tabirz and later Qazvin became the capital, but

Isfahan stayed a provincial center.29

The relocation of the capital from Qazvin in the northwest to

Isfahan in the center occurred in 1697-98, and changed the political

geography of the empire. The

motives for the relocation differ

and include geopolitical and

economic reasons, but also the

influence of the Qizilbash. 30

26 Ibidem.27R.W. Ferrier, ed., A Journey to Persia : Jean Chardin's portrait of a Seventeenth-century empire. (London: Tauris, 1996), 5.28 Ibidem.29 Blake, Half the World, 15-16.30 Blake, Half the World, 15.

10

1.2: The Role of Islam

The role of Islam differt between the empires of Mughals and the

Safavids. In the first place because of the difference between Sunni

and Shi’a Islam, but also to what extent they were theocratic

empires. At least one thing is clear, they both used their form of

Islam to legitimize their power.31

At the heart of the division of the Islamic community between

Sunnis and Shi’as lays a fundamental disagreement about who should

hold the political leaderships of this community. Sunni Muslims

accept the line of caliphs starting with the Rashidun caliphs,

followed by the Umayyads and the Abbasids. Shi’a Muslims reject all

these caliphs except for one, Ali, the last Rashudin caliph, and his

decedents.32 Ali was murdered in 661 after a civil war broke out

31 Harbans Muhkia, The Mughals of India (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 40.; Blake, Half the World, 6.32 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Colorado: Westview Press, 2004), 31.

11

between him and Mu’awiyah, the governor of Syria, who won and

subsequently established the Umayyad dynasty. His successor and son,

Yazid, dealt with the last Shi’a rebellion of Husayn, Ali’s son,

and his followers in 680 at Karbala, which became the holiest place

in Shi’a Islam.33

Apart from the dispute about succession, there exist a

difference about the role of the leader of the Islamic community.

Sunni Muslims acknowledge the caliphs as the religious leadership,

but they have no divine power and thus are mortal beings with

temporal authority. Their task was to uphold the sharia and the

Islamic way of life, while they left matters of doctrine and

jurisprudence to the ulama, the religious establishment.34 In Shi’a

Islam the religious leaders are called Imams, and were direct

decedents from Ali. These Imams did, in contrast to the Sunni

caliphs, poses divine inspiration because it is believed that

Muhammad transmitted this over to Ali. This provided them with

knowledge about the hidden meanings of the Quran. According to the

mainstream Shi’a belief, Twelver Shi’ism, the twelfth Imam, Muhammad

al-Mahdi, entered into a state of occultation in 874 and remains

alive, but concealed by God. This problem of religious and

political leadership was eventually solved when the Shi’a ulama

claimed to represent this so-called Hidden Imam.35

Harbans Mukhia provides in his book, The Mughals of India, two

criteria to examine whether empires where theocratic. The first

looks if the state would use all its power to convert all subjects

to Islam and eliminate all non-Islamic presence in its lands. The

second concerns the jurisdiction of sharia and if this Islamic law had

been applied to all subjects, no matter their religion.36 According

33 Ibidem.34 Ibidem.35 Cleveland, , A History of the Modern Middle East, 32.36 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 22-23.

12

to these two criteria a judgment will be made about the theocracy of

both the Safavid and Mughal empires.

The Mughals were a Sunni Muslim dynasty in a predominately

Hindu land. Most Mughal rulers used Islam to legitimize their

authority by battling kufr(infidelity), demolishing temples,

prohibiting the construction of new ones, erecting mosques instead

and collecting the jiziya, the tax non-Muslims had to pay to practice

their own religion.37 But in Mughal India theory and practice in

regards to religion were very different. Consumption of wine and

pork were no exceptions among some of the rulers and also flirting

with other religions was not uncommon.38 In the case of Shah Jahan,

his court chronicle, the Shah Jahan Nama, paints the picture of his

forces as the armies of Islam fighting for the glorification of this

religion, yet there is little evidence of him emphasizing his

Islamic identity.39

This ambivalent attitude was also present when looking at the

two criteria mentioned above by Mukhia. You can say that total

conversion of the Indian population had failed under the Mughals,

because after their reign in 1857 less than 25% of the population,

mainly from the periphery regions what is now Pakistan, Kashmir and

Bangladesh, was Muslim.40 Given the fact that these regions were

never under total control of the Mughals, not even during the height

of their reign under Shah Jahan, there thus exist a divergence

between regions with a high percentage of Muslims and regions with a

strong Muslim authority.41 The reasons for this are various, but,

although conversions did happen, it is clear that there was no real

intent to converse the whole Indian subcontinent to Islam.42

37 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 17.38 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 20.39 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 22.40 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 27-28.41 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 28.42 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 30-39.

13

There is much evidence of the demolishing of Hindu temples by

various emperors prior to Shah Jahan, but also of the saving of, the

permission to reconstruct and even to extent temples.43 Thus there

existed a kind of tolerance of religion within the Muhgal empire in

the beginning of the seventeenth century. This tolerance continued

with the enthronement of Shah Jahan, although he was a little less

tolerant then his predecessors. He was vehement against the

construction of new Hindu temples and he ordered that “whatsoever idol-

temples had been recently built be razed out to the ground.”44 But even if the

emperors wished to eliminated all forms of infidelity, they would

never succeed. India, with its large Hindu population, simply had

too many temples across the vast territories of the subcontinent.45

In regard to the second criteria, the sharia as the only form of

jurisprudence, it must, as for the first criteria, be concluded that

this was not applicable to Mughal India. The sharia was used for

criminal offenses, but with concerns to other parts of life,

marriage, family life and property, the different kinds of civil law

within each community were exercised. So the Hindu, Zoroastrian,

Christian, Sikh, Jain and Buddhist communities followed their own

religio-legal traditions and codes.46 Looking at the two criteria, it

is obvious that the Muhgal empire was not a theocracy.

The role of Shi’a Islam within the Safavid empire was a whole

different story. The Safavid emperors were know by different names

referencing to geography, time and age, but in the religious context

they were known as a sayyid, a descendant of Ali, the first Imam of

Twelver Shi’ism. The emperors had three main sources to legitimize

their rule: the pre-Islamic Iranian tradition of divine kinship, the

claim to represent the Mahdi, the twelfth and Hidden Imam, and their

43 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 23-24.44 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 24.45 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 25.46 Muhkia, The Mughals of India, 39-40.

14

role as leader of the Safaviyya Sufi Order.47 As explained above,

the Safavid dynasty started off as leaders of this order. Originally

a Sunni Sufi order, it was exposed to Shi’ism due to their

allegiance with Shi’a Turkish tribesmen, and eventually turned to

Shi’ism. With the enthronement of Shah Isma’il I in 1501 Shi’ism

became the state religion.48

Applying the criteria by Mukhia to the Safavid empire, it can

be concluded that the emperors established a theocracy by promoting

Shi’ism. According to Robert Cleave “All evidence suggests that the Safavid

shahs took this responsibility very seriously.”49 This was much easier for them

than for the Mughal emperors because the Safavids had to deal with

an already predominantly Muslim population, but not all followers of

Shi’ism. In the second half of the fifteenth century the leaders of

the Safaviyya Sufi Order proclaimed a jihad against the Christian

populations, in 1501 Shi’ism became the state religion, and Shah

Tahmasp issue two Edicts of Sincere Repentence, in 1532-33 and 1555,

in which he disallowed all non-Islamic behavior and forbid gambling,

prostitution and alcohol. Also he started with the conversion of

Christian slaves within his government, a policy continued and

increased by Shah Abbas I.50

As part of his reforms, Shah Abbas tried to counter treats to

his authority from Sufi groups by giving preference to the Shi’a

ulama and bringing Shi’a practice more in line with the sharia51,

although he did not always uphold the Islamic law.52 He thus

preferred to emphasize his legitimacy as a sayyid over his lineage

from Shaykh Safi al-Din. Although Shah Abbas was, unlike his

47 Blake, Half the World, 6.48 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 15.49 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 88.50 Ibidem.51 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 17.52 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 18.

15

grandfather Tahmasp, more tolerant towards Christians53, his

religious policy had to disseminate Twelver Shi’ism in order to

create a stable empire. He did this by seeking advice of prominent

Shi’a theologians of which Shaykh Baha’i as the Shaykh al-Islam, the

leading authority on matters of religious law, was the most

important. Just as consistent laws were needed, a new congregational

mosque would also help to achieve his goal. This became the Masjid-

I Shah.54

Comparing the role of Islam within both empire, it can be

concluded that Islam was much more dominant within Safavid Iran than

in Mughal India. First of all, the majority of the population was

Muslim, in contrast to Mughal India. Therefore it was much easier to

convert people and to prohibit non-Islamic practices. Secondly, the

sharia was the dominant jurisprudence in Safavid Iran for all

subjects. R.W. Ferrier writes, based on the work of Chardin: “The

important events of every day live, marriage and death were strictly prescribed in

accordance with the precepts and rites of the faith.”55 If we define a theocracy as

an political entity in which one form of religion is the basis for

governing this entity, we can conclude that this was the case of

Safavid Iran and not for the Mughal India in the seventeenth

century. This difference will have its effect in regards to the

political significance of the two congregational mosques of both

capitals.

Two: Mosques within Political Culture

2.1: A Mosque

As mentioned in the introduction a mosque, on a technical level,

does not imply a building of any kind and was in essence an open

53 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 18 and 24.54 Canby, Shah ‘Abbas, 27-28.55 Ferrier, A Journey to Persia, 97.

16

place with a wall directed to Mecca. It remained an open place for

worship and the centre for a Muslim community, but it also developed

some key characteristics. The main three will be described below.

Before turning to the characteristics the two types of mosques,

masjid and jami’ must be mentioned. The masjid, which means to prostrate

oneself, is the smaller mosque for daily private prayer. Every

Muslim community has a masjid and it became associated with a

secondary place of worship.56 A jami’, which means to assemble, is a

congregational mosque used for the collective Friday prayers.

Because of its collective function these mosques are much larger,

mostly needed the approval of the ruler and were most of the time

located in the centre of the city.57 The two mosques examined in this

essay thus perform the function of a jami’, although the name of Shah

Abbas’ mosque, the Masjid-I Shah, not directly indicates this. The

name Jami’ Masjid is the common name for a congregational mosque.

The first characteristic and most important is the mihrab. In the

form of a semicircular niche in a wall of the mosque it provides

the worshippers the qibla, the direction to Mecca.58 The Imam, or the

prayer leader, stands in front of the mihrab during prayer.59 The

second is the minbar, the elevated platform of which the khatib

performs the khutba.60 The minbar is mostly placed right to mihrab and

it was elevated for the simple reason that the khatib needs to be

visible and audible.61 The Masjid-I Shad contained two minbars, one

covered in case of bad weather and one in open air for good

weather.62 The third is the most recognizable of them all, the

56 Robert Hillenbrand, Islamic architecture: form, function and meaning. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 44.57 Ibidem.58 Hillebrand, Islamic architecture: form, function and meaning 45.59 Stephen P. Blake, Half the World, The Social Architecture of Safavid Isfahan, 1590–1722. (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999), 139.60 Ibidem.61 Hillebrand, Islamic architecture: form, function and meaning, 46.62 Blake, Half the World, 143.

17

minaret. It is used to perform the adhan, the call to prayer for

Muslims. This is done by the mu’azzin and leads to the filling up of

the mosques by Muslims after they preformed the pre-prayer washing

ritual which is done in the courtyard of the mosque. Although the

call to prayer is commonly its function, the minaret in Safavid Iran

was not used for this purpose.63

For most mosques it was common to have three officers performing

different tasks. For the administration of the property and revenue

there was the mutavalli or the superintendent, the mu’azzin gave the

call to prayer and the Imam led the Muslims into prayer.64 Larger

mosques employed more people. The Masjid-I Shah, for example, had

seventy-six officers and servants.65 Now that it is clear what a

mosque is, the significance of the congregational mosques within the

political culture of both the Mughal and the Safavid empires will be

examined according to the themes laid out previously.

2.2: The Place of the Mosques within the City

Both mosques, the Masjid-I Shah and the Jami’ Masjid, took a

prominent place along the new constructed central squares of their

respective capitals. As the imperial congregational mosques they

dominated the religious architecture of their cities, reveal a great

deal about the religious organization of the empires and functions

as the central space for worship.

2.3: The Khutba

The main political function of the Khutba is to legitimize the rulers

as the sovereign, to form loyalty from its subjects and to proclaim

political announcements. But what if the large majority of the

subject are not Muslims and therefore do not attend the collective

63 Hillebrand, Islamic architecture: form, function and meaning, 129.; Blake, Half the World, 139.64 Blake, Half the World, 139.65 Ibidem.

18

Friday prayers? Its function will not have its affect on the whole

population, so there are other forms are needed. This is the case in

Mughals India and straightaway the main difference with Safavid Iran

in regards to this theme.

2.4: The Madrasa

Conclusions

The first conclusion so far is that the place of the mosques within

their respective cities are very important for religious

organization of both empires

The second is that the political significance of mosques(Khutba) in

Safavid Iran is larger than in Mughal India due to the difference in

Muslim/Non-Muslim ratio. So the percentage of Muslim within the

empire sais someting about the political reach of mosques.

The third is that the role of the ‘Ulema (Madrasa) is larger in

Safavid Iran than in Mughal India due to the difference in

applicability of the sharia

19

List of literature

Secondary sources:

Blake, Stephen P., Half the World, The Social Architecture of Safavid Isfahan, 1590–

1722. Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999.

Blake, Stephen P., Shahjahanabad: The Sovereign City in Mughal India 1639-1739.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

20

Blake, Stephen P. “Fathpur Sikri and Isfahan: the founding and

layout of capital cities in Mughal India and Safavid Iran.” In Cities in

the Pre-Modern Islamic World: the urban impact of religion, state and society, eds.

Amira K. Bennison and Alison L. Gascoigne, 145-157. Oxon:

Routledge , 2007.

Bosworth, C. Edmund, ed., Historic Cities in the Islamic World. Leiden: Brill,

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