The Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

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Introduction Mind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning Premise 1: Consideration Receptivity Premise 2: Epistemic Rationality The Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering Zachary C. Irving University of Toronto [email protected] May 28, 2013 Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

Transcript of The Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

The Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

Zachary C. Irving

University of Toronto

[email protected]

May 28, 2013

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Vignette: How Whippersnap Writes a Math Proof

Stage 1: “Mind-Wandering”

Goal: Intuition about why thetheorem is trueThinking Strategy:Whippersnap lets her mindwander, exerting little controlover her stream of thoughts,except to stop herself if shebegins to think about somethingcompletely unrelated to theproblem at hand (e.g. what toeat for dinner)

Stage 2: “Guided Reasoning”

Goal: Rigorous proof of herintuitive ideaThinking Strategy:Whippersnap constructs anexplicit (though partial) plan forhow to write the proof, thenguides her thinking by that plan(e.g. “Now that I’ve proved A,I’m confident that I can use A toprove B, from which C willfollow. . . ”)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Vignette: How Whippersnap Writes a Math Proof

Stage 1: “Mind-Wandering”

Goal: Intuition about why thetheorem is true

Thinking Strategy:Whippersnap lets her mindwander, exerting little controlover her stream of thoughts,except to stop herself if shebegins to think about somethingcompletely unrelated to theproblem at hand (e.g. what toeat for dinner)

Stage 2: “Guided Reasoning”

Goal: Rigorous proof of herintuitive ideaThinking Strategy:Whippersnap constructs anexplicit (though partial) plan forhow to write the proof, thenguides her thinking by that plan(e.g. “Now that I’ve proved A,I’m confident that I can use A toprove B, from which C willfollow. . . ”)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Vignette: How Whippersnap Writes a Math Proof

Stage 1: “Mind-Wandering”

Goal: Intuition about why thetheorem is trueThinking Strategy:Whippersnap lets her mindwander, exerting little controlover her stream of thoughts,except to stop herself if shebegins to think about somethingcompletely unrelated to theproblem at hand (e.g. what toeat for dinner)

Stage 2: “Guided Reasoning”

Goal: Rigorous proof of herintuitive ideaThinking Strategy:Whippersnap constructs anexplicit (though partial) plan forhow to write the proof, thenguides her thinking by that plan(e.g. “Now that I’ve proved A,I’m confident that I can use A toprove B, from which C willfollow. . . ”)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Vignette: How Whippersnap Writes a Math Proof

Stage 1: “Mind-Wandering”

Goal: Intuition about why thetheorem is trueThinking Strategy:Whippersnap lets her mindwander, exerting little controlover her stream of thoughts,except to stop herself if shebegins to think about somethingcompletely unrelated to theproblem at hand (e.g. what toeat for dinner)

Stage 2: “Guided Reasoning”

Goal: Rigorous proof of herintuitive idea

Thinking Strategy:Whippersnap constructs anexplicit (though partial) plan forhow to write the proof, thenguides her thinking by that plan(e.g. “Now that I’ve proved A,I’m confident that I can use A toprove B, from which C willfollow. . . ”)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Vignette: How Whippersnap Writes a Math Proof

Stage 1: “Mind-Wandering”

Goal: Intuition about why thetheorem is trueThinking Strategy:Whippersnap lets her mindwander, exerting little controlover her stream of thoughts,except to stop herself if shebegins to think about somethingcompletely unrelated to theproblem at hand (e.g. what toeat for dinner)

Stage 2: “Guided Reasoning”

Goal: Rigorous proof of herintuitive ideaThinking Strategy:Whippersnap constructs anexplicit (though partial) plan forhow to write the proof, thenguides her thinking by that plan(e.g. “Now that I’ve proved A,I’m confident that I can use A toprove B, from which C willfollow. . . ”)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Thesis and Background Motivations

My Thesis

Both mind-wandering (MWing) and guided reasoning can beepistemically rational

Motivations for This Talk

Cases like Whippersnap’s suggest that MWing has a role inepistemic inquiry

MWing is pervasive: at least 30% of our waking thoughts canbe classified as MWing (e.g. Kane et al. 2007)

There’s an increasingly rich empirical literature on theanatomical basis and functional role of MWing (e.g.Smallwood and Schooler 2006; McVay and Kane 2010;Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Thesis and Background Motivations

My Thesis

Both mind-wandering (MWing) and guided reasoning can beepistemically rational

Motivations for This Talk

Cases like Whippersnap’s suggest that MWing has a role inepistemic inquiry

MWing is pervasive: at least 30% of our waking thoughts canbe classified as MWing (e.g. Kane et al. 2007)

There’s an increasingly rich empirical literature on theanatomical basis and functional role of MWing (e.g.Smallwood and Schooler 2006; McVay and Kane 2010;Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Thesis and Background Motivations

My Thesis

Both mind-wandering (MWing) and guided reasoning can beepistemically rational

Motivations for This Talk

Cases like Whippersnap’s suggest that MWing has a role inepistemic inquiry

MWing is pervasive: at least 30% of our waking thoughts canbe classified as MWing (e.g. Kane et al. 2007)

There’s an increasingly rich empirical literature on theanatomical basis and functional role of MWing (e.g.Smallwood and Schooler 2006; McVay and Kane 2010;Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Thesis and Background Motivations

My Thesis

Both mind-wandering (MWing) and guided reasoning can beepistemically rational

Motivations for This Talk

Cases like Whippersnap’s suggest that MWing has a role inepistemic inquiry

MWing is pervasive: at least 30% of our waking thoughts canbe classified as MWing (e.g. Kane et al. 2007)

There’s an increasingly rich empirical literature on theanatomical basis and functional role of MWing (e.g.Smallwood and Schooler 2006; McVay and Kane 2010;Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Two Types of Opponents

Type 1: Mind-Wandering is Irrational

William James: “And the faculty of bringing back a wanderingattention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment,character, and will. . . An education which should improve thisfaculty would be the education par excellence” (James 1890[1981], p. 424)

Clinical Psychology: Mind-wandering is correlated with andused as a diagnostic criteria for ADHD

Argument: MWing is Arational

MWing is neither good nor bad, epistemically speaking

Why? Because MWing is just a way of generating hypothesesto consider, and epistemic rationality only dictates what tobelieve, not what to consider (that’s a practical matter)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Two Types of Opponents

Type 1: Mind-Wandering is Irrational

William James: “And the faculty of bringing back a wanderingattention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment,character, and will. . . An education which should improve thisfaculty would be the education par excellence” (James 1890[1981], p. 424)

Clinical Psychology: Mind-wandering is correlated with andused as a diagnostic criteria for ADHD

Argument: MWing is Arational

MWing is neither good nor bad, epistemically speaking

Why? Because MWing is just a way of generating hypothesesto consider, and epistemic rationality only dictates what tobelieve, not what to consider (that’s a practical matter)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Two Types of Opponents

Type 1: Mind-Wandering is Irrational

William James: “And the faculty of bringing back a wanderingattention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment,character, and will. . . An education which should improve thisfaculty would be the education par excellence” (James 1890[1981], p. 424)

Clinical Psychology: Mind-wandering is correlated with andused as a diagnostic criteria for ADHD

Argument: MWing is Arational

MWing is neither good nor bad, epistemically speaking

Why? Because MWing is just a way of generating hypothesesto consider, and epistemic rationality only dictates what tobelieve, not what to consider (that’s a practical matter)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Two Types of Opponents

Type 1: Mind-Wandering is Irrational

William James: “And the faculty of bringing back a wanderingattention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment,character, and will. . . An education which should improve thisfaculty would be the education par excellence” (James 1890[1981], p. 424)

Clinical Psychology: Mind-wandering is correlated with andused as a diagnostic criteria for ADHD

Argument: MWing is Arational

MWing is neither good nor bad, epistemically speaking

Why? Because MWing is just a way of generating hypothesesto consider, and epistemic rationality only dictates what tobelieve, not what to consider (that’s a practical matter)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Two Types of Opponents

Type 1: Mind-Wandering is Irrational

William James: “And the faculty of bringing back a wanderingattention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment,character, and will. . . An education which should improve thisfaculty would be the education par excellence” (James 1890[1981], p. 424)

Clinical Psychology: Mind-wandering is correlated with andused as a diagnostic criteria for ADHD

Argument: MWing is Arational

MWing is neither good nor bad, epistemically speaking

Why? Because MWing is just a way of generating hypothesesto consider, and epistemic rationality only dictates what tobelieve, not what to consider (that’s a practical matter)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Master Argument

Argument

1 Mind-wandering facilitates and guided reasoning inhibitsconsideration-receptivity

2 Consideration-receptivity can be epistemically rational

3 Therefore, mind-wandering can be epistemically rational in away that guided reasoning is not (from 1 and 2)

Support for the Premises

1 A phenomenological/metacognitive definition of WMing andempirical data on the relationship between mind-wandering,guided-reasoning, and insight-problem-solving

2 A sketch that situates the normative role of MWing within abroader theory of epistemic value

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Master Argument

Argument

1 Mind-wandering facilitates and guided reasoning inhibitsconsideration-receptivity

2 Consideration-receptivity can be epistemically rational

3 Therefore, mind-wandering can be epistemically rational in away that guided reasoning is not (from 1 and 2)

Support for the Premises

1 A phenomenological/metacognitive definition of WMing andempirical data on the relationship between mind-wandering,guided-reasoning, and insight-problem-solving

2 A sketch that situates the normative role of MWing within abroader theory of epistemic value

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Master Argument

Argument

1 Mind-wandering facilitates and guided reasoning inhibitsconsideration-receptivity

2 Consideration-receptivity can be epistemically rational

3 Therefore, mind-wandering can be epistemically rational in away that guided reasoning is not (from 1 and 2)

Support for the Premises

1 A phenomenological/metacognitive definition of WMing andempirical data on the relationship between mind-wandering,guided-reasoning, and insight-problem-solving

2 A sketch that situates the normative role of MWing within abroader theory of epistemic value

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Master Argument

Argument

1 Mind-wandering facilitates and guided reasoning inhibitsconsideration-receptivity

2 Consideration-receptivity can be epistemically rational

3 Therefore, mind-wandering can be epistemically rational in away that guided reasoning is not (from 1 and 2)

Support for the Premises

1 A phenomenological/metacognitive definition of WMing andempirical data on the relationship between mind-wandering,guided-reasoning, and insight-problem-solving

2 A sketch that situates the normative role of MWing within abroader theory of epistemic value

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

VignetteBackground MotivationMy OpponentsMaster Argument

Master Argument

Argument

1 Mind-wandering facilitates and guided reasoning inhibitsconsideration-receptivity

2 Consideration-receptivity can be epistemically rational

3 Therefore, mind-wandering can be epistemically rational in away that guided reasoning is not (from 1 and 2)

Support for the Premises

1 A phenomenological/metacognitive definition of WMing andempirical data on the relationship between mind-wandering,guided-reasoning, and insight-problem-solving

2 A sketch that situates the normative role of MWing within abroader theory of epistemic value

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Definitions

Two Ways to Define ‘Mind-Wandering’

1 Phenomenologically (broadly speaking)

2 Neuroscientifically

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Definitions

Two Ways to Define ‘Mind-Wandering’

1 Phenomenologically (broadly speaking)

2 Neuroscientifically

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Definitions

Two Ways to Define ‘Mind-Wandering’

1 Phenomenologically (broadly speaking)

2 Neuroscientifically

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

How To Distinguish Between MWing and GuidedReasoning

Strategy

Distinguish between MWing and guided reasoning in terms of theircharacteristic phenomenology

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Reasoning and the Phenomenology of Guidedness

Reasoning and Guidedness

Reasoning feels guided, i.e. the reasoner seems to token eachthought for a reason, rather than “. . . as a leap of faith”(Sepielli 2012, p. 18)

Reasons can include. . .1 Prior beliefs and epistemic norms (e.g. norms of inference)2 Partial plan to solve a problem3 Strategies or heuristics for solving problems like this

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Reasoning and the Phenomenology of Guidedness

Reasoning and Guidedness

Reasoning feels guided, i.e. the reasoner seems to token eachthought for a reason, rather than “. . . as a leap of faith”(Sepielli 2012, p. 18)

Reasons can include. . .1 Prior beliefs and epistemic norms (e.g. norms of inference)2 Partial plan to solve a problem3 Strategies or heuristics for solving problems like this

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Reasoning and the Phenomenology of Guidedness

Reasoning and Guidedness

Reasoning feels guided, i.e. the reasoner seems to token eachthought for a reason, rather than “. . . as a leap of faith”(Sepielli 2012, p. 18)

Reasons can include. . .

1 Prior beliefs and epistemic norms (e.g. norms of inference)2 Partial plan to solve a problem3 Strategies or heuristics for solving problems like this

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Reasoning and the Phenomenology of Guidedness

Reasoning and Guidedness

Reasoning feels guided, i.e. the reasoner seems to token eachthought for a reason, rather than “. . . as a leap of faith”(Sepielli 2012, p. 18)

Reasons can include. . .1 Prior beliefs and epistemic norms (e.g. norms of inference)2 Partial plan to solve a problem3 Strategies or heuristics for solving problems like this

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Corollary of Guidedness: Diachronic Constriants

The Epistemic Problem

Multi-step problems require are difficult because . . .

Problem 1 Coordination between multiple stepsProblem 2 Inefficient to determine how to proceed from

scratch at each junction

The Epistemic Advantage of Guidance

Solution Construct and follow a plan for how to reasonthrough a problem

Plans place diachronic constraints on the thoughtsyou’ll consider at each step (cf. Bratman 1999)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Corollary of Guidedness: Diachronic Constriants

The Epistemic Problem

Multi-step problems require are difficult because . . .

Problem 1 Coordination between multiple steps

Problem 2 Inefficient to determine how to proceed fromscratch at each junction

The Epistemic Advantage of Guidance

Solution Construct and follow a plan for how to reasonthrough a problem

Plans place diachronic constraints on the thoughtsyou’ll consider at each step (cf. Bratman 1999)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Corollary of Guidedness: Diachronic Constriants

The Epistemic Problem

Multi-step problems require are difficult because . . .

Problem 1 Coordination between multiple stepsProblem 2 Inefficient to determine how to proceed from

scratch at each junction

The Epistemic Advantage of Guidance

Solution Construct and follow a plan for how to reasonthrough a problem

Plans place diachronic constraints on the thoughtsyou’ll consider at each step (cf. Bratman 1999)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Corollary of Guidedness: Diachronic Constriants

The Epistemic Problem

Multi-step problems require are difficult because . . .

Problem 1 Coordination between multiple stepsProblem 2 Inefficient to determine how to proceed from

scratch at each junction

The Epistemic Advantage of Guidance

Solution Construct and follow a plan for how to reasonthrough a problem

Plans place diachronic constraints on the thoughtsyou’ll consider at each step (cf. Bratman 1999)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Corollary of Guidedness: Diachronic Constriants

The Epistemic Problem

Multi-step problems require are difficult because . . .

Problem 1 Coordination between multiple stepsProblem 2 Inefficient to determine how to proceed from

scratch at each junction

The Epistemic Advantage of Guidance

Solution Construct and follow a plan for how to reasonthrough a problem

Plans place diachronic constraints on the thoughtsyou’ll consider at each step (cf. Bratman 1999)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Mind-Wandering and the Phenomenology of Unguidedness

Characteristic Phenomenology

MWing has a characteristic phenomenology of unguidedness

Unfocused stream of thoughts that neither our beliefs, norms,plans, nor strategies give us reason to consider

Example: When asked why she’s considering a thought withcontent P, a MWer can’t give you a reason more informativethan ‘that’s what came to mind’

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Mind-Wandering and the Phenomenology of Unguidedness

Characteristic Phenomenology

MWing has a characteristic phenomenology of unguidedness

Unfocused stream of thoughts that neither our beliefs, norms,plans, nor strategies give us reason to consider

Example: When asked why she’s considering a thought withcontent P, a MWer can’t give you a reason more informativethan ‘that’s what came to mind’

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Mind-Wandering and the Phenomenology of Unguidedness

Characteristic Phenomenology

MWing has a characteristic phenomenology of unguidedness

Unfocused stream of thoughts that neither our beliefs, norms,plans, nor strategies give us reason to consider

Example: When asked why she’s considering a thought withcontent P, a MWer can’t give you a reason more informativethan ‘that’s what came to mind’

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Corollary of Unguidedness: Few Diachronic Constraints

Diachronic Constraints

MWing places few diachronic constraints on the thoughts weconsider

While MWing we entertain thoughts other than those thatinitially seem most relevant (given our plans, strategies, etc.)

Epistemic Import: Whippersnap’s Brainstorming

Disadvantage: When Whippersnap brainstorms, she’ll considerthoughts other than those that are most likely to justify thetheorem, given how problems like this are usually solved

Advantage: Some of these thoughts might justify thetheorem, despite initial appearances

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Corollary of Unguidedness: Few Diachronic Constraints

Diachronic Constraints

MWing places few diachronic constraints on the thoughts weconsider

While MWing we entertain thoughts other than those thatinitially seem most relevant (given our plans, strategies, etc.)

Epistemic Import: Whippersnap’s Brainstorming

Disadvantage: When Whippersnap brainstorms, she’ll considerthoughts other than those that are most likely to justify thetheorem, given how problems like this are usually solved

Advantage: Some of these thoughts might justify thetheorem, despite initial appearances

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Corollary of Unguidedness: Few Diachronic Constraints

Diachronic Constraints

MWing places few diachronic constraints on the thoughts weconsider

While MWing we entertain thoughts other than those thatinitially seem most relevant (given our plans, strategies, etc.)

Epistemic Import: Whippersnap’s Brainstorming

Disadvantage: When Whippersnap brainstorms, she’ll considerthoughts other than those that are most likely to justify thetheorem, given how problems like this are usually solved

Advantage: Some of these thoughts might justify thetheorem, despite initial appearances

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Corollary of Unguidedness: Few Diachronic Constraints

Diachronic Constraints

MWing places few diachronic constraints on the thoughts weconsider

While MWing we entertain thoughts other than those thatinitially seem most relevant (given our plans, strategies, etc.)

Epistemic Import: Whippersnap’s Brainstorming

Disadvantage: When Whippersnap brainstorms, she’ll considerthoughts other than those that are most likely to justify thetheorem, given how problems like this are usually solved

Advantage: Some of these thoughts might justify thetheorem, despite initial appearances

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Corollary of Unguidedness: Few Diachronic Constraints

Diachronic Constraints

MWing places few diachronic constraints on the thoughts weconsider

While MWing we entertain thoughts other than those thatinitially seem most relevant (given our plans, strategies, etc.)

Epistemic Import: Whippersnap’s Brainstorming

Disadvantage: When Whippersnap brainstorms, she’ll considerthoughts other than those that are most likely to justify thetheorem, given how problems like this are usually solved

Advantage: Some of these thoughts might justify thetheorem, despite initial appearances

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Neural Correlates of Mind-Wandering

Three Networks

1 Temporal lobe areas: processing of long-term memories(Christoff, Ream, and Gabrieli 2004; Christoff et al. 2009a)

2 Default network areas: typically active during low attentionaldemands (e.g. easy/highly practiced tasks, rest) (Shulmanet al. 1997; Raichle 1998; Raichle et al. 2001)

3 Executive regions: typically active when performingattentionally demanding tasks (Christoff et al. 2009b;Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Neural Correlates of Mind-Wandering

Three Networks

1 Temporal lobe areas: processing of long-term memories(Christoff, Ream, and Gabrieli 2004; Christoff et al. 2009a)

2 Default network areas: typically active during low attentionaldemands (e.g. easy/highly practiced tasks, rest) (Shulmanet al. 1997; Raichle 1998; Raichle et al. 2001)

3 Executive regions: typically active when performingattentionally demanding tasks (Christoff et al. 2009b;Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Neural Correlates of Mind-Wandering

Three Networks

1 Temporal lobe areas: processing of long-term memories(Christoff, Ream, and Gabrieli 2004; Christoff et al. 2009a)

2 Default network areas: typically active during low attentionaldemands (e.g. easy/highly practiced tasks, rest) (Shulmanet al. 1997; Raichle 1998; Raichle et al. 2001)

3 Executive regions: typically active when performingattentionally demanding tasks (Christoff et al. 2009b;Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

Phenomenology of GuidednessNeuroscience of MWing

Neural Correlates of Mind-Wandering

Three Networks

1 Temporal lobe areas: processing of long-term memories(Christoff, Ream, and Gabrieli 2004; Christoff et al. 2009a)

2 Default network areas: typically active during low attentionaldemands (e.g. easy/highly practiced tasks, rest) (Shulmanet al. 1997; Raichle 1998; Raichle et al. 2001)

3 Executive regions: typically active when performingattentionally demanding tasks (Christoff et al. 2009b;Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Premise One

Mind-wandering facilitates and guided reasoning inhibitsconsideration-receptivity

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Definition of Consideration Receptivity

Definitions

Let’s say that we’re receptive with respect to some aspect ofour mental lives M just if whether we had M was not affectedby our reasons or choice to have M

Reasons can include plans, strategies, norms (e.g. the normsof inference) etc.

An agent’s thought that P is consideration receptive just ifshe’s receptive with respect to the very fact that sheconsidered P: neither her reasons nor choice to consider Paffected whether she did so

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Definition of Consideration Receptivity

Definitions

Let’s say that we’re receptive with respect to some aspect ofour mental lives M just if whether we had M was not affectedby our reasons or choice to have M

Reasons can include plans, strategies, norms (e.g. the normsof inference) etc.

An agent’s thought that P is consideration receptive just ifshe’s receptive with respect to the very fact that sheconsidered P: neither her reasons nor choice to consider Paffected whether she did so

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Definition of Consideration Receptivity

Definitions

Let’s say that we’re receptive with respect to some aspect ofour mental lives M just if whether we had M was not affectedby our reasons or choice to have M

Reasons can include plans, strategies, norms (e.g. the normsof inference) etc.

An agent’s thought that P is consideration receptive just ifshe’s receptive with respect to the very fact that sheconsidered P: neither her reasons nor choice to consider Paffected whether she did so

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Conceptual Argument for Premise One

Guided Reasoning Inhibits Consideration Receptivity

Guided reasoners mostly engage in thoughts that fit into ourplan for how to solve a problem

While this helps to efficiently reason through complexproblems, it inhibits consideration receptivity (since we’reconsidering only thoughts we have reason to consider)

Mind-Wandering Facilitates Consideration Receptivity

MWing involves a stream of thoughts that’s unguided, in thatour plans, strategies, norms etc. didn’t give us reason toconsider these thoughts

Given this, MWing facilitates consideration receptivity

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Conceptual Argument for Premise One

Guided Reasoning Inhibits Consideration Receptivity

Guided reasoners mostly engage in thoughts that fit into ourplan for how to solve a problem

While this helps to efficiently reason through complexproblems, it inhibits consideration receptivity (since we’reconsidering only thoughts we have reason to consider)

Mind-Wandering Facilitates Consideration Receptivity

MWing involves a stream of thoughts that’s unguided, in thatour plans, strategies, norms etc. didn’t give us reason toconsider these thoughts

Given this, MWing facilitates consideration receptivity

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Conceptual Argument for Premise One

Guided Reasoning Inhibits Consideration Receptivity

Guided reasoners mostly engage in thoughts that fit into ourplan for how to solve a problem

While this helps to efficiently reason through complexproblems, it inhibits consideration receptivity (since we’reconsidering only thoughts we have reason to consider)

Mind-Wandering Facilitates Consideration Receptivity

MWing involves a stream of thoughts that’s unguided, in thatour plans, strategies, norms etc. didn’t give us reason toconsider these thoughts

Given this, MWing facilitates consideration receptivity

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Conceptual Argument for Premise One

Guided Reasoning Inhibits Consideration Receptivity

Guided reasoners mostly engage in thoughts that fit into ourplan for how to solve a problem

While this helps to efficiently reason through complexproblems, it inhibits consideration receptivity (since we’reconsidering only thoughts we have reason to consider)

Mind-Wandering Facilitates Consideration Receptivity

MWing involves a stream of thoughts that’s unguided, in thatour plans, strategies, norms etc. didn’t give us reason toconsider these thoughts

Given this, MWing facilitates consideration receptivity

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

What Are Insight Problems?

Why Insight Problem Solving?

Paradigm case of a problem that’s much easier to solve ifyou’re consideration receptive

Example: Multiple Marriage Problem

Question “A man married seven women in Canada last week,without breaking any laws. How did he do it?”

Answer He was a priest

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

What Are Insight Problems?

Why Insight Problem Solving?

Paradigm case of a problem that’s much easier to solve ifyou’re consideration receptive

Example: Multiple Marriage Problem

Question “A man married seven women in Canada last week,without breaking any laws. How did he do it?”

Answer He was a priest

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

What Are Insight Problems?

Why Insight Problem Solving?

Paradigm case of a problem that’s much easier to solve ifyou’re consideration receptive

Example: Multiple Marriage Problem

Question “A man married seven women in Canada last week,without breaking any laws. How did he do it?”

Answer He was a priest

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Insight and Consideration Receptivity

What Makes an Insight Problem Difficult?

People tend to initially adopt a misleading approach, whichthey must abandon in order to solve the problem (Schooler,Ohlsson, and Brooks 1993)

Multiple marriage: wrong definition of ‘married’

To overcome the impasse, people need to consider anapproach outside of those they initially deemed relevant

When you’re consideration receptive, you’ll consider thoughtsother than those your initial plans, strategies etc. give youreason to consider, and be more likely to consider theseoutside approaches

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Insight and Consideration Receptivity

What Makes an Insight Problem Difficult?

People tend to initially adopt a misleading approach, whichthey must abandon in order to solve the problem (Schooler,Ohlsson, and Brooks 1993)

Multiple marriage: wrong definition of ‘married’

To overcome the impasse, people need to consider anapproach outside of those they initially deemed relevant

When you’re consideration receptive, you’ll consider thoughtsother than those your initial plans, strategies etc. give youreason to consider, and be more likely to consider theseoutside approaches

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Insight and Consideration Receptivity

What Makes an Insight Problem Difficult?

People tend to initially adopt a misleading approach, whichthey must abandon in order to solve the problem (Schooler,Ohlsson, and Brooks 1993)

Multiple marriage: wrong definition of ‘married’

To overcome the impasse, people need to consider anapproach outside of those they initially deemed relevant

When you’re consideration receptive, you’ll consider thoughtsother than those your initial plans, strategies etc. give youreason to consider, and be more likely to consider theseoutside approaches

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Insight and Consideration Receptivity

What Makes an Insight Problem Difficult?

People tend to initially adopt a misleading approach, whichthey must abandon in order to solve the problem (Schooler,Ohlsson, and Brooks 1993)

Multiple marriage: wrong definition of ‘married’

To overcome the impasse, people need to consider anapproach outside of those they initially deemed relevant

When you’re consideration receptive, you’ll consider thoughtsother than those your initial plans, strategies etc. give youreason to consider, and be more likely to consider theseoutside approaches

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Empirical Argument for Premise One

Argument Structure

1 Insight problems are much easier to solve if you’reconsideration receptive

2 Therefore, if guided reasoning inhibits and WMing facilitatesconsideration receptivity, the a) former should inhibit and theb) latter should facilitate insight problem solving

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Metcalfe: Phenomenology of Guided Reasoning

Guidance and Feelings of Warmth

Feelings of Warmth (FOW):subjective meta-cognitiveevaluation of how close oneis to a solution

FOWs gradually increasewhen people solve problemsthat require constructingand following a plan (i.e.guided reasoning; Metcalfe1986)

Gradual Increase

FO

W R

atin

gs

Cold

Hot

Time (10 second intervals)

Explanation As a guided reasonergets farther along her plan, she’saware of getting closer to thesolution, and her FOW increases

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Metcalfe: Phenomenology of Guided Reasoning

Guidance and Feelings of Warmth

Feelings of Warmth (FOW):subjective meta-cognitiveevaluation of how close oneis to a solution

FOWs gradually increasewhen people solve problemsthat require constructingand following a plan (i.e.guided reasoning; Metcalfe1986)

Gradual Increase

FO

W R

atin

gs

Cold

Hot

Time (10 second intervals)

Explanation As a guided reasonergets farther along her plan, she’saware of getting closer to thesolution, and her FOW increases

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Metcalfe: Phenomenology of Guided Reasoning

Guidance and Feelings of Warmth

Feelings of Warmth (FOW):subjective meta-cognitiveevaluation of how close oneis to a solution

FOWs gradually increasewhen people solve problemsthat require constructingand following a plan (i.e.guided reasoning; Metcalfe1986)

Gradual Increase

FO

W R

atin

gs

Cold

Hot

Time (10 second intervals)

Explanation As a guided reasonergets farther along her plan, she’saware of getting closer to thesolution, and her FOW increases

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Metcalfe: Phenomenology of Insight

‘Aha!’ Moment: Sudden Increase in FOWs

78% of successful insight problem solvers had low FOWs untiljust before they solve the problem, at which point they have aspike in FOW

FO

W R

atin

gs

Cold

Hot

Time (10 second intervals)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Metcalfe: Phenomenology of Insight

‘Aha!’ Moment: Sudden Increase in FOWs

78% of successful insight problem solvers had low FOWs untiljust before they solve the problem, at which point they have aspike in FOW

FO

W R

atin

gs

Cold

Hot

Time (10 second intervals)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Metcalfe: Guided Reasoning Inhibits Insight

Punchline

Unsuccessful insight problem solvers tended to show thegradual increases in FOW characteristic of guided reasoning

FO

W R

atin

gs

Cold

Hot

Time (10 second intervals)

Conclusion: guided reasoning inhibits insight problem solving

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Metcalfe: Guided Reasoning Inhibits Insight

Punchline

Unsuccessful insight problem solvers tended to show thegradual increases in FOW characteristic of guided reasoning

FO

W R

atin

gs

Cold

Hot

Time (10 second intervals)

Conclusion: guided reasoning inhibits insight problem solving

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Neuroscientific Argument: MWing Facilitates Insight

Kounios et al.: Neuroscience of Insight

Kounios et al. compared neural activation before and duringtrials when individuals solved a problem with and withoutinsight (i.e. with and without an ‘Aha!’ experience)

Insight trials were associated with increased activity in bothexecutive (dACC) and default (PCC, temporal gyri) regions(Kounios et al. 2006; Subramaniam et al. 2009; Jung-Beemanet al. 2004)

Insight and MWing

Plausibility argument: MWing facilitates insight, sinceco-activation of default and executive regions is very rare (Foxet al. 2005), but also occurs while MWing (Christoff et al.2009b; Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Neuroscientific Argument: MWing Facilitates Insight

Kounios et al.: Neuroscience of Insight

Kounios et al. compared neural activation before and duringtrials when individuals solved a problem with and withoutinsight (i.e. with and without an ‘Aha!’ experience)

Insight trials were associated with increased activity in bothexecutive (dACC) and default (PCC, temporal gyri) regions(Kounios et al. 2006; Subramaniam et al. 2009; Jung-Beemanet al. 2004)

Insight and MWing

Plausibility argument: MWing facilitates insight, sinceco-activation of default and executive regions is very rare (Foxet al. 2005), but also occurs while MWing (Christoff et al.2009b; Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Neuroscientific Argument: MWing Facilitates Insight

Kounios et al.: Neuroscience of Insight

Kounios et al. compared neural activation before and duringtrials when individuals solved a problem with and withoutinsight (i.e. with and without an ‘Aha!’ experience)

Insight trials were associated with increased activity in bothexecutive (dACC) and default (PCC, temporal gyri) regions(Kounios et al. 2006; Subramaniam et al. 2009; Jung-Beemanet al. 2004)

Insight and MWing

Plausibility argument: MWing facilitates insight, sinceco-activation of default and executive regions is very rare (Foxet al. 2005), but also occurs while MWing (Christoff et al.2009b; Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

DefinitionConceptual ArgumentEmpirical Argument

Neuroscientific Argument: MWing Facilitates Insight

Kounios et al.: Neuroscience of Insight

Kounios et al. compared neural activation before and duringtrials when individuals solved a problem with and withoutinsight (i.e. with and without an ‘Aha!’ experience)

Insight trials were associated with increased activity in bothexecutive (dACC) and default (PCC, temporal gyri) regions(Kounios et al. 2006; Subramaniam et al. 2009; Jung-Beemanet al. 2004)

Insight and MWing

Plausibility argument: MWing facilitates insight, sinceco-activation of default and executive regions is very rare (Foxet al. 2005), but also occurs while MWing (Christoff et al.2009b; Christoff 2012)

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Premise Two

Consideration receptivity can be epistemically rational

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Epistemic Rationality and Hypothesis Testing

Minimal Conception of Epistemic Rationality

A theory of epistemic rationality is a theory of epistemic value(i.e. goodness and badness)

The View: Value and Hypothesis Testing

A state or process is epistemically valuable insofar as it supports ordetracts from hypothesis testing, i.e. the generation and evaluationof hypotheses in light of evidence

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Epistemic Rationality and Hypothesis Testing

Minimal Conception of Epistemic Rationality

A theory of epistemic rationality is a theory of epistemic value(i.e. goodness and badness)

The View: Value and Hypothesis Testing

A state or process is epistemically valuable insofar as it supports ordetracts from hypothesis testing, i.e. the generation and evaluationof hypotheses in light of evidence

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Epistemic Rationality and Hypothesis Testing

Minimal Conception of Epistemic Rationality

A theory of epistemic rationality is a theory of epistemic value(i.e. goodness and badness)

The View: Value and Hypothesis Testing

A state or process is epistemically valuable insofar as it supports ordetracts from hypothesis testing, i.e. the generation and evaluationof hypotheses in light of evidence

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Epistemic Rationality and Hypothesis Testing (cont.)

Advantage 1: Value and Inquiry

This view ties epistemic value to epistemic inquiry, i.e. toreplacing one’s current set of beliefs with an epistemicallypreferable set of beliefs about the same subject matter (cf.Chisholm 1997)

Advantage: MWing and guided reasoning (moreuncontroversially rational) derive epistemic value from acommon source

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Epistemic Rationality and Hypothesis Testing (cont.)

Advantage 1: Value and Inquiry

This view ties epistemic value to epistemic inquiry, i.e. toreplacing one’s current set of beliefs with an epistemicallypreferable set of beliefs about the same subject matter (cf.Chisholm 1997)

Advantage: MWing and guided reasoning (moreuncontroversially rational) derive epistemic value from acommon source

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Epistemic Value and Hypothesis Testing (cont)

Advantage 2: Subject-Matter Neutrality

It’s commonly held that what is epistemically good or baddoesn’t depend on the subject matter about which one’sthinking (see Chisholm 1977, p. 14, and Feldman 1988 for aclassic defence of neutrality)

Subject matter neutrality might be a motivation to say thatepistemic rationality doesn’t apply to what you consider, sinceepistemology can’t say that considering certain subjects (e.g.normative epistemology) is better than considering others(e.g. NASCAR) (Chisholm 1997, p. 288).

Advantage: the norms I discuss for hypothesis generation(sometimes be consideration receptive) are also subject matterneutral

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Epistemic Value and Hypothesis Testing (cont)

Advantage 2: Subject-Matter Neutrality

It’s commonly held that what is epistemically good or baddoesn’t depend on the subject matter about which one’sthinking (see Chisholm 1977, p. 14, and Feldman 1988 for aclassic defence of neutrality)

Subject matter neutrality might be a motivation to say thatepistemic rationality doesn’t apply to what you consider, sinceepistemology can’t say that considering certain subjects (e.g.normative epistemology) is better than considering others(e.g. NASCAR) (Chisholm 1997, p. 288).

Advantage: the norms I discuss for hypothesis generation(sometimes be consideration receptive) are also subject matterneutral

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Epistemic Value and Hypothesis Testing (cont)

Advantage 2: Subject-Matter Neutrality

It’s commonly held that what is epistemically good or baddoesn’t depend on the subject matter about which one’sthinking (see Chisholm 1977, p. 14, and Feldman 1988 for aclassic defence of neutrality)

Subject matter neutrality might be a motivation to say thatepistemic rationality doesn’t apply to what you consider, sinceepistemology can’t say that considering certain subjects (e.g.normative epistemology) is better than considering others(e.g. NASCAR) (Chisholm 1997, p. 288).

Advantage: the norms I discuss for hypothesis generation(sometimes be consideration receptive) are also subject matterneutral

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Hypothesis Evaluation

Guided Reasoning and Evaluation

Evaluation is the process of determining how much confidencewe should have in each of our hypotheses, given our availableevidence

Guided reasoning is an efficient and reliable method ofevaluation

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Hypothesis Evaluation

Guided Reasoning and Evaluation

Evaluation is the process of determining how much confidencewe should have in each of our hypotheses, given our availableevidence

Guided reasoning is an efficient and reliable method ofevaluation

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Receptive Hypothesis Generation

Hypothesis Generation

Generation is the process of selecting which hypotheses toconsider, in light of our evidence

We can guide hypothesis generation by a plan: e.g. in themultiple marriage problem, generate ways that a Canadianman can be legally married to seven women in a week

Advantage of Consideration Receptivity

Problem Guided hypothesis generation sometimes leads us toignore relevant hypotheses that happen to falloutside our prepotent strategies, plans for how tosolve a problem

Consideration receptivity can facilitate hypothesisgeneration in such an impasse

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Receptive Hypothesis Generation

Hypothesis Generation

Generation is the process of selecting which hypotheses toconsider, in light of our evidence

We can guide hypothesis generation by a plan: e.g. in themultiple marriage problem, generate ways that a Canadianman can be legally married to seven women in a week

Advantage of Consideration Receptivity

Problem Guided hypothesis generation sometimes leads us toignore relevant hypotheses that happen to falloutside our prepotent strategies, plans for how tosolve a problem

Consideration receptivity can facilitate hypothesisgeneration in such an impasse

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Receptive Hypothesis Generation

Hypothesis Generation

Generation is the process of selecting which hypotheses toconsider, in light of our evidence

We can guide hypothesis generation by a plan: e.g. in themultiple marriage problem, generate ways that a Canadianman can be legally married to seven women in a week

Advantage of Consideration Receptivity

Problem Guided hypothesis generation sometimes leads us toignore relevant hypotheses that happen to falloutside our prepotent strategies, plans for how tosolve a problem

Consideration receptivity can facilitate hypothesisgeneration in such an impasse

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Receptive Hypothesis Generation

Hypothesis Generation

Generation is the process of selecting which hypotheses toconsider, in light of our evidence

We can guide hypothesis generation by a plan: e.g. in themultiple marriage problem, generate ways that a Canadianman can be legally married to seven women in a week

Advantage of Consideration Receptivity

Problem Guided hypothesis generation sometimes leads us toignore relevant hypotheses that happen to falloutside our prepotent strategies, plans for how tosolve a problem

Consideration receptivity can facilitate hypothesisgeneration in such an impasse

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Intuitive Judgments of Epistemic Value

The Case: Whippersnap and Logicos

School project: Whippersnap and Logicos both successfullyevaluate Darwin and Lamark’s theories of evolution (HD andHL) in light of some classic evidence

Difference: Teacher forgot to tell Whippersnap about HD

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Intuitive Judgments of Epistemic Value

The Case: Whippersnap and Logicos

School project: Whippersnap and Logicos both successfullyevaluate Darwin and Lamark’s theories of evolution (HD andHL) in light of some classic evidence

Difference: Teacher forgot to tell Whippersnap about HD

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Intuitive Judgments of Epistemic Value

The Case: Whippersnap and Logicos

School project: Whippersnap and Logicos both successfullyevaluate Darwin and Lamark’s theories of evolution (HD andHL) in light of some classic evidence

Difference: Teacher forgot to tell Whippersnap about HD

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Analysis

Did Whippersnap do something more epistemically valuablethan Logicos?

Any difference comes down to the fact that Whippersnapgenerated HD

We ordinarily praise such acts as ‘inventive’, ‘imaginative’, or‘creative’

Whippersnap’s answer isn’t valuable for a non-epistemicreason (e.g. it’s not practically valuable to rediscover HD),but because she did something to help her replace her currentbeliefs with an epistemically preferable set of beliefs about thesame subject matter

Consideration receptivity (and by extension MWing) isepistemically valuable because it facilitates this kind ofcreative hypothesis generation

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Analysis

Did Whippersnap do something more epistemically valuablethan Logicos?

Any difference comes down to the fact that Whippersnapgenerated HD

We ordinarily praise such acts as ‘inventive’, ‘imaginative’, or‘creative’

Whippersnap’s answer isn’t valuable for a non-epistemicreason (e.g. it’s not practically valuable to rediscover HD),but because she did something to help her replace her currentbeliefs with an epistemically preferable set of beliefs about thesame subject matter

Consideration receptivity (and by extension MWing) isepistemically valuable because it facilitates this kind ofcreative hypothesis generation

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Analysis

Did Whippersnap do something more epistemically valuablethan Logicos?

Any difference comes down to the fact that Whippersnapgenerated HD

We ordinarily praise such acts as ‘inventive’, ‘imaginative’, or‘creative’

Whippersnap’s answer isn’t valuable for a non-epistemicreason (e.g. it’s not practically valuable to rediscover HD),but because she did something to help her replace her currentbeliefs with an epistemically preferable set of beliefs about thesame subject matter

Consideration receptivity (and by extension MWing) isepistemically valuable because it facilitates this kind ofcreative hypothesis generation

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Analysis

Did Whippersnap do something more epistemically valuablethan Logicos?

Any difference comes down to the fact that Whippersnapgenerated HD

We ordinarily praise such acts as ‘inventive’, ‘imaginative’, or‘creative’

Whippersnap’s answer isn’t valuable for a non-epistemicreason (e.g. it’s not practically valuable to rediscover HD),but because she did something to help her replace her currentbeliefs with an epistemically preferable set of beliefs about thesame subject matter

Consideration receptivity (and by extension MWing) isepistemically valuable because it facilitates this kind ofcreative hypothesis generation

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Analysis

Did Whippersnap do something more epistemically valuablethan Logicos?

Any difference comes down to the fact that Whippersnapgenerated HD

We ordinarily praise such acts as ‘inventive’, ‘imaginative’, or‘creative’

Whippersnap’s answer isn’t valuable for a non-epistemicreason (e.g. it’s not practically valuable to rediscover HD),but because she did something to help her replace her currentbeliefs with an epistemically preferable set of beliefs about thesame subject matter

Consideration receptivity (and by extension MWing) isepistemically valuable because it facilitates this kind ofcreative hypothesis generation

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Analysis

Did Whippersnap do something more epistemically valuablethan Logicos?

Any difference comes down to the fact that Whippersnapgenerated HD

We ordinarily praise such acts as ‘inventive’, ‘imaginative’, or‘creative’

Whippersnap’s answer isn’t valuable for a non-epistemicreason (e.g. it’s not practically valuable to rediscover HD),but because she did something to help her replace her currentbeliefs with an epistemically preferable set of beliefs about thesame subject matter

Consideration receptivity (and by extension MWing) isepistemically valuable because it facilitates this kind ofcreative hypothesis generation

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering

IntroductionMind-Wandering vs. Guided Reasoning

Premise 1: Consideration ReceptivityPremise 2: Epistemic Rationality

A Sketch of Epistemic ValueConsideration Receptivity’s Epistemic ValueWhippersnap Returns

Thanks

I thank Andrew Sepielli, Benj Hellie, Ronnie de Sousa, andBenjamin Wald for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I amalso indebted to John Vervaeke for teaching me his original andrigorous theory of insight problem solving. John sparked myinterest in this topic and continues to shape my thoughts about it.This research was supported by the Social Sciences and ResearchCouncil of Canada.

Zachary C. Irving Epistemic Rationality of Mind-Wandering