THE ROLE OF COMPETING ALTERNATIVES AND EPISTEMIC MOTIVATIONS

Social Cognition, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1988, pp. 1-20

CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS

IN HYPOTHESIS TESTING:

THE ROLE OF COMPETING ALTERNATIVES

AND EPISTEMIC MOTIVATIONS

ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI AND OFRA MAYSELESS

Tel-Aviv University

Two experiments were executed to study how persons test hypotheses about

others. Experiment 1 demonstrated that subjects can be sensitive to contextual ly

presented alternatives to a given hypothesis. Subjects who addressed the hypotheses

that an interviewee was an architect or a painter selected different information

than did those who addressed the hypotheses that the interviewee was an architect

or a computer engineer. In both cases, subjects' informational choices appeared

guided by the principle of diagnosticity. Notably, they predominantly selected

information whose diagnostic value with respect to the pertinent hypothesis-alternative pair was high rather than low. Experiment 2 demonstrated that subjects'

sensitivity to a contextually mentioned alternative (architect) to a given target

hypothesis (painter) may be affected by their motivational orientation. Subjects

with a high need for openness (as manipulated by high fear of invalidity) and

low need for closure were more likely to seek diagnostic information demarcatingthe hypothesis from the alternative than subjects with a high need for closure

and low fear of invalidity. Thus, the present research highlights the subjective

determinants of information diagnosticity: It suggests that diagnosticity may depend

on the cognitive context of hypothesis testing (the type of alternatives juxtaposedto a target hypothesis), and on individuals' epistemic motivations, which may

affect their sensitivity to contextually suggested hypotheses.

The process of information gathering in the course of forming judgmentsabout others has long been of interest to social psychologists (cf.

Festinger, 1954; Jones, 1964; Kelley & Thibaut, 1969). Recently, a flurryof research on this issue has revolved about information-gathering

This paper was writtenwhile Arie W. Kruglanski was on leave from Tel-Aviv University

at the University of Wisconsin -Madison, and Ofra Mayseless held a postdoctoral

appointment at the University of California -Berkeley. Requests for reprints should be

sent to Arie W. Kruglanski, who is now at the Department of Psychology, University

of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

1

2 KRUGLANSKI AND MAYSELESS

"strategies" that is, principles of information selection employed by

hypothesis-testing persons. Interest in the topic was instigated by the

provocative works of Snyder and his colleagues (cf. Snyder, 1981;

Snyder & Gangestad, 1982; Snyder & Swann, 1978), who suggestedthat individuals pervasively employ a "confirmatory" strategy in

other words, prefer to examine information consistent with their hy

pothesis over information inconsistent with it, or consistent with a

competing alternative.

In the experimental paradigm devised by Snyder and colleagues,

subjects test a hypothesis about a target's personality by acting as

interviewers and selecting from a pre-existing list the interview questionsto be used. The list contains items (1) consistent with the target hy

pothesis, (2) inconsistent with it or consistent with the alternative,

and (3) neutral with regard to the hypothesis and the alternative. For

example, in a typical study subjects are asked to judge whether a

target person is an extravert. To do so, they select interview items

out of a list with questions already presupposing extraversion (referringto extraverted qualities such as sociability), questions presupposingintroversion (referring to introverted qualities such as shyness), and

"neutral" questions incapable of discriminating between extraversion

and introversion. If subjects are guided by a confirmatory strategy,

they should prefer "extraverted" (over "introverted" or "neutral")

questions when testing the extravert hypothesis, and "introverted"

(over "extraverted" or "neutral") questions when testing the introvert

hypothesis. Precisely such preferences were observed repeatedly in

Snyder and colleagues' hypothesis-testing studies.

An alternative interpretation of Snyder's findings was offered byTrope and Bassok (1982, 1983; Trope, Bassok, & Alon, 1984). These

investigators argued that rather than employing a confirmatory strategy,hypothesis-testing subjects typically adopt a diagnostic strategy,

whereby they gather information that best allows them to discriminate

between the hypothesis and the alternative. According to this argument,Snyder's results could be restricted to the special case where diagnosticinformation is also "confirmatory," or highly characteristic of (probableunder) the hypothesis.

Snyder and his associates, as well as Trope and Bassok, typicallyused in their research bipolar traits in which one end of the dimension

immediately calls to mind the opposite end. For example, the "extravert"

hypothesis naturally contrasts with the "introvert" alternative, and

the "polite" hypothesis contrasts with the "impolite" alternative. Inother words, previous research has typically dealt with the case in

which a hypothesis is tested against a definite (if only an implicit)alternative. In such conditions, it is indeed reasonable to look for

CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS IN HYPOTHESIS TESTING 3

diagnostic evidence (cf. Trope & Bassok, 1983) affording a decision

between the competing hypotheses.But what about cases where the layperson tests a single hypothesis

without considering definite alternatives? For instance, one could wish

to know whether John is an engineeer without juxtaposing this to an

alternative profession, orwhetherMary is atworkwithout contrastingit with alternative whereabouts. Indeed, Tweeney, Doherty, Worner,

Pliske, and Mynatt (1980), using a rule discovery task, reported dif

ficulties in getting their subjects to generate even two viable hypothesesat a time; this suggests that the testing of single hypotheses may be

quite common (cf. Klayman & Ha, 1985).

Arguably, in the single-hypothesis case as well, the hypothesisis tested against some (diffuse) alternative, notably its own negation.Thus, the hypothesis that John is an engineer is tested against the

alternative that he is not, and so on. The question is what type of

information would be sought after under such circumstances. Con

ceivably, it would be information about characteristic attributes per

ceived as unique to the category featured in the hypothesis. In other

words, when testing a single hypothesis, the layperson may have at

the back of his or her mind a diffuse set of alternatives and may select

a unique feature that sets apart the hypothesis from those alternatives

(and hence is diagnostic in regard to those alternatives). For example,when testing the single hypothesis that a given creature is a dog, one

might seek evidence for barking, because this seems unique to dogsas compared to other relevant categories that come to mind.

In other circumstances, however, the individual may wish to test

the dog hypothesis against a specific alternative (e.g., that the creature

is a person known to imitate animals). In such a case, barking may

not appear discriminative or diagnostic, whereas a different feature

(e.g., fur) may. This analysis implies that depending on whether the

individual is testing a given hypothesis singly or in reference to a

competing hypothesis, he or she may search for entirely different

types of information. The question is under what condition such

testing of of single versus multiple hypotheses may take place. One

possibility is that the competing alternative may be contextually given.For instance, in a recently completed study (Mayseless & Kruglanski,

1986), subjects in one condition were asked to test the hypothesisthat the target was a painter; in another condition that he or she was

an architect; and in a third condition that he or she was an architect

or a painter. As expected, subjects in the painter condition asked for

features characteristic of painters (e.g., artistic ability, Bohemian life

style); subjects in the architect condition asked for features characteristic

of architects (e.g., artistic ability, orderliness); and subjects in the


architect versus painter condition asked for features discriminative

between painters and architects (e.g., Bohemian life style, orderliness).Similar findings were reported by Bassok and Trope (1984).

Beyond its impact on individuals' tendency to test a hypothesis

singly or against specific alternatives, the particular context may de

termine the content of competing alternatives a person may entertain.

Thus, in testing the dog hypothesis, persons in one context may

consider the alternative that the animal is instead a cat, whereas

persons in another context may consider the alternative that it is a

wolf. In turn, such divergent alternatives may appropriately affect

the type of diagnostic information the persons will seek. Those notions

were investigated in the first experiment presented in this report.

Furthermore, persons' motivations may affect their sensitivity to

contextually suggested alternatives. For example, persons' need for

cognitive closure is assumed to dull their sensitivity to alternate hy

potheses, whereas their need for cognitive openness may sharpensuch sensitivity (cf. Kruglanski, 1987). Both needs were manipulatedin our second experiment and compared with a motivationally neutral

condition. We predicted that subjects' tendency to prefer information

characteristic of a given hypothesis over information diagnostic with

respect to the hypothesis and an alternative would increase as a function

of subjects' need for closure, and decrease as a function of their need

for openness.

EXPERIMENT 1

METHOD

Constructing the Question List

Experiment 1 tested the following predictions, based on the generalnotion that diagnosticity is context-dependent: (1) When testing a

hypothesis against a specific, contextually given alternative, subjectsshould prefer information with high (rather than low) diagnostic valuewith respect to the hypothesis and this particular alternative. Fur

thermore, (2) when testing the same hypothesis against a different

alternative, subjects should prefer appropriately different informa

tion this time, diagnostic with respect to the hypothesis and the

second alternative. To investigate these ideas, we created an informationlist in which items of high versus low diagnosticity with respect to

the hypothesis and one alternative were orthogonally crossed with

items of high versus low diagnosticity with respect to the hypothesisand another alternative.


To accomplish this, a general pool of relevant items was first

generated by one group of subjects. These items' diagnostic values

with regard to the target hypothesis and each of the two alternatives

were then assessed by different groups of individuals. The generating

group consisted of 30 undergraduates at Tel-Aviv University assigned

randomly to three conditions. Each subject was asked to generate 20

questions, allegedly to be used in a personality questionnaire. In one

condition the questionnaire was said to identify the typical personalityof painters; in the second condition, it was said to identify the typical

personality of architects; and in the third, it was said to help differentiate

between architects and painters. Subjects in all three conditions were

asked to generate questions that could be answered by a "yes" or a

"no," and that pertained to a variety of features (e.g., personalitycharacteristics, habits, behavior, or opinions).

From the initial pool of 600 questions, we selected 117 accordingto the following criteria: The questions chosen (1) had to refer to

heterogeneous features, (2) represented in equal proportions the three

experimental conditions, and (3) represented in equal proportions

positively and negatively worded items. In the next phase, a separate

group of 26 subjects (similar in type to the generating group) rated

the questions' diagnostic values. Subjects were tested in groups of 2

to 3, assigned randomly to one of two conditions, resulting in 13

subjects per condition. In one condition, subjects assessed each of

the 117 questions for the extent to which it tapped features distinguishingan architect from a painter. In the second condition, subjects assessed

the same questions for features distinguishing an architect from a

computer engineer.1In both conditions, subjects made their ratings on 7-point scales.

One end of those scales stated that a "yes" (or a "no") answer to the

question indicated that the feature referred to was very discriminative

between an architect and a painter or between an architect and a

computer engineer. The opposite end stated that a "yes" (or "no")

answer indicated that the feature was not very discriminative between

an architect and a painter or between an architect and a computer

engineer. In addition, subjects indicated for each question what theyassumed to be the answer ("yes" or "no") of an architect and a painteror an architect and a computer engineer. After having responded in

1. While the original pool of 117 items (constructed in connection with previous research)

did not include questions expressly designed to differentiate between architects and

computer engineers, items on that list were readily classifiable into those with high

versus low diagnostic values in regard to the architect -computer engineer pair.


this manner to all questions, subjects were thoroughly debriefed and

dismissed.

The final question list included 12 questions, with 3 items in each

classification of a 2 x 2 design where items of high and low diagnosticvalues between an architect and a painter were orthogonally crossed

with items of high and low diagnostic values between an architect

and a computer engineer. The high and low items in each classification

were selected according to the mean values of subjects' ratings in the

appropriate conditions. Thus, the high and low items had respectivemean values above or below the midpoint (point 4) of the scale. The

high items in each classification were also selected according to the

degree of between-subject consensus. At least 11 out of the 13 subjectsin the appropriate rating condition had to agree on the assumed

answer of an architect, a painter, or a computer engineer for an item

to be included in the high category. For obvious reasons, the consensus

criterion was not employed when choosing items low on diagnosticity;

notably, the latter items were not presumed to represent questionsto which painters, architects, or computer engineers would give uniform

answers.

We also submitted the diagnosticity ratings to several statistical

analyses. For each type of rating, we performed a two-way 2x2

within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA), using the data of subjectsfrom the appropriate rating condition. Furthermore, we computed

alpha coefficients to assess between subjects' agreement concerningthe ratings. The alpha coefficient for judges' ratings of architect versus

painter diagnostic values was .86. The only significant effect in a two-

way within-subjects ANOVA was that of architect versus painter di

agnostic values, F (1, 12)= 22.08, p < .0005; the respective means of

high and low conditions were 4.25 and 2.43. The alpha coefficient for

ratings of architect versus computer engineer diagnostic values was.84. The only significant effect in a two-way ANOVA was that of

architect versus computer engineer diagnostic values, F (1, 12) = 82.4,

p < .00005; the respective means of high and low conditions were

4.22 and 2.39. The question list constructed in this fashion was used

in the following experiment.

Subjects and Procedure

Subjects in the experiment were 30 undergraduates of Tel-Aviv Uni

versity particpating for course credit. They were randomly assignedto two experimental conditions that differed in the interviewing objectivein reference to which questions were to be selected. In one condition,the objective was to determine whether an interviewee was an architect


or a painter, and in the second condition whether he or she was an

architect or a computer engineer.

Subjects were handed the 12-item question list described above,

and were asked to select the 6 most helpful questions for conductingtheir assigned interview. Specifically, in one condition subjects chose

questions in order to tell whether an interviewee was an architect or

a painter, and in the second condition they chose questions in order

to tell whether he or she was an architect or a computer engineer.After selecting their respective questions, subjects were thoroughlydebriefed and asked not to discuss the study with other potential

participants. This concluded the experiment.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The mean numbers of questions in different categories chosen in the

two experimental conditions are given in Table 1, and the marginalsums for the question categories by hypothesis-testing condition are

given in Table 2. Note that for each hypothesis-testing condition the

marginal sums total 6, corresponding to the number of questions

subjects were asked to select.

As may be seen, the distribution of selected questions correspondsto our predictions. Specifically, in the architect-painter condition,

subjects chose on the average considerably more questions with high

(marginal sum=

4.50) as opposed to low (marginal sum=

1.50)architect versus painter diagnostic values, whereas they chose an

almost equal number of questions in the high (marginal sum=

3.33)

TABLE 1

Mean Numbers of Questions Chosen by Category and Hypothesis-

Testing Condition (Experiment 1)

ARCHITECT - PAINTER

ARCHITECT -COMPUTER ENGINEER

DIAGNOSTIC VALUE

DIAGNOSTIC VALUE LOW HIGH

ARCHITECT VERSUS PAINTER HYPOTHESES

Low

High

0.60

2.07

0.90

2.43

ARCHITECT VERSUS COMPUTER ENGINEER HYPOTHESES

Low

High

0.53

0.73

2.57

2.17


TABLE 2

Marginal Sums for Question Categories by Hypothesis-Testing Condition

(Experiment 1)

ARCHITECT VERSUS

ARCHITECT VERSUS COMPUTER ENGINEER

PAINTER HYPOTHESES HYPOTHESES

Architect -painter diagnostic valueLow 1.50 3.10

High 4.50 2.90

Architect -computer engineer diagnostic value

Low 2.67 1.26

High 3.33 4.74

and low (marginal sum = 2.67) architect versus computer engineer

diagnostic values. Furthermore, in the architect- computer engineercondition, subjects chose considerably more questions with high(marginal sum

= 4.74) than low (marginal sum=

1.26) architect versus

computer engineer diagnostic values, whereas they chose a more

nearly equal number of questions with high (marginal sum= 3.10)

and low (marginal sum=

2.90) architect versus painter diagnosticvalues.

It is noteworthy that the data given above are ipsative in nature.

Because of the constant number of questions (6) subjects were allowedto select, question frequencies in different categories were not inde

pendent. This feature precluded the use of conventional statistical

analyses (such as the ANOVA) that assume independence. Instead,we computed for each subject an architect versus painter diagnosticscore, consisting of the mean architect versus painter diagnostic valuesof questions selected by that subject. Similarly, we computed for each

subject an architect versus computer engineer diagnostic score, con

sisting of the mean architect versus computer engineer diagnosticvalues of questions selected by that subject.

The results of the two t tests performed on these measures were

significant. Specifically, the mean architect versus painter diagnosticscore in the architect-painter condition was 21.88, and in the archi

tect-computer engineer condition it was 19.17, t (28) = 4.92, p <

.0005. Furthermore, the mean architect versus computer engineerdiagnostic score in the architect-computer engineer condition was

23.53, and in the architect-painter condition it was 20.68, t (28) = 5.85,

p < .0005.

As another means of testing our prediction, addressing a somewhatdifferent feature of the data, we computed for each subject an architect


versus painter and an architect versus computer engineer diagnosticratio. This was accomplished by dividing the numbers of questionsin the high-diagnosticity category by those in the low-diagnosticity

category. As expected, the architect versus painter ratios were sig

nificantly higher in the architect-painter condition than in the

architect-computer engineer condition, f (28) = 5.73, p < .0005; the

respective means were 3.53 and 0.96. By contrast, the architect versus

computer engineer ratios were significantly higher in the architect-

computer engineer condition than in the architect-painter condition,t (28) = 7.46, p < .0005; the respective means were 4.83 and 1.36.

This experiment demonstrates that what constitutes diagnosticinformation is context-dependent. Thus, when testing a hypothesisagainst one alternative, subjects select different questions than when

testing the same hypothesis against another alternative. Furthermore,

previous research mentioned earlier (Bassok & Trope, 1984; Mayseless& Kruglanski, 1986) has shown that when testing a hypothesis singly,

subjects select different information (notably, characteristic information)than when testing the same hypothesis against a specific alternative.

Thus, the diagnostic value of information seems relative to a specificset of alternate hypotheses an individual happens to consider. Whether

an individual considers a hypothesis singly or in conjunction with

specific alternatives may be determined by the social context that

suggests the types of hypotheses an individual may entertain. In

addition, persons' sensitivity to contextually suggested hypotheses

may depend on their epistemic motivations. This possibility was ex

plored in our second experiment.

EXPERIMENT 2

According to the theory of lay epistemology, persons' tendency to

formulate alternative hypotheses is partially determined by their need

for cognitive closure, and partially by the need for cognitive opennessoften fostered by a fear of invalidity (cf. Kruglanski, 1987). A "need

for closure" refers to the striving for clear-cut knowledge on a given

topic, and the intolerance of confusion and ambiguity. This particularneed is assumed to inhibit the formulation of alternatives to a given

hypothesis, as these introduce confusion and hence undermine existingclosure. By contrast, the "need for openness" is assumed to facilitate

the generation of alternate hypotheses that forestall a commitment to

any particular closure.

Support for these notions was obtained in a study by Kruglanskiand Freund (1983), which found that (1) primacy effects in impression


formation, (2) the tendency to render stereotypic judgments, and (3)

the anchorage of one's estimates in initial values increased as a function

of the need for closure manipulated via degrees of time pressure, and

decreased as a function of the need for openness manipulated via degreesof the "fear of invalidity." All three phenomena were presumed to

represent instances of "epistemic freezing" a state in which the

knower ceases to attend to information suggesting rival alternatives

to a previously formulated notion.

Retardation of premature closure by the fear of invalidity may

also underlie the recent finding by Tetlock (1983) that subjects made

accountable for their judgments in a criminal case (i.e., led to believe

they would have to justify their impressions to others) were less

affected by the order in which evidence either in favor of or againstthe defendant was presented. Finally, we (Mayseless & Kruglanski,in press) obtained direct evidence for the notion that the number of

alternate hypotheses (in this case, they were advanced to account for

the identity of strange objects) increases under high fear of invalidity,and decreases under high need for closure, both as compared with a

motivationally neutral condition.

If need for closure and fear of invalidity, respectively, facilitateand inhibit the generation of alternatives to a currently tested hypothesis, this should appropriately affect subjects' interest in pertinentdiagnostic information. Specifically, high fear of invalidity should

increase subjects' sensitivity to information suggesting an alternate

hypothesis, and consequently should increase their tendency to select

questions diagnostic with respect to the hypothesis versus the alternative. By contrast, high need for closure should lower subjects' sen

sitivity to information suggesting an alternate hypothesis, and con

sequently decrease their tendency to select such diagnostic questions.These predictions were tested in the following manner.

METHOD

Constructing the Question List

The preliminary pool of 117 items generated in connection with Ex

periment 1 was utilized to generate the present question list. Recall

that all 117 items were rated previously for the extent to which theytapped features discriminative between an architect and a painter. In

addition, a group of 13 subjects assessed each of the 117 questionsfor the extent to which it tapped features characteristic of an architect,while yet another group of 13 subjects assessed those same questionsfor the extent to which they tapped features characteristic of a painter.


Again, subjects made their ratings on 7-point scales, one end of

which stated that a "yes" (or a "no") answer to the question indicated

that the feature was very characteristic of an architect (or a painter).The opposite end stated that a "yes" (or "no") answer indicated that

the feature was not very characteristic of an architect (or a painter).Recall that subjects had previously indicated for each question what

they assumed to be the answer ("yes" or "no") for an architect or a

painter. After they responded in this manner to all questions, subjectswere thoroughly debriefed and dismissed.

On the basis of these item ratings, we constructed the final list

of 32 questions. This list contained 4 items in each of the 8 classifications

of a 2 x 2 x 2 design including architect-characteristic values (highvs. low), painter-characteristic values (high vs. low), and architect

versus painter diagnostic values (high vs. low). Item selection criteria

were similar to those used in Experiment 1. We also submitted the

diagnosticity ratings to the same statistical analyses as in the preceding

study. Thus, for painter-characteristic ratings the alpha coefficient was

.82, and the only significant effect in an ANOVA was that of painter-characteristic values, F (1, 12)

= 49.85, p < .00005; the respectivemeans of high and low conditions were 5.09 and 3.42. For architect-

characteristic ratings the alpha coefficient was .94, and the only significant effect in an ANOVA was that of architect-characteristic values,

F (1, 12)= 99.56, p < .00005; the respective means of high and low

conditions were 5.33 and 2.65. For the architect versus painter ratings,the alpha coefficient was .85, and the only significant effect in an

ANOVA was that of architect versus painter diagnostic values, F (1,

12) = 39.07, p < .0001; the respective means of high and low conditions

were 4.37 and 2.31. The questionnaire constructed in this fashion was

used in the experiment described below.

Subjects and Procedure

Thirty undergraduates in psychology at Tel-Aviv University participatedin the experiment for course credit. Subjects were tested individuallyand were randomly assigned to three motivational conditions: a need-

for-closure condition, a fear-of-invalidity condition, and a neutral con

dition.

All subjects were told that the experiment concerned people's

ability to identify the occupations of others from evidence about their

personalities. They were further told that their task would be to select

interview questions they would use to determine whether an inter

viewee was a painter. A subtle mention of an alternate hypothesiswas made by casually noting that "the interviewee could, of course,


be member of a different profession; for instance he or she could be

an architect." Subjects were then handed the 32-item questionnairedescribed above and were asked to select the 16 most useful questionsfor testing the target hypothesis.

Manipulating the Fear of Invalidity

Subjects in the fear-of-invalidity condition were told (1) that an abilityto accurately identify persons' professions from information concerningtheir personalities represents psychological sensitivity and an importantdimension of person perception; and (2) that they would be providedwith an interviewee's answers to the questions selected. On the basis

of those answers, subjects would have to determine whether the

interviewee was or was not a painter. If successful, they would receive

an extra hour of experimental credit (a highly valued commodity).We expected these instructions to instill in the subjects a concern

about the accuracy of their choices, and hence a motivation to maintain

cognitive openness toward various apparent possibilities.

Manipulating the Need for Closure

Subjects in the need-for-closure condition were told (1) that the purposeof the experiment was to study persons' ability to make quick decisions

concerning others' occupations from information about their behaviors

and personality; and (2) that the results would be used to construct

a condensed questionnaire allowing interviewers to reach quick anddecisive conclusions concerning interviewees' occupations. We expectedthese instructions to instill in subjects a sense of time pressure, and

the desire to arrive at quick decisions concerning their choices.

The Control Condition

Subjects in the control condition went through a procedure similar

to those in the two motivational conditions, except that they were

spared instructions stressing (1) the importance of accuracy, or the

relation between accuracy and reward; and (2) the importance of

quickness and decisiveness.

After they made their choices, all subjects responded to a brief

questionnaire designed to tap the efficacy of the experimental ma

nipulations. They were then debriefed and asked not to discuss the


research with other potential participants. This concluded the exper

iment.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Manipulation Checks

Subjects answered two questions designed to assess the efficacy of

our motivational manipulations. One question read: "When makingyour selections, how important was it for you to reach correct decisions

with high confidence?" The second similar question read: "... how

important was it for you to choose questions allowing quick and

decisive conclusions?" Answers to both items were recorded on 7-

point bipolar scales, anchored at the ends with "not at all important"and "extremely important." A one-way ANOVA performed on answers

to the question about correctness yielded a significant effect, F (2,

27) = 7.23, p < .003. Means for the fear-of-invalidity and control

conditions were highly similar (6.3 and 6.2, respectively), while the

mean for the need-for-closure condition (4.5) was significantly ( p <

.05) lower than the other two. These results suggest that subjects'baseline motivation was characterized by an appreciable concern for

validity, and that our attempt to increase that concern further was

unsuccessful, possibly because of a ceiling effect. Interestingly, the

need-for-closure manipulation apparently decreased subjects' concern

with invalidity, so that our conditions did seem to differ on that

particular motivation, although not exactly as planned. The inverse

effect of the need for closure on the fear of invalidity is compatiblewith the idea that the two motivations have contrasting implications(cf. Kruglanski, 1987; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).

A similar ANOVA performed on answers to the question about

the importance of quickness also yielded a significant effect, F (2,

27)= 3.71, p < .05. The mean for the need-for-closure condition was

5.4; that for the fear-of-invalidity condition was 4.3; and that for the

control condition was 5.0. LSD post hoc tests indicated that only the

need-for-closure and fear-of-invalidity conditions differed significantly,whereas neither differed significantly from the control condition.

In sum, our manipulations seem to have been only partially suc

cessful: Subjects in the fear-of-invalidity condition reported significantlymore concern with the accuracy of their choices, and significantly less

concern with quickness and decisiveness, than subjects in the need-

for-closure condition. However, we were unable to separate our mo

tivational conditions sufficiently from the control condition. Conse-


quently, we are unable to interpret our findings in terms of separate

need-for-closure or fear-of-invalidity effects.

Question Selections

Table 3 presents the mean numbers of questions in different categoriesselected by subjects in our three experimental conditions, and Table

4 gives the marginal sums for question categories by experimentalcondition. In particular, these tables present the four pertinent question

categories, defined by the 2x2 factorial design in which painter-characteristic values (high vs. low) were orthogonally crossed with

painter-architect diagnostic values (high vs. low). Across conditions,there was a general tendency to prefer questions with high (rather

than low) painter-characteristic value. This is not surprising, as subjectsin all conditions were essentially testing a single hypothesis. Thus,our findings essentially replicate the single-hypothesis conditions of

previous research (cf. Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1986), where subjectsalso predominantly selected questions with high (rather than low)characteristic values.

More central to this experiment are the diagnosticity data. We

assumed that the hint concerning the alternative (architect) hypothesiswould be reacted to most by subjects in the fear-of-invalidity condition,less by those in the control condition, and least by subjects in the

TABLE 3

Mean Numbers of Questions Chosen by Category and Motivational Condition

(Experiment 2)

]

-ARCHITECT DIAGNOSTIC VALUE

PAINTER-CHARACTERISTIC

VALUE

PAINTER - LOW HIGH

NEED FOR CLOSURE

Low

High

3.0

2.2

6.2

4.6

NEUTRAL

Low

High

2.3

3.3

5.5

4.9

FEAR OF INVALIDITY

Low

High

1.8

3.6

4.7

5.9


TABLE 4

Marginal Sums for Question Categories by Motivational Condition (Experiment 2)

FEAR OF

NEED FOR CLOSURE NEUTRAL INVALIDITY

Painter -architect diagnostic valueLow

High

9.2

6.8

7.8

8.2

6.5

9.5

Painter-characteristic value

Low

High

5.2

10.8

5.6

10.4

5.4

10.6

need-for-closure condition. Consequently, we predicted greatest preference for questions with high (rather than low) diagnostic values in

the fear-of-invalidity condition, least such preference in the need-for-

closure condition, and an intermediate level of preference in the control

condition. The pattern of choices in Tables 3 and 4 accords well with

this prediction.As in Experiment 1, the interdependence of question choices in

the various categories prevented us from submitting these data to an

ANOVA. Instead, we followed the procedure used in the preceding

experiment and computed for each subject a painter-characteristicscore, an architect-characteristic score, and a painter-architect diagnosticscore. As expected, the one-way ANOVAs performed on the painter-characteristic and the architect-characteristic scores yielded no significanteffects, indicating that the motivational orientation (1) did not influence

subjects' tendency to select painter-characteristic questions in (what

essentially was) a single-hypothesis condition; and (2) did not influence

subjects' tendency to select architect-characteristic questions, which

were largely irrelevant to the target (painter) hypothesis being tested.

More interestingly, in conformance with our prediction, an ANOVA

performed on the painter-architect diagnostic values yielded a highly

significant effect, F (2, 27) = 20.97, p < .00005. As expected, the mean

for the fear-of-invalidity condition (55.84) was higher than that for

the control condition (53.66), which in turn was higher than the mean

for the need-for-closure condition (51.13). The difference between any

pair of means was significant at the .05 level by LSD test.

Using the procedure employed in the first study, we also computed

painter-characteristic ratios and painter versus architect diagnosticratios. As expected, a one-way ANOVA performed on the painter-characteristic ratios yielded no significant effects, replicating the findingthat, across conditions, subjects pervasively preferred questions of

high (rather than low) characteristicity. More interestingly, a one-way


ANOVA performed on painter versus architect diagnostic ratios yieldeda highly significant effect, F (2, 27)

= 33.94, p < .00005. As predicted,ratios in the fear of invalidity condition were higher (M

= 1.49) than

those in the neutral condition (M = 1.05), which in turn were higherthan those in the need-for-closure condition (M

= 0.74). The difference

between any pair of means was significant at the .05 level by the LSD

test.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

CONTEXT DEPENDENCY EFFECTS

The present findings suggest that information sought by hypothesis-

testing individuals is context-dependent. Thus in Experiment 1, subjectswho tested a hypothesis against a specific, contextually presentedalternative sought out different information than subjects who tested

the same hypothesis against another alternative. Furthermore, subjects'

sensitivity to contextual variation in hypothesis testing seems to reflect

their concern about informational diagnosticity (cf. Trope & Bassok,

1983). Specifically, subjects typically preferred information whose di

agnosticity in regard to a hypothesis and an alternative was highrather than low.

These results are consistent with those of previous studies, in

which persons asked to test a single hypothesis have selected for that

purpose different information than subjects asked to test that hypothesis

against a specific alternative (cf. Bassok & Trope, 1984; Mayseless &

Kruglanski, 1986; Skov & Sherman, in press). Typically, in a single-

hypothesis case subjects select information about features characteristic

of (or highly probable under) the hypothesis, which presumably de

marcate the hypothesis (X) from its diffuse alternative (not-X). Hence

in both the single- and the multiple-hypothesis cases, subjects mayseek out information with high diagnostic value in regard to the hy

pothesis and its (specific or diffuse) alternative.

The notion of the "diffuse alternative" (not-X) is not sufficientlyclear at the present time and may require further study for its explication.Presumably, it consists of the unarticulated set of objects or entitiesthat do not represent a given category (e.g., the various things thatare not a dog). An unanswered question is whether such a diffuse

alternative is stable or variable across contexts. For instance, the diffuse

alternative may be influenced by automatically processed aspects of

the specific context (cf . Bargh, 1984). If so, it may remain unarticulated

(or unconscious) while varying across contexts (e.g., consisting of


various subsets of "nondogs"); this implies the need to obtain different

types of "characteristic" information in testing singly the same target

hypothesis in different circumstances.

MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN HYPOTHESIS TESTING

The present research also demonstrates that subjects' motivation maydetermine their sensitivity to contextually suggested alternatives. In

our Experiment 2, subjects with a high fear of invalidity and/or low

need for closure appeared more sensitive to contextual cues suggestingan alternative hypothesis than subjects with a low fear of invalidityand/or high need for closure. Consequently, they were more likelyto prefer diagnostic (rather than nondiagnostic) questions capable of

demarcating the hypothesis from the alternative. These findings are

consistent with the theory of lay epistemology (cf. Kruglanski, 1987;

Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983). This theory suggests additionally that

persons' tendency to formulate alternate hypotheses may be affected

by yet another motivation, related to the properties of desired closures

(e.g., the contents of desired conclusions). To the extent that a currentlyentertained hypothesis has desirable properties, the tendency to for

mulate competing alternatives should be less than if the current hy

pothesis is relatively undesirable. It follows that persons' sensitivityto diagnostic information concerning some alternative should be greaterif the target hypothesis is less desirable. This prediction may be profit

ably investigated in future research.

MODE OF CONTEXTUAL PRESENTATION

It is apparent from the choice data presented in Tables 1-4 that whereas

in Experiment 1 subjects generally preferred questions whose diag

nosticity was high (rather than low), in Experiment 2 they exhibited

such a preference only in the fear-of-invalidity condition. This indicates

that the way in which an alternative is contextually presented may

affect persons' tendency to attend to it, and hence to seek diagnosticinformation that may demarcate it from the hypothesis. Thus, in

Experiment 1 the hypothesis and the alternative were given equalfocus, as the task was to determine whether an interviewee was an

architect or a painter (or an architect or a computer engineer). Bycontrast, in Experiment 2 the focus was clearly on the hypothesis, as

the task was to determine whether an interviewee was a painter.The former mode of presentation may have lent equal accessibility


to the hypothesis and the alternative (cf. Higgins & King, 1981) whereas

the latter may have rendered the alternative relatively less accessible,

and hence capable of attracting attention only under special motivational

conditions.

CONSCIOUS REPRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE -

HYPOTHESIS RELATION

Another issue of interest concerns the way in which the linkage between

relevant information (i.e., "evidence") and hypotheses is representedin consciousness. Bayesian analyses of hypothesis testing (cf. Ajzen& Fishbein, 1975; Trope & Bassok, 1983) imply that persons think

probabilistically and consider the "likelihood ratios" of the same data

under competing hypotheses. Alternatively, persons' phenomenological

representations of the relation between evidence and hypotheses maybe deductive or logical (cf. Kruglanski, in press). For instance, a policeofficer may start with the premise, "Only if the driver is intoxicated

will the breathalyzer give a reading of a given magnitude." He or she

can then consider the hypothesis of prior drinking as validated if the

appropriate magnitude is reached or exceeded. Sirnilarly, the Bayesian

might say that the officer's subjective probability of obtaining the

specific reading given the hypothesis of prior drinking is much higherthan that of obtaining the same reading given the no-drinking hy

pothesis, and hence that the officer's posterior probability concerningthe "clrinking" hypothesis will rise if the appropriate reading is observed.

While in this example the assumptions of "logical" versus "probabilistic" representations yield exactly the same prediction, the two

interpretations can be empirically distinguished from each other. The

available data suggest in fact that neither tells the whole story and

that persons often reach their inferences via deductive logic qualified

by subjective probabilities (or via "probabilogic") (cf. McGuire, 1960,

1981; Wyer, 1970, 1974; Wyer & Carlston, 1979). However, these con

clusions have been inferred indirectly from subjects' judgments under

various informational conditions. Further research designed to tapmore directly subjects' spontaneous representations of the relation

between evidence and hypotheses seems in order.

While previous hypothesis-testing research (e.g., Snyder & Swann,

1978; Trope & Bassok, 1983) investigated wlietlier subjects predominantlyseek characteristic or diagnostic information, the present studies highlight the subjective determinants of diagnosticity. It has been shownthat diagnosticity may depend on the cognitive context of hypothesistesting (the types of alternatives juxtaposed to a given target hypothesis),


as well as on the individuals' epistemic motivations, which may affect

their sensitivity to contextually suggested hypotheses.

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THE ROLE OF COMPETING ALTERNATIVES AND EPISTEMIC MOTIVATIONS

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