The Sharp Contour of Consciousness - Jonathan Simon

TheSharpContourofConsciousness

By

JonathanAaronSimon

Adissertationsubmittedinpartialfulfillment

Oftherequirementsforthedegreeof

DoctorofPhilosophy

DepartmentofPhilosophy

NewYorkUniversity

May2012

__________________________

PaulA.Boghossian

©JonathanAaronSimon

AllRightsReserved,2012

iv

DEDICATION

Tomymother,CynthiaWeisfeldSimon,mygrandmother,RhodaWeitzenfeldSimon,mygrandfatherIsraelSimon,andmyuncleRichardKellerSimon.

ToBurtonWeisfeldandSylviaWeisfeld,andtoWilliamSimonandCyndyEstyandBenjaminSimon.

ToHeatherAlexander.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Specialthankstothechairofmycommittee,PaulBoghossian,andtomyadvisorsNedBlock,DavidChalmers,andSharonStreet.Manythanksfortime,insightandencouragementtoEliAlshanetsky,MichaelAntony,DavidBarnett,DeanChapman,JustinClarke‐Doane,JohnnyCottrell,WillDavies,PaulEgre,KitFine,AkikoFrischhut,YuGuo,GraceHelton,RobertHowell,HasenKhudairi,GeoffreyLee,DanLopezDeSa,PhillippeLusson,ColinMarshall,FaridMasrour,JohnMorrison,MarkOkrent,JoelleProust,MichaelRaven,StephenSchiffer,MichaelSchweiger,MiguelSebastian,JeffSebo,TedSider,MichaelStrevens,PeterUnger,AchilleVarzi,ChristopherViger,RobbieWilliams,JarredWarren,SebastianWatzl,CharlotteWittandparticipantsofseminarsatNYU,ENSandGeneva.

Thankstomyparents,grandparents,brotherandextendedfamilyforsupportingme.

Andfinally,thankstoHeatherAlexanderfortheloveshehasgivenme.

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TableofContents

DEDICATION ...............................................................................................................................IV

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ V

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTIONTOEACHCHAPTER. ............................................................................................. 3

CHAPTERONE:MICHAELANTONYONTHEVAGUENESSOF‘CONSCIOUSNESS’.......3

CHAPTERTWO:GENERALIZEDCONCEPTUALGAPPRINCIPLESANDVAGUENESS 3

CHAPTERTHREE:APRIORIPROTOPHENOMENALISMANDNONEXCLUDABILITY5

CHAPTERFOUR:THESIGNIFICANCEOFTHEMENTALPROBLEMOFTHEMANY..7

CHAPTERFIVE:THESIGNIFICANCEOFCONSCIOUSNESS ...................................................8

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................. 9

NOTEONNOTATION............................................................................................................................10

CHAPTERONE:ANTONYONTHEVAGUENESSOF‘CONSCIOUSNESS’......................11

§1.1ANTONY’SCONCEPTUALARGUMENT................................................................................12

§1.1.1THENECESSARYCONDITION ............................................................................................ 12

§1.1.2‘PHENOMENALLYCONSCIOUS’DOESNOTSATISFYMIDDLEGROUND......... 21

§1.2PROBLEMSWITHANTONY’SCONCEPTUALARGUMENT..........................................27

§1.3ANTONY’SMETAPHYSICALCONCLUSIONS .....................................................................37

§1.4PROBLEMSWITHANTONY’SMETAPHYSICALCONCLUSIONS................................38

CHAPTERTWO:.........................................................................................................................43

GENERALIZEDCONCEPTUALGAPPRINCIPLESANDVAGUENESS............................43

§2.1:GENERALIZEDGAPPRINCIPLES..........................................................................................46

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§2.2:THEINTERESTOFNON‐EXCLUDABILITY,CANONICALPRIMITIVITYAND

CANONICALINSCRUTABILITY.........................................................................................................54

§2.3:GENERALIZEDCONCEPTUALGAPSANDTHESTATUSOFPHENOMENAL

CONCEPTS.................................................................................................................................................59

§2.4NON‐EXCLUDABLECONCEPTSARENOTVAGUE .........................................................62

CHAPTERTHREE:.....................................................................................................................73

APRIORIPROTOPHENOMENALISMANDNONEXCLUDABILITY ..............................73

§3.1:PROTOPHENOMENALISMANDAPRIORIPROTOPHENOMENALISM.................76

§3.2:AGAINSTAPRIORIPROTOPHENOMENALISM ...............................................................84

§3.3:IFAPRIORIPROTOPHENOMENALISMISFALSE,THEGENERALIZEDNOTIONS

OFCONCEPTUALGAPAPPLYTOPHENOMENALCONCEPTS .........................................102

CHAPTERFOUR: .................................................................................................................... 112

THESIGNIFICANCEOFTHEMENTALPROBLEMOFTHEMANY............................. 112

§4.1THEMENTALPROBLEMOFTHEMANY..........................................................................113

§4.2:FROMTHEMENTALPROBLEMOFTHEMANYTOPROPERTYDUALISM.......119

§4.2.1:ONTOLOGICALLYCONSERVATIVERESPONSESTHATDONOTAPPEALTO

VAGUENESS ...........................................................................................................................................121

§4.2.2:ONTOLOGICALLYCONSERVATIVERESPONSESTHATAPPEALTO

VAGUENESS ...........................................................................................................................................123

§4.2.3:ONTOLOGICALLYINFLATIONARYRESPONSES......................................................125

§4.3:CHALLENGINGTHEPREMISES..........................................................................................130

CHAPTERFIVE: ...................................................................................................................... 134

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THESIGNIFICANCEOFCONSCIOUSNESS........................................................................ 134

§5.1:NATURALDIMENSIONDETERMINABLES....................................................................135

§5.2:SIGNIFICANCEANDTHESEACHANGEARGUMENT ................................................141

5.3:NORMATIVESIGNIFICANCE..................................................................................................147

§5.4:IFPHENOMENALCONSCIOUSNESSISANATURALDIMENSION(ORSUB‐

DIMENSION)DETERMINABLETHENPROPERTYDUALISMORPANPSYCHISMIS

TRUE.........................................................................................................................................................151

§5.5:THENATURALDIMENSIONARGUMENTVERSUSTHECONCEIVABILITY

ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................................................158

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................... 163

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INTRODUCTION

Wehavetheintuitionthatexperience‐thequalitativecharacterofthe

experienceofcolor,shape,sound,pain,emotion;whatitisliketoexperience

thesethings–isanonoroffphenomenon.Thoughexperiencecanbemoreor

lessintense,moreorlessrich,youareeitherexperiencing(atsomemoment)

oryouarenot.Askingwhethersomeoneisexperiencingislikeaskingwhether

thelightison,ratherthanlikeaskingwhetherthelightisbright.Something

canbemoreorlessbright,butitcanalsobeinastateindeterminatebetween

beingbrightandnotbeingbright.Thiscannothappenwithsubjective

experience–youareeitherhavingsomeoryouarenot.

Wealsotaketheretobeasignificantcontrastbetweenexperiential

realityandnon‐experientialreality.Whetherthelightemitsexactly1542

lumensisayesornoaffair:iteitherisemittingexactlythatamountoritisnot.

Butthereisnosignificantcontrasthere:thereisnothingontologically

distinguishedaboutemitting1542lumensratherthan1543,thewaythereis

somethingontologicallydistinguishedaboutthelightbeingonratherthanoff.

Askingwhethersomeoneisexperiencingislikeaskingwhetherthelightison,

ratherthanlikeaskingwhetherthelightisemittingexactly1542lumens.

Thereisasignificantmetaphysicalcontrastbetweenexperienceandnon‐

experience.

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Puttingthesetwoobservationstogether,wehavethatconsciousnessis

asharpcontourintheworld.Butisthereroomforsuchasharpcontour?The

materialworldisagradualplace.Withapowerfulenoughmicroscope,

everythinglookscloudy,andthereareonlysharpcontoursinnaturevery

rarely–someatthequantumlevel,somedealingwiththresholdsof

fundamentalphenomenalikegravity.Mostthingsthatappeartobesharpand

distinguishedchanges(likethefiringofaneuron,orthesplittingofan

embryoniccell)areactuallyquitegradualonafineenoughscale.

Soconsciousnessseemstobeasharpcontourintheworld,but

materialrealityistoogradualtoaffordusanytrulysharpcontours(in

anythingliketheappropriateplaces).Thisisaproblemifwehopetofinda

placeforconsciousnessinthematerialworld.Onestrategyforsolvingthe

problemistoholdthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’actuallyisvague–thatthe

conceptisreallymorelike‘BrightlyIlluminated’thanlike‘Illuminated’–even

thoughittakessomework,andperhapsempiricaldiscovery,toseehow.Then

wecansaythatconsciousnessisacontour,butdenythatitisasharpone.

Afterafirstchapterofliteraturereview,inchapterstwoandthreeofthis

dissertationIarguethatthisstrategyisnotopentomaterialists:materialists

mustsaythattheconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague.Inchapters

fourandfive,Iarguethatwecannotdispensewiththethoughtthat

consciousnessisacontour,andIarguethatthisisgenuinelyinconsistentwith

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takingconsciousnesstobeapartofordinary,materialreality.Ifconsciousness

isasharpcontour,wemusteithertaketheconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’

todescribesomethingthatgoesbeyondordinarymaterialreality,ortakeitto

describefarmoreofordinarymaterialrealitythanwemighthavesupposed.

‐‐

INTRODUCTION TO EACH CHAPTER.

CHAPTER ONE: MICHAEL ANTONY ON THE VAGUENESS OF ‘CONSCIOUSNESS’

MyworkowesanintellectualdebttoMichaelAntony.Inapairof

paperspublishedin2006,Antonydevelopsanargumentthat‘Phenomenally

Conscious’isnotvague,andthatconsequentlynoneoftheleadingmaterialist

theoriesofconsciousnessmaybecorrect.InthisfirstchapterIdiscusssome

pressingproblemswithAntony’sargumentandoutlinehowIintendto

overcometheseproblems,buildingonthecoreofhisargument,inlater

chapters.

CHAPTER TWO: GENERALIZED CONCEPTUAL GAP PRINCIPLES AND VAGUENESS

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InthischapterIconsiderseveralwaysofgeneralizingtheideaofa

conceptualgap.Manymaterialistsagreewithdualiststhatthereisa

conceptualgapbetweenphenomenalconceptsandmaterialconcepts:zombies

areconceivable,invertedspectraareconceivable,soulsinworldswithout

muchcomplexityareconceivable.Asweusuallyunderstandit,theideaofa

conceptualgapistheideaofarelationbetweentwofamiliesofconcepts–for

examplethefamilyofphenomenalconceptsandthefamilyofmaterial

concepts.HereIconsiderthreewaysofgeneralizingfromtherelationaltothe

absolute.Twoofthese,CanonicalInscrutabilityandCanonicalPrimitivity,are

waysforafamilyofconceptstobeautonomousfromallotherfamiliesof

concepts,andoneofthem,NonExcludability,isawayforasingleconceptto

markakindofabsoluteautonomyintherealmofconcepts.AfterIintroduce

thesenewdistinctionsIdiscusstheirrelevancetoexistingdebates:they

articulatedistinctnotionsofconceptualprimitivity,andtheyallowusto

reframetheissuesincertaindebateslikethedebateovertheautonomyof

ethics.Theyalsoallowustoarticulaterespectsinwhichphenomenalconcepts

maybedistinguishedevenifweholdthattheordinaryrelationalsortof

conceptualgapdoesnotdistinguishthem.Iconcludethepaperbyshowing

onefurtherapplicationofthenotionofNon‐Excludability:Iarguethatifa

conceptisNon‐Excludablethenitisnotvague(assumingthatvaguenessis,

broadlyspeaking,asemanticphenomenon).

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CHAPTER THREE: A PRIORI PROTOPHENOMENALISM AND NON-EXCLUDABILITY

ItiscommonlysupposedthatDemocrituswasright,andtherestofthe

PresocraticandRomanticphilosopherswerewrong:realityismadeofMere

MatterandVoid,ratherthanSacredFire,orAether,orWill,orsomeother

exoticthing.Wesupposethatthegranddebateoverthenatureofbeingis

closed,andmaterialistshavewon.ButthereisroominlogicalspaceforaDual

Aspectviewaccordingtowhich‘SacredFire’and‘Matter’aredifferentguises

ofthesamebeing.ManymaterialistsembracetheDualAspectviewthat‘Mind’

and‘Matter’aredifferentguisesofthesamebeing.Andthissortofmaterialist

mayhavereasontoembracethemoreexoticsortofDualAspecttheory.The

viewthatthereisa‘SacredFire’aspecttomaterialrealitymighthelpto

explaintheconnectionbetweenthenon‐mentalandthemental–ifthe

correlationbetweenthe‘SacredFire’aspectandthe‘Mind’aspectisstrong

enough.

InthischapterIwilldescribeaposition,Protophenomenalism,which

articulatesapreconditiononthisexoticsortofDualAspecttheory,andIwill

tentativelydefendit.Butmyprimaryaiminthischapteristoshowthatthere

isalimitonhowmuchofanexplanationofthementalwecanexpectthis

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strategytodeliver.Iwillcallthepositionwhichsaysthatsomedescriptionin

exotictermsmightactuallyentailaphenomenaldescriptionAPriori

Protophenomenalism.Iwillarguethatthisviewisdifficulttodefendin

conjunctionwithanon‐deflationary,naturalistictheoryofconceptapplication.

SincethatisthesortoftheoryofConceptApplicationyoushouldembraceif

youthinkthatthementalisultimatelymaterial,thismeansthatifyouthink

thementalisultimatelymaterial,youshouldabandonthehopeforanexotic

conceptionofrealitythatentailsanythingaboutmentalreality.Thisimposesa

significantlimitonthewaysthatanexoticDualAspecttheorymighthelpthe

materialistbridgetheexplanatorygap.

Mysecondaryaiminthischapteristousethisresulttoshowthat

phenomenalconceptsareexamplesofthesortsofGeneralizedConceptual

GapsthatIdiscussinchaptertwo.IwillarguethatifAPriori

Protophenomenalismisfalse,thentheconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’is

nonexcludable.Iwillalsopresentsomereasonstothinkthatthefamilyof

phenomenalconceptsiscanonicallyinscrutableandcanonicallyprimitive,

thoughforreasonsIwilldiscusstheseclaimsarehardertoestablish.Butnon

excludabilityisthemorenewsworthynotion:InthesecondchapterIargue

thatifaconceptisnon‐excludablethenitisnotvague,sotheimplicationofmy

conclusionherewillbethat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague(assuming

anon‐deflationary,naturalistictheoryofconceptapplication).Andinthe

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fourthandfifthchaptersIarguethatif‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague

theneitherPanpsychismorPropertyDualismistrue.Thereisthusamaster

argumenthereagainstOrthodoxMaterialismbroadlyconstrued:eitheranon‐

deflationary,naturalistictheoryofconceptapplicationisfalse,oroneof

PanpsychismorPropertyDualismistrue.1Idodefendtheclaimthat

Protophenomenalismisopentoorthodoxmaterialists(thoughAPriori

Protophenomenalismisnot),butthisdefenseismodulomyargumentin

chapterfourandfivethatOrthodoxMaterialismisuntenable.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MENTAL PROBLEM OF THE MANY

InthischapterIofferanargumentthatthepropertyphenomenal

consciousnessisnotidenticaltoorgroundedinanymaterialproperty–in

otherwords,forPropertyDualism(characterizedinanon‐modalway2).My

argumentisanargumentfromtheMentalProblemoftheManytoProperty

1Ifonerejectsanon‐deflationarynaturalisttheoryofconceptapplication,Itakethemostcompellingalternativetobeaprimitivisttheoryofconceptapplication,whichisasortofprimitivismaboutintentionalstatesandrelations.Sinceitisplausiblethatallmentalstates,includingphenomenalstates,areintentionalstates,thismightamounttopropertydualismaboutphenomenalpropertiesaswell,butinanycaseitamountstoapropertydualismaboutsomementalproperties.2AsIdefineitPropertyDualismiscompatiblewithanecessarysupervenienceclaim(althoughtheexplanatoryroleofsuchaclaimwouldbequestionable).ItakeSubstanceDualismtobecompatiblewith(andprobablytoentail)PropertyDualism.IdonotthinkmyownargumentsestablishSubstanceDualismbuttheycertainlydonotruleitout.ThankstoMikeRavenfordiscussiononthispoint.

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Dualism.TherealreadyareargumentsfromtheMentalProblemoftheMany

toDualism(Unger2006,Zimmerman2011).Buttheseargumentsare

argumentsforSubstanceDualism,andtheypresupposePropertyDualism

(Ungerimplicitly,Zimmermanexplicitly).Thereisanargumentfromthe

MentalProblemoftheManytoPropertyDualism,butitcallsfordifferent

premisesthantheexistingargumentsemploy.Myargumenthingesonthree

premises.Thefirstpremise,whichIdefendinchapterstwoandthree,isthat

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague.Thesecondisthattherearenot

swarmsofoverlappingconsciousbeingswhereverthereisone.Thethird

premisespecifiesasenseinwhichphenomenalconsciousnessisasharp

contourintheworld:itisontologicallysignificant.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

InthischapterIfurtherdeveloptheideathatphenomenal

consciousnessisontologicallysignificant–thatthereisacontourinthe

worldbetweenconsciousthingsandnon‐consciousthings.Drawingonthe

premisethat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague,Iarguethattheproperty

phenomenalconsciousnessisaNaturalDimensionDeterminable–a

propertydemarcatinganobjectivedimensionofsimilarityanddifferencein

qualityspace.IthenarguethatifphenomenalconsciousnessisaNatural

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DimensionDeterminabletheneitherPropertyDualismorPanpsychismistrue

(orboth).

CONCLUSION

Chapterstwothroughfiveofthisdissertationamounttoamaster

argumentforthedisjunctionofPropertyDualism,Panpsychism,or

PrimitivismaboutIntentionality.InchaptertwoIarguethatifaconceptis

non‐excludablethenitisnon‐vague.InchapterthreeIarguethatifAPriori

Protophenomenalismisfalse,then‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐

excludable,andIarguethatAPrioriProtophenomenalismisfalse.Thisentails

that‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐vague.Theargumenthingesonthe

assumptionofnon‐deflationarymaterialismaboutconceptapplication.The

non‐deflationisminquestionisverymild,meaningthatthemostplausible

wayofrejectingtheassumptionistorejectmaterialismratherthannon‐

deflationism.ThisrejectionamountstosomethinglikePrimitivismabout

someintentionalrelations.ThuswefaceachoicebetweenPrimitivismabout

someintentionalrelationsandthenon‐vaguenessofconsciousness.Butin

chapterfourIusethenon‐vaguenessofconsciousnessasapremise,along

withthepremisethatconsciousnessissignificant,inanargumentthat

PropertyDualismistrue,andinchapterfiveIuseitasapremise–again,along

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withthepremisethatconsciousnessissignificant–inanargumentthateither

PropertyDualismorPanpsychismistrue.Thus,themasterclaimofmy

dissertationisthat,ifwegrantthatconsciousnessissignificant,wemust

choosebetweenPrimitivismaboutintentionalrelations,PropertyDualismor

Panpsychism.

NOTE ON NOTATION

InthisdissertationIwillco‐optordinarylanguagetonameparticular

theoriesorviews,andIwillmentionanumberofconceptsandproperties.I

willrefertotheories,viewsandprincipleswithcapitalletters.Iwillreferto

conceptswithcapitallettersinsinglequotes,andIwillrefertopropertiesin

lowercasebold.ForexampleinchaptertwoIwilldiscussviewslike

MaterialismandDualism,andIwilldiscussconceptslike‘Phenomenally

Conscious’and‘Good’,andIwilldiscusspropertieslikephenomenal

consciousnessandgoodness.

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CHAPTERONE:ANTONYONTHEVAGUENESSOF‘CONSCIOUSNESS’

Intwogroundbreakingpapers,Antony2006aand2006b,Michael

Antonyarguesthattheconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague,3and

thatif‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvaguethenmostordinaryversionsof

materialismarefalse.Inthischapter,IreviewAntony’sargument,andisolate

whatItaketobeitsmostpressingdifficulties.Thereareseriousproblems

withhiscasethat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague,andwithhiscase

thatthenon‐vaguenessof‘PhenomenallyConscious’impliesthatmost

ordinaryversionsofmaterialismarefalse.Idobelievethattheseproblemsare

solvable,andthatthereisasoundargumentforAntony’sconclusions,butthis

argumentlookssubstantiallydifferentfromAntony’s.Thesubsequent

chaptersofthisdissertationpresentthatargumentinfull,andIwillpresentit

inoutlinehere,asthecritiqueofAntonymakesitsalient.

In§1.1IwillpresentAntony’sargumentthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’

isnotvague.In§1.2Iwillarticulatewhatseemtometobethemostpressing

problemswiththeargument,andindicatehowIthinktheseproblemsarebest

3Antony’sargumentisfortheconcept‘ConsciousState’.Hespendsafewpagesexplainingthatby‘Conscious’hemeans‘PhenomenallyConscious’.Andthoughhespeaksoftheconcept‘ConsciousState’,hemakesclearthathetakestheargumentalsotoworkfor‘HavingaConsciousState’.Buttherearereasonstothinktheargumentwillworkforthelatterandnottheformer(wemightsaythatitisindeterminatewhetheranunattendedpainisaconsciousstatewithoutsayingitisindeterminatewhethertheexperiencerhavingtheunattendedpainhasconsciousstates).SoforreasonsofbothsubstanceandpresentationIwillspeakasthoughhissubjectweretheconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’.

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dealtwith.In§1.3IwillpresentAntony’sargumentthatif‘Phenomenally

Conscious’isnotvaguethenmostordinaryversionsofmaterialismarefalse,

andin§1.4IwilldiscussproblemswiththisargumentandexplainwhatItake

tobethewayforward.

§1.1 ANTONY’S CONCEPTUAL ARGUMENT

Antonyclaimsthattheconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague.

Hisargumenthastwocomponents.Hefirstpresentsaconditionwhichhe

arguesisanecessaryconditionforaconcepttobevague,andhethenargues

thattheconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’doesnotsatisfythiscondition.I

willpresentthesecomponentsinturn.

§1.1.1 THE NECESSARY CONDITION

Antonydoesnotnamethecondition.Itisacomplexconditionwithfour

components,andhenamestheseC1–C4.Iherebynamethecomplex

conditionMiddleGround,becausethecoreoftheideaisthatifaconceptis

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vagueyouhaveaconceptionofamiddlegroundbetweenclearcasesandclear

non‐cases.

Antonydistinguishesbetweenconceptsinthepsychologicalsense,

conceptsinthephilosophicalsense,andconceptions.Aconceptinthe

philosophicalsenseis“roughly,anabstractmeaning,sense,etc”(2006bp.4),

whileaconceptinthepsychologicalsenseis“roughly,amentalrepresentation

thatcanbeaconstituentofthoughts”(ibid.).Aconceptionis“amental

representationstructurethatissemanticallyandsyntacticallycomplex–

structuresbymeansofwhichweidentify,categorizeandoftensimplythink

aboutobjects,events,properties,etc”(ibid.).Antonydistinguishesbetween

philosophicalandpsychologicalconceptstomakeclearthathisinterestiswith

psychologicalconcepts,4andhedistinguishesbetweenpsychologicalconcepts

andconceptionstoremainneutralontheFodoriandebateoverwhich

conceptsarecomplexandwhichareatomic.Aclassicaltheoristmayidentify

conceptionswithpsychologicalconcepts,whileaFodorianmayholdthat

4However,inthefirstfootnoteofhis2006a(whichhewrotelaterbutpublishedsooner),Antonyindicatesthathetakesmentalrepresentationstoexpressabstractconcepts,sohepresumablydrawsthesedistinctionsforthesakeofclarityratherthanbecausehetakessomethingcriticaltohingeonthedistinction.

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conceptionsaredistinctfromconceptsbutassociatedwiththemasamatterof

psychologicallaw.5

Antonytellsusthathisconditionisanecessaryconditiononathinker,

S,possessingthecapacitytoconceiveofborderlinecasesforsomevague

conceptF.Hereisthecondition:

“(C1)ItmustbepsychologicallypossibleforStorepresentaseriesofindividualswithindividualconceptions[ψ

1]–[ψ

n],suchthat:

(C2)TheseriesofindividualscontainsallofandonlyFs,borderlineFs(i.e.,individualswithrespecttowhichv‐dispositionsaremanifested),andnot‐Fs,andinthatorder.(C3)Individuals’parts,properties,etc.arerepresentedasgraduallychangingfromindividualtoindividual,eitheralongsomedimension,orwithrespectto(somethinglike)theirweightedsum,and(C4)Thereareatleastsomeparts,properties,etc.representedinS’sconception[F],thattheFs,borderlineFs,andnot‐Fsareallrepresentedbythe[ψ]sasclearlyhaving.”(2006bp.9)

Taketheconcept‘Tall’.IfSiscompetentwith‘Tall’,thenScanform

conceptionsofaseriesofindividuals,eachslightlylesstallthanthelast,with

thefirstbeingaclearcaseof‘Tall’,thelastbeingaclearcaseof‘NotTall’and

someintermediateonestriggeringS’sv‐dispositions(Isaywhatthesearejust

below).ThissatisfiesC1‐C3.ForC4,weobservethateachoftheseindividuals

5Antonyattributestheconcept/conceptiondistinctiontoWoodfield1991,butseealsoKatz1972,Davis2003andHigginbotham1998.Thedistinctionisparticularlyrelevantifoneissympatheticwiththeconceptualatomismdefendedby,e.g.Fodor1998orMillikan2000.

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–thetall,theborderline,andthenot‐tall–hasaheight,andthismeansthat

‘Height’isthecommonconceptionthatC4demands.

Byan‘individualconception’Antonymeansaconception(acomplex

mentalrepresentation)ofanindividual.Antonydoesnottellusexactlywhat

hetakesaborderlinecasetobe–hesayshewishestoremainneutralbetween

competingtheoriesandsowillleavethematterintuitive–buthetakesthere

tobeastrongconnectionbetweenacaseofsomeconceptFbeingaborderline

case,andthecommunityofcompetentusersofFdisplayingacertainsortof

disposition(avaguenessrelateddispositionorvdisposition)inevaluating

whetherthecaseisanF.Thesedispositionswillinvolve:

“…increasedhesitationaboutwhethertojudgeindividualsasFornot‐F,denyingboththatanindividualisFandthatitisnot‐F,changingone’smindastowhetheritisFornot‐F,judgingittobeneitherclearlyFnorclearlynot‐F(i.e.,aborderlinecase),andsoon...Inaddition,forthosecompetentwithavagueconceptthereisacharacteristicphenomenologyassociatedwithconsciousreflectiononcasesinandaroundtheborderlineregion—aphenomenologydistinctfromthatassociatedwithcertainkindsofignoranceaboutsharpboundaries,forexample.”(2006bp.3)

Antony’sargumentforC1andC2isthat

“ifSpossessesaconceptF,andFisvague,thenSmustbeabletoconceiveinstancesfallingunderF,instancesnotfallingunderF,andborderlineFs.SinceScanselectandorderwhatSconceives,C1andC2follow.”(2006bp.9)6

InC3,Antonyspeaksofpropertiesbeingrepresentedas“gradually

changing…eitheralongsomedimension…orwithrespecttotheirweighted

6FormoreonthepsychologicalapproachtovaguenessseeWright2001,Schiffer2003.

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sum.”Whatdoesthismean?Antonydoesnotreallyexplainwhatitisto

representachangeasgradualalongsomedimension.Hedoesnotsaywhata

dimensionis,thoughhesuggeststhatadimensionisjustaconception(2006b.

p10).AsIwillexplainbelow,itisimplicitinsomeofhisargumentsthathe

expectsthevariationintherelevantdimensiontoexplainorgroundthe

changefromclearFtoborderlineFtonon‐F,thoughhedoesnotmakethis

explicit.

ThedistinctionAntonydrawsbetweencasesofgradualchangealong

somedimensionandgradualchangewithrespecttosomeweightedsumis

Alston1964’sdistinctionbetweenDegreeandCombinatoryvagueness.

AccordingtoAntony(andAlston),degreevaguenessisvaguenesswherebya

seriesofincrementalchangesinsomedimension(forexampleheight,or

color)youcangetfromclearcasestoborderlinecasestoclearnon‐cases.

Combinatorialvaguenessisvaguenessinaclusterconceptwhenitisvague

justwhichconditionsareapartofthecluster,orjusthowmanyofthem

somethinghastohaveinordertosatisfytheconcept.Oneexampleis

‘Religion’:thisisaclusterconceptwithelementslike‘BeliefinaDeity’,‘Belief

inanAfterlife’.Borderlinecaseslike‘Scientology’donotdifferalongsome

dimension(ofmetaphysicallyobjectivesimilarity)fromclearercasesof

religion:theydifferoverhowmanyitemsintheclustertheysatisfy(2006b

p.8).Antonydoesnotoffermuchofanargumentthatthedivisionintodegree

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andcombinatorytypesofvaguenessisanexhaustiveclassificationofthe

varietiesofvagueness,butprovidedthatwearerelativelypermissiveinwhich

conceptscountasclusterconcepts,andwhichchangesareincremental

changesinsomedimension,itishardtoseewhatmightcountasa

counterexample.Still,Antonymayhavetomakethesethingsmoreprecise.For

example,hemustsaywhytheseries‘PhenomenallyConscious’,‘Borderline

PhenomenallyConscious’,‘NotPhenomenallyConscious’doesnotspecify

suitablyincrementalchangesinsomedimension.Thesetermsmaybetoo

generaltocountasindividualconceptions,butthequestioniswhetherthey

maybeelementsoftherelevantindividualconceptions.

Antony’sargumentforC3isthatinconceivingaborderlineF,one

manifestsv‐dispositions

“…partlybecausetheindividual’sproperties,etc.comeclosetosatisfyingtherequirementsofbothF‐hoodandnot‐F‐hood.Butthatsuggestsanabilitytoimaginegradualchangestotheindividual’sparts,properties,etc.(alongadimensionorintermsofaweightedsum)sufficienttotransformtheindividualintoanForanot‐F.”(2006bp.9)

Notethatthisdefenseappealstotheideathattherelevantgradual

variationalongadimensionorintermsofaweightedsumexplainsorgrounds

thetransitionfromclearFtoborderlineFtoclearnon‐F.Thisconstraintdoes

notoccurexplicitlyinC3.Whileitisclearthatsomesortofchangemust

explainorgroundthetransitionfromFtoborderlineFtonon‐F,whatisat

18

issueiswhetherithastobegradualvariationalongadimensionorintermsof

aweightedsum.

AntonyconcedesthatC4isthemostcontestableoftheconditionsof

MiddleGround,andheonlyoffersadefenseofC4forcasesofdegree

vagueness.Inthosecases,hesaysthatthecommonconceptionC4asksforis

justtheconceptionofthedimensionalongwhichtheindividualconceptions

graduallyvary(2006bp.10).Inthecaseof‘Tall’thisdimensionis‘Height’.A

firsttemptationwouldbetoholdthatC4isautomaticallysatisfiedifC3is–or

forthatmatter,evenifitisn’t.Therewillalwaysbegeneralfeaturescommon

toanylistofpotentialFs,borderlineFsandnon‐Fs,forexample,thefeature

‘Exists’.ButitisimplicitinC4thatAntonywantsthecommonconceptionto

specifytheparameterwhosevariationexplainsorgroundsthetransitionfrom

clearFstoborderlineFstoclearnon‐Fs.AsIhavealreadyindicated,thisis

notexplicit–hedoesnotevensaythatthecommonconceptionmustbea

parameterthatvariesinanywaybetweentheFs,borderlineFs,andnon‐Fs,

letaloneinanexplanatoryway.Butitemergesinhisclaimthatforthecasesof

degreevagueness(whereC4isdefensible)thecommonconceptionjustisthe

specificationofthedimensionofvariationmentionedinC3,anditemerges

laterinhisargumentthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’doesnotsatisfyC4.

TheconstraintC4amountstoastrengtheningofC3–imposingsome

structureonwhatsuchaDimensionmaybe.Forexample,wemightimaginea

19

seriesofthings,someofwhichhavespatiallocationandothersdonot,varying

overthedimensionofspatialvolume–somethingshavespatialvolume,while

othershavenoneatall.But‘SpatialVolume’,thoughitmightspecifya

Dimensionofvariationforsuchthings,wouldnotspecifyacommon

conceptionfortheminthesenseofC4ifsomeofthosethingsdonothaveany

spatialvolume.Also,C4deniesthattheremightbedimensionsofvariation

forsomesequencesofFs,borderlineFs,andnon‐Fsthatdonotspecify

elementscommontotheconceptionofallpossibleFs.Thevaguenessof‘Red’

mayhingeonwhathappensalongtheborderbetweencardinalredand

orange.Theremaybesomefeaturecommontobothcardinalredthings,and

reddishorangethings,butnotcommontocrimsonredthings,thatexplains

thevariationfromclearredtoborderlineredtonotred.ButAntonyseemsto

becommittedtosayingthatinsuchcasestheremustbesomeother

conceptionofadimensionofvariationthatiscommontoallredthings,aswell

assomeborderlineredthingsandsomeorangethings.

AsIwillreturntolater,thisisaskingforalot.AsBrogaard2010points

out,evenwith‘Bald’itisnotobviousthatthereisanysuchcommon

conception.7Notionslike‘QuantityofHair’or‘HasaScalp’mayhandlemost

cases,butwhataboutbirds,whomaybebaldeventhoughtheyhaveneither

7CfBrogaard2010.BrogaardarguesthatMiddleGroundcannotbeanecessaryconditiononconceptualvaguenessforpreciselythisreason.

20

scalpsnorhair?Mattersgetworsewhenweconsidertrickiercaseslike‘Cool’

or‘Beautiful’or‘Funny’.Whileitmaybepossibletoisolatesomeconditionthat

allBeautifulthingshaveincommonwithsomeborderlinebeautifulthingsand

somenon‐beautifulthings(e.g.‘BeingPerceptibleorIntellectually

Apprehensible’)itishardtoseethatanysuchconditionmightexplainthe

transitionfrombeautifultoborderlinebeautifultonon‐beautiful.8Inanycase,

Antonyowesusanargumentthatconceptionssimultaneouslysatisfyingallof

theseconstraintsareavailableforanyvagueconcept.Aweakeningofthe

demandsofC4mightmakeMiddleGroundmoredefensible,butasIwill

explainbelow,Antony’sargumentthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’doesnot

meettheconditionsofMiddleGroundhingesonthisstrongreadingofC4.

TheoverallstructureofMiddleGroundneedssomeclarification.

AntonytellsusthatMiddleGroundisanecessaryconditiononathinker

possessingthecapacitytoconceiveofborderlinecasesforsomeconcept‘F’.

ButasAntonyhasstatedit,C2impliesthatsomeonecompetentwiththe

conceptFcanformaseriesofindividualconceptions,someofwhichare

conceptionsofborderlinecasesofF–conceptionsthattriggerv‐dispositions

incompetentusers.C2demandstheverythingforwhichC1‐C4aresupposed

toarticulateanecessarycondition.Thecircularityisnotvicious,butitis

confusing,sinceoneusuallythinksofindependentlystatedconditionsasbeing

8ThankstoDanLopezdeSaandMiguelSebastianfordiscussionhere.

21

independentlysatisfiable.Buthere,wemustrememberthatpartofAntony’s

claimisthatC1‐C2cannotbesatisfiedforsomeconceptFunlessitispossible

toalsosatisfyC3forthatconcept,andalsoC4ifitsvaguenessisvaguenessof

degree.

ThoughIhaveseriousdoubtsaboutthespecifics,ItakeMiddleGround

toarticulateacompellingintuition.Ifaconceptisvaguethencompetentusers

ofthatconceptmustpotentiallybesensitivetothatvagueness,andthis

sensitivityshouldmanifestinsomekindofconceptionofamiddleground–a

borderregion–betweenclearcasesoftheconceptandclearcasesofits

negation.9

§1.1.2 ‘PHENOMENALLY CONSCIOUS’ DOES NOT SATISFY MIDDLE GROUND

HavingclaimedthatC4articulatesanecessaryconditionon(degree)

vagueness,Antonygoesontoarguethat‘PhenomenallyConscious’doesnot

meettheconditionC4,andalsothat‘PhenomenallyConscious’doesnot

9Antonyclaimsthatthisconditionisanecessaryconditiononvaguenessregardlessofwhethervaguenessissemantic,ontologicalorepistemic.Itmayseemthattheconditionisfarmoreplausibleonasemantic(orpsychological)theorythanonanontologicalorepistemicone.ButOntologicalandEpistemictheoriststendtoagreethatvaguenessmanifestsintherealmofconcepts,evenifitsnatureisepistemicorontological.SothisclaimofAntony’sisnotnecessarilyindefensible.

22

exhibitcombinatoryvagueness.Hedoesnotofferanargumentforhis

assumptionthatdegreeandcombinatoryvaguenessexhaustthepossible

typesofvagueness,butifthatassumptioniscorrectthentheseclaimssuffice

forhisconclusion.

Hefirstclarifieswhathemeansby‘PhenomenallyConscious’.He

meansqualitative,subjective,whatitislike,what‐the‐phenomenal‐zombie‐

lacksconsciousness,ratherthanaccessconsciousness,orself‐consciousness,

orattentionalconsciousness.Hetakesourconceptofthissortof

consciousnesstobeneutralwithrespecttowhethermaterialism,dualismor

idealismistrue(2006bp.6).Heleavesthisnotionofneutralityintuitive,butit

laterbecomesclearthathetakesittoimplythatnorepresentationofphysical

orfunctionalpropertiesmaybepartoftheconceptionwehaveof

‘PhenomenallyConscious’(2006bp.11).

AntonyarguesthatthereisnoconceptionsatisfyingC4for

‘PhenomenallyConscious’.10Antonyproceedsbyelimination.Sucha

conceptionmusteitherentailconsciousness,notentailconsciousness,orbe

borderlinewhetherornotitentailsconsciousness.SincebyC4theconception

10InlightofthequestionaboutthecircularityintheformulationofMiddleGroundthatIdiscussabove,wemightaskwhatAntonyhasinmind.If‘PhenomenallyConscious’cannotsatisfyC4,butitcansatisfyC1‐C3(orjustC1‐C2),thensincethatwouldmeanthatitisstillitispossibletoconceiveofBorderlineCases,wouldthatnotbeenoughtoensureitsvagueness(especiallyif,likeAntony,youdefinevaguenessintermsofborderlinecases)?TheansweragainisthatAntonytakesitthattherecanbenoborderlinecasestoconceiveofunlessC4issatisfied.

23

mustbeaconceptionthatisacomponentofatleastoneindividualconception

ofaclearlynon‐consciousthing,itcannotentailconsciousness.Butitcannot

beaborderlineconsciousnessentailingelement,Antonysays,becausethis

wouldmeanthattherearesomeclearlyconsciousstatesthatwerepresentas

involvingborderlineconsciousstates,orconsciousstatesthatareborderline

realized.AndAntonytakesthistobeclearlyfalse.Butwhymighttherenotbe

somefairlyabstractconceptionthatonitsownneitherclearlyentailed

consciousnessnornon‐consciousness,butinconjunctionwithsomeother

conceptionsentailedconsciousness,andwithyetotherconceptionsentailed

non‐consciousness?Again,becauseAntonyisleaningonthe(unarticulated)

assumptionthattheconceptionnotonlyspecifiessomeelementcommontoFs,

borderlineFsandnotFs,butitspecifiestheveryparameterwhosevariation

explainsorgroundsthevariationfromFtoborderlineFtonot‐F.Theremight

besomeparameterthatonitsown,nomatterhowwevaryit,entails

borderlineconsciousness,butthenvariationinthatparametercannotbewhat

getsusfromborderlineconsciousnesstoclearconsciousness.

Mostoftheactioniswiththeargumentthattheconceptioncannotbe

onethatdoesnotentailconsciousness(orborderlineconsciousnessornon‐

consciousness).Thisafterallseemstobethemostnaturalthought:

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isvagueifthereissomeparametersuchthat

variationinittakesusfromclearcasesofnon‐consciousness,through

24

borderlinecasesofconsciousness,toclearcasesofconsciousness.Antony

doesnotclaimtohaveaconclusiveargumentagainstthispossibility.Hismore

provisionalargumentativestrategyistoconsiderwhatseemtohimtobethe

mostnaturalcandidates,andshowthattheydonot,infact,playtherolethat

C4requires.Antonyfirstconsidersmaterialconceptions–conceptionsof

physicalorfunctionalproperties.Theseareruledout,Antonyclaims,because

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isaneutralconcept(inthespecialsenseofbeinga

conceptneutralonwhetherconsciousnessismaterial).Here,Antonyisagain

leaningontheassumptionthatthecommonconditionmustspecifythatin

virtueofwhichthingsvaryfromFtoborderlineFtonotF.Otherwisesome

abstractfunctionallevelofdescriptionmightsuffice–thesortofdescriptionof

theinterrelationshipsofmentalstatesthatevenaCartesianwould

countenance.Heisalsoleaningontheassumptionthatthecommon

conceptionmustbecommontothegeneralconceptionofF,ratherthansimply

beingcommontoatleastoneseriesofindividualconceptionsinvolvingsome

Fs,someborderlineFsandsomenon‐Fs.Iftheconcept‘Phenomenally

Conscious’isneutralinAntony’ssense,thennomaterialconceptisa

componentofthatconcept(or,asAntonymightputit,nomaterialconception

isacomponentoftheconceptionassociatedwiththatconcept).Butitdoesnot

followthatnomaterialconceptmaybeacomponentineachofaseriesof

individualconceptionsmovingfromconsciousonestonon‐consciousones.

25

Forexample,considertheconception‘Statewhichisaconsciousstateiffits

realizeroscillatesatroughly40Hz’.Thisconceptionmaynotbeapartofthe

neutralconceptionof‘PhenomenallyConscious’butitmayfigureineachofa

seriesofindividualconceptions,andindeedweseemtogetanindividual

conceptionofaborderlinecaseofconsciousnessbycombiningthisconception

withaconceptionofaborderlinecaseof40Hzoscillation.Antonymaybeable

togetwhatheneedsherefromtheassumptionthattheparametermust

explainandgroundthetransitionfromFtoborderlineFtonon‐F,buthemust

thentelluswhatthisassumptionamountstoandhowitisdefended.11

Hethenconsiderstwocandidateneutralconceptions:‘Intensity’and

‘TemporalDuration’andarguesthatneitherofthemsuffice.Thoughwecan

apply‘Intensity’tobothconsciousandunconsciousthings,thereisarguably

anambiguityherebetween‘PhenomenalIntensity’whichimplies

‘PhenomenallyConscious’andothernotionsofintensitylike‘Stimulus

Intensity’which,arguably,aredisqualifiedbyAntony’sneutrality

requirement.Tohandle‘TemporalDuration’,Antonyarguesthataconception

ofaseriesofprogressivelyshorterexperiencesdoesnotgiveusaconception

ofborderlineconsciousstates.Aconceptionofanexperience,howevershort,

11Suchanaccountwillhavetotellushowtofilterthroughalotofdifferentpotentialtrickresponses,like‘StatethatisanexperienceiffitisroughlyX’,ortheresponsesettingthecommonconceptionforsomeseriestobematerialconceptM,andthentakingthedifferentdeterminationsofthatparametertobedifferentconjunctionsofM:with‘Conscious’,‘BorderlineConscious’,and‘Non‐Conscious’,forexample.IdonotknowifAntonyhasthemachinerytoadequatelyspelloutwhatheneedshere.Ireturntothispointinsection2.

26

isaconceptionofanexperience,andthereisnoconceptionofasortof

episodesuchthat,ifitissufficientlylongthenitisanexperience,ifitis

sufficientlyshortthenitisnotanexperience,butifitissomewhereinthe

middlethenitisaborderlinecase(2006bp.12).Again,Antonyisassuming

thatthecommonconceptionmustbethethingwhosevariationexplainsthe

transitionfromFtoborderlineFtonon‐F.Heisalsoassumingthattherecan

benowayofdescribingastateneutrallywithrespecttowhetherornotitisan

experience,butsothatthedurationofthatstatedetermineswhetherornotit

isanexperience.Hemightshowthatnosuchdescriptioncouldallow

‘TemporalDuration’tocountasacommonconceptionbyassumingthatsome

experiencesmaybeinstantaneous,andthenappealingtohisassumptionthat

thecommonconceptionmustcharacterizeallFsratherthanjustsomeof

them.However,Antonybelievesthatallexperienceshavesometemporal

duration(ibid.),sothisstrategymaynotbeopentohim,andanywayevenifit

wereitwouldnotruleoutthattherelevantsortofneutraldescriptionitself

gaveusthetermsweneeded.However,Antonyonlyclaimstobeconsidering

potentialcommonconceptionsthatwecanactuallyalreadythinkof,sothe

onusmaynotbeonhimtocoverallsuchexoticpossibilities.

Finally,Antonyarguesthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’doesnotexhibit

combinatorialvagueness.Sincetheargumentisquick,Ireproduceitin

entiretyhere.Antonysays,

27

“StartingwithClearFs,combinatoryborderlinecasesarereachedbyimaginingaseriesofindividualssuchthatthenumberofparts,properties,etc.representedintheconception[F]isgraduallyreducedfromindividualtoindividual.Noticethataselementsfrom[F]areremoved,eachsuccessive[ψ]intheseriesnotonlyrepresentsitsindividualwithouttheremovedelements,butaslackingthepropertiestheremovedelementsexpress.Withthatinmind,considera[ψ]representingaclearconsciousstate.Itwillincludeconsciousness‐entailingelementslike[phenomenology],[qualia],[subjectivity],etc.fromtheconception[consciousstate].Removinganyelementfromthat[ψ]willeitherleaveconsciousness‐entailingelementsinthenext[ψ]intheseries,oreliminatethelastconsciousness‐entailingelement.Ifanyconsciousness‐entailingelementsremain,the[ψ]willrepresentaclearconsciousstate.Ifnoneremain,thensinceaswasarguedabove[consciousness]containsnoborderlineconsciousness‐entailingelements,the[ψ]willcontainonlyclearnon‐consciousness‐entailingelements.Sincethat[ψ]willrepresentitsindividualaslackingallpropertiesexpressedbyallconsciousness‐entailingelements…theindividualwillberepresentedaspossessingnopropertiesthatsufficeforconsciousness.”(2006bp.16)

Thetroublewiththisargumentisthattheconceptionofaclearcaseof

consciousnessmayincludethingsotherthanunfactorizablyconsciousness‐

entailingelements.Itmaycontainelements(componentconceptions)that

neitherentailconsciousnessnornon‐consciousness,butthatwhenin

combinationwithothersuchelementsdoentailconsciousness.Thisis

preciselywhatweshouldexpectif‘PhenomenallyConscious’isinfactthesort

ofclusterconceptthatexhibitscombinatoryvagueness.SoAntony’sargument

seemstobebeggingthequestion,althoughagainthismayhingeonwherewe

taketheonustolie,andhowexoticwetaketherelevantpossibilitytobe.

§1.2 PROBLEMS WITH ANTONY’S CONCEPTUAL ARGUMENT

28

MypresentationofAntony’sargumenthasalreadymadeclearsomeof

theargument’sinternalproblems.Weneedanaccountofwhatsortsofthings

mayfeedintotheindividualconceptionsintheseries,toruleouttrivializing

elementslike‘BorderlineF’.Theargumentthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’

exhibitsnocombinatoryvaguenessseemstobegthequestion.Itisnotobvious

thattherearenoothersortsofvaguenessbesidescombinatoryanddegree.

ThereissomuchloadedintothenotionsofDimension(fromC3)and

CommonConception(fromC4),thatisseemsunlikelythatthesewillreally

specifynecessaryconditionsonthevaguenessofconceptslike‘Beautiful’or

‘Funny’oreven‘Bald’.Andfinally,Antony’scasethat‘Phenomenally

Conscious’doesnotmeetconditionsC3andC4seemstorelyontheloaded‐in

featuresthatmakeitdoubtfulwhethertheyreallyarenecessaryconditionson

vagueness.

However,itisnotmyaimtodwellontheseproblemshere.Isuspect

thattheyaresymptomaticofadeeperproblem,anditisofthisdeeper

problemthatIwillspeak.Thedeeperproblemwiththeargument(withboth

thedefenseofMiddleGround,andtheclaimthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’

doesnotsatisfyit)isthatitiscouchedinthenon‐normativetermsof

descriptivepsychology.Iwillarguethatwithoutappealtosomenormative

notionlikelicenseorjustification,theneithertheMiddleGroundconditionis

trivial,ortheconclusionthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’doesnotsatisfy

29

MiddleGroundisnotnearlyasinterestingasitmayappear.Iwillthenargue

thatappealingtosuchanormativenotionsignificantlyweakensAntony’s

argumentthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’doesnotsatisfyMiddleGround.

Theriskoftrivialityarisesfirstbecauseofthepossibilityoffalse

positives.Competentusersmakemistakes.Competentusersmaymistakenly

displayv‐dispositionsevenwhenthecaseisnotvagueatall.InAntony’s

discussionofwhether‘PhenomenallyConscious’satisfiesC4,heconsiders

‘Intensity’and‘TemporalExtent’.Hearguesthatitwouldbeconfusiontothink

that‘experienceofvanishinglysmallintensity’wasaborderlinecaseof

experience.Heiscorrect.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatsuchconfusionis

impossible.Andsomeoneinthegripofthisconfusionwouldbeableto

produceaseriesthatsatisfiedC1–C4,usingsomethinglike‘Phenomenal

Intensity’asthecommonconceptionC4demands.

Arelatedriskoftrivialityarisesbecauseofadifficultyinsayingwhatit

takestobeagenuineConceptionordimension.Cantherebegruesomeor

gerrymanderedcommonconceptions,gruesomeorgerrymandered

representationsofdimensionsofgradualchange?Withoutaneffectivefilterof

gruesomefromnon‐gruesomeconceptionsanddimensions,C4becomesa

vacuouscondition,andC3approachesvacuityaswell:MiddleGround

collapsesintotheconstraintthattherebeindividualconceptionsthathappen

togiverisetov‐dispositions.AndasInoteinthepreviousparagraph,thiscan

30

happenbymistake.Onereplywouldbetoleanevenmoreheavilyontheidea

implicitinC3andC4thattheConceptionorDimensionspecifiesthe

parameterwhosevariationexplainsorgroundsthechangefromFto

borderlineFtonon‐F.Buttheseareactuallyverytrickynotions,andIdonot

knowhowwemightgetatthemwithouteitherdelvingintotherealmofthe

normative,orperhapsintospeculativemetaphysics.12

Themostnaturaldescriptivereplyistoappealtoouractual

conceptionsasweactuallyusethem.Theremaybegruesomeconceptionsout

there,butwetendtonotemploytheminourmentalrepresentations.And

thoughsomepeoplemayhavev‐dispositionsbymistake,mostofusareonthe

righttrackmostofthetime.ThisisthelineAntonyseemstoendorse.Though

hedoesnotpresenthispositionasaresponsetoaworryaboutgruesomeness

andmistakenv‐dispositions,hisiscarefultorestrictthecentralclaimofhis

argument.Itisnottheclaimthattheconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐

vaguebutrathertheclaimthatourcurrentconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’

isnon‐vague.Notethatitisnotobviousthattherestrictionofattentiontoour

currentconceptsensuresthatweneedonlyconsiderourcurrentconceptions.

12Myownsenseisthatatveryleast,somenotionofConceptualPriorityiscalledfor.Antonymightsaythattherelevantconceptionmaynotbeconceptuallyposteriortoanyphenomenalconcepts.TherelevantgeneralizationofthisthoughtwouldmakeMiddleGroundevenmoredifficulttodefend,butMiddleGroundmaywinduptrivialotherwise.Inmyownargument,IevoketheConceptualPriorityrelationbutIputittodifferent(andIhopemoredefensible)use.

31

Butwecanperhapsthinkintermsofourcurrentconceptsaswecurrently

conceptualizethem,orjustintermsofourcurrentconceptions.

Inanyevent,thisrestrictioniscriticaltoAntony’sargumentthat

‘PhenomenallyConscious’doesnotsatisfyC4.Antonyconcedesthathedoes

nothaveaknockdownargumentforthisconclusion.Instead,heconsidersa

fewofwhatseemtobethemostplausiblecandidatesforneutralconceptions

thatmaybecommontoindividualconceptionsofconsciousthings,borderline

consciousthingsandnon‐consciousthings.Plausiblebywhatmeasure?The

exampleshechoosesareexamplesofthesortofneutralconceptionsthatwe

actually,currentlytendtoassociatewith‘PhenomenallyConscious’.Itmaybe

thatfutureinnovationsofconceptualarchitecturewilluncovernewwaysof

conceptualizingconsciousness,givingrisetoradicallydifferentneutral

conceptionsthatshowushowconsciousnessmayinfactbevague(eitherby

degree,orbycombination,orinsomeotherway).ButAntonydoesnot

considerthissortofcase,sincehetakesitthatsuchadiscoverywouldonly

showthatsomefutureconceptofconsciousnessisvague,andthisis

compatiblewithourcurrentconceptofconsciousnessbeingnon‐vague.The

restrictionalsoemergesinthewayAntonydiscussesthosecaseshedoes

consider.Forexample,heoffersnopositiveargumentthattherewillbeno

neutralconceptionofastateaseitheranexperienceornotanexperience

32

dependingonitstemporalduration.13Andhiscasethat‘Phenomenally

Conscious’exhibitsnocombinatorialvaguenesssimilarlycontainsnopositive

argumentthattherelevantsortofneutralconceptionswillnotemergeon

futurereflection.

Toclarifyhowheunderstandsthedialecticonthisissue,Antony

considerstheexampleoftheconcept‘Life’.Antonyclaimsthatthepre‐modern

concept‘Life’wasnon‐vague.Ourcurrentconcept‘Life’isvague,butaccording

toAntonythisisonlythankstobiologists’“…developingtheoriesofsuchscope

andpowerthatearlierviewsoflifecouldnolongerbesustained.”(2006bp.

18).AccordingtoAntony,theupshotoftheargumentthatourcurrentconcept

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐vagueisthatitputstheonusontheoristsof

thenatureofconsciousnesswhothinkconsciousnesscanbevague,todevelop

atheoryofsuchscopeandpowerthatourearlierviewsofconsciousness(as

non‐vague)maynolongerbesustained.

ButAntonymakesanunwarrantedassumption.Heassumesthatat

somepointourconcept‘Life’wentfrombeingneutralwithrespecttothe

physicalorspiritualnatureoflifetobeingnon‐neutral(andcommittedtothe

physicalnatureoflife).Thisisthesortofchangethathethinksofas

warrantedonlybytheoriesofsuitablescopeandpower.Healsomakesthe

13Nottomentionthathestillowesusareasonwhy‘Statethatisaconsciousstateiffitlastlongerthan,roughly,asecond’doesnotcount.ThisisanexampleofthesortofthingIsuspectAntonyneedstheConceptualPriorityrelationtomanage(seepreviousfootnote).

33

unwarrantedassumptionthatitisonlyinlightofthischangethatourconcept

of‘Life’wentfrombeingnon‐vaguetobeingvague(ibid.).

Antonyowesusanargumentforeachoftheseclaims.True,wemay

nowallbelievethatLifeisaphysicalphenomenon.Butdoesthismeanthatit

isnowapartofourconcept‘Life’thatLifeisaphysicalphenomenon?Perhaps

onapsychologicalmodelofconceptswherethereisnodistinctionbetween

whattheconceptentailsandwhatistypicallyassociatedwiththeconcept,this

assumptionispermissible,thoughthematterisunobvious.Butmore

importantly,thoughitdoesseemthatthepre‐modernstook‘Life’tobenon‐

vagueandthatwetakeittobevague,itisnotobviousthatthistransition

turnedonanyscientificdiscovery.Tobesure,wereliedondiscoverytolearn

thatlifehastodowithcarbon,andtolearnthatsuchthingsasvirusesactually

exist.Butonemightarguethatitwasopentothepre‐modernstoobserve,

withoutthebenefitofanyscientificinnovation,that‘Life’hasmanyofthe

featuresofaclusterconcept:thatitalwayshasbeenpartofourconceptionof

lifethatlivingthingscangrow,move,respondtostimuli,metabolizeand

reproduce.‘VitalForce’mayhavebeenanindependentlyassociated

componentof‘Life’butitwasmorecommonlytakenonlytobeahypothesis

abouttheunderlyingbasisofthesephenomena(BechtelandRichardson

1998).Theassociationmayhavebeenstrong,butifthepictureIsketchhereis

correcttheneveninthepre‐modernagecompetentusersoftheconcept‘Life’

34

wereinapositiontorecognizethattheremightbeborderlinecases–things

thatcouldgrowandmovebutthatdidnotrespondtostimuliorreproduce(or

perhapsthingsthathadtheVitalForcebutcouldnotgrowormoveorrespond

orreproduce).Thiswouldmeanthatifpeopleinthosedaysthoughtthat‘Life’

wasnotavagueconcept,thenthiswasduemoretofailureofimaginationthan

toignoranceoffuturediscovery.Thesituationwouldbeanalogoustotheone

thatParfit1984claimsweareinregardingPersonalIdentity:becausewetend

tothinkofPersonalIdentityintermsofthesurvivalofthesoul,wedonot

naturallyconfrontthosecaseswheresomeofthethingsthatmatterabout

survivaldisentanglefromothers.Butallittakestogetustodosoareafew

cleverlydescribedthoughtexperiments.

Ifthisisthecorrectmodelfor‘Life’thenAntonymaystillsaythat‘Life’

asitwasusedwasnon‐vague,thoughnowitisvague.Butthiswouldonlybe

tosaythatpeopleinpre‐moderntimesfailedtorecognizethewaysthe

conceptwasvague.Inthiscasetheonusneverwasonbiologiststodevelopan

elaboratetheoryaccordingtowhich‘Life’canbevague,inordertoconvinceus

thattheconceptisvague.Theordinaryfolkwerealreadyinapositiontosee

this,theyjusthappenednotto.Ifthisisthecorrectmodel,thenwhetherornot

ittookthebiologicalrevolutiontochangewhetherordinarypeoplehappened

tonoticethevaguenessin‘Life’wasamatterofhistoricalaccident.

35

Antonymaybeabletoestablishthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’aswe

currentlyconceptualizeitisnotvague,butifthemodelIhavejustsketched

applies,thenthisonlymeansthatwehavenotbeenimaginativeenoughtosee

howitmightbevague,thoughitmightbe.Somefuturescientificinnovation

mightsufficetostimulateourimaginationonthisfront,butwemightalso

stimulateourimaginationwithoutsucharevolution.Imaginativereflectionon

itsownmightserveequallywell.Antonyowesusanargumentthatthisisnot

therightmodelonwhichtounderstandtheapparentpastnon‐vaguenessof

‘Life’and‘PersonalIdentity’.Otherwise,theseexamplesshowthatthissortof

failureofimaginativityreallyhappens,andsoitisnotunreasonabletothink

thatourcurrentinabilitytoseethevaguenessof‘PhenomenallyConscious’is

suchafailure.Andevenifthemodeldoesnotapplyinthosecaseswestillhave

reasontowonderwhetheritappliesinthecaseof‘PhenomenallyConscious’.

Antonyowesusadditionalreasonstothinkthatnosuchimaginative

innovationisforthcoming.Withoutsuchadditionalreasons,thesenseinwhich

hehasshownusthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐vagueismuchless

newsworthythanitmayappear.

Thetroubleswehaveseenhereresultbecause,ifweadheretothe

languageofdescriptivepsychology,itisdifficulttofindamiddleground

betweenaconditionthatalmostanyconceptcansatisfy(becausepeople

sometimestakethingstobevagueevenwhentheyshouldn’t),andacondition

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thattoofewconceptssatisfy(becausepeoplesometimesfailtorecognize

thingsasvagueevenwhentheyshould).Whatwerequire,then,isaprinciple

couchedinmoreepistemicterms,aprinciplearticulatingacondition

necessaryforcompetentuserstobewarrantedintakingthatconcepttobe

vague.Inchaptertwoofthisdissertation,Iarticulatesuchaprinciple(Icallit

Excludability14).Butaswehavejustseen,thebarforshowingthattherecanbe

nowarrantoftherightsortforthinkingthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnot

vague,ishigherthanthebarforshowingthataswecurrentlytendto

conceptualizeit,wedonotseehow‘PhenomenallyConscious’mightbevague.

Weneedtoconsiderallpossiblewarrantedconceptualizations,notmerely

typical,currentconceptualizations.Inchapterthree,Ioffersuchanargument

forthismorepowerfulclaimbasedonaconsiderationofallpossible

warrantedconceptualizations.15

14Aconcept‘F’isExcludableifwecanformsomesubstantive,positiveconceptionofaconceptthatexcludesit(inthewaythat‘Red’isexcludedby‘Green’).Iemploytheconceptualpriorityrelationtocharacterizethenotionofapositiveconception.MyformulationoftheargumentcircumventsthemoreparticularproblemsofformulationthatAntonyfaces.Itallowsmetoabstractawayfromthedifferencebetweencombinatorialanddegreevagueness,andfromhavingtosaywhatexactlyagradualchangeis,andIdonotrelyontheclaimthatthereissomecommonelement,inanyinterestingsense,toallFs,someborderlineFsandsomenon‐Fs(norontheclaimthatthereissomecommonelementtosomeFs,someborderlineFsandsomenon‐Fs).Also,Idonotrelyontheclaimthatvaguenessnecessarilyinvolvestheexistenceofaninvariantclassofborderlinecases(amatterthatsomethinkHigherOrdervaguenesscallsintodoubt.CfFine2009).Myconditionisalsofarmoregeneral,anditisfarmoredifficulttogeneratecasesthatwouldhaveachanceofbeingcounterexamples.Forexample,‘Lame’excludes‘Cool’,‘Ugly’excludes‘Beautiful’,andsoon.15OnemightwonderwhetherAntony’sfocusonpsychologicalratherthanphilosophicalconceptswaspartoftheproblemhere.Certainlytheepistemiclanguagecomesmorenaturallywhenwespeakofabstractimmutablesensesratherthanoccurrentmentalrepresentations,

37

§1.3 ANTONY’S METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS

IturnnowtoabriefdiscussionofAntony’sargumentfromthe

conceptualclaimthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvaguetoametaphysical

conclusion.Antonyobservesthatmostofourordinaryformulationsof

materialismarecouchedinvagueterms.Mostofourfunctionalnotions,and

mostofourneurophysiologicalnotions,arevague.Buthow,Antonyasks,

couldanidentityclaim,‘C=N’,betrue,if‘C’hasnoborderlinecases,while‘N’

hasborderlinecases?Insuchaneventwewouldhavesomecase,x,suchthatit

wasborderlinewhetherornotNx,butnotborderlinewhetherornotCx.This

meansthat‘∀x.CxiffNx’isnotdeterminatelytrue.Butif‘∀x.CxiffNx’isnot

determinatelytruethenneitheris‘C=N’(2006app.5‐9)

Antonyisnotclearonwhetherhisgoalistheclaimthatsuchan

identitycannotbedeterminatelytrue,orrathertheclaimthatsuchanidentity

mustbefalse.Evans1978arguesthatifvaguenessisontologicalthenthere

canbenovagueidentity,soifsomeidentitystatementisnotdeterminately

truethenitisfalse.Antony’sargumentappearstobeanattempttogeneralize

thisargument–Antonyinvokesasecondorderquantificationalschema,and

butonemayholdthatepistemicnormsapplytopsychologicalconcepts,sothereisnoobviousconnectionhere.

38

Leibniz’slaw,muchasEvansdoes,totrytoshowthatthisresultapplieseven

ifvaguenessissemantic(2006ap.7).Forthosewhotakevaguenesstobe

epistemicAntonyoffersadifferentargument:ifvaguenessisepistemicthen

bothvagueconceptsandpreciseconceptsrefertosinglepreciseproperties,

butitwouldbeagreatcoincidenceifsomeprecisetermhappenedtohavethe

sameexactdenotationassomevagueterm(2006ap.8‐9).

Antonynotesthattheabovereasoningisonlyofinterestiftheultimate,

correctconceptofconsciousnessisnon‐vague.Itisherethathearguesthat

thenon‐vaguenessofthepresentconceptplacestheonussquarelyonthe

shouldersofthosewhowouldarguethatafutureconceptwillbevague,to

developatheoryofthenatureofconsciousnessofsuchscopeandpowerthat

ourcurrent(neutral)viewsofthemattercannolongerbemaintained(2006a

pp.12).Antonyconcludesthatwehavereasontodisbelieveallversionsof

materialismthatidentifyconsciousnessinvagueterms(aswellasversionsof

dualismthatidentifythematerialcorrelatesofconsciousnessinvagueterms).

Hetakesthistoimplythat,foratruetheoryoftheidentity(orcorrelates)of

consciousness,barringEliminativism,wemustlooktothelanguageof

fundamentalphysics(2006ap.13).

§1.4 PROBLEMS WITH ANTONY’S METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS

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AfirstproblemwithAntony’smetaphysicalargumentisthat,asIargue

above,Antonyhasnotgivenuscompellingreasonstothinkthattheultimately

correctfutureconceptofconsciousnessisnon‐vague.Untilwecanshowthat

thenon‐vaguenessofourcurrentconceptdoesnothingeonamerefailureof

imagination,itisdifficulttosaywheretheonuslies.ButasIwillarguein

chapterthree,Ibelieveitispossibletoshowthis.Soitisworthconsidering

Antony’sargumentontheassumptionthattheultimatelycorrectfuture

conceptofconsciousnessmaywellbenon‐vague.

The next major problem is Antony’s claim to have established that

vague identities like ‘N=C’ must be false (as opposed to merely not

determinatelytrue).Ifvaguenessisontological,theargumentissimplyEvans’

(Evans1978),andwemaygrantthepoint.ButAntonyattemptstogeneralize

Evans’argument to thecasewherevagueness issemantic,and it isnotclear

that this generalization succeeds. The application of Leibniz’ Law and

schematicsecondorderquantificationisnotobviouslywarrantediftheterm

inquestionissemanticallyvague,becausethismaymeanthereisnospecific

thingthatthetermdeterminatelyrefersto(Evans,ibid.andalsoLewis1988).

ThereisalsoaproblemwithAntony’sargumentforthecasethatvaguenessis

epistemic. Antony says itwould be a great coincidence if the semantic facts

thatdeterminewhichofthepointsintheborderlineof‘N’isitstrue(hidden)

exactborder,determineittobetheverysameastheborderof‘C’(2006ap.9).

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He relieshereon the assumption that themechanismwhichdetermines the

true(hidden)borderof‘N’isindependentofthemechanismdeterminingthe

border of ‘C’. But this turns on the as yet forthcoming details of the

Epistemicist account of how semantic mechanisms determine true (hidden)

exactbordersforvagueterms.

SowemaygrantAntonythatifvaguenessisontological,thenidentities

like‘N=C’mustbefalse,ratherthanmerelyindeterminate.16Iamlesssure

thathehasacaseifvaguenessisepistemic.Inthatcase,assumingtherelevant

mechanismsareproperlycoordinated,theidentitymightnotonlybe

indeterminatebutinsomesenseperfectlytrue,inthatthevagueterm‘N’

mightrefertoexactlythesamepropertyasthepreciseterm‘C’.

Thesemanticcaseraisesinterestingquestions.IdonotseethatAntony

canestablishmorethanthatsuchidentitiesarenotdeterminatelytrue–they

mightallbefalse,orsomeofthemmightbeindeterminateandnotfalse.This

resultisstillnewsworthy.Ifweknowthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnot

vague,thenassumingitdenotesaproperty,weknowthereisasingleprecise

propertythatitdeterminatelydenotes.Ifvaguenessissemanticthensome

16Butforadefenseofthepossibilityofvagueidentityifvaguenessisontological,seeLowe2001andBarnesandWilliams2009.ItisalsoworthnotingthatAntonyclaimshisargumentappliestothecovariationclaimsadualistmakesaswellastheidentityclaimsamaterialistmakes.ButtheEvansargumentdoesnotextendbeyondidentityclaims,sothedualistwhoembracesonticvaguenessmayholdthatthecorrelationclaimisindeterminatelycorrectratherthanfalse.

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identitylike‘N=C’maybeindeterminateratherthanfalse,butitwouldstillbe

thecasethatthelanguageofthetheoryinwhich‘N’occursisnotcapableof

generatinganexactdescriptionofexactlythepropertyPhenomenal

Consciousness.This,Itakeit,isthekernelofAntony’sargument,anditisan

eminentlyplausiblepoint.

Butthereisstillaquestionofwhetherthiseminentlyplausiblepoint

meansthattheultimatetheoryofconsciousnessmustbecouchedinthe

languageoffundamentalphysics.Firstofall,thereareprecisedescriptionsin

thelanguageofnon‐fundamentalscience,forexamplethedescription

“oscillatesatafrequencyofexactly40Hz”17.Secondofall,itmightbethat

thereisnowayofdescribingthereferentof‘PhenomenallyConscious’inthe

languageoffundamentalphysics.Itmightcallforsomeinfinitarydisjunction

togenerateanintensionallyadequatecharacterization,whichisbadenough,

andtheremightbefurtherhyperintensionaldistinctionsthatsuchan

infinitarydisjunctiondoesnotmake(considerthewaythat‘Red’maycovary

withsomedisjunctionofpossibleshadesofred,eventhoughRedisnot

identicaltothatdisjunctiveproperty).Itmaythenbethatthereisno

determinatelycorrecttheoryofthematerialbasisofconsciousness,andthe

bestavailabletheorywouldbea(merely)roughlycorrecttheorycouchedin

17Theusualversionofthe40Hztheoryidentifies40Hzasonlyaprototypicalvalueratherthananexactvalue,butinanyeventsuchatheoryisavailable.

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thelanguageofsomehigherlevelscience.Tomakethisworkwecouldtakean

indeterminateidentitybetweenavagueandaprecisegeneraltermtoassert

thatthepropertydenotedbytheprecisetermisoneofthecandidate

propertiesindeterminatelydenotedbythevagueterm,andwemighttakean

identitybetweentwovaguegeneraltermstoassertthatthereissomeoverlap

betweenthesetsofcandidatepropertiesthateachconceptindeterminately

denotes.18

However,Antonyisstillcorrectthatif‘PhenomenallyConscious’is

precise,thenifanylanguageisgoingtotellusexactlywhatmaterialproperty

PhenomenalConsciousnessis(orperfectlycorrelateswith),thatlanguage

hadbetterbeprecise.Thisisaninterestingresult,evenifitdoesnotimply

thattheultimatelycorrecttheoryofconsciousnesswillbecouchedinthe

languageoffundamentalphysics.

18Itisworthpointingoutthatweoftendoacceptidentitiesbetweentermsthatseemtodifferovertheirborderlineprofiles,forexample‘Water=H2O’.ThankstoDanLopezDeSaforthispoint.Aclear,drinkablemixtureofH2OandXYZmightbeaclearcaseof‘Water’butanindeterminatecaseof‘H2O’.However,ifweaccepttheidentityweacceptthatwaterreallyjustisH2O,whichmeansthatwetaketheborderlineprofileof‘Water’toinherittheborderlineprofileof‘H2O’.If‘Water’isarigiddesignatorthenpresumablyitdenotedH2Oallalong,andsoourinitialsenseofdisagreementinborderlineprofileswasreallyjustconfusing‘Water’with‘Watery’.Antonymightputthisintermsofourpretheoreticconceptionofwaterbeingreplacedbyacorrect,scientificconception.SinceAntonyarguesthatthisisonlygoingtobeanoptioninthecaseof‘PhenomenallyConscious’ifscientistspresentuswithatheoryofirresistiblepowerandscope,itisnotfairtoholdthisrevisionmodelofvagueidentitystatementsasacounterexampletohisclaim.Butforthecounterclaim,see(LopezDeSa,forthcoming).

43

MyownmostpressinggrievancewithAntony’sargumenthoweveris

notwithanythinghesaysbutwithsomethinghedoesnotsay.Ithinkthenon‐

vaguenessof‘PhenomenallyConscious’showsussomethingevenmore

interestingthanthatastrictlycorrecttheorymustbecouchedinprecise

language.PhenomenalConsciousnessissignificant,inbothdescriptiveand

normativerespects.Butitturnsoutthatthenon‐vaguenessof‘Phenomenally

Conscious’forcesustochoosebetweenthethesisthatPhenomenal

ConsciousnessissignificantandthethesisthatPhenomenalConsciousness

ismaterial.Inchaptersfourandfiveofthisdissertation,Iarguethatif

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐vaguetheneitheritisneitherdescriptively

ornormativelysignificant,oroneofPropertyDualismorPanpsychismistrue.

CHAPTERTWO:

GENERALIZEDCONCEPTUALGAPPRINCIPLESANDVAGUENESS

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ManyMaterialistsagreewithDualiststhatthereisagapbetweenour

wayofthinkingaboutthemindandourwaysofthinkingaboutthebrain,the

bodyandtherestofthephysicalworld.Asitusuallyoccurstheideaofagapis

arelationalidea:itrelatesonefamilyofconceptstoanotherfamily.Andasit

usuallyoccursoneofthesefamiliesisthefamilyofphenomenalconcepts,

whiletheotherisafamilyofmaterialconcepts.InthisessayIwillconsider

somewaysofgeneralizingtheideaofaconceptualgap.Ihopetogeneralizein

tworespects:first,fromarelationalnotiontoanabsoluteone,andsecond,

fromanotioncharacterizingphenomenalconcepts,toanotioncharacterizing

arbitraryfamiliesofconcepts,oranotioncharacterizingindividualconcepts,

whethertheybelongtoaprominentfamilyornot.

IndoingsoIhavetwoaims.Myfirstaimistoshowthatsensecanbe

madeofnotionsofgeneralizedconceptualgap,andthatthesenotionsare

interesting.Tothisend,Iarguethatthesenotionsframedebateselsewhere

thanjustinthephilosophyofmind–forexamplenormativeandmetaphysical

debates(suchasthedebateovertheAutonomyofEthics,orthequestionof

whetherweonlyunderstandtermslike‘Abstract’or‘Immaterial’asnegations

of‘Concrete’or‘Material),andIwillarguethatthesenotionsareimportant

withinthephilosophyofmind,wheretheyallowustoframenewhypotheses

aboutwhatmakesphenomenalconceptsspecial.

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Mysecondaimistoshowalinkbetweenoneofthesegeneralized

notionsofGap,anotionIwillcallNonExcludability,andvagueness.Iwill

arguethatifaconceptisnonexcludablethenitisnotvague,assumingthat

vaguenessisasemanticphenomenon.InthenextchapterIwillarguethat

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnonexcludable,fromwhichitfollowsthat

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague.19

In§2.1IintroducetheGeneralizedConceptualGapprinciples.In§2.2I

suggestthattheseprinciples,thoughextremelyselective,mayapplytosome

conceptsoutsideofthephilosophyofmind–forexamplenormativeconcepts.

In§2.3Iarguethatevenifmanydifferentfamiliesofconceptsexhibitgapsin

theordinaryrelationalsensetootherfamiliesofconcepts,phenomenal

conceptswouldbeverydistinguishedifthereweregapsbetweenthemand

otherconceptsinanyoftheabsolutesensesIwillconsiderinthischapter.In

§2.4Iarguethatifaconceptisnon‐excludablethenitisnotvague(assuming

thatvaguenessisasemanticphenomenon).

19How,youask,couldthisbe,giventhedifficultyofdefining‘PhenomenallyConscious’andindeterminingwhatitappliesto?Conceptsmaybepreciseeitherdefactoordejure.Aconceptthatisprecisedejureisaconceptthatmakesitsownpreciseboundariesexplicit.Conceptsthatareprecisedefactoareprecisewithoutmakingtheirownboundariesexplicit.Non‐excludableconceptsaredefactoprecise.Referencemagnetism(ifthereissuchathing)isanothersortofdefactoprecision.Butwherereferencemagnetsgiverisetodefactoprecisionbecausetheyarenaturaljointsinmetaphysicalreality,non‐excludableconceptsarenaturaljointsinconceptualreality.Botharewaysinwhichsomeconceptmaybeprecise,eventhoughmastersoftheconceptmaynotknowwheretheboundariesactuallylie.

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§2.1: GENERALIZED GAP PRINCIPLES

Iwillunderstandtheretobeanentailmentrelationbetweenconcepts–

therelationthatholdsbetweenthemwhenthereisnogap–thatmirrorsthe

entailmentrelationbetweenpropositions.Inparticular,I’llsaythatone

concept‘C’,entailsanotherconcept,‘D’,justwhenforanyobjectx,the

proposition<forallx,ifxisaC,thenxisaD>isapriori.Itakeitthat

proposition<P>entailsproposition<Q>justincase<ifP,thenQ>isapriori.I

haveinmindaverycomprehensiveconceptionofconcepts:ifsomethingisthe

meaningofamonadicpredicateinapossiblelanguage,finitaryorinfinitary,

thenitisaconcept,andconceptsmaybedistinctalthoughintensionally

equivalent,iftheyinvolvedifferentlogicalforms,differentcomponentsor

differentdefinitions.20Thosewhowishmayreplace‘PossiblePredicate’for

‘Concept’.Ialsohaveinmindapermissiveconceptionofapriority:the

differencebetweensomethingthatisknowableapriori,andsomethingthatis

knowableonthebasisofarmchairknowledge,orsomethingforwhichwe

rationallyhaveextremelyhighcredence,isnotanimportantdifferenceformy

purposes.

20Isuppressfurthergeneralizationsforsimplicity.WemightrelaxtheconstraintthatCandDbemonadic,aswellastheconstraintthattheybeofmatchingarity,andwemightcallitentailmentiftherelationholdsforsomexratherthanforallx,orforsomecourseofvaluesforCandsome(potentiallydifferent)courseofvaluesforD,ratherthandemandingthattheybethesame.Inanycase,Imeantotreattheclaimthatphenomenalfactsareentailedbyaspecificationofallofthephysicalfacts,togetherwithaspecificationthatthoseareallthephysicalfacts,asanentailmentclaiminmysense.

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Weexpresssomethinginthevicinityoftheintuitiveideaofthe

Material‐PhenomenalConceptualGapwhenwesay:Nophenomenalconceptis

entailedbyanymaterialconcept.21

Whetherthisclaimistruehingesonhowwedelineatethecategories

phenomenalconceptandmaterialconcept.Areintentionalconcepts

phenomenalconcepts?Arefunctionalconcepts,orconceptsofyettobe

developedphysics,materialconcepts?Itdependsonthedistinctionsweare

interestedindrawing.Usuallythisisclearenoughfromthecontext,butthere

maynotbeanysinglebestpartitionofconceptsintofamilialcategories.If

thereweresuchapartitionwecoulduseittocharacterizeaGeneralized

ConceptualGap:wemightsaythatoneconcept(orfamilyofconcepts)exhibits

suchagapwhenitisnotentailedbyanyconceptinanydistinctfamily.

Inspecialcases,suchanapproachyieldsfruit.Thephenomenal

conceptsaresuchaspecialcase.Wehaveagoodenoughsenseofwhich

conceptsareconceptsofrelativelyspecifictypesofexperience–forexample,

theconcept‘SeeingScarletRed’ortheconcept‘HearingaTrombone’orthe

21Thisisaverystrongformulation,andtobemadeplausiblemustbequalifiedsomewhat.Forexample,ifPropertyDualismisapriorithenaphysicaldescriptionwitha‘That’sAll’clause(eg:‘HasPhysicalPropertiesandOnlyPhysicalProperties)willentailsomethingaboutconsciousness:itsabsence.Also,sincemanyphenomenaldescriptionswillentailfunctionaldescriptions(whichevenmanydualistsgrant),somenegativefunctionaldescriptionswillentailthatcertainphenomenaldescriptionsdonotapply.Oncewetakethesequalificationsintoaccount,weseehowotheranalogouslocalgapprinciplesmayalsobedefensible,forexamplethethesisthatmacroscopicconcepts(‘Water’)arenotentailedbymicroscopicones(‘H2O’).

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concept‘FeelingaStingingPaininone’sKnee.’Let’scallthesethecanonical

phenomenalconcepts.Wemightthencharacterizetheclaimthatphenomenal

conceptsexhibitsuchagapastheclaimthatnocanonicalphenomenalconcept

isentailedbyanyothersortofconcept.

Weneedanotionofconceptualprioritytogivethischaracterizationa

fightingchance.‘SeeingScarletRed’isentailedbytheconjunctiveconcept

‘((SeeingScarletRedorBeing5feetTall)andNotBeingFiveFeetTall)’andby

thenegativeconcept‘NotNotSeeingScarletRed.’Buttheseconceptsare,inan

obvioussense,conceptuallyposteriortotheconcept‘SeeingScarletRed’(Iwill

saymoreaboutconceptualposterioritybelow).Wemaynowcharacterizea

GeneralizedGapclaimforphenomenalconcepts:

(PHENOMENALINSCRUTABILITY):Nocanonicalphenomenalconcept

isentailedbyanyotherconceptofanyothersort,exceptconcepts

conceptuallyposteriortocanonicalphenomenalconcepts.

Thisclaimhasafightingchangebecausewehaveaclear‐enough

categoryofcanonicalphenomenalconcepts.Thissuggeststhatforanyfamily

ofconceptsforwhichthereissomeclear‐enoughcanonicalsubsetwecan

define

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(CANONICALINSCRUTABILITY):ThefamilyofconceptsFiscanonically

inscrutableiffnocanonicalFconceptisentailedbyanyotherconceptofany

othersort,exceptconceptsconceptuallyposteriortocanonicalFconcepts.

Averycloselyrelatedidea,leaningslightlymoreheavilyonthenotion

ofconceptualpriorityis:

(CANONICALPRIMITIVITY):ThefamilyofconceptsFiscanonically

primitiveiffnocanonicalFconceptisconceptuallyposteriortoanyconceptof

anyothersort.

Thesedefinitionscapturesomethingbutnoteverythingthatwemight

wishinageneralizationoftheideaofaConceptualGap.Suchageneralization

shouldcapture,totheextentpossible,theideathatourcanonicalphenomenal

conceptsareautonomous,andnottobedefinedorconstructedorexplained22

intermsofanymorebasicconcepts.Supposewehadsomeconceptionofhow

tofactorconsciousnessintocomponents,butinsuchawaythateachofthese

componentsdependedontheothersandsoneveroccurredexceptasapartof

someconsciouswhole.Thereisanintuitivesenseinwhichthephenomenal

conceptsmightbeautonomouseventhoughsomeconceptlikethisexists,

sincethisconceptshowsusnoconnectionbetweenthingssatisfying

phenomenalconceptsandthingsthatdonot.Similarly,supposesomevery

22Whereoneconceptisexplanatorilypriortoanotheriftheapplicationofonehelpsexplaintheapplicationoftheother.

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generalpreconditionforconsciousness,alsoapreconditionforvariousforms

ofnon‐consciousness,turnsouttobeconceptuallyprior,oranywaynot

conceptuallyposterior,tosomecanonicalphenomenalconcepts.Thereisa

senseinwhichthephenomenalconceptsmightbeautonomousevenifsome

conceptlikethisexists,becausesuchaconceptmightnotgiveusany

particularlysubstantiveconceptionoftheconnectionbetweenthings

satisfyingphenomenalconceptsandthingsthatdonot(supposetheconcept

were‘MaterialBeing’or‘ExhibitsSomeFunctionalOrganization’).Finally,

supposethatwehavesomeconception,neitherpriornorposteriortoany

phenomenalconcepts,ofadeterminatewayofbeingnon‐conscious.Sucha

conceptionmightshowushowadeterminatesortofnon‐consciousnessis

relatedtoadeterminatesortofconsciousness.Givensuchaconception,there

isasenseinwhichthephenomenalisnotautonomous,evenifphenomenal

conceptsarebothcanonicallyinscrutableandcanonicallyprimitive.Theseare

threerespectsinwhichthetwodefinednotionsdonotcaptureallofthe

intuitionsthatwemighthopeforinageneralizationofthenotionofa

conceptualgap.Andthenthereisalsoouroriginalpointthatthereisno

generalwaytopartitionconceptsintofamilies,andevenwhenwedohavea

familyofconceptsthereisnogeneralwaytotellcanonicalfromnon‐canonical

elementsofthatfamily.Iwillnowdevelopanotionthatisconsonantwith

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theseintuitionsanddoesnotrelyonconcepts’havingwell‐definedfamilial

relations.

ThislastnotionIwilldevelopisthenotionofNonexcludability.Some

conceptsexcludeotherconcepts.‘Red’excludes‘Green’.‘Dirt’excludes‘Water’,

‘Tall’excludes‘Short’,‘Married’excludes‘Single’andsoon.Averydistinctive

conceptwouldbeonethatwasnotexcludedbyanyotherconceptatall.No

conceptisthatdistinctive,sinceeveryconceptisexcludedbyitsownnegation.

Butwemaydistinguishbetweenthoseexcludersthatgiveusapositiveideaof

thealternativewhichdoestheexcluding,andthoseexcludersthatmerely

negatetheconcept,ornegatesomenecessaryconditionforitsapplication:

(NON‐EXCLUDABILITY):Aconcept‘C’isnonexcludableifftheonly

conceptsthatexclude‘C’excludeitnegatively

Toexclude‘C’isjusttoentail‘~C’.Isaywhatnegativeexclusionis

below.NON‐EXCLUDABILITYisageneralizednotionofaconceptualgap

becauseanon‐excludableconceptisonethatcannotbesituatedintoany

broaderconceptualspace:wehavenopositiveconceptionofwhatsucha

conceptcontrastswith,nosenseofhowthingsthatsatisfyitrelatetothings

thatdonot.Itdepictsadimensionallofitsown.Also,non‐excludability

impliestheordinaryrelationalsortofconceptualgaps:if‘C’isnon‐excludable

thenforanyfamilyofconceptsF,noconceptinFpositivelyexcludes‘C’.Butif

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Fisafamilyofconceptsthatarenotconceptuallyposteriorto‘C’,thenthere

willbeaconceptualgap(intheordinaryrelationalsense)between‘C’andthe

Fconcepts.

Toproperlydrawthecontrastbetweennegativeandpositiveexclusion

wemustagaininvoketheConceptualPriorityrelation.Oneconcept‘N’

negativelyexcludesanotherconcept‘P’justwhen‘N’excludes‘P’(‘N’entails

‘~P’)andalso‘N’isconceptuallyposteriortosomeconceptthatarticulatesan

apriorinecessaryconditionfor‘P’toobtain(someconceptentailedby‘P’).

Manyconceptsentailthenegationsofotherconcepts.Iamdrawing

hereonthemoresubstantiveideathatsomeconceptsreallyarenegative,

whileothersreallyarepositive.‘Red’ispositiveand‘NotRed’isnegative.‘(Not

Red)andTall’isamixtureofnegativeandpositive,butitisconceptually

posteriorto‘Red’,andsoitsexclusionof‘Red’isnegativeexclusion.

Wemayfurtherqualifytheideaofnegativeexclusion.Forexample,ifI

enumerateyourqualities,andthendeclarethatIhaveenumeratedallofyour

qualities,butIomityoursardonicwit,thenindeclaringthatIhave

enumeratedallofyourqualitiesIamsayingyoudonothaveasardonicwit.

Butmydescriptiononlynegativelyexcludessardonicwit:Idonotdescribe

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someothervirtueofyoursthatrulesitout.Rather,Ilistonlyothervirtuesand

thensay‘that’sall’.‘That’sAll’exclusionisalsoaformofnegativeexclusion.23

Butthekeyideaisthecontrastbetweennegativeandpositiveconcepts.

Thisisasubstantialcontrast.Itcannotbereducedtoanylexicalcontrast,like

acontrastinthelogicalformoftheconceptsinvolved.Noroughtitbereduced

tosomesociologicalorpsychologicalcontrast.Supposetherewereatribethat

forreasonsofcontingentpsychologyfound‘NotRed’or‘ColorotherthanRed’

tobeamoregraspablenotionthan‘Red’.Inthistribepeoplefirstlearn‘Not

Red’(forwhichtheyhavesomesingleterm,‘Nred’)anddefine‘Red’asthe

negationof‘Nred’.Still,Isay,‘Nred’isconceptuallyposteriorto‘Red’.24Thisis

23Ifdualismistrueapriorithenthedescription,‘HasOnlyPhysicalProperties’entails‘NotPhenomenallyConscious’bymeansofsuchaThat’sAllclause.SinceIamopentotheaprioritruthofdualism(thoughmyownargumentfordualismisnotfullyapriori),butIalsotake‘PhenomenallyConscious’tobenon‐excludable,itisimportantformethatexclusionbythat’s‐allclausecountsasnegativeexclusion.Youmightworrythatthethat’s‐allclausemakestheconceptofexclusiontooexclusive.Forexampleyoumightworrythat‘Sweet’onlyexcludes‘Sour’givensomesortofrestrictedThat’sAllclause(“That’sAlloftheTasteQualitiesHere”).Butthisismistaken.‘Sweet’excludes‘Sour’thewaythat‘Red’excludes‘Green’.‘SweetandSour’isacoherentpredicatebutsois‘RedandGreen’.Nothingisbothsweetandsouronthesametastebudatthesametame.Evenifitwere,wehavepositiveconceptionsofamoredeterminatesortoftastespace,andconceptslike‘Bittersweet’excludeconceptslike‘HoneySweet’.24Howtosupportthisclaim?Wemightsaythatiftwoconceptsnegateeachother,thenatmostoneofthemcanseemtopresentapositiveproperty.Intuitively,apropertyispositiveiffhavingitisanachievement–somethingGodhadtodo–ratherthansimplyafailuretohavesomeothersortofproperty.Beingredispositive,andnotbeingredisnegative.Beinggreen,thoughitnecessitatesnotbeingred,ispositive.Wecanalsounderstandapositivepropertyasonethatyoucannotlosesimplybyacquiringnewproperties.Chalmers(1996)definesapositivepropertyas“OnethatifinstantiatedataworldW,isalsoinstantiatedbythecorrespondingindividualatallworldsthatcontainWasaproperpart”.BothmyformulationandChalmers’suppressdifficulties.Inminethereisacontrastbetweenonewayoflosingaproperty(simplyacquiringanothercontraryone)andamoresubstantialwayoflosingaproperty.InChalmers’wehavethenotionofwhatisinstantiatedatallworldsthatcontainWasaproperpart.YoumightthinkthatPositivitygoesalongwithNaturalnessor

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nottosaythatforeverypairofpredicativeconceptsthatnegateseachother,

onemustbenegativeandtheothermustbepositive,onlythatthisisoftenthe

case.‘Married’and‘Single’bothseemtobepositive,forexample.25Insuch

casesneitherconceptisnon‐excludable.

§2.2: THE INTEREST OF NON-EXCLUDABILITY, CANONICAL PRIMITIVITY AND CANONICAL INSCRUTABILITY

Verybroadlyspeaking,theinterestofthesenotionsisthattheygiveus

alternativecharacterizationsofrespectsinwhichsomeconceptorfamilyof

conceptsisprimitive,orautonomous.Mostphilosophersthesedaysare

skepticalofdefinitionalapproachestoprimitivity,butotherapproachesare

available;thesensethatsomeconceptsaremorebasicthanotherssurvives

thedeathofthehopesthatthemajorityofconceptsaredefinedintermsof

somesmallcorecollection.

Fundamentality–wemightsaythatpositivepropertiesjustarefundamentalproperties.Butaconjunctionoffundamentalpropertiesisstillapositiveproperty,thoughitisnotafundamentalproperty,andalsoonsomeaccountsoffundamentality(forexample,thoseconnectingitwithCausalRole)intuitivelynegativepropertiesmaycomeoutfundamental.Thedistinctionbetweenapositiveandanon‐positivepropertymayultimatelybeaconceptuallyprimitivedistinction,butitisanimportantone.Wemightalsocharacterizetheconceptualpriorityrelationmoredirectlyintermsofwhichconceptsaremorefundamentalinthesenseofcarvingmorecloselytonaturaljoints(cf.Sider).25Thedefinitionisnotvacuous.If‘A’entails‘~C’,then‘C’entails‘~A’.Might‘~A’betheconcept‘D’fromthedefinition?Wehavethat‘C’entails‘~A’.‘A’automaticallyentails‘~~A’.But‘A’isnotposteriorto‘~A’.Onlyif‘A’wereposteriorto‘~A’wouldwehavesomeproofthateveryconceptisnon‐excludable.

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Equippedwithournotionofconceptualprioritywemightcharacterize

aprimitiveconceptasonethatisnotposteriortoanyotherconcept.Butthere

areotherrelatednotionstobehadthatdonotrelyquitesoexplicitlyonthe

detailsoftheconceptualpriorityrelation,andthenotionsofNon‐

excludability,CanonicalPrimitivityandCanonicalInscrutabiltityareamong

these:thesatisfiabilityofeachofthesenotionsiscompatiblewiththe

possibilitythateveryconceptisposteriortosomeotherconcept.Anyway,itis

likelythatthereisnounivocalnotionofconceptualprimitivity,butinstead

therewillbedifferentsuchnotionsthatcapturedifferentaspectsofthe

generalidea.26Ifsomefamilyofconceptsiscanonicallyinscrutable,thenits

canonicalelementsmayentailoneanother,buttheyarenotentailedbyany

otherconcepts,andso,inonesense,primitiveasagroup.Likewiseifafamily

ofconceptsiscanonicallyprimitive,thenitscanonicalelementsmaybeprior

onlytooneanother,whichmeansthatevenifeachofthemisposteriorto

someotheroneofthem,thefamilyasawholeisprimitiverelativeto

everythingelse.Anon‐excludableconceptisonethatisprimitiveinthesense

thatittellsuslittleabouthowitsinstancesmustagreeorcontrastwiththe

instancesofotherconcepts.Anon‐excludableconceptmustalsobesomething

26Chalmers(ConstructingtheWorld)isasustaineddiscussionoftheseissues,andacharacterizationofafewmoreconceptionsofprimitivity.Chalmersaskswhichconceptswerequiretoarticulateabasisoftruthsfromwhichalltruthswouldbeapriorideducible(scrutable).Figuringinsuchabasisisaverynaturalsenseofprimitivity(albeitarelativizableone).

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liketheheadofafamilyofconcepts,inroughlythesenseofdescribinga

maximallydeterminablepropertyratherthansomemoredeterminateone,

sincedeterminatesareexcludedbyotherdeterminatesofthesame

determinable.

G.E.Moorefamouslyassertedthatthepropertyofgoodnessissimple

andunanalyseable(oratleastunanalyseableinnon‐moralterms)27.Moore’s

argumentfromthispremisetoNon‐naturalismisoftendismissedasarelicof

atimebeforeaposteriorinecessity,butweoughtnotassumethatthismeans

thattheconcept‘Good’isnomoredistinguishedthantheconcept‘Water’.

‘Good’maynotbenon‐excludable–itispresumablyexcludedby‘Bad’(though

notifSt.Augustineiscorrectthat‘Bad’isapurenegation),but‘HasNormative

Status’maybenon‐excludable(takingneutralitytobeakindofstatus),and

thefamilyofmoralconcepts(oranywaythefamilyofnormativeconcepts)

maybecanonicallyinscrutableorcanonicallyprimitive,asmaybesome

subfamilies,likethefamilyofdeonticconcepts.

Non‐excludabilityraisessomeinterestingquestionsinmetaphysical

debates.Itishardtofindexamplesofconceptsthatarenon‐excludable.

‘Water’isexcludable:‘SolidMetal’,‘ThinAir’,‘EmptyVacuum’areallpositive

conceptionsof‘NotWater’.‘Married’isexcludedby‘Single’,‘Red’by‘Green’,

27Moore,PrincipiaEthica

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‘Tall’by‘Short’,andsoon.Thingsgetinterestingwhenweaskaboutmore

generaltermslike‘Concrete’or‘Material’.‘Immaterial’iscertainly

conceptuallyposteriorto‘Material’butthereareotherconceptslike‘Beingthe

NumberTwo’thatpresumablyarenot(unlesssuchconceptsprovetoactually

bederivativethemselves:merenegationsofmateriality).Whatabout

‘Concrete’?Itisnotobviousthat‘Abstract’isdownstreamfrom‘Concrete’.It

maybe:somethinkwedefineabstractasthenegationofconcrete.Butthere

doseemtobemorepositiveconceptionsoftheabstract:Angels,Ghosts,

Propositions,Numbers,UniversalsandFormsmaygiveuspositive

conceptionsoftheabstract.Ifyoutakeallofthesenotionstobenegations,

then‘Concrete’maywellbenon‐excludable.Thismightbethepositionofa

certainsortofnominalist,whoheldthattherereallyarenosuchthingsas

abstracta,andourabstractconceptsdonotreallycharacterizeexistences

distinctfromconcreteparticularexistences,butrathermerelytake

characterizationsofconcreteparticularsandnegatekeyfeaturesofthem.

Thesearenottheonlyinterestingcases.Accordingtosomenegative

theologians,theconceptof‘Ungodly’maybenon‐excludable–weonly

understandGodbynegation.StrictFinitistsmayfeelthiswayaboutthe

concept‘Finite’.Modalconcepts(possibility,necessity)maybeasafamily

canonicallyprimitiveorinscrutable,andperhapsoneof‘Possible’or

‘Necessary’arepriortotheother,inwhichtheprioronemaybenon‐

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excludable.Inchaptertwo,Iwillarguebelowthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’is

non‐excludable.

Thereisaproblemofeasyexclusion.Conceptslike‘Normatively

Evaluable’or‘PhenomenallyConscious’seemtobeexcludedbyconceptslike

‘BeingtheNumberTwo’or‘BeingtheConjunctionOperation’.Idonotthinkit

isobviousthatthesearegenuineexclusionrelations28butindiscussionIhave

foundthatfewsharemydoubtonthispoint.Happilynothinghingesonthis:

non‐excludabilitycanberelativizedwithoutlosingitsinterest.Toomuch

relativizationwouldtrivializethings:Concept‘C’isnotpositivelyexcluded

exceptbythoseconceptsthatpositivelyexcludeit.Butifweholdthata

conceptrequiresitsinstancestobeofsomeextremelybroadontological

category(oranywaythatitdoesnotruleoutthatanythinginthatcategoryis

aninstance)thenwemayaskwhetheritisnon‐excludablewithinthat

category.Thusifyouthinkthatsomethingsareexcludedfrombeingconscious

becausetheyaretooabstracttobeconscious,askwhether‘Phenomenally

Conscious’isnon‐excludablebyconceptswhoseinstancesareconcretebeings.

Ifyouthinkthatonlyactions,oronlyintentions,arenormativelyevaluable,

28Ifitisconceivablethatrocksareconscious,andthatghostsandangelsareconscious,andthatGodisconscious,whythenshoulditbeinconceivablethatthenumbertwoortheconjunctionoperatorshouldbeconscious?Trulyuniversalpanpsychismseemstobeacoherentpossibility.PossiblyonaNeo‐Fregeanconceptionofnumberthematterisdeterminedbytheimplicitdefinitionofnumber–thoughthisisnotobvious[cfWrightandHale],andevenifsoitseemstoamounttoacaseofThat’s‐Allexclusion(whichisakindofnegativeexclusion).

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askwhether‘NormativelyEvaluable’isnon‐excludablebyconceptswhose

instancesareactions,orintentions.29

§2.3: GENERALIZED CONCEPTUAL GAPS AND THE STATUS OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS

InthephilosophyofmindournotionsofGeneralizedConceptualGap

areparticularlyinteresting,asthereareadvanceddebatesaboutwhatmakes

phenomenalconceptsspecialthathingeontheubiquityofconceptualgaps.

Manyacceptthatthereisagapbetweenphenomenalconceptsandmaterial

conceptsbutthereisaquestionabouthowspecialthismakesthephenomenal

concepts.Chalmersarguesthatitmakesthemextremelyspecial,butmany

holdthatitdoesnot.Manymaterialists(amongthemJosephLevine,NedBlock

andRobertStalnaker)holdthatthissortofconceptualgapiscommonplace

(andthatitthereforedoesnotaccountfortheExplanatoryGapwhichisagap

inasortofexplanationthatiscompatiblewithalackofapriorientailment).

BlockandStalnakerargue,forexample,thatthereareanalogousconceptual

29OtheralternativerefinementsthatIshallnotpursuehere,butthatmeritconsideration:wemightrefinethenotionofconceptualentailment.ThankstoDavidChalmersforthissuggestion.Wemightsay:Concept‘C’explanatorilyentailsconcept‘D’iff‘C’entails‘D’butalsothatsomethingisChelpsexplain(displaythegroundsof)whatitistobeD.Alternatively,wemightasknotjustforsomepositiveconceptionofsomewayofbeing~C,butratherforapositiveconceptionofanaturalgenusofwhichsomewaysofbeingCandsomewaysofbeing~Carebothspecies.

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gapsbetweenmicrophysicalconceptsandmacrophysicalconcepts.Ifthe

conceptualgapsassociatedwith‘Conscious’arenodifferentfromthegaps

associatedwith‘Water’or‘Heat’,thenthoseconceptualgapsclearlydonot

accountfortheExplanatoryGap.Thismeansforexamplethatmaterialistscan

holdouthopethattheExplanatoryGapwillonedaysomehowbeclosedeven

thoughtheConceptualGapwillnotbe.ButevenifwegrantBlock,Stalnaker

andLevinethattheExplanatoryGapisnotsimplyamatteroftheconceptual

gapbetweenphenomenalconceptsandmaterialconcepts,itdoesnotfollow

thattheExplanatoryGapisnotamatterofsomedeepconceptualdistinction.I

proposeherethatitisatleastinpartamatterofthenon‐excludabilityof

‘PhenomenallyConscious’andperhapsalsoofthecanonicalinscrutabilityor

canonicalprimitivityofthephenomenalconceptsingeneral.

Waterfactsmaynotbeentailedbymicrophysicalfacts30but‘Water’is

certainlyexcludablebyothermacroscopicconcepts,forexample‘Solid

Ground’or‘HardSteel’.Thisgoesforjustaboutanymundaneconceptwecan

imagine.Eventheconcept‘MacroscopicObject’isexcludedby‘Microscopic

Object,orfailingthat(becauseyouthink‘Microscopic’isjustthenegationof

‘Macroscopic’)itisexcludedbyanyspecificpositivemicroscopicconcept,for

exampletheconcept‘Electron’.

30IhavestressedthatasIunderstandit,‘entailment’isflexiblebetweenapriorityandsomeslightlyweakernotionlike‘isarmchairknowablefrom’or‘verystronglyconfirms’.BlockandStalnakeronlyclaimthatwaterfactsarenotapriorientailedbymicrophysicalfacts(plustotalizerandindexicalfacts),butmypointholdsnomatterhowweinterpret‘entails’.

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If‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐excludable(asIargueinthenext

chapter),itstandsapartfromordinarymacroscopicconcepts.Itmayevenbe

thattheExplanatoryGapisafunctionofthissortofconceptualdivide.This

wouldsuggestthattheExplanatoryGapisnotbridgeableunlesswechange

ourconcepts,eitherabandoningwhatledustoaskthequestionsinthefirst

place,orreplacingourcurrentphysicalconceptswithonesthataremore

accommodatingtophenomenalconsciousness.

Doesthesameholdifphenomenalconceptsarecanonicallyinscrutable

orcanonicallyprimitive?Perhaps,althoughhereitishardertosay.‘Electron’

excludes‘MacroscopicObject’butifBlockandStalnakerarecorrectthen

canonicalmacroscopicconceptslike‘Heat’,‘Water’and‘Gold’maynotbe

entailedbyanyothersortofconcept(thetrickhereisthatthecanonical

macroscopicconceptswillbepositiveconcepts.‘NotWater’maybeentailed

by‘Electron’but‘NotWater’isnotacanonicalmacroscopicconcepteven

though‘Water’is).LikewiseforCanonicalPrimitivity:ifyouholdthatconcepts

like‘Water’arenotentailedbyanymicroscopicconcepts(howevercomplex)

thenyoumaytakethemtonotbeposteriortoanyothersortofconcepts.ButI

takethesematterstobecomplicated,andthereisatleastsomechancethat

thefamilyofmacroscopicconceptsisneithercanonicallyprimitivenor

canonicallyinscrutable,inwhichcasethePhenomenalConceptswouldstand

apartiftheywere.

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Butofourthreenotions,itmaybethatNon‐Excludabilityisthemost

exclusive.Iwillnowdeveloponeparticularlyexclusiveconsequenceofa

concept’sbeingnon‐excludable–itimpliesthatthatconceptisnotvague.

Ihaveyettoarguethat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐excludable.

Thiswillbeoneofthetasksofthesecondchapterofthisdissertation.Very

broadly,theideaisthatacompletelyuniversalpanpsychismisconceivable.

Butthereismoretoitthanthat,asIshallexplainthere.

§2.4 NON-EXCLUDABLE CONCEPTS ARE NOT VAGUE

Therearemanydeepquestionssurroundingthephenomenonof

vagueness.Here,Iwillassumethatvaguenessis,verybroadlyspeaking,a

semanticphenomenon.Vaguenessisafunctionoftheworkingsofour

conceptsandpredicatesandterms–itisaphenomenonthatisgroundedin

featuresoftheinferentialroles(broadlyconstrued)ofthesesemanticentities.

Thisisnottosaythatcontextorpsychologyplaynorole–onlythatthatrole

mesheswiththeinferentialroles,broadlyconstrued,ofthetermsinvolved.I

takethistoimplythatcharacteristicsymptomsofthevaguenessofaconcept

shouldbeavailabletoanyonewhoknowshowtogetbywiththatconcept,but

notforexamplethatvaguenessisnecessarilyamatteroftruthvaluegaps,or

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semanticindecision.ButIwillalsoassumethoseadditionalthingshere:

vaguenessisamatterofsemanticindecision,andthismeansthatvagueness

manifestsintruthvaluegaps.Vaguenessisamatterofwhathappenswhenthe

inferentialroleassociatedwithsomeconceptisnotsufficientlyspecificto

determineapreciseextensionforit.InthememorablewordsofDavidLewis,

“Theonlyintelligibleaccountofvaguenesslocatesitinourthoughtandlanguage.Thereasonit'svaguewheretheoutbackbeginsisnotthatthere'sthisthing,theoutback,withimpreciseborders;rathertherearemanythings,withdifferentborders,andnobodyhasbeenfoolenoughtotrytoenforceachoiceofoneofthemastheofficialreferentoftheword`outback.'Vaguenessissemanticindecision”.(Lewis1986,213)

Iclaimthatifthisplausibleviewofvaguenessiscorrect,thenaconcept

thatisnon‐excludablecannotbevague.Recall:

(NON‐EXCLUDABILITY):Aconcept‘C’isnon‐excludableifftheonly

conceptsthatexclude‘C’excludeitnegatively.

Whereoneconceptexcludesanothernegativelyifitexcludesitby

negatinganapriorinecessaryconditionforittoobtain,orbymeansofa

That’sAllclause.

Thetwophenomenamostessentiallyassociatedwithvaguenessare

BorderlineCasesandSoritesSusceptibility.Onthesemanticindecisionview,

thesephenomenaaredifferentwaysforconceptstogiveout.Inbothcases,

thisgivingoutisnecessarilyamatterofacontrast.Inaborderlinecase,wesee

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adescriptionthatseemstohavemoreorlessequalclaimtobeingaCand

beinga~C.Weseesome,butnotallofthefeaturesthatmakeforaclearcase

ofaC,orweseesomerespectsofsimilaritywithaclearC,andwealsosee

some,butnotallofthefeaturesthatmakeforaclearcaseof~Corwesee

somerespectsofsimilaritywithaclear~C.Andwecantell–ifweknowhow

togetonwiththeconcept‘C’,andthisreallyisaborderlinecaseof‘C’–that

theconcept‘C’givesoutforthiscase:theconceptwasnotdesignedtosay

whethersuchacasefallsinsideoroutsideofitsboundary.Similarlyina

soritesserieswearegivenasequenceofcasesdescribedinsuchawaythat

eachofthemseemstovaryincrementallyawayfromwhataclearCislike

towardwhataclear~Cislike.Ifweknowhowtogetonwiththeconcept,we

knowthattheconceptwillgiveoutifweaskittodetermineforuswhichof

thesetransitionsistheonethatmarksthefinalcaseof‘C’andthefirstcaseof

‘~C’:theconceptwasnotdesignedtomakedistinctionsthatfine.

WithBorderlinecaseswegraspawayofbeingsomewherebetweena

clearCandaclear~C.Withsoritesserieswegraspaseriesofgradualchanges

fromaclearCtoaclear~Cbystepstoosmallfortheconcepttoadjudicateon

anychangebetweenthem.Butifwehaveeitherofthesethings,then‘C’is

excludable.Ifouronlyconceptionof‘~C’isparasiticontheconcept‘C’thenwe

arenotinapositiontorecognizesomethingashavingelementsincommon

with~Cswithoutjudgingthosethingstobe~Cs,andwearenotinaposition

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torecognizesomeseriesofchangesasheadedawayfromaclearCand

towardsaclear~C,withoutjudgingthosethingstobe~Cs.Ifontheother

handwehavewaysofconceivingofthingsassomehowintermediatebetween

Cand~C,thenweknowhowtofactor‘~C’intocomponents,orhowto

identify‘~C’asdepictingaconditionsimilartootherconditionsthatwecan

articulateindifferentterms.Butthismeanswehaveanindependent

conceptionof‘~C.’Ifaconceptisvague,forexample,becauseitsclearcases

simultaneouslymeettwoconditions(say,‘BeingInTheNorth’and‘BeingIn

TheEast’)anditsindeterminatecasesonlymeetoneofthem,thenanexcluder

forthatconceptjustisanexcluderforeachofthetwoconditions(here:‘Being

intheSouth’and‘BeingintheWest’).Infact,anexcludermightjustbethe

negationsofeachoftheconditions–thisconjunctionofnegationswouldbe

conceptuallyposteriortoeachoftheconceptsitnegates,butitwouldnotbe

posteriortoanysingleconceptthatstatesanecessaryconditionon‘Beingin

theNortheast’(allconjunctiveconceptsareexcludable).

Thisisnottosaythatifaconceptisvague,itmustbeapriorihowtoget

bydegreesfromaclearinstancetoaclearinstanceofitsnegation.Theremay

bewaysofgettinggraduallyfromaclearinstancetoaclearinstanceofits

negationthatareonlyknowableaposteriori.Butinordertobeinapositionto

recognizesuchathingasagenuinepossibilityyouhadbetterhavesome

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positiveconceptionofwhatitisthisgradualseriesbeginningwithaCis

changinginto.31

Forexample,‘Water’isexcludedby‘ThickMud’.Itisprobablya

posteriorithatmudisamixtureofdirtandwater.Butitisonlyifyouhave

somegraspofmudasadifferentthingthanwaterthatyouareinapositionto

recognizeagradualtransformationofwaterintomudasatransformationofa

clearcaseof‘Water’intoaclearcaseof‘NotWater’.Anotherwayofputtingthe

samepoint:itisonlybecausewehavesomepositiveconceptionofanexcluder

of‘Water’thatweareinapositiontorecognizesomethingasamixtureof

waterandnon‐water.Itisonlybyhavingsomeindependentgrasponthesorts

ofthingsthatwaterisnot,thatwecanhaveanygrasponhowwatermight

potentiallybemixable.

Itcertainlydoesnotsufficethatyouhavesomesenseofhowagiven

conceptcanvaryindegree,intensity,orsomeothermagnitude.Evenintheold

dayswhenwethoughtoflifeasVitalForce,wecouldmakesenseoftheforce

31Evenifsupervaluationismistrue(whichSemanticIndecisiontheorydoesnotimply),itcertainlyisnotthecasethatitmustbeaprioriwhattheadmissiblecompleteprecisificationsofsomevagueconceptare.Itisnotimplausibletoaskthattherebesomeaprioributpartialconceptionofwhatmakesforanadmissibleprecisification,butthisisaweakconstraint,requiringonlythatsomeoftheconcept’spenumbralconnectionsareapartofitsconceptualrole.Anyway,IdonottaketheSemanticIndecisiontheorytoimplySupervaluationism–especiallyifthelatteristakentobetheviewthatprecisificationsaresupposedtoextendthemeaningsofvaguetermswhilepreservingwhattheyalreadymean,andtheideathatthevaguenessofavaguetermisboundupwithwhatitmeans.FordifficultieswiththisideaseeSchiffer[2003].Forexample,itisunclearhowthispicturecouldapplyinintensionalcontexts,eg.‘Sheonlylikesbaldmen’

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beingstrongerorweakerinsomecases:presumably,theforcediminishes

beforeyoudie.Butherewehavenoconceptionofhowthisforcemightbe

vague,andpresumablyyouarealive,butweakly,untilyouhaveabsolutely

noneofthisforce.Weonlygetagriponhow‘Life’canbevaguewhenwegeta

griponsomepositivecharacteristicsofnotbeingalive–forexample,being

unabletoprocessinformation,reproduce,adapttocircumstancesasan

organism,grow,etc.Ihavetohaveanindependentconceptionofwhat

somethingisheadingtowards,asitceasestobealive,inorderfortheretobe

somespaceintheregionbetweendepartureandarrivalwhereitisunclear

whethertheborderhasyetbeencrossed.32

Thisisnottosaythatwecannotinsomethinsenseunderstanda

locutionlike‘IndeterminatelyC’,where‘C’isanon‐excludableconcept.Wecan

understandalocutionlike‘IndeterminatelyaPrimeNumber’,afterall.Butif

vaguenessisinfactsomethingthatflowsfromthenatureofconcepts–from

gapsinthewaytheydelineatethedifferencesbetweentheirinstancesand

32WearenowinapositiontocomparehowmyownproposalcompareswiththeproposalofAntonyconsideredinthepreviouschapter.Myownclaimisthatifsomeconcept‘C’isvaguewemustbeabletoconceiveofacaseashavingsomethingincommonwithaclearC,otherthingsincommonwithaclear~C,butwithoutthisconceptionsettlingthethingasaC,orasa~C.Idonothavetospelloutexactlywhatthismeans,sinceitisclearthatwhateveritmeans,itwillhavetoinvolveaconceptionof‘~C’thatisnotsimplyparasiticontheconceptionof‘C’–forifsothentherewouldbenowayoffactoringoutelementsofourconceptionof‘~C’thatdidnotentail‘~C’.Antonyhastogiveusanaccountofexactlywhatitisforgradualchangestobegradualinsomedimension.Perhapsmoreimportantly,heiscommittedtotherebeingsomeelementcommontoCs,borderlineCsand~Cs.Ifthereisthenpresumablythereissomeindependentconceptionof~C,buttheconversedoesn’thold.IneednotclaimthatthereisanythingcommontoaconceptionofCandaconceptionof~C.

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non‐instances–thenthereisnothingforsuchalocutiontodenote.IfIhaveno

appreciationofwhatittakesforaconcepttofailtoapply,Iaminnoposition

toappreciatewheretheapplicationoftheconceptgivesout.Ifvagueness

flowsfromthenatureofconceptsthenitisnotsomethingthatwemayonly

cometoknowaboutviaempiricaldiscovery,andaminimalconstrainton

vaguenessnotbeingsomethingwemayonlycometoknowaboutvia

empiricaldiscoveryisthatwehavesomeindependentandapriori(oratleast

armchairknowable)grasponwhatanexcluderofthevagueconceptmust

be.33

Thisconcludesthepresentationofmyargument.Iwillnowconsideran

objectiontoit,andthenIwillconcludewithanexplanationofwhymy

argumentcannotbeextendedtoshowthatfamiliesofconceptsthatare

canonicallyinscrutableorcanonicallyprimitivearenotvague.

TheobjectioncomesfromDavidPapineau(andmyresponsetoitis

heavilyindebtedtoMichaelAntony2006c).InThinkingAboutConsciousness,

Papineauarguesdirectlyfortheconclusionthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’is

33Non‐excludabilitymaycallforrelativization.Aswenoted,‘Beingthenumbertwo’mightexclude‘PhenomenallyConscious’,butthisdoesnotexclude‘PhenomenallyConscious’fromnon‐excludability,becausewecanthinkofnon‐excludabilityasrelativizedtosomecategoryrestriction.Therewillbeanensuingconstraintontheargumentthatanon‐excludableconceptcannotbevague.Iftherestrictionisvague,thentherelevantconceptmaybevaguewhenitcomestotheboundaryoftherestriction.Iseenoproblemhere,providedthatourrestrictionissufficientlybroad.Forexample,ifweonlyrestricttheclaimofthenon‐excludabilityof‘PhenomenallyConscious’toconcreteparticulars,thismeansthattherewillbenoconcreteparticularthatisanindeterminatecaseofphenomenalconsciousness,andthatisinterestingenough.

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vagueorreferentiallyindeterminate.Papineautakestheconcept

‘PhenomenallyConscious’(hecallsit‘Consciousness‐as‐such’)toberadically

indeterminate.PapineauisrespondingtosomeworriesraisedbyNedBlockin

“TheHarderProblemofConsciousness.”Inthispaper,Blockaskshow

PhenomenalRealistscouldeverhopetosettlethequestionofwhether

superficialfunctionalisomorphsofourselves(likeCommanderDatafromStar

Trek:TheNextGeneration)areconscious.Papineauseekstosolvethis

problemonbehalfofPhenomenalRealistsbyholdingthatthereisnofactof

thematter.

Tojustifyhisclaim,PapineauappealstoNaturalisticTheoriesof

Content–inparticulartocausalorteleosemanticaccounts.Itisplausible,he

says,thatthesemanticsof‘PhenomenallyConscious’(alongwithmost

phenomenalconcepts)willbegivenbysuchanaccount,and,

“…anycausalorteleosemanticaccountwillleaveitindeterminateexactlywhichofthecorrelatedmaterialcandidatesanygivenphenomenalconceptrefersto.Forallthecorrelatedmaterialcandidateswillfigureequivalentlyinthecharacteristiccausesorbiologicalfunctionsoftherelevantphenomenaljudgments,andsocausalorteleosemanticconsiderationswillfailtopickoutonementalcandidateratherthatanotherasthereferent.”(2002:198)

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Theproblemisthatcausalorteleosemanticaccountsoftenimply

indeterminacywherethereisnone,andthisisaproblemforthosetheories.34

Onesalientcorollaryproblemarises.Vaguenessisveryplausiblytakentobe

groundedinconcepts,insuchawaythatsymptomsofthevaguenessofa

vagueconceptshouldbedetectabletothosewhoarefullycompetentusersof

theconcepts.Butifwetakecausalandteleosemantictheoriestoconstrain

meaningssothatconceptsonlydeterminatelyapplyincaseswheretheir

causalorteleologicalsourcesarefullydeterminate,thentheyimplythe

prevalenceofasortofvaguenessthatiswhollyundetectabletofully

competentusersoftherelevantconcepts.Inotethatthisshouldbothereven

thosewhorejectthetheorythatvaguenessissemanticindecision–thosewho

acceptEpistemicism,andsomeofthosewhoacceptOnticism(thosewhotake

vaguenesstobeanontologicalphenomenonratherthananepistemicor

semanticone)alsocountenancetheideathatindeterminacyhasdetectable

linguisticorconceptualmanifestations.

Thisisnottosaythatsuchtheoriesareclearlywrong.Butif

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isvaguebecauseitssemanticsisgivenbyacausal

orteleosemantictheoryofmeaning,thenwehavelargerthingstoworry

about:mostoftheconceptsandpredicatesweemployareprobably

34Cf.Boghossian,“TheRuleFollowingConsiderations”,“NaturalizingContent”andKripke,“WittgensteinonRulesandPrivateLanguage”,

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indeterminateinwayswedonotexpect.Itisalsoworthnotingthatifno

physicaldescriptioncanhavephenomenalimplications,thenthetruthofthe

relevantnaturalistictheoryofmeaningwillhavetobeaposteriori,anditis

notexactlyobviousthatasemantictheorycanbeaposteriori35.Allthisisto

concedethatifthereisthissortofreferentialindeterminacy,thenconcepts

canbenon‐excludableandalsobeindeterminate.Butthissortof

indeterminacyisafarcryfromthephenomenonthatweordinarilythinkofas

vagueness.

ThatconcludesmyconsiderationofPapineau’sobjection.Iconclude

withanexplanationofwhytheresultheredoesnotextendfromnon‐

excludabilitytocanonicalinscrutabilityorcanonicalprimitivity.Itis

commonlyassumedthatprimitiveconcepts,iftherewereany,wouldnotbe

vague.Ifprimitivitywereamatterofbeingoneofthebasicbuildingblocksina

granddefinitionaledificethenthismightbeso:arguablyaconceptisonly

vagueifthereissomemorebasiclevelofdescriptionalongwhichitispossible

todrawdistinctionsfinerthanthosecutoutbythelessbasicvagueconcept.

Butthingsarelessobviouswhenwedoawaywiththedefinitionalmodelof

primitivity.AsIhaveindicated,someonewhothinksthatconceptualgapsare

35CfGeoffLeeforthcoming.Ifthesemantictheoryisapriorithenitisplausiblethattherelevantindeterminaciesshouldbeavailabletocompetentusersoftherelevantconcepts,atleastinconjunctionwithaspecificationofthecausalorteleosemanticfacts.ButItakeitthenaturalconstraintshouldbethatsymptomsofthevaguenessofavagueconceptshouldbedetectabletocompetentuserswhetherornottheyknowthecausalorteleosemanticfacts.Butinanycasemattersareevenworseifthetheoryisaposteriori.

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pervasivemightthinkthatthefamilyofmacroscopicconceptsiscanonically

inscrutable,orcanonicallyprimitive.But‘Water’isvague,whetheritis

posteriortootherconceptsornot.Likewise,Iwillargueinthenextchapter

thatthephenomenalconceptsarecanonicallyinscrutableandcanonically

primitive.Butitishardtosaywhethertherearenon‐vaguephenomenal

conceptsotherthan‘PhenomenallyConscious’.Ifthereareconceptsof

maximallypreciseanddeterminatephenomenalstatesthenthesemaywellbe

precise.Butifwehavesuchconceptswedonotemploythemofteninpublic

discourse.Forallweknow,thespaceofsuchconceptsisgunky,inthesense

thatforeverydeterminatephenomenalconcept,thereisanevenmore

determinatephenomenalconcept.

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CHAPTERTHREE:

APRIORIPROTOPHENOMENALISMANDNON‐EXCLUDABILITY

ItiscommonlysupposedthatDemocrituswasright,andtherestofthe

PresocraticandRomanticphilosopherswerewrong:realityismadeofMatter

andVoid,ratherthanSacredFire,orAether,orWill,orsomeotherexotic

thing.Wesupposethatthegranddebateoverthenatureofbeingisclosed,and

materialistshavewon.

ButthereislogicalspaceformaterialiststoembracetheDualAspect

viewthat‘SacredFire’and‘Matter’aredifferentguisesofthesamething.

ManymaterialistsembracetheDualAspectviewthat‘Mind’and‘Matter’are

differentguisesofthesamething.Andthissortofmaterialistmayhave

reasontoembracethemoreexoticsortofDualAspecttheory.Theviewthat

thereisa‘SacredFire’aspecttomaterialrealitymighthelptoexplainthe

connectionbetweenthenon‐mentalandthemental–ifthecorrelation

betweenthe‘SacredFire’aspectandthe‘Mind’aspectweresignificant

enough.

InthischapterIwilldescribeaposition,Protophenomenalism,which

articulatesapreconditiononthisexoticsortofDualAspecttheory,andIwill

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tentativelydefendit.36Butmyprimaryaiminthischapteristoshowthat

thereisalimitonhowmuchofanexplanationofthementalwecanexpectthis

strategytodeliver.Iwillcallthepositionwhichsaysthatsomedescriptionin

exotictermsmightactuallyentailaphenomenaldescriptionAPriori

Protophenomenalism.Iwillarguethatthisviewisdifficulttodefendin

conjunctionwithanon‐deflationary,naturalistictheoryofconceptapplication.

SincethatisthesortoftheoryofConceptApplicationyoushouldembraceif

youthinkthatthementalisultimatelymaterial,thismeansthatifyouthink

thementalisultimatelymaterial,youmayhavetoabandonthehopeforan

exoticconceptionofrealitythatentailsanythingaboutmentalreality.This

imposesasignificantlimitonthewaysthatanexoticDualAspecttheorymight

helpthematerialistbridgetheexplanatorygap.

Mysecondaryaiminthischapteristoshowthatthishasconsequences

forourunderstandingofphenomenalconcepts.Inthesecondchapterofthis

dissertationIcharacterizethreedifferentwaystogeneralizetheideaofa

conceptualgap:CanonicalInscrutability,CanonicalPrimitivityandNon‐

excludability.HereIwillarguethatifAPrioriProtophenomenalismisfalse,

thentheconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnonexcludable.Iwillalso

presentsomereasonstothinkthatthefamilyofphenomenalconceptsis

36Itisonlyapreconditionbecause,asIwilldiscuss,onecouldbeaProtophenomenalistwithoutbeingamaterialist.

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canonicallyinscrutableandcanonicallyprimitive,thoughforreasonsIwill

discusstheseclaimsarehardertoestablish.Howevernonexcludabilityisthe

morenewsworthynotion:InthesecondchapterIarguethatifaconceptis

non‐excludablethenitisnotvague,sotheimplicationofmyconclusionhere

willbethat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague(assuminganon‐

deflationary,naturalistictheoryofconceptapplication).

InthefourthandfifthchaptersIarguethatif‘PhenomenallyConscious’

isnotvaguetheneitherPanpsychismorPropertyDualismistrue.Thereis

thusamasterargumenthereagainstOrthodoxMaterialismbroadlyconstrued:

eitheranon‐deflationary,naturalistictheoryofconceptapplicationisfalse,or

oneofPanpsychismorPropertyDualismistrue.37Idodefendtheclaimthat

Protophenomenalismisanoptionfororthodoxmaterialists(thoughAPriori

Protophenomenalismisnot),butthisdefenseismodulomyargumentin

chapterfourthatOrthodoxMaterialismisuntenable.

In§1IwillintroduceProtophenomenalismandexplainthecontrast

betweenAPrioriandAPosterioriProtophenomenalism.In§2IwillarguethatA

PrioriProtophenomenalismisincompatiblewithanon‐deflationary,

37Ifonerejectsanon‐deflationarynaturalisttheoryofconceptapplication,Itakethemostcompellingalternativetobeaprimitivisttheoryofconceptapplication,whichisasortofprimitivismaboutintentionalstatesandrelations.Sinceitisplausiblethatallmentalstates,includingphenomenalstates,areintentionalstates,thismightamounttopropertydualismaboutphenomenalpropertiesaswell,butinanycaseitamountstoapropertydualismaboutsomementalproperties.

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naturalistictheoryofconceptapplication.In§3IwillarguethatifAPriori

Protophenomenalismisfalsethentheconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’is

nonexcludable,andthefamilyofphenomenalconceptsmaybecanonically

inscrutableandcanonicallyprimitive.

§3.1: PROTOPHENOMENALISM AND A PRIORI PROTOPHENOMENALISM

SaythataconceptisExoticjustincaseitisnotamaterialconceptnor

posteriortoany,notaphenomenalconceptorposteriortoany,andnota

concepttypicallyassociatedwithanyphenomenalconceptsorposteriorto

anythatare.Idrawhereonsometerminologyfromthelastchapter.The

materialconceptsincludeconceptsofmatterandvoid,conceptsof

spatiotemporalandcausalstructure,functionalconcepts,andsomeother

relatedones.38Thephenomenalconceptsincludepositiveconceptsof

38Ileavethiscategoryvague.IstheHeracliteanconceptof‘Fire’amaterialconcept?Thismaydepend.Wehaveseveraldifferentconceptionsofthematerial.Oneveryausterereadingtakesmaterialconceptstobeconceptsonlypertainingtotheattributeofextension.Aslightlylessausterereadingtakesthemtobeconceptsoftheobjectsofanultimatetheoryofphysics,alongwithrigiddesignatorsthatturnouttodenotesuchobjects.Finallythereisthemorepermissiveviewthataconceptismaterialifitisaconceptthatcanbeusedtothinkaboutparadigmaticallymaterialobjects(seeStoljar2001).TheHeracliteanconceptwouldcountasmaterialinthisthirdsense–hemusthavethoughtof‘Fire’ascharacterizingaspecialsubstantialformorattributedifferentfromextension.Thisisnotamaterialconceptineitherthefirstorsecondsense;thisexcludes‘MereMatter’anditisnotarigiddesignatorforwhateverhappenstocauseFieryexperiences(itisnotevenobvioushowtoformulatethe

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particularphenomenalstates,like‘SeeingRed’or‘HearingaTrombone’or

‘FeelingPain’,andalsomoregeneralconceptslike‘PhenomenallyConscious’.I

alsotakeonboardarelationofConceptualPriority.Incharacterizingthe

generalizationsoftheconceptualgapImakeheavydutyuseofthisrelation,

buthereitsfunctionismainlytoscreenoutconceptsdefinedintermsofother

concepts.Iwillsaymoreaboutwhichconceptsaretypicallyassociatedwith

theconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’below.

Theremightbeexoticconceptsthathavenothingtodowith

consciousnessonewayortheother(forexample,abstractmathematical

concepts)andtheremightbeunsatisfiedexoticconcepts.Ourquestionis

whetherthereareanyexoticconceptswithnon‐emptyextensionsthat

correlateinsomesystematicwaywiththeextensionsofphenomenalconcepts.

Callatheoryassertingthatthereisatleastoneexoticconceptwithanon‐

emptyextensionthatcorrelatessystematicallywiththeextensionofsome

phenomenalconceptaProtophenomenalisttheory.Protophenomenalist

theoriescomeintwotypes:APrioriProtophenomenalismaddsthatsome

phenomenalconceptsareentailedbysomeexoticconcepts,whileAPosteriori

Protophenomenalismdeniesthis(onefinalpieceofterminology:Iwillspeakof

claimthateverythingiffireifthatclaimistrueonlyifeverythingisthesortofthingthattypicallycausesfieryexperiences).Myowninclinationis,ifthereisanydoubt,andanychancethattheconceptmightentailsomephenomenalconcepts,tothinkofsuchconceptsasexoticratherthanmaterial.ThankstoCharlotteWittfordiscussiononthispoint.

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conceptsentailingotherconcepts:oneconcept‘C’entailsanotherconcept‘D’

justincasetheproposition<forallx,ifCxthenDx>isapriori).

Protophenomenalisttheoriestracebackasfarasphilosophyitself.If

youthinkthateverythingissacredfire,youprobablythinkthatconsciousness

issomespecialmodificationofthatsacredfire.Onepossibilityisthatthe

exoticconceptsprovetobecompletelyalien–conceptswecannoteven

triangulateupon,pendingsomefutureinnovationofthought.Butthehistory

ofphilosophyoffersusmanyalternativeconceptionsoffundamentalreality,

asidefromMatter:Aether,Air,Bubbles,ClassStruggle,Dialectic,Earth,Fire,

Force,Geist,God,TheGood,theIndefinite,theInfinite,Information,Light,

Love,Music,Number,Oppositionality,PowerRelations,Representation,Self‐

Consciousness,Structure,Text,Unity,VitalForce,Water,Will,orany

combinationofthese;forexample,WillandRepresentation,orTextand

Information,orEarth,Water,AirandFire.Ofcourse,anycomprehensive

theoryshouldgiveusnotonlythefundamentalprinciplesofbeing,butalso

thefundamentalprinciplesofformation.IfyouthinkthateverythingisAir,

youmighttaketheseprinciplestobeRarefactionandCondensation.Ifyou

thinkthateverythingisLight,youmighttakethemtobeReflectionand

Refraction.

Protophenomenalismisadoctrineregardingconceptsratherthan

properties.NotonlyMaterialists,butalsoDualistsandIdealistsmaybe

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Protophenomenalists.Idealistsmaysaythatexoticconceptsapplyto

phenomenalproperties.Dualistsmaysaythattheyapplytophenomenal

properties,ortomaterialproperties,ortoboth.Also,Protophenomenalism

doesnotautomaticallyentailaDualAspecttheory,atleastnotifwe

individuateaspectsintermsofnon‐entailment.AProtophenomenalism

accordingtowhichexoticconceptsentailbothmaterialandphenomenal

conceptsisaSingleAspectProtophenomenalism.ADualAspect

Protophenomenalismmighttaketheexoticconceptstoentailsome

phenomenalconcepts,butnotanymaterialconcepts(ortoentailsome

materialconceptsandnophenomenalones),thenholdthattheexotic

conceptsapplytotheverysamepropertiesassomematerialconcepts.A

TripleAspectProtophenomenalismwouldsaythattheexoticconceptsentail

neithermaterialnorphenomenalconcepts.39Thematerialistwhohopesfora

Protophenomenalwayofbridgingthegapbetweenmaterialandmental

shouldhopeforaSingleorDualAspectversionoftheview–itisonlyagainst

thesethatIwillarguebelow.

ProtophenomenalismgoesnaturallywiththemetaphysicsofRussellian

MonismorNeutralMonism.RussellianMonismistheviewthatthestructural‐

dynamicanddispositionalpropertiesstudiedbyphysicalscience(thet‐

39Nagel’spresocraticphilosopher,whoprescientlyassertsthatmatterisenergy,withouthavingaconceptionofhowthismightbetrue,wassuchacompatibilist.Inthosedaysthematerialconceptswouldhavebeenanarrowercollection,andtheconcept‘Energy’probablywouldnothavefiguredamongthem.

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physicalproperties)aresomehowtetheredtocategoricalproperties(theo‐

physicalproperties),whichareeitheridenticaltoorthegroundsof

phenomenalproperties.NeutralMonismistheviewthatbothmindand

matterareconstructedoutofsomethirdsortofthingthatinatleastsomeof

itsbasicmanifestationsisneithermindnormatter.40Protophenomenalism

goesverynaturallywiththeseviews,asitisapreconditionoftherebeinga

positivecharacterizationoftheo‐physicalpropertiesthatarenotphenomenal

properties,oroftheneutralthirdsortofproperties.However,

Protophenomenalismisindependentofbothofthesemetaphysicalviews.

Protophenomenalismiscompatiblewithanontologyholdingthatstructural‐

dynamicanddispositionalpropertiesarenottetheredtocategorical

properties,anditiscompatiblewithanontologyholdingthateverythingis

mental,withanontologyholdingthateverythingismaterial,andwithan

ontologyholdingthateverythingisbothmentalandmaterial.Thus,

ProtophenomenalismmaybetrueevenifRussellianMonismandNeutral

40BothRussellianandNeutralMonistsmayholdthattheintrinsicnatureofrealityisneithermentalnormaterial,buttotheRussellianMonistthismeansthattheo‐physicalpropertiesarethecategoricalbasesofthet‐physicalpropertiesandground(construct)thementalproperties,whiletotheNeutralMonistthismeansthattheneutralpropertiesground(construct)bothmaterialandmentalproperties.ProponentsorsympathizersofRussellianMonismarguablyinclude:Mach1959,Russell1921,1924,1927,Feigl1958,Maxwell1978,Lockwood1989,Stoljar2001,Chalmers1996,2002c,Strawson1994,2008.ProponentsorsympathizersofNeutralMonismarguablyinclude:Mach1959,James1904,Russell1921,1924,1927,Sayre1976andChalmers1996,2002c.Thetwopositionsconvergeifyouholdthatwhatitisforacategoricalpropertytobethebasis(orintrinsicnature)ofadispositionalonejustisforthecategoricalpropertytogroundthedispositionalone.ThechallengeformanyoftheseviewsistodifferentiatethemselvesfromPanpsychismorIdealism.AcasethatnosuchdifferentiationispossibleismadebyV.I.Lenin1909.

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Monismarefalse.Also,RussellianMonismandNeutralMonismarecompatible

withitbeingimpossibletoadequatelyconceptualizetherelevanto‐physicalor

neutralproperties,oranywaywithitbeingimpossibletoconceptualizethem

exceptwithconceptsposteriortophenomenalconcepts.SoRussellianor

NeutralMonismmaybetrueeventhoughProtophenomenalismisfalse.But

insofarasrussellianorneutralmonistshopeforapositiveconceptionoftheo‐

physicalorneutralpropertiestheyposit,theyhopethatProtophenomenalism

istrue.41

OneworryisthatProtophenomenalismisdeadinthewaterbecause

therearenotenoughexoticconceptstogoaround.Ourconcept‘Fire’is

material,notexotic.Ourconcept‘Will’isphenomenal,notexotic.Butthere

maybesomeconceptlike‘ManifestSacredFire’,or‘TheFieryFormal

Attribute’looselyrelatedtoourordinaryconcept‘Fire’,butclosertowhat

Heraclitushadinmind,thatisnotmaterial,42oraconceptof‘PureWill’,only

41Imeanthisclaimbothdescriptivelyandnormatively.Theyshould,becauseifwecouldnotconceptualizetherelevantpropertiesthatwouldgiveusatleastsomeprimafaciereasontodoubttheirexistence.Andtheydo.SeeforexampleChalmers2002c.42AsIindicateinapreviousfootnote,itisdifficulttodrawalinebetweenmaterialandexoticconcepts.Stoljar’sdistinctionbetweenanobject‐basedconceptionofmaterialismandatheory‐basedconceptionissalienthere(Stoljar2001).Aconceptlike‘ManifestTrueFire’wouldhavecountedasmaterialontheobject‐basedconceptionifordinaryfirereallydidamounttomanifesttruefire.Thesamegoesmutatismutandisfor‘Life’andvitalforce.Also,Iamnotclaimingthatallexoticconceptsmustbecompatible(inasingleordualaspectsortofway)withmaterialconcepts,onlythatthereistheoreticalroomforsomeofthemtobe.Finally,nothinginmyargumenthingesonexactlyhowwedemarcatethematerialconceptsfromtheexoticconcepts.Solongastheconceptclearlydoesnotentailanyphenomenalconcepts,itdoesnotmatterformydialecticalpurposes.Iftheconceptmayentailsome

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looselyrelatedtoourintrospectivelyderivednotion,thatisnotphenomenal.

Forexample,ourordinaryconcept‘Life’isperhapsamaterialconcept,butthe

concept‘VitalForce’apparentlyisnot.Inanycase,someofthecandidate

exoticconceptsIlistabove,liketheconceptofPower,ortheconceptofGod,

donotseemtobematerial,phenomenalorposteriortoconceptsthatare.If

thereissomeaccountofhowsuchconceptscanapplythatreservessome

neutralityonthemetaphysicalnatureofwhattheyapplyto,then

Protophenomenalismhasachance.IstressthatImeantotakeintoaccount

herethepossibilityofconceptsthatnoactualsentientbeingwillevergrasp.

Myquestioniswhetherthereareexoticconceptssuitablyconnectedto

phenomenalconceptsthatasentientbeingcouldgrasp(andtruthfullyapply).

Oneoftheclausesofthedefinitionofanexoticconceptis:aconceptnot

typicallyassociatedwithphenomenalconceptsorposteriortoconceptsthat

are.Whichconceptsaretypicallyassociatedwith‘PhenomenallyConscious’?I

haveinmindhereconceptsthatarenotjustcontingentlypsychologically

associatedwithphenomenalconcepts,butratherconceptsthatareboth

contingentlypsychologicallyassociatedwithphenomenalconceptsandalso

thatentail,orareentailedby,phenomenalconcepts.Thiscategorymay

includesomeconceptsofintentionalityandnormativity:‘Beingamoral

phenomenalconcepts,classifyitasexotic.Iholdthatphenomenalconceptsarenotentailedbymaterialconcepts.

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agent’,‘Beingamoralpatient’,‘Beingarationalagent’,‘BeingaPerson’,

‘HavingaPerspective’,‘BelievingthatP’,‘DesiringthatP’,‘PerceivingthatP’,

‘PerceivingRedness’.Thisisnottosaythatanynormativeorintentional

conceptthatentailssomephenomenalconceptistypicallyassociatedwithit

andthereforenotexotic.Forexample,ifthereissomeconceptionofan

aestheticvaluethatgivesusapositiveconceptionofnon‐consciousness,itis

notonethatmostofushaveanygripon,norisitobvioushowwemightgo

aboutgettingagriponit,andsoitcountsasexotic.

Thecategoryalsoincludesconceptslike‘IntensityofExperience’and

‘AttentivenessofExperience’,thatdescribepotentiallynecessaryconditions

forexperience.Thereareconceptslike‘Semi‐conscious’,‘MarginallyConscious

State’and‘Subconscious’.Andthenofcoursetherearecognatesof

‘PhenomenallyConscious’itself,like‘QualitativelyExperiencing’,‘ThereBeing

SomethingItIsLike’,etc.

Thecategoryofconceptstypicallyassociatedwithphenomenal

concepts,andthereforethecategoryofexoticconcepts,isparochial.Things

thatareexotictousmaybecommonplaceelsewhere.Aconceptthatwedonot

nowbutonedaywillcometoassociatewithphenomenalconcepts(andthat

entailssomeofthem)countsasexotic,sinceitisexoticforusnow.Myaimis

tocapturetheideathatanexoticconceptwouldbeaconceptdifferentfrom

anythingthatweordinarilythinkofasamaterial(structural‐dispositional)

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conceptanddifferentfromanythingweordinarilythinkofasaphenomenal

concept:anexoticconceptwouldrevealsomefundamentallydifferentvantage

pointonrealitythanthematerialorphenomenalvantagepoints.

Incontrast,thenotionsofnonexcludability,canonicalinscrutabilityand

canonicalprimitivityarenotparochialnotions.Iwillarguein§3thatifAPriori

Protophenomenalismisfalsethen‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐

excludable,andpresentsomereasonsinfavorofphenomenalconcepts’being

canonicallyinscrutableandcanonicallyprimitive.IndoingsoIwillarguethat

noneoftheconceptstypicallyassociatedwithphenomenalconceptsare

counterexamplestoanyofthesenon‐parochialclaims.Iturnnowtoan

argumentthatAPrioriProtophenomenalismisincompatiblewithanon‐

deflationary,naturalistictheoryofconceptapplication.

§3.2: AGAINST A PRIORI PROTOPHENOMENALISM

Itakeittobeatleastcoherentthatthereisaperceptualwayfor

sentientbeingstopossessthesortofconceptsthatAPriori

Protophenomenalismcountenances.Wemaynothavetheperceptualfaculties

necessarytoacquiresuchconcepts,butothermorephilosophicallyinsightful

creaturesmight.Anditmaybethatevenwemayacquirenewperceptual

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facultiesbytechnologicalself‐modification,orperhapsevenbytakingdrugs(I

mean‘perceptual’looselyhere:adrugmayassistmetoacquireanexotic

conceptbygivingmeanexperienceasofsomethinghavinganapparentlynew

propertythatIhadnotexperiencedbefore,eventhoughnothingwiththat

propertyplaysanycausalroleinbringingmetohavetheexperience.Forour

purposesIconsiderthissortofexperiencetobeperceptual).

Itaketheperceptualroutetoexoticconceptsthatentailphenomenal

concepttobethemostpromisingroute.AsIwillarguebelow,introspectionis

unlikelytodeliverusanyexoticconceptsthatentailphenomenalconcepts,

anditisevenmoredoubtfulthatsomemoretheoreticalwillhelpusifthe

introspectiveandtheoreticalroutesdonot.Iconcludethat,ifyouwantto

defendAPrioriProtophenomenalism,youshouldrejectNon‐Deflationary

MaterialismaboutConceptApplication(whichmaymeanthatyoushould

rejectMaterialismaboutatleastsomeIntentionalstatesorrelations).

Thetroublewithintrospectiveapproachesisthatintrospectionisa

facultyfordevelopingconceptsofexperiences(oroftheobjectsofexperiences

orfeaturescloselyconnectedtoexperience)–notofbitsandcomponentsof

experiences,unlessthosebitsandcomponentsareexperiencesthemselves.

Basically,introspectivelyderivedconceptsaretooclosetophenomenal

conceptstobeexotic.Iftheyentailphenomenalconceptsitisbecausetheyare

phenomenalconcepts,orbecausetheyareconceptstypicallyassociatedwith

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phenomenalconcepts.43OnemightobjectthatsomeoftheconceptsIlist

aboveascandidatesforbeingTypicallyAssociatedwithphenomenalconcepts

areveryclosetophenomenalconceptsinjustthissortofway(rememberthat

asIuseit,tobeinthiscategoryatermmustbothbeinfacttypicallyassociated

withphenomenalconceptsbutalsomustentailsomephenomenalconcepts).

Theobjectionwouldcontinuethatintrospectionmightuncoverfuture

conceptsthatwewillonedaycategorizeasconceptsTypicallyAssociatedwith

phenomenalconcepts,buttodaydonot.Suchconceptsmightnotbeconcepts

ofbitsorcomponentsofconsciousnessbuttheymightneverthelessbeexotic

conceptsaccessingmaterialconcepts.Itaketheretobeatleastsomereasonto

thinkthatintrospectionisnotgoingtodeliveranygenuinelynewconcepts

thatentailphenomenalconceptswithoutbeingconceptuallyposteriorto

phenomenalconcepts(ortheotherconceptswecurrentlyTypicallyAssociate

withthem).ButIdonothaveamoredecisiveargumenthere,andaccordingly

(inlightofthemoreprincipledreasonsIamabouttogiveagainstaPerceptual

orTheoreticalroute)Isuspectthatafutureintrospectiveinnovationmaybe

thematerialistAPrioriProtophenomenalist’sbesthope.However,inthenext

43Wecanintrospectaspectsofexperience–theintensityofthepain,thesaturationofthevisualfield.Butthisisfarfromwhatwearelookingfor.Youdonotforgenewdeterminateconceptsofexperiencebycombiningdifferentdeterminableconceptsofexperience.Andyoucertainlydonotformapositiveconceptionofnon‐experiencebycombiningdeterminableconceptsofexperience.Schopenauertakeshimselftohaveintrospectiveaccesstowill.Butitispreciselyforthisreasonthatitisobscurehowanynon‐consciousthingmighthavewill.Rather,itishardtoavoidinterpretingSchopenhauerasakindofpanpsychist,holdingthateverythinghaswillandthereforeisminimallyconscious.

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sectionIwillarguethatsuchintrospectivelyderivedexoticconceptsentailing

phenomenalconceptswouldnotthreatenthethesisthat‘Phenomenally

Conscious’isnon‐excludable.44

Iturnnowtothecentralargumentofthissection.Ifonethinksthereis

aperceptualroutetoexoticconceptsthatentailphenomenalconcepts,then

onemustrejectNon‐DeflationaryMaterialismaboutConceptApplication

(‘ConceptMaterialism’forshort).ItakeNon‐DeflationaryMaterialismabout

ConceptApplicationtobetheview,forsomeconcept‘C’,thatthereisa

substantive(non‐deflationary)account,intermsofmaterialpropertiesand

relations(forexamplespatiotemporalrelations,causalrelations,functional

relations,informationtheoreticrelations,evolutionary‐teleologicalrelations)

44Myremarksontheproblemswithintrospectiveaccesstoexoticconceptsparallelhisremarksonintrospectiveaccesstoa(conceptofa)propertythatexplainsthepsychophysicalnexus.Myremarksontheproblemswithperceptualaccessaredistinctfromhis.Whereheremarkssimplythatwehavenosuchcapacity(becauseallofourperceptualcapacitiesareofessentiallyspatialphenomena),IamarguinginprinciplethatnosentientcreaturecouldhavesuchacapacityifNaturalismaboutConceptApplicationiscorrect.APrioriProtophenomenalismiscompatiblewithMcGinn’sclaimthatthepropertyPwhosegraspwillexplainthepsychophysicalnexus,isungraspablebyus.McGinnspeaksofopaquelogicalsupervenience,andAPrioriProtophenomenalismisapreconditionforwhatheseemstohaveinmind.OtherwiseifPissomematerialpropertywepresumablydoalreadyhaveagrasponitbymeansofsomematerialconceptfromtherelevantscience.Whatweneedisthekindofgrasponitthatlaysbareitsconnectiontophenomenologyandalsotootherthings.Thatis,weneedanexoticconceptthatentailsbothphenomenalandmaterialconcepts.Inawaythen,myownviewisatoddswithMcGinn’s,sinceMcGinninfactreliesonthetruthofanAPrioriProtophenomenalism,sincehethinksthereissomepropertyPoutthereadequategraspofwhichwouldexplainthepsychophysicalnexus,althoughwehappentobecognitivelyclosedtoit.Accordingly,hisargumentsthatwearecognitivelyclosedtoAPrioriProtophenomenalismdonotallcarryovertoargumentsthatAPrioriProtophenomenalismisfalse.E.g.,hisargumentthatifwehadaccesstotherelevantconceptsthenwewouldknowwhatitisliketobeabat(butwecannotknowwhatitisliketobeabat).Thisisagoodargument,butonlywhen‘we’issuitablyrestricted.Ofcoursesomesentientbeingscouldknowwhatitisliketobeabat(imaginearaceofrationalbeingsevolvedfrombats).

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ofwhatitisinvirtueofwhichtheconcept‘C’appliestoCs.Forexample,a

ConceptMaterialistaccountoftheconcept‘Red’mightsaythat‘Red’appliesto

redthingsinvirtueofthosethings’havingbeenthenormalcauseinoptimal

conditionsofthesortofexperiencesfromwhichtheconcept‘Red’isacquired.

Incontrast,itisnotConceptMaterialismifyousaythatthefullstoryisthat,

e.g.,‘C’appliestoCsbecauseCsareintheextensionof‘C’,orthat‘C’appliesto

objectcinvirtueofthefactthatcisaC.Ifyouholdthatthisisallthereisto

sayaboutthegroundsofapplicationofaconceptC,thenyoudenythatthereis

asubstantiveexplanationofwhatitisinvirtueofwhich‘C’appliestoCs.A

variantofthisapproachistosaythatthereisnothinginvirtueofwhich‘C’

appliestoCs.TosayanyofthesethingsistoembraceDeflationism,and

thereforetorejectConceptMaterialism.

ThesortofDeflationismatissuehereisnotsimplytheviewthattruth

isnotafundamentaluniversal(asevenmanyMetaphysicianswillagree),nor

simplytheviewthatthegroundsofapplicationfordifferentconceptshave

littleornothingmetaphysicallyfundamentalincommon(asevenmanyUse

Theoristswillagree),butratherthemoreradicalviewthatconceptshaveno

groundsofapplicationinanynon‐disquotationalsenseatall.Thereisanon‐

factualistreadingofthisclaim(“therearenofactsofconceptsapplication”)

andthereisaprimitivistreading(“theapplicationrelationisprimitiveandso

itisabrutefactthat‘C’appliestoCs”)buttheradicaldeflationisthopesfor

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somemiddlegroundbetweentheseextremes.Iamnotsurethatthereissuch

aground.45

AnotherwaytorejectConceptMaterialismistoembracesomesortof

PrimitivismorNon‐Materialism–holdthattheconcept‘C’appliestoCsin

virtueofsomesortofprimitiveornon‐materialstatesofaffairs.Forexample,

onemightsaythat‘Red’appliestoredthingsbecausetheconcept‘Red’reveals

thenatureofmanifestredness,andredthingsarethingsthatreallyare

manifestred(Johnston1992).

SomecareisrequiredsinceMaterialistsmayusethelanguageof

revelation,manifestcolor,andsoon(ByrneandHilbert2006).The

differentiatingfeatureiswhetheronetakessuchlanguagetoarticulatethe

finalstoryofwhatitisinvirtueofwhichaconceptapplies,orratherwhether

thefactsaboutwhatconceptsrevealaregroundedinfurtherfactsabout

causalrelations,informationtrackingrelations,etc.

HavingintroducedConceptMaterialism,Iturnnowtothecentral

argument.IfConceptMaterialismistrue,thenifsomeperceptuallyderived

conceptappliestox,thisisgroundedinsomesubstantivematerialrelation

(forexampleacausalorfunctionalrelation)betweenxandperceiversofx.

Butifoneconceptentailsanotherthenwemaygenerallyexpectthegrounds

45Horwich1998a,1998b,Field1994a,1994b,Boghossian1990.

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ofonetoalsobeamongthegroundsoftheother–oratleastthatthegrounds

oftheonewouldmetaphysicallyentailthegroundsoftheother.Thismeans

thatifsomeexoticconceptthatentailsaphenomenalconceptisperceptually

derived,andConceptMaterialismistrue,thenthephenomenalconceptin

questionwillapplytoxinvirtueofsomesubstantivematerialrelation

betweenxandperceiversofx.

VersionsofsuchaviewmaybeattributabletoHegel,tothelater

Wittgenstein,andperhapstoSellarsandBrandomandDavidson.46Butthe

claimisdeeplyimplausible,andpotentiallycircular.Sayforconcretenessthat

thephenomenalconceptinquestionis‘FeelingPain’.Thentheimplication

wouldbethatthefactthattheconcept‘FeelingPain’appliestoxessentially

involvessomesubstantivematerialrelationbetweenxandperceiversofx.

Thisisnotquitetosaythatx’sfeelingpainisactuallygroundedinsome

substantivematerialrelationbetweenxandotherexperiencers–x’sfeeling

painmaybeidenticaltosomeintrinsicstateofx’sbrain–buttheclaimis

almostasproblematic.ConceptMaterialismdoesnotimplythatthefactthat

someobjectisredisgroundedinthatobject’smaterialrelationstoperceivers

(Redmightbeasurfacereflectancyproperty).Butitdoesimplythatthefact

thatourconcept‘Red’appliestoanobjectissogrounded.Anditistheredness

46Hegel1977,WIttgenstein1953,Sellars1997,Brandom1994,Davidson1991.ThankstoMarkOkrentfordiscussion.

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ofred–thefactthatredisthepropertydesignatedbythemodeof

presentationgivenbyconcept‘Red’;thefactthatredhasamanifestnature,or

anywayamanifestaspect‐thatmakesuswanttostudythepropertyinthe

firstplace.Redwouldlikelyholdlittleinterestforusifitwerenotthe

propertydesignatedbyourperceptualconcept‘Red’.Thisisnoobjectionto

ConceptMaterialism.IfoneissympathetictoPhysicalismaboutColor,one

mayreasonablyholdthatredisacategoricalpropertyoutthereintheworld47

eventhoughthereasonitseemsspecialtousisafunctionofthesortof

consciousexperienceswehaveinitspresence.DispositionalistsaboutColor

saythatcolorsarerelationstoourminds.ConceptMaterialistsneednotsay

this,buttheypreservetheDispositionalistideathattheapplicabilityofcolor

conceptsisafunctionofthewaythoseconcepts,andcolors,relatetoour

minds.

Butweoughtnotsaythesamethingaboutconsciousexperiences

themselves:itissurelysomethingintrinsictomyconsciousexperiencethat

makesitseemdistinctiveandworthyofstudytome,notsimplythefactthat

otherpeoplehaveconsciousexperiencesinthepresenceofmyconscious

experiences.Thefactthatsomestatesofmecountasconsciousstatesisnota

functionofsomematerialrelationbetweenmeandotherpeople’sconscious

47Relativetoourpurposes,anyway.ASurfacereflectancypropertyisadispositiontoreflectorabsorbphotons.Butitisnotadispositiontocausecertainmentalstates(thoughitmaygroundsuchadisposition).

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states.Thisisimplausibleonitsface.PaceHegel,therecognitionoftheOther

isnotapreconditionoftheapplicabilityoftheconcept‘Phenomenally

Conscious’.EvenHegelhimselfmaynothaveheldthisview–heheldthata

sophisticatedconceptionofselfconsciousnessonlyappliesincaseofsuitable

recognitionfromtheOther,butitisnotobviousthatheheldthisviewalso

aboutbasicphenomenalconsciousness.

Theviewmayinfactbecircular;whetherthisissodependsonhow

manyphenomenalconceptsareentailedbyperceptualconcepts.Ifexotic

conceptsonlyentailafewphenomenalconcepts(e.g.theyentail‘FeelingPain’

butnot‘SeeingRed’)thenthereisprobablynocircularity,unlesstherelation

groundingtheapplicationoftherelevantexoticconceptisonewhereitapplies

tomeinvirtueofmybeinginastatethatcausesyoutofeelpain.Butifthere

areperceptuallyderivedexoticconceptstoentailanyphenomenalconcept

whatsoever,andtheapplicabilityofeachoftheseexoticconceptsisgrounded

insomerelationtoperceivers’consciousstates,thencircularitylooms.48

ThisargumentonlypresentsaproblemforConceptMaterialism.

Consideragaintheviewthatsomeintentionalrelationsarerevelatory:that

48Italsodependsonwhethertheconceptappliesinvirtueoftheconsciousstatesofperceiversorinvirtueofsomeotherfactaboutperceivers.Especiallywhentheconceptsinquestionareperceptual,itisplausiblethattheconsciousstatesoftheperceiversarewhatmatter,butthisisnotinevitable.Wemayinsteadholdthecriticalfactorstobethesub‐personalprocessingstates.Thiswouldallowustoavoidthecircularityworry,thoughnotthegeneralimplausibilityworry.ItisimplausiblethatwhetherIcountasconsciouscouldbeafunctionofhowIinteractwithyoursubpersonalprocessingstates.

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perceptualexperiences,andtheconceptsderivedfromthoseexperiences,

revealthenaturesofthepropertiestheydescribe.Onsuchaviewthereis

roomtosaythatanexoticconceptofthephenomenalrevealsthenatureofthe

phenomenal–thegroundsoftheconcept’sapplicationtosomepropertyPare

simplythatPisthepropertywhosenaturetheconceptreveals.Concept

Materialistsarewelcometothislanguage,ofcourse,buttheymustsayinturn

thatsuchrevelationisgroundedintheusualsortofmaterialrelation,andthen

wearebackintrouble.Anon‐naturalistmaysaythatsomeexoticconceptof

thephenomenalappliestothethingsitdoesbecauseandonlybecausethose

arethethingswhosenatureitreveals,andthisiswhatallowsthenon‐

naturalisttocountenanceAPrioriProtophenomenalism.

Itisimportanttodistinguishconceptapplicationfrompredicate

application.Termsinanaturallanguageonlyapplytothingsbecausethey

meanwhattheydo.Andtheyonlymeanwhattheydobecauseofthe

intentionsoftheirusers,therelationsbetweenmembersofthelinguistic

community,etc.Insomesense,then,apredicateonlyeverappliesto

somethinginvirtueofsomerelationbetweenthethingtowhichthepredicate

appliesandtheuserofthepredicate(orthatuser’slinguisticcommunity).But

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hereIamtalkingaboutconceptapplicability–whatitisinvirtueofwhichthe

meaningexpressedbythepredicatecharacterizesthethingthatitdoes.49

WhyistheargumentrestrictedtoConceptMaterialismabout

PerceptuallyDerivedconcepts?Itdoesnotapplytointrospectivelyderived

conceptsbecauseitisperhapsplausiblethatsomeintrospectivephenomenal

conceptsonlyapplytothepropertiestheydoinvirtueofsomematerial

relationbetweenthosepropertiesandtheexperiencerswhoinstantiatethose

properties.Theimplausibilityonlyariseswhentherelationisbetweenthat

property(oritsbearers)anddistinctconceptusers.Also,ConceptMaterialists

maycountenanceabstractobjects(oranywaytaketheretobeconceptsfor

thoseobjects)buttheymaydenythatourconceptsofnumber,orourconcepts

oflogicalstructure,aregroundedinsubstantivematerialrelationsbetween

bearersoftheconceptandusersoftheconcept.Iwillarguenowthatthe

argumentwillextendaboutasfarasEmpiricismdoes–ConceptMaterialism

aboutanynon‐theoreticalEmpiricalconceptimpliesthatthatconceptapplies

whereitdoesinvirtueofsomesubstantivematerialrelationbetweenthe

49Someonemightdefendammoretenableandmoderatedeflationismaboutconceptapplicationbyholdingthatwhatcallsformetasemanticanalysisisnotthegroundsoftheapplicationofsomeconcept,butratherthegroundsofthetruthofajudgmentortheveridicalityofaperceptualexperience.Onethenaddsthatthetruthofjudgments(atleastofjudgmentsexpressedinnaturallanguage)alwayshingesonrelationalorcommunalelements,becauselanguagedoes.OneconcludesthattherelationalityoftherelevantfactscannothavetheimplausibleconsequencesIsay.Irespondthatthereisstillawaytotheimplausibleconsequences,evenifwetaketheactiontobewithjudgmentsandperceptualexperiencesratherthanwithconcepts.Wedistinguishbetweencaseswheretherelationalelementsexhaustthemetasemanticexplanationandcaseswheretheymerelyenableit.

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instancesoftheconcept(orthepropertiesofthoseinstances)andusersofthe

concept.Theexactextentoftheargumentisunclearsinceitisunclearwhere

Empiricismistheappropriateresponse.Areourspatiotemporalandcausal

conceptsultimatelyempiricalinoriginordotheystemfromsomespecialnon‐

relationalfacultyofrationalintuition?

Iwillnowdefendtheclaimthatwhatgoesforperceptuallyderived

conceptsprobablygoesforallnon‐theoreticalempiricalconcepts.The

groundsofapplicationofperceptuallyderivedconceptstendtoinvolvetype

relationsbetweenexperiencesandtheircausalorteleologicalobjects,butin

othercasesthematerialrelationmaybeone‐off.Somehaveallegedthat

names,forexample,acquiretheirmeaningsindubbingceremonies–whichis

onesortofcausalrelationbetweentheinstanceoftheconceptandconcept

users–butthenothersareonlyinapositiontocorrectlyapplytheconceptto

anindividualinvirtueoftherightsortoftransmissionrelations–adifferent

sortofcausalrelation.50‘Water’neednotcauseafixedsortofexperiencein

mostpeoplewhoemploytheconcept,but‘Watery’does,andwaterhadtobe

wateryatleastinsomeprivilegedclassofcases.Evenbeforewemovetoa

discussionofmoreabstractconcepts,thereisapuzzleoverconceptslike

‘Square’.Unlikewith‘Red’or‘Water’,itishardtodigesttheideathatwhat

50Ofcoursemanyinthecausalreferencetraditionarguethattherearenoconceptsfornames,butrathernamesdirectlydenote,sonamesmaynotbeanidealexample.Inanycase,termsderivedinthisway,forwhichtherearenoconcepts,wouldipsofactonotstandforexoticconcepts.

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makesthepropertyofsquarenessworthyofourattentionisthatthe‘square’

modeofpresentationappliestoit.Revelatorythinkingcomesmuchmore

naturallywhenitcomestoshapethantocolor.Oranywayweseemtohave

twocomplementaryconceptionsofshape–bothamoredirectperceptual

graspandalsoamoreabstractmathematicalgrasp.Thereisapuzzleoverthe

relationofthetwo.Thisraisesthequestion:doweembraceRationalism,

ratherthanEmpiricism,regardingtheoriginofourconceptsofshape?If

Rationalismthenthereisperhapsroomforthematerialisttoresisttheidea

thatourshapeconceptsonlyapplyinvirtueofsomesubstantivematerial

relationbetweenshapedthingsandusersofshapeconcepts.Butifwe

embraceEmpiricismthenourconceptsofshapepresumablyarederivedfrom

perceptualexperience.51

SoItakeitthattheargumentextendstoconceptslike‘Water’and

‘Square’insofarasthoseconceptsareEmpirical.Idonotthinkitisobvious

thatRationalismgetsanyoneoffthehook–thisdependsonwhatRational

Intuitionis,andwhatgroundstheapplicationoftheconceptsitdelivers.If

RationalIntuitionresemblesaspecialsortofperceptualexperience,thenthe

materialiststoryabouttheapplicationofrationalconceptsmaywellinvolvea

51Oneobviousdifferenceisthatourexperienceofshapeiscrossmodal,whileourexperienceofcolorisnot.TheEmpiricistcanarguethattheapparentdifferencebetweenourperceptualandmathematicalconceptionsofspaceisactuallyadifferencebetweenuni‐modalandmultimodalconceptionsofspace.

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substantivematerialrelationbetweentheconcept’sinstancesanditsusers.

Butitisunclearhowexoticconceptsentailingphenomenalconceptsmightbe

innateordeliveredbyrationalintuition.Sothereisaproblemhereforany

claimthattherearerationallyderivedexoticconceptsthatentailphenomenal

concepts,andtheremayalsobeaspecialproblemforConceptMaterialist

Rationalists,hingingonwhattheycantellusaboutthegroundsofapplication

ofrationallyderivedconcepts.

Iturnnowtoaconsiderationoftheoreticalconcepts,conceptslike

‘Electron’or‘H2O’.Thesedeservespecialtreatmentbecauseitisnotclearthat

theyfallunderthescopeofmyargumentregardingperceptuallyderived

concepts.Ratherthantryingtoshowthattheydo,myaimherewillbetoargue

directlythatsuchconceptscannotbeexoticconceptsthatentailphenomenal

concepts.Noteveryoneagrees.Chalmerssuggeststhatwemightcometo

possessnewconceptsentailingphenomenalconceptsvia“somesortof

theoreticalinferencefromthecharacterofphenomenalpropertiestotheir

underlyingconstituents”,whichhethenglossesas“…somesortofinferenceto

thebestexplanationof(introspected)phenomenology,subjecttothe

additionalconstraintsof(perceived)physicalstructure.”(Chalmers2002c)52

52Chalmersisnottalkingaboutexoticconceptsinmysensehere,butratheraboutconceptsofwhatStoljarcallso‐physicalproperties–thesortofpropertythatarussellianmonistthinksservesastheintrinsicnatureorcategoricalbasisofthestructural‐dynamicpropertiesthatphysicalsciencestudies.AsInotedearlier,RussellianMonismmaybetrueevenifouronly

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Suchatheoreticalconceptmightbebasedonlyonintrospective

phenomenalconcepts,inwhichcaseitsapplicationmaynotcomeunderthe

scrutinyofmyConceptMaterialismargumentabove.Butthensuchaconcept

isposteriortothosephenomenalconcepts(ortheotherrelatedconceptsIam

calling"conceptstypicallyassociatedwithphenomenalconcepts”),and

thereforeisnotexoticinmysense.MoregenerallyItakeittobequite

plausiblethatanytheoreticalconceptthatentailsphenomenalconceptsdoes

soonlybecauseitisconceptuallyposteriortophenomenalconceptsor

conceptstypicallyrelatedtophenomenalconcepts.

Weneednotunderstandtheoreticalconceptsonanold‐fashioned

definitionalmodeltocountenancetheideathattheoreticaltermsare

dependentinmeaningonthemeaningsoftheirvariousobservationterms,

evenifonlyinindirectways.Thus‘Electron’isdependentinmeaningon

‘Electricity’,‘Photon’isdependentinmeaningon‘Light’,and‘H2O’is

dependentinmeaningon‘Hydrogen’and‘Oxygen’.Onewaytotrytoavoidthe

implicationwouldbetoconstruethetheoreticalinformationasonlypre‐

conceptually,orevensub‐personally,involvedinusers’graspingsuch

concepts.Burgeforexampleseemstoholdthatmanyofourconceptsinvolve

sub‐personalprocessingofinformationinourmentalfiles(Burge2010).

conceptsofo‐propertiesarenon‐exotic(becausederivedfromphenomenalconcepts).However,Chalmershasindicatedinconversationthathedoeshopethatthetheoreticalapproachmightyieldgenuinelyexoticconceptionsoftheo‐physicalproperties.

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Peacockespeaksofourgraspingaconceptasbasedinourgraspofthat

concept’sfundamentalreferencerule,butwherethisrulemaybecouchedin

termsofpre‐conceptualnotionsratherthanfull‐fledgedconcepts(Peacocke

2008).Buttotheextentthatthepre‐conceptualnotions,orthesub‐personally

processedinformation,havecorrespondingconceptsthatarenotidenticalto

theconceptwhosegraspisinquestion,theconceptwhosegraspisinquestion

wouldbeposteriortothoseotherconcepts.53

Soasconcernstheoreticalconcepts,Itakeittobestraightforward

enoughthatsuchconcepts,iftheyweretoentailphenomenalconcepts,would

dosoonlyinvirtueofbeingconceptuallyposteriortophenomenalconcepts,

orbybeingconceptuallyposteriortosomeotherconceptsthatentailed

phenomenalconcepts,inwhichcaseweshouldbetalkingaboutthem,rather

thanthetheoreticalconceptswederivefromthem.Theoreticalconceptsdo

notgiveAPrioriProtophenomenalismanyfoothold.54

53ThisdiscussionagaincompareswithsomeremarksinMcGinn1989(pp.358‐359).McGinnisconsideringwhetherornotwemightcomeupwithanadequateconceptionasatheoreticalinferencefromperceptualdataaboutthebrain(bywhichhemeansdatathatcreatureslikeusareactuallyinapositiontoperceptuallyacquire).Hesays,“Acertainprincipleofhomogeneityoperatesinourintroductionoftheoreticalconceptsonthebasisofobservation”andhequotesNagel(Panpsychismp.183)assaying“itwillneverbelegitimatetoinfer,asatheoreticalexplanationofphysicalphenomenaalone,apropertythatincludesorimpliestheconsciousnessofitssubject.”ThethoughtexpressedbyMcGinnandNagelhereisquiteplausible.ButitdoesnotaddressthesortofsuggestionChalmersmakes,thatwemightarriveataconceptionofsomesuchpropertyasatheoreticalinferencefromacombinationofphysicalandpsychicaldata.54InthenextsectionIwillarguethatifAPrioriProtophenomenalismisfalsethen‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnonexcludable.InChapter1Iarguethatifaconceptisnon‐

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Thisconcludestheargumentofthissection.Wewillnotderiveexotic

conceptsthatentailphenomenalconceptsfromintrospection,sincethe

conceptswederivefromintrospectionaretooclosetophenomenalconcepts.

Norwillwederiveexoticconceptsthatentailphenomenalconceptsfrom

theoreticalinference,becauseanytheoreticalconceptsthatentailed

phenomenalconceptswouldbeconceptuallyposteriortophenomenal

conceptsorconceptstypicallyassociatedwithphenomenalconcepts.Finally,if

ConceptMaterialismistruethenwecannotderivesuchconceptsfrom

perception.Thisisapointofprincipleratherthanofcontingentpsychology–

itisnotmerelytheclaimthatwecannothaveperceptualexperiencesof

consciousnessbecauseourperceptionislimitedtopropertiesunderspatial

modesofpresentation(cf.McGinn);itistheclaimthatnosuchperceptionis

possibleforanycreaturewhatsoever.Iarguethatthispointofprinciple

extendstoallnon‐theoreticalEmpiricalconcepts.Thisleavesopenthe

possibilityofsomenon‐empirical,non‐introspectivebasisforsuchaconcept

thatevenaConceptMaterialistcouldaccept.Butthesortsofconceptsthat

rationalistsusuallydiscussinthesecontexts–conceptslikespace,timeand

excludablethenitisnotvague.ButIfAPrioriProtophenomenalismcanbefalseeventhoughtherecanbeconceptslike‘PropertythatGroundsBothsomeformsofConsciousnessandsomeformsofNon‐consciousness’,thenhowcanthisresultfollow?Whycannotsuchaconceptspecifyaborderlinecaseof‘PhenomenallyConscious’?Theansweristhat,preciselybecausesuchaconceptisconceptuallyposteriortophenomenalconcepts,iteitherleavesitepistemicallyopenwhetheritsinstancesareconsciousornot(asintheconceptIjustexpressed),oritexplicitlyadjudicatesonthematter(aswith“PropertythatGroundsNon‐consciousness,butisRelatedtoPropertiesthatGroundConsciousness”).

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causation–areconceptuallydivorcedfromphenomenalconcepts.Sointhe

absenceofanactualexample,oraprincipledreasontothinktherewillbeone,

theonusseemstobeontheRationalisttoshowthatanysuchconceptmight

entailphenomenalconcepts.Iemphasizeagainthattheargumentregarding

perceptualandempiricalconceptsisonlyanargumentagainstConcept

MaterialistversionsofAPrioriProtophenomenalism.Myargumentdoesnot

applytothosewhoholdthatperceptionisfundamentallyamatterof

Revelation.Onthatview,itisanopenquestionwhethercreatureswithmore

refinedperceptualcapacitiesthanourownmightbeabletoseethehidden

commonalitybetweenmindandmatter.55Inowconcludethischapterwithan

argumentthatifAPrioriProtophenomenalismisfalsethen‘Phenomenally

Conscious’isnon‐excludableandperhapsalsophenomenalconceptsare

canonicallyinscrutableandcanonicallyprimitive.

55Idonotthinkitisobviousonewayortheotherwheretheonusthenlies.Whereverthereisaconceptualgap,thereisaquestionofitsfullextent.Assumingthereisagapbetweenphenomenalconceptsandmaterialconcepts,whatotherconceptsareagapawayfromphenomenalconcepts?Untilwehaveananswertothisquestionwecannotruleoutthatitisamatterofprinciplethattheonlyconceptsthatarenotagapawayfromphenomenalconceptsareeitherphenomenalconcepts,orconceptsthatstandnochanceofdisplayinganyrealcommonalitybetweenmentalandnon‐mentalreality.Thismightbethecase,forexample,ifthecriterionfornon‐gappinessrelativetophenomenalconceptswasthataconceptdisplaysomethingaboutfirstpersonalpointofview(cfNagel1974)orthataconceptexhibitthetokeningstructuredistinctiveofphenomenalconcepts,wherebytokeningtheconceptinordinarycircumstancesmeanstokeningthepropertythattheconceptdenotes(cfBlock2006,Chalmers2006,Levine2006,Loar1990,Papineau2002,Stoljar2005).

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§3.3: IF A PRIORI PROTOPHENOMENALISM IS FALSE, THE GENERALIZED NOTIONS OF CONCEPTUAL GAP APPLY TO PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS

Hereagainareourthreegeneralizednotionsofconceptualgap,

introducedinchaptertwo:

(PHENOMENALCANONICALINSCRUTABILITY):Nocanonicalphenomenal

conceptisentailedbyanyotherconceptofanyothersort,exceptconcepts

conceptuallyposteriortocanonicalphenomenalconcepts.

(PHENOMENALCANONICALPRIMITIVITY):Nocanonicalphenomenal

conceptisconceptuallyposteriortoanyconceptofanyothersort.

(NON‐EXCLUDABILITY):Aconcept‘C’isnonexcludableifftheonlyconcepts

thatexclude‘C’excludeitnegatively.

Acanonicalphenomenalconceptisapositiveconceptofamoreorless

specificphenomenalstate,like‘ExperiencingRed’or‘FeelingPain.’APriori

Protophenomenalismistheclaimthatthereexistexoticconcepts(concepts

thatarenotmaterialconceptsorposteriortoanyofthem,notphenomenal

conceptsorposteriortoanyofthem,andnottypicallyassociatedwith

phenomenalconceptsorposteriortoanythatare)withnon‐emptyextensions,

bywhichsomephenomenalconceptsareentailed.

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Iamassumingthatfewornophenomenalconceptsareentailedbyany

materialconcepts.Iassumethisalsomeansphenomenalconceptsarenot

entailedbyconceptsposteriortomaterialconcepts.Butnon‐excludability

requiresthatsomeconceptsthatareneitherphenomenalconceptsnor

posteriortophenomenalconceptsneverthelessentailphenomenalconcepts.If

APrioriProtophenomenalismisfalse,theonlyconceptsthatcouldfitthis

descriptionwouldbeconceptstypicallyassociatedwithphenomenalconcepts.

Thequestioniswhetheranyoftheseconceptsincludeanypositiveexcluders

of‘PhenomenallyConscious’.ThePhenomenalCanonicalPrimitivitythesis

claimsthatnoconceptsotherthancanonicalphenomenalconceptsareprior

tocanonicalphenomenalconcepts.Giventhematerial‐phenomenalconceptual

gap(andassumingthatsystematiclackofentailmentmeanslackofconceptual

priority),nomaterialconceptispriortoanyphenomenalconcept.Itfollows

thatifAPrioriProtophenomenalismisfalsethentheonlypotential

counterexamplesarenon‐canonicalphenomenalconcepts,andconcepts

typicallyassociatedwithphenomenalconcepts.ThePhenomenalCanonical

Inscrutabilitythesisclaimsthattheonlyconceptsthatentailcanonical

phenomenalconceptsarecanonicalphenomenalconcepts,orconcepts

posteriortothem.Underourcurrentassumptions,theonlycandidate

counterexamplesarenon‐canonicalphenomenalconcepts,andconcepts

typicallyassociatedwithphenomenalconcepts.Iturnnowtoadiscussionof

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whythatgroupofconceptsdoesnotincludeanypositiveexcludersof

‘PhenomenallyConscious’andwhyitmaynotincludeanyconceptspriorto

canonicalphenomenalconcepts.56

Thereisdisputeoverwhetherconceptsofthenormativeandthe

intentionalentailanyphenomenalconcepts.Mustconsciousbeingsbeableto

think?Musttheybeabletoperceive?Mustwhathappenstothemmatter

morally?Musttheybeabletoactandberesponsiblefortheiractions?Ifso

then‘NotPhenomenallyConscious’maybeentailedbyconceptslike‘Not

CapableofIntentionalStates’or‘NotaMoralPatient’or‘NotaMoralAgent’.

Butthesearenegativecharacterizations,andsowillnotbecounterexamples

toourthirdprinciple,whichstatesthat‘NotPhenomenallyConscious’isonly

entailedbynegativecharacterizationslikethese.

Regardingourfirsttwoprinciplesthematterislessclear.Forexample,

ifyouacceptthedoctrineofIntentionalism,andtakeittobeanaprioritruth,

youmightthinkthataconceptionlike‘SensorilyAwareofRed’ispriortoand

entails‘ExperiencingRed’.Butthisisacontroversialclaim:itseemscoherent

tothinkofaverysimpleconsciousbeingthatexperiencescolorwithout

56Itiscompatiblewithmyargumentintheprevioussectionthatthereareexoticconceptsthatentailphenomenalconceptsbutthatdonotapplytoanything.Butsuchaneventualitywouldnotbeinteresting,inthesensethatsuchconceptswouldnothelpusunderstandmuchaboutconsciousnessasitismanifestedintheactualworld.InchapteroneIarguethatifaconceptisnon‐excludablethenitisnon‐vague.Thisthesisgeneralizesslightly:aconceptthatisonlyexcludablebyconceptsthathaveemptyextensionsatsomeworld,cannothaveanyvagueinstancesatthatworld.

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thinking.Adverbialiststakeallexperiencestobestructurallyakintotickles

anditches–meresensationsthatinvolvenofundamentalintentionalrelation.

YoumightalsoacceptAPrioriIntentionalism,butholdthattherelevant

intentionalconceptsareposteriortophenomenalconcepts,orequivalentto

phenomenalconcepts.Regardingmoralconceptsitseemsunlikelythatthere

areanythatarepriortocanonicalphenomenalconcepts.Thosethatentail

phenomenalconceptsseemtodosoataveryabstractlevel,forexample

entailingthatsomeoneisconscioussomehoworother.57Andifyouthink

therecanbesimplebeingswhoonlyexperiencecolorthenyoumightthink

thatthingscanbeconsciouswithoutmatteringmorally.58

‘Intensity’and‘Attention’donotseemtobecounterexamplestoanyof

ourthreetheses.Tobesure,thereisanotionofintensity–phenomenal

intensity–thatseemstobeaprerequisiteforphenomenalexperience.

Plausibly,everyexperiencehassomeamountofphenomenalintensityor

other–thereisnosuchthingasanexperiencethathasabsolutelynointensity

withrespecttoanyparameter(likebrightness,loudness,sharpness)atall.But

57Somearguethat‘Pain’isitselfamoralconcept(Hewitt2006).ButthisisnocounterexampletothePrimitivitythesis.CanonicalPhenomenalConceptsmayalsoadmitofotherclassifications–thethesisclaimsthatnootherconceptsthatarenotcanonicalphenomenalconceptsarepriortoconceptsthatare.58Though‘NotBeingAMoralPatient’mayentail‘NotExperiencingPain’evenifitdoesnotentail‘NotPhenomenallyConscious’.Buteventhisisnotobvious:thoughsometheoriespositthatpleasureisGoodandpainisBad,othertheoriesdenythis.Yetothersacceptitbutdenythatitisapriori–youshouldfindthisplausibleifyoutakeevaluativeconceptstobeautonomous.

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noconceptherewillentailanyspecificcanonicalphenomenalconcept,though

somewillentailthenegationsofsuchconcepts,andcertainlynocanonical

phenomenalconceptwillbeposteriortosuchconcepts.Thistakescareofour

firsttwoprinciples.AsforNon‐excludability,‘NoPhenomenalIntensity’

excludes‘PhenomenallyConscious’,butitonlyexcludesitnegatively.What

about‘Attention’?Perhapseveryexperiencemustbeattendedtotosome

degreeorother,andnoexperiencemaybecompletelyinattentional.Thisisfar

fromobvious,butinanyeventtheconcept‘NotAttendedtoAnydegreeatall’

isposteriortotheconcept‘AttendedtoSomeDegree’,andnoconceptof

attentionaloneislikelytotelluswhethersomeparticularcanonical

phenomenalconceptapplies,orbepriortosuchaconcept.

Termslike‘Semi‐conscious’,‘marginallyconscious’and‘subconscious’

areambiguousbetweenoperationalandphenomenalreadings.Ontheir

operationalreadings,‘semi‐conscious’and‘marginallyconscious’indicate

statesdisplayingsomebutnotallofthebehaviorusuallyassociatedwith

phenomenalconsciousawareness,and‘subconscious’denotesastatethathas

someeffectonthesubject’sbehaviorandfunctionwithoutthesubjectbeing

occurrentlyawareofit.Thesetermsmayalsobeusedtoexpressmoreclearly

phenomenalnotions:‘semi‐conscious’and‘marginallyconscious’mightthen

meaneitherastateofverylowintensityexperience,orastateofoscillation

betweenexperiencingandnotexperiencing,and‘subconscious’mightdenote

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astatewhich,thoughitmakesnodirectcontributiontothesubject’s

experience,neverthelessindirectly(perhapscausally)influencesthecourseof

thatexperience.Inanycase,ifnotionssuchastheseentail‘NotPhenomenally

Conscious’,itseemsfairlyclearthattheywilldosoonlythroughbeing

posteriorto‘PhenomenallyConscious’.Anditisequallyclearthatsuchnotions

willnotbeconceptuallypriorto,orentail,anycanonicalphenomenal

concepts.

Finallywehavecognatesof‘PhenomenallyConscious’itself:‘BeingA

SubjectofExperience’or‘BeingSuchthatthereisSomethingitisLiketobe

You’.Thatthenegationsofsuchconceptsonlynegativelyexclude

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isobvious,asitisobviousthatsuchconceptsdonot

entailcanonicalphenomenalconcepts–conceptsofspecificpositive

phenomenalstates.Itisnotcompletelyobvious,however,thattheseconcepts

arenotconceptuallypriortosomecanonicalphenomenalconcepts.Doesour

generalconceptofconsciousnessderivefromconceptsofspecifickindsof

consciousness,oristhegeneralconceptaprerequisiteforanyspecific

conceptualizationofphenomenology?Thisisaninterestingissue,butnothing

reallyturnsonit:thespiritofoursecondthesisisintactiftheonlyconcepts

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priortocanonicalphenomenalconceptsarecognatesof‘Phenomenally

Conscious.’59

Itakethistoestablishthatnoneoftheconceptswetypicallyassociate

withphenomenalconceptsarecounterexamplestothethesisthat

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐excludable,andItakethecasetobefairly

strongthattheyalsoarenotcounterexamplestoourothertwogeneralized

gaptheses(withthepossibleexceptionofsomeIntentionalconcepts).Butto

conclusivelyestablishtheothertwotheses(CanonicalInscrutabilityand

CanonicalPrimitivity)wewouldalsohavetoestablishthatnonon‐canonical

phenomenalconceptsarecounterexamples,andthisisbeyondmyscope.Also,

toestablishCanonicalPrimitivitywewouldhavetosaymoreaboutthe

conceptualpriorityrelation.ForallIhaveofficiallyargued,oneconceptcould

bepriortoanothereventhoughtheyhavenoepistemicconnectiontospeak

of.ButItaketheremarksofthissectiontobeprogresstowardadefenseof

thosetwotheses.

59Imustalsoconsiderherethesortofnegativeabstractconceptsthatexcludesomephenomenalconcepts.Aphenomenaldescriptionwillentailsomefunctionaldescriptions,andperhapsalsobiologicaldescription,economicaldescription,sociologicaldescription,etc.Thenegationofthesefunctional,biological,economicalorsociologicaldescriptionswillentailthenegationsoftherelevantphenomenaldescriptions.ButthissortofcasedoesnotfalsifyanyofourGeneralizedGaptheses.Suchconceptsareobviouslynotconceptuallypriortocanonicalphenomenalconcepts.Thephenomenalconceptstheydoexclude,theyexcludenegatively,andmoreovertheyonlyexcludespecificphenomenalconceptsnegatively;theydonotexclude‘PhenomenallyConscious’.

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Iconcludebyaddressingaloopholeinmyargumentintheprevious

section.Iarguetherethatintrospectioncannotgiveusaccesstoexotic

conceptsthatentailphenomenalconcepts.Butsomeoftheconceptstypically

associatedwithphenomenalconceptsseemtobeintrospectivelyderived(for

example,ourintentionalconcepts,ourconceptsofattentionandintensity,and

perhapsevenournormativeconcepts).Butthiscategoryisparochial.What

aboutconceptsthatwewillonedaytypicallyassociatewithphenomenal

concepts(andthatentailthem)butthatwehavenotnoticedyet–orforthat

matterwhataboutconceptsthatwecurrentlytypicallyassociatewith

phenomenalconceptsbutthatIhaveoverlookedhere?

Ifsuchconceptswereperceptuallyderived(oranywaywereEmpirical)

thenthiswouldbeaproblemfornon‐deflationarynaturalismaboutconcept

application.Butiftheywereintrospectivelyderived,itwouldnotbe.Whosays

thattherearenosuchexoticconceptsouttherewaitingtobenoticed(or

perhapsalreadynoticed,butoverlookedbyme)?

Itakeittobeplausiblethattherearelimitstohowmanynewconcepts

wemayderivefromintrospectionthatwehavenotalreadyencountered.We

canmakesenseofbeingswithdifferentperceptualmachineryfromus,and

thereisaseeminglyinfinitepotentialfornewperceptualconcepts,butthisis

nottrueofintrospectiveconcepts.Butmoreimportantly,evenifthereare

suchexoticconcepts,weshouldexpectthemtonotbecounterexamplestoany

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ofourgeneralizedgaptheses.ThepointImadeinsectiontwo–that

introspectiondoesnotgiveusaccesstocomponentsorbuildingblocksof

consciousness,butonlytoconsciousnessitselfortootherstatesverymuch

likeit–maynotstrictlyimplythatintrospectiongivesusnoaccesstoany

exoticconcepts.Butitillustrateswhywearenotgoingtointrospectaconcept

ofapositiveexcluderofconsciousness.Wecertainlywillnotdirectly

introspectapositiveexcluderofconsciousness,asyouseemtohaveto

consciouslyinstantiateastatetointrospectit,andyoucannotconsciously

instantiateanystatethatexcludesconsciousness.Theonlyhopewouldbeto

introspectdifferentcomponentsofdifferentstatesofconsciousnessthatwhen

assembledtogetherexcludeconsciousness.Butthisiswhatitseemsunlikely

thatintrospectioncandeliver.Introspectivelyderivedconcepts,whetherthey

makemylistofconceptstypicallyassociatedwithphenomenalconceptsor

not,arenotgoingtobethesourceofcounter‐examplestotheclaimthat

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐excludable.Likewise,introspectionis

unlikelytodeliverusconceptsthatarepriortoallcanonicalphenomenal

concepts,andifitdeliversaconceptthatentailssomecanonicalphenomenal

concept,itislikelythatthiswouldbebecausetheentailingconceptwasan

abstractionfrom(andhenceposteriorto)phenomenalconcepts.

Iconcede,inanycase,thatmyargumentagainstintrospectively

derivedexoticcounterexamplestothegeneralizedgaptheses,islesspowerful

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thanmyargumentagainstperceptuallyderivedexoticcounterexamples.The

perceptualargumentturnsonamatterofprinciple–ofwhysuchconcepts

wouldbeincompatiblewithanon‐deflationarymaterialismaboutconcept

application.Theintrospectionargumentturnsonlyonwhatseemstobea

plausibleobservationabouthowintrospectionworks,andwhatitcandeliver,

butitisnotanargumentofprinciplethewaytheperceptionargumentis.

Really,allIofferhereisanargumentofonus:theonusisonthefriendof

introspectivelyderivedexoticcounterexamplestogeneralizedgapprinciples,

tosaywhattheyare.Readersmaywonderhowthisleavesmyargumentin

comparisonwithMcGinn’sargument,whichIhavediscussedinseveral

footnotes,orwithAntony’s,whichIdiscussinchapterone.Antonyisnot

concernedwithundiscoveredconceptsatall,andsodoesnotevendiscuss

primafaciereasonstodoubtthattherewillbeany,betheyderived

introspectivelyorperceptually.McGinndoesmakeaprimafaciecase.WhatI

sayaboutintrospectionisverysimilartowhathesays(thoughmyframework

andmyaimsaredifferent).Myargumentismorepowerfulthanhisprimarily

whenitcomestoconsiderationofperceptuallyderivedconcepts.Heoffers

nothinganalogoustomyargumentofprinciple(andinfactheiscarefultosay

thatthelimitationinconceptualcapacityhediscussesisalimitationfor

creatureslikeusratherthanalimitationonallpossibleconceptualizers).

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CHAPTERFOUR:

THESIGNIFICANCEOFTHEMENTALPROBLEMOFTHEMANY

InthischapterIwillofferanargumentthatthepropertyphenomenal

consciousnessisnotidenticaltoorgroundedinanymaterialproperty–in

otherwords,forPropertyDualism(characterizedinanon‐modalway60).My

argumentisanargumentfromtheMentalProblemoftheManytoProperty

Dualism.TherealreadyareargumentsfromtheMentalProblemoftheMany

toDualism(Unger2006,Zimmerman2011).Buttheseargumentsare

argumentsforSubstanceDualism,andtheypresupposePropertyDualism

(Ungerimplicitly,Zimmermanexplicitly).Thereisanargumentfromthe

MentalProblemoftheManytoPropertyDualism,butitcallsfordifferent

premisesthantheexistingargumentsemploy.Myargumenthingesonthe

premise(whichIhavedefendedinchapterstwoandthree)that

‘PhenomenalllyConscious’isnotvague,andonapremisespecifyingasensein

whichphenomenalconsciousnessissignificant.

60AsIdefineitPropertyDualismiscompatiblewithanecessarysupervenienceclaim(althoughtheexplanatoryroleofsuchaclaimwouldbequestionable).ItakeSubstanceDualismtobecompatiblewith(andprobablytoentail)PropertyDualism.IdonotthinkmyownargumentsestablishSubstanceDualismbuttheycertainlydonotruleitout.ThankstoMikeRavenfordiscussiononthispoint.Also,asIdefineit,RussellianMonismcountsasaformofPropertyDualism.ThoughitmaycountasaversionofPhysicalismontheobject‐conceptionofPhysicalism(cf.Stoljar2001),theviewstillisPropertyDualistinthesensethatitpositsthatthephenomenalproperties(theo‐physicalproperties)areneitheridenticaltonorgroundedinthestructural‐dynamicmaterialproperties(thet‐physicalproperties).Arguablyonthisviewthephenomenalpropertiesgroundthestructural‐dynamicproperties,thoughnotallRussellianMonistsneedthinkso.

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In§1IpresenttheMentalProblemoftheMany,andintroducethe

principlesthatmyargumentwillemploy.In§2Ipresentmyargumentfrom

theMentalProblemoftheManytoPropertyDualism.In§3Iconcludeby

consideringwaysofrejectingmypremises.

§4.1 THE MENTAL PROBLEM OF THE MANY

IfMaterialismistruethenyouandIareeachcomposedofcollectionsof

materialparts.Wehaveorgansaspartsbutalsohairs,fingernails,skincells,

individualproteinmolecules,andsoon.Howevernothingnaturallysingles

outanyexactcollectionofallofthesepartsoveranyother.Whereverthereis

onecollectionofmaterialpartsarrangedperson‐wise,therearemanyother

almostentirelyoverlappingsuchcollections.Assumethat‘Jon’namesoneof

them.Butthensodoes‘Jon#’,whichnamesthecollectionalmostexactlylike

JonexceptlackingoneoftheproteinsfromthepieceoftoastIhadfor

breakfast,andcontainingoneoftheskincellsthatisonthevergeoffallingoff

ofmyfinger.Andsodoes‘Jon*’,whichnamesthecollectionalmostexactlylike

JonexceptthatitcontainsanextraproteinfromthepieceoftoastthatIamon

thevergeofmetabolizing,andlacksadifferentskincell.

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Giventhevastswarmofinterconnectedpartsthatmakeupaperson,

therewillbethousandsorevenmillionsofperson‐wisearrangedcollections

ofmaterialparts,whereverthereisone.61Andnothingdistinguishesanyone

ofthesefromalltheothersenoughforittobereasonabletoholdthatoneof

themisthetruebodyofthepersonwhiletheothersarenot,orthatoneof

themhaswhatittakestobeconsciouswhiletheothersdonot.

TheproblemIwishtodiscussthenarisesbecauseitishighly

implausiblethattherearemanyphenomenallyconsciousbeingswherever

thereisone.Idonotalmostentirelyoverlapahostofdistinctphenomenally

consciousbeings,andneitherdoyou.Theproblemalsoappliesatthelevelof

consciousstates:thoughwemayholdthattherearedisunifiedexperiences

realizedwithinagivensubject,wedonotwanttosaythateachoftheseis

almostentirelyoverlappedbyahostofothersthatalsorealizesanexperience.

ButjustasJonisoverlappedbyJon#andJon*,soanycollectionofneuronsor

neuronaleventNwillbeoverlappedbysimilaronesN#andN*.

Again,theproblemisthatoncewegetspecificenoughtodistinguish

betweenalloftheeversoslightlydifferentcollectionsofmaterialpartsthat

arearrangedperson‐wiseinthevicinityofeveryperson(orcollectionsof

61Ifwebelieveintemporalpartsandspecialrelativitythenthenumbermayinfactbeinfinite,sincetherewillbeinfinitelymanydifferentfoliationsofspacetimeintotime‐likehypersurfaces,andthesewillyieldinfinitelymanydifferentbutoverlappingtemporalpartsofeachperson.

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materialpartsarrangedbrain‐state‐wiseinthevicinityofeverybrainstate),

andweseethatnoneofthemismetaphysicallysingledoutfromtheothersin

anywaythatphysicalsciencecanreveal(thatis,noneissingledoutfromthe

othersintermsofthestructural‐dynamicorcausalpropertiesthatphysical

sciencestudies),weappreciatethepressuretosaythatifoneofthesebeings

isconsciousthentheyallare.Butitishighlyimplausiblethatthatisso.Letme

calltherejectionofthisimplausibilityNoSwarms:

(NOSWARMS):Therearenotswarmsofoverlappingexperiencers

whereverthereisone(andingeneralexperiencersdonotoverlap).

NoSwarmsishardtoresist.Itisnotobviouslyaconceptualconstraint

–itisperfectlycoherentandconceivablethatthereareswarmsofoverlapping

experiencers.Butthereissomethingmetaphysicallyrepugnantaboutthe

suggestionofSwarms.Weknowthattherearecasesofpeoplewhosebrains

aresplit,andthatthismaymeanthatthosepeopleembodytwodifferent

consciousbeings.Thesecasesaredifficultenoughtofathom,butifNoSwarms

isfalsethenweeachshareourbrainsnotonlywithoneotherconsciousbeing

butwiththousands,ormillions.

PeterUngersuggeststhattheonlywaytocountenanceNoSwarmsis

SubstanceDualism.Ungersaysthatitwouldamounttoanunacceptable

arbitrarinessinnatureifoneofthesebeingsgottobeconsciouswhileallof

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therestdidnot.Whatmakestheonesospecial?Butthis,coupledwithNo

Swarms,impliesthatnoneofthemareconscious,andhence(sinceweknow

thatsomethings,namelyourselves,areconscious)thatSubstanceDualismis

true.

EvenifUnger’sreasoningisvalid,wemightobjecttohisappealtothe

unacceptabilityofarbitrariness.Natureisarbitraryandcapricious.Whywere

theinitialconditionsoftheuniversejustastheywere,ratherthanslightly

different?Whydobadthingshappentogoodpeople?Thereseemtobe

violationsoftheprincipleofsufficientreasoneverywherewelook,andsoitis

difficulttoassessthedialecticalforceofUnger’spremise.Infactitlooksas

thoughtheSubstanceDualismUngerarguesforwillofnecessityexhibitsome

ofthisarbitrarinessinspecifyingthedetailsoftheinteractionrelation–why

doesthesoulinteractwithJonandnotJon*?62

ButwhileUnger’sappealtoarbitrarinessmayfalter,anappealtothe

natureofphenomenalconsciousnessmaysucceed.Considerthematerial

propertiesthatdifferentiateJon,Jon#,andJon*.Whatevertheymaybe,none

ofthemwillstandout.Nonewillindicateanyspecialsortofcausalor

62ToaddressthisproblemUngertellsacomplicated,speculativestoryaboutdispositionalproperties,holdingthatsomethingshavedispositionsthatonlymanifestinthepresenceofsingleindividualinteractionpartners(asopposedtomanifestinginthepresenceofanythingofsomeappropriateType).Comparethefatalistsuggestionthattheinitialconditionsarenotarbitrarybecausetheywerenecessary.PerhapsSubstanceDualismenablesustominimizethearbitrarinesstosomedegree,butitisnotgoingtoridusofitentirely.

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structuralthreshold.Butifphenomenalconsciousnessisamaterialproperty

ofJonbutnotofJon#orJon*thenitmustbeidenticalwithoneofthese

propertiesandnottheothers(oranywayitmustberealizedbyoneofthese

propertiesandnottheothers).Butthisisanimplausibilityofanentirely

differentorderfromtheimplausibilityofthearbitrarinessthatUnger

considers.Itisimplausiblebecausethepropertyphenomenalconsciousness

isatleastsomewhatdistinctive–thereisatleastsomesubstantiveobjective

differencebetweenanyconsciousthingandanynon‐consciousthing.

ItiseasytoconfusethisprinciplewithUnger’s,buttheyareinfactvery

different.NotethatifUnger’sargumentissounditappliestoPropertyDualists

aswellastoTypeIdentityMaterialists.63Unger’sprincipleisthatthematerial

differencesbetweenmaterialbeingsmustbesignificantifoneofthemis

consciousandtheotherisnot.ButtheprincipleIappealtoholdssimplythat

thedifferencesbetween(material)beingsmustbesignificantifoneofthemis

consciousandtheotherisnot.IfPropertyDualismistruethenmyprincipleis

automaticallysatisfied,becauseaconsciousthingandnon‐consciousthing

differoverthesuigenerispropertyphenomenalconsciousness.Wemight

articulatetheprincipleIappealtoassomethinglike

63InfactUnger’sargumentmayworkbetteragainstPropertyDualiststhanTypeIdentityMaterialists,sinceMaterialistsmayreplythatidentities,beingnecessary,areautomaticallynon‐arbitrary.

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(SIGNIFICANCE):Thepropertyphenomenalconsciousness

metaphysicallystandsout.Itconstitutesamajordifferencebetweenthings

thathaveitandthingsthatdonot.

Supposethatthe2784thstrawistheonethatbreaksthecamel’sback.

Beingthestrawthatbreaksthecamel’sbackconstitutesamajordifference

betweenthestrawthathasitandthepreviousstraw.Butbeingthe2784th

strawdoesnot.Andtobesure,beingthestrawthatbreaksthecamel’sback

involvesmorethansimplybeingthe2784thstraw–itreliesalsoonthe

structuralpropertiesofcamel’sback,thegravitationalconstant,andsoon.The

analogueofUnger’sprinciplewouldimplythatnostrawmaybetheonethat

breaksthecamel’sback.Theanalogueofmyprinciplewouldimplyonlythat

thepropertybeingthestrawthatbreaksthecamel’sbackcannotbe

identifiedwiththepropertybeingthe2784thstraw.

ItakedifferenceslikethestatedphysicaldifferencesbetweenJon,Jon#

andJon*(differencesofaproteininthestomachorskincellontheperiphery

ofafinger)tobeparadigmaticexamplesofnon‐majordifferences.The

principleSignificanceassertsthatthedifferencebetweenbeingconsciousand

notbeingconsciouscannotbegroundedinsomedifferencelikethat.Inthe

nextchapterIdevelopamoregeneralframeworkforcomparingMajorfrom

Non‐Majordifferences.Theprincipleadvantageoftheargumentfromthe

ProblemoftheManyMindsovertheargumentIgiveinthenextchapter,is

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thatthisargumentisindependentofthedetailsoftheframeworkIdevelop

there.Here,weonlyrequireagripoftheparadigmaticexamplesofnon‐major

differences;theordinaryphysicaldifferencesbetweenJon,Jon#andJon*in

numberofskincells,numberofproteins,etc.

§4.2: FROM THE MENTAL PROBLEM OF THE MANY TO PROPERTY DUALISM

SothesituationforTypeIdentityMaterialistsisthatwedonotwantto

saythateachofJon,Jon#andJon*areconscious–becauseitisimplausible

thattherearemanyalmostentirelyoverlappingconsciousexperiencers

whereverthereisone–butwealsodonotwanttosaythatonlyoneofthemis

conscious,attheexpenseoftheothers,becausetodosowouldbetoidentify

thepropertyphenomenalconsciousnesswithsomematerialpropertythat

onlyoneofJon,Jon#orJon*has,andthiswouldviolateSignificance.

Thequestioniswhetherthereareanymaterialpropertieswithwhich

toidentifyphenomenalconsciousnessthatallowustoupholdboth

SignficanceandNoSwarms.Wehaveseenthatnoneoftheordinaryphysical

propertiesdifferentiatingJonfromJon#andJon*(propertieslikehaving

2784skincellsinyourleftpinkiewilldo).Butitdoesnotfollowthatno

materialpropertieswilldo.

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Anumberofproposalstothiseffectareonoffer.Iwilldividethespace

ofpossibleresponsesintothreeseparategroups.Thefirstarethoseresponses

thatholdthatwecancountenanceSignificanceandNoSwarmswithout

positingtheexistenceofanypropertiesthatarenotgroundedintheordinary

physicalpropertiesdifferentiatingJonfromJon#andJon*,andwithout

appealingtothevaguenessof‘PhenomenallyConscious’.Thesecondarethose

responsesthatholdthatwecancountenanceSignificanceandNoSwarms

withoutpositingtheexistenceofanypropertiesthatarenotgroundedinthe

ordinaryphysicalpropertiesdifferentiatingJonfromJon#andJon*,butonly

byappealingtothevaguenessof‘PhenomenallyConscious’.Thethirdare

thosewhoholdthatwecanidentifyphenomenalconsciousnesswithsome

materialpropertywhilecountenancingbothSignificanceandNoSwarms,but

onlybypositingpropertiesthatarenotgroundedintheordinaryphysical

propertiesdifferentiatingJonfromJon#andJon*(orindividualsnotofakind

withJon,Jon#andJon*).Iarguethatresponsesfromthefirstgroupeitherfail

outright,oractuallybelongtothesecondorthirdgroups.Responsesofthe

secondgroupcannotsucceedifthepremisesofthischapterarecorrect‐one

premiseofthischapteristhat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague.

Regardingsolutionsfromthethirdgroup,IarguethatPropertyDualismmay

beamoreontologicallyconservativehypothesisthananyofthesesolutions.

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§4.2.1: ONTOLOGICALLY CONSERVATIVE RESPONSES THAT DO NOT APPEAL TO VAGUENESS

OneclassicresponsefromthefirstgroupisGeach1980’sRelative

Identitytheory.Accordingtothistheory,twothingsmaycountasdistinct

relativetopredicateFbutidenticalrelativetopredicateG.Thesalient

applicationwouldbetosaythatJon,Jon#andJon*maycountasdistinct

massesormereologicalcomposites,butasthesameconsciousbeing.Sucha

solutionallowsustosaythatthereisonlyoneconsciousbeing.However,it

alsoentailsthattherearedistinctmassesormereologicalcomposites,eachof

whichisaconsciousbeing.Ifitisimplausibletosaythatthereareswarmsof

overlappingconsciousbeings,itisequallyimplausibletosaythatthereare

swarmsofoverlappingbutdistinctmereologicalcompositebeings,eachof

whichisaconsciousbeing.TheRelativeIdentitysolutionisnosolutiontothe

MentalProblemoftheMany.64

Anotherapproachfromthefirstgroupistosaythatonlythemaximal

collectionofparticlesarrangedperson‐wiseisconscious(Sider2003).Strictly,

thisistoappealtoaproperty,beingmaximal,thatisnotgroundedinthe

64ArelatedresponseisinHudson2001.Hudsonarguesthateachofthecompositesintheswarmisnumericallyidenticaltotheothers–adifferent(albeitoverlapping)wholelocationofthesameentity,capableofbeingmultiplywhollylocated.Butifitisimplausiblethatthereareswarmsofconsciousbeingsalmostentirelyoverlappingme,thenitisimplausiblethatthereareswarmsofconsciousbeingsoverlappingmethathappentobealternativeincarnationsofme.Also,themetaphysicsofthisapproachissufficientlycontroversialthatitmaybelongingroupthreeratherthangroupone.

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differencesbetweenJon,Jon#andJon*,butitisatleastnotapropertywhose

instantiationismetaphysicallycontroversial.Thefirstproblemisthatthis

solutionwouldnotobviouslycountenanceSignificance.Whyisbeingmaximal

anymoreofadistinctionthanbeingsecond‐to‐maximal,orthird‐to‐maximal?

Amorepressingproblemisthattheremaybenomaximalcollection–thereis

noguaranteethatthefusionofalloverlappingcollectionsofparticlesarranged

person‐wiseisitselfacollectionofparticlesarrangedpersonwise:itmaybe

toobig.65Butthemostpressingproblemofallisthatitisvaguewhich

collectionisthemaximalone.Evenifweareguaranteedthatthefusionof

overlappingcollectionsofparticlesarrangedperson‐wiseisalwaysa

collectionofparticlesarrangedperson‐wise,itisvaguewhichcollectionsof

particlesarecollectionsarrangedperson‐wise.Thissolutionwillthusimply

thatitisvaguewhichareconsciousindividuals,meaningthatthepresent

solutionisreallyinthesecondgroup.

Itisdoubtfulthatthereareanymetaphysicallyuncontroversial

extrinsicfeaturesthatstandanychanceofdeterminatelydistinguishingoneof

theperson‐wisearrangedcollectionsofparticlesfromalloftheothers.But

therecertainlyarenometaphysicallyuncontroversialintrinsicfeaturesthat

65Thisisaparticularlypressingpointifwefocusonthespatiotemporalversionoftheproblem(seefootnotetwo).

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doso.Iconcludethatnoapproachfromthefirstgroupislikelytocountenance

bothSignificanceandNoSwarms.

§4.2.2: ONTOLOGICALLY CONSERVATIVE RESPONSES THAT APPEAL TO VAGUENESS

Approachesofthesecondgroupappealtothevaguenessof

‘PhenomenallyConscious’tocountenanceSignificanceandNoSwarms

withoutappealingtoanycontroversialmetaphysics.Forif‘Phenomenally

Conscious’isvaguethenwemaycuttheGordianKnotthatconfrontsus:we

maysaythatthereisonlyoneconsciousbeinghere,thoughitisindeterminate

whichofJon,Jon#,orJon*itis.Wemaythenavoidhavingtosaythatoneof

theinsignificantdifferencesbetweenJon,Jon#andJon*constitutesthe

differencebetweenconsciousnessandnon‐consciousness(therebyupholding

Signficance)withoutsurrenderingtotheabsurdconclusionthateach

consciousbeingissurroundedbyaswarmofotheroverlappingconscious

beings.

Itisunclearhowexactlytoimplementthedetailsofsuchasuggestion,

anditmaydependonwhatwetakevaguenesstobe.Forexample,the

suggestionmaynotsucceedifwetakevaguenesstobeepistemicratherthan

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semanticorontological.Butatleastonsomeversionsoftheviewthat

vaguenessissemantic,thereareproposalsforhowtohandletheproblemof

themanyintheeventthattheconceptinquestionisvague.Thedetailsofhow

theSupervaluationisttheoryofvaguenessaccountsfortheproblemofthe

manyhavebeenworkedoutinsomedetail.SeeforexampleMcGeeand

McLaughlin2001,Weatherson2003.66Nosuchaccountisperfect,ofcourse,

anditmightalwaysturnoutthatitwasintheendnotpossibletoexploitthe

vaguenessof‘PhenomenallyConscious’toevadetheproblem.Butthereisat

leasttheprospectofanadequatesolutionhere.67

Unfortunately,theapproachisnotavailabletous,because

‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague,asIhavearguedinchapterstwoand

three.Because‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague,itisnotopentousto

saythatthereisonlyoneconsciousbeinginthevicinityofJon,Jon#andJon*

thoughitisindeterminatewhichofJon,Jon#andJon*itis.

66ThankstoPhillipKellerfordiscussiononthispoint.67Theredoesseemtobeadifferencebetweenthesortofindeterminatecasesthatariseinthecontextoftheproblemofthemanyandordinaryborderlinecases.OrdinaryborderlinecasesofFtendtobe,insomesenseorother,ontheborderbetweenbeingFandbeingnon‐F,exhibitingfeaturesofboth.IntheproblemofthemanyeachofthemanyseemstobeaperfectlyqualifiedcandidateforbeingF–theonlythingcountingagainstitsF‐hoodisthepresenceofotheroverlappingqualifiedcandidates.ItseemsmoreplausibletosaythatthesethingsarealmostFsratherthanindeterminateFs(Lewis1993).AndwemightarguethatitisimplausiblethattherearemanyAlmostconsciousthingsoverlappingeachotherwheneverthereisone.Butanyway,sinceweknowthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague,wedonothavetoworryaboutjusthowimplementablethissolution,whichwouldhingeonsuchvagueness,wouldbe.

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Thismeanswemustconsiderresponsesfromthethirdgroup:

responsesthatappealtomorespeculativemetaphysicstocountenanceboth

SignificanceandNoSwarms.Themostpopularsuchapproachistheviewthat

CompositionisnotIdentity,buttherearealsoafewoptionsherethatsay

compositionisidentity.Iwillconsidertheseinturn.

§4.2.3: ONTOLOGICALLY INFLATIONARY RESPONSES

Tosaythatcompositionisnotidentityistosaythatthereissomebeing

composedbyacollectionofparticlesarrangedperson‐wisebutnotidentical

tothatcollection(ortoitsmereologicalfusion).Suchaviewistypically(but

notnecessarily)supportedbythethoughtthattrueSubstancesmaysurvive

thelossorgainofparts,whilemerefusionsmaynot.Thus,substanceshave

different(andmoreinteresting)persistenceconditionsfromthethingswhich

composethem.

Therearedifferentwaysofimplementingtheproposal.First,doesonly

oneofJon,Jon#orJon*composeaTrueSubstance?Ifwesayyes,itprobably

hastobeabrutefactwhichofthemitis.Ifwesayno,howdoweavoidthe

implicationthatitisindeterminatewhereexactlysubstancesarelocated,or

indeterminatewhatexactlyaretheirparts?Oneoptionistosaythatitisvague

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whichofthecompositescomposesthesubstance.Thisisstilladifferentview

fromanyinthesecondgroupIconsiderabove:herewesaythereisa

substancethatisdeterminatelynon‐identicaltoanyofthecompositesJon,

Jon#orJon*,butindeterminatelycomposedofeachofthem.Anotheroption

(suggestedtomebyPaulBoghossian)istosaythatthesubstanceismultiply

composed–inroughanalogytothewaythatsomepropertiesaremultiply

realized.

Theseviewsallfaceproblems.Ifthecompositionrelationisnotvague,

thenitprobablywillbemetaphysicallyarbitrarywhichofthecomposites

composethesubstance.Ontheotherhandthereisastrongcase(madeby

Sider2001)thatanyvaguenessherewouldhavetobeontologicalvagueness,

andthereisalsoastrongcase(madebyEvans1978)thattherecanbenosuch

thing.ButthemostpressingproblemhereisthatitishardhowaSubstance

getstobeconsciousunlessthecomposite(s)thatcomposeitareconscious.

TheoristswhodenythatCompositionisIdentity,butwhoneverthelesscall

themselvesMaterialists,oweusanaccountofwhatmakesthemmaterialists

ratherthanEpiphenomenalistSubstanceDualists(inthegeneralsensethat

therearetwofundamentallydifferentsortsofconcreteparticularsratherthan

themorespecificsensewhichaddsthatonesortismaterialandtheotheris

mental).Theusualansweristhatthepropertiesofthesubstance–withthe

importantexceptionofitspersistenceproperties–aregroundedinthe

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propertiesofthecompositesthatcomposeitatthattime.Butifacomposite

likeJon*haspropertiesthatgroundthepropertyofbeingconscious,thenwhy

doesJon*nothavethepropertyofbeingconscious?Itdoesnotdotosaythat

thepropertyofbeingconsciousismultiplyrealizable.AphysicalpropertyP

mayground(realize)functionalpropertyFwithoutbeingidenticaltothat

property.Butitdoesnotfollowthatsomeindividualmayinstantiateproperty

PwithoutinstantiatingpropertyF.

Thisobjectioncouldofcoursebeadvancedagainstattemptstouse

CompositionIsNotIdentitytosolveanyproblemofthemany–theproblemof

themanyCats,orthemanyClouds.Butoneattractiveresponsetothe

objection(duetoLowe1995)isthattheSortalPropertiesintermsofwhich

theproblemofthemanyisusuallyposedareinfactpropertiespertainingto

thepersistenceconditionsofthesubstancesinvolved.Havingthepropertyof

beingacloudinvolveshavingtheabilitytosurvivechangesofyourparts;an

abilitythatisnotsharedbyanycompositeofparticlesarrangedcloud‐wise.

Perhapsthereissomesortalpropertylikebeingaconsciousbeing

whichissensitivetothepersistencefactsinthisway.Buttheproperty

phenomenalconsciousness(orthepropertyhavingphenomenal

consciousness)isanoccurrentproperty,onethatapparentlyhasnothingto

dowithpersistenceconditions.Theusualreplydoesnotwork.Toexplainwhy

thecompositesarenotalsoconscious,theproponentoftheCompositionisnot

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Identitytheorymustdriveafurtherwedgebetweenthesubstanceandthe

compositesthatcomposeit.Thismakesthetheorylookevenmorelikeaform

ofSubstanceDualism(albeit,presumably,anepiphenomenalistone).Andit

undercutsthetheory’sclaimtobealreadymotivatedbytheneedtosolve

otherproblemsinthetheoryofpersistence.68

Whataboutmetaphysicallyspeculativeproposalsthatdonotdenythat

Compositionisidentity?Wemightrestrictcomposition,holdingthatthe

collectioncorrespondingtoJoncomposesasum,butthecollections

correspondingtoJon#andJon*donot.AlternativelywemightholdthatJon,

butnotJon#orJon*,iscapableofsurvivingthechangeofhisparts.69Or,ifwe

aretiredofproposalscastintermsofformalontologicalproperties,wemight

invokeothersortsofmetaphysicallycontentiousemergentproperties.For

example,wemightholdthatJon,butnotJon#orJon*,hasElanVital.Another

optionwouldbetosimplytakeitthatoneofthematerialproperties

differentiatingJonfromJon#andJon*turnsouttobeasignificantproperty–a

hiddensortofhigherlevelnaturalness,orsomethinginthatspirit.

Thesuggestionthatcompositionisrestrictedhasbeendefended

(Markosian1998,VanInwagen1990)butithasseriousproblems–notleast

ofwhichbeingthatitcompromisesthepopularclaimthatmereological

68CfOlson1995.69CfCasatiandVarzi1999

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compositionisontologicallyinnocent(Lewis1991).70ThesuggestionthatJon

hasdifferentpersistenceconditionsfromJon#andJon*doesnotobviously

helpussinceitisnotobviouswhatpersistenceconditionshavetodowith

propertieslikephenomenalconsciousness,andagain,inadifferentwayit

callsintoquestiontheideathatmereologicalcompositionisontologically

innocent.IfwealreadythoughtthereweresuchathingasVitalForce,itmight

makesensetopostulateitsinvolvementwithconsciousness,butaswedonot,

thesuggestionwouldbeextravagant.Insectionfive,Iconsiderthesuggestion

thatsomeordinaryphysicalpropertythatdifferentiatesJonfromJon#and

Jon*(forexamplethepropertyhavingexactly2784skincellsonthetipof

theleftpinkyfinger)justturnsouttomarksomemajordifferencebetween

JonontheonehandandJon#andJon*ontheother.Iarguetherethatsucha

suggestionactuallyamountstoaversionofPropertyDualism.Butevenifit

doesnot,itisclearlyahighlyspeculativeproposal.

Iconcludethatnoneoftheproposalsfromgroupthreeobviouslyhave

anadvantageoverPropertyDualism.Eachoftheotherproposalsinvolves

takingsomecontentiousmetaphysicalhypothesisandputtingittoworkeven

70VanInwagen1990attemptstomitigatesomeoftheharshnessoftheviewbyholdingthatmereologicalcompositionrelationsarevague:itisvaguewhichofJon,Jon#orJon*istheonethatcomposesthesum.Sider2001arguesthatthisvaguenesswouldhavetobeontological,whichisproblematicenough.TheviewmayalsoimplythatJon,Jon#andJon*areindeterminatelyconscious,whichwouldconflictwithourpremise.However,mycaseforthatpremisehingesonmytakingvaguenesstobebroadlyspeakingasemanticphenomenon,sotheimplicationthatitmightbeontologicallyvague(thoughhighlyproblematicinitsownright)doesnotactuallyconflictwithmyargumentinchapterstwoandthree.

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morecontentiousthanthatforwhichitwasintended.Thepresent

considerationsseemtodirectlymotivatePropertyDualism.Sincethatisnot

obviouslyalessextravagantoptionthanitsrivals,weshouldtakeit

seriously.71

§4.3: CHALLENGING THE PREMISES

ThisconcludesmyargumentfromthepremisesNoSwarms,

Significanceandthenon‐vaguenessof‘PhenomenallyConscious’toProperty

Dualism(oranywaytotheviewthatPropertyDualismisnomore

ontologicallyextravagantthananyoftheothertheoriesthatcountenanceallof

thesepremises).Itremainsforustoconsiderwhetherrejectinganyofthe

premisesmightturnouttobethemostplausibleresponse.

Myargumentthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvaguehingesonthe

assumptionofanon‐deflationary,naturalistictheoryofconceptapplication.

Onemightresisttheconclusionoftheargumentofthischapterbyrejecting

71HowwouldPropertyDualismbepreferabletothesortofCompositionIsNotIdentityviewweconsideredjustabove,supposingwetooksomemoremoderateversionofCompositionIsNotIdentitytobecalledfortohandleproblemsofpersistenceandthegeneralproblemofthemany?YoucouldtakeoneofthecompositesJon,Jon#orJon*tobefundamentallyphenomenallyconsciousandthentaketheSubstancetoinherittheconsciousnessofthecompositethatcomposesit,justastheSubstanceinheritsthespatialpropertiesofthecompositethatcomposesit.ThisarguablystillconflictstosomedegreewiththespiritofNoSwarms,butarguablytheproponentofthisstrategyneedsanaccountofpropertyinheritancetoassuagediscomfortaboutthissortofthinganyway.

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suchatheory.Butthesortofdeflationismonewouldhavetoembraceto

escapetheresultwouldbeaparticularlyunstablevariety,hoveringbetween

PrimitivismandNon‐factualismaboutthegroundsofconceptapplication(see

chapterthree).Sothemostnaturalstrategyforresistingtheconclusionwould

betoembraceanon‐naturalistictheoryofconceptapplication–whichmeans

acceptingthattheintentionalrelation,orsomeotherrelationinwhichitis

grounded,isaprimitive(oranywaynon‐materially‐grounded)relation.Given

theplausibletheoryofIntentionalism,thisactuallyimpliesDualismabout

phenomenalproperties,butevenifwedoubtthat,wecannotdoubtthatit

impliesDualismaboutintentionalproperties,sothiswouldnotbemuchofa

defenseiftheobjectiveistosalvageaTypeIdentitytheoryofthemental.72

TheonlyotheroptionsarerejectingSignificanceorNoSwarms.Idonot

seehowtorejectSignificancewithoutineffectchangingthesubject.Ifthe

differencebetweenbeingphenomenallyconsciousandnotbeing

phenomenallyconsciousdoesnotmarksomesortofobjectivethreshold,Ido

notknowwhatdoes.Itseemstobeapartoftheconcept‘Phenomenally

72Also,myargumentforthenon‐vaguenessof‘PhenomenallyConscious’isanargumentthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’doesnothaveborderlinecasesintheordinarysense,orgiverisetosoritesseries.Butonemightthinkthatthesortofvaguenessaconceptneedstobeamenabletoavagueness‐basedsolutiontotheproblemofthemanyisdifferent:ithastodowiththecogencyofaspecialwayofbeingalmostaC,andthisisdifferentfromtherebeingborderlineCs,ortherebeingsoritesseriesforC.Isuspectthatmyargumentdoesextendtoanargumentthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvagueinthisway,andalso,moregenerally,thatnothingcanbevagueinthisspecialwaywithoutbeingvagueinthemoreordinaryways.

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Conscious’thatitissignificantinatleastthisrespect.73Itisalsoworthnoting

adifficultmeta‐semanticquestionthatariseshere.Howdoestheconcept

‘PhenomenallyConscious’cometoselectonefromthesetofinsignificantly

differentcandidatereferentproperties?Someholdthatsurprising,hidden

semanticfactslikethisabound,usuallyinthecontextofanepistemictheoryof

vagueness(seeWilliamson2000)butmanytakethissortofthingtobehighly

implausible.

PerhapsweshouldconsiderrejectingNoSwarms.Thosewhoaccept

Panpsychismmaybeamenabletosuchasuggestion,thoughitisnotobviously

aconsequenceofPanpsychism.Buttherecertainlyareprecedentsforthe

suggestion.Forexample,ononeinterpretationofquantummechanics,the

ManyMindsinterpretation,thereareapotentialinfinityofmindsassociated

73Butcf.Leeforthcomingforanargumenttothecontrary.LeearguesforwhathecallsaDeflationaryStanceonthequestionofthesignificanceofconsciousness(BlockintroducestheterminologyofInflationismandDeflationisminthiscontextinhis2002.ForanexampleofDeflationismsimilartowhatLeemayhaveinmindseeDennett1991),andheconsidersbothnormativeanddescriptiveformsofsignificance,asIdo(thedescriptiveformIconsiderisSignificance,Iconsidernormativesignificancein§4).ButLee’sargumentisofthehypotheticalform:Ifacertainsortofmaterialismistruethenconsciousnessisnotsignificant(ineachofvarioussenses).Iaminclinedtoagreewithsomethinginthevicinityofthishypotheticalclaim.ButLeedoesnotofferusanyexplanationofwhyConsciousnessseemstobesignificant,evenifitreallyisnot.Thereisadifficultdialecticalquestionhere:ifwemustchoosebetweenmaterialismandtheprinciplethatconsciousnessissignificant,whichshoulditbe?Materialismmaybeanattractiveview,butsoisthethoughtthatthedifferencebetweenbeingconsciousandnotbeingconsciousismoresubstantivethananyofthedifferencesbetweenJon,Jon#andJon*.Weareatminimumentitledtoanexplanationofwhyitseemssoplausibletosaythatconsciousnessissignificant,eventhoughitisnot.IalsonotethatLee’sargumentdoesnotdrawonthenon‐vaguenessof‘PhenomenallyConscious’,andtheformofDescriptiveSignificanceheconsidersisstrongerthantheoneIconsider.PhenomenalConsciousnessmightfailtobesignificantinthedescriptivesenseheconsiders,yetstillbeSignificantinmysense.

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withasinglebody–eachregisteringadifferentpossibleprojectionofthe

relevantHilbertspace.74Andofcoursethereareexamplesofdifferent

overlappingminds,asweseeinBrainBisectioncases.75Butthisisstrange

territory,andagain,itmaybemorereasonableonthewholetoembrace

PropertyDualism.ButforthosewhotoywithrejectingNoSwarms,inthenext

andfinalchapterofthisdissertationIwillconsideranargumentsforthe

disjunctionofPropertyDualismorPanpsychismthatdoesnotpresupposeNo

Swarms.Thisargumentalsowillmoreconclusivelyruleoutcompeting

(InflationarybutnotPropertyDualist)options.HereItriedtoshowthat

PropertyDualismisatleastasreasonableasotheradequatesolutionstothe

problem,butinthenextchapterIwillarguethatPropertyDualismand

Panpsychismaretheonlyreasonablesolutions.76

74Albert1993.75Nagel1971.76Zimmerman2011advancesanargumentsimilartoUnger’s,fromtheproblemofthemanycollectionsofpartsarrangedperson‐wise,viaconsiderationofphenomenalproperties,toSubstanceDualism.Zimmerman’sargumentdoesnotappealtoNoSwarms,buthedoesassumethatPropertyDualismistrue(andhetakesthistoimplythat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague,andthatphenomenalpropertiesarefundamental).ZimmermanarguesforSubstanceDualismmuchasIdohereforPropertyDualism–byarguingthatitisatleastasreasonableasotheradequatesolutions.IdonotthinkitisobviousthatPropertyDualismentailsthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague(myownargumenthingesonthematerialistassumptionofanaturalistictheoryofconceptapplication,butseeGoffforthcomingandSimonforthcomingfordiscussion)orthatphenomenalpropertiesarefundamental(seeChalmers2002cfordiscussion).However,IsuspectthatsomethingalongthelinesofZimmerman’sargumentmaybeadvancedevenifwerelaxtheseassumptions.IagreewithhimthatSubstanceDualismisnotobviouslylessreasonablethantheotheroptionsopentous,thoughIdisagreewithUngerthatitistheonlyreasonablesolutionavailable.

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CHAPTERFIVE:

THESIGNIFICANCEOFCONSCIOUSNESS

IarguethatthepropertyphenomenalconsciousnessisaNatural

Dimension(orSub‐Dimension)Determinable–apropertydemarcatingan

objectivedimension(orSub‐Dimension)ofsimilarityanddifferenceinquality

space.IthenarguethatifphenomenalconsciousnessisaNaturalDimension

(orSub‐Dimension)DeterminabletheneitherPropertyDualism77or

Panpsychismistrue(orboth).Myargumenthingesonthepremisethat

‘PhenomenalllyConscious’isnotvague,andonapremisespecifyingasensein

whichphenomenalconsciousnessissignificant.

In§1Iexplainwhatanaturaldimensionorsub‐dimension

determinableis.In§2Iintroducemypremisethatphenomenal

consciousnessissignificantandgivemyargumentthatphenomenal

consciousnessisanaturaldimensionorsub‐dimensiondeterminable.In§3I

77AsIdefineitnon‐modallyinthepreviouschapter:PropertyDualismistheviewthatphenomenalpropertiesarenotidenticaltoorgroundedinmaterialproperties.Thisiscompatiblewithanecessarysupervenienceclaim(althoughtheexplanatoryroleofsuchaclaimwouldbequestionable).ItakeSubstanceDualismtobecompatiblewith(andprobablytoentail)PropertyDualism.IdonotthinkmyownargumentsestablishthedisjunctionofSubstanceDualismorPanpsychism,buttheycertainlydonotruleSubstanceDualismout.ThankstoMikeRavenfordiscussiononthispoint.Andagain,asIhavedefineditRussellianMonismcountsasaformofPropertyDualism.ThoughitmaycountasaversionofPhysicalismontheobject‐conceptionofPhysicalism(cf.Stoljar2001),theviewstillisPropertyDualistinthesensethatitpositsthatthephenomenalproperties(theo‐physicalproperties)areneitheridenticaltonorgroundedinthestructural‐dynamicmaterialproperties(thet‐physicalproperties).Arguablyonthisviewthephenomenalpropertiesgroundthestructural‐dynamicproperties,thoughthisisaveryweaksenseof‘ground’.

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offerfurthersupportformypremisethatphenomenalconsciousnessis

significant.In§4Iarguethatifphenomenalconsciousnessisanatural

dimensionorsub‐dimensiondeterminabletheneitherPropertyDualismor

Panpsychismistrue.In§5Iconcludebyconsideringparallelsbetweenthis

argumentandthesortofConceivabilityargumentadvancedbyDescartes,

Kripke,JacksonandChalmers.78

§5.1: NATURAL DIMENSION DETERMINABLES

Iassumethatthereisastructureofobjectivesimilarityanddifference

inqualityspace.Justwhatthisassumptionamountstoisthesubjectofmuch

debate,butthereissomeconsensusthatwemustdistinguishbetween

predicatesthatcarveatthenaturaljointsandthosethatdonot,between

‘Green’and‘Grue’.FollowingDavidLewis,Iwillsaythatjoint‐carving

predicatesexpressnaturalproperties.79TheonlyworktowhichIputthese

notionsistocapturerelationsofobjectivesimilarityanddifference.Two

thingshavesomeobjectivesimilarityiftheyinstantiateacommonnatural

78Descartes1641,Kripke1980,Jackson1982,Chalmers1996.79Lewis1983a,1984,1986.Ifyouthinkthatthereisanabundanceofproperties,youdobesttothinkofnaturalnessasasortofselectivepropertyofproperties(orclasses).Ifyouthinkthatpropertiesaresparse,asArmstrong1988,1997,2004does,youneedonlydistinguishbetweenthepredicatesthatexpresspropertiesandthosethatdonot.

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property,andtheyhavesomeobjectivedifferenceifthereisanatural

propertythatoneofthemhasandanotherdoesnot.

Manywriterstakethestartingpointofthissortofinvestigationtobea

notionofFundamentalorUngroundedpropertiesratherthanNaturalones.80

Eachofthesenotionsisconfusing,butthereisanimportantreasonthatIuse

‘natural’hereratherthan‘fundamental’or‘ungrounded’.Talkofwhatis

fundamentalorungroundedisentangledwithmodaltalk.Itisveryhardto

thinkofpropertyPasfundamental,ifpropertyPisalwaysnecessitatedby

someotherproperty,thewaythatredisnecessitatedbyscarletorspinis

necessitatedbyupspin.Butpropertieslikeredandspincarveatthenatural

joints,andspecifyrespectsofobjectivesimilaritythattheirmorefundamental

determinatesmaynot.81

Somehavemaintainedthatallobjectivesimilarityanddifference

supervenesontheidentityordistinctnessofmaximallydeterminatenatural

80Manyhavecontributedtotheliteratureontheobjectivestructureofreality,beginningwiththePresocratics,PlatoandAristotle.ButforsomerecentliteratureseetheLewisandArmstrongpapersmentionedabove,Bennettforthcoming,Dasguptaforthcoming,Fine2001and2009,Heil2003,McDaniel2009,Mulligan,SmithandSimons1984,Ravenforthcoming,Rosen2010,Schaffer2004and2009,Sider1995,2001andforthcoming,SmithandSimon2007,Wilsonforthcoming,81Themainpitfallofusingtheterm‘Natural’isthatonerisksgivingtheimpressionofsomeassociationwithNaturalism.Itismyhopethatthecontextmakesitclearthatthisassociationwouldbeillicithere:apropertymaybenaturalinmysense,butneverthelessbespooky,suigeneris,andinaccessibletoscientificstudy.AnothermoreminorpitfallisthatforLewis,Naturalnessisamatterofintrinsicsimilarity,notjustof(objective)similarity.Idonotassumethis:therecanbebothnaturalandgerrymanderedrespectsofextrinsicsimilarity,justastherecanbebothnaturalandgerrymanderedrelationalproperties.

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properties(propertieslikered27ratherthanpropertieslikered).Onthis

view,thenumericalspecificationofhowmanynaturaldeterminatesIshare

withyou(orperhapsthespecificationoftheratioofhowmanynatural

determinatesIsharewithyou,tohowmanynaturaldeterminatesIdifferwith

youover)fixesthefactsabouthowobjectivelysimilarIamtoyou.Butthis

pictureignoresthesortofobjectivesimilaritythatwehavewhenwe

instantiatenearbydeterminatesofthesamedeterminable:ifIamcrimsonred,

andyouarescarletred.IfIamcrimsonandyouarescarletthenweare

objectivelysimilar,andwearemoresimilarthanwewouldbeifIweregreen

andyouwerescarlet.Therearealsofactsofexclusiontoaccountfor:Icannot

bebothscarlet(allover)andcrimson(allover).

Theseobservationsshowthatthereisatleastasupportingrolefor

determinablepropertiestoplayinthestoryofnaturalstructure.82Takingthe

fundamentalpropertiestobeaspecialsubsetofthenaturalproperties,we

maygrantthatonlythemaximallydeterminatenaturalpropertiesare

fundamental.Anditmaybethatthesefundamentalpropertiesgroundor

82ThelocusclassicusforthemoderndiscussionofthemetaphysicalstatusofdeterminablesisJohnson1921.Wilson2011offersasustaineddefenseofthefundamentalityofdeterminables,drawingonconsiderationsofobjectivesimilaritybutalsoonotherarguments.Johansson2000offersdefendstheexistenceofmaximalbutnotintermediatedeterminables.Gardenfors2000discussesthemetaphysicsofqualityspaces(thoughhethinksofthemasconceptualspaces).Armstrong1978deniestheexistenceofdeterminableuniversals.Yablo1992andShoemaker2001,2007invokedeterminablestodocausalwork,whileGilletandRives2005,andKim1992expressskepticism.Stazicker(forthcoming)appealstodeterminablestosolveaprobleminthetheoryofperception.

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determinealloftheobjectivesimilarityfacts.Butitwouldbeamistaketo

thinkthatthemerefactsofidentityanddistinctnessofsuchpropertiesareall

thatthisgroundingordeterminingrequires.Rather,toholdthatthe

determinatesdoallthegrounding,wemustthinkofthedeterminatesas

containingtheirdeterminables.IfinmakingthedeterminatesGodhadto

alreadyhavedeterminablesonhand,thenofcourseoncehehasmadethe

determinateshehasnomoreworktodotomakethedeterminables.Toallow

thatthedeterminatesdoallofthegroundingisnottosaythatthe

determinablefactsareconventional,orthattalkofdeterminablesismerely

talkofdisjunctionsorhigherorderquantificationoverdeterminates.

Determinatesmaybetheonstagepropertiesthatinterfacedirectlywith

particulars,buttheirdeterminablesarethebackstagecoordinatorswhomake

theproductionpossible.TotheextentthatFundamentalityhastodowith

beinganungroundedgrounder,anunnecessitatednecessitator,wemaydeny

thatdeterminableslikeredandspinarefundamental.Butwemustholdthat

somedeterminablesarenatural(orthatsomepredicatespickouttrue

determinableswhileothersdonot)ifwethinkthatscarletismorelike

crimsonthanitislikemauve.83

83Theremaybereasonsforholdingthatdeterminablesreallymaynotbesubordinatedtotheirdeterminates,reasonsforthinkingtheyamounttomoreworkthatGodhadtodo.Onesuchreasonisthatdeterminablesmayplayacausalrolethattheirdeterminatesdonot(cf.Yablo1992,Shoemaker2001).AnotherreasonhastodowiththepossibilityofGunk.Youmightthinkthatitispossibleforobjectstofailtohavemaximallydeterminateproperties.You

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Theupshotofthisisthatthenaturaldeterminatescomeorganizedinto

naturaldimensionsofqualityspace,dimensionsofcomparativesimilarityand

ofexclusion.Somedeterminableswillmarkregionsinsuchspaces,while

others,themaximaldeterminables,willmarkthedimensions,orthespaces,

themselves.Thegeneralpicturewillbeofatreewithentangledbranches:the

dimensiondeterminable(say,color)atthetop,andthenaseriesoflevelsof

overlappingregiondeterminables(warmcolor,darkcolor,reddishcolor,

greenishcolor,red,orange,purple,blue,…)inthemiddleandthenfinally,if

thereareany,themaximaldeterminates(red27,orange16,blue38)atthe

bottom.Theremaybereasonstoprivilegesomeofthedeterminablesoverthe

others,dependingonwhethertheycarvenaturaljointswithintheirquality

space.Thoughcolormayspecifyanaturalspace,itisnotobviousthatwarm

colorcarvesatanaturaljointinthatspace.84

mightthinkthisongeneraltheoreticalgrounds–youmightthinktherecanbenosuchthingsasmaximallydeterminateproperties–oryoumightthinkthatsomeobjectssometimesdohavethemandsomeobjectssometimesdonot.Forexample,youmightthinkthisbecauseyouthinkthattimecanbemereologicallygunky(thereareincreasinglyshortmomentsoftime,butnotrulyinstantaneouspointsoftime)andyouthinkthatcontinuouschangeispossible.(butcf.ArnzteniusandHawthorne2005,whodrawadifferentconclusionfromthissortofpossibility).Thispossibilitydeserveselaboration.Itiscompatiblewith,butdoesnotimply,thatanobjectmayfailtobefullydeterminate(wherethiswouldmeanthatforsomeobjectthereisapropertythatisthemostdeterminateproperty(insomedimension)thatitinstantiates,eventhoughtherearemoredeterminatepropertiesinthisdimensionthatitdoesnotinstantiate).84CfJohansson2000.ForJohanssonthequestioniswhetherintermediatedeterminablesexist,ratherthanwhethertheyarenatural,butpresumablyinasparsepropertyframeworkexistencemeansnaturalness(althoughcf.Schaffer2004).Ontheotherhand,supposeyouthinkthatgreenisreallyamixtureofyellowandblue,butyellowisnotreallyamixtureofgreenandorange.Youmightcountenancethisbyholdingthatyellowishandblueishcarveatthejointsbutgreenishandorangeishdonot.

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Wemayaskquestionsaboutthestructuralpropertiesofsuchquality

spaces.85Doesagivenspacehavetopologicalormetricstructure?Isit

continuousordense?Doesitdivideintonon‐pathconnectedsubspaces?Is

thespaceboundedorunbounded?Iwillnotgointoanyofthesequestionsin

depthhere,butitwillbeusefultodistinguishbetweenaDimension

determinableandaSub‐Dimensiondeterminable.Supposewehavesome

qualityspacelikespatiality.Nowtherearemanydifferentsortsofspatial

propertiesandtheyallhavespatialityincommon,butone‐dimensionalspatial

propertiesseemtobedifferentinkindfromtwo‐dimensionalspatial

properties.Wemightthinkofpropertieslikeonedimensionalspatialobject

assub‐dimensiondeterminables,toacknowledgethattheregionsofquality

spacethattheydesignatearenotonlynaturalbutalsoseparatedfromother

regionsofthesamequalityspace.

Ihaveusedcolorspaceasanexampleofanobjectivequalityspace.

Thisisforheuristicpurposes.Itmaybeverydifficulttodeterminewhichare

infacttheobjectivequalityspaces–justasitisdifficulttodeterminewhich

arethefundamentaldeterminateproperties.Theymayactuallybethinonthe

ground.Forexample,itmaybethattheonlynaturaldimensiondeterminables

instantiatedatourworldarethingslikespatiotemporalityandcausalityand

massandcharge(orperhapsonlysomethingevenmoregeneralthanthis,for

85SeeforexampleGardenfors2000.

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exampleacharacterizationofpathwaysinsomemultidimensionalphase

space).Thereisalsotheskepticalworrythat‘Grue’infactcorrespondstoa

naturalregioninsomequalityspace,while‘Green’doesnot(cf.Goodman

1955).ButItakeitthatwehavevariouspathstojustificationforbeliefsabout

whichthingsareobjectivelysimilartowhich.86Itiscertainlyachallengeto

saywhattheseare,buttheenterpriseisfarfromhopeless.

§5.2: SIGNIFICANCE AND THE SEA CHANGE ARGUMENT

InthepreviouschapterIinvokeaprinciple,Significance,thatspeaksof

apropertyconstitutingamajordifferencebetweenthingsthathaveitand

thingsthatdonothaveit.InthischapterIdevelopanotherargumentfrom

thatpremisetometaphysicalconclusions.There,becausethecontextmade

thingsclearenough(theordinarymaterialdifferencesbetweenJon,Jon#and

Jon*areclearlynotmajordifferences),Ileftthematterintuitive.NowIwill

haveneedtosaymoreprecisethingsaboutthecomparativedifference

betweenpropertiesandtheirinstances.

86Oneareawherethemattergetstricky:debatesoverthenatureofFunctionalism.Doourfunctionalpredicates(‘Mousetrap’,‘AddingMachine’etc)carveatthejointsornot?Block2002andKim1992holdthatingeneraltheydonot,whileShoemaker2001,2007holdsthattheysometimesdo.

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Havingdoneso,Iwillpresentmyfirstargumentthatphenomenal

consciousnessisanaturaldimensiondeterminable.Strictly,myargumentis

thatphenomenalconsciousnessisanaturaldimensionorsub‐dimension

determinable,butforstylisticpurposesIwillsuppressthisdetailsometimesin

whatfollows.Itakeittobequiteanaccomplishmenttobeanaturalsub‐

dimensiondeterminable,andmyargumentinthefinalsectionwillbethatif

phenomenalconsciousnessisadimensionorsub‐dimensiondeterminable

thenoneofPropertyDualismorPanpsychismmustbetrue.

ThoughItakeitthatwehavesomebeliefsaboutwhichpropertiesare

naturaldimensiondeterminables,forthemostparttheseconceptsaretoo

abstrusetofigureinthebeliefsofallbutafewselectmetaphysicians.Butwe

dohavebeliefsaboutobjectivesimilarityanddifference,andtheabstruse

frameworkisonlytheretoregimentourvocabularyforarticulatingthissortof

belief.

Iclaimthatweinmanycaseshavethesortofbeliefthatmyprinciple

Significance(fromthepreviouschapter)articulates:thatsomeproperty

specifiesamajorobjectivedifferencebetweenthingsthatinstantiateitand

thingsthatdon’t.Whatisamajordifference?Amajordifferenceisnotmerely

anobjectivedifference–eventhemostinconsequentialdifference,suchasthe

differencebetweenJonandJon#,willpresumablybegroundedinsome

fundamentaldifferenceorother.Amajordifferenceisadifferenceovermore

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thanjustanadjacent(orveryclose)determinateortwo.Thedifference

betweenred27andred28isnotamajordifference,eventhoughitisan

objectivedifference.

Thereisaveryspecialcircumstanceinwhichtwothingsmayseemto

differonlyoverasingledeterminate,butstillthedifferenceisamajor

difference.Thisisthecasewhensomequalityspaceisbounded,andtheloss

ofthedeterminateinquestiontakesthethingfromhavingaperipheralor

boundarydeterminatefromthespace,tonothavinganydeterminatefrom

thatspace.Imaginethatsomethingshrinksinsize,untilfinallyitnolonger

occupiesanyspaceatall.Thedifferencebetweenbeingextremelysmall,and

notoccupyinganyspaceatall,isinonesenseonlyadifferenceinasingle

determinate(wemaysayitisonlyadifferenceofaPlancklengthortwo)but

inanothersenseitisaseachange–somethingthatbeforewasspatial,nowis

non‐spatial.Thesamegoesforachangebetweensub‐dimensions.Something

thatisalmostperfectlyonedimensionalmayonlydifferfromsomethingthat

isperfectlyonedimensionalbyalittlebitofspatialextent,butthisdifference

isneverthelessaseachange(ifyoudoubtthis,thenyoudoubtthatone

dimensionalspatialobjectreallydoesspecifyanaturalsub‐dimension

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determinable,notthatceasingtoinstantiatesomesub‐dimension

determinableisaseachange).87

Withthisinmindwemaysaythatamajordifferenceisadifference

thatisnotaminimaldifferencewithinsomenaturalqualityspace–a

differenceofatleastseveraldeterminateswithinsomenaturalqualityspace,

oradifferencebetweenhavingandnothavingapropertybelongingtosucha

space.Formulatedinthismatter,thephenomenonofapropertybeing

Significant–thathavingitinvolvesamajordifferencefromanythingthatdoes

nothaveit–isquitetypical.Thereareagreatmanypropertiesthatseemtobe

significant:propertieslikebeingspatiotemporal,havingmassbutalso

propertieslikebeingintelligent,beingaliveandperhapsevenproperties

likebeingtall,beingrich.

Ineachcase,thereseemstobeamajordifferencebetweenanything

thathasthepropertyandanythingthatdoesnot–adifferenceofeitherat

leastafewnaturaldeterminates,oradifferencethatseemstobeaseachange.

Evenifthingsmaybemoreorlessalive,thedifferencebetweenbeingalive

andnotbeingaliveseemstobeaseachange.

87CfthedistinctionJohansson2000drawsbetweenLackofResemblanceandBeingVeryDissimilar.TwopropertiesLackResemblanceiftheyarenotdeterminatesofacommondeterminable,whiletwopropertiesaredissimilariftheyaredeterminatesofacommondeterminablebutnotveryclosetooneanotherintherelevantpropertyspace.

145

Itishardtodenythatphenomenalconsciousnessissignificantinthis

senseaswell–thedifferencebetweenbeingconsciousandnotbeing

consciousisaseachange,oranywayitisnotsimplyamatterofmovingone

determinatedowntheline.ButasIhavejustindicated,thissortofSignificance

israthercommon.HowdowegetfromtheSignificanceofphenomenal

consciousnesstoanydeepmetaphysicalconclusions?

Eventhoughtherearemanycaseswhereitiscorrecttoassertthata

givenpropertyisSignificant,thereactuallyarenotthatmanypropertiesout

therethatareSignificant.Determinates,bydefinition,arenotSignificant,but

neitherareregiondeterminables:ifaregiondeterminableisdeterminedby

somefixedsetofdeterminates,somethingfailstohavetheregion

determinablebybeingonedeterminatedownthelinefromthelast

determinatetodeterminethatdeterminable.

Howthencanitbecorrecttosay,‘Lifeissignificant’or‘Intelligenceis

significant’or‘Beingtallissignificant’?Theansweristhatthesetermsare

vague.Thismeansthatbetweenanyclearinstanceandanyclearnon‐instance

thereisano‐man’slandofborderlinecases.Ifwetakevaguenessintoaccount

wemayreformulateSignificance:

Propertypissignificant*iffthereisamajordifferencebetweenany

clearinstanceof‘P’andanyclearinstanceof‘~P’.

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Iuse‘clear’hereasasubstitutefor‘determinate’toavoidconfusion,

sinceinthisdiscussiontheterm‘determinate’isalreadyinuse.‘Clear’does

notstandforanyfurtherrestriction.Ifthepredicate‘P’isvaguethenitmaybe

slightlymisleadingtospeakofthepropertypsinceatleastonmostsemantic

accountsofvagueness,avaguepredicatedoesnotcorrespondtoanysingle

property;insteadthereareanumberofprecisepropertiesandthepredicate

indeterminatelycorrespondstoeachofthem.ButforeaseofformulationIwill

sometimesspeakinthematerialmode,unlessthesituationcallsfor

clarification.

Iclaim,then,thatagreatnumberofpropertiesaresignificant*.In

almosteverycase,however,thissignificanceisafunctionofvagueness.

Propertieslikebeingintelligent,beingalive,orbeingtallarenotnatural

dimensiondeterminables–butthepredicates‘BeingIntelligent’,‘BeingAlive’

and‘BeingTall’arevague.Butinthecasethatapropertyissignificant*but

notvague,thenthatpropertymustbeanaturaldimensionorsub‐dimension

determinable.

AsIargueinchapterstwoandthree,‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnot

vague.Thisimpliesthatiftheconceptisnotdefective–ifitdenotesaproperty

–thenthefactthatphenomenalconsciousnessisSignificant*impliesthat

phenomenalconsciousnessisanaturaldimension(orsub‐dimension)

determinable.Strictlyspeaking,itdoesnotquiteimplythis:strictlywhatit

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impliesisthatthedifferencebetweenanythingthatisaclearinstanceof

phenomenalconsciousnessandanythingthatisaclearinstanceofno

phenomenalconsciousnessisadifferenceofsomenaturaldimension(or

sub‐dimension)determinable.Butinsuchacasethemostconservativetheory

isthatthepropertyinquestionisitselfthedeterminableoverwhichits

instancesallvaryfromitsnon‐instances(oralternativelythatitisaBoolean

compoundofsuchdeterminables:aCartesianProductofdimension

determinables).88Iconcludethatsince‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague,

andsincephenomenalconsciousnessissignificant*,phenomenal

consciousnessisanaturaldimensiondeterminable.

§5.3: NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE

IntheprevioussectionIconsiderasortofdescriptivesignificancethata

propertycanhave.Idonotpresentanydirectargumentfortheclaimthat

phenomenalconsciousnessissignificant*,thoughIdosuggestthattheclaim

isveryintuitiveandthatindeedmanypropertiesaresignificant*.Inowturn

myattentiontowaysthatapropertycanbenormativelysignificant.Iwill

88Thealternativewouldbetosaythatdifferentkindsofdifferencebetweenconsciousnessandnonconsciousnessinvolvedifferencesoverdifferentdimensiondeterminables.

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considerafewwaysthatphenomenalconsciousnessisnormatively

significantandarguethattheseimplythatitissignificant*.

Phenomenalconsciousnessmattersbothmorallyandepistemically.89

Manydebatesabouttheethicalsignificanceofanimalshingeonwhether

animalsareinfactconscious.90Wehaveheretheideaboththatconsciousness

isapreconditionforbeingamoralpatient,andtheideathatconsciousness

hassomedistinctivesortofintrinsicvalue.Certainly,itishardtoresistthe

ideathatpainisbad,ortheideathatloveisvaluableinitself.

Onemightholdthatthoughthesespecificstatesaremorallyimportant,

thereisnoimportancetoconsciousnessassuch.Butitseems,tothecontrary,

thatconsciousnessassuchfigurescriticallyintheexplanationofwhyeachof

thesemorespecificstatesmatterinthewaytheydo.Itisdifficulttoidentify

anylessgeneralfeaturethatallofthestatesthatseemtomatterinthisway

haveincommon,anditisdifficulttothinkofaconsciousstatethatclearly

doesnotmatteratall–thereissomethingnormativelyseriousabout

extinguishingaconsciouslight,howeverdimitmaybe.Herethesuggestionis

notonlythatthecapacityforexperiencingmattersmorally,andso

89ButagainforalimiteddefenseofthedenialofthisclaimseeLeeforthcoming.Leearguesthatthoughtheremaybeaspecialsortofnormativesignificanceassociatedwithconsciousness,theremaybesomeanalogoussortofthing,schormativeschmignificance,associatedwithacertainsortofnon‐consciousbeing;forexample,anon‐conscioussuperficialfunctionalisomorphofaconsciousbeing.ButsolongasLeedoesnotdenythatconsciousnessisnormativelysignificant,hedoesnotdenythecentralclaimImakeinthissection.90CfThomasHuxley1874.

149

extinguishingthatcapacitymattersmorally,butalsothatwhetherornot

somethingisoccurentlyexperiencingmattersmorally(orifwewanttotalk

aboutstatesratherthanexperiencers,whetherornotastateisanexperiential

statemattersmorally)

Consciousnessalsoseemstobeepistemicallysignificant:accordingto

some,thejustificationforourepistemicattitudesmaydependonourbeing

consciousinformingthem.91Hereagain,onemightholdthatitisonlyspecific

statesthatareepistemicallyimportant.Inthisinstancethereisanatural

candidateforthemorespecificfeaturecommontoallconsciousstatesthat

matterepistemically–beingaperceptualstate.However,onaveryplausible

theoryofconsciousness,theAct‐Objectview,allconsciousstatesare

metaphysicallyofakindwithperceptualstates,andsopotentiallysuitedto

playtherelevantsortofjustificatoryrole.Also,itisplausiblethatsomenon‐

perceptualstatesplayajustificatoryrole,forexample,myheadachemay

justifymeinbelievingthatIhaveaheadache.92

Howdowegetfromthesenormativeobservationstoametaphysical

conclusion?Theansweristhatnormativefactsnotonlysuperveneon

descriptivefacts,butalsoaconstitutivepresuppositionofnormativeinquiryis

91CfDeclanSmithies2006andLeesupra.92CfPryor2000.

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thatnormativefactsarenotbrutefacts.93Superveniencealonedoesnot

guaranteeusmuch,buttheconstitutivepresuppositionofnormativeinquiry

seemstobethatifthereisamajornormativedifferencebetweentwocases

thentherehadbetteralsobeamajordescriptivedifferencebetweenthose

cases.Itmaysometimesbedifficulttosaywhatmakesanormativedifference

amajornormativedifference,andsoinpracticethisprinciplemaynotalways

giveusausefuldecisionprocedure.Butwemaytakeitthatthedifference

betweenhavingandlackingthenormativestatusthatconsciousnessbestows

isamajornormativedifference.Assuch,itmustsuperveneonamajor

descriptivedifference.

PhenomenalConsciousnessisnottheonlypropertythatis

normativelysignificant.Lifemaybenormativelysignificant,asmaybe

Intelligence.Butaswesawintheprevioussection,thereisnodifficultyin

sayingthatthosepropertiesaresignificant*.Wemaysaythiseventhoughwe

donotbelieveinElanVitalorIntellectualEntelechy,because‘Life’and

‘Intelligence’arebothvague,anditiseasyforapropertytobesignificant*if

thepredicatethatcanonicallyexpressesitisvague(sotospeak94).

93CfDworkin2011,Nagel1986.94Rememberthatstrictlyspeaking,Significance*isacharacteristicofpredicatesratherthanproperties;Idonotpresupposeherethattherearevagueproperties.Butitisusefultotalkthatway.CfSchiffer2003.

151

Sowehavethatifapropertyisnormativelysignificantthenitis

significant*.Butaswesawintheprevioussection,ifapropertyissignificant*

andnon‐vague,thenitisanaturaldimensionorsub‐dimensiondeterminable.

PhenomenalConsciousnessisnormativelysignificant,andIhaveargued

that‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon‐vague.ItfollowsthatPhenomenal

Consciousnessisanaturaldimensionorsub‐dimensiondeterminable.95

§5.4: IF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS IS A NATURAL DIMENSION (OR SUB-DIMENSION) DETERMINABLE THEN PROPERTY DUALISM OR PANPSYCHISM IS TRUE

Withwhichmaterialpropertiesmightweidentifytheproperty

phenomenalconsciousness,ifphenomenalconsciousnessisanatural

dimensionorsub‐dimensiondeterminable?Whichmaterialpropertiesspecify

anentire(sub)dimensionofsimilarityanddifference?Thisisanelitecategory.

Spatialityseemstobesuchaproperty,asdotemporalityandcausality,

thoughmanytaketheultimatenaturalcategorytobespatiotemporality

95Anotherroutetothisconclusionwouldevaluatewhethersomethingcouldbeanindeterminatecaseofthenormativestatusbestowedbytherelevantproperty.Ifwefind,forexample,thatnothingcanbeanindeterminatecaseofthenormativestatusassociatedwithbeingalive,thenthesignificance*ofbeingalivethatcomesduetothevaguenessof‘Life’maynotbeadequatetocountenancethenormativesignificanceoflife–wemightthenhavereasontorethinkVitalism.Someonewhowasunpersuadedbymyargumentthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvaguemightneverthelessbepersuadedbytheargumentthattherearenoborderlinecasesof‘HavingtheIntrinsicValuethatConsciousnessbestows’or‘Havingthecapacityforepistemicjustification’,andthismightbeanotherroutetoourconclusion.

152

ratherthanspatialityandtemporality,oranywaytheytakespatialityand

temporalitytobesub‐dimensionsofspatiotemporality(ortheytake

spatiotemporalitytosubsumeintosomeyetmoregeneralspace,e.g.some

multi‐dimensionalphasespace).

Wemightidentifyphenomenalconsciousnesswithasub‐dimension

ratherthanadimension.Thiswidensourcandidatepoolalittlebit.Wemay

considerbeingthesortofthingthatcancollapseawavefunction,orbeing

threedimensional.Butthisisnotmuchofanimprovement.Wemayalso

allowthatphenomenalconsciousnessisactuallysomesortofBoolean

compound,orCartesianproduct,ofnaturaldimensions–forexamplebeing

threedimensionalandbeingthesortofthingthatcancollapseawave

functionbutthisagainwillnotwidenourcandidatepoolverymuch.

Itisimportanttonotconfusetheclaimthatphenomenal

consciousnessisanatural(sub)dimensiondeterminablewiththeclaimthat

consciousnessissomekindofcausalthreshold–theneuronthatcompletes

thecircuit.Therearetheoriesonwhichphenomenalconsciousnessinvolves

suchacausalorstructuralthreshold,forexamplethe40Hztheory,orthe

Orch‐OrTheory,butthesetheoriesdoimplythatphenomenalconsciousness

isnotanaturaldimension(sub)determinable.40Hzdoesnotdifferoverany

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dimensionorsub‐dimensionofrealqualityspacefrom39Hz.96TheOrch‐Or

theorysaysthatconsciousnessarisesinvirtueofsomesortofsynchronicity

betweenratesofneuronalfiring,andthedecoherencetimeofquantum

processinginsideneuronalcellwalls.Nopropertyalongtheselinesiseven

remotelyclosetobeingadimensionofqualityspace.Itakeitthatifweare

lookingtophysics,ourbestbetwouldbesomefeatureassociatedwiththe

powertocollapsewavefunctions.Thisisarguablyabasicdeterminable

dimensionorsub‐dimensionofcausalpower,andthecollapseofwave

functionsdoesseemtohavesomethingtodowithphenomenal

consciousness.97Butthereareseveralreasonswhysuchanidentification

wouldbeproblematic.Foronething,onsomerespectabletheories,like

GRW98,verysmallsystemscancollapsewavefunctions,sotheproposalmight

amounttosomethinginthevicinityofPanpsychism.99Foranotherthing,even

96The40HzandOrch‐Ortheoriesareinfactbothcouchedinvaguelanguage,butwecanimagineperfectlyprecisemodifications.FormoreonGammaWave(40Hz)theory,seeCrickandKoch1990.FormoreonOrch‐OrseePenrose1989andHameroff1998.ForanargumentthatOrch‐OrisempiricallyinadequateseeTegmark2000.97AnotherexamplemightbeTonini’sPhi.IfweholdthatanyamountofPhicorrespondstosomeamountofconsciousness,thenaversionofPanpsychismfollows,butthereisalsoaquestionofwhetherPhireallydescribesaproperdimensionofqualityspace.Ontheotherhand,thesuggestionthatthereissomenon‐zerovalueofphithatistheminimalvaluegivingrisetoconsciousnessisinviolationoftheprinciplethatphenomenalconsciousnessisanaturaldimensiondeterminable.98FormoreontheGhirardi‐Rimini‐WeberinterpretationofquantummechanicsseeforexampleGhirardi,Rimini,Weber1985andAlbert1993.99PanpsychismalsofollowswithoutassumingGRWifweconclude,asweperhapsshould,thattherelevantsub‐dimensionissomethinglikebeingpotentiallycausallyinvolvedinthecollapseofawavefunction.Allmoreselectivepropertiesinthevicinitymaybedeterminatesofthisone.Butthisisaveryeasypropertytoinstantiate,barringsomeappropriatenaturaljointinthevicinityofcausalinvolvement.

154

ifitdoesnotamounttoPanpsychismitmightrunusafoulofthemental

problemofthemanysinceifonecomplexphysicalsystemhasthepowerto

collapsewavefunctionsthenpresumablysodoesanyalmostentirely

overlappingcomplexphysicalsystem.Finally,anidentificationleavesyouwith

twomysteries:ontheonehandtheExplanatoryGap(whyisphenomenal

consciousnessidenticaltotheabilitytocollapsewavefunctions,ratherthan

somethingelse?),andontheotherthequestionofwhyexactlythesethings,

ratherthanotherthings,havetheabilitytocollapsewavefunctions.Itisno

explanationtosaythattheydosobecausetheyareconscious:identitiesdonot

explaininthisway.PropertyDualismseemsthemoresensiblerouteatthis

stage:weavoidtheexplanatorygap,andwegetanexplanationofthephysical

laws(thesethingshavetheabilitybecausetheyareconscious)–andin

additionwefindsomethingnomologicallyusefulforconsciousnesstodo.But

inanycase,thatphenomenalconsciousnessisanatural(sub)dimension

determinablemeansfarmorethanthatphenomenalconsciousnessissome

kindofcausalthresholdphenomenon–soifweseektoidentifyitwithany

sortofphysicalphenomenon,weseemtohavetodosoinawaythatmakes

somethinginthevicinityofPanpsychismtrue.

Itisimportantnottoconfusetheintuitionthatphenomenal

consciousnessisanaturaldimensiondeterminablewiththeeasier‐to‐

countenancethoughtthatconsciousthingsaredistinguishedfromnearbynon‐

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consciousthings.100Onewaytosuccumbtothistemptationistotake

something’sbeingacausalthresholdtomakeitanadequatereductionbase

forphenomenalconsciousness,butanotherwayistotakesomething’s

markingasortofmetaphysicalthresholdtomakeitanadequatereduction

base.Itistemptingtocountenancethedifferencebetweenconscious

individualsandnon‐consciousindividualsbycombiningsomesortof

requirementofphysicalcomplexity,withsomeextrametaphysicalcomponent.

Forexample,aswediscussedinsectionone,youmightsaythatmereological

compositionisrestricted,andthatphenomenalconsciousnessisphysical

conditionC,butbeingthesortofmereologicallystructuredentitythatyou

havetobetoinstantiateCalreadymakesyouspecial:mostarbitrary

collectionsofparticlesdonotcomposeasum.Oryoumightbeauniversalist

aboutmereologicalcomposition,buttaketheretobeadistinctionbetweenthe

persistenceconditionsoftruesubstances,whichcansurvivethechangeof

parts,andmerejunkcomposites,whichcannot.Thenyoumightsaythat

consciousnessisthephysicalconditionCfortruesubstances–inotherwords,

itisthecompositepropertyofbeingatruesubstanceandbeingC.

100Wemightcharacterizetheclaimthatphenomenalconsciousnessisathresholdpropertyastheclaimthatphenomenalconsciousnessislocallysignificant:clearcasesof‘PhenomenallyConscious’exhibitsomemajordifferencefromallspatiotemporallynearbyclearcasesof‘NotPhenomenallyConscious’.

156

Butourdataisnotmerelythatconsciousthingsstandapartfromnon‐

consciousthings,itisthatconsciousnessisitsown(sub)dimensioninsome

objectivequalityspace.Simplytakingmereologicalcompositestobesparse

onthegrounddoesnotmakeanordinaryphysicalpropertylikeCintoa

dimensionofqualityspace–northecompositepropertybeingCandbeing

mereologicallystructured.Thepropertyofbeingmereologically

structuredisperhapsitsowndimensionofqualityspace,anditisaccordingly

opentoustosaythatbeingconsciousisbeingmereologicallystructured.

Similarremarksgoforbeingatruesubstance.Butineithercase,weinherit

theworstofbothworlds.Phenomenalconsciousnessgetsidentifiedwith

somethingweunderstandinanentirelydifferentway,givingrisetothe

ExplanatoryGap,andthissomethingelseiseitherstronglyemergentand

ungroundedinanyordinarymaterialfeatures(andsonorealgainfromthe

standpointofparsimonyoverPropertyDualism),orsomethinginthevicinity

ofPanpsychismistrue.

Afinalquestioniswhethertheremightbehiddendimensionsof

objectivesimilarityanddifference:whether,forexample,thepropertyCinour

previousexamplesmightjustturnouttobeanaturaldimensiondeterminable,

eventhoughitdoesnotseemtobe,andourcanonicalphysicalconceptsofthis

apparentlyordinaryphysicalpropertydonotdisclosethatitis.

157

Thissuggestionisdifferentfromthemoreplausiblesuggestionthat

somehigh‐levelorcomplexpropertiesmightneverthelessbenatural.That

suggestion,charitablyconstrued,isjustthesuggestionthatdeterminable

properties(regiondeterminablesordimensiondeterminables)canbenatural,

andasIhaveargued,somethinginthevicinityofthisthoughthastobe

correct.Thepresentsuggestioncomparesbetterwiththesuggestionthatit

turnsoutthatgrueismorenaturalthangreenorblue.Butitisactuallyless

plausibleeventhanthatsuggestion.

Itisevenlessplausiblebecause,whenitcomestodeterminable

properties,weindividuatethosepropertiesintermsofthesimilarityrelations

theyimposeontherelevantclassofdeterminates.Itisnotanoptiontosay

thatthefactthatredismoresimilartoorangethanitistogreen,isthesame

factasthefactthatthesoundofatromboneismoresimilartothesoundof

asackbutthanitistothesoundofatheorbo.Likewise,itisnousepointing

tosomepropertywhichweidentifyasaregiondeterminableinsomeordinary

physicalorfunctionalclassofproperties,andthenidentifyingitwithsome

otherdeterminablegroundingsomeentirelydifferentsetofsimilarityor

differencerelations.Neithermayweidentifythesimilarityrelationsof

phenomenalconsciousness,whichmusthavethestructureofadimension,

withsomealreadyexistentclassofsimilarityrelationsthatdonothaveafull

dimensionalorsub‐dimensionalstructure.

158

Onefinalhopewouldbetoconcedethatconsciousnessisinthe

relevantsenseaprimitiveproperty:asuigenerissetofsimilarityand

differencerelationswithafull(sub)dimensionalstructurebetweennatural

determinates,butneverthelessholdoutthatthenaturaldeterminatesit

relatesarephysical.Itakeittobeplausiblethatifacollectionofdeterminates

isphysical,thenthedeterminablesofthosedeterminatesshouldalsobe

physical.Idonotseeanyknockdownargumentforthisconclusion.Butwhat

wouldbethegainofsuchanidentification?Itwouldamounttoholdingthat

thereissomefulldimensionalsimilaritystructurethatwehavenotidentified

inanymorescientificallyacceptabletermsamongsomerealmofphysical

determinates.Thiswillofnecessityamounttosayingthatthereareobjective

similaritiesanddifferencesbetweenphysicalpropertiesthattheircanonical

physicaldescriptionsdonotdisclose.Itisnotatallobviousthatthetheoretical

virtueofsuchapartialdualismoutweighthevirtuesofamorestraightforward

dualism.

§5.5: THE NATURAL DIMENSION ARGUMENT VERSUS THE CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT

Ihavegivenseveralargumentsfromaconceptualpremise–thenon‐

vaguenessoftheconcept‘PhenomenallyConscious’–toametaphysical

159

conclusion–PropertyDualismorPanpsychism.Fromadistance,thissoundsa

lotlikeaconceivabilityargument.Isnotmyargumentreallyjusttheusual

conceivabilityargumentindisguise?

Theconceivabilityargumentinvolvesthecriticalepistemic‐ontological

linkingprinciplethateverythingconceivableispossible.Thereisnoprinciple

inmyargumentplayingthatrole.Iappealtoacriticalepistemic‐semantic

linkingprincipleinmyargumentthat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnotvague,

buttogettothemetaphysicalconclusionIaddthemetaphysicalpremisethat

phenomenalconsciousnessissignificant*.

Therearequestionsabouthowthismetaphysicalpremiseisjustified.

Here,theremaybeanepistemic‐ontologicallinkingprincipleinplay–the

movefromthepremisethatsomepropertyseemstobesignificant*tothe

conclusionthatitissignificant*.Aswesaw,significance*basicallycomesfor

freeiftheconceptcanonicallyexpressingthepropertyinquestionisvague.

Sinceaconceptingeneralonlyseemsvagueifitisvague,thismightgiveusa

restricteddefenseoftheprinciple.Therearealsomoregeneralreasonsto

accepttheprinciple.Itmaybethatmanyofourobjectivesimilarityjudgments

aremandatedbytheconceptswithwhichwemakethem,sothatthose

conceptswouldbedefectiveifthepropertiestheyexpresseddidnotmake

thosejudgmentstrue.Thiswouldnotquitegiveustheprinciplethatifa

propertyseemssignificant*thenitissignificant*,butitwouldgiveusthatifa

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propertyseemssignificant*theneitheritisorthecanonicalconceptofthat

propertyisdefective.Otherreasonstoacceptthislinkingprinciplehavetodo

withageneralanti‐skepticalapproachtometaphysics.Howdoweknowthat

grueislessnaturalthangreenorblue?Oneaustereresponseistosaythat

actuallythesebeliefsarenotjustified,andonlysciencecanteachusanything

aboutobjectivesimilarity–ourprescientificintuitionsatbestonlyshowus

thestructureofobjectivesimilarityrelations.Thisresponsemaybetoo

austere,however,sinceitishardtoseehowtodoscienceunlessyoubring

withyouabasiccapacitytoidentifysimilaritiesanddifferencesintermsof

spatiotemporalstructure,causalstructure,etc.

Sothereisawaytojustifymyclaimthatphenomenalconsciousnessis

significant*intermsofageneralepistemic‐ontologicallinkingprinciple.But

thisisaverydifferentprinciplefromthesortthatadherentsoftheclassical

Conceivabilityargumentuse(thatsortofprinciplesayssomethingaboutthe

linkbetweentheConceivabilityofsomepropositionorstateofaffairsandits

Possibility).Rejectingthatsortofprincipledoesnothingtomotivatea

rejectionoftheoneIhaveinmind.Andsuchaprinciplemaynotbetheonly

waytodefendthepremisethatphenomenalconsciousnessissignificant*.

Myargumentinsectionthreefromthenormativesignificanceofphenomenal

consciousnesstoitssignificance*hingesonspecialfeaturesofphenomenal

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consciousnessthatmakeitsignificant*evenifthegenerallinkingprincipleis

false.

Iconcludebybrieflysketchingadifferentargumentforthedisjunction

ofPropertyDualismorPanpsychism,fromthesortsofprinciplesIhave

invoked,butthatlooksmoreexplicitlylikeaconceivabilityargument.

ThisargumentmakesuseofthenotionofaCanonicalConceptofsome

property–aconceptthatseemstodisclosethenatureoressenceofthe

propertyinquestion,oranywaysomeaspectofitsnatureoressence.Consider

thelinkingprinciple:IfpropertyPisobjectivelysimilartopropertyQ,thenfor

anycanonicalconcept‘P’ofPtheremustbesomecanonicalconcept‘Q’ofQ

thatgivesusapositiveconceptionofthatsimilarity.

InchapterthreeIarguethat‘PhenomenallyConscious’isnon

excludable–thatwehavenopositiveconceptionofwhatitistonotbe

phenomenallyconscious;onlyanegativeconception.Iexploitthenon‐

excludabilityofthisconcepttoargueforitsnon‐vagueness.Buthereweargue

directlyfromnon‐excludability:Supposethatphenomenalconsciousnessis

similartobutdistinctfromsomephysicalpropertyp(nothingthatispis

phenomenallyconscious).Butthenthenon‐excludabilityof‘Phenomenal

Consciousness’stronglysuggeststhattherewillbenocanonicalconceptofp

thatgivesusapositiveconceptionofhowpisobjectivelysimilarto

phenomenalconsciousness.Iamnotsurewhatreasonwehavetoacceptthe

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linkingprincipleofthisargument,independentofourreasonstoacceptthe

linkingprincipleofthestandardconceivabilityargument.Thislinking

principleiscertainlyclosertotheclassicalconceivability‐possibilitylinking

principlethanisthelinkingprincipletellingusthatifapropertyseemstobe

significant*thenitissignificant*.However,itisnotobviousthatrejectionof

theclassicallinkingprincipleentailsrejectionoftheoneIconsiderinthis

section.

Ifyourejecttheclassicallinkingprincipleoftheconceivability

argumentyourejecttheclaimthatallidentitystatementsareapriori,andyou

alsorejecttheclaimthatallidentitystatementsareapriorientailedbythe

microphysicalfacts,orbytheontologicallyfundamentalfacts.Butthepresent

linkingprincipledoesnotimplyotherwise.Thereisnorequirementherethat

everycanonicalconceptofpandqdisclosep’smetaphysicalrelationtoq,but

onlythatoneofthemdoes.Soifp=qtheprincipleissatisfiedby‘PisP’.SoI

takeittobeanopenquestionwhetherthisargumentgetsusanywhere.Butin

anycase,itisverydifferentfromtheargumentatthecenterofthischapter.

Thoughalinkingprincipleisusefulthere,itmaynotbenecessary,andinany

eventitisalinkingprincipleofaverydifferentorderfromthelinking

principleoftheclassicalconceivabilityargument,orofthevariantIhavejust

sketchedhere.

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The Sharp Contour of Consciousness - Jonathan Simon

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